Certification Report
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
BSI-DSZ-CC-0247-2005
for
IBM z/OS
Version 1, Release 6
from
IBM Corporation
- Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 228 9582-0, Fax +49 228 9582-455, Infoline +49 228 9582-111
BSI-DSZ-CC-0247-2005
IBM z/OS
Version 1, Release 6
from
IBM Corporation Common Criteria Arrangement
The IT product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an accredited and licensed/
approved evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Part 1
Version 0.6, Part 2 Version 1.0 extended by CEM supplementation “ALC_FLR – Flaw remediation”,
Version 1.1, February 2002 for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation,
Version 2.1 (ISO/IEC 15408:1999) and including final interpretations for compliance with Common
Criteria Version 2.2 and Common Methodology Part 2, Version 2.2.
Evaluation Results:
PP Conformance: Labeled Security Protection Profile (LSPP), Issue 1.b, 08.10.1999 and
Controlled Access Protection Profile (CAPP), Issue 1.d, 08.10.1999
Functionality: PP conformant plus product specific extensions
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance Package: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL3 augmented by ADV_SPM.1 (Informal TOE security policy model)
and ALC_FLR.1 (Basic flaw remediation)
This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated
configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification scheme
of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions of the evaluation
facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence adduced.
The notes mentioned on the reverse side are part of this certificate.
Bonn, March 09th
, 2005
SOGIS-MRA
The President of the Federal Office
for Information Security
Dr. Helmbrecht L.S.
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 228 9582-0 - Fax +49 228 9582-455 - Infoline +49 228 9582-111
The rating of the strength of functions does not include the cryptographic algorithms suitable for
encryption and decryption (see BSIG Section 4, Paragraph 3, Clause 2)
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information
Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty
of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
BSI-DSZ-CC-0247-2005 Certification Report
Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the
task of issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a
distributor, hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product
according to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised
security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the
BSI or by BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This
report contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the
detailed Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security
functionality of the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and
weaknesses) and instructions for the user.
1
Act setting up the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Errichtungsgesetz, BSIG) of
17 December 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2834
V
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0247-2005
Contents
Part A: Certification
Part B: Certification Results
Part C: Excerpts from the Criteria
VI
BSI-DSZ-CC-0247-2005 Certification Report
A Certification
1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down
in the following:
· BSIG2
· BSI Certification Ordinance3
· BSI Schedule of Costs4
· Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal
Ministry of the Interior)
· DIN EN 45011 standard
· BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
· Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 2.15
· Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM)
- Part 1, Version 0.6
- Part 2, Version 1.0
· BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS)
· CEM supplementation on “ALC_FLR – Flaw remediation”, Version 1.1,
February 2002
The use of Common Criteria Version 2.1, Common Methodology, part 2,
Version 1.0 and final interpretations as part of AIS 32 results in compliance of
the certification results with Common Criteria Version 2.2 and Common
Methodology Part 2, Version 2.2 as endorsed by the Common Criteria
recognition arrangement committees.
2
Act setting up the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Errichtungsgesetz, BSIG) of
17 December 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2834
3
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of a Certificate by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungsverordnung, BSIZertV) of 7 July 1992,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1230
4
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-
Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 29th October 1992, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1838
5
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 22nd September 2000 in the
Bundesanzeiger p. 19445
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0247-2005
2 Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries
a mutual recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are
based on ITSEC or CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
2.1 ITSEC/CC - Certificates
The SOGIS-Agreement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on
ITSEC became effective on 3 March 1998. This agreement was signed by the
national bodies of Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, The Netherlands,
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. This
agreement on the mutual recognition of IT security certificates was extended to
include certificates based on the CC for all evaluation levels (EAL 1 – EAL 7).
2.2 CC - Certificates
An arrangement (Common Criteria Arrangement) on the mutual recognition of
certificates based on the CC evaluation assurance levels up to and including
EAL 4 was signed in May 2000. It includes also the recognition of Protection
Profiles based on the CC. The arrangement was signed by the national bodies
of Australia, Canada, Finland France, Germany, Greece, Italy, The Netherlands,
New Zealand, Norway, Spain, United Kingdom and the United States. Israel
joined the arrangement in November 2000, Sweden in February 2002, Austria
in November 2002, Hungary and Turkey in September 2003, Japan in
November 2003, the Czech Republic in September 2004.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0247-2005 Certification Report
3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform
procedure, a uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product IBM z/OS Version 1, Release 6 has undergone the certification
procedure at BSI.
The evaluation of the product IBM z/OS Version 1, Release 6 was conducted by
atsec information security GmbH. The atsec information security GmbH is an
evaluation facility (ITSEF)6
recognised by BSI.
The developer and sponsor is:
IBM Corporation
2455 South Road
Poughkeepsie NY 12601 - USA
The certification is concluded with
· the comparability check and
· the production of this Certification Report.
This work was completed by the BSI on 09.03.2005.
The confirmed assurance package is only valid on the condition that
· all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in
the following report, are observed,
· the product is operated in the environment described, where specified in the
following report.
This Certification Report only applies to the version of the product indicated
here. The validity can be extended to new versions and releases of the product,
provided the sponsor applies for re-certification of the modified product, in
accordance with the procedural requirements, and the evaluation does not
reveal any security deficiencies.
For the meaning of the assurance levels and the confirmed strength of
functions, please refer to the excerpts from the criteria at the end of the
Certification Report.
6
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0247-2005
4 Publication
The following Certification Results contain pages B-1 to B-32.
The product IBM z/OS Version 1, Release 6 has been included in the BSI list of
the certified products, which is published regularly (see also Internet: http://
www.bsi.bund.de). Further information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline
0228/9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the vendor7
of
the product. The Certification Report can also be downloaded from the above-
mentioned website.
7
IBM Corporation
2455 South Road
Poughkeepsie NY 12601 - USA
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0247-2005 Certification Report
B Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
· the security target of the sponsor for the target of evaluation,
· the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
· complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0247-2005
Contents of the certification results
1 Executive Summary 3
2 Identification of the TOE 12
3 Security Policy 14
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope 15
5 Architectural Information 16
6 Documentation 19
7 IT Product Testing 20
8 Evaluated Configuration 22
9 Results of the Evaluation 24
10 Comments/Recommendations 26
11 Annexes 27
12 Security Target 28
13 Definitions 29
14 Bibliography 32
B-2
BSI-DSZ-CC-0247-2005 Certification Report
1 Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is IBM z/OS Version 1, Release 6.
z/OS is a general-purpose, multi-user, multi-tasking operating system for
enterprise computing systems running on IBM zSeries mainframe computers.
