TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V.
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Version
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Certification Report
Cisco Nexus 9000 Switch Series with ACI mode, APIC, and
Nexus 2000 Fabric Extenders
Sponsor and developer: Cisco Systems Inc
170 West Tasman Dr.
San Jose, CA 95134
USA
Evaluation facility: Brightsight
Brassersplein 2
2612 CT Delft
The Netherlands
Report number: NSCIB-CC-142306-CR
Report version: 1
Project number: 142306
Author(s): Denise Cater
Date: 30 April 2018
Number of pages: 19
Number of appendices: 1
Reproduction of this report is authorized provided the report is reproduced in its entirety.
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CONTENTS:
Foreword 4
Recognition of the certificate 5
International recognition 5
European recognition 5
1 Executive Summary 6
2 Certification Results 7
2.1 Identification of Target of Evaluation 7
2.2 Security Policy 7
2.3 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope 8
2.4 Architectural Information 9
2.5 Documentation 9
2.6 IT Product Testing 9
2.7 Evaluated Configuration 13
2.8 Results of the Evaluation 14
2.9 Comments/Recommendations 14
3 Security Target 15
4 Definitions 15
5 Bibliography 16
Appendix A 17
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Foreword
The Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security (NSCIB) provides a third-party
evaluation and certification service for determining the trustworthiness of Information Technology (IT)
security products. Under this NSCIB, TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V. has the task of issuing
certificates for IT security products, as well as for protection profiles and sites.
Part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product, protection profile or site
according to the Common Criteria assessment guidelines published by the NSCIB. Evaluations are
performed by an IT Security Evaluation Facility (ITSEF) under the oversight of the NSCIB Certification
Body, which is operated by TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V. in cooperation with the Ministry of the
Interior and Kingdom Relations.
An ITSEF in the Netherlands is a commercial facility that has been licensed by TÜV Rheinland
Nederland B.V. to perform Common Criteria evaluations; a significant requirement for such a license is
accreditation to the requirements of ISO Standard 17025 “General requirements for the accreditation
of calibration and testing laboratories”.
By awarding a Common Criteria certificate, TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V. asserts that the product or
site complies with the security requirements specified in the associated (site) security target, or that
the protection profile (PP) complies with the requirements for PP evaluation specified in the Common
Criteria for Information Security Evaluation. A (site) security target is a requirements specification
document that defines the scope of the evaluation activities.
The consumer should review the (site) security target or protection profile, in addition to this
certification report, in order to gain an understanding of any assumptions made during the evaluation,
the IT product's intended environment, its security requirements, and the level of confidence (i.e., the
evaluation assurance level) that the product or site satisfies the security requirements stated in the
(site) security target.
Reproduction of this report is authorized provided the report is reproduced in its entirety.
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Recognition of the certificate
Presence of the Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement and SOG-IS logos on the certificate
indicates that this certificate is issued in accordance with the provisions of the CCRA and the SOG-IS
agreement and will be recognised by the participating nations.
International recognition
The CCRA has been signed by the Netherlands in May 2000 and provides mutual recognition of
certificates based on the CC. Starting September 2014 the CCRA has been updated to provide mutual
recognition of certificates based on cPPs (exact use) or STs with evaluation assurance components
up to and including EAL2+ALC_FLR. The current list of signatory nations and approved certification
schemes can be found on: http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
European recognition
The European SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) version 3 effective from April
2010 provides mutual recognition of Common Criteria and ITSEC certificates at a basic evaluation
level for all products. A higher recognition level for evaluation levels beyond EAL4 (resp. E3-basic) is
provided for products related to specific technical domains. This agreement was initially signed by
