IDL full EAC v2 Public Security Target EAC with BAP and AA FQR No: 110 7639 FQR Issue: 5 T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ Legal Notice © OT. All rights reserved. Specifications and information are subject to change without notice. The products described in this document are subject to continuous development All trademarks and service marks referred to herein, whether registered or not in specific countries, are the properties of their respective owners. ** Printed versions of this document are uncontrolled ** IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with BAP and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 Specifications and information are subject to change without notice. The products described in this document are subject to continuous development and improvement. All trademarks and service marks referred to herein, whether registered or not in specific countries, are the properties ** Printed versions of this document are uncontrolled ** curity Target EAC with BAP and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - 92700 and improvement. All trademarks and service marks referred to herein, whether registered or not in specific countries, are the properties T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ Document Management A. Identification Business Unit - Department ID R&D Document type: FQR Document Title: IDL FQR No: 110 FQR Issue: 5 IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with BAP and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 Document Management ID R&D FQR IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with BAP and 110 7639 5 curity Target EAC with BAP and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - BAP and AA T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ Table of contents LIST OF FIGURES LIST OF TABLES 9 1 SECURITY TARGET INTRODUCTION 1.1 Purpose ................................ 1.2 Objective of the security target 1.3 Security target identification 1.4 TOE technical identification 1.5 IC identification 2 TOE OVERVIEW 2.1 Product overvi 2.2 TOE overview................................ 2.3 TOE usages................................ 2.4 TOE definition 3 OE ARCHITECTURE 3.1 Integrated Circuit 3.2 Low layer ................................ 3.3 Tools modules 3.4 Applicative modules 3.5 Operating System 3.6 Application layer 4 TOE LIFE CYCLE 4.1 Life cycle overview 4.2 Phase 1 “Development” 4.3 Phase 2 “Manufacturing” 4.4 Phase 3 “Personalization of the travel document” 4.5 Phase 4 “Operational Use” IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with BAP and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................ Objective of the security target................................................................ Security target identification ................................................................ TOE technical identification................................................................ IC identification................................................................................................ Product overview................................................................................................ ................................................................................................ ................................................................................................ ................................................................................................ Integrated Circuit - NXP P60................................................................ ................................................................................................ ................................................................................................ e modules................................................................ Operating System................................................................................................ Application layer................................................................................................ overview .............................................................................................. Phase 1 “Development”................................................................ Phase 2 “Manufacturing”................................................................ Phase 3 “Personalization of the travel document”................................ Phase 4 “Operational Use” ................................................................ curity Target EAC with BAP and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - 8 10 ..............................................10 ............................................10 ...............................................11 .................................................12 ...................................13 14 ................................14 ......................................15 ..........................................16 .....................................18 19 .................................................19 ............................................20 .....................................21 ............................................................21 ................................22 .................................22 24 ..............................24 .......................................................26 .....................................................26 ................................................27 ..................................................28 T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ 5 CONFORMANCE CLAIMS 5.1 Common Criteria conformance 5.1.1 Overview of the SFR defined in this ST 5.1.2 Overview of the additional protocols 5.1.2.1 Active Authentication 5.1.2.2 Prepersonalization phase 5.2 Protection Profile conformance 5.3 Rationale for the additions 5.4 Non evaluated features 6 SECURITY PROBLEM DEF 6.1 Subjects ................................ 6.1.1 PP EAC subjects 6.1.2 Additional Subjects 6.2 Assets ................................ 6.3 Threats ................................ 6.3.1 Threats from the PP EAC 6.3.2 Threats for AA 6.3.3 Threats for Note 6 6.4 Organisational Security Policies 6.4.1 OSP from PP EAC 6.4.2 OSP for AA................................ 6.5 Assumptions ................................ 6.5.1 Assumptions from PP EAC 6.5.2 Assumptions for Active Authentication 7 SECURITY OBJECTIVES 7.1 Security Objectives for the TOE 7.1.1 SO from PP EAC 7.1.2 SO for AA................................ 7.1.3 SO for Note 6................................ 7.2 Security objectives for the Operational Environment 7.2.1 OE from PP EAC 7.2.1.1 Issuing Organization IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with BAP and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 CONFORMANCE CLAIMS Criteria conformance ................................................................ Overview of the SFR defined in this ST ................................................................ Overview of the additional protocols ................................................................ Active Authentication................................................................................................ Prepersonalization phase................................................................................................ Protection Profile conformance ................................................................ Rationale for the additions ................................................................ Non evaluated features................................................................ SECURITY PROBLEM DEFINITION ................................................................................................ PP EAC subjects................................................................................................ Additional Subjects ................................................................................................ ................................................................................................ ................................................................................................ Threats from the PP EAC................................................................ ................................................................................................ Threats for Note 6................................................................................................ Organisational Security Policies ................................................................ OSP from PP EAC................................................................................................ ................................................................................................ ................................................................................................ Assumptions from PP EAC................................................................ Assumptions for Active Authentication ................................................................ SECURITY OBJECTIVES Security Objectives for the TOE................................................................ SO from PP EAC................................................................................................ ................................................................................................ ................................................................................................ Security objectives for the Operational Environment................................ OE from PP EAC................................................................................................ Issuing Organization ................................................................................................ curity Target EAC with BAP and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - 29 ............................................29 .................................... 29 ...................................... 30 ...................................... 30 ................................ 30 ...........................................31 ..................................................31 .......................................................31 33 ..............................................33 ........................................ 33 .................................. 35 .................................................35 ...............................................37 .......................................................... 37 .......................................... 40 .................................... 40 ...........................................41 ...................................... 41 ................................................ 42 .......................................42 ........................................................ 42 ................................... 44 45 ............................................45 ........................................ 45 .................................................. 47 ............................................ 47 ............................................48 ........................................ 48 ........................................ 48 T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ 7.2.1.2 Receiving Organization 7.2.2 OE for AA................................ 8 EXTENDED REQUIREMENT 8.1 Extended family FAU_SAS 8.1.1 Extended components FAU_SAS.1 8.2 Extended family FCS_RND 8.2.1 Extended component FCS_RND.1 8.3 Extended family FIA_API 8.3.1 Extended component FIA_API.1 8.4 Extended family FMT_LIM 8.4.1 Extended component FMT_LIM.1 8.4.2 Extended component FMT_LIM.2 8.5 Extended family FPT_EMS 8.5.1 Extended component FPT_EMS.1 9 SECURITY REQUIREMENT 9.1 Security Functional Requirements 9.1.1 Global SFR ................................ 9.1.2 Product configuration SFR 9.1.2.1 SFR for additional code 9.1.2.2 Manufacturing and Personalization 9.1.3 Active Authentication SFR 9.1.4 Basic Access Protection SFR 9.1.5 Chip Authentication SFR 9.1.6 Terminal Authentication SFR 9.1.7 Extended Access Control SFR 9.2 Security Assurance Requirements 10 TOE SUMMARY SPECIFIC 10.1 TOE Summary Specification 11 RATIONALES 12 REFERENCES IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with BAP and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 Receiving Organization................................................................................................ ................................................................................................ EXTENDED REQUIREMENTS Extended family FAU_SAS - Audit data storage................................ Extended components FAU_SAS.1................................................................ Extended family FCS_RND - Generation of random numbers ................................ Extended component FCS_RND.1................................................................ Extended family FIA_API – Authentication proof of identity ................................ Extended component FIA_API.1 ................................................................ Extended family FMT_LIM - Limited capabilities and availability Extended component FMT_LIM.1................................................................ Extended component FMT_LIM.2................................................................ Extended family FPT_EMS - TOE Emanation ................................ Extended component FPT_EMS.1................................................................ SECURITY REQUIREMENTS Security Functional Requirements................................................................ ................................................................................................ Product configuration SFR ................................................................ SFR for additional code ................................................................................................ Manufacturing and Personalization ................................................................ Active Authentication SFR................................................................ Basic Access Protection SFR................................................................ Chip Authentication SFR................................................................ Terminal Authentication SFR ................................................................ Extended Access Control SFR................................................................ Security Assurance Requirements................................................................ TOE SUMMARY SPECIFICATION TOE Summary Specification ................................................................ curity Target EAC with BAP and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - .................................... 50 .................................................. 51 52 .....................................................52 ........................................... 52 ................................52 ............................................ 52 .................................52 .............................................. 52 availability...........................53 ............................................ 53 ............................................ 53 .........................................................54 ............................................ 54 55 ........................................55 ................................................ 55 ....................................................... 57 ................................... 57 ................................................ 61 ........................................................ 68 ..................................................... 70 ........................................................... 75 ................................................... 81 ................................................... 83 ........................................86 87 .................................................87 91 92 T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ 13 ACRONYMS INDEX 96 IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with BAP and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 curity Target EAC with BAP and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - 95 T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ List of Figures Figure 1 - ID-One Native eDoc Overview Figure 2 - Block 1 Overview Figure 4: Smartcard product life- IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with BAP and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 One Native eDoc Overview -cycle for the TOE curity Target EAC with BAP and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - 15 15 24 T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ List of tables Table 1 - General Identification Table 2 - TOE Technical Identification Table 3 - Chip Identification Table 4 - Block 1 Applications overview Table 5 - OT Cryptographic library Table 6 - Roles identification on the life cycle Table 7 - Subjects identification following life cycle steps Table 8 - Conformance Rationale Table 10 - Additional SFR Table 11 - User Data Table 12 - TSF Data Table 13- Threats and Security Objectives Table 14 - OSPs and Security Objectives Table 15 - Assumptions and OE – IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with BAP and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 TOE Technical Identification Block 1 Applications overview OT Cryptographic library Roles identification on the life cycle Subjects identification following life cycle steps Conformance Rationale Threats and Security Objectives – coverage OSPs and Security Objectives – Coverage – Coverage curity Target EAC with BAP and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - 11 12 13 15 20 25 25 29 30 36 36 91 91 91 T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ 1 SECURITY TARGET INTRODUCTION 1.1 Purpose The objective of this document is to present the IDL full EAC v2 product on NXP components from 1.2 Objective of the security target This security target describes the security needs for PP EAC and adds requirements for prepersonalization and personalization. This security target aims to satisfy the requirements of Common Criteria level defined in §1.3 in defining the security enforcing functions of the the environment in which it operates. The objectives of this Security Target are: - To describe the Target of Evaluation (TOE), its life cycle and to position it in the smart card life cycle. - To describe the security envi the threats to be countered by the TOE and by the operational environment during the platform active phases. - To describe the security objectives of the TOE and its supporting environment in terms integrity and confidentiality of sensitive information. It includes protection of the TOE (and its documentation) during the product active phases. - To specify the security requirements which include the TOE functional requirements, the TOE assurance requirements and the security requirements for the - To describe the summary of the TOE specification including a description of the security functions and assurance measures that meet the TOE security requirements. - To present evidence that this ST TOE provides on an effective set of IT security countermeasures within the security environment, and that the TOE summary specification addresses the requirements. IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with BAP and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 INTRODUCTION The objective of this document is to present the Public Security Target EAC with NXP components from P60 family. Objective of the security target This security target describes the security needs for IDL full EAC v2 product. The product is AC and adds requirements for prepersonalization and personalization. This security target aims to satisfy the requirements of Common Criteria level in defining the security enforcing functions of the Target Of Evaluation and describing the environment in which it operates. The objectives of this Security Target are: To describe the Target of Evaluation (TOE), its life cycle and to position it in the smart To describe the security environment of the TOE including the assets to be protected and the threats to be countered by the TOE and by the operational environment during the platform active phases. To describe the security objectives of the TOE and its supporting environment in terms integrity and confidentiality of sensitive information. It includes protection of the TOE (and its documentation) during the product active phases. To specify the security requirements which include the TOE functional requirements, the uirements and the security requirements for the environment. To describe the summary of the TOE specification including a description of the security functions and assurance measures that meet the TOE security requirements. To present evidence that this ST is a complete and cohesive set of requirements that the TOE provides on an effective set of IT security countermeasures within the security environment, and that the TOE summary specification addresses the requirements. curity Target EAC with BAP and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - with BAP and AA of the full EAC v2 product. The product is based on This security target aims to satisfy the requirements of Common Criteria level EAL5 augmented as Target Of Evaluation and describing To describe the Target of Evaluation (TOE), its life cycle and to position it in the smart ronment of the TOE including the assets to be protected and the threats to be countered by the TOE and by the operational environment during the To describe the security objectives of the TOE and its supporting environment in terms of integrity and confidentiality of sensitive information. It includes protection of the TOE To specify the security requirements which include the TOE functional requirements, the environment. To describe the summary of the TOE specification including a description of the security functions and assurance measures that meet the TOE security requirements. is a complete and cohesive set of requirements that the TOE provides on an effective set of IT security countermeasures within the security environment, and that the TOE summary specification addresses the requirements. T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ 1.3 Security target identification Title: Security Editor: Oberthur Technologies CC version: 3.1 revision 4 EAL: EAL5 augmented with: - ALC_DVS. - AVA_VAN.5 - PP(s): BSI-CC-PP ST Reference: FQR 110 72 ITSEF: LETI Certification Body: ANSSI Evaluation scheme: FR IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with BAP and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 identification Security target EAC with BAP Oberthur Technologies 3.1 revision 4 augmented with: ALC_DVS.2 AVA_VAN.5 PP-056 [R12] FQR 110 7246 Issue 7 Table 1 - General Identification curity Target EAC with BAP and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ 1.4 TOE technical identification Product name: ID- Commercial name of the TOE 1: ID- configuration Commercial name of the TOE 2: ID- configuration IC type ‘6C14 ‘6014 ‘6A15 ‘6019 ‘6A20 Additional code 1 Mandatory generic Identification: ‘C96E449AD06093BB25395B4F2C4F63720C46F52E2D4D91BA00B84B098 6F7A738 Additional code 2 Optional DBI Identification: ‘B765E230D3B932A3930445DF453B50CAA3EC0077C03ABD2F327D8606 532F51C2 Table Nota Bene - The additional code doesn’t depend on the IC and the memory size - The additional code is encrypted with the LSK key - An optional additional code (functional) can be loaded. This additional code, relative to the Digitally Blurred Image process (DBI) is part evaluation. IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with BAP and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 TOE technical identification -One ePass Full EAC v2 -One ePass Full EAC v2 on P60x080 VC/VG configuration EAC with BAP and AA -One ePass Full EAC v2 on P60x144 VA IDL configuration configuration EAC with BAP and AA 6C14’ (P60D080 VC) 6014’ (P60D080 VG) 6A15’ (P60D144 VA) 6019’ (P60C080 VG) 6A20’ (P60C144 VA) C96E449AD06093BB25395B4F2C4F63720C46F52E2D4D91BA00B84B098 6F7A738’ B765E230D3B932A3930445DF453B50CAA3EC0077C03ABD2F327D8606 532F51C2’ Table 2 - TOE Technical Identification The additional code doesn’t depend on the IC and the memory size The additional code is encrypted with the LSK key An optional additional code (functional) can be loaded. This additional code, relative to the Digitally Blurred Image process (DBI) is part of the product, but not in the scope of the curity Target EAC with BAP and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - IDL configuration IDL configuration C96E449AD06093BB25395B4F2C4F63720C46F52E2D4D91BA00B84B098 B765E230D3B932A3930445DF453B50CAA3EC0077C03ABD2F327D8606 An optional additional code (functional) can be loaded. This additional code, relative to the of the product, but not in the scope of the T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ 1.5 IC identification IC Reference: NXP P60 chips TOE 1: NXP P60x080/052/040 EAL 6 + AVA_VAN.5 + TOE 2: NXP P60x144/080PVA/PVA (Y) EAL 6 + ALC_FLR.1 Communication protocol: Contact, Contactless and Dual Memory: ROM Chip Manufacturer: NXP Semiconductors Nota Bene TOE 1 and TOE 2 possess the same source NXP chips are driven from the NXP IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with BAP and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 NXP P60 chips NXP P60x080/052/040 PVC/PVG [R19] + AVA_VAN.5 + ALC_DVS.2 + ASE_TSS.2 P60x144/080PVA/PVA (Y) [R18] EAL 6 + ALC_FLR.1 Contact, Contactless and Dual NXP Semiconductors Table 3 - Chip Identification the same source code, which is embedded on the two NXP chips. The two NXP chips are driven from the NXP P60 chip family. curity Target EAC with BAP and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - is embedded on the two NXP chips. The two T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ 2 TOE OVERVIEW 2.1 Product overview The product ID-One Native eDoc and/or contact-less smart card integrated circuits of different form factors. The product can be configured to serve different use cases, during the product. For more information on the The product supports the storage and retrieval of structured information compliant to the Logical Data Structure as specified in [R2] Access Control [R11], Supplementary Access Control Access Control ([R12] and [R13] (compliant to [R9]). It can host four types of applications as mentioned above, namely the Moreover, further configuration may also be do other than those behaviourally defined in the referenced normative documents. This product is embedded on the ICs The ID-One Native eDoc architecture can be viewed as shown in the following pictu Platform layer Application layer Block 1: MRTD - IDL IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with BAP and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 One Native eDoc is a multi-applicative native software, embeddable in contact less smart card integrated circuits of different form factors. The product can be configured to serve different use cases, during the Prepersonalization/personalization product. For more information on the product, please refer to complete ST. The product supports the storage and retrieval of structured information compliant to the Logical [R2]. It also provides standard authentication protocols, namely Basic , Supplementary Access Control [R17], Active Authentication [R13]), the Basic Access Protection [R9] and Extended Access Protection It can host four types of applications as mentioned above, namely the IDL, MRTD Moreover, further configuration may also be done to each type of application to serve use cases defined in the referenced normative documents. This product is embedded on the ICs described in §1.5 IC identification. architecture can be viewed as shown in the following pictu NXP P60 Low layer Tools modules Applicative modules Operating System Block 2: eID Block 3: eSign curity Target EAC with BAP and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - embeddable in contact less smart card integrated circuits of different form factors. The product can be Prepersonalization/personalization phases of the The product supports the storage and retrieval of structured information compliant to the Logical . It also provides standard authentication protocols, namely Basic , Active Authentication [R39], Extended and Extended Access Protection MRTD, eID and eSign. ne to each type of application to serve use cases architecture can be viewed as shown in the following picture: Block 4: Dauth T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ Figure 2.2 TOE overview The TOE described in this security target is the the Block 1 MRTD - IDL. The block 1 of the ID-One Native eDoc is composed of the following Applications PP MRTD BAC with CA and AA [R11] EAC with AA [R12] EAC with PACE and AA [R13] PACE with CA, PACE_CAM and AA [R14] IDL BAP X EAC and BAP X PACE X PACE and EAC X Table The EAC with BAP TOE is instantiated during the product prepersonalization, using the system that creates the MF / DF required for the Block 1: MRTD & IDL MRTD BAC IDL BAP IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with BAP and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 Figure 1 - ID-One Native eDoc Overview The TOE described in this security target is the EAC with BAP and AA TOE of the One Native eDoc is composed of the following applications: Targeted EAL EAL4 + ADV_FSP.5 + ADV_INT.2 + ADV_TDS.4 + ALC_DVS.2 + ALC_CMS.5 + ALC_TAT.2 + ATE_DPT.3 EAL5 + ALC_DVS.2 + AVA_VAN.5 EAL5 + ALC_DVS.2 + AVA_VAN.5 EAL5 + ALC_DVS.2 + AVA_VAN.5 EAL4 + ADV_FSP.5 + ADV_INT.2 + ADV_TDS.4 + ALC_DVS.2 + ALC_CMS.5 + ALC_TAT.2 + ATE_DPT.3 EAL5 + ALC_DVS.2 + AVA_VAN.5 EAL5 + ALC_DVS.2 + AVA_VAN.5 EAL5 + ALC_DVS.2 + AVA_VAN.5 Table 4 - Block 1 Applications overview Figure 2 - Block 1 Overview TOE is instantiated during the product prepersonalization, using the that creates the MF / DF required for the EAC with BAP configuration. MRTD EAC MRTD EAC with PACE IDL PACE IDL PACE & EAC MRTD IDL EAC with BAP curity Target EAC with BAP and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - TOE of the product, a subset of EAL4 + ADV_FSP.5 + ADV_INT.2 + ADV_TDS.4 + ALC_DVS.2 + EAL4 + ADV_FSP.5 + ADV_INT.2 + ADV_TDS.4 + ALC_DVS.2 + TOE is instantiated during the product prepersonalization, using the operating IDL PACE & EAC MRTD PACE T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ The TOE life cycle is described in The TOE identification is described in Nota bene The TOE scope encompasses the following features: - Extended Access Control - Basic Access Protection - Active Authentication - Prepersonalization phase - Personalization phase Nevertheless, the TOE can embed TOE and subject to an evaluation in other TOEs. 2.3 TOE usages Organisation issues MRDs to be used by the holder to prove his/her identity and claiming associated rights. For instance, it can be used to check identity at customs in an MRD configuration, verifying authenticity of electronic visa stored on the card and correspondence with the holder. In order to pass successfully the control, the holder presents its personal system to first prove his/her identity. The inspection system is under control of an authorised agent and can be either a desktop device such as those present in airports or a portable device to be used on the field. The MRD in context of this securit - Visual (eye readable) biographical data and portrait of the holder printed in the - A separate data summary keydoc) for visual and machine reading using OCR methods in the Machine Readable Zone (keydoc area) - And data elements stored o reading. The authentication of the holder is based on: - The possession of a valid the biographical data page and - The Biometric matching performed on the Inspection system using the reference data stored in the MRD. IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with BAP and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 The TOE life cycle is described in §4 TOE life cycle. TOE identification is described in §1.4 TOE technical identification. The TOE scope encompasses the following features: Access Control with Chip Authentication and Terminal Authentication Prepersonalization phase (in particular with Additional code loading) embed other secure functionalities, but they are not in the scope of this TOE and subject to an evaluation in other TOEs. to be used by the holder to prove his/her identity and claiming associated be used to check identity at customs in an MRD configuration, verifying authenticity of electronic visa stored on the card and correspondence with the holder. In order to pass successfully the control, the holder presents its personal MRD system to first prove his/her identity. The inspection system is under control of an authorised agent and can be either a desktop device such as those present in airports or a portable device to be used in context of this security target contains: Visual (eye readable) biographical data and portrait of the holder printed in the A separate data summary keydoc) for visual and machine reading using OCR methods in the Machine Readable Zone (keydoc area) And data elements stored on the TOE’s chip for dual, contact and contact The authentication of the holder is based on: The possession of a valid MRD personalized for a holder with the claimed identity as given on the biographical data page and The Biometric matching performed on the Inspection system using the reference data stored curity Target EAC with BAP and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - with Chip Authentication and Terminal Authentication other secure functionalities, but they are not in the scope of this to be used by the holder to prove his/her identity and claiming associated be used to check identity at customs in an MRD configuration, verifying authenticity of electronic visa stored on the card and correspondence with the holder. MRD to the inspection system to first prove his/her identity. The inspection system is under control of an authorised agent and can be either a desktop device such as those present in airports or a portable device to be used Visual (eye readable) biographical data and portrait of the holder printed in the card A separate data summary keydoc) for visual and machine reading using OCR methods in the contact-less machine personalized for a holder with the claimed identity as given on The Biometric matching performed on the Inspection system using the reference data stored T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ When holder has been authenticated the issuing Organization can performed extra authentications in order to gain rights required to grant access to some information”… The issuing Organization ensures the authenticity of the data of genuine Organization trusts a genuine MRD The MRD can be viewed as the combination: - A physical MRD in form of paper or plastic with an embedded chip and possibly an antenna. It presents visual readable data including (but not limited to) personal data of the holder o The biographical data on the biographical o The printed data in the Machine the device o The printed portrait - A logical MRD as data of the specified by ICAO and extended in presents contact or contact the MRD holder o The digital Machine R o The digitized portraits o The optional biometric reference data of finger(s) or iris image(s) or both o The other data according to LDS (up to o The Document security object The issuing Organization implements security integrity of the MRD and its data. The identified by the document number. The physical MRD is protected by physical security measures (e.g. wat printing), logical (e.g. authentication keys of the (e.g. control of materials, personalization procedures). These security measures include the binding of the MRD’s chip to the physical support. The logical MRD is protected in authenticity and integrity by a digital signature created by the document signer acting for the issuing Organization and the security features of the IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with BAP and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 When holder has been authenticated the issuing Organization can performed extra authentications in order to gain rights required to grant access to some sensitive information such as “visa The issuing Organization ensures the authenticity of the data of genuine MRDs MRD of an issuing Organization. can be viewed as the combination: in form of paper or plastic with an embedded chip and possibly an antenna. It presents visual readable data including (but not limited to) personal data of the The biographical data on the biographical data page of the Driving Licence Do The printed data in the Machine-Readable Zone (keydoc)keydoc are The printed portrait as data of the MRD holder stored according to the Logical Data Structure as specified by ICAO and extended in [R7], [R8], [R9] on the contactless integrated circuit. It presents contact or contact-less readable data including (but not limited to) personal data of The digital Machine Readable Zone Data (keydoc data, DG1) The digitized portraits The optional biometric reference data of finger(s) or iris image(s) or both The other data according to LDS (up toDG64) The Document security object The issuing Organization implements security features of the MRD to maintain the authenticity and and its data. The MRD as the physical device and the MRD’s chip is uniquely identified by the document number. is protected by physical security measures (e.g. watermark on paper, security printing), logical (e.g. authentication keys of the MRD’s chip) and organisational security measures (e.g. control of materials, personalization procedures). These security measures include the binding chip to the physical support. is protected in authenticity and integrity by a digital signature created by the document signer acting for the issuing Organization and the security features of the curity Target EAC with BAP and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - When holder has been authenticated the issuing Organization can performed extra authentications sensitive information such as “visa MRDs. The receiving in form of paper or plastic with an embedded chip and possibly an antenna. It presents visual readable data including (but not limited to) personal data of the MRD Driving Licence Document keydoc area that identifies holder stored according to the Logical Data Structure as on the contactless integrated circuit. It less readable data including (but not limited to) personal data of The optional biometric reference data of finger(s) or iris image(s) or both to maintain the authenticity and as the physical device and the MRD’s chip is uniquely ermark on paper, security chip) and organisational security measures (e.g. control of