Certification Report
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
BSI-DSZ-CC-0245-2005
for
SM4128 (V3) A5-step module
from
Sharp Corporation
- Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 228 9582-0, Fax +49 228 9582-455, Infoline +49 228 9582-111
BSI-DSZ-CC-0245-2005
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 228 9582-0 - Fax +49 228 9582-455 - Infoline +49 228 9582-111
SM4128 (V3) A5-step module
from
Sharp Corporation
SOGIS-MRA
The IT product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an accredited and licensed/
approved evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Part 1
Version 0.6, Part 2 Version 1.0 extended by advice of the Certification Body for components
beyond EAL4 and smart card specific guidance for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT
Security Evaluation, Version 2.1 (ISO/IEC 15408:1999) and including final interpretations for
compliance with Common Criteria Version 2.2 and Common Methodology Part 2, Version 2.2.
Evaluation Results:
Functionality: product specific Security Target
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance Package: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL4 augmented by
ADV_IMP.2 (Implementation of the TSF),
ALC_DVS.2 (Sufficiency of security measures),
AVA_MSU.3 (Analysis and testing for insecure states) and
AVA_VLA.3 (Moderately resistant)
This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its
evaluated configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification
scheme of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions of
the evaluation facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence
adduced.
The notes mentioned on the reverse side are part of this certificate.
Bonn, 20. September 2005
The President of the Federal Office
for Information Security
Dr. Helmbrecht L.S.
The rating of the strength of functions does not include the cryptoalgorithms suitable for
encryption and decryption (see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2).
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for
Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security
or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either
expressed or implied.
BSI-DSZ-CC-0245-2005 Certification Report
Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the
task of issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a
distributor, hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product
according to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised
security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the
BSI or by BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This
report contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the
detailed Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security
functionality of the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and
weaknesses) and instructions for the user.
1
Act setting up the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Errichtungsgesetz, BSIG) of
17 December 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2834
V
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0245-2005
Contents
Part A: Certification
Part B: Certification Results
Part C: Excerpts from the Criteria
Part D: Annexes
VI
BSI-DSZ-CC-0245-2005 Certification Report
A Certification
1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down
in the following:
• BSIG2
• BSI Certification Ordinance3
• BSI Schedule of Costs4
• Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal
Ministry of the Interior)
• DIN EN 45011 standard
• BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
• Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 2.15
• Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM)
• Part 1, Version 0.6
• Part 2, Version 1.0
• BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme
(AIS)
• Advice from the Certification Body on methodology for assurance
components above EAL4 (AIS 34)
The use of Common Criteria Version 2.1, Common Methodology, part 2,
Version 1.0 and final interpretations as part of AIS 32 results in compliance of
the certification results with Common Criteria Version 2.2 and Common
Methodology Part 2, Version 2.2 as endorsed by the Common Criteria
recognition arrangement committees.
2
Act setting up the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Errichtungsgesetz, BSIG) of
17 December 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2834
3
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of a Certificate by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungsverordnung, BSIZertV) of 7 July 1992,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1230
4
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik (BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519
5
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 22nd September 2000 in the
Bundesanzeiger p. 19445
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0245-2005
2 Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries
a mutual recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are
based on ITSEC or CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
2.1 ITSEC/CC - Certificates
The SOGIS-Agreement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on
ITSEC became effective on 3 March 1998. This agreement was signed by the
national bodies of Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, The Netherlands,
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. This
agreement on the mutual recognition of IT security certificates was extended to
include certificates based on the CC for all evaluation levels (EAL 1 – EAL 7).
2.2 CC - Certificates
An arrangement (Common Criteria Arrangement) on the mutual recognition of
certificates based on the CC evaluation assurance levels up to and including
EAL 4 was signed in May 2000. It includes also the recognition of Protection
Profiles based on the CC. The arrangement was signed by the national bodies
of Australia, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, The
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, United Kingdom and the United
States. Israel joined the arrangement in November 2000, Sweden in February
2002, Austria in November 2002, Hungary and Turkey in September 2003,
Japan in November 2003, the Czech Republic in September 2004, the Republic
of Singapore in March 2005, India in April 2005.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0245-2005 Certification Report
3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform
procedure, a uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product SM4128 (V3) A5-step module, has undergone the certification
procedure at BSI.
The evaluation of the product SM4128 (V3) A5-step module, was conducted by
TNO ITSEF BV. TNO ITSEF BV is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)6
recognised by
BSI.
The sponsor, vendor and distributor is:
Sharp Corporation
2613-1, Ichinomoto-cho,
Tenri, Nara 632-8567
Japan
The certification is concluded with
• the comparability check and
• the production of this Certification Report.
This work was completed by the BSI on 20. September 2005.
The confirmed assurance package is only valid on the condition that
• all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as
given in the following report, are observed,
• the product is operated in the environment described, where specified in
the following report.
This Certification Report only applies to the version of the product indicated
here. The validity can be extended to new versions and releases of the product,
provided the sponsor applies for re-certification of the modified product, in
accordance with the procedural requirements, and the evaluation does not
reveal any security deficiencies.
For the meaning of the assurance levels and the confirmed strength of
functions, please refer to the excerpts from the criteria at the end of the
Certification Report.
6
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0245-2005
4 Publication
The following Certification Results contain pages B-1 to B-22 and D1 to D4.
The product SM4128 (V3) A5-step module, has been included in the BSI list of
the certified products, which is published regularly (see also Internet: http://
www.bsi.bund.de). Further information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline +49
228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the vendor7
of
the product. The Certification Report can also be downloaded from the above-
mentioned website.