Finland, France, Germany, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Italy
joined the SOGIS-MRA in December 2010. The current list of signatory nations, approved certification
schemes and the list of technical domains for which the higher recognition applies can be found on:
http://www.sogisportal.eu.
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1 Executive Summary
This Certification Report states the outcome of the Common Criteria security evaluation of the Cisco
Nexus 9000 Switch Series with ACI mode, APIC, and Nexus 2000 Fabric Extenders. The developer of
the Cisco Nexus 9000 Switch Series with ACI mode, APIC, and Nexus 2000 Fabric Extenders is Cisco
Systems Inc located in San Jose, USA and they also act as the sponsor of the evaluation and
certification. A Certification Report is intended to assist prospective consumers when judging the
suitability of the IT security properties of the product for their particular requirements.
The Cisco Nexus 9000 Switch Series with ACI (Application-Centric Infrastructure) mode, APIC
(Application Policy Infrastructure Controller), and Nexus 2000 Fabric Extenders offer both modular
(9500 switches) and fixed (9300 switches) 1, 10, 40, and 100 Gigabit Ethernet configurations. The
TOE operates in ACI mode to take full advantage of the policy-focused services and infrastructure
automation features of the ACI.
The TOE is comprised of the Nexus 9000 Series Switches that include the 9300, 9500 models with
ACI mode and the APIC including the optional Nexus 2000 Fabric Extenders. The APIC is the security
management controller used to manage the ACI fabric and is installed on Cisco UCS C-series servers.
The Nexus 2000 Fabric Extender functions essentially as a remote line card and is optional to the
deployment of the Nexus 9000 Switch Series with APIC/ACI to add additional ports. The Nexus 9000
Switch Series with ACI, APIC, and optional Fabric Extender are collectively referred to as TOE or
individually as TOE Components.
The TOE has been evaluated by Brightsight B.V. located in Delft, The Netherlands. The evaluation
was completed on 30 April 2018 with the approval of the ETR. The certification procedure has been
conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of
IT Security [NSCIB].
The scope of the evaluation is defined by the security target [ST], which identifies assumptions made
during the evaluation, the intended environment for the Cisco Nexus 9000 Switch Series with ACI
mode, APIC, and Nexus 2000 Fabric Extenders, the security requirements, and the level of confidence
(evaluation assurance level) at which the product is intended to satisfy the security requirements.
Consumers of the Cisco Nexus 9000 Switch Series with ACI mode, APIC, and Nexus 2000 Fabric
Extenders are advised to verify that their own environment is consistent with the security target, and to
give due consideration to the comments, observations and recommendations in this certification
report.
The results documented in the evaluation technical report [ETR]
1
for this product provide sufficient
evidence that it meets the EAL2 assurance requirements for the evaluated security functionality.
The evaluation was conducted using the Common Methodology for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 4 [CEM], for conformance to the Common Criteria for Information
Technology Security Evaluation, version 3.1 Revision 4 [CC].
TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V., as the NSCIB Certification Body, declares that the evaluation meets
all the conditions for international recognition of Common Criteria Certificates and that the product will
be listed on the NSCIB Certified Products list. It should be noted that the certification results only apply
to the specific version of the product as evaluated.
1
The Evaluation Technical Report contains information proprietary to the developer and/or the
evaluator, and is not releasable for public review.
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2 Certification Results
2.1 Identification of Target of Evaluation
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) for this evaluation is the Cisco Nexus 9000 Switch Series with ACI
mode, APIC, and Nexus 2000 Fabric Extenders from Cisco Systems Inc located in San Jose, USA.
The TOE is comprised of the following main components:
Delivery
item type
Identifier Version
Hardware
9300 models, 9500 models, Fabric Extenders and ACI Line
Cards (for detailed models please refer to Appendix A)
n/a
Software
NX-OS System Software-ACI
APIC
12.3(1f)
2.3(1f)
To ensure secure usage a set of guidance documents is provided together with the Cisco Nexus 9000
Switch Series with ACI mode, APIC, and Nexus 2000 Fabric Extenders. Details can be found in
section 2.5 of this report.
2.2 Security Policy

