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meer +eomna-0>-HAHA AAb<« ee ss Aaper aaah apaee@n cyber.gov.au :::> mae peus. : AAA “>E>BHa> AA rs “>> aa . a PrPe@AAA «<<. adsd<00@ rare ons > 0011180480 1+>4>0< AAA /- C CO C Australian Cyber Security 7 Sd Centre Table of contents Executive summary 1 Introduction 2 Overview 2 Purpose 2 Identification 2 Target of Evaluation 4 Overview 4 Description of the TOE 4 TOE Functionality 4 TOE physical boundary 4 Architecture 5 Clarification of scope 6 Evaluated functionality 6 Non-TOE hardware/software/firmware 6 Non-evaluated functionality and services 6 Security 6 Usage 6 Evaluated configuration 6 Secure delivery 7 Installation of the TOE 7 Version verification 7 Documentation and guidance 8 Secure usage 8 @avre /- C CO C Australian Cyber Security 7 Sd Centre Evaluation 9 Overview 9 Evaluation procedures 9 Functional testing 9 Entropy testing 9 Penetration testing 9 Certification 10 Overview 10 Assurance 10 Certification result 10 Recommendations 10 Annex A - References and abbreviations 11 References 11 Abbreviations 11 @avre /- C CO C Australian Cyber Security 7 Sd Centre Executive summary This report describes the findings of the IT security evaluation of Junos OS 19.2R1 executing on the MX204 and EX9251 appliances against a Common Criteria approved Protection Profile. The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is Juniper Networks, Inc. Junos OS 19.2R1 executing on the MX204 and EX9251 appliances. Each appliance is a secure network device that protects itself largely by offering only a minimal logical interface to the network and attached nodes. Both the MX204 and EX9251 platforms are powered by the Junos OS software, Junos OS 19.2R1, which is a special purpose operating system that provides no general purpose computing capability. Junos OS provides both management and control functions as well as all IP routing. This report concludes that the TOE has complied with the Collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices (NDcPP), version 2.1, 24 September 2018 [4]. The evaluation was conducted in accordance with the Common Criteria and the requirements of the Australasian Information Security Evaluation Program. The evaluation was performed by Teron Labs and was completed on 9 September 2019. With regard to the secure operation of the TOE, the Australasian Certification Authority recommends that administrators: = ensure that the TOE is operated in the evaluated configuration and that assumptions concerning the TOE security environment are understood = configure and operate the TOE according to the vendor’s product administrator guidance = verify the hash of any downloaded software, as present on the Juniper website. Potential purchasers of the TOE should review the intended operational environment and ensure that they are comfortable that the stated security objectives for the operational environment can be suitably addressed. This report includes information about the underlying security policies and architecture of the TOE, and information regarding the conduct of the evaluation. It is the responsibility of the user to ensure that the TOE meets their requirements. For this reason, it is recommended that a prospective user of the TOE refer to the Security Target and read this Certification Report prior to deciding whether to purchase the product. Bae er sss Beet teehee ta ee we Se ee ee ee eee cyber.gov.au Fe eke Doreen rer 604 seas Denen DAAD /- C CO C Australian Cyber Security 7 Sd Centre Introduction Overview This chapter contains information about the purpose of this document and how to identify the Target of Evaluation (TOE). Purpose The purpose of this Certification Report is to: = report the certification of results of the IT security evaluation of the TOE against the requirements of the Common Criteria and NDcPP v2.1 [4] = provide a source of detailed security information about the TOE for any interested parties. This report should be read in conjunction with the TOE’s Security Target [8] which provides a full description of the security requirements and specifications that were used as the basis of the evaluation. Identification The TOE is Junos OS 19.2R1 for MX204 and EX9251. Description Version Evaluation scheme Australasian Information Security Evaluation Program TOE Juniper Junos OS 19.2R1 for MX204 and EX9251 Software version 19.2R1 Hardware platforms MX204 and EX9251 appliances Security Target Security Target Junos OS 19.2R1 for MX204 and EX9251, v1.0, dated September 9, 2019 Evaluation Technical Report Evaluation Technical Report v1.0, dated 09 September 2019 Document reference EFT-T002-ETR 1.0 Criteria Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2 Extended and Part 3 Conformant, April 2017, Version 3.1 Rev5 Methodology Common Methodology for Information Technology Security, April 2017 Version 3.1 Rev5 Conformance NDcPPv2.1, 24 September 2018 cyber.gov.au Donner need Dre rn Dornen DAAD © /- C CO C Australian Cyber Security 7 Sd Centre Developer Juniper Networks, Inc. 1133 Innovation Way, Sunnyvale California 94089 United States of America Evaluation facility Teron Labs, Level 7, 221 