7
Sharp Corporation
2613-1, Ichinomoto-cho,
Tenri, Nara 632-8567
Japan
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0245-2005 Certification Report
B Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
• the security target of the sponsor for the target of evaluation,
• the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
• complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0245-2005
Contents of the certification results
1 Executive Summary 3
2 Identification of the TOE 0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
3 Security Policy 0
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope 0
5 Architectural Information 1
6 Documentation 5
7 IT Product Testing 5
8 Evaluated Configuration 6
9 Results of the Evaluation 6
10 Comments/Recommendations 8
11 Annexes 8
12 Security Target 9
13 Definitions 9
14 Bibliography 0
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0245-2005 Certification Report
1 Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the SM4128 (V3) A5-step module (a
packaged IC), hereafter called SM4128 (V3). This Sharp dual interface type
module has interfaces for contact and contact-less communications, physical
and logical protection mechanisms, DES and RSA/ECC coprocessors.
This module is intended for exclusive use with the Sharp software in national ID
cards and electronic passports. It is not intended for general usage.
The TOE physically consists of a packaged module containing the following:
• The circuitry of an IC (hardware, including the physical memories RAM,
ROM and Flash ROM (FROM))
• TSF data stored in the IC
• The following IC dedicated software:
• BootROM (including DRNG function)
• TestROM (test functionality is disabled before TOE delivery)
Figure 1: System Configuration
A detailed description of the TOE can be found in chapter 5 of this document.
The IT product SM4128 (V3) A5-step module, was evaluated by TNO ITSEF
BV. The evaluation was completed on 29.07.2005. TNO ITSEF BV is an
evaluation facility (ITSEF)8
recognised by BSI.
8
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0245-2005
The sponsor ,vendor and distributor is
Sharp Corporation
2613-1, Ichinomoto-cho,
Tenri, Nara 632-8567
Japan
1.1 Assurance package
The TOE security assurance requirements are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in part 3 of the Common Criteria (see Annex C or [1], part
3 for details). The TOE meets the assurance requirements of assurance level
EAL4+ (Evaluation Assurance Level 4 augmented ADV_IMP.2 (Implementation
of the TSF), ALC_DVS.2 (Sufficiency of security measures), AVA_MSU.3
(Analysis and testing for insecure states) and AVA_VLA.3 (Moderately
resistant)).
1.2 Functionality
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) selected in the Security
Target are Common Criteria Part 2 conformant as shown in the following tables.
The following SFRs are taken from CC part 2:
Security
Functional
Requirement
Identifier
FDP User data protection
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control
FDP_ITT.1 Basic internal transfer protection
FPT Protection of the TSF
FPT_FLS.1 Failure with preservation of secure state
FPT_ITT.1 Basic internal TSF data transfer protection
FPT_PHP.3 Resistance to physical attack
FPT_SEP.1 TSF domain separation
FRU Fault tolerance
FRU_FLT.2 Limited fault tolerance
Table 1:SFRs CC part 2 conformant
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0245-2005 Certification Report
The following SFRs are CC part 2 extended:
Security
Functional
Requirement
Identifier
FAU Security audit
FAU_SAS.1 Audit review
FCS Cryptographic support
FCS_RND.1 Audit review
FMT Security management
FMT_LIM.1 Security management
FMT_LIM.2 Security management
Table 2:SFRs CC part 2 conformant
Note: Only the titles of the Security Functional Requirements are provided. For
more details please refer to the Security Target [6], chapter 5.
These Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functions:
SF.Passivation
The complete top layer of the IC, except for the bond pads, is covered with a
passivation layer making physical attack difficult.
SF.Module
The IC (including the passivation layer) is covered with resin making physical
attack difficult.
SF.Flat_Layout
The TOE’s wiring rule for the logic circuits, which is called “Flat-layout”, does
not have hierarchies. This makes it difficult for an attacker to find the signals
between the logical circuits (CPU, CPU Bus, Reset Circuit, Clock Circuit, I/O
Port, Timer, UART, SCI, Memory Protect Circuit, Flash Interface, Protocol
Controller, Type C Protocol Controller, Contact/Contact-less Detector, RF
Interface, Crypto Accelerator, DES Circuit, PLL Lock Detector, Test Circuit).
SF.Narrow_Wiring
The wiring space of the IC is very narrow, making it difficult to change the IC or
read data from it.
SF.Bus_Scrambling
The bus between the CPU and memories (Flash, ROM, RAM and coprocessor
RAM) is scrambled, making it difficult to read data from it.
SF.Shielding_Layer
The two top layers of the IC (part of the TOE) are shielding layers, one passive
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0245-2005
and one active.If the active shield is broken, the TOE does not operate, making
physical attacks difficult.
SF.Watchdog_Timer
The TOE has a watchdog timer, which resets the TOE when it times out.
SF.Odd_Address
The TOE resets when it detects an odd address violation.
SF.Illegal_Instruction
The TOE resets when it detects an illegal instruction.
SF.Abnormal_Internal_Clock
The TOE resets when it detects that the period of the high level or low level of
the internal clock is outside of the range FSYS_tmin specified in [FSP].
SF.Abnormal_RF_Clock
The TOE resets when, in contact-less mode, it detects that the period of the
high level or low level of the RF clock outside of the range RFCS_tmin specified
in [FSP].
SF.Abnormal_Temperature
The TOE resets when it detects a temperature higher than TMPS_Tmax or
lower than TMPS_Tmin specified in [FSP].
SF.Abnormal_Voltage_Flash
Flash memory uses 2 power-sources. One is the internal voltage. The other is
the internal program voltage.
The TOE resets when it detects the internal voltage for the flash component is
less then VFFS_VL or more then VFFS_VH specified in [FSP]
SF.Abnormal_Voltage_Logic
The TOE resets when it detects an internal voltage for the logic components is
less then VDDS_VL or more then VDDS_VH specified in [FSP]
SF.Over-Voltage_Protector
Should the voltage of the internal supply power (VCC) become too high, then
the TOE will absorb excess power up to a limit. If the absorbed power is too
high, the TOE will disable itself permanently.
SF.Power_Regulator
The TOE regulates the internal power voltages VAA, VDD, VFF and VPPO from
the internal supply power VCC.
SF.PLL
The TOE regulates the internal clock in contact operation.