Multiple users can use z/OS simultaneously to perform a variety of functions
that require controlled, shared access to the information stored on the system.
The TOE includes software components only and provides LSPP and CAPP
compliant security functionality plus product specific extensions. Among these
functions are:
· Identification and Authentication
· Discretionary and Mandatory Access Control
· Secure Communication
· Audit
· Object re-use functionality
· Security Management
· TSF Protection
The TOE is one instance of z/OS running on an abstract machine as the sole
operating system and exercising full control over this abstract machine. This
abstract machine can be provided by
· an IBM zSeries Processor,
· a logical partition of an IBM zSeries Processor (certified version of PR/SM)
or
· z/VM (certified version) either running on a zSeries Processor or on a logical
partition of PR/SM
For details about the abstract machine please refer to chapter 1.6 of this report.
For more details concerning the software version defining the TOE, the abstract
machine the TOE runs on and the user guidance documentation delivered with
the TOE please refer to the remainder of this report.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFRs) used in the Security Target
are Common Criteria Part 2 extended as shown in the following table:
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0247-2005
Security
Functional
Requirement
Identifier
SFRs from CC Part 2, contained in LSPP/CAPP
FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation
FAU_GEN.2 User identity association
FAU_SAR.1 Audit review
FAU_SAR.2 Restricted audit review
FAU_SAR.3 Selectable audit review
FAU_SEL.1 Selective audit
FAU_STG.1 Guarantees of audit data availability
FAU_STG.3 Action in case of possible audit data loss
FAU_STG.4 Prevention of audit data loss
FDP_ACC.1 Discretionary access control policy
FDP_ACF.1 Discretionary access control functions
FDP_ETC.1 Export of unlabeled user data
FDP_ETC.2 Export of labeled user data
FDP_IFC.1 Mandatory access control policy
FDP_IFF.2 Mandatory access control functions
FDP_ITC.1 Import of unlabeled user data
FDP_ITC.2 Import of labeled user data
FDP_RIP.2 Object residual information protection
FIA_ATD.1 User attribute definition
FIA_SOS.1 Strength of authentication data
FIA_UAU.1 Authentication
FIA_UAU.7 Protected authentication feedback
FIA_UID.1 Identification
FIA_USB.1 User-subject binding
FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialization
FMT_MTD.1 Management
FMT_REV.1 Revocation of attributes
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0247-2005 Certification Report
Security
Functional
Requirement
Identifier
FMT_SMR.1 Security management roles
FPT_RVM.1 Reference mediation
FPT_SEP.1 Domain separation
FPT_STM.1 Reliable time stamps
SFRs not in CC Part 2 (Part 2 extended), contained in
LSPP/CAPP
„Note1“
as defined in LSPP/CAPP
Subject Residual Information Protection
SFRs from CC Part 2, not contained in LSPP/CAPP
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic Key Generation
FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic Key Distribution
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic Operation
FDP_UTC.1 Basic data exchange confidentiality
FDP_UIT.1 Data exchange integrity
FMT_MSA.2 Secure security attributes
FMT_SMF.18
Specification of Management Functions
FPT_TDC.1 Inter-TSF basic TSF data consistency
FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel
Note that some of the SFRs have been iterated in the Security Target. For
details on the iteration and the required security functionality please refer to [7],
chapter 5.1.
The IT product IBM z/OS Version 1, Release 6 (for details on the evaluated
configuration please refer to chapter 2) was evaluated by atsec information
security GmbH. The evaluation was completed on 07.03.2005. The atsec
information security GmbH is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)9
recognised by BSI.
The developer and sponsor is
IBM Corporation
2455 South Road
Poughkeepsie NY 12601 - USA
8
Added because of AIS32, Final Interpretation 065
9
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0247-2005
1.1 Assurance package
The TOE security assurance requirements are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C of this report,
or [1], part 3 for details).
The TOE meets the assurance requirements of assurance level EAL3+
(Evaluation Assurance Level 3 augmented).
The assurance level is augmented by: ADV_SPM.1 – Informal TOE security
policy model and ALC_FLR.1 – Basic flaw remediation. For the evaluation of
the CC component ALC_FLR.1 the mutually recognised CEM supplementation
“ALC_FLR – Flaw remediation”, Version 1.1, February 2002 ([5]) was used.
1.2 Functionality
The TOE security functions are:
Identification and authentication: The TOE provides identification and
authentication of users by the means of an alphanumeric user ID and a system-
encrypted password.
Discretionary access control: The TOE supports access controls that are
capable of enforcing access limitations on individual users and data objects.
Discretionary access control (DAC) allows individual users to specify how such
resources as direct access storage devices (DASDs), tape data sets, and tape
volumes that under their control are to be shared. DAC is provided by two
mechanisms. The z/OS standard DAC mechanism is used for most protected
objects, except for UNIX file system objects, which are protected by the z/OS
UNIX DAC mechanism.
Mandatory access control: In addition to DAC, the TOE provides mandatory
access control (MAC) in LSPP mode, which imposes access restrictions to
information based on security classification. Users and resources can have a
security label specified in their profile. Security labels contain a hierarchical
classification (security level), which specify the sensitivity (for example: public,
internal use, or secret), and zero or more non-hierarchical security categories
(for example: PROJECTA or PROJECTB). The access control enforced by the
TOE ensures that users can only read labelled information if their security labels
dominate the information’s label, and that they can only write to labelled
information containers if the container’s label dominates the subject’s, thus
implementing the Bell-LaPadula model of information flow control.
Audit: The TOE provides an auditing capability that allows generating audit
records for security-critical events. RACF (Resource Access Control Facility) as
part of the TOE provides a number of logging and reporting functions that allow
resource owners and auditors to identify users who attempt to access the
resource. Audit records are collected by the System Management Facilities
(SMF) into an audit trail, which is protected from unauthorized modification or
deletion by the DAC and (in LSPP mode) MAC mechanisms.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0247-2005 Certification Report
Object re-use: The TOE ensures the re-usability of protected objects and
storage before making it accessible to further use.
Security management: The TOE provides a set of commands and options to
adequately manage the TOE’s security functions. Several roles are recognized
that are able to perform the different management tasks related to the TOE’s
security.