materials, personalization procedures). These security measures include the binding is protected in authenticity and integrity by a digital signature created by the document signer acting for the issuing Organization and the security features of the MRD’s chip. T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ 2.4 TOE definition The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the readable documents (MRD’s chip) programmed according to the Logical Data Structure (LDS) and providing the following features: - Basic Access Protection - Active Authentication - Extended Access Control The TOE comprises at least: - Circuitry of the MRD’s chip (the integrated circuit, IC) - IC Dedicated Software with the parts IC Dedicated Test Software and IC Dedicated Software - IC Embedded Software (opera - MRD application - Associated guidance documentation IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with BAP and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the contact, contactless and dual integrated circuit chip of machine documents (MRD’s chip) programmed according to the Logical Data Structure (LDS) and following features: Extended Access Control ircuitry of the MRD’s chip (the integrated circuit, IC) IC Dedicated Software with the parts IC Dedicated Test Software and IC Dedicated IC Embedded Software (operating system) sociated guidance documentation curity Target EAC with BAP and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - integrated circuit chip of machine documents (MRD’s chip) programmed according to the Logical Data Structure (LDS) and IC Dedicated Software with the parts IC Dedicated Test Software and IC Dedicated Support T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ 3 OE ARCHITECTURE The TOE is a smartcard, composed of various modules and composed of the following components: 3.1 Integrated Circuit - NXP P60 The TOE is embedded on NXP chips, as presented in More information on the chips are given in the related Application layer Block 1: MRTD & IDL Platform layer BAC EAC eDoc Application IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with BAP and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 OE ARCHITECTURE The TOE is a smartcard, composed of various modules and composed of the following components: Figure 3 - TOE architecture NXP P60 The TOE is embedded on NXP chips, as presented in Table 3 - Chip Identification More information on the chips are given in the related security targets. MRTD & IDL Block 2 Resident Application IDL PACE IDL PACE & EAC Low layer Tools modules Applicative modules Operating System PACE EAC w PACE IDL BAP & EAC IDL BAP curity Target EAC with BAP and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - The TOE is a smartcard, composed of various modules and composed of the following components: Chip Identification. Block 3 Block 4 T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ 3.2 Low layer The low layer developed by Oberthur Technologies provides an efficient and easy way to access chip features from the applications. Indeed, it is based on services organized according to a multi design which allows applications to use a high level interface completely independent of the chip. The main features of the OS are the following: - EEPROM management including secure data processing, - Other memories management, - Transaction management, - APDU protocol management, - Low level T=0 ; T=1 and T=CL management, - Error processing, - Advanced securities activation. A dedicated cryptographic library has been develop provide the highest security level and best tuned performances. It provides the following algorithms: Cryptographic Feature SHA1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384 and SHA RSA CRT from 1024, to 4096 bits (by steps of 256 bits) - signature/verification - key pair generation RSA SFM from 1024 to 4096 bits (by steps of 256 bits) - signature/verification - key pair generation ECC with key sizes from 192 to 521 bits - signature/verification (ECDSA) - key agreement (ECDH) - key pair generation 3DES with 112 bits key size AES with 128, 192, 256 key sizes Random Generator compliant AIS31 Diffie Hellman from 1024 to 2048 - key agreement - key generation Integrated mapping over prime field and Elliptic curves Table IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with BAP and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 Oberthur Technologies provides an efficient and easy way to access chip s from the applications. Indeed, it is based on services organized according to a multi design which allows applications to use a high level interface completely independent of the chip. The main features of the OS are the following: nt including secure data processing, Other memories management, Transaction management, APDU protocol management, and T=CL management, Advanced securities activation. A dedicated cryptographic library has been developed and designed by Oberthur Technologies provide the highest security level and best tuned performances. It provides the following algorithms: Embedded 384 and SHA-512 bits 4096 bits (by steps of 256 bits): RSA SFM from 1024 to 4096 bits (by steps of 256 bits): ECC with key sizes from 192 to 521 bits : Random Generator compliant AIS31 Diffie Hellman from 1024 to 2048 : prime field and Elliptic curves Table 5 - OT Cryptographic library curity Target EAC with BAP and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - Oberthur Technologies provides an efficient and easy way to access chip s from the applications. Indeed, it is based on services organized according to a multi-layer design which allows applications to use a high level interface completely independent of the chip. ed and designed by Oberthur Technologies to provide the highest security level and best tuned performances. It provides the following algorithms: T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ More information is available in complete ST 3.3 Tools modules The tools modules provide IDL full EAC v2 product: - File system compliant with ISO/IEC 7816 recommendations [R2]. - ISO Secure Messaging as specified in - PIN and BIO access rights - Asymmetric Keys Management as storage, signature, verification, D - Symmetric Key management - Access Control for ‘Change MSK’ and ‘PUT KEY’ APDU - Authentication and secure messaging to be used Personalization phases, based on Global Platform standard More information is available in 3.4 Applicative modules The applicative modules provide - Chip Authentication version 1 ephemeral-static Diffie communication and unilateral authentication of the - Terminal Authentication two move challenge-response protocol that provides explicit unilateral authentication of the terminal. - PACE Protocol as specified in protocol that provides secure communication and explicit password the IDL chip and the terminal. - Access Conditions Engine object) with a current context (CHA, Role ID…). documents such as eMRTD, iDL, eID and eSign, the application embeds ROMed access condition rules. - Another applicative module is the Digital Blurred Imag of a JPG or JPEG2000 file stored in a transparent file. patents owned by Oberthur Technologies. scope of this present certification. More information is available in IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with BAP and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 complete ST. full EAC v2 product: compliant with ISO/IEC 7816-4 and ISO/IEC 7816-9. It is also compliant with ICAO ISO Secure Messaging as specified in [R20] and as described in annex E of N and BIO access rights management as presented in § 2.5 of [R40] and B.6 of Asymmetric Keys Management as storage, signature, verification, DH and generation. Symmetric Key management Access Control for ‘Change MSK’ and ‘PUT KEY’ APDU Authentication and secure messaging to be used during Prepersonalization and Personalization phases, based on Global Platform standard complete ST. Applicative modules The applicative modules provide IDL full EAC v2 product: version 1 as described in [R39] and version 2 as described in static Diffie-Hellman key agreement protocol that provides secure communication and unilateral authentication of the IDL chip. Authentication version 1 as described in [R39] and version 2 as described in response protocol that provides explicit unilateral authentication of the s specified in [R17], a password authenticated Diffie-Hellman key agreement protocol that provides secure communication and explicit password-based authentication of chip and the terminal. Access Conditions Engine that checks the AC rules attached to an object (file, object) with a current context (CHA, Role ID…). For applications already defined by normative documents such as eMRTD, iDL, eID and eSign, the application embeds ROMed access Another applicative module is the Digital Blurred Image (DBI) module. It allows the blurring of a JPG or JPEG2000 file stored in a transparent file. This feature is the implementation of patents owned by Oberthur Technologies. This module is part of the TOE and outside the scope of this present certification. complete ST. curity Target EAC with BAP and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - 9. It is also compliant with ICAO and as described in annex E of [R41]. and B.6 of [R41] H and generation. Prepersonalization and and version 2 as described in [R40], an Hellman key agreement protocol that provides secure and version 2 as described in [R40], a response protocol that provides explicit unilateral authentication of the Hellman key agreement based authentication of checks the AC rules attached to an object (file, key, data For applications already defined by normative documents such as eMRTD, iDL, eID and eSign, the application embeds ROMed access e (DBI) module. It allows the blurring This feature is the implementation of is part of the TOE and outside the T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ 3.5 Operating System This application manages the TOE in pre configure the TOE in the expected way. It implements and control access to Key management (MSK, LSK), File management including data reading and writing addressed in clear mode for secure environment or non More information is available in 3.6 Application layer Two kinds of dispatcher are available on the top of the product: the resident application for Personalization Phase and for used during the Use Phase of MRD Applications. The application layer also manages Control, Basic Access Protection, Extended Access Control The protocol for Basic Access Control is specified by ICAO terminal has physical access to the MRD’s data page. This is enforced by requiring the terminal to derive an authentication key from the optically read Access Control is based on ISO/IEC 11770 also used to generate session keys that are used to protect the confidentiality (and integrity) of the transmitted data. The inspection system: - Reads the printed data in the - Authenticates itself as inspection system by means of keys derived from After successful 3DES based authentication, the TOE provides read access to data requiring BAC rights by means of a private communication (secure messaging) with the inspection system. The Basic Access Protection (BAP) is especially used in the context of IDL as an alternative to BAC. Indeed it is actually a generalisation of BAC allowing usage of extra algorithms and key l exists in 4 modes: BAP1 - 3DES with key length of 128 bits (equivalent to BAC), BAP2 - AES with key length of 128 bits, BAP3 - AES with key length of 192 bits, BAP4 - AES with key length of 256 bits. Following Secure messaging is performed using IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with BAP and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 This application manages the TOE in pre-personalization and personalization phases in configure the TOE in the expected way. It implements and control access to Key management (MSK, SK), File management including data reading and writing or additional code loading in clear mode for secure environment or non-sensitive commands, using SCP02 or SCP03 More information is available in complete ST. are available on the top of the product: the resident application for administration during Use Phase and the eDoc the Use Phase of MRD Applications. manages protocols available during Use phase such as Basic Access , Basic Access Protection, Extended Access Control or Active Authentication The protocol for Basic Access Control is specified by ICAO [R2]. Basic Access Control checks that the terminal has physical access to the MRD’s data page. This is enforced by requiring the terminal to ey from the optically read KEYDOC of the MRD. The protocol for Basic Access Control is based on ISO/IEC 11770-2 [R36] key establishment mechanism 6. This protocol is also used to generate session keys that are used to protect the confidentiality (and integrity) of the eads the printed data in the KEYDOC (for MRD), Authenticates itself as inspection system by means of keys derived from After successful 3DES based authentication, the TOE provides read access to data requiring BAC te communication (secure messaging) with the inspection system. The Basic Access Protection (BAP) is especially used in the context of IDL as an alternative to BAC. Indeed it is actually a generalisation of BAC allowing usage of extra algorithms and key l 3DES with key length of 128 bits (equivalent to BAC), AES with key length of 128 bits, AES with key length of 192 bits, AES with key length of 256 bits. Following Secure messaging is performed using the algorithm used in the selected BAP mode. curity Target EAC with BAP and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - personalization and personalization phases in order to configure the TOE in the expected way. It implements and control access to Key management (MSK, dditional code loading. It can be sing SCP02 or SCP03. are available on the top of the product: the resident application that is used eDoc application that is protocols available during Use phase such as Basic Access or Active Authentication. Basic Access Control checks that the terminal has physical access to the MRD’s data page. This is enforced by requiring the terminal to of the MRD. The protocol for Basic key establishment mechanism 6. This protocol is also used to generate session keys that are used to protect the confidentiality (and integrity) of the Authenticates itself as inspection system by means of keys derived from KEYDOC data. After successful 3DES based authentication, the TOE provides read access to data requiring BAC te communication (secure messaging) with the inspection system. The Basic Access Protection (BAP) is especially used in the context of IDL as an alternative to BAC. Indeed it is actually a generalisation of BAC allowing usage of extra algorithms and key length. It the algorithm used in the selected BAP mode. T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ Note that the term MRZ is specific to ICAO standard; equivalent unique identifier printed on the physical TOE as a random number or barcode. The Extended Access Control (EAC) mutual authentication of the TOE and the Inspection system. This step is required to access biometric data such as fingerprints and iris stored in ensures a strong secure channel able to pro and authentication of the Inspection system retrieving the date to perform a Match on Terminal comparison. The Extended Access curve cryptography, or with RSA cryptography. This application uses the Chip Authentication and then after the Terminal Authentication. The Active Authentication of the TOE is an optional feature that may be implemented. It ensures that the TOE has not been “cloned”, by means of a challenge System and the TOE. For this purpose the chip contains its own Active Authentication RSA or ECC Key pair. A hash representation of Data Group containing the Verification Public Key and (algorithm...) is stored in the Document Security Object (SOD) and therefore authenticated by the issuer’s digital signature. The corresponding Private Key is stored in the TOE’s secure memory. The TOE supports the loading and generation of the More information is available in IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with BAP and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 Note that the term MRZ is specific to ICAO standard; [R8] uses the term “Keydoc” which refers to an ivalent unique identifier printed on the physical TOE as a random number or barcode. (EAC) enhances the latest security features and ensures mutual authentication of the TOE and the Inspection system. This step is required to access biometric data such as fingerprints and iris stored in DG7 and DG8. In particular, the authentication steps ensures a strong secure channel able to provide confidentiality of the biometric data that are read and authentication of the Inspection system retrieving the date to perform a Match on Terminal Access Control authentication steps may be performed cryptography, or with RSA cryptography. This application uses the Chip Authentication and then after the Terminal Authentication. The Active Authentication of the TOE is an optional feature that may be implemented. It ensures that oned”, by means of a challenge-response protocol between the Inspection System and the TOE. For this purpose the chip contains its own Active Authentication RSA or ECC Key pair. A hash representation of Data Group containing the Verification Public Key and (algorithm...) is stored in the Document Security Object (SOD) and therefore authenticated by the issuer’s digital signature. The corresponding Private Key is stored in the TOE’s secure memory. The TOE supports the loading and generation of the Active Authentication RSA or ECC Key pair. More information is available in complete ST. curity Target EAC with BAP and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - uses the term “Keydoc” which refers to an ivalent unique identifier printed on the physical TOE as a random number or barcode. ensures a strong and mutual authentication of the TOE and the Inspection system. This step is required to access biometric . In particular, the authentication steps vide confidentiality of the biometric data that are read and authentication of the Inspection system retrieving the date to perform a Match on Terminal be performed either with elliptic This application uses the Chip Authentication and then after the Terminal Authentication. The Active Authentication of the TOE is an optional feature that may be implemented. It ensures that response protocol between the Inspection System and the TOE. For this purpose the chip contains its own Active Authentication RSA or ECC Key pair. A hash representation of Data Group containing the Verification Public Key and attributes (algorithm...) is stored in the Document Security Object (SOD) and therefore authenticated by the issuer’s digital signature. The corresponding Private Key is stored in the TOE’s secure memory. Active Authentication RSA or ECC Key pair. T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ 4 TOE LIFE CYCLE 4.1 Life cycle overview Figure Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 Phase 4 Phase 5 Phase 6 Phase 7 TOE delivery point Card printing Embedding Software development Patch development IC photomask fabrication IC manufacturing Application End of life Application End usage IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with BAP and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 Figure 4: Smartcard product life-cycle for the TOE Testing Testing Testing AGD PRE Micromodule Prepersonalization Personalization Software development Patch development photomask fabrication IC database construction manufacturing IC testing Smartcard End of life Application Smartcard product Application AGD OPE curity Target EAC with BAP and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - ALC phase AGD phase USE phase AGD PRE AGD OPE T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ The TOE life-cycle is described in terms of four life life-cycle is additionally subdivided into 7 steps.) Additional codes are identified in § The table below presents the TOE role: Roles Subject IC developer NXP Semiconductors IC manufacturer NXP Semiconductors TOE developer Oberthur Technologies Manufacturer NXP Semiconductors Oberthur Technologies or another agent Prepersonalizer Oberthur Technologies or another agent Personalization Agent Oberthur Technologies or another agent Table 6 - Roles identification on the life cycle The table below presents the subjects following TOE life cycle steps in accordance with the standard smart card life cycle [R10], the Pr coverage: Steps Phase Subject Step 1 Development Oberthur Technologies Step 2 Development NXP Semiconductors Step 3 Manufacturing NXP Semiconductors TOE delivery point Step 4 Manufacturing MRD (Prepersonalizer) Step 5 Manufacturing MRD (Prepersonalizer) Step 6 Personalization Personalization Agent Step 7 Operational Use End user Table 7 - Subjects identification following life cycle steps IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with BAP and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 cycle is described in terms of four life-cycle phases. (With respect to the cycle is additionally subdivided into 7 steps.) Additional codes are identified in §1.5. The table below presents the TOE role: Subject NXP Semiconductors NXP Semiconductors Oberthur Technologies NXP Semiconductors Oberthur Technologies or another agent Oberthur Technologies or another agent Oberthur Technologies or another agent Roles identification on the life cycle The table below presents the subjects following TOE life cycle steps in accordance with the standard , the Protection Profile lifecycle in phases, the TOE delivery point and the Subject Covered by Oberthur Technologies ALC R&D sites NXP Semiconductors IC certification NXP Semiconductors IC certification TOE delivery point MRD Manufacturer (Prepersonalizer) AGD_PRE MRD Manufacturer (Prepersonalizer) AGD_PRE Personalization Agent AGD_PRE End user AGD_OPE Subjects identification following life cycle steps curity Target EAC with BAP and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - cycle phases. (With respect to the [R10], the TOE The table below presents the subjects following TOE life cycle steps in accordance with the standard ses, the TOE delivery point and the Sites Pessac and Colombes IC certification IC certification T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ 4.2 Phase 1 “Development” (Step1) The TOE is developed in phase 1. The IC developer develops the Dedicated Software and the guidance documentation associated with these TOE components. (Step2) The TOE developer uses the guidance documentation for the integrated circuit and the guidance documentation for relevant parts of th Embedded Software (operating system), the associated with these TOE components. The manufacturing documentation of the IC including the IC Dedicated Software and th Software in the non-volatile non manufacturer. The IC Embedded Software in the non application and the guidance documentation is securely delivered to 4.3 Phase 2 “Manufacturing” (Step3) In a first step the TOE integrated circuit is produced containing the document’s chip Dedicated Software and the parts of the document’s chip Embedded Software in the non non-programmable memories (ROM). The IC manufacturer writes the IC Identification Data onto the chip to control the IC as travel document material during the IC manufacturing and the process to the Manufacturer. The IC is securely delivered from the IC manufacture to the Manufacturer. If necessary the IC manufacturer adds the parts of the IC Embedded Software in the non-volatile programmable memories (for instance EEPROM). The IC manufacturer data in EEPROM and keys (MSK, LSK). (Step4) The Manufacturer combines the IC with hardware for the contact based / contactless interface in the travel document unless the travel document consists of the card only. (Step5) The Manufacturer (i) adds the IC Embedded Software or part of it and code in the non-volatile programmable memories if necessary, (ii) creates the e (iii) equips travel document’s chips with pre IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with BAP and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 Phase 1 “Development” (Step1) The TOE is developed in phase 1. The IC developer develops the integrated circuit, the IC Dedicated Software and the guidance documentation associated with these TOE components. developer uses the guidance documentation for the integrated circuit and the guidance documentation for relevant parts of the IC Dedicated Software and develops the IC Embedded Software (operating system), the IDL application and the guidance documentation associated with these TOE components. The manufacturing documentation of the IC including the IC Dedicated Software and th volatile non-programmable memories is securely delivered to the IC manufacturer. The IC Embedded Software in the non-volatile programmable memories, the e application and the guidance documentation is securely delivered to the Manufacturer. Phase 2 “Manufacturing” (Step3) In a first step the TOE integrated circuit is produced containing the document’s chip Dedicated Software and the parts of the document’s chip Embedded Software in the non s (ROM). The IC manufacturer writes the IC Identification Data onto the chip to control the IC as travel document material during the IC manufacturing and the process to the Manufacturer. The IC is securely delivered from the IC manufacture to the Manufacturer. If necessary the IC manufacturer adds the parts of the IC Embedded Software in the volatile programmable memories (for instance EEPROM). The IC manufacturer data in EEPROM and keys (MSK, LSK). TOE delivery point (Step4) The Manufacturer combines the IC with hardware for the contact based / contactless interface in the travel document unless the travel document consists of the card only. (Step5) The Manufacturer (i) adds the IC Embedded Software or part of it and the additional source volatile programmable memories if necessary, (ii) creates the e (iii) equips travel document’s chips with pre-personalization Data. curity Target EAC with BAP and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - integrated circuit, the IC Dedicated Software and the guidance documentation associated with these TOE components. developer uses the guidance documentation for the integrated circuit and the e IC Dedicated Software and develops the IC application and the guidance documentation The manufacturing documentation of the IC including the IC Dedicated Software and the Embedded programmable memories is securely delivered to the IC volatile programmable memories, the eIDL the Manufacturer. (Step3) In a first step the TOE integrated circuit is produced containing the document’s chip Dedicated Software and the parts of the document’s chip Embedded Software in the non-volatile s (ROM). The IC manufacturer writes the IC Identification Data onto the chip to control the IC as travel document material during the IC manufacturing and the delivery process to the Manufacturer. The IC is securely delivered from the IC manufacture to the Manufacturer. If necessary the IC manufacturer adds the parts of the IC Embedded Software in the volatile programmable memories (for instance EEPROM). The IC manufacturer add initialization (Step4) The Manufacturer combines the IC with hardware for the contact based / contactless interface in the travel document unless the travel document consists of the card only. the additional source volatile programmable memories if necessary, (ii) creates the eIDL application, and T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ The pre-personalised travel document together with the IC Identi Manufacturer to the Personalization Agent guidance documentation to the Personalization Agent Additional code loading is performed in Prepersonalization phase. [R45]. The additional code loading process is performed by the the Command LOAD SECURE: - Additional code generation - MSK authentication - LSK derivation - Memory area definition - Loading of the additional code - Secure activation of the additional code The additional code loading is performed before the creation of the MF file durin Prepersonalization. Identification of the additional code loading is given in Additional code generation The additional code is generated by signed. After generation, it is sent to the MR Loading of the additional code The additional code is loaded in the (initial) TOE by the Prepersonalizer that shall authenticate itself to the TOE beforehand. Upon reception, the (intial) TOE checks it has been generated by Oberthur Technologies (by verifying the signature) before activating it. Identification of the TOE After successful loading and activation of the additional code, the TOE update its identification data to reflects the presence of the additional code. 4.4 Phase 3 “Personalization of the travel document” (Step6) The personalization of the travel document includes (i) the survey of the travel document holder’s biographical data, (ii) the enrolment of the travel document holder biometric reference data IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with BAP and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 personalised travel document together with the IC Identifier is securely delivered from the Personalization Agent. The Manufacturer also provides the relevant parts of the Personalization Agent. Additional code loading is performed in Prepersonalization phase. It is compliant to ANSSI Note 6 The additional code loading process is performed by the Prepersonalizer in the following steps, via Additional code generation Loading of the additional code Secure activation of the additional code The additional code loading is performed before the creation of the MF file durin Identification of the additional code loading is given in Table 2 - TOE Technical Identification generated by Oberthur Technologies: developped, compiled, ciphered and sent to the MRD manufacturer to that it can load it in the (initial) TOE. loaded in the (initial) TOE by the Prepersonalizer that shall authenticate itself to the TOE beforehand. Upon reception, the (intial) TOE checks it has been generated by Oberthur Technologies (by verifying the signature) before activating it. After successful loading and activation of the additional code, the TOE update its identification data to reflects the presence of the additional code. Phase 3 “Personalization of the travel document” (Step6) The personalization of the travel document includes (i) the survey of the travel document holder’s biographical data, (ii) the enrolment of the travel document holder biometric reference data curity Target EAC with BAP and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - fier is securely delivered from the . The Manufacturer also provides the relevant parts of the It is compliant to ANSSI Note 6 in the following steps, via The additional code loading is performed before the creation of the MF file during TOE Technical Identification. : developped, compiled, ciphered and D manufacturer to that it can load it in the (initial) TOE. loaded in the (initial) TOE by the Prepersonalizer that shall authenticate itself to the TOE beforehand. Upon reception, the (intial) TOE checks it has been generated by Oberthur After successful loading and activation of the additional code, the TOE update its identification data (Step6) The personalization of the travel document includes (i) the survey of the travel document holder’s biographical data, (ii) the enrolment of the travel document holder biometric reference data T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ (i.e. the digitized portraits and the optional biometric visual readable data onto the physical part of the travel document, (iv) the writing of the TOE User Data and TSF Data into the logical travel document and (v) configuration of the TSF if necessary. The step (iv) is performed by the Personalization Agent (i) the digital KEYDOC data (EF.DG1), (ii security object. The signing of the Document security ob personalization of the genuine travel document for the travel document holder. The personalised travel document (together with appropriate guidance for TOE use if necessary) is handed over to the travel document holder for operational use. 4.5 Phase 4 “Operational Use” (Step7) The TOE is used as a travel document's chip by the traveller and the inspection systems in the “Operational Use” phase. The user data can be read according to the security policy of the issuing Organisation and can be used according to the security policy of the issuing can never be modified. Note that the personalization process and its environment may depend on specific security needs of an issuing Organisation. All produc to the “Operational Use” (phase 4) have to be considered in the product evaluation process under AGD assurance class. Therefore, the Security Target has to outline the split up of P.Manufac P.Personalization and the related security objectives into aspects relevant before vs. after TOE delivery. Some production steps, e.g. Step 4 in Phase 2 may also take place in the Phase 3. IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with BAP and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 (i.e. the digitized portraits and the optional biometric reference data), (iii) the personalization of the visual readable data onto the physical part of the travel document, (iv) the writing of the TOE User Data and TSF Data into the logical travel document and (v) configuration of the TSF if necessary. The Personalization Agent and includes but is not limited to the creation of data (EF.DG1), (ii) the digitized portrait (EF.DG6), and (iii) the Document security object. The signing of the Document security object by the Document signer finalizes the personalization of the genuine travel document for the travel document holder. The personalised travel document (together with appropriate guidance for TOE use if necessary) is handed over to the lder for operational use. Phase 4 “Operational Use” (Step7) The TOE is used as a travel document's chip by the traveller and the inspection systems in the “Operational Use” phase. The user data can be read according to the security policy of the issuing rganisation and can be used according to the security policy of the issuing Organization Note that the personalization process and its environment may depend on specific security needs of an issuing Organisation. All production, generation and installation procedures after TOE delivery up to the “Operational Use” (phase 4) have to be considered in the product evaluation process under AGD assurance class. Therefore, the Security Target has to outline the split up of P.Manufac P.Personalization and the related security objectives into aspects relevant before vs. after TOE delivery. Some production steps, e.g. Step 4 in Phase 2 may also take place in the Phase 3. curity Target EAC with BAP and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - reference data), (iii) the personalization of the visual readable data onto the physical part of the travel document, (iv) the writing of the TOE User Data and TSF Data into the logical travel document and (v) configuration of the TSF if necessary. The and includes but is not limited to the creation of ), and (iii) the Document ject by the Document signer finalizes the personalization of the genuine travel document for the travel document holder. The personalised travel document (together with appropriate guidance for TOE use if necessary) is handed over to the (Step7) The TOE is used as a travel document's chip by the traveller and the inspection systems in the “Operational Use” phase. The user data can be read according to the security policy of the issuing Organization but they Note that the personalization process and its environment may depend on specific security needs of tion, generation and installation procedures after TOE delivery up to the “Operational Use” (phase 4) have to be considered in the product evaluation process under AGD assurance class. Therefore, the Security Target has to outline the split up of P.Manufact, P.Personalization and the related security objectives into aspects relevant before vs. after TOE delivery. Some production steps, e.g. Step 4 in Phase 2 may also take place in the Phase 3. T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ 5 CONFORMANCE CLAIMS 5.1 Common Criteria conformance This Security Target (ST) claims conformance to the Common Criteria version 3.1 revision 4 [R43] and [R44]. The conformance to the CC is claimed as follows: CC Conformance rationale Part 1 Strict conformance Part 2 Conformance to the extended - FAU_SAS.1 “Audit Storage” - FCS_RND.1 “Quality metric for random numbers” - FMT_LIM.1 “Limited capabilities” - FMT_LIM.2 “Limited availability” - FPT_EMS.1 “TOE Emanation” - FIA_API.1 “Authentication Part 3 Strict conformance to Part 3. The product claims conformance to - ALC_DVS.2 “Sufficiency of security measures” - AVA_VAN.5 “Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis 5.1.1 Overview of the SFR defined in this ST SFR are presented in § 9.1 Security Functional Requirements - SFR (/Global) that are global to the product (shared - SFR (/MP_Add_code) that are dedicated for the patch loading - SFR (/MP) that are dedicated for the Manufacturing and Personalization phases - SFR (/AA) that are dedicated for Active Authentication - SFR (/CA) that are dedicated for Chip - SFR (/TA) that are dedicated for Terminal Authentication - SFR (/BAC and /BAP) that are dedicated for Basic Access - SFR (/EAC) that are dedicated for Extended Access Control 1 The rationale for SFR addition is described in the relative PP IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with BAP and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 CONFORMANCE CLAIMS Common Criteria conformance Target (ST) claims conformance to the Common Criteria version 3.1 revision 4 The conformance to the CC is claimed as follows: Conformance rationale Conformance to the extended1 part: “Audit Storage” “Quality metric for random numbers” “Limited capabilities” “Limited availability” “TOE Emanation” “Authentication Proof of Identity” Part 3. The product claims conformance to EAL 5, augmented with: “Sufficiency of security measures” Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis” Table 8 - Conformance Rationale Overview of the SFR defined in this ST Security Functional Requirements: SFR (/Global) that are global to the product (shared between the various TOE) SFR (/MP_Add_code) that are dedicated for the patch loading SFR (/MP) that are dedicated for the Manufacturing and Personalization phases SFR (/AA) that are dedicated for Active Authentication SFR (/CA) that are dedicated for Chip Authentication SFR (/TA) that are dedicated for Terminal Authentication ) that are dedicated for Basic Access Protection SFR (/EAC) that are