SF.Blocked_Test_Pins
The test pins, which are defined in [FSP], of the TOE are irreversibly blocked
before the TOE is shipped to the customer
SF.Memory_Protect
The TOE enforces the following memory protection:
If the Memory Protect is On: read/write access to the RAM is allowed except for:
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0245-2005 Certification Report
• Read/write access to the OS stack area
• Read/write access to the OS working area
• Read/write access to the co-processor shared RAM area unless explicitly
enabled
read/write access to all other memory areas is denied, except for:
• Read access to the application area
• Read/write access the General Purpose Registers except the SYS
register.
SF.Memory_Protect_On: The TOE ensures that only Software running with the
Memory Protect Off can turn the Memory Protect On.
SF.Memory_Protect_Off: The TOE ensures that Software running with the
Memory Protect On can turn the Memory protect Off only by:
• returning control to the Software in the SCALL relief area with the SCALL
instruction, or
• returning control to the Software in the SRET relief area with the SRET
instruction, or
• to the interrupt handling Software by generating an interrupt.
SF.FLASH
The TOE has flash memory capable of storing initialisation data and/or pre-
personalisation data and/or supplements of the Smartcard Embedded Software.
SF.RNG
The TOE has Deterministic Random Number Generator that meets the AIS20
K3 requirements.
1.3 Strength of Function
The TOE’s strength of functions is claimed high (SOF-high) for SF.RNG. The
rating of the strength of functions does not include the cryptoalgorithms suitable
for encryption and decryption (see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2).
1.4 Summary of threats and Organisational Security Policies (OSPs)
addressed by the evaluated IT product
The threats which were partly taken from [8] for the evaluation and averted by
the TOE are specified in the Security Target [6]:
• T.Leak-Inherent
• T.Phys-Probing
• T.Malfunction
• T.Phys-Manipulation
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0245-2005
• T.Leak-Forced
• T.Abuse-Func
• T.RND
• T.Mem-Acess
The OSP is also specified in the Security Target:
• P.Process-TOE
1.5 Special configuration requirements
The TOE has two different operating modes, user mode and test mode. The
application software being executed on the TOE cannot use the test mode. The
TOE is delivered as a hardware unit at the end of the IC packaging process
(Phase 4). At this point in time the operating system software is already stored
in the non-volatile memories of the chip and the test mode is disabled. Thus
there are no special procedures for generation or installation that are important
for a secure use of the TOE. The further production and delivery processes, like
the Smartcard finishing process, personalisation and the delivery of the
smartcard to an end user, have to be organized in a way that excludes all
possibilities of physical manipulation of the TOE. There are no special security
measures for the startup of the TOE besides the requirement that the controller
has to be used under the well-defined operating conditions and that the
requirements on the software have to be applied as described in the user
documentation.
1.6 Assumptions about the operating environment
• It is assumed that security procedures are used after delivery of the TOE
by the TOE Manufacturer up to delivery to the end-user to maintain
confidentiality and integrity of the TOE and of its manufacturing and test
data (to prevent any possible copy, modification, retention, theft or
unauthorised use
• It is assumed that the Smartcard Embedded Software is designed so that
the requirements from the following documents are met: (i) TOE
guidance documents (refer to the Common Criteria assurance class
AGD) such as the hardware data sheet, and the hardware application
notes, and (ii) findings of the TOE evaluation reports relevant for the
Smartcard Embedded Software
• It must be assumed that security relevant User Data (especially
cryptographic keys) are treated by the Smartcard Embedded Software as
defined for the specific application context. Details must be specified in
the application context
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0245-2005 Certification Report
1.7 Disclaimers
The Certification Results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the
Certificate and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in
this Certification Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product
by the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation
that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT
product by BSI or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, is either expressed or implied.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0245-2005
2 Identification of the TOE
No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
1 Hardware Hardware SM4128 (V3) A5 step Packaged module
2 Software HERMES_BOOT_V100.hex 1.0.0 included in
BootROM
3 Software IC dedicated test software 1.4 included in
TestROM
4 Documentation Technical Document of
SM4128 (V3) [9]
1.4.0 paper
5 Documentation Combination Type Smart
Card LSI HERMES Bootstrap
program Functional
Specification [10]
0.6.0 paper
Table 3: Deliverables to customer
3 Security Policy
The TOE Manufacturer must ensure that the development and production of the
Smartcard Integrated Circuit (Phase 2 up to TOE Delivery, refer to [7]) is secure
so that no information is unintentionally made available for the operational
phase of the TOE. For example, the confidentiality and integrity of design
information and test data shall be guaranteed; access to samples, development
tools and other material shall be restricted to authorised persons only; scrap will
be destroyed etc. This not only pertains to the TOE but also to all information
and material exchanged with the developer of the Smartcard Embedded
Software and therefore especially to the Smartcard Embedded Software itself.
This includes the delivery (exchange) procedures for Phase 1 and the Phases
after TOE Delivery as far as they can be controlled by the TOE Manufacturer.
An accurate identification must be established for the TOE. This requires that
each instantiation of the TOE carries this unique identification.
The security policy of the TOE is to provide basic security functions to be used
by the smartcard operating system and the smartcard application thus providing
an overall smartcard system security. Therefore the TOE will provide a random
number generatior of appropriate quality.
As the TOE is a hardware security platform, the security policy of the TOE is
also to provide protection against leakage of information (e.g. to ensure the
confidentiality of cryptographic keys during cryptographic functions performed
by the TOE), against physical probing, against malfunctions, against physical
manipulations and against abuse of functionality. Hence the TOE shall:
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0245-2005 Certification Report
• maintain the integrity and the confidentiality of data stored in the memory
of the TOE and
• maintain the integrity, the correct operation and the confidentiality of
security functions (security mechanisms and associated functions)
provided by the TOE.