Secure communication: z/OS provides means of secure communication
between systems sharing the same security policy. In LSPP mode,
communication within TOE parts coupled into a sysplex can be multilevel,
whereas other communication channels are assigned a single security label. In
CAPP mode, no labels are assigned and evaluated for any communication
channel. The confidentiality and integrity of network connections are assured by
Secure Sockets Layer / Transport Layer Security (SSLv3/TLSv1) or IPSec-
encrypted communication (with the Internet Key Exchange / IKE) for TCP/IP
connections.
TSF protection: TSF protection is based on several protection mechanisms
that are provided by the underlying abstract machine the TOE is executed upon.
Only a brief summary of the security functionality was provided here. For a
precise definition of the SF please refer to the Security Target of the TOE ([7],
chapter 6)
1.3 Strength of Function
The TOE’s strength of function is rated ‘SOF-medium’ for the authentication
function using passwords (refer to [7], chapter 6.2).
1.4 Summary of threats and Organisational Security Policies (OSPs)
addressed by the evaluated IT product
In compliance with LSPP and CAPP all security objectives are derived from
OSP. Therefore no threats have been defined in [7].
The TOE has to comply to the following Organisational Security Policies
(OSPs). Note that only a summary of the policies is provided here. For the
detailed and precise definition refer to [7], chapter 3.4:
P.AUTHORIZED_USERS
Only users who have been authorised to access information within the
system may access the system.
P.NEED_TO_KNOW
The system must limit the access to, modification of, and destruction of the
information in protected resources to those authorized users who have a
“need to know” for that information.
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P.ACCOUNTABILITY
The users of the system shall be held accountable for their actions within
the system.
P.CLASSIFICATION
The system must limit the access to information based on sensitivity and
formal clearance of users (LSPP mode only).
1.5 Special configuration requirements
The configuration requirements for the TOE are defined in chapter 2.3.1 and
subsequent chapters of the Security Target [7] and are summarised here
(please refer to the Security Target for the precise and more detailed
description):
· Installation and configuration of the TOE components as detailed in chapter
2 and 6 of this report is required.
· Software outside the TOE components boundary may be added if this
software cannot run (i) in supervisor mode, (ii) APF-authorised, (iii) with keys
0 through 7
· Replacement of any element in the ServerPac is not allowed
· The following elements or element components are not to be used:
- All Bulk Data Transfer (BDT) elements: BDT (FMID HBD6602), BDT
File-to-File (FMID JBD6201), and BDT Systems Network Architecture
(SNA) NJE (FMID JBD6202)
- Connection Manager (FMID HCMG110)
- The Distributed Computing Environment (DCE) component (FMID
HRSS190) of the Integrated Security Services element
- DCE Base Services (FMID HMB3190)
- The DFS™ Server Message Block (SMB) and DFS DCE-DFS (FMID
H0H2360) components of the Distributed File Service element
- The Enterprise Identity Mapping (FMID HIT7709) component of the
Integrated Security Services element
- Infoprint Server (FMIDs HMOS705, HNET708, and HOPI708)
- The Integrated Cryptographic Service Facility (ICSF, FMID
HCR770A) component of the Cryptographic Services element
- JES3 (FMID HJS7708)
- The Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) server component
(FMIDs HRSL360 and JRSL362) of the Integrated Security Services
element
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0247-2005 Certification Report
- Managed System Infrastructure for Operations (msys for Operations,
FMIDs HPZ8500 and HKYS300)
- The Multiple Virtual Storage / Advanced Program-to-Program
Communication (MVS/APPC) component of the BCP (FMID
HBB7709)
- The Network Authentication Service component (FMID HSWK360) of
the Integrated Security Services element
- Network File System (FMIDs HDZ11US (NFS Server) and HDZ11UC
(NFS Client))
- Process Manager (FMID HPMG110)
They have to be either deactivated or to be not configured for use.
· The PassTicket authentication mechanism has not been part of the
evaluation and cannot be used in the evaluated configuration.
· The RACF Remote Sharing Facility has not been part of the evaluation and
cannot be used in the evaluated configuration.
· The Data Facility Storage Management Subsystem (DFSMS) Object Access
Method for content management type applications cannot be used.
1.6 Assumptions about the operating environment
The following assumptions about the technical environment in which the TOE is
intended to be used are defined in the ST [7], chapter 2.3.2 and are
summarized here:
The TOE can be run either directly, or within a logical partition provided by a
certified version of PR/SM, on the z/Architecture as implemented by the
following hardware platforms:
· IBM zSeries model z800
· IBM zSeries model z890
· IBM zSeries model z900
· IBM zSeries model z990
In addition, the TOE may run on a virtual machine provided by a certified
version of z/VM.
For details on peripherals which can be used with the TOE, while still preserving
the security functionality please refer to [7], chapter 2.3.2.
The following constraints concerning the operating environment are made in the
Security Target. They are based on the assumptions defined in [7], chapter 3.2.
(Please refer to the Security Target for the precise and more detailed definition):
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0247-2005
Identifier Summary
A.LOCATE Location of TOE processing resources in facilities
with controlled access.
A.PROTECT Protection against physical modification (of TOE
hardware and software).
A.MANAGE Management of the TOE is done by competent
individuals.
A.NO_EVIL_ADMIN Administrative personnel are not careless, wilfully
negligent, or hostile.
A.COOP Authorised users possess the necessary
authorization to access at least some of the
information managed by the TOE and are
expected to act in a co-operating manner.
A.CLEARANCE
(LSPP mode only)
Procedures exist for granting users authorization
for access to specific security levels.
A.SENSITIVITY
(LSPP mode only)
Procedures exist for establishing the security
level of all information imported into the system,
for establishing the security level for all peripheral
devices (such as printers, tape drives, and disk
drives) attached to the TOE, and marking a
sensitivity label on all output generated.
A.PEER Any other system with which the TOE
communicates is assumed to be under the same
management control and operate under the same
security policy constraints.
A.CONNECT All connections (to peripherals and other
systems) not using the secured protocols TLS v1
SSL v3 or IPSec reside within the controlled
access facilities.
It is assumed that the client chooses SSL v3 or
TLS v1 and one of the strong cipher suites as
defined the ST, chapter 5.
The following constraints are based on Security Objectives which have to be
met by the TOE environment. Theses objectives are defined in [7], chapter 4.2.
(Please refer to the Security Target for the precise and more detailed definition):
Identifier Summary
OE.INSTALL The installation, management and operation of
the TOE has to be done in a secure manner.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0247-2005 Certification Report
Identifier Summary
OE.CREDEN User Authentication Data has to be treated
securely.
OE.HW_SEP The underlying abstract machine has to provide
separation mechanisms.