 The TOE can audit events related to cryptographic functionality, identification and
authentication, enforcement of information flow control policies and administrative actions. The
Cisco Nexus 9000 Switch in ACI mode and APIC generate an audit record for each auditable
event. Each security relevant audit event has the date, timestamp, event description, and
subject identity. The authorized administrator configures auditable events, performs back-up
operations, and manages audit data storage. The TOE provides the administrator with a
circular audit trail. Logs are written to an internal database.

 The TOE provides cryptography in support of other Cisco 9K security functionality and to
support remote management via SSHv2. The cryptographic services provided by the TOE are:
Cryptographic Method Use within the TOE
Secure Shell Establishment Used to establish initial SSH session
Transport Layer Security (TLS) Used in TLS session establishment
RSA/DSA Signature Services Used in SSH session establishment
Used in TLS session establishment
SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-512 Used to provide SSH traffic integrity verification
Used to provide TLS traffic integrity verification
Password hashing
AES CBC, GCM, and CTR (128, 192,
256)
Used to encrypt SSH session traffic
Used to encrypt TLS session traffic
HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-
SHA-384, HMAC-SHA-512
Used for keyed hash, integrity services in SSH
and TLS session establishment

 The TOE ensures that all information flows from the TOE do not contain residual information
from previous traffic. Packets are padded with zeros. Residual data is never transmitted from
the TOE.

 The TOE performs user authentication for the Authorized Administrator of the TOE and device
level authentication. The TOE provides authentication services for administrative users to
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connect to the TOE's secure administrator interfaces. The TOE requires Authorized
Administrators to authenticate prior to being granted access to any of the management
functionality. The TOE can be configured to require a minimum password length as well as
mandatory password complexity rules. The TOE provides administrator authentication against
a local user database. Password-based authentication can be performed on the local serial
port referred to as the management port on the Nexus switches. In addition, password-based
authentication can be performed when connecting to the TOE CLIs remotely using SSHv2.
The SSHv2 interface also supports authentication using SSH keys. The TOE supports use of
a RADIUS or TACACS+ AAA server (part of the IT Environment) to facilitate authentication
(including single-use authentication, or password-based authentication) and authorization
(roles) for administrative users attempting to connect to the TOE’s GUI and CLI. When the role
is defined through the management interface on the TOE, it is sent to the RADIUS server
using Vendor Specific Attributes (VSA). Password based authentication is used for
authenticating to the APIC using a browser to access the web based GUI secured by TLS.

 The TOE provides the ability to control traffic flow into or out of the Nexus 9000 switch. The
following types of traffic flow are controlled for both IPv4 and IPv6 traffic:
o Layer 3 Traffic – RACLs (Contracts)
o Layer 2 Traffic – PACLs (Contracts)
o VLAN Traffic – VACLs (Contracts)
o Virtual Routing and Forwarding – VRFs (tenant)

 The TOE provides secure administrative services for management of general TOE
configuration and the security functionality provided by the TOE. All CLI TOE administration
occurs either through a secure SSHv2 session or via a local console connection. In addition,
the web based GUI can be used for TOE administration using TLS. For the 9k with ACI, the
APIC controls the management of the devices within the ACI fabric. Cisco NX-OS in ACI
mode and APIC devices use role-based access control (RBAC). Preconfigured roles can be
used and customized roles can be created.

 The TOE protects against interference and tampering by untrusted subjects by implementing
identification, authentication, and access controls to limit configuration and access to
Authorized Administrators. The TOE prevents reading of cryptographic passwords. Use of
separate VLANs is used to ensure routing protocol communications between the TOE and
neighbour switches including routing table updates and neighbour switch authentication will be
logically isolated from traffic on other VLANs. The TOE internally maintains the date and time
and the TOE performs power-up self-tests and conditional self-tests to verify correct operation
of the switch itself and that of the cryptographic module.

 The administrator can terminate their own session by exiting out of the CLI and GUI. The TOE
can also be configured to display an Authorized Administrator specified banner on the CLI and
GUI management interfaces prior to allowing any administrative access to the TOE.