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
4.1 Usage assumptions
• It is assumed that security procedures are used after delivery of the TOE
by the TOE Manufacturer up to delivery to the end-user to maintain
confidentiality and integrity of the TOE and of its manufacturing and test
data (to prevent any possible copy, modification, retention, theft or
unauthorised use). This means that the Phases after TOE Delivery (refer
to Sections 2.1 and 8.1 of [8]) are assumed to be protected appropriately.
For a preliminary list of assets to be protected refer to paragraph 80
(page 22) [8].
• The Smartcard Embedded Software has to be designed so that the
requirements from the following documents are met: (i) TOE guidance
documents (refer to the Common Criteria assurance class AGD) such as
the hardware data sheet, and the hardware application notes, and (ii)
findings of the TOE evaluation reports relevant for the Smartcard
Embedded Software. Note that particular requirements for the Smartcard
Embedded Software are often not clear before considering a specific
attack scenario during vulnerability analysis of the smartcard integrated
circuit (AVA_VLA). Therefore, such results from the TOE evaluation (as
contained in the Evaluation Technical Report (ETR)) can be given to the
developer of the Smartcard Embedded Software in an appropriate and
authorised form (e.g. ETR Lite for composition according to AIS 36 [4])
and be taken into account during the evaluation of the software. This
may also hold for additional tests being required for the combination of
hardware and software.
• All User Data are owned by Smartcard Embedded Software. Therefore, it
must be assumed that security relevant User Data (especially
cryptographic keys) are treated by the Smartcard Embedded Software as
defined for the specific application context. Details must be specified in
the application context.
4.2 Clarification of scope
The SM4128 (V3) A5-step module is intended for exclusive use with the Sharp
software electronic passports. It is not intended for general usage. Smartcard
Embedded Software (outside of TOE) may be loaded in and executed from the
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0245-2005
Flash ROM (logically outside the TOE). DES and RSA/ECC encryption and the
functionality of the corresponding modules are also not considered as part of
the TSF.
5. Architectural Information
The TOE looks like this internally:
ROM
Work
RAM
Coprocessor
RAM
Flash
Memory
CPU
Reset
Circuit
Clock
Circuit
I/O Port
Timer
(WDT)
UART
SCI
Memory
Protect
Circuit
Flash
Interface
Protocol
Contoroller
Contact
Contact-less
Detector
RF
Interface
Crypt
Accelerator
DES
Circuit
Random
Number
Generator
Sensors
PLL Lock
Detector
Test
Circuit
Bus Scramble
CPU Bus
Address Bus
CPU Read/Write
Protect Read/Write
Flash Control
RF Circuit
(Regulator)
CL2
CL3
IO
CLK
System
Clock/Clock
RF Internal Clock
Clock
Port
RST
System
Reset
VCC
GND
VDD/VFF/VPPO
NOTE: is powered by VDD
is powered by VDD/VFF/VPPO
is powered by VCC
Bus
scramble
External Clock
RF Clock
System Clock
VDD/VFF
Type C
Protocol
Controller
Hardware Reset
External
Reset
Sensor Error
Software
Reset
Software
Reset
Sensor Error Hard Error Reset
Hard Error Reset
External
Clock/RF
Clock
RF RESET
RF RESET INTERNAL
RESET
INTERNAL
RESET
Figure 2: Block diagram of the TOE
The TOE is intended for use in an E-passport application with Sharp software
only.
The TOE physically consists of a packaged module containing the following:
The circuitry of an IC (hardware, including the physical memories RAM, ROM
and Flash ROM (FROM))
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0245-2005 Certification Report
1. CPU Sharp original 16 bit CPU
• General purpose register construction, 16 bit x 16
• 62 basic commands including bit manipulation command, bit transfer
instruction and bit branch instruction suitable for controlling application.
• High speed multiplication and division instructions (16 bit x 16 bit, 16 bit /
16 bit, 32 bit /16 bit)
• 10 types of addressing mode
• 16M bytes address space
• Data automatic transfer function (DTS) for highly functional interrupt
processing. It is possible to automatically transfer data using hardware
instead of interrupt processing when generating the demand for interrupt.
Continuous operation of each type of function block is possible using
DTS and continuous storage of the results and data is possible.
• CPU clock switching function.
CONTACT Mode: Multiplication x 3 of the CLK PORT which is input from
the CLK pin and x 3/8 can be selected.
CONTACT-LESS Mode: Multiplication x 1 of the RF CLOCK and x 1/8
can be selected.
2. Memory
• ROM 8k Byte
• RAM 8k Byte
• Coprocessor RAM 1664 Byte
• Flash memory 1024k Byte
3. Terminal for IC card ISO/IEC 7816 base
• Communications method
• <Contact operation>
• ISO/IEC 7816 base T=0 & T=1 protocol
• Operating power voltage: 2.7 - 5.5V
• Input clock frequency: 1.0 - 5.0 MHz
• <Contact-less operation>
• ISO14443-2 TypeB 106kbps - 424kbps
• The anti-collision is compatible with the slot marker method
4. Interrupt
• In addition to a total of 15 types of interrupt, software interrupt is also
possible.
• Mask capable interrupt 15 types (external 1: internal 14)
• Non-maskable interrupt 6 types
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0245-2005
5. Crypto Accelerator
• RSA/ECC Crypto Accelerator integrated.
• DES Circuit integrated.
6. Timer
• 16 bit compare type timer 2
• 8 bit watch dog timer 1
7. Serial interface: Asynchronous simultaneous (UART) 1 channel
8. PLL: Integrated PLL generates an operating clock for CPU and for Crypto
Accelerator in contact operation.
9. Base Register: By storing the start address of the applications in Base
Register, multi applications are available easily.
10. Hardware seed generator for the software DRNG
11. Watchdog Timer: The SM4128(V3) is reset when the time out occurs.
12. Odd Address Access: The SM4128(V3) is reset when the violation of the
odd address access occurs.
13. Illegal Instruction: The SM4128(V3) is reset when the illegal instruction
occurs.
14. Sensors: The SM4128(V3) is reset when the sensors detect an out of the
specified value.