1.7 Disclaimers
The Certification Results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the
Certificate and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in
this Certification Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product
by the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation
that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT
product by BSI or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, is either expressed or implied.
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2 Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation is called: IBM z/OS Version 1, Release 6
The TOE is software only. The following product components represent the
TOE:
Software Components:
z/OS Version 1 Release 6, in the “Common Criteria Evaluated Base” version
consists of the following tape sets:
· z/OS V1R6 Common Criteria Evaluated Base (IBM program number 5694-
A01) with enabled features:
· CBPDO tape with additional service, including RACF APAR OA09052
· IBM Print Services Facility™ Version 3 for z/OS (PSF V3R4, program
number 5655-B17)
· Overlay Generation Language Version 1 (OGL V1R1, program number
5688-191).
Guidance Documents:
· Memo to Customers of z/OS V1.6 Common Criteria Configuration
· ServerPac: IYO (Installing Your Order), a custom-built installation manual
shipped in printed form.
· z/OS V1R6.0 Planning for Multilevel Security and the Common Criteria
(IBM Document number GA22-7509-02) shipped in printed form.
· ServerPac Using the Installation Dialog (Dialog Level 17) (IBM Document
number SA22-7815-09) provided on the set of documentation CD-ROMs
· z/OS V1R6.0 Information Roadmap (IBM Document number SA22-7500-
07), which contains references to other relevant documents provided on a
set of documentation CD-ROMs.
· Additional documents shipped on CD-ROM:
- z/OS V1R6 Program Directory
- z/OS V1.6 Collection
- PSF 3.4 CDROM Kit BOOK
- PSF 3.4 CDROM Kit PDF
- PSF V3R4 User's Guide
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- Overlay Generation Language/370: User's Guide and Reference
- OGL/370 V1R1.0: Getting Started
- OGL/370 V1R1.0: LPS
- OGL: Command Summary and Quick Reference
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3 Security Policy
The TOE implements several policies which are specified in the Security Target
by the TOE security functional requirements. Those policies are:
· An Identification & Authentication Policy that is defined by the SFRs
FIA_ATD.1, FIA_UID.1, FIA_UAU.1, FIA_UAU.7, FIA_USB.1, FIA_SOS.1,
FMT_MTD.1, FMT_REV.1, FMT_MTD.1
· Access Control Policies.
A Mandatory Access Control Policy defined by the SFRs FDP_IFC.1,
FDP_IFF.2, FDP_ETC.1, Note 1, FDP_ITC.1, FDP_ITC.2, FIA_ATD.1,
FIA_USB.1, FMT_MSA.1, FMT_REV.1, FPT_TDC.1 and
a Discretionary Access Control Policy that is defined by the SFRs
FDP_ACC.1, FDP_ACF.1, FDP_ACF.1, FIA_ATD.1, FIA_USB.1,
FMT_MSA.1, FMT_MSA.3, FMT_REV.1.
· An Audit Policy defined by the SFRs FAU_GEN.1.2, FAU_GEN.2,
FAU_SEL.1, FAU_SAR.1, FAU_SAR.2, FAU_SAR.3, FAU_STG.1,
FAU_STG.3,FAU_STG.4, FIA_USB.1, FMT_MTD.1, FMT_MTD.1,
FPT_STM.1
· A Trusted Channel Policy defined by the SFRs FDP_UCT.1, FDP_UIT.1,
FMT_MTD.1, FTP_ITC.1
In addition to the Security Target the Security Policy of the TOE has been
described in a separate Informal TOE security policy model as required by the
CC assurance component ADV_SPM.1.
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4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
4.1 Usage assumptions
Based on the personnel and procedural assumptions the following usage
conditions exist. Refer to [7], chapter 3.2.2 and 3.2.3 for more details:
· The TOE is managed by competent individuals (A.MANAGE).
· Administrative personnel are not careless, wilfully negligent, or hostile
(A.NO_EVIL_ADMIN).
· Users of the TOE are co-operative (A.COOP).
LSPP mode only:
· Procedures for granting users authorization for access to specific security
levels exist (A.CLEARANCE).
· Procedures for establishing the security level exist (A.SENSITIVITY)
4.2 Environmental assumptions
The following assumptions about physical and connectivity aspects defined by
the Security Target have to be met (refer to Security Target [7], chapter 3.2.1
and 3.2.4):
· The TOE is located in an access controlled facility (A.LOCATE).
· The TOE (Hardware used by the TOE and the TOE software itself) is
protected against physical modification (A.PROTECT).
· Any other system with which the TOE communicates is assumed to be
under the same management control and operate under the same security
policy constraints. (A.PEER)
· All connections (to peripheral devices and other systems) not using TLSv1,
SSLv3 or IPSec reside within the controlled access facilities (A.CONNECT).
Please consider also the requirements for the evaluated configuration specified
in chapter 2 and 8 of this report.
4.3 Clarification of scope
No threats to be averted by the TOE environment have been defined in the
Security Target [7].
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5 Architectural Information
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the z/OS operating system with the software
components as described in chapter 2 and 8 of this report. z/OS is a general-
purpose, multi-user, multi-tasking operating system for enterprise computing
systems. Multiple users can use z/OS simultaneously to perform a variety of
functions that require controlled, shared access to the information stored on the
system.
The TOE is seen as one instance of z/OS running on an abstract machine as
the sole operating system and exercising full control over this abstract machine.
This abstract machine can be provided by one of the following:
· an IBM zSeries processor (z800, z890, z900, or z990)
· a logical partition of an IBM zSeries processor (certified version of PR/SM)
· certified version of z/VM on a zSeries processor or on a logical partition of
PR/SM
The abstract machine itself is not part of the TOE, rather, it belongs to the TOE
environment.
Multiple instances of the TOE may be connected in a basic sysplex or in a
parallel sysplex with the instances sharing their RACF database.
The individual TOEs can be run alone or within a network as a set of co-
operating hosts, operating under and implementing the same set of security
policies.
Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP) network services,
connections, and communication that occur outside of a sysplex are restricted
to one security label; that is, each system regards its peers as single-label
hosts. Other network communication is disallowed, with the exception of the Job
Entry System 2 (JES2) Network Job Entry (NJE) protocol.
Most of the TOE security functions (TSF) are provided by the z/OS operating
system Base Control Program (BCP) and the Resource Access Control Facility
(RACF), a z/OS component that is used by different services as the central
instance for identification and authentication and for access control decisions.
z/OS comes with management functions that allow configuring the TOE security
functions to tailor them to the customer’s needs.