London Circuit, Canberra, ACT 2601, Australia cyber.gov.au Donner need Dre rn Denen DAAD © /- C CO C Australian Cyber Security 7 Sd Centre Target of Evaluation Overview This chapter contains information about the Target of Evaluation (TOE), including a description of functionality provided, its architectural components, the scope of evaluation, its security policies and its secure usage. Description of the TOE The TOE is Juniper Networks, Inc. Junos OS 19.2R1 for MX204 and EX9251. The Juniper Networks MX204 5G Universal Routing Platform is an Ethernet-optimized edge router with 400-Gbps capacity that provides both switching and carrier-class Ethernet routing. The MX204 routing appliance delivers an end- to-end infrastructure security solution for enterprises looking to move business-critical applications to public clouds. It is a complete routing system that delivers features, functionality, and secure services at scale in the 5G era, which shares common Junos firmware, features, and technology for compatibility across platforms. The Juniper Networks EX9251 Ethernet Switch is an Ethernet-optimized switch that provides carrier-class Ethernet switching, ideal for aggregating access switches such as Juniper EX2300, EX3400, EX4300 and EX4600 Ethernet switches (not included in this evaluation) deployed in campus wiring closes and in on-premises data centres. It is a fixed configuration switch with a built-in Routing Engine. It has a throughput of up to 400 gigabits per second (Gbps). The appliances are physically self-contained housing the software, firmware and hardware necessary to perform all switching functions. The appliances are fixed chassis configuration switches. TOE Functionality The TOE functionality that was evaluated is described in section 1.6.3 of the Security Target [8]. TOE physical boundary The TOE is the Junos OS 19.2R1 firmware running on the appliance chassis listed in the table below. The TOE is contained within the physical boundary of the specified appliance chassis. Chassis Model Routing Engine Processor Firmware (Operating System) MX204 RE-S-1600x8 Intel Xeon E5 Junos OS 19.2R1 EX9251 EX9251-RE Intel Xeon E5 Junos OS 19.2R1 | Deere nern AAO AO AH AO A>O> OH «> << ne Lettre: AO HE «AP HH>>O>A > n>o cyber.gov.au Dreier "Ad DoA>>A> «A>O ««OH> Q era er es "OO OH «> «AP ATon ss. ner er ED AAD OO AAP AO OH HA «PO AH A «EA GA A| /- C CO Australian Cyber Security N Sd Centre The physical TOE boundary of the MX204 and EX9251 appliances is the entire chassis on which the Junos OS firmware executes. This physical boundary is shown in the figure below. Management Platform Syslog Server À internal Interface ER] TOE Component } External Interface|_] IT Environment Component The TOE interfaces comprise the following: = network interfaces which pass traffic = management interface through which handle administrative actions. The firmware version reflects the detail reported for the components of the Junos OS when the ‘show version local’ command is executed on the appliance. Architecture Each instance of the TOE consists of the following major architectural components: = Routing Engine (RE) (Control Board) — the RE runs the Junos firmware and provides Layer 3 routing services and Layer 2 switching services. The RE also provides network management for all operations necessary for the configuration and operation of the TOE and controls the flow of information through the TOE, including support for appliance interface control and control plane functions such as chassis component, system management and user access to the appliance. = The Packet Forwarding Engine (PFE) — provides all operations necessary for transit packet forwarding: e The MX204 router has four rate-selectable ports that can be configured as 100-Gigabit Ethernet ports or 40- Gigabit Ethernet ports, or each port can be configured as four 10-Gigabit Ethernet ports (by using a breakout cable). The MX204 also has eight 10-Gigabit Ethernet ports. The four rate-selectable ports support QSFP28 and QSFP+ transceivers, whereas the eight 10-Gigabit Ethernet ports support SFP+ transceivers. ®e The EX9251 switch has eight 10-Gigabit Ethernet ports and four rate-selectable ports that can be configured as 100-Gigabit Ethernet ports or 40-Gigabit Ethernet ports (by using a breakout cable). The 10-Gigabit Ethernet ports support SFP+ transceivers and rate-selectable ports support QSFP28 and QSFP+ transceivers. = The Routing Engine and Packet Forwarding Engine perform their primary tasks independently while constantly communicating through a high-speed internal link. This arrangement provides streamlined forwarding and routing control and the capability to run internet-scale networks at high speeds. cybergovau | ee eee as ns... 444>r0401H<4e u HH>>O> *A4-eA--AE-AAEE «A ee oe eee ee ee) peared ardeommadre /- C CO C Australian Cyber Security 7 Sd Centre Clarification of scope The evaluation was conducted in accordance with the Common Criteria and associated methodologies. The scope of the evaluation was limited to those claims made in the Security Target [8]. Evaluated functionality All tests performed during the evaluation were taken from