15. Over-voltage Protector: The SM4128(V3) limits the internal voltage VCC.
16. Voltage Regulator: The SM4128(V3) generates four voltages such as
VPPO, VFF, VDD and VAA from the VCC voltage.
17. Memory Protection: The SM4128(V3) is reset when the violation of the
memory protection occurs.
18. Bus Scramble: The data bus between the CPU and the memory is
scrambled as the countermeasure for the physical attacks such as the
reading and the rewriting the data bus with the probing.
19. Module: The chip is covered with a resin. The module prevents an attacker
from looking at the circuits of the chip because it is difficult to scratch the
resin off.
20. Passivation: The surface of the chip is covered with a passivation. The
passivation prevents an attacker from probing the circuits directly.
21. Shielding Layer (Wire Break Down Sensor): The shielding layer covers the
circuits. The wire break down sensor responds and the SM4128(V3) is reset
when the shielding layer is scratched off.
The following is the software of the TOE:
BootROM (including DRNG function)
TestROM (test functionality is disabled before TOE delivery)
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6 Documentation
The following documentation is provided with the product by the developer to
the customer for secure usage of the TOE in accordance with the Security
Target:
• Technical Document of SM4128 (V3), Version 1.4.0, December 28th
,
2004 [9]
• Combination Type Smart Card LSI HERMES Bootstrap program
Functional Specification, Version 0.6.0, January 13th
, 2005 [10]
7 IT Product Testing
The develover tests cover all Security Functions and all security mechanisms as
identified in the fuctional specification and the high level design.
The functional testing of SM4128 (V3) can be devided in
• tests which are performed in a simulation environment for analogue and
digital simulations,
• layout tests by testing the implementation by optical control, in order to
verify statements concerning the layout design.
• functional tests
The evaluators conducted the independent testing and penetration testing in
conjunction.
• Independent testing: The evaluators designed a series of tests to test
special security functions. All test results were as expected.
• The penetration testing effort can be summarized as follows:
1. The evaluators assessed all possible vulnerabilities found during evaluation
of the classes. This resulted in a shortlist with a number of possible
vulnerabilities to be tested.
2. The evaluators made an analysis of the TOE in its intended environment to
check whether the developer vulnerability analysis has assessed all
information. The attack tree technique was used for this assessment.
3. The evaluators tested the claims made by the developer, which the
evaluators deemed worth further investigation, based on the vulnerability
analysis.
All test results were as expected.
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8 Evaluated Configuration
The TOE is identified by SM4128 (V3) A5-step module. There is only one
evaluated configuration of the TOE. All information of how to use the TOE and
its security functions by the software is provided within the user documentation.
The TOE has two different operating modes, user mode and test mode. The
application software being executed on the TOE can not use the test mode.
Thus, the evaluation was mainly performed in the user mode. For all evaluation
activities performed in test mode, there was a rationale why the results are valid
for the user mode, too.
9 Results of the Evaluation
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR), [7] was provided by the ITSEF
according to the Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of
the Scheme [3] and all interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as
relevant for the TOE.
The evaluation methodology CEM [2] was used for those components identical
with EAL4. For components beyond EAL4 the methodology was defined in co-
ordination with the Certification Body [4], AIS 34]).
For smart card IC specific methodology the CC supporting documents
(i.) Functionality Classes and Evaluation Methodology for Deterministic
Random Number Generators
(ii.) The Application of CC to Integrated Circuits and
(iii.) Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards
(see [4], AIS 20, AIS 25, AIS 26]) were used. The assurance refinements
outlined in the Security Target were followed in the course of the evaluation of
the TOE.
The verdicts for the CC, Part 3 assurance components (according to EAL4
augmented with ADV_IMP.2, ALC_DVS.2, AVA_MSU.3 and AVA_VLA.3 and
the class ASE for the Security Target evaluation) are summarised in the
following table.
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Assurance classes and components Verdict
Security Target evaluation CC Class ASE PASS
TOE description ASE_DES.1 PASS
Security environment ASE_ENV.1 PASS
ST introduction ASE_INT.1 PASS
Security objectives ASE_OBJ.1 PASS
PP claims ASE_PPC.1 PASS
IT security requirements ASE_REQ.1 PASS
Explicitly stated IT security requirements ASE_SRE.1 PASS
TOE summary specification ASE_TSS.1 PASS
Configuration management CC Class ACM PASS
Partial CM automation ACM_AUT.1 PASS
Generation support and acceptance procedures ACM_CAP.4 PASS
Problem tracking CM coverage ACM_SCP.2 PASS
Delivery and operation CC Class ADO PASS
Detection of modification ADO_DEL.2 PASS
Installation, generation, and start-up procedures ADO_IGS.1 PASS
Development CC Class ADV PASS
Fully defined external interfaces ADV_FSP.2 PASS
Security enforcing high-level design ADV_HLD.2 PASS
Implementation of the TSF ADV_IMP.2 PASS
Modularity ADV_INT.1 PASS
Descriptive low-level design ADV_LLD.1 PASS
Informal correspondence demonstration ADV_RCR.1 PASS
Informal TOE security policy model ADV_SPM.1 PASS
Guidance documents CC Class AGD PASS
Administrator guidance AGD_ADM.1 PASS
User guidance AGD_USR.1 PASS
Life cycle support CC Class ALC PASS
Sufficiency of security measures ALC_DVS.2 PASS
Developer defined life-cycle model ALC_LCD.1 PASS
Well-defined development tools ALC_TAT.1 PASS
Tests CC Class ATE PASS
Analysis of coverage ATE_COV.2 PASS
Testing: high-level design ATE_DPT.1 PASS
Functional testing ATE_FUN.1 PASS
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Assurance classes and components Verdict
Independent testing – sample ATE_IND.2 PASS
Vulnerability assessment CC Class AVA PASS
Analysis and testing for insecure states AVA_MSU.3 PASS
Strength of TOE security function evaluation AVA_SOF.1 PASS
Moderately resistant AVA_VLA.3 PASS
Table 3: Verdicts for the assurance components
The evaluation has shown that:
• Security Functional Requirements specified for the TOE are Common
Criteria Part 2 extended
• the assurance of the TOE is Common Criteria Part 3 conformant, EAL4
augmented with ADV_IMP.2, ALC_DVS.2, AVA_MSU.3 and AVA_VLA.3
• The following TOE Security Function fulfil the claimed Strength of
Function:
SF.RNG according to AIS 20 [4]
The rating of the strength of functions does not include the
cryptoalgorithms suitable for encryption and decryption (see BSIG
Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2). DES and RSA/ECC functionality and
vulnerability assessment was not part of the evaluation.