 The TOE allows trusted paths to be established to itself from remote administrators over
SSHv2 for remote CLI access and TLS using a browser for connection to the web based GUI
on the APIC.
2.3 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
2.3.1 Assumptions
The assumptions defined in the Security Target are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead
to specific Security Objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. Detailed information on these
security objectives that must be fulfilled by the TOE environment can be found in section 3.1 of the
[ST].
2.3.2 Clarification of scope
The TOE is mainly designed to regulate traffic of Layer 3 and above. To mitigate against hostile and
malicious traffic, especially against Layer 2 attacks such as ARP spoofing, the TOE requires a
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properly configured firewall to be installed between the trusted and untrusted networks in the
Organization’s operational environment.
2.4 Architectural Information
The general architecture consists of four subsystems:

 The Hardware subsystem providing:
o hardware clock, CPU, memory, network ports, and interrupts to switch.
o local storage (NVRAM, DRAM, and FLASH memory) of audit data and other data
o physical ports
o self-tests on boot up

 The Cryptographic subsystem providing cryptographic support for:
o Encrypting of communication with users and other systems (SSH)
o Hashing of stored passwords
o Generation and zeroizing cryptographic keys

 The NX-OS subsystem providing all other SFR-related functionality, such as:
o Security Audit
o Full Residual Information Protection
o Information Flow Control
 Control traffic flow (Packet Filtering)
 ACL enforcement
o Identification and Authentication (I&A)
o Protection of the TSF
o TOE Access
o Security Management
o Trusted Path/ Channels (the SSH functionality)

 The APIC Subsystem providing
o Security Audit
o Identification and Authentication (I&A)
o Protection of the TSF
o TOE Access
o Security Management
o Trusted Path/Channels (the SSH and SSL functionalities)
2.5 Documentation
The following documentation is provided with the product by the developer to the customer:
Identifier Version
Cisco Nexus 9k Switch with APIC/ACI Common Criteria Configuration
Guide
V1.0
2.6 IT Product Testing
Testing (depth, coverage, functional tests, independent testing): The evaluators examined the
developer’s testing activities documentation and verified that the developer has met their testing
responsibilities.
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2.6.1 Testing approach and depth
The developer tests consist of the twenty two (22) tests. These tests cover all TSFI and all SFRs and
include both positive and negative tests. The developer performed these twenty-two (22) tests on 2
setups.
The 1st setup includes:

 N9K-C9396PQ (SPINE) running NX-OS System Software ACI Mode 12.3(1e)

 N9K-C93180YC (LEAF) running NX-OX System Software ACI Mode 12.3(1e)

 N9K-C9372PX-E (LEAF) running NX-OS System Software ACI Mode 12.3(1e)

 UCS-C220-M4 APIC v2.3(1e) – three in a cluster
The 2nd setup includes:

 N9K-C9396PX running NX-OS System Software ACI Mode 12.3(1e)

 N9K-C9508 running NX-OS System Software ACI Mode 12.3(1e) with supervisor module A
and N9K-X9736PQ line card.

 N9K-C93180YC-EX running NX-OS System Software ACI Mode 12.3(1e)

 UCS-C220-M4 APIC v2.3(1e) – three in a cluster
The evaluator repeated six (6) of the twenty-two (22) developer tests, using the hardware setup:

 2 of N9K-C9372PX running NX-OS System Software ACI Mode 12.3(1e)

 N9K-C9336PQ running NX-OS System Software ACI Mode 12.3(1e)

 UCS-C220-M3 APIC v2.3(1e) – 1 for testing purpose (not in cluster)