NDcPP v2.1 [4] and sufficiently demonstrate the security functionality of the TOE. Some of the tests were combined for ease of execution. Non-TOE hardware/software/firmware The TOE relies on the provision of the following items in the network environment: = Syslog server supporting SSHv2 connections to send audit logs = SSHv2 client for remote administration = serial connection client for local administration. Non-evaluated functionality and services Potential users of the TOE are advised that some functions and services have not been evaluated as part of the evaluation. Potential users of the TOE should carefully consider their requirements for using functions and services outside of the evaluated configuration. Australian Government users should refer to the Australian Government Information Security Manual [5] for policy relating to using an evaluated product in an unevaluated configuration. New Zealand Government users should consult the New Zealand Information Security Manual [6]. The following components are considered outside of the scope of the TOE: = use of telnet, since it violates the Trusted Path requirement set = use of File Transfer Protocol, since it violates the Trusted Path requirement set = use of Simple Network Management Protocol, since it violates the Trusted Path requirement set = use of Secure Sockets Layer, including management via J-Web, JUNOScript and JUNOScope, since it violates the Trusted Path requirement set = use of Command Line Interface account super-user and Linux root account. Security The TOE Security Policy is a set of rules that defines how information within the TOE is managed and protected. The Security Target [8] contains a summary of the functionality that are evaluated. Usage Evaluated configuration The evaluated configuration is based on the default installation of the TOE with additional configuration implemented as per guidance documentation Junos OS Common Criteria Configuration Guide for MX204 and EX9251 Series Devices, 13 June 2019 [7]. cyber.gov.au ee eee as pers. Vmware @avre en we sees ss /- C CO C Australian Cyber Security N Sd Centre Secure delivery There are several mechanisms provided in the delivery process to ensure that a customer receives a product that has not been tampered with. The customer should perform the following checks upon receipt of a device to verify the integrity of the platform. = Shipping label - Ensure that the shipping label correctly identifies the correct customer name and address as well as the device. = Outside packaging - Inspect the outside shipping box and tape. Ensure that the shipping tape has not been cut or otherwise compromised. Ensure that the box has not been cut or damaged to allow access to the device. = Inside packaging - Inspect the plastic bag and seal. Ensure that the bag is not cut or removed. Ensure that the seal remains intact. If the customer identifies a problem during the inspection, they should immediately contact the supplier providing the order number, tracking number and a description of the identified problem to the supplier. Additionally, there are several checks that can be performed to ensure that the customer has received a box sent by Juniper Networks and not a different company masquerading as Juniper Networks. The customer should perform the following checks upon receipt of a device to verify the authenticity of the device: = Verify that the device was ordered using a purchase order. Juniper Networks devices are never shipped without a purchase order. = When a device is shipped, a shipment notification is sent to the e-mail address provided by the customer when the order is taken. Verify that this e-mail notification was received and contains the following information: e purchase order number e Juniper Networks order number used to track the shipment e carrier tracking number used to track the shipment e — list of items shipped including serial numbers e address and contacts of both the supplier and the customer. = Verify that the shipment was initiated by Juniper Networks. To verify that a shipment was initiated by Juniper Networks, you should perform the following tasks: e Compare the carrier tracking number of the Juniper Networks order number listed in the Juniper Networks shipping notification with the tracking number on the package received. « Log on to the Juniper Networks online customer support portal at https://www.juniper.net/customers/csc/management to view the order status. e Compare the carrier tracking number or the Juniper Networks order number listed in the Juniper Networks shipment notification with the tracking number on the package received. Installation of the TOE The Configuration Guide [7] contains all relevant information for the secure configuration of the TOE. Version verification The verification of the TOE is largely automatic, including the verification using hashes. The TOE cannot load a modified image. Valid software images can be downloaded from https://www.juniper.net. In addition to the automated EEE 0. « eurer ern a cyber.gov.au Fe eke Doreen rer 604 seas Denen DAAD /- C CO C Australian Cyber Security 7 Sd Centre verification, the site