dedicated for Extended Access Control The rationale for SFR addition is described in the relative PP and in this Security Target curity Target EAC with BAP and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - Target (ST) claims conformance to the Common Criteria version 3.1 revision 4 [R42], between the various TOE) SFR (/MP) that are dedicated for the Manufacturing and Personalization phases T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ The following table presents all the SFR defined in the SFR from the PP FAU_SAS.1; FCS_CKM.1; FCS_CKM.4; FCS_COP.1 FCS_RND.1; FIA_UID.1; FIA_UAU.1; FIA_UAU.4 FDP_UCT.1 ; FDP_UIT.1 ; FMT_SMF.1; FMT_SMR.1 FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS ; FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_INI FMT_MTD.1/CAPK; FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ; FMT_MTD.3; FPT_EMS.1 Section Additional SFR MP FCS_CKM.1/MP ; FCS_COP.1/MP ; FDP_ACC.2/MP ; FDP_ACF.1/MP ; FDP_ITC.1/MP ; FDP_UCT.1/MP ; FDP_UIT.1/MP ; FIA_AFL.1/MP ; FIA_UAU.1/MP ; FIA_UID.1/MP ; FIA_UAU.4/MP FMT_MTD.1/MP_KEY_READ ; MP Add code FAU_STG.2/MP_Add_code ; FTP_ITC.1/MP_Add_code ; FCS_CKM.1/MP_Add_code FCS_COP.1/MP_Add_code FMT_MTD.1/MP_KEY_READ_Add_code ; FMT_SMR.1/MP_Add_code Active Authentication FCS_COP.1/AA ; FDP_DAU.1/AA ; FDP_ITC.1/AA ; FMT_MTD.1/AA_KEY_READ ; FMT_MOF.1/AA ; 5.1.2 Overview of the additional protocols 5.1.2.1 Active Authentication The additional functionality of Active Authentication related on-card generation of RSA and ECC keys. It implies the following addition to the standard PP: - Additional Threats: § 6.3.2 - Additional Objective: § 7.1.2 - Additional OE: § 7.2.2 OE for AA 5.1.2.2 Prepersonalization phase The prepersonalization phase has been reinforced in this elements. IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with BAP and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 The following table presents all the SFR defined in the ST with the generic notation. FCS_COP.1/SHA ; FCS_COP.1/SYM ; FCS_COP.1/MAC ; FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER ; FIA_UAU.4 ; FIA_UAU.5; FIA_UAU.6 ; FIA_API.1 ; FDP_ACC.1 ; FDP_ACF.1 ; ; FMT_SMF.1; FMT_SMR.1; FMT_LIM.1; FMT_LIM.2 FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA ; ; FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_INI ; FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_UPD ; FMT_MTD.1/DATE ; FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE FMT_MTD.1/CAPK; FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ; FMT_MTD.3; FPT_EMS.1 ; FPT_FLS.1; FPT_TST.1; FPT_PHP.3 Table 9 -SFR from the PP Additional SFR FCS_CKM.1/MP ; FCS_COP.1/MP ; FDP_ACC.2/MP ; FDP_ACF.1/MP ; FDP_ITC.1/MP ; FDP_UCT.1/MP ; FDP_UIT.1/MP ; FIA_AFL.1/MP ; FIA_UAU.1/MP ; FIA_UID.1/MP ; FIA_UAU.4/MP ; FIA_UAU.5/MP ; FMT_MTD.1/MP ; FTP_ITC.1/MP ; FMT_MTD.1/MP_KEY_READ ; FMT_MTD.1/MP_KEY_WRITE FAU_STG.2/MP_Add_code ; FTP_ITC.1/MP_Add_code ; FCS_CKM.1/MP_Add_code CS_COP.1/MP_Add_code ; FDP_UIT.1/MP_Add_code ; FMT_MTD.1/MP_Add_code ; FMT_MTD.1/MP_KEY_READ_Add_code ; FMT_SMR.1/MP_Add_code FCS_COP.1/AA ; FDP_DAU.1/AA ; FDP_ITC.1/AA ; FMT_MTD.1/AA_KEY_READ ; FMT_MOF.1/AA ; FMT_MTD.1/AA_KEY_WRITE Table 10 - Additional SFR Overview of the additional protocols Active Authentication (AA) is based on the ICAO PKI V1.1 and the card generation of RSA and ECC keys. the following addition to the standard PP: 6.3.2 Threats for AA 7.1.2 SO for AA OE for AA Prepersonalization phase The prepersonalization phase has been reinforced in this Security Target, with the following curity Target EAC with BAP and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - ST with the generic notation. /SIG_VER ; ; ; FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE ; FCS_CKM.1/MP ; FCS_COP.1/MP ; FDP_ACC.2/MP ; FDP_ACF.1/MP ; FDP_ITC.1/MP ; FDP_UCT.1/MP ; FDP_UIT.1/MP ; FIA_AFL.1/MP ; FIA_UAU.1/MP ; FIA_UID.1/MP ; FAU_STG.2/MP_Add_code ; FTP_ITC.1/MP_Add_code ; FCS_CKM.1/MP_Add_code ; FDP_UIT.1/MP_Add_code ; FMT_MTD.1/MP_Add_code ; (AA) is based on the ICAO PKI V1.1 and the Security Target, with the following T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ This functionality is usable in phase 5 and phase 6. Once the product is locked, stated as personalized, it is no more possible to perform this operation. performed: - Additional Threats: § 6.3.3 - Additional Objective: § 7.1.3 The TOE is compliant to the last version (draft) of ANSSI Note 6 5.2 Protection Profile conformance The Security Target is based on the foll - Machine Readable Travel Documents with “ICAO Application”, For consistency reasons, editorial modifications have been performed: - BAC replaced by BAP - MRTD replaced by MRD - “DG1 to DG16“ replaced - State replaced by organization - MRZ replaced by keydoc - Reference to EF.COM for access control rules (which specifies which DG is protected by BAP or EAP) - DG2 replaced by DG6 - DG3 replaced by DG7 - DG4 replaced by DG8 - DG15 replaced by DG13 5.3 Rationale for the additions The rationales are available in the complete ST. 5.4 Non evaluated features Some features may be part of the TOE but are not evaluated as they are not relevant for the TSFs: - Standard and biometric PIN management - File system management - PACE - DBI The TOE may also contain other combination of application. IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with BAP and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 This functionality is usable in phase 5 and phase 6. Once the product is locked, stated as personalized, it is no more possible to perform this operation. The following addition has been 6.3.3 Threats for Note 6 7.1.3 SO for Note 6 The TOE is compliant to the last version (draft) of ANSSI Note 6 [R45]. Protection Profile conformance the following PP written in CC3.1 revision 2: Machine Readable Travel Documents with “ICAO Application”, Extended Access For consistency reasons, editorial modifications have been performed: replaced by “DG1 to DG24” State replaced by organization replaced by keydoc Reference to EF.COM for access control rules (which specifies which DG is protected by BAP Rationale for the additions le in the complete ST. Non evaluated features may be part of the TOE but are not evaluated as they are not relevant for the TSFs: Standard and biometric PIN management The TOE may also contain other applications such as eID, eSign, …..The current evaluation covers any curity Target EAC with BAP and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - This functionality is usable in phase 5 and phase 6. Once the product is locked, stated as The following addition has been Access Control [R12]. Reference to EF.COM for access control rules (which specifies which DG is protected by BAP may be part of the TOE but are not evaluated as they are not relevant for the TSFs: applications such as eID, eSign, …..The current evaluation covers any T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with BAP and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 curity Target EAC with BAP and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ 6 SECURITY PROBLEM DEF 6.1 Subjects 6.1.1 PP EAC subjects Manufacturer The generic term for the IC Manufacturer producing the integrated c Manufacturer completing the IC to the during the Phase 2 Manufacturing. The TOE does not distinguish between the users IC Manufacturer and MRD Manufacturer using this role Manuf Personalization Agent The agent is acting on behalf of the issuing some or all of the following activities (i) establishing the identity the holder for the biogr the MRD, (ii) enrolling the biometric reference data of the finger image(s) and/or the encoded iris image(s) (iii) writing these data on the physical and logical MRD for the holder as defined for glob initial TSF data and (iv) signing the Document Security Object defined in Application Note Personalization Agent is refered as the Country Verifying Certification Authority The Country Verifying Certification Authority (CVCA) enforces the privacy policy of the issuing Organization with respect to the protection of sensitive biometric reference data stored in The CVCA represents the country specific root of the PKI of Inspection Systems and Document Verifier Certificates within this PKI. The updates of the publi distributed in the form of Country Verifying CA Link Document Verifier The Document Verifier (DV) enforces the privacy policy of the the protection of sensitive biometric Systems. The Document Verifier manages the authorization of the sensitive data of the MRD in the limits provided by the the form of the Document Verifier Certificates. IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with BAP and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 SECURITY PROBLEM DEFINITION AC subjects The generic term for the IC Manufacturer producing the integrated circuit and the Manufacturer completing the IC to the MRD’s chip. The Manufacturer is the default user of the TOE during the Phase 2 Manufacturing. The TOE does not distinguish between the users IC Manufacturer Manufacturer using this role Manufacturer. The agent is acting on behalf of the issuing Organization to personalize the MRD some or all of the following activities (i) establishing the identity the holder for the biogr , (ii) enrolling the biometric reference data of the MRD holder i.e. the portrait, the encoded finger image(s) and/or the encoded iris image(s) (iii) writing these data on the physical and logical for the holder as defined for global, international and national interoperability, (iv) writing the initial TSF data and (iv) signing the Document Security Object defined in [R2]. Personalization Agent is refered as the Personalizer in the Security Target Country Verifying Certification Authority The Country Verifying Certification Authority (CVCA) enforces the privacy policy of the issuing with respect to the protection of sensitive biometric reference data stored in The CVCA represents the country specific root of the PKI of Inspection Systems and Document Verifier Certificates within this PKI. The updates of the public key of the distributed in the form of Country Verifying CA Link-Certificates. The Document Verifier (DV) enforces the privacy policy of the receiving Organization biometric reference data to be handled by the Extended Inspection Systems. The Document Verifier manages the authorization of the Extended Inspection Systems in the limits provided by the issuing Organization the Document Verifier Certificates. curity Target EAC with BAP and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - ircuit and the MRD ’s chip. The Manufacturer is the default user of the TOE during the Phase 2 Manufacturing. The TOE does not distinguish between the users IC Manufacturer MRD for the holder by some or all of the following activities (i) establishing the identity the holder for the biographic data in holder i.e. the portrait, the encoded finger image(s) and/or the encoded iris image(s) (iii) writing these data on the physical and logical al, international and national interoperability, (iv) writing the The Country Verifying Certification Authority (CVCA) enforces the privacy policy of the issuing with respect to the protection of sensitive biometric reference data stored in the MRD. The CVCA represents the country specific root of the PKI of Inspection Systems and creates the c key of the CVCA are receiving Organization with respect to by the Extended Inspection the Extended Inspection Systems for issuing Organizations or Organizations in T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ Terminal A terminal is any technical system communicating with the TOE either through the contact interface or through the contactless interface. Inspection System (IS) A technical system used by the border control officer of the MRD presented by the traveler and verifying its authenticity and (ii) verifying the traveler as holder. The Basic Inspection System with the MRD’s chip, (ii) implements the terminals part of the Basic Access Control Mechanism and (iii) gets the authorization to read the logical the MRD or other parts of the Inspection System (GIS) is a Basic Inspection System which implements additionally the Authentication Mechanism. The Inspection System (i) implements the Terminal Authentication Protocol and (ii) is authorized by the issuing Organization through the Document Verifier of the sensitive biometric reference data. The security attr System Certificates. MRD Holder The rightful holder of the MRD for whom the issuing Traveler Person presenting the MRD to the inspec Attacker A threat agent trying (i) to manipulate the logical biometric reference data (i.e. EF. Application Note - Note that an attacker trying to identify and to trace the movement of the remotely (i.e. without knowing or optically reading the physical this PP since this can only be averted by the Basic Access Keys that is covered by [25]. The same holds for the confidentiality of the user data EF.DG1, EF.DG6, EF.DG5 to EF.DG IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with BAP and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 A terminal is any technical system communicating with the TOE either through the contact interface or through the contactless interface. A technical system used by the border control officer of the receiving Organization presented by the traveler and verifying its authenticity and (ii) verifying the traveler as Basic Inspection System (BIS) (i) contains a terminal for the contactless communication ’s chip, (ii) implements the terminals part of the Basic Access Control Mechanism and (iii) gets the authorization to read the logical MRD under the Basic Access Control by optical reading or other parts of the Driving Licence book providing this information. The (GIS) is a Basic Inspection System which implements additionally the Mechanism. The Extended Inspection System (EIS) in addition to th Inspection System (i) implements the Terminal Authentication Protocol and (ii) is authorized by the through the Document Verifier of the receiving Organization sensitive biometric reference data. The security attributes of the EIS are defined of the Inspection for whom the issuing Organization personalized the to the inspection system and claiming the identity of the A threat agent trying (i) to manipulate the logical MRD without authorization, (ii) to read biometric reference data (i.e. EF.DG7, EF.DG8) or (iii) to forge a genuine MRD. Note that an attacker trying to identify and to trace the movement of the remotely (i.e. without knowing or optically reading the physical MRD) is not considered by this PP since this can only be averted by the BAP mechanism using the “weak” Document Basic Access Keys that is covered by [25]. The same holds for the confidentiality of the user , EF.DG5 to EF.DG24 as well as EF.SOD and EF.COM. curity Target EAC with BAP and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - A terminal is any technical system communicating with the TOE either through the contact interface receiving Organization (i) examining an presented by the traveler and verifying its authenticity and (ii) verifying the traveler as MRD a terminal for the contactless communication ’s chip, (ii) implements the terminals part of the Basic Access Control Mechanism and under the Basic Access Control by optical reading book providing this information. The General (GIS) is a Basic Inspection System which implements additionally the Chip (EIS) in addition to the General Inspection System (i) implements the Terminal Authentication Protocol and (ii) is authorized by the receiving Organization to read the ibutes of the EIS are defined of the Inspection personalized the MRD. tion system and claiming the identity of the MRD holder. without authorization, (ii) to read sensitive Note that an attacker trying to identify and to trace the movement of the MRD’s chip ) is not considered by echanism using the “weak” Document Basic Access Keys that is covered by [25]. The same holds for the confidentiality of the user T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ - An impostor is attacking the inspection system as TOE IT a genuine, counterfeit or forged attacks against the TOE but the attack itself is not relevant for the TOE. 6.1.2 Additional Subjects IC Developer Developer of the IC. TOE Developer Developer of part of the TOE source code. Prepersonalizer Agent in charge of the Prepersonalization. described in [R11]. 6.2 Assets Logical MRD data The logical MRD data consists of the EF.COM, EF.DG1 to EF.DG the Document Security Object EF.SOD according to LDS [R2]. These data are user data of the TOE. The EF.COM lists the existing elementary files (EF) with the user data. The EF.DG1 to EF.DG13 and EF.DG16 contain personal data of the used by the inspection system for the Chip Authentication. The EF.SOD is used by the inspection system for Passive Authentication of the logical The current EAC Security Target is dedicated to the protection of both (see below) and sensitive biometric EF. and managed in the related BAP The Active Authentication Public Key Info in EF. Authentication of the chip. The Document security object is used by the inspection system for Passive Authentication of the logical MRD All these data may be sorted out in two different categories. If they are specific to the user, they are If they ensure the correct behaviour of the application, they are TSF Data. User Data IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with BAP and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 An impostor is attacking the inspection system as TOE IT environment independent on using a genuine, counterfeit or forged MRD. Therefore the impostor may use results of successful attacks against the TOE but the attack itself is not relevant for the TOE. Additional Subjects Developer of part of the TOE source code. Agent in charge of the Prepersonalization. This agent corresponds to the MRD data consists of the EF.COM, EF.DG1 to EF.DG24 (with different security needs) and Document Security Object EF.SOD according to LDS [R2]. These data are user data of the TOE. The EF.COM lists the existing elementary files (EF) with the user data. The EF.DG1 to EF.DG13 and EF.DG16 contain personal data of the MRD holder. The Chip Authentication Public Key (EF.DG 14) is used by the inspection system for the Chip Authentication. The EF.SOD is used by the inspection system for Passive Authentication of the logical MRD. The current EAC Security Target is dedicated to the protection of both Active Authentication EF. (see below) and sensitive biometric EF.DG7&4. The other one (and associated keys) are described Security Target. The Active Authentication Public Key Info in EF.DG13 is used by the inspection sys Authentication of the chip. The Document security object is used by the inspection system for Passive MRD. All these data may be sorted out in two different categories. If they are specific to the user, they are User data, If they ensure the correct behaviour of the application, they are TSF Data. Description curity Target EAC with BAP and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - environment independent on using . Therefore the impostor may use results of successful MRD manufacturer as (with different security needs) and Document Security Object EF.SOD according to LDS [R2]. These data are user data of the TOE. The EF.COM lists the existing elementary files (EF) with the user data. The EF.DG1 to EF.DG13 and ication Public Key (EF.DG 14) is used by the inspection system for the Chip Authentication. The EF.SOD is used by the inspection Active Authentication EF.DG13 &4. The other one (and associated keys) are described is used by the inspection system for Active Authentication of the chip. The Document security object is used by the inspection system for Passive T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ User Data CPLC Data Sensitive biometric reference data Active Authentication Public Key in EF.DG13 (AAPK) Chip Authentication Public Key in EF.DG14 (CAPK) TSF Data TOE_ID Prepersonalizer reference authentication data Personalization Agent reference authentication Data Basic Access Control (BAC) Key Active Authentication private key (AAK) Chip Authentication private key (CAK) Session keys for the secure channel Life Cycle State Additional Code Public Key CVCA CVCA Certificate Current date IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with BAP and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 Description Data uniquely identifying the chip. They are considered as user data as they enable to track the holder data Contain the fingerprint and the iris picture Public Key in Contains public data enabling to authenticate the chip thanks to an Active Authentication Public Key in Contains public data enabling to authenticate the chip thanks to an the Chip Authentication Protocol Table 11 - User Data Description Data enabling to identify the TOE Private key enabling to authenticate the Prepersonalizer reference Private key enabling to authenticate the Personalization Agent Master keys used to established a trusted channel b the Basic Inspection Terminal and the travel document private key Private key the chip uses to perform an Active Authentication Private key the chip uses to perform a Chip Session keys for the secure channel Session keys used to protect the communication in confidentiality, authenticity and integrity Life Cycle state of the TOE Additional code to be loaded on the initial prepersonalization by the Prepersonalizer. The loading of the additional code on the initial TOE constitures the final TOE Trust point of the travel document stored in persistent memory All the data related to the CVCA key (expiration date, name, …) stored in persistent memory Current date of the travel document Table 12 - TSF Data curity Target EAC with BAP and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - Data uniquely identifying the chip. They are considered as user data as they enable to track the holder the fingerprint and the iris picture public data enabling to authenticate the chip thanks public data enabling to authenticate the chip thanks Prepersonalizer Personalization Master keys used to established a trusted channel between the Basic Inspection Terminal and the travel document Active Authentication Chip Authentication Session keys used to protect the communication in Additional code to be loaded on the initial TOE during prepersonalization by the Prepersonalizer. The loading of the additional code on the initial TOE constitures the final TOE Trust point of the travel document stored in persistent the CVCA key (expiration date, name, T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ Authenticity of the MRD's chip The authenticity of the MRD's chip personalized by the issuing used by the traveler to prove his possession of a genuine 6.3 Threats IT environment. These threats result from the TOE method of use in the operational env and the assets stored in or protected by the TOE. Application note: The threats T.Chip_ID and T.Skimming described in the BAC PP which cannot withstand an attack with not addressed here. T.Chip_ID addresses the threat of tracing identifying remotely the MRD’s contactless communication interface. system to read the logical MRD Both attacks are conducted by an attacker physical MRD in advance. 6.3.1 Threats from the PP T.Read_Sensitive_Data Adverse action: An attacker tries to gain the sensitive biometric reference data through the communication interface of the T.Skimming (cf. [R10]) in respect of the attack path (communication interface) and the motivation (to get data stored on the MRD's chip) but differs from those in the asset under the attack biometric reference data vs. digital knowing Document Basic Access Keys) and therefore the possible attack methods. Note, that the sensitive biometric reference data are stored o data whereas the KEYDOC data and the portrait are visually readable on the physical Threat agent: having high attack potential, knowing the Document Basic Access Keys, being in possession of a legitimate MRD Asset: confidentiality of sensitive logical T.Forgery IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with BAP and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 's chip personalized by the issuing Organization for the used by the traveler to prove his possession of a genuine MRD. IT environment. These threats result from the TOE method of use in the operational env and the assets stored in or protected by the TOE. The threats T.Chip_ID and T.Skimming (cf [R11]) are averted by the described in the BAC PP which cannot withstand an attack with high attack potential thus these are not addressed here. T.Chip_ID addresses the threat of tracing the movement ’s chip by establishing or listening to communications interface. T.Skimming addresses the threat of imitating the inspection or parts of it via the contactless communication channel of the TOE. Both attacks are conducted by an attacker who cannot read the KEYDOC or who does not know the Threats from the PP EAC An attacker tries to gain the sensitive biometric reference data through the communication interface of the MRD's chip. The attack T.Read_Sensitive_Data is similar to the threat T.Skimming (cf. [R10]) in respect of the attack path (communication interface) and the motivation (to 's chip) but differs from those in the asset under the attack biometric reference data vs. digital KEYDOC, digitized portrait and other data), the opportunity (i.e. knowing Document Basic Access Keys) and therefore the possible attack methods. Note, that the sensitive biometric reference data are stored only on the MRD's chip as private sensitive personal data and the portrait are visually readable on the physical having high attack potential, knowing the Document Basic Access Keys, being in confidentiality of sensitive logical MRD (i.e. biometric reference) data curity Target EAC with BAP and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - for the MRD holder is IT environment. These threats result from the TOE method of use in the operational environment ) are averted by the mechanisms high attack potential thus these are movement of the MRD by communications through the addresses the threat of imitating the inspection the contactless communication channel of the TOE. or who does not know the An attacker tries to gain the sensitive biometric reference data through the 's chip. The attack T.Read_Sensitive_Data is similar to the threat T.Skimming (cf. [R10]) in respect of the attack path (communication interface) and the motivation (to 's chip) but differs from those in the asset under the attack (sensitive , digitized portrait and other data), the opportunity (i.e. knowing Document Basic Access Keys) and therefore the possible attack methods. Note, that the 's chip as private sensitive personal data and the portrait are visually readable on the physical MRD as well. having high attack potential, knowing the Document Basic Access Keys, being in T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ Adverse action: An attacker alters fraudulently the complete stored logical including its security related data in order to deceive on an inspection system by means of the changed MRD holder"s identity or biometric reference data. This threat comprises several attack scenarios of MRD forgery. The attacker may alter the biographical data on the biographical data of the Driving Licence book, in the printed identity of the traveler. The attacker may alter the printed portrait and the digitized portrait to overcome the visual inspection of the inspection officer and the automated biometric authentication mechanism by face recognition. The att automated biometric authentication mechanism of the inspection system. The attacker may combine data groups of different logical digitized portrait and optional biometric reference finger data read from the logical into another MRD’s chip leaving their digital this MRD. The attacker may also copy the complete unchanged log chip. Threat agent: having enhanced basic attack potential, being in possession of one or more legitimate MRDs. Asset: authenticity of logical MRD T.Counterfeit Adverse action: An attacker with reproduction of a genuine MRD authenticity of the MRD's chip used for authentication of a traveller by possession of a attacker may generate a new data set or extract completely or partially the data from a genuine MRD's chip and copy them on another appropriate chip to imitate this genuine Threat agent: having high attack potential, being in possession of one or more Asset: authenticity of logical MRD data T.Abuse-Func Adverse action: An attacker may use functions of the TOE which shall not be used in the phase "Operational Use" in order (i) to manipulate User Data, (ii) to manipulate (explore, bypass, deactivate or change) security features or functions of the TOE or (iii) to disclose This threat addresses the misuse of the functions for the initialization and the personalization in the operational state after delivery to Threat agent: having enhanced basic attack potential, being in possession of Asset: confidentiality and authenticity of logical T.Information_Leakage IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with BAP and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 An attacker alters fraudulently the complete stored logical MRD data in order to deceive on an inspection system by means of the holder"s identity or biometric reference data. This threat comprises several attack forgery. The attacker may alter the biographical data on the biographical data book, in the printed KEYDOC and in the digital KEYDOC identity of the traveler. The attacker may alter the printed portrait and the digitized portrait to overcome the visual inspection of the inspection officer and the automated biometric authentication mechanism by face recognition. The attacker may alter the biometric reference data to defeat automated biometric authentication mechanism of the inspection system. The attacker may combine data groups of different logical MRDs to create a new forged MRD, e.g. the attacker writes the portrait and optional biometric reference finger data read from the logical ’s chip leaving their digital KEYDOC unchanged to claim the identity of the holder . The attacker may also copy the complete unchanged logical MRD to another contactless having enhanced basic attack potential, being in possession of one or more legitimate MRD data. An attacker with high attack potential produces an unauthorized copy or MRD's chip to be used as part of a counterfeit MRD 's chip used for authentication of a traveller by possession of a r may generate a new data set or extract completely or partially the data from a genuine 's chip and copy them on another appropriate chip to imitate this genuine MRD having high attack potential, being in possession of one or more legitimate authenticity of logical MRD data An attacker may use functions of the TOE which shall not be used in the phase "Operational Use" in order (i) to manipulate User Data, (ii) to manipulate (explore, bypass, deactivate or change) security features or functions of the TOE or (iii) to disclose or to manipulate TSF Data. This threat addresses the misuse of the functions for the initialization and the personalization in the operational state after delivery to MRD holder. having enhanced basic attack potential, being in possession of a legitimate confidentiality and authenticity of logical MRD and TSF data, correctness of TSF. curity Target EAC with BAP and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - MRD or any part of it data in order to deceive on an inspection system by means of the holder"s identity or biometric reference data. This threat comprises several attack forgery. The attacker may alter the biographical data on the biographical data page KEYDOC to claim another identity of the traveler. The attacker may alter the printed portrait and the digitized portrait to overcome the visual inspection of the inspection officer and the automated biometric authentication acker may alter the biometric reference data to defeat automated biometric authentication mechanism of the inspection system. The attacker may combine , e.g. the attacker writes the portrait and optional biometric reference finger data read from the logical MRD of a traveler unchanged to claim the identity of the holder to another contactless having enhanced basic attack potential, being in possession of one or more legitimate high attack potential produces an unauthorized copy or MRD. This violates the 's chip used for authentication of a traveller by possession of a MRD. The r may generate a new data set or extract completely or partially the data from a genuine MRD's chip. legitimate MRDs An attacker may use functions of the TOE which shall not be used in the phase "Operational Use" in order (i) to manipulate User Data, (ii) to manipulate (explore, bypass, deactivate or to manipulate TSF Data. This threat addresses the misuse of the functions for the initialization and the personalization in the a legitimate MRD. and TSF data, correctness of TSF. T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ Adverse action: An attacker may exploit information which is leaked from the TOE during its us order to disclose confidential TSF data. The information leakage may be inherent in the normal operation or caused by the attacker. Leakage may occur through emanations, variations in power consumption, I/O characteristics, clock frequency, or by ch This leakage may be interpreted as a covert channel transmission but is more closely related to measurement of operating parameters, which may be derived either from measurements of the contactless interface (emanation) or direct measurements (by contact to the chip still available even for a contactless chip) and can then be related to the specific operation being performed. Examples are the Differential Electromagnetic Analysis (DEMA) and the Differential Power Analy Moreover the attacker may try actively to enforce information leakage by fault injection (e.g. Differential Fault Analysis). Threat agent: having enhanced basic attack potential, being in possession of a legitimate Asset: confidentiality of logical MRD T.Phys-Tamper Adverse action: An attacker may perform physical probing of the TSF Data or (ii) to disclose/reconstruct the physically modify the MRD’s chip in order to (i) modify security features or functions of the chip, (ii) modify security functions of the (iv) to modify TSF data. The physical tampering may be f (e.g. the biometric reference data for the inspection system) or TSF Data (e.g. authentication key of the MRD’s chip) or indirectly by preparation of the TOE to following attack methods by of security features (e.g. to enable information leakage through power analysis). Physical tampering requires direct interaction with the failure analysis and IC reverse engineering mechanisms and layout characteristics need to be identified. Determination of software design including treatment of User Data and TSF Data may also be a pre result in the deactivation of a security function. Changes of circuitry or data can be permanent or temporary. Threat agent: having enhanced basic attack potential, being in possession of a legitimate Asset: confidentiality and authenticity of logical T.Malfunction Adverse action: An attacker may cause a malfunction of TSF or of the Software by applying environmental stress in order to (i) deactivate or modify security featur IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with BAP and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 An attacker may exploit information which is leaked from the TOE during its us order to disclose confidential TSF data. The information leakage may be inherent in the normal operation or caused by the attacker. Leakage may occur through emanations, variations in power consumption, I/O characteristics, clock frequency, or by changes in processing time requirements. This leakage may be interpreted as a covert channel transmission but is more closely related to measurement of operating parameters, which may be derived either from measurements of the n) or direct measurements (by contact to the chip still available even for a contactless chip) and can then be related to the specific operation being performed. Examples are the Differential Electromagnetic Analysis (DEMA) and the Differential Power Analy Moreover the attacker may try actively to enforce information leakage by fault injection (e.g. having enhanced basic attack potential, being in possession of a legitimate MRD and TSF data. An attacker may perform physical probing of the MRD’s chip in order (i) to disclose TSF Data or (ii) to disclose/reconstruct the MRD’s chip Embedded Software. An attacker may ’s chip in order to (i) modify security features or functions of the chip, (ii) modify security functions of the MRD’s chip Embedded Software, (iii) modify User Data or The physical tampering may be focused directly on the disclosure or manipulation of TOE User Data (e.g. the biometric reference data for the inspection system) or TSF Data (e.g. authentication key of ’s chip) or indirectly by preparation of the TOE to following attack methods by of security features (e.g. to enable information leakage through power analysis). Physical tampering requires direct interaction with the MRD’s chip internals. Techniques commonly employed in IC failure analysis and IC reverse engineering efforts may be used. Before that, the hardware security mechanisms and layout characteristics need to be identified. Determination of software design including treatment of User Data and TSF Data may also be a pre-requisite. The modification may the deactivation of a security function. Changes of circuitry or data can be permanent or having enhanced basic attack potential, being in possession of a legitimate confidentiality and authenticity of logical MRD and TSF data, correctness of TSF. An attacker may cause a malfunction of TSF or of the MRD Software by applying environmental stress in order to (i) deactivate or modify security featur curity Target EAC with BAP and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - An attacker may exploit information which is leaked from the TOE during its usage in order to disclose confidential TSF data. The information leakage may be inherent in the normal operation or caused by the attacker. Leakage may occur through emanations, variations in power anges in processing time requirements. This leakage may be interpreted as a covert channel transmission but is more closely related to measurement of operating parameters, which may be derived either from measurements of the n) or direct measurements (by contact to the chip still available even for a contactless chip) and can then be related to the specific operation being performed. Examples are the Differential Electromagnetic Analysis (DEMA) and the Differential Power Analysis (DPA). Moreover the attacker may try actively to enforce information leakage by fault injection (e.g. having enhanced basic attack potential, being in possession of a legitimate MRD. ’s chip in order (i) to disclose ’s chip Embedded Software. An attacker may ’s chip in order to (i) modify security features or functions of the MRD’s ’s chip Embedded Software, (iii) modify User Data or ocused directly on the disclosure or manipulation of TOE User Data (e.g. the biometric reference data for the inspection system) or TSF Data (e.g. authentication key of ’s chip) or indirectly by preparation of the TOE to following attack methods by modification of security features (e.g. to enable information leakage through power analysis). Physical tampering ’s chip internals. Techniques commonly employed in IC efforts may be used. Before that, the hardware security mechanisms and layout characteristics need to be identified. Determination of software design requisite. The modification may the deactivation of a security function. Changes of circuitry or data can be permanent or having enhanced basic attack potential, being in possession of a legitimate MRD. and TSF data, correctness of TSF. MRD’s chip Embedded Software by applying environmental stress in order to (i) deactivate or modify security features or T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ functions of the TOE or (ii) circumvent, deactivate or modify security functions of the Embedded Software. This may be achieved e.g. by operating the exploiting errors in the MRD’s chip E exploit these vulnerabilities an attacker needs information about the functional operation. Threat agent: having enhanced basic attack potential, being in possession of a legitimate Asset: confidentiality and authenticity of logical 6.3.2 Threats for AA T.Counterfeit 6.3.3 Threats for Note 6 T.Unauthorized_Load Adverse action: An attacker tries to load an additional code that is not intended to be assembled with the initial TOE, ie the evidence of authenticity or integrity is not correct. Threat agent: having high attack potential, knowing the MSK, LSK and derivation data, bein possession of a legitimate MRD Asset: Logical MRD data T.Bad_Activation Adverse action: An attacker tries to perturbate the additional code activation such as the final TOE is different than the expected one (initial TOE or Threat agent: having high attack potential, knowing the MSK, LSK and derivation data, being in possession of a legitimate MRD load Asset: Logical MRD data T.TOE_Identification_Forgery Adverse action: An attacker tries to perturbate the TOE identification and in particular the additional code identification. Threat agent: having high attack potential, being in possession of a legitimat Asset: TOE_ID Application Note IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with BAP and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 functions of the TOE or (ii) circumvent, deactivate or modify security functions of the This may be achieved e.g. by operating the MRD’s chip outside the normal operating conditions, ’s chip Embedded Software or misusing administration function. To exploit these vulnerabilities an attacker needs information about the functional operation. having enhanced basic attack potential, being in possession of a legitimate dentiality and authenticity of logical MRD and TSF data, correctness of TSF. Threats for AA Threats for Note 6 An attacker tries to load an additional code that is not intended to be assembled with the initial TOE, ie the evidence of authenticity or integrity is not correct. having high attack potential, knowing the MSK, LSK and derivation data, bein An attacker tries to perturbate the additional code activation such as the final TOE is different than the expected one (initial TOE or perturbated TOE). having high attack potential, knowing the MSK, LSK and derivation data, being in MRD, being in possession of an additional code that is authorized to be An attacker tries to perturbate the TOE identification and in particular the additional having high attack potential, being in possession of a legitimate MRD curity Target EAC with BAP and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - functions of the TOE or (ii) circumvent, deactivate or modify security functions of the MRD’s chip ’s chip outside the normal operating conditions, mbedded Software or misusing administration function. To exploit these vulnerabilities an attacker needs information about the functional operation. having enhanced basic attack potential, being in possession of a legitimate MRD. and TSF data, correctness of TSF. An attacker tries to load an additional code that is not intended to be assembled having high attack potential, knowing the MSK, LSK and derivation data, being in An attacker tries to perturbate the additional code activation such as the final TOE is having high attack potential, knowing the MSK, LSK and derivation data, being in , being in possession of an additional code that is authorized to be An attacker tries to perturbate the TOE identification and in particular the additional MRD T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ This threat is not applicable in phase 7, as the TOE identification is not possible in phase 7. 