 N2K-C2232PP and N2K-C2348TQ running same NX-OS as their parents
The TOE software was updated from NX-OS System Software ACI Mode 12.3(1e) and APIC v2.3(1e)
to NX-OS System Software ACI Mode 12.3(1f) and APIC v2.3(1f). The evaluator performed an
analysis of the changes and repeated the agreed subset of developer test cases using the updated
software versions.
In addition to the developer tests, the evaluator derived and executed eleven (11) additional functional
tests. On the basis of the evaluator analysis of the software changes, 6 tests were performed using
APIC v2.3(1e) / NX-OS ACI Mode 12.3(1e), and 6 tests were performed on the updated TOE software
APIC v2.3(1f) / NX-OS ACI Mode 12.3(1f), with 1 test performed on both versions.
2.6.2 Independent Penetration Testing
The evaluators produced twenty-nine (29) penetration tests in total. These were derived from a
vulnerability analysis comprised of 3 parts:
1. Public domain vulnerability analysis of TOE specific vulnerabilities (both hardware and
software);
2. Public domain vulnerability analysis of TOE-type vulnerabilities (vulnerabilities that are generic
for routers/switches) and a vulnerability scanning tool was used to identify generic potential
vulnerabilities;
3. Analysis of TOE deliverables (AGD, FSP, TDS etc.).
The evaluators considered the potential vulnerabilities in the context of the management plane, the
data plane and the APIC Controller. All penetration tests were performed using the hardware setup:

 2 of N9K-C9372PX running NX-OS System Software ACI Mode

 N9K-C9336PQ running NX-OS System Software ACI Mode

 UCS-C220-M3 APIC– 1 for testing purpose (not in cluster)