Some elements have been included in the TOE that do not provide security
functions. These elements run in authorized mode, so they could compromise
the TOE if they do not behave properly. Because these elements are essential
for the operation of many customer environments, the inclusion of these
elements subjects them to the process of scrutiny during the evaluation and
ensures that they may be used by customers without affecting the TOE’s
security status.
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In its evaluated configuration, the TOE allows two modes of operation: LSPP-
compliant and CAPP-compliant. In both modes, the same software elements
are used. The two modes have different RACF settings with respect to the use
of security labels. All other configuration parameters are identical in the two
modes.
Intended Method of Use:
z/OS provides a general computing environment that allows users to gain
controlled access to its resources in different ways:
· online interaction with users through Time Sharing Option Extensions
(TSO/E) or z/OS UNIX System Services
· batch processing (JES2)
· services provided by started procedures or tasks
· daemons and servers of the z/OS UNIX System Services that provide
similar functions as started procedures or tasks based on UNIX interfaces
These services can be accessed by users local to, or with otherwise protected
access to, the computer systems.
All users of the TOE are assigned a unique user identifier (user ID). This user
ID, which is used as the basis for access control decisions and for
accountability, associates the user with a set of security attributes. The TOE
authenticates the claimed identity of a user before allowing this user to perform
any further security-relevant actions.
All TOE resources are under the control of the TOE. The TOE mediates the
access of subjects to TOE-protected objects. Subjects in the TOE are called
tasks. Tasks are the active entities that can act on the user’s behalf. Data is
stored in named objects. The TOE can associate a set of security attributes with
each named resource, which include the description of the access rights to that
object and (in LSPP mode) a security label.
Objects are owned by users, who are assumed to be capable of assigning
discretionary access rights to their objects in accordance with the organizational
security policies. Ownership of named objects can be transferred under the
control of the access control policy. In LSPP mode, security labels are assigned
by the TOE, either automatically upon creation of the object or by the trusted
system administrator. The security attributes of users, data objects, and objects
through which the information is passed are used to determine if information
may flow through the system as requested by a user.
Apart from normal users, z/OS recognizes administrative users with special
authorizations. These users are trusted to perform system administration and
maintenance tasks, which includes configuration of the security policy enforced
by the z/OS system and attributes related to it. Authorizations can be delegated
to other administrative users by updating their security attributes. The TOE also
recognizes the role of an auditor, who uses the auditing system provided by
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z/OS to monitor the system usage according to the organizational security
policies.
The TOE is intended to operate in a networked environment with other
instantiations of the TOE as well as other well-behaved client systems operating
within the same management domain. All of those systems need to be
configured in accordance with a defined common security policy.
The primary security features of the product are:
· Identification and Authentication
· Discretionary Access Control
· in LSPP mode: Mandatory Access Control and support for security labels
· Auditing
· Object Re-use
· Security Management
· Secure Communication
· TSF protection
These primary security features are supported by domain separation and
reference mediation, which ensure that the features are always invoked and
cannot be bypassed.
A detailed description of the security functions can be found in the Security
Target [7], chapter 6.2 to 6.8.
The subsystems considered in the high-level design of the TOE are the
following:
· z/Architecture
· Base Control Program (BCP)
· System Management Facilities (SMF)
· Security Server (RACF)
· Systems Operations
· Communications Server (IP)
· DFSMS – System Managed Storage
· JES2
· TSO/E
· z/OS UNIX System Services
· Print Services Facility – Print Labeling Function
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6 Documentation
The following documentation is provided with the product by the developer to
the customer:
· Memo to Customers of z/OS V1.6 Common Criteria Configuration
· ServerPac: IYO (Installing Your Order), a custom-built installation manual
shipped in printed form.
· z/OS V1R6.0 Planning for Multilevel Security and the Common Criteria
(IBM Document number GA22-7509-02) shipped in printed form.
· ServerPac Using the Installation Dialog (Dialog Level 17) (IBM Document
number SA22-7815-09) provided on the set of documentation CD-ROMs
· z/OS V1R6.0 Information Roadmap (IBM Document number SA22-7500-
07), which contains references to other relevant documents provided on a
set of documentation CD-ROMs.
· Additional documents shipped on CD-ROM:
- z/OS V1R6 Program Directory
- z/OS V1.6 Collection
- PSF 3.4 CDROM Kit BOOK
- PSF 3.4 CDROM Kit PDF
- PSF V3R4 User's Guide
- Overlay Generation Language/370: User's Guide and Reference
- OGL/370 V1R1.0: Getting Started
- OGL/370 V1R1.0: LPS
- OGL: Command Summary and Quick Reference
To get to the evaluated configuration of z/OS a user should start with the
guidance documents "Memo to Customers of z/OS V1.6 Common Criteria
Configuration" and "z/OS V1R6.0 Planning for Multilevel Security and the
Common Criteria (IBM Document number GA22-7509-02)".
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7 IT Product Testing
Test configuration
The Security Target requires the software packages comprising the TOE to be
run on an abstract machine implementing the z/Architecture machine interface
as defined in the "z/Architecture Principles of Operation". The hardware
platforms implementing this abstract machine are:
· IBM zSeries model z800
· IBM zSeries model z890
· IBM zSeries model z900
· IBM zSeries model z990
The TOE may be running on those machines either directly or within a logical
partition provided by a certified version of PR/SM. In addition, the TOE may run
on a virtual machine provided by a certified version of z/VM.
IBM has tested the platforms (hardware and combinations of hardware with
PR/SM and/or z/VM) for z/OS individually for their compliance to the
z/Architecture using the Systems Assurance Kernel (SAK) suite of tests. These
tests ensure that every platform provides the abstract machine interface that
z/OS requires.
Due to the massive amount of tests, testing was performed throughout the
development of the TOE. To ensure proper testing of all security relevant
behaviour of the TOE, the evaluators verified that all tests that might have been
affected by any security-relevant change introduced late in the development
cycle had been run on the evaluated configuration. This was also proven by re-
running all independent evaluator tests in the final environment.
Depth/Coverage of Testing
The developer has done substantial functional testing of all externally visible
interfaces (TSFI). Internal interfaces of the High-level design have been
covered by direct and indirect testing. The evaluators repeated a subset of the
developer tests and conducted additional independent tests and penetration
tests.
Summary of Developer Testing Effort
Test configuration:
The sponsor/developer has performed the tests on the platforms defined above.
The software was installed and configured as required in the guidance
documents (refer to chapter 6).
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Testing approach:
The sponsor/developer conducts extensive testing for every release of z/OS.