6.4 Organisational Security Policies 6.4.1 OSP from PP P.BAC-PP The issuing Organizations or Organizations ensures that successfully authenticated Basic Inspection Systems have read access to logical well as to the data groups Common and Security Data. The certified in accordance with the "Common Criteria Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel Document with "DRIVING LICENCE confidentiality of standard user data and preventing the traceability of the Application note:The organizational security [R2] is addressed by the [R11] EF.DG7 and EF.DG8 is ensured by the BAC mechanism. Note the BAC mechanisms attacks with high attack potentia data in EF.DG7 and EF.DG8 against attacks with high attack potential. Due the protection of EF.DG7 and EF. and EF.DG5 to EF.DG24 are addressed technically separated evaluations (at least for P.Sensitive_Data The biometric reference data of finger(s) (EF. personal data of the MRD holder. The sensitive biometric reference data can be used only by inspection systems which are authorized for this access at the time the inspection system (Extended Inspection Systems). The issuing Verifiers of the receiving Organization limits defined by the Document Verifier Certificate. The and integrity of the sensitive private persona Inspection System after Chip Authentication. P.Manufact The Initialization Data are written by the IC Manufacturer to identify the IC uniquely. The Manufacturer writes the Pre-persona Key. IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with BAP and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 This threat is not applicable in phase 7, as the TOE identification is not possible in phase 7. Organisational Security Policies OSP from PP EAC s or Organizations ensures that successfully authenticated Basic Inspection Systems have read access to logical MRD data DG1, DG6, DG5 to DG24 the "ICAO Doc 9303" well as to the data groups Common and Security Data. The MRD is successfully evaluated and certified in accordance with the "Common Criteria Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel DRIVING LICENCE Application", Basic Access Control" [R11] in order to ensure the confidentiality of standard user data and preventing the traceability of the MRD data. The organizational security policy P.Personal_Data drawn from the ‘ICAO (cf. P.BAC-PP). The confidentiality of the personal data is ensured by the BAC mechanism. Note the BAC mechanisms attacks with high attack potential (cf. [R11]). The TOE shall protect the sensitive against attacks with high attack potential. Due to the different re and EF.DG8 on one side and the other EF.SOD, EF.COM, addressed separated protection profiles, which is assumed to result in technically separated evaluations (at least for classes ASE and VAN) and certificates. The biometric reference data of finger(s) (EF.DG7) and iris image(s) (EF.DG8) are sensitive private holder. The sensitive biometric reference data can be used only by inspection systems which are authorized for this access at the time the MRD inspection system (Extended Inspection Systems). The issuing Organization authorizes the Doc receiving Organizations to manage the authorization of inspection systems within the limits defined by the Document Verifier Certificate. The MRD's chip shall protect the confidentiality and integrity of the sensitive private personal data even during transmission to the Extended Inspection System after Chip Authentication. The Initialization Data are written by the IC Manufacturer to identify the IC uniquely. The personalization Data which contains at least the Personalization Agent curity Target EAC with BAP and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - This threat is not applicable in phase 7, as the TOE identification is not possible in phase 7. s or Organizations ensures that successfully authenticated Basic Inspection the "ICAO Doc 9303" [R2] as is successfully evaluated and certified in accordance with the "Common Criteria Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel in order to ensure the data. policy P.Personal_Data drawn from the ‘ICAO Doc 9303’ PP). The confidentiality of the personal data other than is ensured by the BAC mechanism. Note the BAC mechanisms may not resist ). The TOE shall protect the sensitive biometric reference to the different resistance EF.COM, EF.DG1, EF.DG6 protection profiles, which is assumed to result in cates. ) are sensitive private holder. The sensitive biometric reference data can be used only by MRD is presented to the authorizes the Document s to manage the authorization of inspection systems within the 's chip shall protect the confidentiality l data even during transmission to the Extended The Initialization Data are written by the IC Manufacturer to identify the IC uniquely. The MRD Personalization Agent T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ P.Personalization The issuing Organization guarantees the correctness of the biographical data, the printed portrait and the digitized portrait, the biometric respect to the MRD holder. The personalization of the authorized by the issuing Organization 6.4.2 OSP for AA P.Activ_Auth The terminal implements the Active Authentication 6.5 Assumptions The assumptions describe the security aspects of the envi intended to be used. 6.5.1 Assumptions from PP A.MRD_Manufact It is assumed that appropriate functionality testing of the procedures are used during all manufacturing and test operations to maintain confidentiality and integrity of the MRD and of its manufacturing and test data (to prevent any possible copy, modification, retention, theft or unauthorized use). A.MRD_Delivery Procedures shall guarantee the control of the TOE delivery and storage process and conformance to its objectives: - Procedures shall ensure protection of TOE material/information under delivery and storage. - Procedures shall ensure that corrective actions ar the delivery process and storage. - Procedures shall ensure that people dealing with the procedure for delivery have got the required skill. A.Pers_Agent IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with BAP and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 guarantees the correctness of the biographical data, the printed portrait and the digitized portrait, the biometric reference data and other data of the logical holder. The personalization of the MRD for the holder is performed by an agent Organization only. Active Authentication protocol as described in [R39] The assumptions describe the security aspects of the environment in which the TOE will be used or is Assumptions from PP EAC It is assumed that appropriate functionality testing of the MRD is used. It is assumed that security g all manufacturing and test operations to maintain confidentiality and and of its manufacturing and test data (to prevent any possible copy, modification, retention, theft or unauthorized use). Procedures shall guarantee the control of the TOE delivery and storage process and conformance to Procedures shall ensure protection of TOE material/information under delivery and storage. Procedures shall ensure that corrective actions are taken in case of improper operation in the delivery process and storage. Procedures shall ensure that people dealing with the procedure for delivery have got the curity Target EAC with BAP and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - guarantees the correctness of the biographical data, the printed portrait reference data and other data of the logical MRD with for the holder is performed by an agent [R39]. ronment in which the TOE will be used or is is used. It is assumed that security g all manufacturing and test operations to maintain confidentiality and and of its manufacturing and test data (to prevent any possible copy, Procedures shall guarantee the control of the TOE delivery and storage process and conformance to Procedures shall ensure protection of TOE material/information under delivery and storage. e taken in case of improper operation in Procedures shall ensure that people dealing with the procedure for delivery have got the T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ The Personalization Agent ensures the correctness of(i) the logical holder, (ii) the Document Basic Access Keys, (iii) the stored on the MRD’s chip, and (iv) the Document Signer Public Key Certificate (if stor chip). The Personalization Agent bears the Personalization Agent cryptographic mechanisms. A.Insp_Sys The Inspection System is used by the border control officer of the examining an MRD presented by the traveler and verifying its authenticity and (ii) verifying the traveler as MRD holder. The Basic Inspection System for g Country Signing CA Public Key and the Document Signer Public Key of each issuing (ii) implements the terminal part of the Basic Access Control. The Basic Inspection System reads the logical MRD under Basic Access Control and performs the Passive Authentication to verify the logical MRD. The General Inspection System in addition to the Basic Inspection System implements the Chip Authentication Mechanism. The General Inspection System verifies the auth chip during inspection and establishes secure messaging with keys established by the Chip Authentication Mechanism. The Extended Inspection System in addition to the General Inspection System (i) supports the Terminal Authentication P Organization through the Document Verifier of the biometric reference data. A.Signature_PKI The issuing and receiving Organization passive authentication i.e. digital signature creation and verification fo Organization runs a Certification Authority (CA) which securely generates, stores and Country Signing CA Key pair. The CA keeps the Country Signing CA Private Key secret recommended to distribute the Country Signing CA Public Key to ICAO, all maintaining its integrity. The Document Signer (i) generates the Document Signer Key over the Document Signer Public Key to the CA for certification, (iii) keeps the Private Key secret and (iv) uses securely the Document Signer Private Key for Security Objects of the MRDs. The CA creates the Signer Public Keys that are distributed to the A.Auth_PKI IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with BAP and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 ensures the correctness of(i) the logical MRD with respect to the holder, (ii) the Document Basic Access Keys, (iii) the Chip Authentication Public Key (EF.DG14) if ’s chip, and (iv) the Document Signer Public Key Certificate (if stor Personalization Agent signs the Document Security Object. The Personalization Agent Personalization Agent Authentication to authenticate himself to the TOE by symmetric The Inspection System is used by the border control officer of the receiving Organization presented by the traveler and verifying its authenticity and (ii) verifying the holder. The Basic Inspection System for global interoperability (i) includes the Country Signing CA Public Key and the Document Signer Public Key of each issuing (ii) implements the terminal part of the Basic Access Control. The Basic Inspection System reads the r Basic Access Control and performs the Passive Authentication to verify the logical The General Inspection System in addition to the Basic Inspection System implements the Chip Authentication Mechanism. The General Inspection System verifies the authenticity of the chip during inspection and establishes secure messaging with keys established by the Chip Authentication Mechanism. The Extended Inspection System in addition to the General Inspection System (i) supports the Terminal Authentication Protocol and (ii) is authorized by the issuing through the Document Verifier of the receiving Organization to read the sensitive receiving Organizations or Organizations establish a public key infrastructure for authentication i.e. digital signature creation and verification for the logical MRD. The issuing runs a Certification Authority (CA) which securely generates, stores and r. The CA keeps the Country Signing CA Private Key secret recommended to distribute the Country Signing CA Public Key to ICAO, all receiving Organization maintaining its integrity. The Document Signer (i) generates the Document Signer Key over the Document Signer Public Key to the CA for certification, (iii) keeps the Private Key secret and (iv) uses securely the Document Signer Private Key for signing the Document s. The CA creates the Document Signer Certificates for the Document Signer Public Keys that are distributed to the receiving Organizations and Organizations. curity Target EAC with BAP and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - with respect to the MRD Public Key (EF.DG14) if ’s chip, and (iv) the Document Signer Public Key Certificate (if stored on the MRD’s Personalization Agent Authentication to authenticate himself to the TOE by symmetric receiving Organization (i) presented by the traveler and verifying its authenticity and (ii) verifying the lobal interoperability (i) includes the Country Signing CA Public Key and the Document Signer Public Key of each issuing Organization, and (ii) implements the terminal part of the Basic Access Control. The Basic Inspection System reads the r Basic Access Control and performs the Passive Authentication to verify the logical The General Inspection System in addition to the Basic Inspection System implements the Chip enticity of the MRD's chip during inspection and establishes secure messaging with keys established by the Chip Authentication Mechanism. The Extended Inspection System in addition to the General Inspection rotocol and (ii) is authorized by the issuing to read the sensitive public key infrastructure for r the logical MRD. The issuing runs a Certification Authority (CA) which securely generates, stores and uses the r. The CA keeps the Country Signing CA Private Key secret and is receiving Organizations maintaining its integrity. The Document Signer (i) generates the Document Signer Key Pair, (ii) hands over the Document Signer Public Key to the CA for certification, (iii) keeps the Document Signer signing the Document Certificates for the Document Organizations. T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ The issuing and receiving Organization verifiable certificates of the Extended Access Control. The Country Verifying Certification Authorities, the Document Verifier and Extended Inspection Systems hold authentication key pairs and certificates for their public keys encoding the Certification Authorities of the issuing Organization the Document Verifier and the Document Verifiers are signing the certificates of the Extended Inspection Systems of the receiving Organization Organizations distribute the public keys of their Country Verifying Certification Authority to their MRD's chip. 6.5.2 Assumptions for A.Insp_Sys_AA The Inspection System implements the verifies the authenticity of the MRD’s chip during inspection during Active Authentication. IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with BAP and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 receiving Organizations or Organizations establish a public key infrastr verifiable certificates of the Extended Access Control. The Country Verifying Certification Authorities, the Document Verifier and Extended Inspection Systems hold authentication key pairs and certificates for their public keys encoding the access control rights. The Country Verifying issuing Organizations or Organizations are signing the certificates of the Document Verifier and the Document Verifiers are signing the certificates of the Extended receiving Organizations or Organizations. The issuing Organization Organizations distribute the public keys of their Country Verifying Certification Authority to their Assumptions for Active Authentication The Inspection System implements the Active Authentication Mechanism. The Inspection System verifies the authenticity of the MRD’s chip during inspection using the signature returned by the TOE curity Target EAC with BAP and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - s or Organizations establish a public key infrastructure for card verifiable certificates of the Extended Access Control. The Country Verifying Certification Authorities, the Document Verifier and Extended Inspection Systems hold authentication key pairs and access control rights. The Country Verifying s or Organizations are signing the certificates of the Document Verifier and the Document Verifiers are signing the certificates of the Extended issuing Organizations or Organizations distribute the public keys of their Country Verifying Certification Authority to their The Inspection System using the signature returned by the TOE T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ 7 SECURITY OBJECTIVES 7.1 Security Objectives for the TOE This section describes the security objectives for the TOE addressing the aspects of identified threats to be countered by the TOE and organizational security policies to be met by the TOE. 7.1.1 SO from PP E OT.AC_Pers The TOE must ensure that the logical according to LDS [R2] and the TSF data can be written by authorized logical MRD data in EF.DG1 to EF.DG changed after its personalization. The Document security object can be updated Personalization Agents if data in the data groups EF.DG 3 to EF.DG OT.Data_Int The TOE must ensure the integrity of the logical manipulation and unauthorized wr during their transmission to the General Inspection System after Chip Authentication OT.Sens_Data_Conf The TOE must ensure the confidentiality of the EF.DG8) by granting read access only to authorized Extended Inspection Systems. The authorization of the inspection system is drawn from the Inspection System Certificate used for the successful authentication and shall be a non Certificate in the certificate chain to the Country Verifier Certification Authority of the issuing Organization. The TOE must ensure the confidentiality of the logical transmission to the Extended Inspection System. The confidentiality of the sensitive biometric reference data shall be protected against attacks with high attack potential OT.Identification The TOE must provide means to store IC Identification and Pre memory. The IC Identification Data must provide a unique identification of the IC during Phase 2 "Manufacturing" and Phase 3 "Personalization of the IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with BAP and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 JECTIVES Security Objectives for the TOE This section describes the security objectives for the TOE addressing the aspects of identified threats to be countered by the TOE and organizational security policies to be met by the TOE. EAC The TOE must ensure that the logical MRD data in EF.DG1 to EF.DG24, the Document security object and the TSF data can be written by authorized Personalization Agent data in EF.DG1 to EF.DG24 and the TSF data may be written only during and cannot be changed after its personalization. The Document security object can be updated s if data in the data groups EF.DG 3 to EF.DG24 are added. The TOE must ensure the integrity of the logical MRD stored on the MRD's chip against physical manipulation and unauthorized writing. The TOE must ensure the integrity of the logical MRD data during their transmission to the General Inspection System after Chip Authentication The TOE must ensure the confidentiality of the sensitive biometric reference data (EF. ) by granting read access only to authorized Extended Inspection Systems. The authorization of the inspection system is drawn from the Inspection System Certificate used for the successful and shall be a non-strict subset of the authorization defined in the Document Verifier Certificate in the certificate chain to the Country Verifier Certification Authority of the issuing . The TOE must ensure the confidentiality of the logical MRD transmission to the Extended Inspection System. The confidentiality of the sensitive biometric reference data shall be protected against attacks with high attack potential. The TOE must provide means to store IC Identification and Pre-Personalization Data in its nonvolatile memory. The IC Identification Data must provide a unique identification of the IC during Phase 2 "Manufacturing" and Phase 3 "Personalization of the MRD". The storage of the Pre curity Target EAC with BAP and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - This section describes the security objectives for the TOE addressing the aspects of identified threats to be countered by the TOE and organizational security policies to be met by the TOE. , the Document security object Personalization Agents only. The and the TSF data may be written only during and cannot be changed after its personalization. The Document security object can be updated by authorized 's chip against physical e integrity of the logical MRD data during their transmission to the General Inspection System after Chip Authentication data. sensitive biometric reference data (EF.DG7 and ) by granting read access only to authorized Extended Inspection Systems. The authorization of the inspection system is drawn from the Inspection System Certificate used for the successful strict subset of the authorization defined in the Document Verifier Certificate in the certificate chain to the Country Verifier Certification Authority of the issuing MRD data during their transmission to the Extended Inspection System. The confidentiality of the sensitive biometric Personalization Data in its nonvolatile memory. The IC Identification Data must provide a unique identification of the IC during Phase 2 The storage of the Pre- Personalization T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ data includes writing of the Personalization Agent includes writing of the Personalization Agent Key(s). OT.CA_Proof The TOE must support the General MRD’s chip as issued by the identified issuing defined in [R39]. The authenticity proof provided by the attacks with high attack potential. OT.Prot_Abuse-Func After delivery of the TOE to the functions that may be maliciously used to - (i) Disclose critical User Data - (ii) Manipulate critical User Data of the IC Embedded Software - (iii) Manipulate Soft-coded IC Embedded Software - (iv) Bypass, deactivate, change or explore security features or functions of the TOE. Details of the relevant attack scenarios depend, for instance, on the capabilities of the Test Features provided by the IC Dedicated Test Software which are not specified here. OT.Prot_Inf_Leak The TOE must provide protection against disclosure of confidential TSF data stored and/or processed in the MRD's chip: - By measurement and analysis of the shape and amplitude of signals or the time between events found by measuring signals on the electromagnetic field, power consumption, clock, or I/O lines and - By forcing a malfunction of the TOE and/or - By a physical manipulation of the TOE. OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper The TOE must provide protection of the confidentiality and integrity of the User Data, the TSF Data, and the MRD's chip Embedded Software. This includes protection against attacks with enhanced basic attack potential by means of - Measuring through galvanic contacts which is direct except on pads being bonded (using standard tools for measuring voltage and current) or - Measuring not using galvanic contacts but other types of physical interaction between charges (using tools used in solid - Manipulation of the hardware and its security features, as well as - Controlled manipulation of memory contents (User Data, TSF Data) with a prior - reverse-engineering to understand the design and its properties and IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with BAP and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 Personalization Agent Key(s). The storage of the Prepersonalization data includes writing of the Personalization Agent Key(s). General Inspection Systems to verify the identity and authenticity of the ’s chip as issued by the identified issuing Organization by means of the Chip Authentication . The authenticity proof provided by the MRD’s chip shall be protected against attacks with high attack potential. After delivery of the TOE to the MRD Holder, the TOE must prevent the abuse of test and support functions that may be maliciously used to: (i) Disclose critical User Data (ii) Manipulate critical User Data of the IC Embedded Software coded IC Embedded Software tivate, change or explore security features or functions of the TOE. Details of the relevant attack scenarios depend, for instance, on the capabilities of the Test Features provided by the IC Dedicated Test Software which are not specified here. The TOE must provide protection against disclosure of confidential TSF data stored and/or processed y measurement and analysis of the shape and amplitude of signals or the time between ound by measuring signals on the electromagnetic field, power consumption, clock, y forcing a malfunction of the TOE and/or y a physical manipulation of the TOE. ection of the confidentiality and integrity of the User Data, the TSF Data, 's chip Embedded Software. This includes protection against attacks with enhanced basic attack potential by means of easuring through galvanic contacts which is direct physical probing on the chips surface except on pads being bonded (using standard tools for measuring voltage and current) or easuring not using galvanic contacts but other types of physical interaction between charges (using tools used in solid-state physics research and IC failure analysis) anipulation of the hardware and its security features, as well as ontrolled manipulation of memory contents (User Data, TSF Data) engineering to understand the design and its properties and functions. curity Target EAC with BAP and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - The storage of the Prepersonalization data Inspection Systems to verify the identity and authenticity of the Chip Authentication as ’s chip shall be protected against the TOE must prevent the abuse of test and support tivate, change or explore security features or functions of the TOE. Details of the relevant attack scenarios depend, for instance, on the capabilities of the Test Features The TOE must provide protection against disclosure of confidential TSF data stored and/or processed y measurement and analysis of the shape and amplitude of signals or the time between ound by measuring signals on the electromagnetic field, power consumption, clock, ection of the confidentiality and integrity of the User Data, the TSF Data, 's chip Embedded Software. This includes protection against attacks with enhanced- physical probing on the chips surface except on pads being bonded (using standard tools for measuring voltage and current) or easuring not using galvanic contacts but other types of physical interaction between ysics research and IC failure analysis) functions. T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ OT.Prot_Malfunction The TOE must ensure its correct operation. The TOE must prevent its operation outside the normal operating conditions where reliability and secure operation has not been proven or tested. This is prevent errors. The environmental conditions may include external energy (esp. electromagnetic) fields, voltage (on any contacts), clock frequency, or temperature. 7.1.2 SO for AA OT.AA_Proof The TOE must support the Inspection Systems issued by the identified issuing Organization by means of the [R2]. The authenticity proof through AA provided by MRD’s chip shall be protected against attacks with high attack potential. OT.Data_Int_AA The TOE must ensure the integri manipulation and unauthorized writing. The TOE must ensure the integrity of the logical MRD data during their transmission to the General Inspection System after 7.1.3 SO for Note 6 OT.Secure_Load_ACode The Loader of the Initial TOE shall check an evidence of authenticity and integrity of the loaded Additional Code. The Loader enforces that only the allowed version of the Additional Code can be loaded on the Initial TOE. The Loader shall forbid the loading of an Additional Code not intended to be assembled with the Initial TOE. During the Load Phase of an Additional Code, the TOE shall remain secure. OT.Secure_AC_Activation Activation of the Additional Code and update of the Identification Data shall be performed at the same time in an Atomic way. All the operations needed for the code to be able to operate as in the Final TOE shall be completed before activation. If the Atomic Activation is successful, then the resulting product is the Final TOE, otherwise (in case of interruption or incident which prevents the forming of the Final TOE), the Initial TOE shall remain in its initial state or fail secure. IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with BAP and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 The TOE must ensure its correct operation. The TOE must prevent its operation outside the normal operating conditions where reliability and secure operation has not been proven or tested. This is prevent errors. The environmental conditions may include external energy (esp. electromagnetic) fields, voltage (on any contacts), clock frequency, or temperature. The TOE must support the Inspection Systems to verify the identity and authenticity of MRD’s chip as issued by the identified issuing Organization by means of the Active Authentication . The authenticity proof through AA provided by MRD’s chip shall be protected against attacks The TOE must ensure the integrity of the logical MRD stored on the MRD's chip against physical manipulation and unauthorized writing. The TOE must ensure the integrity of the logical MRD data during their transmission to the General Inspection System after Active Authentication Note 6 The Loader of the Initial TOE shall check an evidence of authenticity and integrity of the loaded Additional Code. The Loader enforces that only the allowed version of the Additional Code can be oaded on the Initial TOE. The Loader shall forbid the loading of an Additional Code not intended to be assembled with the Initial TOE. During the Load Phase of an Additional Code, the TOE shall remain secure. Activation of the Additional Code and update of the Identification Data shall be performed at the same time in an Atomic way. All the operations needed for the code to be able to operate as in the Final TOE shall be completed before activation. If the Atomic Activation is successful, then the resulting product is the Final TOE, otherwise (in case of interruption or incident which prevents the forming of the Final TOE), the Initial TOE shall remain curity Target EAC with BAP and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - The TOE must ensure its correct operation. The TOE must prevent its operation outside the normal operating conditions where reliability and secure operation has not been proven or tested. This is to prevent errors. The environmental conditions may include external energy (esp. electromagnetic) to verify the identity and authenticity of MRD’s chip as Active Authentication as defined in . The authenticity proof through AA provided by MRD’s chip shall be protected against attacks ty of the logical MRD stored on the MRD's chip against physical manipulation and unauthorized writing. The TOE must ensure the integrity of the logical MRD data Active Authentication. The Loader of the Initial TOE shall check an evidence of authenticity and integrity of the loaded Additional Code. The Loader enforces that only the allowed version of the Additional Code can be oaded on the Initial TOE. The Loader shall forbid the loading of an Additional Code not intended to Activation of the Additional Code and update of the Identification Data shall be performed at the same time in an Atomic way. All the operations needed for the code to be able to operate as in the If the Atomic Activation is successful, then the resulting product is the Final TOE, otherwise (in case of interruption or incident which prevents the forming of the Final TOE), the Initial TOE shall remain T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ OT.TOE_Identification The Identification Data identifies the Initial TOE and Additional Code. The TOE provides means to store Identification Data in its non Atomic Activation of the Additional Code, the Identification Data of the Final TOE allows identifications of Initial TOE and Additional Code. The user must be able to uniquely identify Initial TOE and Addtitional Code(s) which are embedded in the Final TOE. Systems to verify the authenticity 7.2 Security objectives for the Operational Environment 7.2.1 OE from PP 7.2.1.1 Issuing Organization The issuing Organization will implement the following security objectives of the TOE environment. OE.MRD_Manufact Appropriate functionality testing of the TOE shall be used in step 4 to 6. During all manufacturing and test operations, security procedures shall be used through phases 4, 5 and 6 to maintain confidentiality and OE.MRD_ Delivery Procedures shall ensure protection of TOE material/information under delivery including the following objectives: - Non-disclosure of any security releva - Identification of the element under delivery - Meet confidentiality rules (confidentiality level, transmittal form, reception acknowledgment) - Physical protection to prevent external damage - Secure storage and handling procedures (including reje - Traceability of TOE during delivery including the following parameters: o Origin and shipment details o Reception, reception acknowledgement o Location material/information. Procedures shall ensure that corrective actions are taken in case of improper delivery process (including if applicable any non highlight all