 N2K-C2232PP and N2K-C2348TQ running same NX-OS as their parents
On the basis of the evaluator analysis of the software changes, 12 tests were performed on the
version APIC 2.3(1e) / NX-OS 12.3(1e), and 18 tests were performed on the version APIC 2.3(1f) /
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NX-OS 12.3(1f), with 1 test performed on both versions, in accordance with the change analysis
presented
2.6.3 Test Configuration
The network diagram in Figure 1 describes the overall setup of the lab used for evaluator testing
(some tests required additional network components e.g. virtual devices, sniffers, etc).
Figure 1 Baseline evaluator test setup
The ports are labelled as follows:
Port Type Description
Management PC (Mgmt-PC)
EH Ethernet Management port
N9K-C9336PQ
SL1 SFP Ethernet port 1/1
SL2 SFP Ethernet port 1/2
API-SERVER-M1
AL1 SFP Port Eth 2-1 which connects the APIC to the LEAF1 switch
AL2 SFP Port Eth 2-2 which connects the APIC to the LEAF2 switch
Mgmt Ethernet Management Ethernet port which connects the APIC to the Management
PC
N9K-C9372PX (LEAF1)
L1A SFP Port Eth 1/1 connects the LEAF1 Switch to the APIC
L1S QSFP Port Eth 1/49 connects the LEAF1 Switch to the Spine
L1TB SFP Ethernet port connects leaf1 WITH Tester TB
L1EXT 4*SFP Ethernet ports 1/3 – 1/6 which connects the Leaf1 switch to the Extender
N2K-C2348TQ-10GE (LEAF1 EXTENDER)
EXTL1 QSFP Uplink port 1/1
Extends the I/O module managed by LEAF1
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Port Type Description
L1TA SFP Ethernet port connects the LEAF1 Extender to tester TA
N9K-C9372PX (LEAF2)
L2A SFP Port Eth 1/1 connects the LEAF2 Switch to the APIC
L2S QSFP Port Eth 1/49 connects the LEAF1 Switch to the Spine
L2TC SFP Ethernet port connects leaf1 WITH Tester TC
L2TD SFP Ethernet port connects leaf1 WITH Tester TD
EXTL2 QSFP Uplink port 1/1
Extends the I/O module managed by LEAF2
Testing Computer (Debian workstation)
TA SFP TA testing computer
TB SFP TB testing computer
TC SFP TD testing computer
TD Ethernet TC testing computer
Management PC Ethernet Management port
The TOE devices sampled in the evaluator testing were
2
:
Identifier Product name Firmware
N9K-C9372PX Cisco Nexus 9372PX Switch NX-OS ACI mode: 12.3 (1f)
N9K-C9336PQ Cisco Nexus 9336PQ Switch NX-OS ACI mode: 12.3 (1f)
N2K-C2232PP-10GE Cisco Nexus 2232PP Fabric Extender NX-OS ACI mode: 12.3 (1f)
N2K-C2348TQ-10GE Cisco Nexus 2348TQ Fabric Extender NX-OS ACI mode: 12.3 (1f)
APIC-SERVER-M1 Cisco UCS C220-M3 server APIC v2.3 (1f)
The following tools were used for testing:
Description Package Name Platform Version
Management PC
Operating system Windows 7 professional SP1 X86_64 6.1.7601
Terminal putty X86_64 2011-1’2-1’9:r9371
Terminal putty X86_64 2011-1’2-1’9:r9371
Virtualization VM VirtualBox X64 5.0.0
VM Debian 8 (Jessie) VM X64 Linux kernel 3.16
Testing Computer
Operating system Debian 8 (Jessie) X64 Linux kernel 3.16
Packet capture Tcpdump X64 4.6.2
Complier gcc X64 5.4.0 20160609
2
Note that originally the TOE software version was APIC v2.3(1e) / NX-OS ACI mode 12.3(1e).
However, during the evaluation the developer advanced the TOE version to APIC v2.3(1f) / NX-OS
ACI mode 12.3(1f). Consequently, as a result of evaluator analysis, some tests were performed on
APIC v2.3(1e) / NX-OS ACI Mode 12.3(1e), some tests were performed on APIC v2.3(1f) / NX-OS ACI
Mode 12.3(1f), and some of the tests were performed on both versions.
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Description Package Name Platform Version
Network enumeration nmap X64 6.49BETAA4
IP stack integrity checkerisic X64 0.07
VLAN hopping Python-scapy X64 2.2.0-1’kali1
Vulnerability scan tool Nessus X64 6.5.2
Port bridging Bridge-utils X64 1.6
Mac flooding macoff X64 1.07
Teardrop attack Targa2.c X64 2.1
CVE-2016-8858 kexkill X64 1.0
CVE-2016-10010 ExploitDB script#40962 X64 1.0
Test-Pi
Operating system Raspberry pi X32 Raspbain debian 8
Linux kernel 4.4.50 version 7
System logs Syslog-ng X32 3.5.6
DHCP attacks Yersina X32 0.7.3
Attacker-2
Operating system Raspberry pi X32 Raspbian debian 8
Linux kernel 4.4.50 version 7
DHCP Server Isc-dhcp-server X32 Isc-dhcpd-4.3.1
DHCP attacks Yersina X32 0.7.3
2.6.4 Testing Results
The testing activities, including configurations, procedures, test cases, expected results and observed
results are summarised in the [ETR], with references to the documents containing the full details.
The developer’s tests and the independent functional tests produced the expected results, giving