includes individual hashes for each image. The administrator should verify the hash of the software before installing it into the hardware platform. Documentation and guidance It is important that the TOE is used in accordance with guidance documentation in order to ensure secure usage. The following documentation is available to the consumer when the TOE is purchased. All guidance material is available for download at https://www.juniper.net: = Junos® OS Common Criteria Configuration Guide for MX204 and EX9251 Series Devices, 13-06-2019 = Junos® OS CLI User Guide, 5 August 2019 = Junos® OS Installation and Upgrade Guide, 5 August 2019 = Junos® OS User Access and Authentication Feature Guide, 9 July 2019 All Common Criteria guidance material is available at https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org. The Australian Government Information Security Manual is available at https://www.cyber.gov.au/ism [5]. The New Zealand Information Security Manual is available at https://www.gcsb.govt.nz/ [6]. Secure usage The evaluation of the TOE took into account certain assumptions about its operational environment. These assumptions must hold in order to ensure the security objectives of the TOE are met: = The network device is assumed to be physically protected in its operational environment and not subject to physical attacks that compromise the security and/or interfere with the device’s physical interconnections and correct operation. This protection is assumed to be sufficient to protect the device and the data it contains. = The device is assumed to provide networking functionality as its core function and not provide functionality/services that could be deemed as general purpose computing. For example, the device should not provide a computing platform for general purpose applications (unrelated to networking functionality). = The administrator(s) for the network device are assumed to be trusted and to act in the best interest of security for the organisation. This includes being appropriately trained, following policy and adhering to guidance documentation. Administrators are trusted to ensure passwords/credentials have sufficient strength and entropy. The network device is not expected to be capable of defending against a malicious administrator that actively works to bypass or compromise the security of the device. = The network device firmware and software is assumed to be updated by an administrator on a regular basis in response to the release of product updates due to known security vulnerabilities. = The administrator’s credentials (private key) used to access the network device are protected by the platform on which they reside. = It is assumed that the TOE is connected to distinct networks in a manner that ensures that the TOE security policies will be enforced on all applicable network traffic flowing among the attached networks. Bae er sss Beet teehee ta ee we Se ee ee ee eee cyber.gov.au Fe eke Doreen rer 604 seas Denen DAAD /- C CO C Australian Cyber Security 7 Sd Centre Evaluation Overview This chapter contains information about the procedures used in conducting the evaluation, the testing conducted as part of the evaluation and the certification result. Evaluation procedures The criteria against which the Target of Evaluation (TOE) has been evaluated are contained in the NDcPP [4] and Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Version 3.1 Revision 5, Parts 2 and 3 (1, 2]. Testing methodology was drawn from Common Methodology for Information Technology Security, April 2017 Version 3.1 Revision 5 [3]. The evaluation was carried out in accordance with the operational procedures of the Australasian Information Security Evaluation Program [11]. In addition, the conditions outlined in the Arrangement on the Recognition of Common Criteria Certificates in the field of Information Technology Security were also upheld [10]. Functional testing All tests performed by the evaluators were taken from the NDcPP [4]. These tests are designed in such a way as to provide a full coverage of testing for all security functions claimed by the TOE. All Security Functional Requirements listed in the Security Target and the Protection Profiles were exercised during testing. Entropy testing The entropy design description, justification, operation and health tests are assessed and documented in a separate report [12]. Penetration testing Vulnerability assessments made against the NDcPP [4] are performed using a set of modified evaluation activities drawn from the Common Criteria Evaluation Methodology [5] to provide standardised vulnerability testing for TOE- types evaluated against this cPP. More details can be found in the NDcPP [4] and its supporting document. The developer performed a vulnerability analysis of the TOE in order to identify any obvious security vulnerability in the product, and if identified, to show that the security vulnerabilities were not exploitable in the intended environment of the TOE. This analysis included a search for possible security vulnerabilities in publicly-available information. The following factors have been taken into consideration