non-conformance to this process. IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with BAP and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 The Identification Data identifies the Initial TOE and Additional Code. The TOE provides means to store Identification Data in its non-volatile memory and guarantees the integrity of these data. After omic Activation of the Additional Code, the Identification Data of the Final TOE allows identifications of Initial TOE and Additional Code. The user must be able to uniquely identify Initial TOE and Addtitional Code(s) which are embedded in the Final TOE. TOE must support the Inspection Systems to verify the authenticity. Security objectives for the Operational Environment EAC will implement the following security objectives of the TOE environment. Appropriate functionality testing of the TOE shall be used in step 4 to 6. During all manufacturing and test operations, security procedures shall be used through phases 4, 5 and 6 to maintain confidentiality and integrity of the TOE and its manufacturing and test data. Procedures shall ensure protection of TOE material/information under delivery including the disclosure of any security relevant information dentification of the element under delivery eet confidentiality rules (confidentiality level, transmittal form, reception hysical protection to prevent external damage ecure storage and handling procedures (including rejectd TOE"s) aceability of TOE during delivery including the following parameters: rigin and shipment details eception, reception acknowledgement ocation material/information. Procedures shall ensure that corrective actions are taken in case of improper delivery process (including if applicable any non-conformance to the confidentiality convention) and conformance to this process. curity Target EAC with BAP and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - The Identification Data identifies the Initial TOE and Additional Code. The TOE provides means to volatile memory and guarantees the integrity of these data. After omic Activation of the Additional Code, the Identification Data of the Final TOE allows identifications of Initial TOE and Additional Code. The user must be able to uniquely identify Initial TOE must support the Inspection will implement the following security objectives of the TOE environment. During all manufacturing and test operations, security procedures shall be used through phases 4, 5 integrity of the TOE and its manufacturing and test data. Procedures shall ensure protection of TOE material/information under delivery including the eet confidentiality rules (confidentiality level, transmittal form, reception Procedures shall ensure that corrective actions are taken in case of improper operation in the conformance to the confidentiality convention) and T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ Procedures shall ensure that people (shipping department, carrier, reception department) d with the procedure for delivery have got the required skill, training and knowledge to meet the procedure requirements and be able to act fully in accordance with the above expectations. OE.Personalization The issuing Organization must ensure that the Organization: - (i) Establish the correct identity of the holder and create - (ii) Enroll the biometric reference data of the image(s) and/or the encoded iris image(s) - (iii) Personalize the MRD security measures to protect the confidentiality and integrity of these data. OE.Pass_Auth_Sign The issuing Organization must: - (i) Generate a cryptographic secu - (ii) Ensure the secrecy of the Country Signing CA Private Key and sign Document Signer Certificates in a secure operational environ - (iii) Distribute the Certificate of the Country Signing CA Public Key to and Organizations maintaining The issuing Organization must: - (i) Generate a cryptographic secure Document Signer Key Pair and ensure the secrecy of the Document Signer Private Keys - (ii) Sign Document Security Objects of genuine only - (iii) Distribute the Certificate of the Document and Organizations. The digital signature in the Document Security Object relates all data in the data in EF.DG1 to EF.DG OE.Auth_Key_MRD The issuing Organization has to establish the necessary public key infrastructure in order to - (i) Generate the MRD's Chip Authentication Key Pair - (ii) Sign and store the Chip Authentication Public Key in the Chip Authentica data in EF.DG14 - (iii) Support inspection systems of authenticity of the MRD Authentication Public Key by means of the Document Security Object. OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data The issuing Organization has to establish the necessary public key infrastructure in order to limit the access to sensitive biometric reference data of IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with BAP and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 Procedures shall ensure that people (shipping department, carrier, reception department) d with the procedure for delivery have got the required skill, training and knowledge to meet the procedure requirements and be able to act fully in accordance with the above expectations. must ensure that the Personalization Agents acting on behalf of th stablish the correct identity of the holder and create biographical data for the MRD nroll the biometric reference data of the MRD holder i.e. the portrait, the encoded finger e encoded iris image(s) MRD for the holder together with the defined physical and logical security measures to protect the confidentiality and integrity of these data. enerate a cryptographic secure Country Signing CA Key Pair nsure the secrecy of the Country Signing CA Private Key and sign Document Signer re operational environment istribute the Certificate of the Country Signing CA Public Key to receiving Organization and Organizations maintaining its authenticity and integrity. enerate a cryptographic secure Document Signer Key Pair and ensure the secrecy of the Document Signer Private Keys ign Document Security Objects of genuine MRD in a secure operational environment istribute the Certificate of the Document Signer Public Key to receiving Organization and Organizations. The digital signature in the Document Security Object relates all data in the data in EF.DG1 to EF.DG24 if stored in the LDS according to [R2]. has to establish the necessary public key infrastructure in order to s Chip Authentication Key Pair ign and store the Chip Authentication Public Key in the Chip Authentica upport inspection systems of receiving Organizations or organizations to verify the MRD's chip used for genuine MRD by certification of the Chip Authentication Public Key by means of the Document Security Object. has to establish the necessary public key infrastructure in order to limit the access to sensitive biometric reference data of MRD's holders to authorized receiving Organization curity Target EAC with BAP and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - Procedures shall ensure that people (shipping department, carrier, reception department) dealing with the procedure for delivery have got the required skill, training and knowledge to meet the procedure requirements and be able to act fully in accordance with the above expectations. s acting on behalf of the issuing biographical data for the MRD he portrait, the encoded finger for the holder together with the defined physical and logical security measures to protect the confidentiality and integrity of these data. nsure the secrecy of the Country Signing CA Private Key and sign Document Signer receiving Organizations enerate a cryptographic secure Document Signer Key Pair and ensure the secrecy of the perational environment receiving Organizations and Organizations. The digital signature in the Document Security Object relates all data in has to establish the necessary public key infrastructure in order to: ign and store the Chip Authentication Public Key in the Chip Authentication Public Key s or organizations to verify the by certification of the Chip has to establish the necessary public key infrastructure in order to limit the receiving Organizations T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ or Organizations. The Country Verifying Certification Authority of the issuing card verifiable Document Verifier Certificates for the OE.BAC-PP It has to be ensured by the issuing and certified in accordance with the "Common Criteria Protection Profile Machine Readabl Document with "DRIVING LICENCE cover the BAC mechanism ensuring the confidentiality of sta traceability of the MRD data. Note that due to the differences within the assumed attack potential the addressed evaluation and certification is a technically separated process. 7.2.1.2 Receiving Organization The receiving Organization will implement the following security objectives of the TOE environment. OE.Exam_MRD The inspection system of the receiving traveler to verify its authenticity by means of the physical security measures and to detect any manipulation of the physical MRD - (i) Includes the Country Signing Public Key and th issuing Organization - (ii) Implements the terminal part of the Basic Access Control OE.Pass_Auth_Verif The border control officer of the traveler as MRD holder. The inspection systems must have successfully verified the signature of Document Security Objects and the The receiving Organizations and Organizations must manage the Country Signing Public Key and the Document Signer Public Key maintaining their authenticity and availability in all inspection s OE.Prot_Logical_MRD The inspection system of the receiving data read from the logical MRD. The Basic Access Control will use inspection systems which implement the terminal part of the Basic Access Control and use the secure messaging with fresh generated keys for the protection of the transmitted data (i.e. Basic Inspection Systems). IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with BAP and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 or Organizations. The Country Verifying Certification Authority of the issuing Organization card verifiable Document Verifier Certificates for the authorized Document Verifier only. It has to be ensured by the issuing Organization, that the TOE is additionally successfully evaluated and certified in accordance with the "Common Criteria Protection Profile Machine Readabl DRIVING LICENCE Application", Basic Access Control" [R11]. This is necessary to cover the BAC mechanism ensuring the confidentiality of standard user data and preventing the data. Note that due to the differences within the assumed attack potential the addressed evaluation and certification is a technically separated process. Receiving Organization will implement the following security objectives of the TOE environment. The inspection system of the receiving Organization must examine the MRD traveler to verify its authenticity by means of the physical security measures and to detect any MRD. The Basic Inspection System for global interoperability ncludes the Country Signing Public Key and the Document Signer Public Key of each mplements the terminal part of the Basic Access Control [R2] The border control officer of the receiving Organization uses the inspection system to verify the holder. The inspection systems must have successfully verified the signature of Document Security Objects and the integrity data elements of the logical MRD before they are used. s and Organizations must manage the Country Signing Public Key and the Document Signer Public Key maintaining their authenticity and availability in all inspection s The inspection system of the receiving Organization ensures the confidentiality and integrity of the . The receiving Organization examining the logical Basic Access Control will use inspection systems which implement the terminal part of the Basic Access Control and use the secure messaging with fresh generated keys for the protection of the transmitted data (i.e. Basic Inspection Systems). curity Target EAC with BAP and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - Organization generates authorized Document Verifier only. , that the TOE is additionally successfully evaluated and certified in accordance with the "Common Criteria Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel . This is necessary to ndard user data and preventing the data. Note that due to the differences within the assumed attack potential will implement the following security objectives of the TOE environment. MRD presented by the traveler to verify its authenticity by means of the physical security measures and to detect any . The Basic Inspection System for global interoperability: e Document Signer Public Key of each uses the inspection system to verify the holder. The inspection systems must have successfully verified the signature of before they are used. s and Organizations must manage the Country Signing Public Key and the Document Signer Public Key maintaining their authenticity and availability in all inspection systems. ensures the confidentiality and integrity of the examining the logical MRD being under Basic Access Control will use inspection systems which implement the terminal part of the Basic Access Control and use the secure messaging with fresh generated keys for the protection of the T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ OE.Ext_Insp_Systems The Document Verifier of receiving Organization Systems by creation of Inspection System Certificates for access to sensitive biometric reference data of the logical MRD. The Extended Inspection System authenticates themselves to the access to the sensitive biometric reference data with its private Terminal Authentication Key and its Inspection System Certificate. 7.2.2 OE for AA OE.Exam_MRD_AA Aditionally to the OE.Exam_MRD, the inspection systems perform the to verify the Authenticity of the presented MRD’s chip. OE.Prot_Logical_MRD_AA Aditionally to the OE.Prot_Logical_MRD, the inspection system prevents eavesdropping to their communication with the TOE before secure messaging is successfully established based on the Authentication Protocol. OE.Activ_Auth_Verif In addition to the verification by passive authentication, the inspection systems may use the verification by Active Authentication MRD. OE.Activ_Auth_Sign The issuing Organization has to establis generate the MRD’s Active Authentication Authentication Private Key, sign and store the Authentication Public Key data in EF.DG1 Organizations to verify the authenticity of the MRD’s chip used for genuine MRD by certification of the Active Authentication Public Key by means of the Document Security Object IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with BAP and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 receiving Organizations or Organizations authorizes Extended Inspection Systems by creation of Inspection System Certificates for access to sensitive biometric reference data . The Extended Inspection System authenticates themselves to the access to the sensitive biometric reference data with its private Terminal Authentication Key and its Aditionally to the OE.Exam_MRD, the inspection systems perform the Active Authentication to verify the Authenticity of the presented MRD’s chip. Logical_MRD, the inspection system prevents eavesdropping to their communication with the TOE before secure messaging is successfully established based on the fication by passive authentication, the inspection systems may use the Active Authentication, which offers a stronger guaranty of the authenticity of the The issuing Organization has to establish the necessary public key infrastructure in order to (i) Active Authentication Key Pair, (ii) ensure the secrecy of the MRD’s Private Key, sign and store the Active Authentication Public Key in the Active cation Public Key data in EF.DG13 and (iii) support inspection systems of receiving s to verify the authenticity of the MRD’s chip used for genuine MRD by certification of Public Key by means of the Document Security Object. curity Target EAC with BAP and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - s or Organizations authorizes Extended Inspection Systems by creation of Inspection System Certificates for access to sensitive biometric reference data . The Extended Inspection System authenticates themselves to the MRD's chip for access to the sensitive biometric reference data with its private Terminal Authentication Key and its Active Authentication protocol Logical_MRD, the inspection system prevents eavesdropping to their communication with the TOE before secure messaging is successfully established based on the Active fication by passive authentication, the inspection systems may use the , which offers a stronger guaranty of the authenticity of the h the necessary public key infrastructure in order to (i) Key Pair, (ii) ensure the secrecy of the MRD’s Active Public Key in the Active and (iii) support inspection systems of receiving s to verify the authenticity of the MRD’s chip used for genuine MRD by certification of T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ 8 EXTENDED REQUIREMENT 8.1 Extended family FAU_SAS 8.1.1 Extended components FAU_SAS.1 Description: see [R11]. FAU_SAS.1 Audit storage FAU_SAS.1.1 The TSF shall provide [assignment: authorized users] with the capability to store [assignment: list of audit information] in the audit records. Dependencies: No dependencies. Rationale: see [R11] 8.2 Extended family FCS_RND 8.2.1 Extended component FCS_RND.1 Description: see [R11] FCS_RND.1 Quality metric for random numbers FCS_RND.1.1 The TSF shall provide a mechanism to generate random numbers that meet [assignment: a defined quality metric]. Dependencies: No dependencies. Rationale: See [R11] 8.3 Extended family FIA_API 8.3.1 Extended component FIA_API.1 Description: see [R12] IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with BAP and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 EXTENDED REQUIREMENTS Extended family FAU_SAS - Audit data storage Extended components FAU_SAS.1 The TSF shall provide [assignment: authorized users] with the capability to store [assignment: list of audit information] in the audit records. : No dependencies. Extended family FCS_RND - Generation of random numbers Extended component FCS_RND.1 FCS_RND.1 Quality metric for random numbers The TSF shall provide a mechanism to generate random numbers that meet efined quality metric]. : No dependencies. Extended family FIA_API – Authentication proof of identity component FIA_API.1 curity Target EAC with BAP and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - The TSF shall provide [assignment: authorized users] with the capability to store Generation of random numbers The TSF shall provide a mechanism to generate random numbers that meet of identity T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ FIA_API.1 Quality metric for random numbers FIA_API.1.1 The TSF shall provide a [assignment: the [assignment: authorized user or role]. Dependencies: No dependencies. Rationale: See [R12] 8.4 Extended family FMT_LIM 8.4.1 Extended component FMT_LIM.1 Description: see [R11] FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities FMT_LIM.1.1 The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their capabilities so that in conjunction with "Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)" the following p Limited capability and availability policy]. Dependencies: (FMT_LIM.2) Rationale: See [R11] 8.4.2 Extended component FMT_LIM.2 Description: See [R11] FMT_LIM.2 Limited availabilit FMT_LIM.2.1 The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their availability so that in conjunction with "Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)" the following policy is enforced [assignment: Limited capability and availability policy]. Dependencies: (FMT_LIM.1) IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with BAP and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 FIA_API.1 Quality metric for random numbers The TSF shall provide a [assignment: authentication mechanism] to prove the identity of the [assignment: authorized user or role]. : No dependencies. Extended family FMT_LIM - Limited capabilities and availability Extended component FMT_LIM.1 FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their capabilities so that in conjunction with "Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)" the following policy is enforced [assignment: Limited capability and availability policy]. Extended component FMT_LIM.2 FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their availability so that in conjunction with "Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)" the following policy is enforced [assignment: Limited capability and availability policy]. curity Target EAC with BAP and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - authentication mechanism] to prove the identity of Limited capabilities and availability The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their capabilities so that in olicy is enforced [assignment: The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their availability so that in conjunction with "Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)" the following policy is enforced [assignment: T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ Rationale: See [R11] 8.5 Extended family FPT_EMS 8.5.1 Extended component FPT_EMS.1 Description: see [R11] FPT_EMS.1 TOE Emanation FPT_EMS.1.1 The TOE shall not emit [assignment: types of emissions] in excess of [assignment: specified limits] enabling access to [assignment: list of types of TSF data] and [assignment: list of types of user data]. FPT_EMS.1.2 The TSF shall ensure [assignment: type of users] are unable to use the following interface [assignment: type of connection] to gain access to [assignment: list of types of TSF data] and [assignment: list of types of user data]. Dependencies: No dependencies. Rationale: See [R11] IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with BAP and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 Extended family FPT_EMS - TOE Emanation Extended component FPT_EMS.1 FPT_EMS.1 TOE Emanation The TOE shall not emit [assignment: types of emissions] in excess of [assignment: specified limits] enabling access to [assignment: list of types of TSF data] and [assignment: list of The TSF shall ensure [assignment: type of users] are unable to use the following interface [assignment: type of connection] to gain access to [assignment: list of types of TSF data] and [assignment: list of types of user data]. No dependencies. curity Target EAC with BAP and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - The TOE shall not emit [assignment: types of emissions] in excess of [assignment: specified limits] enabling access to [assignment: list of types of TSF data] and [assignment: list of The TSF shall ensure [assignment: type of users] are unable to use the following interface [assignment: type of connection] to gain access to [assignment: list of types of TSF data] T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ 9 SECURITY REQUIREMENT 9.1 Security Functional Requirements This chapter presents the Security Functional configuration presented in this security target. It is composed of the following elements: - Global SFR that are applicable to all the passports configuration - MP SFR for covering the phase Manufacturing and Pe Protection Profile and also the coverage of Additional Code. - Active Authentication SFR - BAP SFR that cover the Basic Access - CA SFR that cover the Chip Authentic - TA SFR that cover the Terminal Authentication Protocol (note: Terminal Authentication Protocol is only available with the Extended Access Control) - EAC SFR that cover the Extended Access Control (note: EAC protocol is a combination of TA and CA, this chapter only contains SFR that can not be strictly applied to one or another) 9.1.1 Global SFR This chapter covers the common SFR that are shared between the different applications that are embedded on the product. FCS_CKM.4/Global Cryptographic key destruction FCS_CKM.4.1/Global The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key destruction method FCS_RND.1/Global Quality metric for random numbers FCS_RND.1.1/Global The TSF shall provide a mechanism to generate random numbers that meet 1. The requirement to provide an and 2. The requirement of RGS_B1 for random number generation. IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with BAP and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 SECURITY REQUIREMENTS Security Functional Requirements This chapter presents the Security Functional Requirements to take into account within the TOE configuration presented in this security target. It is composed of the following elements: that are applicable to all the passports configuration for covering the phase Manufacturing and Personalization described in the Passport Protection Profile and also the coverage of Additional Code. Active Authentication SFR that cover the Active Authentication Protocol that cover the Basic Access Protection that cover the Chip Authentication Protocol that cover the Terminal Authentication Protocol (note: Terminal Authentication Protocol is only available with the Extended Access Control) that cover the Extended Access Control (note: EAC protocol is a combination of TA CA, this chapter only contains SFR that can not be strictly applied to one or another) This chapter covers the common SFR that are shared between the different applications that are Cryptographic key destruction The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key destruction method zeroisation that meets the following: none Quality metric for random numbers The TSF shall provide a mechanism to generate random numbers that meet an entropy of at least 7.976 bits in each byte, following 2. The requirement of RGS_B1 for random number generation. curity Target EAC with BAP and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - Requirements to take into account within the TOE configuration presented in this security target. It is composed of the following elements: rsonalization described in the Passport that cover the Active Authentication Protocol that cover the Terminal Authentication Protocol (note: Terminal Authentication that cover the Extended Access Control (note: EAC protocol is a combination of TA CA, this chapter only contains SFR that can not be strictly applied to one or another) This chapter covers the common SFR that are shared between the different applications that are The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified none. The TSF shall provide a mechanism to generate random numbers that meet following AIS 31 [R37] T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ FMT_LIM.1/Global Limited capabilities FMT_LIM.1.1/Global The TSF shall be designed in a conjunction with "Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)" the following policy is enforced Deploying Test Features after 1. User Data to be manipulated 2. TSF data to be disclosed or 3. Software to be reconstructed 4. Substantial information about other attacks FMT_LIM.2/Global Limited availability FMT_LIM.2.1/Global The TSF shall be designed in a conjunction with "Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)" the following policy is enforced Deploying Test Features after TOE 1. User Data to be manipulated 2. TSF data to be disclosed or 3. Software to be reconstructed 4. Substantial information about other attacks FPT_EMS.1/Global TOE Emanation FPT_EMS.1.1/Global The TOE shall not emit execution in excess of non useful information 1. EF.COM, EF.SOD and EF.DG1 to EF. FPT_EMS.1.2/Global The TSF shall ensure interface smart card circuit contacts 1. EF.COM, EF.SOD and EF.DG1 to EF. FPT_FLS.1/Global Failure with preservation of secure state FPT_FLS.1.1/Global The TSF shall preserve 1. Exposure to out-of-range operating 2. Failure detected by TSF according IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with BAP and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 Limited capabilities The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their capabilities so that in conjunction with "Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)" the following policy is enforced after TOE Delivery does not allow manipulated or manipulated reconstructed about construction of TSF to be gathered Limited availability The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their availability so that in conjunction with "Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)" the following policy is enforced TOE Delivery does not allow manipulated or manipulated reconstructed about construction of TSF to be gathered TOE Emanation The TOE shall not emit power variations, timing variations during command non useful information enabling access to 1. EF.COM, EF.SOD and EF.DG1 to EF.DG24 The TSF shall ensure any unauthorized users are unable to use the following contacts to gain access to 1. EF.COM, EF.SOD and EF.DG1 to EF.DG24 Failure with preservation of secure state The TSF shall preserve a secure state when the following types of failures occur: operating conditions where therefore a malfunction according to FPT_TST.1. curity Target EAC with BAP and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - manner that limits their capabilities so that in conjunction with "Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)" the following policy is enforced: which may enable manner that limits their availability so that in conjunction with "Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)" the following policy is enforced: which may enable variations, timing variations during command are unable to use the following a secure state when the following types of failures occur: malfunction could occur T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ FPT_TST.1/Global TSF testing FPT_TST.1.1/Global The TSF shall run a suite of self tests TSF, at the conditions: - At reset - Before any cryptographic - When accessing a DG or any EF - Prior to any use of TSF data - Before execution of any FPT_TST.1.2/Global The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the integrity of TSF data. FPT_TST.1.3/Global The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the integrity of stored TSF executable code. FPT_PHP.3/Global Resistance to physical attack FPT_PHP.3.1/Global The TSF shall resist responding automatically such that the SFRs are always enforced. 9.1.2 Product configuration SFR This chapter covers the Manufacturing and Personalization SFR. It also includes additional SFR for the compliance to Note 6. 9.1.2.1 SFR for additional code FAU_STG.2/MP_Add_code FAU_STG.2.1/MP_Add_code The TSF shall protect the stored audit records in the audit trail from unauthorized deletion. FAU_STG.2.2/MP_Add_code The TSF shall be able to stored audit records in the audit trail. FAU_STG.2.3/MP_Add_code The TSF shall ensure that records will be maintained when the following conditions occur: IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with BAP and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 TSF testing The TSF shall run a suite of self tests to demonstrate the correct operation of cryptographic operation DG or any EF data any command The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the integrity The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the integrity Resistance to physical attack The TSF shall resist physical manipulation and physical probing responding automatically such that the SFRs are always enforced. configuration SFR This chapter covers the Manufacturing and Personalization SFR. It also includes additional SFR for the SFR for additional code _Add_code Guarantees of audit data availability The TSF shall protect the stored audit records in the audit trail from The TSF shall be able to prevent unauthorized modifications to the audit records in the audit trail. The TSF shall ensure that Additional code identification records will be maintained when the following conditions occur: failure and attack curity Target EAC with BAP and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - to demonstrate the correct operation of the The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the integrity The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the integrity probing to the TSF by This chapter covers the Manufacturing and Personalization SFR. It also includes additional SFR for the The TSF shall protect the stored audit records in the audit trail from unauthorized modifications to the Additional code identification stored audit failure and attack. T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ Application Note: Additional code code is loaded with its integrity information. This integrity information is verified by the TOE after the loading, and before the writing of the identification information by calculating the signature and comparing to the expected value. The signature is protecte TOE life cycle, at each power on, the card verifies the integrity of this signature. FCS_CKM.1/MP_Add_code FCS_CKM.1.1/MP_Add_code The TSF shall generate cryptographic k specified cryptographic key generation algorithm specified cryptographic key sizes Cryptographic key generation algorithm Calculation of LSK_LOAD, from initial LSK and derivation data entered - AES 128 ECB FCS_COP.1/MP_ENC_Add_code FCS_COP.1.1/MP_ENC_Add_code with a specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic key sizes] that meet the following Cryptographic operation Encryption of the additional code (ciphered with LSK_LOAD) and signature verification FCS_COP.1/MP_MAC_Add_code FCS_COP.1.1/MP_MAC_Add_code with a specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic key sizes] that meet the following Cryptographic operation IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with BAP and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 loaded with its integrity information. This integrity information is verified by the TOE after the loading, and before the writing of the identification information by calculating the signature and comparing to the expected value. The signature is protected in integrity through the TOE life cycle, at each power on, the card verifies the integrity of this signature. /MP_Add_code Cryptographic key generation The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm [cryptographic key generation algorithm] specified cryptographic key sizes [key length] that meet the following [standard] Cryptographic key generation algorithm Key length Calculation of LSK_LOAD, from initial LSK and derivation data 128 /MP_ENC_Add_code Cryptographic operation /MP_ENC_Add_code The TSF shall perform [cryptographic operation] with a specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes that meet the following [standard]: Algo Key length (bits) of the additional code (ciphered with LSK_LOAD) and signature verification AES 128 /MP_MAC_Add_code Cryptographic operation /MP_MAC_Add_code The TSF shall perform [cryptographic operation] with a specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes meet the following [standard]: Algo Key length (bits) curity Target EAC with BAP and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - loaded with its integrity information. This integrity information is verified by the TOE after the loading, and before the writing of the identification information by calculating the d in integrity through the eys in accordance with a [cryptographic key generation algorithm] and [standard]: Key length (bits) Standards None [cryptographic operation] in accordance and cryptographic key sizes Key length Standard [R35] [cryptographic operation] in accordance and cryptographic key sizes Standard T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ Cryptographic operation Secure Messaging MAC FDP_UIT.1/MP_Add_code FDP_UIT.1.1/MP_Add_code The TSF shall enforce the receive user data in a manner protected from FDP_UIT.1.2/MP_Add_code [Editorially user data, whether modification has occurred. Application Note Modification errors should be understood as modification, substitution, unrecoverable ordering change of data and any other integrity error that may cause the additional code to be installed on the card to be different from the one sent by the TOE Developer. This SFR control integrity of data FMT_MTD.1/MP_Add_code FMT_MTD.1.1/MP_Add_code The TSF shall restrict the ability to [authorized identified roles]: List of TSF data Activate Additional code Application note The Activation of the additional code modify the TOE. This additional code is ciphered with the LSK_LOAD (LSK and Derivation Data) and FMT_MTD.1/MP_KEY_READ FMT_MTD.1.1/MP_KEY_READ_Add_code [authorized identified roles]: IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with BAP and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 Algo Key length (bits) 3DES Retail MAC 112 AES CMAC 128, 192 or 256 /MP_Add_code Data exchange integrity The TSF shall enforce the Prepersonalization access user data in a manner protected from modification errors. [Editorially Refined] The TSF shall be able to determine on receipt of modification of some of the pieces of the application sent by Modification errors should be understood as modification, substitution, unrecoverable ordering change of data and any other integrity error that may cause the additional code to be installed on the the one sent by the TOE Developer. control integrity of data import in phase 5, including the additional code but not only. /MP_Add_code Management of TSF data The TSF shall restrict the ability to [selection the Authorised role TOE developer of the additional code modify the TOE. This additional code is ciphered with the LSK_LOAD (LSK and Derivation Data) and activated after the authentication of the KEY_READ_Add_code Management of TSF data _Add_code The TSF shall restrict the ability to curity Target EAC with BAP and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - Standard [R35] , 192 or 256 [R35] access control SFP to The TSF shall be able to determine on receipt of by the TOE developer Modification errors should be understood as modification, substitution, unrecoverable ordering change of data and any other integrity error that may cause the additional code to be installed on the code but not only. the [list of TSF data] to of the additional code modify the TOE. This additional code is ciphered with the after the authentication of the TOE developer. The TSF shall restrict the ability to read the [data] to T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ TSF Data Authorized Identified roles LSK None FMT_SMR.1/MP_Add_code FMT_SMR.1.1/MP_Add_code The TSF shall maintain the roles 1. TOE developper FMT_SMR.1.2/MP_Add_code The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles. FPT_EMS.1/MP_Add_code FPT_EMS.1.1/MP_Add_code The TOE shall not emit command execution in excess of 1. LSK FPT_EMS.1.2/MP_Add_code The TSF shall ensure following interface smart card circuit 