Functional Verification Testing (FVT) and System Verification Testing (SVT) are
performed by independent test teams with testers being independent from
developers. A special collection of tests was compiled to explicitly deal with the
security functionality as claimed in the Security Target.
Testing results:
All actual test results were consistent with the expected test results.
Summary of Evaluator Testing Effort
Test configuration:
The evaluator used the same abstract machines as the developer. The
configuration of the TOE was conformant to the Security Target requirements
and have been set up according to the guidance documents.
Testing approach:
The evaluation facility decided to re-run a subset of the developer tests covering
all security functions without striving for exhaustive testing. In addition evaluator
tests were defined and executed by the evaluation facility.
Testing results:
All actual test results were consistent with the expected test results.
Evaluator penetration testing:
The evaluators have devised a set of penetration tests based on
· common sources for vulnerabilities of operating systems,
· findings of their evaluation work.
The penetration testing addressed the following security functions:
· Secure Communication
· TSF Protection
with emphasis on the TSF Protection.
The penetration testing showed no obvious vulnerabilities which are exploitable
in the intended operating environment.
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8 Evaluated Configuration
The Target of Evaluation IBM z/OS Version 1, Release 6. The TOE is software
only. The following product components represent the TOE:
Software Components:
z/OS Version 1 Release 6, in the “Common Criteria Evaluated Base” version
consists of the following tape sets:
· z/OS V1R6 Common Criteria Evaluated Base (IBM program number 5694-
A01) with enabled features:
· CBPDO tape with additional service, including RACF APAR OA09052
· IBM Print Services Facility™ Version 3 for z/OS (PSF V3R4, program
number 5655-B17)
· Overlay Generation Language Version 1 (OGL V1R1, program number
5688-191).
Guidance Documents:
· Memo to Customers of z/OS V1.6 Common Criteria Configuration
· ServerPac: IYO (Installing Your Order), a custom-built installation manual
shipped in printed form.
· z/OS V1R6.0 Planning for Multilevel Security and the Common Criteria
(IBM Document number GA22-7509-02) shipped in printed form.
· ServerPac Using the Installation Dialog (Dialog Level 17) (IBM Document
number SA22-7815-09) provided on the set of documentation CD-ROMs
· z/OS V1R6.0 Information Roadmap (IBM Document number SA22-7500-
07), which contains references to other relevant documents provided on a
set of documentation CD-ROMs.
· Additional documents shipped on CD-ROM:
- z/OS V1R6 Program Directory
- z/OS V1.6 Collection
- PSF 3.4 CDROM Kit BOOK
- PSF 3.4 CDROM Kit PDF
- PSF V3R4 User's Guide
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- Overlay Generation Language/370: User's Guide and Reference
- OGL/370 V1R1.0: Getting Started
- OGL/370 V1R1.0: LPS
- OGL: Command Summary and Quick Reference
The software elements are shipped on installation tapes (3480 compressed
tapes). All guidance documents are either printed or on CD-ROMs packaged
and shipped with the installation tapes.
The configuration requirements for the TOE are defined in chapter 2.3.1 of the
Security Target [7]. A summary can also be found in chapter 1.5 of this report.
Constraints on the abstract machine the TOE can be run on are given in the
Security Target [7], chapter 2.3.2. Chapter 1.6 of this report provides a
summary of the operating platform.
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9 Results of the Evaluation
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [8] was provided by the ITSEF
according to the Common Criteria [1], the Common Evaluation Methodology [2],
the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all interpretations and guidelines of the
Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE (this includes especially the
methodology for flaw remediation, [5]).
The verdicts for the CC, Part 3 assurance components (according to EAL3
augmented by ADV_SPM.1 and ALC_FLR.1 as well as the Security Target
evaluation) are summarised in the following table:
Assurance Classes and Components Verdict
Security Target CC Class ASE PASS
TOE description ASE_DES.1 PASS
Security environment ASE_ENV.1 PASS
ST introduction ASE_INT.1 PASS
Security objectives ASE_OBJ.1 PASS
PP claims ASE_PPC.1 PASS
IT security requirements ASE_REQ.1 PASS
Explicitly stated IT security requirements ASE_SRE.1 PASS
TOE summary specification ASE_TSS.1 PASS
Configuration management CC Class ACM PASS
Authorisation controls ACM_CAP.3 PASS
TOE CM coverage ACM_SCP.1 PASS
Delivery and Operation CC Class ADO PASS
Delivery Procedures ADO_DEL.1 PASS
Installation, generation, and start-up procedures ADO_IGS.1 PASS
Development CC class ADV PASS
Informal functional specification ADV_FSP.1 PASS
Security enforcing high-level design ADV_HLD.2 PASS
Informal TOE security policy model ADV_SPM.1 PASS
Informal correspondence demonstration ADV_RCR.1 PASS
Guidance documents CC Class AGD PASS
Administrator guidance AGD_ADM.1 PASS
User guidance AGD_USR.1 PASS
Life cycle support CC Class ALC PASS
Identification of security measures ALC_DVS.1 PASS
Basic flaw remediation ALC_FLR.1 PASS
Tests CC Class ATE PASS
Analysis of coverage ATE_COV.2 PASS
Testing: high-level design ATE_DPT.1 PASS
Functional testing ATE_FUN.1 PASS
Independent testing - sample ATE_IND.2 PASS
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Assurance Classes and Components Verdict
Vulnerability assessment CC Class AVA PASS
Examination of guidance AVA_MSU.1 PASS
Strength of TOE security function evaluation AVA_SOF.1 PASS
Developer vulnerability analysis AVA_VLA.1 PASS
The evaluation has shown that the TOE fulfils the claimed strength of function
for the authentication function using passwords.
The TOE has no obvious vulnerabilities which are exploitable in the intended
operating environment.
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the product IBM z/OS
Version 1, Release 6 in the configuration as defined in the Security Target and
summarised in this report (refer to the Security Target [7] and the chapters 2, 4,
and 8 of this report). The validity can be extended to new versions and releases
of the product, provided the sponsor applies for re-certification of the modified
product, and if the evaluation of the modified product does not reveal any
security deficiencies.
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10 Comments/Recommendations
None.
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11 Annexes
None.
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12 Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [7] of the target of evaluation
(TOE) is provided within a separate document.