during the penetration tests: = time taken to identify and exploit (elapsed time) = specialist technical expertise required (specialist expertise) = knowledge of the TOE design and operation (knowledge of the TOE) = window of opportunity = IT hardware/software or other equipment required for the exploitation. cyber.gov.au ee eee as pers. Vmware @avre en we sees ss /- C CO C Australian Cyber Security 7 Sd Centre Certification Overview This chapter contains information about the result of the certification, an overview of the assurance provided and recommendations made by the certifiers. Assurance This certification is focused on the evaluation of product compliance with Protection Profiles that covers the technology area of network devices. Organisations can have confidence that the scope of an evaluation against an ASD-approved Protection Profile covers the necessary security functionality expected of the evaluated product and known threats will have been addressed. The analysis is supported by testing as outlined in the assurance activities, and a vulnerability survey demonstrating resistance to penetration attackers with a basic attack potential. Compliance also provides assurance through evidence of secure delivery procedures. Certification is not a guarantee of freedom from security vulnerabilities. The effectiveness and integrity of cryptographic functions are also within the scope of product evaluations performed in line with the Protection Profile (PP). PPs provide assurance by providing a full Security Target, and an analysis of the Security Functional Requirements in that Security Target, guidance documentation, and a basic description of the architecture of the TOE. Certification result Teron Labs has determined that the TOE upholds the claims made in the Security Target [8] and has met the requirements of the NDcPP. After due consideration of the conduct of the evaluation as reported to the certifiers, and of the Evaluation Technical Report [9], the Australasian Certification Authority certifies the evaluation of the Juniper Junos OS 19.2R1 for MX204 and EX9251 appliances performed by the Australasian Information Security Evaluation Facility, Teron Labs. Recommendations Not all of the evaluated functionality present in the TOE may be suitable for Australian and New Zealand Government users. For further guidance, Australian Government users should refer to the Australian Government Information Security Manual [5] and New Zealand Government users should consult the New Zealand Information Security Manual [6]. In addition to ensuring that the assumptions concerning the operational environment are fulfilled, and the guidance document is followed, the Australasian Certification Authority also recommends that users and administrators: = ensure that the TOE is operated in the evaluated configuration and that assumptions concerning the TOE security environment are fulfilled = configure and operate the TOE according to the vendor’s product administrator guidance = maintain the underlying environment in a secure manner so that the integrity of the TOE Security Function is preserved = verify the hash of any downloaded software, as present on the https://www.juniper.net website. Bae er sss Beet teehee ta ee we Se ee ee ee eee cyber.gov.au Fe eke Doreen rer 604 seas Denen DAAD /- C CO C Australian Cyber Security 7 Sd Centre Annex À — References and abbreviations References 1. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2: Security functional components April 2017, Version 3.1 Revision 5 2. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 3: Security assurance components April 2017, Version 3.1 Revision 5 3. Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Evaluation Methodology, April 2017, Version 3.1 Revision 5 4. collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices (NDcPP), Version 2.1, 24 September 2018 5. Australian Government Information Security Manual: https://www.cyber.gov.au/ism 6. New Zealand Information Security Manual: https://www.nzism.gcsb.govt.nz/ism-document/ 7. Guidance documentation: Junos® OS Common Criteria Configuration Guide for MX204 and EX9251 Series Devices, 13 June 2019 Junos® OS CLI User Guide, 5 August 2019 Junos® OS Installation and Upgrade Guide, 5 August 2019 Junos® OS User Access and Authentication Feature Guide, 9 July 2019 8. Security Target Junos OS 19.2 R1 for MX204 and EX9251, v1.0, 9 September 2019 9. Evaluation Technical Report - Junos OS 19.2R1 for MX204 and EX9251, v1.0, 9 September 2019 10. ‚Arrangement on the Recognition of Common Criteria Certificates in the field of Information Technology Security, 2 July 2014 11. AISEP Policy Manual (APM): https://www.cyber.gov.au/publications/aisep-policy-manual 12. Seeding of the Kernel RBG in MX204 and EX9251 Appliances running Junos 19.2R1, Version 1.0, 1 July 2019 Abbreviations AISEP Australasian Information Security Evaluation Program ASD Australian Signals Directorate CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement NDcPP CCRA-approved collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices TOE Target of Evaluation cyber.gov.au Donner need Dre rn Dornen DAAD ©