1. LSK FTP_ITC.1/MP_Add_code FTP_ITC.1.1/MP_Add_code The TSF shall provide a communication channel another trusted IT product that is logically distinct from other communication channels and provides assured identification of its end points and protection of the channel data from modification or disclosure. FTP_ITC.1.2/MP_Add_code [Editorially Prepersonalizer to initiate communication via the trusted channel. FTP_ITC.1.3/MP_Add_code The TSF shall initiate communication via the trusted channel for: 1. Additional code loading IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with BAP and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 Authorized Identified roles /MP_Add_code Security roles The TSF shall maintain the roles The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles. /MP_Add_code TOE Emanation The TOE shall not emit power variations, timing variations during in excess of non useful information enabling access to The TSF shall ensure any unauthorized users are unable to use the circuit contacts to gain access to Inter-TSF trusted channel The TSF shall provide a communication channel another trusted IT product that is logically distinct from other communication channels and provides assured identification of its end points and protection of the channel data from modification or ditorially Refined] The TSF shall permit the TOE Developer and to initiate communication via the trusted channel. The TSF shall initiate communication via the trusted channel for: curity Target EAC with BAP and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles. variations, timing variations during are unable to use the The TSF shall provide a communication channel between itself and another trusted IT product that is logically distinct from other communication channels and provides assured identification of its end points and protection of the channel data from modification or TOE Developer and The TSF shall initiate communication via the trusted channel for: T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ 9.1.2.2 Manufacturing and Personalization FCS_CKM.1/MP Cryptographic key generation FCS_CKM.1.1 The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm [cryptographic key generation algorithm] sizes [key length] that meet the following Cryptographic key generation algorithm MSK derivation from initial MSK loaded in phase 1 using SHA 256 FCS_COP.1/MP_ENC_3DES Cryptographic operation FCS_COP.1.1/MP_ENC_3DES The TSF shall perform specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic key sizes] that meet the following Cryptographic operation Secure Messaging – encryption and decryption FCS_COP.1/MP_ENC_AES FCS_COP.1.1/MP_ENC_AES The TSF shall perform specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic key sizes] that meet the following Cryptographic operation Secure Messaging – encryption and decryption IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with BAP and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 turing and Personalization Cryptographic key generation The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic [cryptographic key generation algorithm] and specified cryptographic key that meet the following [standard]: Cryptographic key generation algorithm Key length (bits) MSK derivation from initial MSK loaded in phase 1 using SHA 256 256 FCS_COP.1/MP_ENC_3DES Cryptographic operation The TSF shall perform [cryptographic operation] in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes that meet the following [standard]: Algo Key length (bits) encryption and 3DES in CBC mode 112 Cryptographic operation The TSF shall perform [cryptographic operation] in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes that meet the following [standard]: Algo Key length (bits) encryption and AES in CBC mode 128, 192 and 256 curity Target EAC with BAP and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic and specified cryptographic key Key length Standards None in accordance with a and cryptographic key sizes Key length Standard [R32] in accordance with a and cryptographic key sizes Standard 128, 192 and 256 [R35] T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ FCS_COP.1/MP_MAC_3DES FCS_COP.1.1/MP_MAC_3DES The TSF shall perform specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic key sizes] that meet the following Cryptographic operation Secure Messaging – MAC FCS_COP.1/MP_MAC_AES FCS_COP.1.1/MP_MAC_AES The TSF shall perform specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic key sizes] that meet the following Cryptographic operation Secure Messaging MAC FCS_COP.1/MP_AUTH_3DES FCS_COP.1.1/MP_AUTH_3DES The TSF shall perform specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic key sizes] that meet the following Cryptographic operation Card Manufacturer Authentication (MSK) FCS_COP.1/MP_AUTH_AES FCS_COP.1.1/MP_AUTH_AES The TSF shall perform specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic key sizes] that meet the following IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with BAP and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 /MP_MAC_3DES Cryptographic operation The TSF shall perform [cryptographic operation] specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes that meet the following [standard]: Algo Key length (bits) Standard 3DES RMAC 112 [R32] /MP_MAC_AES Cryptographic operation The TSF shall perform [cryptographic operation] in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes that meet the following [standard]: Algo Key length (bits) Standard AES 128, 192 and 256 [R35] /MP_AUTH_3DES Cryptographic operation The TSF shall perform [cryptographic operation] specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes that meet the following [standard]: Algo Key length (bits) Standard Card Manufacturer Authentication (MSK) 3DES 112 [R32] /MP_AUTH_AES Cryptographic operation The TSF shall perform [cryptographic operation] in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes that meet the following [standard]: curity Target EAC with BAP and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - in accordance with a and cryptographic key sizes in accordance with a and cryptographic key sizes in accordance with a and cryptographic key sizes Standard [R32] in accordance with a and cryptographic key sizes T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ Cryptographic operation Card Manufacturer Authentication (MSK) FCS_COP.1/MP_SHA Cryptographic operation FCS_COP.1.1/MP_SHA The TSF shall perform specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic key sizes] that meet the following Cryptographic operation Hashing FDP_ACC.2/MP Complete access control FDP_ACC.2.1/MP The TSF shall enforce the objects and all operations among subjects and objects covered by the SFP. FDP_ACC.2.2/MP The TSF shall ensure that all operations between any subject controlled by the TSF and any object controlled by the TSF are covered by an acc Application Note This SFR enforces access control over code loading but not only. FDP_ACF.1/MP Security attribute based access control FDP_ACF.1.1/MP The TSF shall enforce the the following Prepersonalizer Authentication (AS_AUTH_MSK_STATUS) FDP_ACF.1.2/MP The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed: AUTHENTICATE). IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with BAP and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 Algo Key length (bits) Authentication (MSK) AES 128, 192 and 256 Cryptographic operation The TSF shall perform [cryptographic operation] in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes that meet the following [standard]: Algo Key length (bits) Standard SHA256 None [R27] Complete access control The TSF shall enforce the Prepersonalization Access Control on and all operations among subjects and objects covered by the SFP. The TSF shall ensure that all operations between any subject controlled by the TSF and any object controlled by the TSF are covered by an access control SFP. enforces access control over all the operation performed in phase 5, including Security attribute based access control SF shall enforce the Prepersonalization Access Control Prepersonalizer Authentication (AS_AUTH_MSK_STATUS). The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed: AS_AUTH_MSK_STATUS=TRUE (EXTERNAL curity Target EAC with BAP and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - Standard [R35] in accordance with a and cryptographic key sizes on all subjects and all The TSF shall ensure that all operations between any subject controlled by the TSF all the operation performed in phase 5, including additional to objects based on The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among AS_AUTH_MSK_STATUS=TRUE (EXTERNAL T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ FDP_ACF.1.3/MP The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules: none. FDP_ACF.1.4/MP The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules: none. Application Note This SFR enforces access control over but not only. FDP_ITC.1/MP Import of user data without security attributes FDP_ITC.1.1/MP The TSF shall enforce the data, controlled under the SFP, from outside of the TOE. FDP_ITC.1.2/MP The TSF shall ignore any security attributes associated with the user data when imported from outside the TOE. FDP_ITC.1.3/MP The TSF shall enforce the following rules when importing user data controlled under the SFP from outside the TOE: none Application Note This SFR control import of data in phase 5, including This SFR ensures also the MSK diviersification, which is performs once, at first command, without any security requirements preliminary to this action. FDP_UCT.1/MP Basic data exchange confidentiality FDP_UCT.1.1/MP The TSF shall enforce the a manner protected from unauthorised disclosure Application note For the Additional code loading access control, the LSK_LOAD is used to cipher the data transmitted. This SFR control confidentiality of data IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with BAP and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on the . The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the following enforces access control over all the operation in phase 5, including additional Import of user data without security attributes The TSF shall enforce the Prepersonalization access control when importing user data, controlled under the SFP, from outside of the TOE. The TSF shall ignore any security attributes associated with the user data when The TSF shall enforce the following rules when importing user data controlled under none. in phase 5, including the additional code but not only. diviersification, which is performs once, at first command, without any security requirements preliminary to this action. Basic data exchange confidentiality The TSF shall enforce the Prepersonalization access control to unauthorised disclosure. For the Additional code loading access control, the LSK_LOAD is used to cipher the data transmitted. control confidentiality of data import in phase 5, including the additional curity Target EAC with BAP and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on the The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the following additional code loading when importing user The TSF shall ignore any security attributes associated with the user data when The TSF shall enforce the following rules when importing user data controlled under code but not only. diviersification, which is performs once, at first command, without any to receive user data in For the Additional code loading access control, the LSK_LOAD is used to cipher the data transmitted. additional code but not only. T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ FDP_UIT.1/MP Data exchange integrity FDP_UIT.1.1/MP The TSF shall enforce the data in a manner protected from FDP_UIT.1.2/MP [Editorially refined] whether modification of some pieces of the application sent by the Prepersonalizer FIA_AFL.1/MP Authentication failure handling FIA_AFL.1.1/MP The TSF shall detect when authentication of 1. Prepersonalizer FIA_AFL.1.2/MP When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has been the TSF shall forbid any authentication attempt as Personalizer FIA_UAU.1/MP Timing of authentication FIA_UAU.1.1/MP The TSF shall allow before the user is authenticated. FIA_UAU.1.2/MP The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user. FIA_UID.1/MP Timing of identification FIA_UID.1.1/MP The TSF shall allow before the user is identified. FIA_UID.1.2/MP The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user. FIA_UAU.4/MP_3DES Single FIA_UAU.4.1/MP_3DES The TSF shall prevent reuse of authentication data related to 1. Authentication Mechanisms based on IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with BAP and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 Data exchange integrity The TSF shall enforce the Prepersonalization Access Control SFP data in a manner protected from modification errors /MP [Editorially refined] The TSF shall be able to determine on receipt of user data, of some pieces of the application sent by the Prepersonalizer Authentication failure handling The TSF shall detect when 3 unsuccessful authentication attempts occur related to When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has been forbid any authentication attempt as Personalizer. Timing of authentication The TSF shall allow GET DATA, SELECT FILE on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is authenticated. The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before allowing mediated actions on behalf of that user. Timing of identification The TSF shall allow GET DATA, SELECT FILE on behalf of the user to be performed The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before allowing any mediated actions on behalf of that user. Single-use authentication mechanisms The TSF shall prevent reuse of authentication data related to 1. Authentication Mechanisms based on 3DES curity Target EAC with BAP and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - ccess Control SFP to receive user The TSF shall be able to determine on receipt of user data, of some pieces of the application sent by the Prepersonalizer has occurred unsuccessful authentication attempts occur related to When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has been met, on behalf of the user to be performed The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before allowing on behalf of the user to be performed The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before allowing any The TSF shall prevent reuse of authentication data related to T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ FIA_UAU.4/MP_AES Single FIA_UAU.4.1/MP_AES The TSF shall prevent reuse of authentication data related to 1. Authentication Mechanisms based on FIA_UAU.5/MP_3DES Multiple authentication mechanisms FIA_UAU.5.1/MP_3DES The TSF shall provide 1. Symmetric Authentication Mechanism based on to support user authentication. FIA_UAU.5.2/MP_3DES The TSF shall authenticate any user's cl 1. The TOE accepts the authentication Authentication Mechanism with FIA_UAU.5/MP_AES Multiple authentication mechanisms FIA_UAU.5.1/MP_AES The TSF shall 1. Symmetric Authentication Mechanism based on AES to support user authentication. FIA_UAU.5.2/MP_AES The TSF shall authenticate any user's claimed identity according to the 1. The TOE accepts the authentication Authentication Mechanism with FMT_MTD.1/MP Management of TSF data FMT_MTD.1.1/MP The TSF shall phase 6 to the Prepersonalizer. FTP_ITC.1/MP Inter-TSF trusted channel FTP_ITC.1.1/MP The TSF shall provide a communication channel between itself and another trusted IT product that is logically distinct from other communication channels and provides assured identification of its end points and protection of the channel data from modification or disclosure. IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with BAP and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 Single-use authentication mechanisms The TSF shall prevent reuse of authentication data related to 1. Authentication Mechanisms based on AES tiple authentication mechanisms The TSF shall provide 1. Symmetric Authentication Mechanism based on 3DES The TSF shall authenticate any user's claimed identity according to the authentication attempt as Personalization Agent with the Personalization Agent Key Multiple authentication mechanisms The TSF shall provide 1. Symmetric Authentication Mechanism based on AES The TSF shall authenticate any user's claimed identity according to the authentication attempt as Personalization Agent with Personalization Agent Key Management of TSF data The TSF shall restrict the ability to switch the TOE life cycle from phase 5 to TSF trusted channel The TSF shall provide a communication channel between itself and another trusted IT product that is logically distinct from other communication channels and provides assured identification of its end points and protection of the channel data from modification or disclosure. curity Target EAC with BAP and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - The TSF shall prevent reuse of authentication data related to aimed identity according to the Personalization Agent by the Symmetric The TSF shall authenticate any user's claimed identity according to the Personalization Agent by the Symmetric TOE life cycle from phase 5 to The TSF shall provide a communication channel between itself and another trusted IT product that is logically distinct from other communication channels and provides assured identification of its end points and protection of the channel data from modification or disclosure. T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ FTP_ITC.1.2/MP [Editorially Refined] communication via the trusted channel. FTP_ITC.1.3/MP The TSF shall initiate communication via the trusted channel for: 1. Personalization Agent key storage 2. Life cycle transition from Prepersonalization to Personalization phase FMT_MTD.1/MP_INI_ENA Management of TSF data FMT_MTD.1.1/MP_INI_ENA The TSF shall Prepersonalization Data to the Prepersonalizer FMT_MTD.1/MP_INI_DIS Management of TSF data FMT_MTD.1.1/MP_INI_DIS The TSF shall Initialization Data to the Personalization Agent FMT_MTD.1/MP_KEY_READ Management of TSF data FMT_MTD.1.1/MP_KEY_READ The TSF shall restrict the ability to identified roles]: TSF Data MSK Personalization Agent Keys FMT_MTD.1/MP_KEY_WRITE Management of TSF data FMT_MTD.1.1/MP_KEY_WRITE identified roles]: TSF Data MSK Personalization Agent Keys IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with BAP and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 Refined] The TSF shall permit the Prepersonalizer communication via the trusted channel. hall initiate communication via the trusted channel for: Personalization Agent key storage 2. Life cycle transition from Prepersonalization to Personalization phase INI_ENA Management of TSF data The TSF shall restrict the ability to write the Initialization Data and the Prepersonalizer. INI_DIS Management of TSF data The TSF shall restrict the ability to disable read access for users the Personalization Agent. KEY_READ Management of TSF data The TSF shall restrict the ability to read the [data] Authorized Identified roles None None KEY_WRITE Management of TSF data The TSF shall restrict the ability to write the [data] Authorized Identified roles IC manufacturer (created by the developer) None curity Target EAC with BAP and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - Prepersonalizer to initiate hall initiate communication via the trusted channel for: Initialization Data and to disable read access for users to the [data] to [authorized [data] to [authorized IC manufacturer (created by the developer) T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ FAU_SAS.1/MP Audit storage FAU_SAS.1.1/MP The TSF shall provide Identification Data in the audit records. FMT_SMF.1/MP Specification of Management Functions FMT_SMF.1.1/MP The TSF shall be 1. Initialization 2. Pre-personalization 3. Personalization FMT_SMR.1/MP Security roles FMT_SMR.1.1/MP The TSF shall maintain the roles 1. Manufacturer FMT_SMR.1.2/MP The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles. FPT_EMS.1/MP TOE Emanation FPT_EMS.1.1/MP The TOE shall not emit execution in excess of non useful information 1. Prepersonalizer Key 2. Personalization Agent Key 3. MSK FPT_EMS.1.2/MP The TSF shall ensure interface smart card circuit contacts 1. Prepersonalizer Key 2. Personalization Agent Key 3. MSK 9.1.3 Active Authentication SFR IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with BAP and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 Audit storage The TSF shall provide the Manufacturer with the capability to store in the audit records. Specification of Management Functions The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions: Security roles The TSF shall maintain the roles shall be able to associate users with roles. TOE Emanation The TOE shall not emit power variations, timing variations during command non useful information enabling access to The TSF shall ensure any unauthorized users are unable to use the following contacts to gain access to Active Authentication SFR curity Target EAC with BAP and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - with the capability to store the IC capable of performing the following management functions: variations, timing variations during command are unable to use the following T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ FCS_COP.1/AA_DSA Cryptographic operation FCS_COP.1.1/AA_DSA The TSF shall perform specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic key sizes] that meet the following Operation Algorithm Digital Signature Creation RSA signature (CRT or SFM) with SHA1, 224, 256, 384, 512 FCS_COP.1/AA_ECDSA Cryptographic operation FCS_COP.1.1/AA_ECDSA The TSF shall perform specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic key sizes] that meet the following Operation Algo Digital Signature Creation ECDSA with SHA1, 224, 256, 384, 512 FDP_DAU.1/AA Basic Data Authentication FDP_DAU.1.1/AA The TSF shall provide a capability to generate evidence that can be used as a guarantee of the validity of the TOE FDP_DAU.1.2/AA The TSF shall provide the indicated information. Refinement: Evidence generation and ability of verfying it, constitute the FDP_ITC.1/AA Import of user data without security attributes FDP_ITC.1.1/AA The TSF shall enforce the user data, controlled under the SFP, from outside of the TOE. IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with BAP and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 Cryptographic operation The TSF shall perform [cryptographic operation] in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes that meet the following [standard]: Key length (bits) RSA signature (CRT or SFM) with SHA1, 224, 256, 384, 512 1024 to 4096 with a step of 256 bits Cryptographic operation The TSF shall perform [cryptographic operation] in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes that meet the following [standard]: Key length (bits) ECDSA with SHA1, 224, 256, 384, 192 to 521 over prime field curves FDP_DAU.1/AA Basic Data Authentication The TSF shall provide a capability to generate evidence that can be used as a TOE itself. The TSF shall provide any users with the ability to verify evidence of the validity of Evidence generation and ability of verfying it, constitute the Active Authentication FDP_ITC.1/AA Import of user data without security attributes The TSF shall enforce the Active Authentication Access Control user data, controlled under the SFP, from outside of the TOE. curity Target EAC with BAP and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - in accordance with a and cryptographic key sizes Standard 1024 to 4096 with a step [R25] in accordance with a and cryptographic key sizes Standard 192 to 521 over prime [R25] [R26] [R27] [R28] The TSF shall provide a capability to generate evidence that can be used as a with the ability to verify evidence of the validity of Active Authentication protocol. Control SFP when importing T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ FDP_ITC.1.2/AA The TSF shall ignore any security attributes associated with the user data when imported from outside the TOE. FDP_ITC.1.3/AA The TSF shall enforc the SFP from outside the TOE: none FMT_MTD.1/AA_KEY_READ Management of TSF data FMT_MTD.1.1/AA_KEY_READ The TSF shall restrict the ability to FPT_EMS.1/AA TOE Emanation FPT_EMS.1.1/AA The TOE shall not emit execution in excess of non useful information 1. Active Authentication: Private Key (AAK) FPT_EMS.1.2/AA The TSF shall ensure interface smart card circuit contacts 1. Active Authentication: Private Key (AAK) FMT_MOF.1/AA Management of security functi FMT_MOF.1.1/AA The TSF shall restrict the ability to Authentication to Personalization Agent FMT_MTD.1/AA_KEY_WRITE Management of TSF data FMT_MTD.1.1/AA_KEY_WRITE T Agent. 9.1.4 Basic Access IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with BAP and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 The TSF shall ignore any security attributes associated with the user data when The TSF shall enforce the following rules when importing user data controlled under none. KEY_READ Management of TSF data The TSF shall restrict the ability to read the AAK to TOE Emanation The TOE shall not emit power variations, timing variations during command non useful information enabling access to 1. Active Authentication: Private Key (AAK) The TSF shall ensure any unauthorized users are unable to use the following contacts to gain access to 1. Active Authentication: Private Key (AAK) FMT_MOF.1/AA Management of security functions behaviour The TSF shall restrict the ability to disable and enable the functions Personalization Agent. KEY_WRITE Management of TSF data The TSF shall restrict the ability to write the AAK Basic Access Protection SFR curity Target EAC with BAP and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - The TSF shall ignore any security attributes associated with the user data when e the following rules when importing user data controlled under to none. variations, timing variations during command are unable to use the following the functions TSF Active AAK to Personalization T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ FCS_CKM.1/BAC Cryptographic key generation FCS_CKM.1.1/BAC The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm cryptographic key sizes [key length] Cryptographic key generation algorithm Document Basic Access Key Derivation Algorithm FCS_COP.1/BAC_AUTH Cryptographic operation FCS_COP.1.1/BAC_AUTH The TSF shall perform specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic key sizes] that meet the following Cryptographic operation Symmetric authentication, encryption and decryption FCS_COP.1/BAC_SHA Cryptographic operation FCS_COP.1.1/BAC_SHA The TSF shall perform specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic key sizes] that meet the following Cryptographic operation Hashing IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with BAP and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 Cryptographic key generation The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm [cryptographic key generation algorithm] [key length] that meet the following [standard]: key generation algorithm Key length (bits) Document Basic Access Key Derivation Algorithm 112 Cryptographic operation The TSF shall perform [cryptographic operation] in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes that meet the following [standard]: Algo Key length (bits) encryption and decryption 3DES 112 Cryptographic operation The TSF shall perform [cryptographic operation] in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes that meet the following [standard]: Algo Key length (bits) SHA1 None curity Target EAC with BAP and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified [cryptographic key generation algorithm] and specified Standards [R2] in accordance with a and cryptographic key sizes Key length Standard [R35] in accordance with a and cryptographic key sizes ngth Standard [R27] T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ FCS_COP.1/BAC_ENC Cryptographic operation FCS_COP.1.1/BAC_ENC The TSF shall perform specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic key sizes] that meet the following Cryptographic operation Secure Messaging (BAP) – encryption and decryption FCS_COP.1/BAC_MAC Cryptographic operation FCS_COP.1.1/BAC_MAC The TSF shall perform specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic key sizes] that meet the following Cryptographic operation Secure Messaging MAC FDP_UCT.1/BAC Basic data exchange confidentiality FDP_UCT.1.1/BAC The TSF shall enforce the user data in a manner protected from FDP_UIT.1/BAC Data exchange integrity FDP_UIT.1.1/BAC The TSF shall enforce the data in a manner protected from FDP_UIT.1.2/BAC The TSF shall be able to determine on receipt of user data, whether deletion, insertion and replay has occurred IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with BAP and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 Cryptographic operation The TSF shall perform [cryptographic operation] in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes that meet the following [standard]: Algo Key length (bits) encryption and 3DES in CBC mode 112 Cryptographic operation The TSF shall perform [cryptographic operation] in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes that meet the following [standard]: Algo Key length (bits) Standard Retail MAC 112 [R32] Basic data exchange confidentiality The TSF shall enforce the Basic Access Protection SFP to transmit and r user data in a manner protected from unauthorised disclosure. Data exchange integrity The TSF shall enforce the Basic Access Protection SFP to transmit and r data in a manner protected from modification, deletion, insertion and replay errors The TSF shall be able to determine on receipt of user data, whether has occurred curity Target EAC with BAP and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - in accordance with a and cryptographic key sizes Key length Standard [R35][R32] in accordance with a and cryptographic key sizes transmit and receive transmit and receive user errors The TSF shall be able to determine on receipt of user data, whether modification, T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ FMT_MTD.1/BAC_KEY_RE FMT_MTD.1.1/BAC_KEY_READ The TSF shall restrict the ability to identified roles]: TSF Data Document Access Keys FMT_LIM.1/BAC Limited capabilities FMT_LIM.1.1/BAC The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their capabilities so that in conjunction with "Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)" the following policy is enforced Deploying Test Features after 1. User Data to be disclosed FMT_LIM.2/BAC Limited availability FMT_LIM.2.1/BAC The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their availability so that in conjunction with "Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)" the following policy is enforced Deploying Test Features after TOE 1. User Data to be disclosed FPT_TST.1/BAC TSF testing FPT_TST.1.1/BAC The TSF shall run a suite of self tests TSF, at the conditions: - When performing a BAP FPT_TST.1.2/BAC The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the integrity of TSF data. FPT_TST.1.3/BAC The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the integ stored TSF executable code. IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with BAP and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 KEY_READ Management of TSF data The TSF shall restrict the ability to read the [data] Authorized Identified roles None Limited capabilities The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their capabilities so that in conjunction with "Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)" the following policy is enforced after TOE Delivery does not allow Limited availability The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their availability so that in conjunction with "Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)" the following policy is enforced TOE Delivery does not allow TSF testing The TSF shall run a suite of self tests to demonstrate the correct operation of BAPauthentication The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the integrity of The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the integ curity Target EAC with BAP and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - [data] to [authorized The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their capabilities so that in conjunction with "Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)" the following policy is enforced: The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their availability so that in conjunction with "Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)" the following policy is enforced: to demonstrate the correct operation of the The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the integrity of The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the integrity of T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ FMT_MTD.1/BAC_KEY_WRITE FMT_MTD.1.1/BAC_KEY_WRITE [authorized identified roles]: List of TSF data Write Document Basic Access Keys FCS_CKM.1/BAP Cryptographic key generation FCS_CKM.1.1/BAP The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm cryptographic key sizes [key length] Cryptographic key generation algorithm Document Basic Access Key Derivation Algorithm FCS_COP.1/BAP Cryptographic operation FCS_COP.1.1/BAP The TSF shall perform cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic algorithm] sizes] that meet the following [standard] Cryptographic operation Encryption and decryption FCS_COP.1/BAP-SM Cryptographic operation FCS_COP.1.1/BAP-SM The TSF shall perform specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic key sizes] that meet the following IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with BAP and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 /BAC_KEY_WRITE Management of TSF data /BAC_KEY_WRITE The TSF shall restrict the ability to [selection the Authorised role Document Basic Access Keys Personalization Agent FCS_CKM.1/BAP Cryptographic key generation The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm [cryptographic key generation algorithm] [key length] that meet the following [standard]: key generation algorithm Key length (bits) Document Basic Access Key Derivation Algorithm - AES 128, 192 and 256 FCS_COP.1/BAP Cryptographic operation The TSF shall perform [cryptographic operation] in accordance with a specified [cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes [standard]: Algo Key length (bits) Standard AES 128, 192 and 256 [R35] SM Cryptographic operation The TSF shall perform [cryptographic operation] in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes that meet the following [standard]: curity Target EAC with BAP and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - the [list of TSF data] to The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified [cryptographic key generation algorithm] and specified Standards 128, 192 and 256 [R7] in accordance with a specified and cryptographic key sizes [cryptographic key in accordance with a and cryptographic key sizes T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ Cryptographic operation Secure messaging – message authentication code 9.1.5 Chip Authentication SFR FIA_API.1/CA Authentication Proof of Identity FIA_API.1.1/CA The TSF shall provide a identity of the TOE. FCS_CKM.1/CA_DH_SM_3DES FCS_CKM.1.1/CA_DH_SM_3DES specified cryptographic key generation algorithm specified cryptographic key sizes Cryptographic key generation algorithm Algorithm based on the Key Diffie protocol compliant to PKCS#3 FCS_CKM.1/CA_DH_SM_AES FCS_CKM.1.1/CA_DH_SM_AES The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm specified cryptographic key sizes Cryptographic key generation algorithm Algorithm based on the Key Diffie protocol compliant to PKCS#3 IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with BAP and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 Algo Key length (bits) authentication code AES in CBC mode 128, 192 and 256 Chip Authentication SFR FIA_API.1/CA Authentication Proof of Identity The TSF shall provide a Chip Authentication protocol according to /CA_DH_SM_3DES Cryptographic key generation ES The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm [cryptographic key generation algorithm] specified cryptographic key sizes [key length] that meet the following [standard] c key generation algorithm Key length (bits) Algorithm based on the Key Diffie-Hellman key derivation 112 /CA_DH_SM_AES Cryptographic key generation The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm [cryptographic key generation algorithm] specified cryptographic key sizes [key length] that meet the following [standard] key generation algorithm Key length (bits) Algorithm based on the Key Diffie-Hellman key derivation 128, 192, 256 curity Target EAC with BAP and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - Key length Standard 128, 192 and [R35] protocol according to [R39] to prove the The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a [cryptographic key generation algorithm] and [standard]: Key length (bits) Standards [R2] The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a [cryptographic key generation algorithm] and [standard]: Key length (bits) Standards 128, 192, 256 [R2] T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ FCS_CKM.1/CA_ECDH_SM_3DES FCS_CKM.1.1/CA_ECDH_SM_3DES specified cryptographic key generation algorithm specified cryptographic key sizes Cryptographic key generation algorithm Algorithm based on ECDH key derivation protocol compliant to ISO 15946 FCS_CKM.1/CA_ECDH_SM_AES FCS_CKM.1.1/CA_ECDH_SM_AES specified cryptographic key generation algorithm specified cryptographic key sizes Cryptographic key generation algorithm Algorithm based on ECDH key derivation protocol compliant to ISO 15946 FCS_COP.1/CA_SHA_SM_3DES FCS_COP.1.1/CA_SHA_SM_3DES cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic algorithm] meet the following [standard]: Cryptographic algorithm Key length (bits) SHA1 None FCS_COP.1/CA_SHA_SM_AES FCS_COP.1.1/CA_SHA_SM_AES cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic algorithm] meet the following [standard]: Cryptographic algorithm Key length IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with BAP and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 /CA_ECDH_SM_3DES Cryptographic key generation /CA_ECDH_SM_3DES The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm [cryptographic key generation algorithm] specified cryptographic key sizes [key length] that meet the following [standard] key generation algorithm Key length (bits) Algorithm based on ECDH key derivation protocol compliant to 112 /CA_ECDH_SM_AES