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13 Definitions
13.1 Acronyms
BDT Bulk Data Transfer
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal
Office for Information Security
CAPP Controlled Access Protection Profile
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
DCE Distributed Computing Environment
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
LSPP Labeled Security Protection Profile
IKE Internet Key Exchange
IPSec Secure Internet Protocol
IT Information Technology
JES Job Entry Subsystem
LDAP Lightweight Directory Access Protocol
PP Protection Profile
RACF Resource Access Control Facility
SF Security Function
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
SMB Server Message Block
SOF Strength of Function
SSL Secure Socket Layer
ST Security Target
TCP/IP Transmission Control Protocol / Internet Protocol
TLS Transport Layer Security
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSC TSF Scope of Control
TSF TOE Security Functions
TSP TOE Security Policy
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13.2 Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more assurance component(s) from CC
Part 3 to an EAL or assurance package.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not
contained in part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in part 3 of the
CC.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics
based on well-established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - An entity within the TSC that contains or receives information and
upon which subjects perform operations.
Protection Profile - An implementation-independent set of security require-
ments for a category of TOEs that meet specific consumer needs.
Security Function - A part or parts of the TOE that have to be relied upon for
enforcing a closely related subset of the rules from the TSP.
Security Target - A set of security requirements and specifications to be used
as the basis for evaluation of an identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined
semantics.
Strength of Function - A qualification of a TOE security function expressing
the minimum efforts assumed necessary to defeat its expected security
behaviour by directly attacking its underlying security mechanisms.
SOF-basic - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that
the function provides adequate protection against casual breach of TOE
security by attackers possessing a low attack potential.
SOF-medium - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows
that the function provides adequate protection against straightforward or
intentional breach of TOE security by attackers possessing a moderate attack
potential.
SOF-high - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that
the function provides adequate protection against deliberately planned or
organised breach of TOE security by attackers possessing a high attack
potential.
Subject - An entity within the TSC that causes operations to be performed.
Target of Evaluation - An IT product or system and its associated
administrator and user guidance documentation that is the subject of an
evaluation.
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TOE Security Functions - A set consisting of all hardware, software, and
firmware of the TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the
TSP.
TOE Security Policy - A set of rules that regulate how assets are managed,
protected and distributed within a TOE.
TSF Scope of Control - The set of interactions that can occur with or within a
TOE and are subject to the rules of the TSP.
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14 Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 2.1, August 1999
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
(CEM), Part 1, Version 0.6; Part 2: Evaluation Methodology, Version 1.0,
August 1999
[3] BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
[4] Applicaton Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for
the TOE.
[5] Applicaton Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme AIS33, Version 2 –
“Methodologie zur Fehlerbehebung – Flaw Remediation”, 26.07.2002
[6] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148, BSI 7149), periodically
updated list published also on the BSI Web-site
[7] Security Target BSI-DSZ-0247-2005, Version 1.15, February 2005,
Security Target for IBM z/OS Version 1 Release 6, IBM Corporation
[8] Evaluation Technical Report, Version 2.0, 04.03.2005, Evaluation
Technical Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0247 (confidential document)
[9] Labeled Security Protection Profile (LSPP), Version 1.b National Security
Agency, 1999-10-08
[10] Controlled Access Protection Profile (CAPP), Version 1.d National
Security Agency, 1999-10-08
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C Excerpts from the Criteria
CC Part 1:
Caveats on evaluation results (chapter 5.4) / Final Interpretation 008
The conformance result indicates the source of the collection of requirements that is
met by a TOE or PP that passes its evaluation. This conformance result is presented
with respect to Part 2 (functional requirements), Part 3 (assurance requirements) and, if
applicable, to a pre-defined set of requirements (e.g., EAL, Protection Profile).
The conformance result consists of one of the following:
Part 2 conformant - A PP or TOE is Part 2 conformant if the functional requirements
are based only upon functional components in Part 2
Part 2 extended - A PP or TOE is Part 2 extended if the functional requirements
include functional components not in Part 2
plus one of the following:
Part 3 conformant - A PP or TOE is Part 3 conformant if the assurance requirements
are based only upon assurance components in Part 3
Part 3 extended - A PP or TOE is Part 3 extended if the assurance requirements
include assurance requirements not in Part 3.
Additionally, the conformance result may include a statement made with respect to sets
of defined requirements, in which case it consists of one of the following:
Package name Conformant - A PP or TOE is conformant to a pre-defined named
functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the requirements (functions or
assurance) include all components in the packages listed as part of the conformance
result.
Package name Augmented - A PP or TOE is an augmentation of a pre-defined
named functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the requirements (functions
or assurance) are a proper superset of all components in the packages listed as part of
the conformance result.
Finally, the conformance result may also include a statement made with respect to
Protection Profiles, in which case it includes the following:
PP Conformant - A TOE meets specific PP(s), which are listed as part of the
conformance result.
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CC Part 3:
Assurance categorisation (chapter 2.5)
„The assurance classes, families, and the abbreviation for each family are shown in
Table 2.1.
Assurance Class Assurance Family Abbreviated Name
Class ACM:
Configuration
management
CM automation ACM_AUT
CM capabilities ACM_CAP
CM scope ACM_SCP
Class ADO: Delivery
and operation
Delivery ADO_DEL
Installation, generation and start-up ADO_IGS
Class ADV:
Development
Functional specification ADV_FSP
High-level design ADV_HLD
Implementation representation ADV_IMP
TSF internals ADV_INT
Low-level design ADV_LLD
Representation correspondence ADV_RCR
Security policy modeling ADV_SPM
Class AGD: Guidance
documents
Administrator guidance AGD_ADM
User guidance AGD_USR
Class ALC: Life cycle
support
Development security ALC_DVS
Flaw remediation ALC_FLR
Life cycle definition ALC_LCD
Tools and techniques ALC_TAT
Class ATE: Tests Coverage ATE_COV
Depth ATE_DPT
Functional tests ATE_FUN
Independent testing ATE_IND
Class AVA:
Vulnerability
assessment
Covert channel analysis AVA_CCA
Misuse AVA_MSU
Strength of TOE security functions AVA_SOF
Vulnerability analysis AVA_VLA
Table 2.1 -Assurance family breakdown and mapping“
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Evaluation assurance levels (chapter 6)
„The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that balances
the level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of acquiring that degree of
assurance. The CC approach identifies the separate concepts of assurance in a TOE
at the end of the evaluation, and of maintenance of that assurance during the
operational use of the TOE.
It is important to note that not all families and components from Part 3 are included in
the EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful and desirable
assurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and components will be
considered for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and STs for which they provide
utility.
Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview (chapter 6.1)
Table 6.1 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a hierarchically
ordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families. Each number in the
resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component where applicable.