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the SM4128 (V3) A5-step
module, produced in the sites as listed in part D, Annex A of this report.
The validity can be extended to new versions and releases of the product,
provided the sponsor applies for re-certification or assurance continuity of the
modified product, in accordance with the procedural requirements, and the
evaluation of the modified product does not reveal any security deficiencies.
10 Comments/Recommendations
The operational documents [9] - [10] contain necessary information about the
usage of the TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered.
11 Annexes
Annex A: Evaluation results regarding the development and production
environment (see part D of this report).
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12 Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the security target [6] of the target of evaluation
(TOE) is provided within a separate document.
13 Definitions
13.1 Acronyms
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for
Information Security, Bonn, Germany
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
IT Information Technology
PP Protection Profile
SF Security Function
SFP Security Function Policy
SOF Strength of Function
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSC TSF Scope of Control
TSF TOE Security Functions
TSP TOE Security Policy
13.2 Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more assurance component(s) from CC
Part 3 to an EAL or assurance package.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not
contained in part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in part 3 of the
CC.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics
based on well-established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - An entity within the TSC that contains or receives information and
upon which subjects perform operations.
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Protection Profile - An implementation-independent set of security require-
ments for a category of TOEs that meet specific consumer needs.
Security Function - A part or parts of the TOE that have to be relied upon for
enforcing a closely related subset of the rules from the TSP.
Security Target - A set of security requirements and specifications to be used
as the basis for evaluation of an identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined
semantics.
Strength of Function - A qualification of a TOE security function expressing
the minimum efforts assumed necessary to defeat its expected security
behaviour by directly attacking its underlying security mechanisms.
SOF-basic - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that
the function provides adequate protection against casual breach of TOE
security by attackers possessing a low attack potential.
SOF-medium - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows
that the function provides adequate protection against straightforward or
intentional breach of TOE security by attackers possessing a moderate attack
potential.
SOF-high - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that
the function provides adequate protection against deliberately planned or
organised breach of TOE security by attackers possessing a high attack
potential.
Subject - An entity within the TSC that causes operations to be performed.
Target of Evaluation - An IT product or system and its associated
administrator and user guidance documentation that is the subject of an
evaluation.
TOE Security Functions - A set consisting of all hardware, software, and
firmware of the TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the
TSP.
TOE Security Policy - A set of rules that regulate how assets are managed,
protected and distributed within a TOE.
TSF Scope of Control - The set of interactions that can occur with or within a
TOE and are subject to the rules of the TSP.
14 Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version
2.1, August 1999
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
(CEM), Part 1, Version 0.6; Part 2: Evaluation Methodology, Version 1.0,
August 1999
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[3] BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
[4] Applicaton Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for
the TOE. Specifically
• AIS 20, Version 1, 2 December 1999 for: CC Supporting Document, -
Functionality Classes and Evaluation Methodology for Deterministic
Random Number Generators, version 2.0, 2 December 1999
• AIS 25, Version 2, 29 July 2002 for: CC Supporting Document, - The
Application of CC to Integrated Circuits, Version 1.2, July 2002
• AIS 26, Version 2, 6 August 2002 for: CC Supporting Document, -
Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards, Version 1.1, July 2002
• AIS 34, Version 1.00, 1 June 2004, Evaluation Methodology for CC
Assurance Classes for EAL5+
• AIS 36 Version 1, 29 July 2002 for CC Supporting Document, ETR-
lite for Composition, Version 1.1, July 2002 and
CC Supporting Document, ETR-lite for Composition: Annex A
Composite smartcard evaluation, Version 1.2, March 2002
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148, BSI 7149), periodically
updated list published also on the BSI Web-site
[6] Security Target BSI-DSZ-0245-2005, Version 1.8.5, March 29th
, 2005,
SM4128(V3) LSI FOR USE IN NATIONAL IDS AND PASSPORTS WITH
SHARP SOFTWARE SECURITY TARGET,
[7] Evaluation Technical Report, Version 3.0, July 29th
, 2005, Evaluation
Technical Report Sharp SM4128(V3) A5 step - EAL4+ (confidential
document)
[8] Protection Profile BSI-PP-0002-2001 - „Smartcard IC Platform Protection
Profile“, Version 1.0, July 2001
[9] Technical Document of SM4128(V3), Version 1.4.0, December 28th
, 2004
[10] Combination Type Smart Card LSI HERMES Bootstrap program
Functional Specification, Version 0.6.0, January 13th
, 2005
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C Excerpts from the Criteria
CC Part 1:
Caveats on evaluation results (chapter 5.4) / Final Interpretation 008
The conformance result indicates the source of the collection of requirements that is
met by a TOE or PP that passes its evaluation. This conformance result is presented
with respect to Part 2 (functional requirements), Part 3 (assurance requirements) and, if
applicable, to a pre-defined set of requirements (e.g., EAL, Protection Profile).
The conformance result consists of one of the following:
Part 2 conformant - A PP or TOE is Part 2 conformant if the functional requirements
are based only upon functional components in Part 2
Part 2 extended - A PP or TOE is Part 2 extended if the functional requirements
include functional components not in Part 2
plus one of the following:
Part 3 conformant - A PP or TOE is Part 3 conformant if the assurance requirements
are based only upon assurance components in Part 3
Part 3 extended - A PP or TOE is Part 3 extended if the assurance requirements
include assurance requirements not in Part 3.