assurance that the TOE behaves as specified in its [ST] and functional specification.
As the result of the test execution the evaluator determined that the TOE needs to rely on the
evaluated configuration to defend against some of these attacks. The developer consequently updated
the relevant documents, clarifying the evaluated configuration to ensure these attacks are not
applicable to the TOE in its evaluated configuration.
As a result, the independent penetration tests found no exploitable vulnerabilities in the TOE when
operated in its evaluated configuration.
2.7 Evaluated Configuration
The TOE is defined uniquely by its name and version number Cisco Nexus 9000 Switch Series with
ACI mode, APIC, and Nexus 2000 Fabric Extenders (as detailed in Appendix A). The chassis of each
hardware component is labelled with its identifier. The version of software executing on each
component can be verified through the CLI/GUI to be APIC v2.3(1f) for the APIC Controller and NX-
OS ACI Mode 12.3(1f) for the Cisco Nexus 9000 Switch Series with ACI mode switches and Nexus
2000 Fabric Extenders.
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2.8 Results of the Evaluation
The evaluation lab documented their evaluation results in the [ETR]
3
which references a ASE
Intermediate Report and other NSP#6-compliant evaluator documents.
The verdict of each claimed assurance requirement is “Pass”.
Based on the above evaluation results the evaluation lab concluded the Cisco Nexus 9000 Switch
Series with ACI mode, APIC, and Nexus 2000 Fabric Extenders, to be CC Part 2 extended, CC Part 3
conformant, and to meet the requirements of EAL 2. This implies that the product satisfies the security
requirements specified in Security Target [ST].
2.9 Comments/Recommendations
The user guidance as outlined in section 2.5 contains necessary information about the usage of the
TOE. Certain aspects of the TOE’s security functionality, in particular the countermeasures against
attacks, depend on accurate conformance to the user guidance of both the software and the hardware
part of the TOE. Please note that the documents contain relevant details with respect to the resistance
against certain attacks.
When an administrative user is deleted, it is required to reload all the APIC to ensure any existing
sessions associated with that user are terminated as instructed in the guidance [AGD].
In addition all aspects of assumptions, threats and policies as outlined in the Security Target not
covered by the TOE itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his system risk
management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and techniques to be covered, he
should define the period of time until a re-assessment for the TOE is required and thus requested from
the sponsor of the certificate.
The strength of the implemented cryptographic algorithms and protocols was not rated in the course of
this evaluation.
3
The Evaluation Technical Report contains information proprietary to the developer and/or the
evaluator, and is not releasable for public review.
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3 Security Target
The Cisco Nexus 9000 Switch Series with ACI mode, APIC, and Nexus 2000 Fabric Extenders
Security Target, Version 1.0, April 12, 2018 [ST] is included here by reference.
4 Definitions
This list of Acronyms and the glossary of terms contains elements that are not already defined by the
CC or CEM:
ACI Application-Centric Infrastructure
APIC Application Policy Infrastructure Controller
IT Information Technology
ITSEF IT Security Evaluation Facility
JIL Joint Interpretation Library
NSCIB Netherlands scheme for certification in the area of IT security
PP Protection Profile
TOE Target of Evaluation
UCS Unified Computing System
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5 Bibliography
This section lists all referenced documentation used as source material in the compilation of this
report:
[CC] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Parts I, II and III,
Version 3.1 Revision 4, September 2012.
[CEM] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1
Revision 4, September 2012.
[ETR] Evaluation Technical Report Cisco Nexus 9000 Switch Series with ACI mode,
APIC, and Nexus 2000 Fabric Extenders, 18-RPT-152, Version 3.0, 30 April 2018.
[NSCIB] Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security, Version 2.4, 27
September 2017.