As outlined in the next section, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation assurance
levels are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE's assurance. They are hierarchically
ordered inasmuch as each EAL represents more assurance than all lower EALs. The
increase in assurance from EAL to EAL is accomplished by substitution of a
hierarchically higher assurance component from the same assurance family (i.e.
increasing rigour, scope, and/or depth) and from the addition of assurance components
from other assurance families (i.e. adding new requirements).
These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as
described in chapter 2 of this Part 3. More precisely, each EAL includes no more than
one component of each assurance family and all assurance dependencies of every
component are addressed.
While the EALs are defined in the CC, it is possible to represent other combinations of
assurance. Specifically, the notion of “augmentation“ allows the addition of assurance
components (from assurance families not already included in the EAL) or the
substitution of assurance components (with another hierarchically higher assurance
component in the same assurance family) to an EAL. Of the assurance constructs
defined in the CC, only EALs may be augmented. The notion of an “EAL minus a
constituent assurance component“ is not recognised by the CC as a valid claim.
Augmentation carries with it the obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility
and added value of the added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also be
extended with explicitly stated assurance requirements.
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Assurance
Class
Assurance
Family
Assurance Components by
Evaluation Assurance Level
EAL1 EAL2 EAL3 EAL4 EAL5 EAL6 EAL7
Configuration
management
ACM_AUT 1 1 2 2
ACM_CAP 1 2 3 4 4 5 5
ACM_SCP 1 2 3 3 3
Delivery and
operation
ADO_DEL 1 1 2 2 2 3
ADO_IGS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Development ADV_FSP 1 1 1 2 3 3 4
ADV_HLD 1 2 2 3 4 5
ADV_IMP 1 2 3 3
ADV_INT 1 2 3
ADV_LLD 1 1 2 2
ADV_RCR 1 1 1 1 2 2 3
ADV_SPM 1 3 3 3
Guidance
documents
AGD_ADM 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
AGD_USR 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Life cycle
support
ALC_DVS 1 1 1 2 2
ALC_FLR
ALC_LCD 1 2 2 3
ALC_TAT 1 2 3 3
Tests ATE_COV 1 2 2 2 3 3
ATE_DPT 1 1 2 2 3
ATE_FUN 1 1 1 1 2 2
ATE_IND 1 2 2 2 2 2 3
Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_CCA 1 2 2
AVA_MSU 1 2 2 3 3
AVA_SOF 1 1 1 1 1 1
AVA_VLA 1 1 2 3 4 4
Table 6.1 - Evaluation assurance level summary“
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Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL1) - functionally tested (chapter 6.2.1)
„Objectives
EAL1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but the
threats to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where independent
assurance is required to support the contention that due care has been exercised with
respect to the protection of personal or similar information.
EAL1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer, including
independent testing against a specification, and an examination of the guidance
documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL1 evaluation could be successfully
conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE, and for minimal outlay.
An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a manner
consistent with its documentation, and that it provides useful protection against
identified threats.“
Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL2) - structurally tested (chapter 6.2.2)
„Objectives
EAL2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of design
information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the part of the
developer than is consistent with good commercial practice. As such it should not
require a substantially increased investment of cost or time.
EAL2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require
a low to moderate level of independently assured security in the absence of ready
availability of the complete development record. Such a situation may arise when
securing legacy systems, or where access to the developer may be limited.“
Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL3) - methodically tested and checked
(chapter 6.2.3)
„Objectives
EAL3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from positive
security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of existing sound
development practices.
EAL3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
moderate level of independently assured security, and require a thorough investigation
of the TOE and its development without substantial re-engineering.“
Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL4) - methodically designed, tested, and
reviewed (chapter 6.2.4)
„Objectives
EAL4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security
engineering based on good commercial development practices which, though rigorous,
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do not require substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other resources. EAL4 is the
highest level at which it is likely to be economically feasible to retrofit to an existing
product line.
EAL4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require
a moderate to high level of independently assured security in conventional commodity
TOEs and are prepared to incur additional security-specific engineering costs.“
Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL5) - semiformally designed and tested
(chapter 6.2.5)
„Objectives
EAL5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security engineering
based upon rigorous commercial development practices supported by moderate
application of specialist security engineering techniques. Such a TOE will probably be
designed and developed with the intent of achieving EAL5 assurance. It is likely that
the additional costs attributable to the EAL5 requirements, relative to rigorous
development without the application of specialised techniques, will not be large.
EAL5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require
a high level of independently assured security in a planned development and require a
rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable costs attributable to
specialist security engineering techniques.“
Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL6) - semiformally verified design and
tested (chapter 6.2.6)
„Objectives
EAL6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security
engineering techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to produce a
premium TOE for protecting high value assets against significant risks.
EAL6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in
high risk situations where the value of the protected assets justifies the additional
costs.“
Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL7) - formally verified design and tested
(chapter 6.2.7)
„Objectives
EAL7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in extremely
high risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies the higher costs.
Practical application of EAL7 is currently limited to TOEs with tightly focused security
functionality that is amenable to extensive formal analysis.“
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Strength of TOE security functions (AVA_SOF) (chapter 14.3)
AVA_SOF Strength of TOE security functions
„Objectives
Even if a TOE security function cannot be bypassed, deactivated, or corrupted, it may
still be possible to defeat it because there is a vulnerability in the concept of its
underlying security mechanisms. For those functions a qualification of their security
behaviour can be made using the results of a quantitative or statistical analysis of the
security behaviour of these mechanisms and the effort required to overcome them. The
qualification is made in the form of a strength of TOE security function claim.“
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VLA) (chapter 14.4)
AVA_VLA Vulnerability analysis
„Objectives
Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether vulnerabilities identified,
during the evaluation of the construction and anticipated operation of the TOE or by
other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses), could allow users to violate the TSP.
Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that a user will be able to discover flaws
that will allow unauthorised access to resources (e.g. data), allow the ability to interfere
with or alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorised capabilities of other users.“
„Application notes
A vulnerability analysis is performed by the developer in order to ascertain the
presence of security vulnerabilities, and should consider at least the contents of all the
TOE deliverables including the ST for the targeted evaluation assurance level. The
developer is required to document the disposition of identified vulnerabilities to allow
the evaluator to make use of that information if it is found useful as a support for the
evaluator's independent vulnerability analysis.“
„Independent vulnerability analysis goes beyond the vulnerabilities identified by the
developer. The main intent of the evaluator analysis is to determine that the TOE is
resistant to penetration attacks performed by an attacker possessing a low (for
AVA_VLA.2), moderate (for AVA_VLA.3) or high (for AVA_VLA.4) attack potential.“
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