Additionally, the conformance result may include a statement made with respect to sets
of defined requirements, in which case it consists of one of the following:
Package name Conformant - A PP or TOE is conformant to a pre-defined named
functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the requirements (functions or
assurance) include all components in the packages listed as part of the conformance
result.
Package name Augmented - A PP or TOE is an augmentation of a pre-defined
named functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the requirements (functions
or assurance) are a proper superset of all components in the packages listed as part of
the conformance result.
Finally, the conformance result may also include a statement made with respect to
Protection Profiles, in which case it includes the following:
PP Conformant - A TOE meets specific PP(s), which are listed as part of the
conformance result.
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CC Part 3:
Assurance categorisation (chapter 2.5)
„The assurance classes, families, and the abbreviation for each family are
shown in Table 2.1.
Assurance Class Assurance Family Abbreviated Name
Class ACM:
Configuration
management
CM automation ACM_AUT
CM capabilities ACM_CAP
CM scope ACM_SCP
Class ADO: Delivery
and operation
Delivery ADO_DEL
Installation, generation and start-up ADO_IGS
Class ADV:
Development
Functional specification ADV_FSP
High-level design ADV_HLD
Implementation representation ADV_IMP
TSF internals ADV_INT
Low-level design ADV_LLD
Representation correspondence ADV_RCR
Security policy modeling ADV_SPM
Class AGD: Guidance
documents
Administrator guidance AGD_ADM
User guidance AGD_USR
Class ALC: Life cycle
support
Development security ALC_DVS
Flaw remediation ALC_FLR
Life cycle definition ALC_LCD
Tools and techniques ALC_TAT
Class ATE: Tests Coverage ATE_COV
Depth ATE_DPT
Functional tests ATE_FUN
Independent testing ATE_IND
Class AVA:
Vulnerability
assessment
Covert channel analysis AVA_CCA
Misuse AVA_MSU
Strength of TOE security functions AVA_SOF
Vulnerability analysis AVA_VLA
Table 2.1 -Assurance family breakdown and mapping
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Evaluation assurance levels (chapter 6)
„The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that
balances the level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of
acquiring that degree of assurance. The CC approach identifies the separate
concepts of assurance in a TOE at the end of the evaluation, and of
maintenance of that assurance during the operational use of the TOE.
It is important to note that not all families and components from Part 3 are
included in the EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful
and desirable assurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and
components will be considered for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and
STs for which they provide utility.
Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview (chapter 6.1)
Table 6.1 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a
hierarchically ordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families.
Each number in the resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component
where applicable.
As outlined in the next section, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation
assurance levels are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE's assurance.
They are hierarchically ordered inasmuch as each EAL represents more
assurance than all lower EALs. The increase in assurance from EAL to EAL is
accomplished by substitution of a hierarchically higher assurance component
from the same assurance family (i.e. increasing rigour, scope, and/or depth)
and from the addition of assurance components from other assurance families
(i.e. adding new requirements).
These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as
described in chapter 2 of this Part 3. More precisely, each EAL includes no
more than one component of each assurance family and all assurance
dependencies of every component are addressed.
While the EALs are defined in the CC, it is possible to represent other
combinations of assurance. Specifically, the notion of “augmentation“ allows the
addition of assurance components (from assurance families not already
included in the EAL) or the substitution of assurance components (with another
hierarchically higher assurance component in the same assurance family) to an
EAL. Of the assurance constructs defined in the CC, only EALs may be
augmented. The notion of an “EAL minus a constituent assurance component“
is not recognised by the CC as a valid claim. Augmentation carries with it the
obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility and added value of the
added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also be extended with
explicitly stated assurance requirements.
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Assurance
Class
Assurance
Family
Assurance Components by
Evaluation Assurance Level
EAL1 EAL2 EAL3 EAL4 EAL5 EAL6 EAL7
Configuration
management
ACM_AUT 1 1 2 2
ACM_CAP 1 2 3 4 4 5 5
ACM_SCP 1 2 3 3 3
Delivery and
operation
ADO_DEL 1 1 2 2 2 3
ADO_IGS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Development ADV_FSP 1 1 1 2 3 3 4
ADV_HLD 1 2 2 3 4 5
ADV_IMP 1 2 3 3
ADV_INT 1 2 3
ADV_LLD 1 1 2 2
ADV_RCR 1 1 1 1 2 2 3
ADV_SPM 1 3 3 3
Guidance
documents
AGD_ADM 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
AGD_USR 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Life cycle
support
ALC_DVS 1 1 1 2 2
ALC_FLR
ALC_LCD 1 2 2 3
ALC_TAT 1 2 3 3
Tests ATE_COV 1 2 2 2 3 3
ATE_DPT 1 1 2 2 3
ATE_FUN 1 1 1 1 2 2
ATE_IND 1 2 2 2 2 2 3
Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_CCA 1 2 2
AVA_MSU 1 2 2 3 3
AVA_SOF 1 1 1 1 1 1
AVA_VLA 1 1 2 3 4 4
Table 6.1 - Evaluation assurance level summary“
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Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL1) - functionally tested (chapter 6.2.1)
„Objectives
EAL1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but
the threats to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where
independent assurance is required to support the contention that due care has
been exercised with respect to the protection of personal or similar information.
EAL1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer,
including independent testing against a specification, and an examination of the
guidance documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL1 evaluation could
be successfully conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE,
and for minimal outlay.
An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a
manner consistent with its documentation, and that it provides useful protection
against identified threats.“
Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL2) - structurally tested (chapter 6.2.2)
„Objectives
EAL2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of
design information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the
part of the developer than is consistent with good commercial practice. As such
it should not require a substantially increased investment of cost or time.