Cryptographic key generation /CA_ECDH_SM_AES The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm [cryptographic key generation algorithm] specified cryptographic key sizes [key length] that meet the following [standard] key generation algorithm Key length (bits) Algorithm based on ECDH key derivation protocol compliant to 128, 192, 256 /CA_SHA_SM_3DES Cryptographic key generation /CA_SHA_SM_3DES The TSF shall perform hashing in accordance with a specified [cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes Key length (bits) Standards None [R27] /CA_SHA_SM_AES Cryptographic key generation The TSF shall perform hashing in accordance with a specified [cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes Key length Standards curity Target EAC with BAP and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a [cryptographic key generation algorithm] and [standard]: Key length (bits) Standards [R2] The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a [cryptographic key generation algorithm] and [standard]: Key length (bits) Standards 128, 192, 256 [R2] in accordance with a specified cryptographic key sizes [key length] that in accordance with a specified cryptographic key sizes [key length] that T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ (bits) SHA1 and SHA256 None FCS_COP.1/CA_SYM_SM_3DES FCS_COP.1.1/CA_SYM_SM_3DES accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm key sizes [key length] that meet the following Cryptographic algorithm Key length (bits) 3DES CBC mode 112 FCS_COP.1/CA_SYM_SM_AES FCS_COP.1.1/CA_SYM_SM_AES with a specified cryptographic algorithm length] that meet the following [standard] Cryptographic algorithm Key length (bits) AES 128, 192 and 256 FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC_SM_3DES FCS_COP.1.1/CA_MAC_SM_3DES accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm key sizes [key length] that meet the following Cryptographic algorithm Key length (bits) 3DES Retail MAC 112 IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with BAP and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 (bits) None [R27] /CA_SYM_SM_3DES Cryptographic key generation /CA_SYM_SM_3DES The TSF shall perform SM encryption and accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic algorithm] that meet the following [standard]: Key length (bits) Standards 112 [R27] /CA_SYM_SM_AES Cryptographic key generation The TSF shall perform SM encryption and decryption with a specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes [standard]: Key length (bits) Standards 128, 192 and 256 [R27] /CA_MAC_SM_3DES Cryptographic key generation /CA_MAC_SM_3DES The TSF shall perform SM message authentication code accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic algorithm] that meet the following [standard]: Key length (bits) Standards 112 [R39] curity Target EAC with BAP and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - SM encryption and decryption in [cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic SM encryption and decryption in accordance cryptographic key sizes [key authentication code in [cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC_SM_AES FCS_COP.1.1/CA_MAC_SM_AES accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm key sizes [key length] that meet the following Cryptographic algorithm Key length (bits) AES CMAC 128, 192 and FIA_UAU.1/CA Timing of authentication FIA_UAU.1.1/CA The TSF shall allow: 1. To establish the communication channel 2. To read the Initialization Data if it is not disabled by TSF according to FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS 3. To identify themselves by selection of the authentication key 4. To carry out the Chip Authentication Protocol on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is auth FIA_UAU.1.2/CA The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user. FIA_UAU.5/CA_3DES Multiple authentication mechanisms FIA_UAU.5.1/CA_3DES The TSF shall provide 1. Secure Messaging in MAC-ENC mode 2. Symmetric Authentication Mechanism based on 3DES to support user authentication. FIA_UAU.5.2/CA_3DES The TSF shall authenticate any user's cl 1. After run of the Chip Authentication Protocol the TOE accepts only received commands with correct message authentication code sent by means of secure messaging with key agreed with the terminal by means of the Chip Authentication Mechanism FIA_UAU.5/CA_AES Multiple authentication mechanisms FIA_UAU.5.1/CA_AES The TSF shall provide IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with BAP and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 /CA_MAC_SM_AES Cryptographic key generation /CA_MAC_SM_AES The TSF shall perform SM message authentication code accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic algorithm] that meet the following [standard]: Key length (bits) Standards 128, 192 and 256 [R39] Timing of authentication The TSF shall allow: 1. To establish the communication channel Initialization Data if it is not disabled by TSF according to FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS 3. To identify themselves by selection of the authentication key 4. To carry out the Chip Authentication Protocol on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is authenticated. The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before allowing any mediated actions on behalf of that user. FIA_UAU.5/CA_3DES Multiple authentication mechanisms The TSF shall provide ENC mode 2. Symmetric Authentication Mechanism based on 3DES The TSF shall authenticate any user's claimed identity according to the of the Chip Authentication Protocol the TOE accepts only received commands with correct message authentication code sent by means of secure messaging with key agreed with the terminal by means of the Chip Authentication Mechanism Multiple authentication mechanisms The TSF shall provide curity Target EAC with BAP and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - authentication code in [cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic Initialization Data if it is not disabled by TSF according to FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before allowing any aimed identity according to the of the Chip Authentication Protocol the TOE accepts only received commands with correct message authentication code sent by means of secure messaging with key agreed with the T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ 1. Secure Messaging in MAC-ENC mode 2. Symmetric Authentication Mechanism based on AES to support user authentication. FIA_UAU.5.2/CA_AES The TSF shall authentica 1. After run of the Chip Authentication Protocol the TOE accepts only received commands with correct message authentication code sent by means of secure messaging with key agreed with the terminal by means of the Chip Authentication Mechanism FIA_UAU.6/CA Re-authenticating FIA_UAU.6.1/CA The TSF shall re the TOE after successful run of the CA shall be verified as being sent FIA_UID.1/CA Timing of identification FIA_UID.1.1/CA The TSF shall allow 1. To establish the communication channel 2. To read the Initialization Data if it is not disbled by TSF according to FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS 3. To carry out th Chip Authentication Protocol on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is identified. FIA_UID.1.2/CA The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of FPT_EMS.1/CA TOE Emanation FPT_EMS.1.1/CA The TOE shall not emit execution in excess of non useful information 1. Chip Authentication: Session Keys, FPT_EMS.1.2/CA The TSF shall ensure interface smart card circuit contacts 1. Active Authentication: Session Keys, Private Key (CAK) IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with BAP and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 ENC mode 2. Symmetric Authentication Mechanism based on AES The TSF shall authenticate any user's claimed identity according to the After run of the Chip Authentication Protocol the TOE accepts only received commands with correct message authentication code sent by means of secure messaging with key agreed with the the Chip Authentication Mechanism authenticating The TSF shall re-authenticate the user under the conditions each command sent to after successful run of the CA shall be verified as being sent by the inspection system Timing of identification The TSF shall allow 1. To establish the communication channel 2. To read the Initialization Data if it is not disbled by TSF according to FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS 3. To carry out th Chip Authentication Protocol on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is identified. The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before allowing any mediated actions on behalf of that user. TOE Emanation The TOE shall not emit power variations, timing variations during command non useful information enabling access to 1. Chip Authentication: Session Keys, Private Key (CAK) The TSF shall ensure any unauthorized users are unable to use the following contacts to gain access to 1. Active Authentication: Session Keys, Private Key (CAK) curity Target EAC with BAP and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - te any user's claimed identity according to the After run of the Chip Authentication Protocol the TOE accepts only received commands with correct message authentication code sent by means of secure messaging with key agreed with the each command sent to by the inspection system 2. To read the Initialization Data if it is not disbled by TSF according to FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before allowing any variations, timing variations during command are unable to use the following T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ FPT_TST.1/CA TSF testing FPT_TST.1.1/CA The TSF shall run a suite of self tests TSF, at the conditions: - When performing the Chip Authentication FPT_TST.1.2/CA The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the integrity of TSF data. FPT_TST.1.3/CA The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the integrity of stored TSF executable code. FMT_MTD.1/CA_KEY_WRITE FMT_MTD.1.1/CA_KEY_WRITE The TSF shall restrict the ability to Agent. FMT_MTD.1/CA_KEY_READ Management of TSF data FMT_MTD.1.1/CA_KEY_READ The FDP_UCT.1/CA Basic data exchange confidentiality FDP_UCT.1.1/CA [Editorially Refined] receive user data in a manner protected from protocol. FDP_UIT.1/CA Data exchange integrity FDP_UIT.1.1/CA [Editorially Refined] receive user data in a manner protected from after Chip Authentication protocol FDP_UIT.1.2/CA [Editorially Refined] whether modification, deletion, insertion and replay protocol IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with BAP and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 TSF testing The TSF shall run a suite of self tests to demonstrate the correct operation of performing the Chip Authentication The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the integrity of The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the integrity of WRITE Management of TSF data The TSF shall restrict the ability to write the CAK KEY_READ Management of TSF data The TSF shall restrict the ability to read the CAK to Basic data exchange confidentiality [Editorially Refined] The TSF shall enforce the Access Control SFP user data in a manner protected from unauthorised disclosure after Chip Authentication Data exchange integrity [Editorially Refined] The TSF shall enforce the Access Control SFP user data in a manner protected from modification, deletion, insertion and replay after Chip Authentication protocol [Editorially Refined] The TSF shall be able to determine on receipt of user data, ion, insertion and replay has occurred after Chip Authentication curity Target EAC with BAP and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - to demonstrate the correct operation of the The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the integrity of The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the integrity of AK to Personalization to none. Access Control SFP to transmit and after Chip Authentication Access Control SFP to transmit and , deletion, insertion and replay errors The TSF shall be able to determine on receipt of user data, after Chip Authentication T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ 9.1.6 Terminal Authentication SFR FCS_COP.1/TA_SHA_RSA FCS_COP.1.1/TA_SHA_RSA The TSF shall cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic algorithm] meet the following [standard]: Cryptographic algorithm SHA1, SHA256 and SHA 512 FCS_COP.1/TA_SHA_SM_ECC FCS_COP.1.1/TA_SHA_SM_ECC The TSF shall cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic algorithm] meet the following [standard]: Cryptographic algorithm SHA1, SHA224, SHA256, SHA384 and SHA512 FCS_COP.1/TA_SIG_VER_RSA FCS_COP.1.1/TA_SIG_VER_RSA with a specified cryptographic algorithm length] that meet the following [standard] Cryptographic algorithm Key length (bits) RSA coupled with SHA From 1024 to 4096, with a step of 256 IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with BAP and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 Authentication SFR Cryptographic key generation The TSF shall perform hashing in accordance with a specified [cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes Key length (bits) Standards None [R27] /TA_SHA_SM_ECC Cryptographic key generation The TSF shall perform hashing in accordance with a specified [cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes Key length (bits) Standards SHA1, SHA224, SHA256, SHA384 and SHA512 None [R27] /TA_SIG_VER_RSA Cryptographic key generation The TSF shall perform digital signature verification with a specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes [standard]: Key length (bits) Standards From 1024 to 4096, with a step of 256 [R39] curity Target EAC with BAP and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - in accordance with a specified cryptographic key sizes [key length] that in accordance with a specified cryptographic key sizes [key length] that Standards digital signature verification in accordance cryptographic key sizes [key Standards [R39] T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ FCS_COP.1/TA_SIG_VER_ECC FCS_COP.1.1/TA_SIG_VER_ECC The TSF shall with a specified cryptographic algorithm length] that meet the following [standard] Cryptographic algorithm Key (bits) ECC coupled with SHA From 192 to 521 FIA_UAU.4/TA Single-use authentication mechanisms FIA_UAU.4.1/TA The TSF shall prevent reuse of authentication data related to 1. Terminal Authentication Protocol FMT_MTD.1/TA_CVCA_UPD FMT_MTD.1.1/TA_CVCA_UPD The TSF shall 1. Country Verifying Certification Authority Public Key 2. Country Verifying Certification Authority Certificate to Country Verifying Certification Authority. FMT_MTD.1/TA_DATE Management of TSF data FMT_MTD.1.1/TA_DATE The TSF shall 1. Country Verifying Certification Authority 2. Document Verifier 3. Domestic Extended Inspection System FPT_TST.1/TA TSF testing FPT_TST.1.1/TA The TSF shall run a suite of self tests TSF, at the conditions: - When using the CVCA Root key - When verifying a certificate with an extracted public key µ - When performing a Terminal authentication IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with BAP and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 /TA_SIG_VER_ECC Cryptographic key generation The TSF shall perform digital signature verification with a specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes [standard]: Key length (bits) Standards From 192 to 521 [R39] use authentication mechanisms The TSF shall prevent reuse of authentication data related to Protocol TA_CVCA_UPD Management of TSF data The TSF shall restrict the ability to update the 1. Country Verifying Certification Authority Public Key 2. Country Verifying Certification Authority Certificate Country Verifying Certification Authority. Management of TSF data The TSF shall restrict the ability to modify the Current Date 1. Country Verifying Certification Authority 3. Domestic Extended Inspection System The TSF shall run a suite of self tests to demonstrate the correct operation of When using the CVCA Root key When verifying a certificate with an extracted public key µ When performing a Terminal authentication curity Target EAC with BAP and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - digital signature verification in accordance cryptographic key sizes [key Standards [R39] Current Date to to demonstrate the correct operation of the T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ FPT_TST.1.2/TA The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the integrity of TSF data. FPT_TST.1.3/TA The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the integrity of stored TSF executable code. FMT_SMR.1/TA Security roles FMT_SMR.1.1/TA The TSF shall maintain the roles 1. Country Verifying Certification Authority 2. Document Verifier 3. Domestic Extended Inspection System 4. Foreign Extended Inspection System FMT_SMR.1.2/TA The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles. FMT_MTD.1/TA_CVCA_INI FMT_MTD.1.1/TA_CVCA_INI The TSF shall 1. Initial Country Verifying Certification Authority Public Key 2. Initial Country Verifying Certification Authority Certificate 3. Initial Current Date to the Personalization Agent 9.1.7 Extended Access Control FDP_ACC.1/EAC Subset access control FDP_ACC.1.1/EAC The TSF shall enforce the write, read and modification access to data in the EF.DG1 to EF.DG24 of the logical MRTD FDP_ACF.1/EAC Security attribute based access control FDP_ACF.1.1/EAC The TSF shall enforce the IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with BAP and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the integrity of The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the integrity of Security roles The TSF shall maintain the roles ing Certification Authority Domestic Extended Inspection System Foreign Extended Inspection System The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles. TA_CVCA_INI Management of TSF data The TSF shall restrict the ability to write the 1. Initial Country Verifying Certification Authority Public Key 2. Initial Country Verifying Certification Authority Certificate Extended Access Control SFR Subset access control The TSF shall enforce the Access Control SFP on terminals gaining write, read and modification access to data in the EF.COM, EF.SOD, of the logical MRTD Security attribute based access control The TSF shall enforce the Access Control SFP to objects based on the following: curity Target EAC with BAP and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the integrity of The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the integrity of on terminals gaining to objects based on the following: T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ 1. Subjects a. Personalization Agent b. Extended Inspection S c. Terminal 2. Objects a. Data EF.DG1 to EF.DG6 and EF.DG9 to EF.DG24 of the logical MRD b. Data EF.DG7 and EF.DG8 of the logical MRD c. Data in EF.COM d. Data in EF.SOD 3. Security attributes a. Authentication status b. Terminal Authorization FDP_ACF.1.2/EAC The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed: 1. The successfully authenticated the EF.COM, EF.SOD, EF.DG1 to EF.DG24 of the logical MRD 2. The successfully authenticated relative certificate holder authorization encoding is allowed to read the data in EF.DG7 of the logical MRD 3. The successfully authenticated EIS with the read accedd to DG8 (Iris) granted by the relative certificate holder authorization encoding is allowed to read the data in EF.DG8 of the logical MRD FDP_ACF.1.3/EAC The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules: none. FDP_ACF.1.4/EAC The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules: 1. A terminal authenticated as CVCA is not allowed to read data in the EF. 2. A terminal authenticated as CVCA is not allowed to read data in the EF. 3. A terminal authenticated as DV is not allowed to read data in the EF. 4. A terminal authenticated as DV is n 5. Any terminal is not allowed to modify any of the EF.DG1 to EF.DG 6. Any terminal not being successfully authenticated a to read any of the EF.DG7 to EF. Application Note: IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with BAP and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 Personalization Agent System Data EF.DG1 to EF.DG6 and EF.DG9 to EF.DG24 of the logical MRD b. Data EF.DG7 and EF.DG8 of the logical MRD status of terminals Authorization The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed: authenticated Personalization Agent is allowed to write and the EF.COM, EF.SOD, EF.DG1 to EF.DG24 of the logical MRD authenticated EIS with the read access to DG7 (Fingerprint) granted by the relative certificate holder authorization encoding is allowed to read the data in EF.DG7 of the 3. The successfully authenticated EIS with the read accedd to DG8 (Iris) granted by the relative certificate holder authorization encoding is allowed to read the data in EF.DG8 of the logical MRD The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on the . The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the following authenticated as CVCA is not allowed to read data in the EF.DG7 2. A terminal authenticated as CVCA is not allowed to read data in the EF.DG8 3. A terminal authenticated as DV is not allowed to read data in the EF.DG7 4. A terminal authenticated as DV is not allowed to read data in the EF.DG8 5. Any terminal is not allowed to modify any of the EF.DG1 to EF.DG24 of the logical 6. Any terminal not being successfully authenticated as Extended Inspection System is .DG8 of the logical MRD curity Target EAC with BAP and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among and read the data of EIS with the read access to DG7 (Fingerprint) granted by the relative certificate holder authorization encoding is allowed to read the data in EF.DG7 of the 3. The successfully authenticated EIS with the read accedd to DG8 (Iris) granted by the relative certificate holder authorization encoding is allowed to read the data in EF.DG8 of the logical MRD The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on the The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the following of the logical MRD s Extended Inspection System is not allowed T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ Note the BAC mechanism controls the read access of the EF.COM, and EF.DG9 to EF.DG24 of the logical are not subject of this protection profile. table 3 of the ISO 18013-3. FMT_MTD.3/EAC Secure TSF data FMT_MTD.3.1/EAC [Editiorally Refined] certificate chain are accepted for Control. Refinement: The Certificate chain is valid if and only if: 1- The digital signature of the Inspection System Certificate can be verified as correc Document Verifier Certificate and the expiration date of the Inspection System Certificate is not before the Current Date of the TOE 2- The digital signature of the Document Verifier Certificate can be verified as correct with Certificate of the Country Verifying Certification Authority and the expiration date of the Document Verifier Certificate is not before the Current Date of the TOE 3- The digital signature of the Certificate of the Country Verifying C the public key of the Country Verifying Certification Authority known to the TOE and the expiration date of the Certificate of the Country Verifying Certification Authority is not before the Current Da The Inspection System Public Key contained in the Inspection System Certificate in a valid certificate chain is a secure value for the authentication reference data of the Extended Inspection System. The intersection of the Certificate Hol secure value for Terminal Authorization of a successful authenticated Extended Inspection System. FIA_UAU.5/EAC Multiple authentication mechanisms FIA_UAU.5.1/EAC The TSF shall provide 1. Terminal Authentication Protocol 2. Secure messaging in MAC-ENC mode to support user authentication. FIA_UAU.5.2/EAC The TSF shall authenticate any user's cl 1. 1. The TOE accepts the authentication attempt by means of the Terminal Authentication Protocol only if the terminal uses the public key presented during the Chip Authentication Protocol and the secure messaging established by the Chip Authentication Mechanism IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with BAP and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 Note the BAC mechanism controls the read access of the EF.COM, EF.SOD, EF.DG1 of the logical MRD. According to P.BAC-PP this security features of the f this protection profile. For more information on the associated DG, please refer to Secure TSF data /EAC [Editiorally Refined] The TSF shall ensure that only secure values of ccepted for TSF data of the Terminal Authentication Protocol and the Access The Certificate chain is valid if and only if: The digital signature of the Inspection System Certificate can be verified as correct with the public key of the Document Verifier Certificate and the expiration date of the Inspection System Certificate is not before the Current Date The digital signature of the Document Verifier Certificate can be verified as correct with Certificate of the Country Verifying Certification Authority and the expiration date of the Document Verifier Certificate is not before the Current Date of the TOE The digital signature of the Certificate of the Country Verifying Certification Authority can be verified as correct with the public key of the Country Verifying Certification Authority known to the TOE and the expiration date of the Certificate of the Country Verifying Certification Authority is not before the Current Date of the TOE. The Inspection System Public Key contained in the Inspection System Certificate in a valid certificate chain is a secure value for the authentication reference data of the Extended Inspection System. The intersection of the Certificate Holder Authorizations contained in the certificates of a valid certificate chain is a secure value for Terminal Authorization of a successful authenticated Extended Inspection System. FIA_UAU.5/EAC Multiple authentication mechanisms The TSF shall provide 1. Terminal Authentication Protocol ENC mode The TSF shall authenticate any user's claimed identity according to the authentication attempt by means of the Terminal Authentication Protocol only if the terminal uses the public key presented during the Chip Authentication Protocol and the secure messaging established by the Chip Authentication Mechanism curity Target EAC with BAP and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - EF.SOD, EF.DG1 to EF.DG6 this security features of the MRD For more information on the associated DG, please refer to ensure that only secure values of the TSF data of the Terminal Authentication Protocol and the Access t with the public key of the Document Verifier Certificate and the expiration date of the Inspection System Certificate is not before the Current Date The digital signature of the Document Verifier Certificate can be verified as correct with the public key in the Certificate of the Country Verifying Certification Authority and the expiration date of the Document Verifier Certificate is ertification Authority can be verified as correct with the public key of the Country Verifying Certification Authority known to the TOE and the expiration date of the te of the TOE. The Inspection System Public Key contained in the Inspection System Certificate in a valid certificate chain is a secure der Authorizations contained in the certificates of a valid certificate chain is a secure value for Terminal Authorization of a successful authenticated Extended Inspection System. aimed identity according to the authentication attempt by means of the Terminal Authentication Protocol only if the terminal uses the public key presented during the Chip Authentication Protocol T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ FMT_LIM.1/EAC Limited capabilities FMT_LIM.1.1/EAC The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their capabilities so that in conjunction with "Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)" the following policy is enforced Deploying Test Features after TOE 1. Sensitive User Data (EF.DG7 and EF. FMT_LIM.2/EAC Limited availability FMT_LIM.2.1/EAC The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their availability so tha conjunction with "Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)" the following policy is enforced Deploying Test Features after TOE 1. User Data to be disclosed 9.2 Security Assurance Requirements The security assurance requirement level is IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with BAP and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 Limited capabilities The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their capabilities so that in conjunction with "Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)" the following policy is enforced Deploying Test Features after TOE Delivery does not allow and EF.DG8) to be disclosed (not available for BAC) Limited availability The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their availability so tha conjunction with "Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)" the following policy is enforced TOE Delivery does not allow Security Assurance Requirements The security assurance requirement level is EAL5 augmented with ALC_DVS.2, and AVA.VAN.5 curity Target EAC with BAP and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their capabilities so that in conjunction with "Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)" the following policy is enforced: ) to be disclosed (not available for BAC) The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their availability so that in conjunction with "Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)" the following policy is enforced: and AVA.VAN.5. T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ 10 TOE SUMMARY SPECIFIC 10.1 TOE Summary Specification Access Control in reading This function controls access to read functions and enforces the security policy for data Prior to any data retrieval, it authenticates the actor trying to access the data, and checks the access conditions are fulfilled as well as the life cycle state. It ensures that at any time, the following keys are never readable: - BA keys - Chip Authentication keys - Active Authentication private key - Personalization Agent keys - MSK and LSK - CVCA keys It controls access to the CPLC data as well: - It ensures the CPLC data can be read during the personalization phase - It ensures it can not be readable in Regarding the file structure: In the operational use: - The terminal can read user data EF.CVA, EF.COM only after BAC authentication and - When the EAC was successfully performed, the terminal can only read the DG7 & DG8 provided the access rights are sufficient throught a valid secure channel In the personalization phase - The Personalization Agent by the TOE (using its authentication keys) - The TOE is uniquely identified by a random number, generated at each reset. This unique identifier is called (PUPI) It ensures as well that no other part of the Access Control in writing This function controls access to write functions (in EEPROM) and enforces the security policy for data writing. Prior to any data update, it a fulfilled as well as the life cycle state. This security functionality ensures the application locks can only be written once in personalization phase to be set to “1”. IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with BAP and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 TOE SUMMARY SPECIFICATION TOE Summary Specification This function controls access to read functions and enforces the security policy for data Prior to any data retrieval, it authenticates the actor trying to access the data, and checks the access conditions are fulfilled as well as the life cycle state. It ensures that at any time, the following keys are never readable: keys private key keys It controls access to the CPLC data as well: It ensures the CPLC data can be read during the personalization phase It ensures it can not be readable in free mode at the end of the personalization step The terminal can read user data (except DG7 & DG8), the Document Security Object, EF.COM only after BAC authentication and through a valid secure When the EAC was successfully performed, the terminal can only read the DG7 & DG8 provided the access rights are sufficient throught a valid secure channel Personalization Agent can read all the data stored in the TOE after it is authenticated (using its authentication keys) The TOE is uniquely identified by a random number, generated at each reset. This unique identifier is called (PUPI) er part of the memory can be accessed at anytime This function controls access to write functions (in EEPROM) and enforces the security policy for data writing. Prior to any data update, it authenticates the actor, and checks the access conditions are fulfilled as well as the life cycle state. This security functionality ensures the application locks can only be written once in personalization curity Target EAC with BAP and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - This function controls access to read functions and enforces the security policy for data retrieval. Prior to any data retrieval, it authenticates the actor trying to access the data, and checks the access free mode at the end of the personalization step , the Document Security Object, through a valid secure channel When the EAC was successfully performed, the terminal can only read the DG7 & DG8 provided the access rights are sufficient throught a valid secure channel can read all the data stored in the TOE after it is authenticated The TOE is uniquely identified by a random number, generated at each reset. This unique This function controls access to write functions (in EEPROM) and enforces the security policy for data uthenticates the actor, and checks the access conditions are This security functionality ensures the application locks can only be written once in personalization T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ It ensures as well the CPLC data can not be written anymore once the TOE is personalized and that it is not possible to load an additional code personalization phase.. Regarding the file structure In the operational use: It is not possible to create any files (system or data files). Furthermore, it is not possible to update any system files. However - The application data is still accessed internally by the application for its own needs - The root CVCA key files and temporary key files according to the authentication mechanism described in In the personalization phase - The Personalization Agent can data files it needs after it is authenticated by the TOE (using its authentication keys) Active Authentication This security functionality ensures the is activated by the personnalizer). BAP mechanism This security functionality ensures the BAP is correctly performed. It can only be performed once the TOE is personalized with the Triple DES Document Basic Access keys the Personalization Agent loaded beforehand during the personalization phase. Furthermore, this security functi ensures the session keys are destroyed at the end of each BA EAC mechanism This security functionality ensures the EAC is cor - It handles the certificate verification - The management of the current date (update and control towards the expiration da incoming certificate) - The signature verification (in the certificate or in th It can only be performed once the TOE is personalized with the chip aut key(s) the Personnalization Agent loaded during the personalization phase. Furthermore, this security functionalities ensures the authentication is performed as described in [R4]. This security functionalities ensures the sessi successful Chip Authentication step. The TOE handles an error counter; after several failure in attempting to strongly authenticate the GIS (the error limit is reached). The TOE also implements countermeas more and more time for the TOE to reply to subsequent wrong GIS authentication attempts. IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with BAP and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 LC data can not be written anymore once the TOE is personalized and that it is not possible to load an additional code or change the personalizer authentication keys in possible to create any files (system or data files). Furthermore, it is not possible to update application data is still accessed internally by the application for its own needs The root CVCA key files and temporary key files are updated internally by the application according to the authentication mechanism described in [R39] The Personalization Agent can create and write through a valid secure channel all the data files it needs after it is authenticated by the TOE (using its authentication keys) This security functionality ensures the Active Authentication is performed as described in ctivated by the personnalizer). ity ensures the BAP is correctly performed. It can only be performed once the TOE is personalized with the Triple DES Document Basic Access keys the Personalization Agent loaded beforehand during the personalization phase. Furthermore, this security functi ensures the session keys are destroyed at the end of each BAP session. This security functionality ensures the EAC is correctly performed. In particular: es the certificate verification of the current date (update and control towards the expiration da he signature verification (in the certificate or in the challenge/response mechanism) It can only be performed once the TOE is personalized with the chip authentication keys & Root CVCA key(s) the Personnalization Agent loaded during the personalization phase. Furthermore, this security functionalities ensures the authentication is performed as described in [R4]. This security functionalities ensures the session keys for secure messaging are destroyed at each successful Chip Authentication step. The TOE handles an error counter; after several failure in attempting to strongly authenticate the GIS (the error limit is reached). The TOE also implements countermeasures to protect the TOE; it takes more and more time for the TOE to reply to subsequent wrong GIS authentication attempts. curity Target EAC with BAP and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - LC data can not be written anymore once the TOE is personalized and that it or change the personalizer authentication keys in possible to create any files (system or data files). Furthermore, it is not possible to update application data is still accessed internally by the application for its own needs are updated internally by the application create and write through a valid secure channel all the data files it needs after it is authenticated by the TOE (using