EAL2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users
require a low to moderate level of independently assured security in the
absence of ready availability of the complete development record. Such a
situation may arise when securing legacy systems, or where access to the
developer may be limited.“
Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL3) - methodically tested and checked
(chapter 6.2.3)
„Objectives
EAL3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from
positive security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of
existing sound development practices.
EAL3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
moderate level of independently assured security, and require a thorough
investigation of the TOE and its development without substantial re-
engineering.“
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Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL4) - methodically designed, tested, and
reviewed (chapter 6.2.4)
„Objectives
EAL4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security
engineering based on good commercial development practices which, though
rigorous, do not require substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other
resources. EAL4 is the highest level at which it is likely to be economically
feasible to retrofit to an existing product line.
EAL4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users
require a moderate to high level of independently assured security in
conventional commodity TOEs and are prepared to incur additional security-
specific engineering costs.“
Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL5) - semiformally designed and tested
(chapter 6.2.5)
„Objectives
EAL5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security
engineering based upon rigorous commercial development practices supported
by moderate application of specialist security engineering techniques. Such a
TOE will probably be designed and developed with the intent of achieving EAL5
assurance. It is likely that the additional costs attributable to the EAL5
requirements, relative to rigorous development without the application of
specialised techniques, will not be large.
EAL5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users
require a high level of independently assured security in a planned development
and require a rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable
costs attributable to specialist security engineering techniques.“
Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL6) - semiformally verified design and
tested (chapter 6.2.6)
„Objectives
EAL6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security
engineering techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to
produce a premium TOE for protecting high value assets against significant
risks.
EAL6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for
application in high risk situations where the value of the protected assets
justifies the additional costs.“
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Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL7) - formally verified design and tested
(chapter 6.2.7)
„Objectives
EAL7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in
extremely high risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies
the higher costs. Practical application of EAL7 is currently limited to TOEs with
tightly focused security functionality that is amenable to extensive formal
analysis.“
Strength of TOE security functions (AVA_SOF) (chapter 14.3)
AVA_SOF Strength of TOE security functions
„Objectives
Even if a TOE security function cannot be bypassed, deactivated, or corrupted,
it may still be possible to defeat it because there is a vulnerability in the concept
of its underlying security mechanisms. For those functions a qualification of their
security behaviour can be made using the results of a quantitative or statistical
analysis of the security behaviour of these mechanisms and the effort required
to overcome them. The qualification is made in the form of a strength of TOE
security function claim.“
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VLA) (chapter 14.4)
AVA_VLA Vulnerability analysis
„Objectives
Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether vulnerabilities
identified, during the evaluation of the construction and anticipated operation of
the TOE or by other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses), could allow users to
violate the TSP.
Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that a user will be able to discover
flaws that will allow unauthorised access to resources (e.g. data), allow the
ability to interfere with or alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorised
capabilities of other users.“
„Application notes
A vulnerability analysis is performed by the developer in order to ascertain the
presence of security vulnerabilities, and should consider at least the contents of
all the TOE deliverables including the ST for the targeted evaluation assurance
level. The developer is required to document the disposition of identified
vulnerabilities to allow the evaluator to make use of that information if it is found
useful as a support for the evaluator's independent vulnerability analysis.“
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„Independent vulnerability analysis goes beyond the vulnerabilities identified by
the developer. The main intent of the evaluator analysis is to determine that the
TOE is resistant to penetration attacks performed by an attacker possessing a
low (for AVA_VLA.2), moderate (for AVA_VLA.3) or high (for AVA_VLA.4)
attack potential.“
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D Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Evaluation results regarding development
and production environment D-3
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Annex A of Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0245-2005
Evaluation results regarding
development and production
environment
The IT product, SM4128 (V3) A5-step module (Target of Evaluation, TOE) has been
evaluated at an accredited and licensed/ approved evaluation facility using the
Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Part 1 Version 0.6, Part 2
Version 1.0, extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL4
and smart card specific guidance, for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT
Security Evaluation, Version 2.1 (ISO/IEC15408: 1999) and including final
interpretations for compliance with Common Criteria Version 2.2 and Common
Methodology Part 2, Version 2.2.
As a result of the TOE certification, dated 20. September 2005, the following results
regarding the development and production environment apply. The Common Criteria
assurance requirements
• ACM – Configuration management (i.e. ACM_AUT.1, ACM_CAP.4,
ACM_SCP.2),
• ADO – Delivery and operation (i.e. ADO_DEL.2, ADO_IGS.1) and
• ALC – Life cycle support (i.e. ALC_DVS.2, ALC_LCD.1, ALC_TAT.1),
are fulfilled for the development and production sites of the TOE listed below ((a) – (e)):
(a) Sharp Makuhari, 1-9-2, NAKASE, MIHAMA-KU, CHIBA-SHI, CHIBA 261-
8520, Japan
(b) Sharp Tenri, 2631-1, ICHINOMOTO-CHO, TENRI-SHI, NARA 632-8567,
Japan
(c) Toppan Printing Co. Ltd., 1101-20, MYOHOJI-CHO, YOHKAICHI-SHI,
SHIGA 527-8566, Japan
(d) Sharp Fukuyama, 1, ASAHI, DAIMON-CHO, FUKUYAMA-SHI, HIROSHIMA
721-8522, Japan
(e) Sharp Takaya Electronic Industry Co. Ltd., 3121-1, SATOMI, SATOSHO-
CHO, ASAKUCHI-GUN, OKAYAMA 719-0301, Japan
For the sites listed above, the requirements have been specifically applied in
accordance with the Security Target (Security Target BSI-DSZ-0245-2005, Version
1.8.5, March 29th
, 2005, SM4128 (V3) LSI FOR USE IN NATIONAL IDS AND
PASSPORTS WITH SHARP SOFTWARE SECURITY TARGET).
The evaluators verified, that the threats and the security objective for the life cycle
phases 2, 3 and 4 up to delivery at the end of phases 3 or 4 as stated in the Security
Target [6]) are fulfilled by the procedures of these sites.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0245-2005
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D-4