its authentication keys) is performed as described in [R39]. (if it ity ensures the BAP is correctly performed. It can only be performed once the TOE is personalized with the Triple DES Document Basic Access keys the Personalization Agent loaded beforehand during the personalization phase. Furthermore, this security functionalities of the current date (update and control towards the expiration date of the e challenge/response mechanism) hentication keys & Root CVCA key(s) the Personnalization Agent loaded during the personalization phase. Furthermore, this security functionalities ensures the authentication is performed as described in [R4]. on keys for secure messaging are destroyed at each The TOE handles an error counter; after several failure in attempting to strongly authenticate the GIS ures to protect the TOE; it takes more and more time for the TOE to reply to subsequent wrong GIS authentication attempts. T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ Personalization This security functionality ensures the TOE, when delivered to the P an authentication prior to any data exchange. This authentication is based on a symmetric Authentication mechanism based on a Triple DES or AES algorithm. Messaging described in the TSF Secure Messag Physical protection This security functionality protects the TOE against physical attacks. Prepersonalization This security functionality ensures the TOE, when delivered to the P demands an authentication prior to any data exchange. This authentication is based on a symmetric Authentication mechanism based on a Triple DES or AES algorithm. initializing the product and loading additio TSF can use a Secure Messaging described in the TSF Secure Messaging. Safe state management This security functionalities ensures th - an integrity error is detected by F.SELFTESTS - a tearing occurs (during a copy of data in EEPROM) This security functionality ensures that such a case occurs, the TOE is either switched in the state "kill card" or becomes mute. Secure Messaging This security functionality ensures the confidentiality between the TOE and the IFD. After a successful based on Triple DES or AES algorithm, and after a successful Chip Authentication, a established based on Triple DES/AES This security functionality ensures - No commands were inserted - The data exchanged remain confidential If an error occurs in the secure messaging layer, the session keys are destroyed This Secure Messaging can be combined with the This TSF can provide a GP Secure Messaging (SCP02 or SCP03) for the Prepersonalization or Personalization. Self tests The TOE performs self tests to verify the inte IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with BAP and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 This security functionality ensures the TOE, when delivered to the Personnalization Agent, demands an authentication prior to any data exchange. This authentication is based on a symmetric Authentication mechanism based on a Triple DES or AES algorithm. This TSF can use a Secure Messaging described in the TSF Secure Messaging. This security functionality protects the TOE against physical attacks. This security functionality ensures the TOE, when delivered to the Prepersonnal demands an authentication prior to any data exchange. This authentication is based on a symmetric Authentication mechanism based on a Triple DES or AES algorithm. This function is in charge of pre initializing the product and loading additional code if needed. This TSF is conformant with TSF can use a Secure Messaging described in the TSF Secure Messaging. This security functionalities ensures that the TOE gets back to a secure state when an integrity error is detected by F.SELFTESTS a tearing occurs (during a copy of data in EEPROM) ures that such a case occurs, the TOE is either switched in the state "kill This security functionality ensures the confidentiality, authenticity & integrity of TOE and the IFD. After a successful BAP authentication, a secure channel is establishe algorithm, and after a successful Chip Authentication, a /AES algorithms. unctionality ensures No commands were inserted, modified nor deleted within the data flow The data exchanged remain confidential If an error occurs in the secure messaging layer, the session keys are destroyed. This Secure Messaging can be combined with the Active Authentication. This TSF can provide a GP Secure Messaging (SCP02 or SCP03) for the Prepersonalization or to verify the integrity on the TSF data: curity Target EAC with BAP and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - ersonnalization Agent, demands an authentication prior to any data exchange. This authentication is based on a symmetric This TSF can use a Secure ersonnalization Agent, demands an authentication prior to any data exchange. This authentication is based on a symmetric This function is in charge of pre- This TSF is conformant with [R45]. This k to a secure state when ures that such a case occurs, the TOE is either switched in the state "kill & integrity of the communication authentication, a secure channel is established algorithm, and after a successful Chip Authentication, a secure channel is This TSF can provide a GP Secure Messaging (SCP02 or SCP03) for the Prepersonalization or T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ - Before the TSF data usage - The additional code integrity - The integrity of keys and sensitive data is ensured IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with BAP and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 usage integrity is checked at each POWER ON of the card The integrity of keys and sensitive data is ensured curity Target EAC with BAP and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ 11 RATIONALES Threats Security Objectives T.Read_Sensitive_Data OT.Sens_Data_Conf T.Forgery OT.AC_Pers OE.Exam_MRD T.Counterfeit OT.CA_Proof OE.Activ_Auth_Verif, OT.Data_Int_AA T.Abuse-Func OT.Prot_Abuse T.Information_Leakage OT.Prot_Inf_Leak T.Phys-Tamper OT.Prot_Phys T.Malfunction OT.Prot_Malfunction T.Unauthorized_Load OT.Secure _Load_ACode T.Bad_Activation OT.Secure _AC_Activation T.TOE_Identification_Forgery OT.TOE_Identification Table 13- Threats and Security Objectives OSP Security Objectives P.BAC-PP OE.BAC-PP P.Sensitive_Data OT.Sens_Data_Conf, OE. P.Manufact OT.Identification P.Personalization OT.AC_Pers, OT.Identification P.Activ_Auth OT.AA_Proof Table 14 - OSPs and Security Objectives Assumptions OE A.MRD_Manufact OE.MRD_Manufact A.MRD_Delivery OE.MRD_ Delivery A.Pers_Agent OE.Personalization A.Insp_Sys OE.Exam_MRD, OE.Prot_Logical_ A.Signature_PKI OE.Exam_MRD, OE. A.Auth_PKI OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data A.Insp_Sys_AA OE.Exam_MRD_AA Table 15 - Assumptions and OE The other rationales are available in the complete ST IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with BAP and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 Security Objectives Sens_Data_Conf, OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data, OE.Ext_Insp_Systems OT.AC_Pers, OE.Personalization, OT.Data_Int, OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper, Exam_MRD, OE.Exam_MRD_AA, OE.Pass_Auth_Sign, OE.Pass_Auth_Verif Proof, OE.Auth_Key_MRD, OE.Exam_MRD, OT.AA_Proof, OE.Activ_Auth_Verif, OT.Data_Int_AA OT.Prot_Abuse-Func, OE.Personalization OT.Prot_Inf_Leak OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper OT.Prot_Malfunction OT.Secure _Load_ACode OT.Secure _AC_Activation OT.TOE_Identification Threats and Security Objectives – coverage Security Objectives OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data, OE.Ext_Insp_Systems OT.Identification, OE.Personalization OSPs and Security Objectives – Coverage _Manufact _ Delivery OE.Personalization OE.Prot_Logical_MRD OE.Pass_Auth_Verif, OE.Activ_Auth_Sign Authoriz_Sens_Data, OE.Ext_Insp_Systems _AA, OE.Prot_Logical_MRD_AA Assumptions and OE – Coverage rationales are available in the complete ST. curity Target EAC with BAP and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - Auth_Verif T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ 12 REFERENCES MRTD specifications [R1] Machine Readable Travel Documents Technical Report, PKI for Machine Readable Travel Documents Offering ICC Read published by authority of the secretary general, International Civil Aviation Organization [R2] ICAO Doc 9303, Machine Readable Travel Documents, part 1 Passports, Sixth Edition, 2006, International Civil Aviation Organization [R3] ICAO Doc 9303, Machine Readable Travel Documents, part 3 Travel Documents, Specificatio biometric identification capabilities (including supplement), ICAO doc 93003, 2008 [R4] Development of a logical data structure technologies Machine Readable Trave Logical Data Structure 1.7, published by authority of the secretary general, International Civil Aviation Organization, LDS 1.7, 2004 [R5] Advanced Security Mechanisms for Machine readable travel documents Access control (EAC) [R6] Annex to Section III Security Standards for Machine Readable Travel Documents Excerpts from ICAO Doc 9303, Part 1 IDL specifications [R7] Information Technology 1:Physical characteristics and basic data set, ISO/IEC 18013 [R8] Information Technology 2: Machine-readable technologies, ISO/IEC 18013 [R9] Information Technology 3: Access control, authentication and integrity validation, ISO/IEC 18013 Protection Profiles [R10] Smartcard IC Platform Protection Profile v 1.0 [R11] Machine readable travel documents with “ICAO Application”, Basic Access control PP-0055 v1.10 25th march 2009 [R12] Machine readable travel documents with “ICAO BSI-PP-0056 v1.10 25 [R13] Machine readable travel documents with “ICAO Application”, Extended Access Control with PACE (EAC PP) [R14] MRTD with PACE – PP [R15] E-passport: adaptation and in SGDN/DCSSI/SDR, ref. 10.0.1, February 2007 [R16] Embedded Software for Smart Security Devices, Basic and Extended Configurations, ANSSi-CC-PP-2009/02, 1/12/2009 IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with BAP and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 Readable Travel Documents Technical Report, PKI for Machine Readable Travel Documents Offering ICC Read-Only Access, Version - 1.1, Date published by authority of the secretary general, International Civil Aviation Organization 9303, Machine Readable Travel Documents, part 1 – Passports, Sixth Edition, 2006, International Civil Aviation Organization ICAO Doc 9303, Machine Readable Travel Documents, part 3 – Machine Readable Offical Travel Documents, Specifications for electronically enabled offical travel documents with biometric identification capabilities (including supplement), ICAO doc 93003, 2008 Development of a logical data structure – LDS for optional capacity expansion technologies Machine Readable Travel Documents Technical Report, Development of a Logical Data Structure – LDS, For Optional Capacity Expansion Technologies, Revision 1.7, published by authority of the secretary general, International Civil Aviation Organization, LDS 1.7, 2004-05-18 ed Security Mechanisms for Machine readable travel documents Access control (EAC) – TR03110 – v1.11 Annex to Section III Security Standards for Machine Readable Travel Documents Excerpts from ICAO Doc 9303, Part 1 - Machine Readable Passports, Fifth Edition Information Technology - Personal Identification — ISO Compliant Driving Licence 1:Physical characteristics and basic data set, ISO/IEC 18013-1:2005 Information Technology - Personal Identification — ISO Compliant Driving Licence readable technologies, ISO/IEC 18013-2:2008 Information Technology - Personal Identification — ISO Compliant Driving Licence 3: Access control, authentication and integrity validation, ISO/IEC 18013 Smartcard IC Platform Protection Profile v 1.0 - BSI-PP-0035 15/06/2007 Machine readable travel documents with “ICAO Application”, Basic Access control march 2009 Machine readable travel documents with “ICAO Application”, Extended Access control 0056 v1.10 25th march 2009 Machine readable travel documents with “ICAO Application”, Extended Access Control with PACE (EAC PP) – BSI-PP-0056 V2 – 2012 PP-0068v2 passport: adaptation and interpretation of e-passport Protection Profiles, SGDN/DCSSI/SDR, ref. 10.0.1, February 2007 Embedded Software for Smart Security Devices, Basic and Extended Configurations, 2009/02, 1/12/2009 curity Target EAC with BAP and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - Readable Travel Documents Technical Report, PKI for Machine Readable Travel - October 01, 2004, published by authority of the secretary general, International Civil Aviation Organization – Machine Readable Passports, Sixth Edition, 2006, International Civil Aviation Organization Machine Readable Offical ns for electronically enabled offical travel documents with biometric identification capabilities (including supplement), ICAO doc 93003, 2008 LDS for optional capacity expansion l Documents Technical Report, Development of a LDS, For Optional Capacity Expansion Technologies, Revision – 1.7, published by authority of the secretary general, International Civil Aviation ed Security Mechanisms for Machine readable travel documents – Extended Annex to Section III Security Standards for Machine Readable Travel Documents Excerpts ifth Edition – 2003 ISO Compliant Driving Licence — Part liant Driving Licence — Part ISO Compliant Driving Licence — Part 3: Access control, authentication and integrity validation, ISO/IEC 18013-3:2009 0035 15/06/2007 Machine readable travel documents with “ICAO Application”, Basic Access control – BSI- Application”, Extended Access control – Machine readable travel documents with “ICAO Application”, Extended Access Control passport Protection Profiles, Embedded Software for Smart Security Devices, Basic and Extended Configurations, T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ [R17] Technical Report, Supplemental Access Control for Mac – version v1.01 Chips References [R18] Certification report Controller P60x144/080 [R19] Certification report Controller P60x080/052/040PVC(Y/Z/A)/PVG with IC Dedicated Software Standards [R20] ISO/IEC 7816-4:2013 [R21] Technical Guideline: Elliptic Curve Cryptography according to 2006 [R22] ISO/IEC 15946-1. Information technology techniques based on elliptic curves [R23] ISO/IEC 15946-2. Information technology techniques based on elliptic curves [R24] ISO/IEC 15946: Information technology techniques based on elliptic curves [R25] ISO/IEC 9796-2:2002 schemes giving message recovery [R26] PKCS #3: Diffie-Hellman Key Version 1.4 Revised November 1, 1993 [R27] Federal Information Change Notice to include SHA of Standards and Technology, 2002 August 1 [R28] AMERICAN NATIONAL STANDARD X9.62 Financial Services Industry (rDSA), 9 septembre 1998 [R29] Jakob Jonsson and Burt Kaliski. Public cryptography specifications version 2.1. RFC 3447, 2003 [R30] RSA Laboratories. PKCS#1 v2.1: RSA cryptography standard. RSA L Note, 2002 [R31] ANSI X9.31 - Digital Signatures Using Reversible Public Key Cryptography for the Financial Services Industry (rDSA), 1998. [R32] FIPS 46-3 Data Encryption Standard (DES) [R33] ISO/IEC 9797-1:1999 "Codes d'authentification de message utilisant un cryptogramme bloc" [R34] NIST SP 800-90 – Recommendation for Random Number Generation Using Deterministic Random Bit Generators (Revised) [R35] FIPS 197 – Advance Encryption Standard (AES) [R36] ISO/IEC 11770-2. Information Technology part 2: Mechanisms using symmetric techniques, 1996 Misc IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with BAP and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 Technical Report, Supplemental Access Control for Machine Readable Travel Documents Certification report - BSI-DSZ-CC-0845-V2-2013-MA-02 - NXP Secure Smart Card 144/080PVA/PVA(Y/B) with IC dedicated software FW5.0 Certification report - BSI-DSZ-CC-0837-v2-2014 - NXP Secure Smart Card Controller Controller P60x080/052/040PVC(Y/Z/A)/PVG with IC Dedicated Software :2013 – Organization, security and commands for interchange Technical Guideline: Elliptic Curve Cryptography according to ISO/IEC 1. Information technology – Security techniques techniques based on elliptic curves – Part 1: General, 2002 2. Information technology – Security techniques s based on elliptic curves – Part 2: Digital signatures, 2002 ISO/IEC 15946: Information technology — Security techniques techniques based on elliptic curves — Part 3: Key establishment, 2002 2002 - Information technology - Security techniques schemes giving message recovery - Part 2: Mechanisms using a hash Hellman Key-Agreement Standard, An RSA Laboratories Technical Note, Version 1.4 Revised November 1, 1993 Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 180-2 Secure Hash Standard (+ Change Notice to include SHA-224), U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE/National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2002 August 1 AMERICAN NATIONAL STANDARD X9.62-1998: Public Key Cryptography For T Financial Services Industry (rDSA), 9 septembre 1998 Jakob Jonsson and Burt Kaliski. Public-key cryptography standards (PKCS) #1: RSA cryptography specifications version 2.1. RFC 3447, 2003 RSA Laboratories. PKCS#1 v2.1: RSA cryptography standard. RSA Laboratories Technical Digital Signatures Using Reversible Public Key Cryptography for the Financial Services Industry (rDSA), 1998. 3 Data Encryption Standard (DES) 1:1999 "Codes d'authentification de message (MAC) Partie 1: Mécanismes utilisant un cryptogramme bloc" Recommendation for Random Number Generation Using Deterministic Random Bit Generators (Revised) Advance Encryption Standard (AES) 2. Information Technology – Security techniques – part 2: Mechanisms using symmetric techniques, 1996 curity Target EAC with BAP and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - hine Readable Travel Documents NXP Secure Smart Card PVA/PVA(Y/B) with IC dedicated software FW5.0 NXP Secure Smart Card Controller Controller P60x080/052/040PVC(Y/Z/A)/PVG with IC Dedicated Software Organization, security and commands for interchange ISO/IEC 15946.TR-ECC, BSI Security techniques – Cryptographic Security techniques – Cryptographic Security techniques — Cryptographic Part 3: Key establishment, 2002 ecurity techniques - Digital signature Part 2: Mechanisms using a hash-function Agreement Standard, An RSA Laboratories Technical Note, 2 Secure Hash Standard (+ 224), U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE/National Institute 1998: Public Key Cryptography For The key cryptography standards (PKCS) #1: RSA aboratories Technical Digital Signatures Using Reversible Public Key Cryptography for the (MAC) Partie 1: Mécanismes Recommendation for Random Number Generation Using Deterministic – Key management – T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ [R37] Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema, AIS31: Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für physikalische Zufallszahlengeneratoren, Ve 25.09.2001, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik [R38] NOTE-10 - Interpretation with e [R39] Advanced Security Mechanisms for Machine Readable Travel Documents part 1 Technical Guideline TR [R40] Advanced Security Mechanisms for Machine Readable Travel Documents part 2 Technical Guideline TR [R41] Advanced Security Mechanisms for Machine Readable Travel Documents part 3 Technical Guideline T CC [R42] Common Criteria for Information Technology security Evaluation Part 1: Introduction and general model, CCMB [R43] Common Criteria for Information Technology securit Functional Components, CCMB 2012 [R44] Common Criteria for Information Technology security Evaluation Part 3: Security Assurance Components, CCMB 2012 [R45] ANSSI-CC note 6 – v0.91 IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with BAP and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema, AIS31: Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für physikalische Zufallszahlengeneratoren, Ve 25.09.2001, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik Interpretation with e-passport PP_courtesy translation-draft v0.1 Advanced Security Mechanisms for Machine Readable Travel Documents part 1 Technical Guideline TR-03110-1 – version 2.10 March 2012 Advanced Security Mechanisms for Machine Readable Travel Documents part 2 Technical Guideline TR-03110-2 – version 2.10 March 2012 Advanced Security Mechanisms for Machine Readable Travel Documents part 3 Technical Guideline TR-03110-3 – version 2.10 March 2012 Common Criteria for Information Technology security Evaluation Part 1: Introduction and general model, CCMB-2012-09-001, version 3.1 Revision 4 Final, September 2012 Common Criteria for Information Technology security Evaluation Part 2: Security Functional Components, CCMB-2012-09-002, version 3.1 Revision 4 Final, September Common Criteria for Information Technology security Evaluation Part 3: Security Assurance Components, CCMB-2012-09-003, version 3.1 Revision v0.91 curity Target EAC with BAP and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema, AIS31: Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für physikalische Zufallszahlengeneratoren, Version 1, draft v0.1 Advanced Security Mechanisms for Machine Readable Travel Documents part 1 – Advanced Security Mechanisms for Machine Readable Travel Documents part 2 – Advanced Security Mechanisms for Machine Readable Travel Documents part 3 – Common Criteria for Information Technology security Evaluation Part 1: Introduction and 001, version 3.1 Revision 4 Final, September 2012 y Evaluation Part 2: Security 002, version 3.1 Revision 4 Final, September Common Criteria for Information Technology security Evaluation Part 3: Security 4 Final, September T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ 13 ACRONYMS AA Active Authentication BAC Basic Access Control CC Common Criteria Version 3.1 revision CPLC Card personalization life cycle DF Dedicated File DFA Differential Fault Analysis DG Data Group EAL Evaluation Assurance Level EF Elementary File EFID File Identifier DES Digital encryption standard DH Diffie Hellmann I/0 Input/Output IC Integrated Circuit ICAO International Civil Aviation organization ICC Integrated Circuit Card IFD Interface device LDS Logical Data structure MF Master File MRTD Machine readable Travel Document MRZ Machine readable Zone MSK Manufacturer Secret Key OCR Optical Character Recognition OS Operating System PKI Public Key Infrastructure PP Protection Profile SFI Short File identifier SHA Secure hashing Algorithm SOD Security object Data TOE Target of Evaluation TSF TOE Security function IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with BAP and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 Active Authentication Basic Access Control Common Criteria Version 3.1 revision 4 Card personalization life cycle Differential Fault Analysis Evaluation Assurance Level Digital encryption standard International Civil Aviation organization Integrated Circuit Card Logical Data structure Machine readable Travel Document Machine readable Zone Manufacturer Secret Key Optical Character Recognition Public Key Infrastructure Secure hashing Algorithm Security object Data Target of Evaluation TOE Security function curity Target EAC with BAP and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ INDEX A A.BAC-Keys .................................................... A.Insp_Sys...................................................... A.Insp_Sys_AA................................ A.Insp_Sys_CA ................................ A.MRTD_Delivery ................................ A.MRTD_Manufact................................ A.Pers_Agent................................ Access__Control__in__reading..................... Access__Control__in__writing...................... Active__Authentication................................ Attacker......................................................... Authenticity__of__the__MRTD's__chip B BAC__mechanism................................ F FAU_SAS.1/MP................................ FAU_STG.2/MP_Add_code ........................... FCS_CKM.1/BAC ................................ FCS_CKM.1/CA_DH_SM_3DES...................... FCS_CKM.1/CA_DH_SM_AES ........................ FCS_CKM.1/CA_ECDH_SM_3DES FCS_CKM.1/CA_ECDH_SM_AES .................... FCS_CKM.1/MP ................................ FCS_CKM.1/MP_Add_code........................... FCS_CKM.4/Global ................................ FCS_COP.1/AA_DSA ................................ FCS_COP.1/AA_ECDSA ................................ FCS_COP.1/BAC_AUTH................................ FCS_COP.1/BAC_ENC ................................ FCS_COP.1/BAC_MAC ................................ FCS_COP.1/BAC_SHA ................................ FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC_SM_3DES.................... FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC_SM_AES ...................... FCS_COP.1/CA_SHA_SM_3DES ..................... IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with BAP and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 ....................40 ......................39 ...............................................40 ...............................................40 ..........................................39 ........................................39 .................................................39 .....................71 ......................71 .................................71 .........................34 Authenticity__of__the__MRTD's__chip.......35 ..........................................71 ..............................................59 ...........................52 ............................................61 ......................66 ........................66 FCS_CKM.1/CA_ECDH_SM_3DES..................66 ....................67 .............................................54 ...........................52 ........................................50 ......................................60 ..................................60 ..................................62 ....................................62 ...................................62 ....................................62 ....................68 ......................68 .....................67 FCS_COP.1/CA_SHA_SM_AES FCS_COP.1/CA_SYM_SM_3DES FCS_COP.1/CA_SYM_SM_AES FCS_COP.1/MP_AUTH_3DES FCS_COP.1/MP_AUTH_AES FCS_COP.1/MP_ENC_3DES FCS_COP.1/MP_Enc_Add_code FCS_COP.1/MP_ENC_AES FCS_COP.1/MP_MAC_3DES FCS_COP.1/MP_MAC_Add_code FCS_COP.1/MP_MAC_AES FCS_COP.1/MP_SHA................................ FCS_RND.1/Global ................................ FDP_ACC.1/BAC................................ FDP_ACC.2/MP ................................ FDP_ACF.1/BAC ................................ FDP_ACF.2/MP................................ FDP_DAU.1/AA ................................ FDP_ITC.1/AA................................ FDP_ITC.1/CA................................ FDP_ITC.1/MP................................ FDP_UCT.1/BAC................................ FDP_UCT.1/MP................................ FDP_UIT.1/BAC................................ FDP_UIT.1/CA ................................ FDP_UIT.1/MP ................................ FDP_UIT.1/MP_Add_code FIA_AFL.1/BAC................................ FIA_AFL.1/MP ................................ FIA_API.1/CA................................ FIA_UAU.1/BAC ................................ FIA_UAU.1/CA................................ FIA_UAU.1/MP................................ FIA_UAU.4/BAC ................................ FIA_UAU.4/MP_3DES ................................ FIA_UAU.4/MP_AES ................................ FIA_UAU.5/BAC ................................ FIA_UAU.5/CA_3DES ................................ FIA_UAU.5/MP_3DES ................................ FIA_UAU.5/MP_AES ............................... curity Target EAC with BAP and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - 92700 FCS_COP.1/CA_SHA_SM_AES....................... 67 FCS_COP.1/CA_SYM_SM_3DES.................... 67 FCS_COP.1/CA_SYM_SM_AES...................... 67 .1/MP_AUTH_3DES........................ 55 FCS_COP.1/MP_AUTH_AES .......................... 55 FCS_COP.1/MP_ENC_3DES........................... 54 FCS_COP.1/MP_Enc_Add_code ................... 52 FCS_COP.1/MP_ENC_AES............................. 54 FCS_COP.1/MP_MAC_3DES ......................... 55 FCS_COP.1/MP_MAC_Add_code ................. 52 FCS_COP.1/MP_MAC_AES............................ 55 ..................................... 56 ........................................ 50 ............................................ 64 ............................................. 56 ............................................ 64 .............................................. 56 ............................................. 60 ................................................ 61 ................................................ 68 ............................................... 56 ...................................... 62, 70 ............................................. 57 ............................................. 63 ............................................... 70 .............................................. 57 FDP_UIT.1/MP_Add_code............................ 53 .............................................. 65 ............................................... 57 ................................................. 66 ............................................ 65 ............................................... 68 .............................................. 57 ............................................ 65 ................................... 58 ..................................... 58 ............................................ 65 .................................... 68 ................................... 58 ............................... 58, 69 T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ FIA_UAU.6/BAC................................ FIA_UAU.6/CA ................................ FIA_UID.1/BAC................................ FIA_UID.1/CA................................ FIA_UID.1/MP................................ FMT_LIM.1/BAC ................................ FMT_LIM.1/Global................................ FMT_LIM.2/BAC ................................ FMT_LIM.2/Global................................ FMT_MOF.1/AA................................ FMT_MTD.1/AA_KEY_READ.......................... FMT_MTD.1/AA_KEY_WRITE ........................ FMT_MTD.1/BAC_KEY_READ........................ FMT_MTD.1/BAC_KEY_WRITE ...................... FMT_MTD.1/CA_KEY_READ.......................... FMT_MTD.1/CA_KEY_WRITE ........................ FMT_MTD.1/MP................................ FMT_MTD.1/MP_Add_code ......................... FMT_MTD.1/MP_INI_DIS.............................. FMT_MTD.1/MP_INI_ENA ............................ FMT_MTD.1/MP_KEY_READ......................... FMT_MTD.1/MP_KEY_READ_Add_code FMT_MTD.1/MP_KEY_WRITE ....................... FMT_MTD.1/MP_KEY_WRITE_Add_code FMT_SMF.1/MP................................ FMT_SMR.1/BAC................................ FMT_SMR.1/MP ................................ FMT_SMR.1/MP_Add_code.......................... FPT_EMS.1/AA................................ FPT_EMS.1/CA................................ FPT_EMS.1/Global................................ FPT_EMS.1/MP................................ FPT_EMS.1/MP_Add_code ........................... FPT_FLS.1/Global................................ FPT_PHP.3/Global ................................ FPT_TST.1/BAC................................ FPT_TST.1/Global ................................ FTP_ITC.1/MP................................ FTP_ITC.1/MP_Add_code .......................... FTP_ITC.1/PP................................ IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with BAP and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 .............................................65 ...............................................69 ...............................................65 .................................................69 ................................................57 ............................................63 .........................................50 ............................................63 .........................................50 .............................................61 ..........................61 ........................61 ........................63 ......................63 ..........................70 ........................70 ............................................58 .........................53 ..............................59 ............................59 .........................59 FMT_MTD.1/MP_KEY_READ_Add_code.......53 .......................59 FMT_MTD.1/MP_KEY_WRITE_Add_code.....53 .............................................59 ...........................................64 ............................................59 ..........................53 ...............................................61 ...............................................69 .........................................51 ..............................................60 ...........................53 ...........................................51 .........................................51 ..............................................63 ....................................51, 69 ..............................................58 ..........................54 ...............................................70 IC_developer................................ Inspection_System................................ Logical__MRTD__data Manufacturer................................ MRTD_Holder ................................ OE.Auth_Key_MRTD................................ OE.BAC-Keys ................................ OE.Exam_MRTD........................... OE.MRTD___Delivery ................................ OE.MRTD_Manufact................................ OE.Pass_Auth_Sign................................ OE.Passive_Auth_Verif OE.Personalization................................ OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD OT.AA_Proof................................ OT.AC_Pers................................ OT.CA_Proof ................................ OT.Data_Conf ................................ OT.Data_Int................................ OT.Data_Int_AA................................ OT.Data_Int_CA................................ OT.Identification................................ OT.Prot_Abuse-Func................................ OT.Prot_Inf_Leak................................ OT.Prot_Malfunction................................ OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper OT.Secure_AC_Activation OT.Secure_Load_ACode OT.TOE_Identification P.Activ_Auth ................................ P.Chip_Auth................................ curity Target EAC with BAP and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - 92700 I ................................................. 34 ........................................ 33 L .................................. 34 M ................................................ 33 ............................................... 34 O ..................................... 45 ................................................. 44 ...........................31, 44, 45, 46 ................................... 43 ..................................... 43 ....................................... 44 OE.Passive_Auth_Verif ................................. 44 ........................................ 44 OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD................................. 45 ................................................. 42 ................................................... 41 ................................................. 42 ............................................... 41 ................................................... 41 ............................................ 42 ............................................ 42 ........................................... 41 ..................................... 41 .......................................... 41 .................................... 42 .................................. 42 OT.Secure_AC_Activation............................. 43 OT.Secure_Load_ACode ............................... 43 .................................. 43 P ................................................. 39 .................................................. 39 T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ P.Manufact.................................................... P.Personal_Data ................................ P.Personalization................................ Personalisation__Agent__Authentication Personalization_Agent ................................ Physical__protection................................ Prepersonalizer ................................ S Safe__state__management .......................... Secure__Messaging................................ Self__tests..................................................... Software_developer................................ T T.Abuse-Func................................ T.Bad_Activation ................................ T.Chip_ID ....................................................... T.Counterfeit ................................ T.Eavesdropping................................ T.Forgery........................................................ T.Information_Leakage ................................ T.Malfunction................................ T.Phys-Tamper................................ T.Skimming.................................................... T.TOE_Identification_Forgery ....................... T.Unauthorized_load................................ Terminal ........................................................ Traveler.......................................................... IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with BAP and AA F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves info@oberthur.com € - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534 ....................38 ............................................38 ...........................................38 Personalisation__Agent__Authentication ....72 ..................................33 .....................................72 .............................................34 ..........................72 .......................................72 .....................72 ......................................34 .................................................36 ...........................................38 .......................36 ...........................................37, 38 ............................................36 ........................36 .................................36 ................................................37 ...............................................37 ....................36 .......................38 .....................................38 ........................33 ..........................34 curity Target EAC with BAP and AA 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - 92700