[ST] Cisco Nexus 9000 Switch Series with ACI mode, APIC, and Nexus 2000 Fabric
Extenders Security Target, Version 1.0, April 12, 2018.
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Appendix A
The following table provides the detailed hardware models of the TOE:
Model Description Interfaces
Cisco 9300 models with ACI support
9332PQ QSFP+ 40-Gigabit downlink interface
ports. Ports 1 to 12 and 15 to 26 also
support 40-Gigabit-to-4x10-Gigabit
breakout cables with the Dynamic
Breakout feature.
QSFP+ 40-Gigabit uplink interface
ports (6)
I/O ports as described
Management ports: 1 RJ45
connector
Console serial port: 1 RJ45
connector
USB ports (2)
9336PQ 36 line-rate QSFP+ ports. 10 and 40
Gigabit Ethernet ports.
I/O ports as described
Management ports: 1 RJ45
connector
Console serial port: 1 RJ45
connector
USB ports (2)
N9K-C9372PX-E Intel Core i3 processor Four 48 x
10/25-Gbps fiber ports and 6 x
40/100-Gbps Quad Small Form-
Factor Pluggable 28 (QSFP28) ports
I/O ports as described
Management ports: 1 RJ45
connector
Console serial port: 1 RJ45
connector
USB ports (1)
9372PX 1- and 10-Gigabit SFP+ interface
ports (48)
QSFP+ 40-Gigabit interface ports (6)
I/O ports as described
Management ports: 1 RJ45
connector
Console serial port: 1 RJ45
connector
USB ports (2)
9372TX 48 1- and 10-Gigabit Ethernet Small
Form-Factor 10 Pluggable (SFP+)
optical ports (supporting 1-Gigabit
and 10-Gigabit speeds) QSFP+ 40-
Gigabit interface ports (6)
I/O ports as described
Management ports: 1 RJ45
connector
Console serial port: 1 RJ45
connector
USB ports (2)
9396PX 4-port 100-Gigabit Ethernet CFP2
optical ports, or 6- or 12-port 40-
Gigabit Ethernet Quad Small Form-
Factor Pluggable (QSFP+) optical
ports for connections to other
devices
48 1- and 10-Gigabit Ethernet Small
Form-Factor 10 Pluggable (SFP+)
optical ports (supporting 1-Gigabit
and 10-Gigabit speeds) to switches
or Fabric Extenders (FEXs)
I/O ports as described
Management ports: 1 RJ45
connector
Console serial port: 1 RJ45
connector
USB ports (2)
9396TX 4-port 100-Gigabit Ethernet CFP2
optical ports, or 6- or 12-port 40-
Gigabit Ethernet Quad Small Form-
Factor Pluggable (QSFP+) optical
ports for connections to other
devices
48 10GBASE-T copper ports
(supporting 10100-Megabit, 1-
Gigabit, and 10-Gigabit speeds) for
connections to other devices
I/O ports as described
Management ports: 1 RJ45
connector
Console serial port: 1
RJ45 connector
USB ports (2)
Page: 18/19 of report number: NSCIB-CC-142306-CR, dated 30 April 2018
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Model Description Interfaces
93128TX Four, six, or 12 40-Gigabit Ethernet
Quad Small Form-Factor Pluggable
(QSFP+) optical ports for uplink
connections to aggregation switches
96 10GBASE-T copper ports
(supporting speeds 10 of 100
Megabits, 1 Gigabit, and 10 Gigabits)
to other devices
I/O ports as described
Management ports: 1 RJ45
connector
Console serial port: 1 RJ45
connector
USB ports (2)
C93180LC-EX Intel Core i3 processor Four 48 x
10/25-Gbps fiber ports and 6 x
40/100-Gbps Quad Small Form-
Factor Pluggable 28 (QSFP28) ports
I/O ports as described
Management ports: 1 RJ45
connector
Console serial port: 1 RJ45
connector
USB ports (1)
93180YC-EX Intel Core i3 processor Four 48 x
10/25-Gbps fiber ports and 6 x
40/100-Gbps Quad Small Form-
Factor Pluggable 28 (QSFP28) ports
I/O ports as described
Management ports: 1 RJ45
connector
Console serial port: 1 RJ45
connector
USB ports (1)
93108TC-EX Intel Core i3 processor Four 48 x
10GBASE-T ports and 6 x 40/100-
Gbps QSFP28 ports
I/O ports as described
Management ports: 1 RJ45
connector
Console serial port: 1 RJ45
connector
USB ports (1)
Cisco 9500 models
9504 Chassis: up to 2 supervisor modules
of the same type, 4 I/O modules, and
up to 6 fabric modules, 2 system
controllers
Based on Supervisor and ACI
compatible I/O modules
installed. Each line card should
be ACI compatible
9508 Chassis: up to 2 supervisor modules
of the same type, 8-I/O modules, up
to two system controller modules, up
to six fabric modules
Based on Supervisor and ACI
compatible I/O modules I/O
modules installed
9516 Chassis: up to 2 supervisor modules
and 16 I/O modules, up to two
system controller modules, up to six
fabric modules
Based on Supervisor and ACI
compatible I/O modules I/O
modules installed
Supervisor A four cores, 1.8 GHz, 16 GB of
memory, and 64 GB of SSD (N9K-
SUP-A)
Management ports: 1 RJ45
connector
Console serial port: 1 RJ45
connector
USB ports (2)
Supervisor B six cores, 2.1 GHz, 24 GB of
memory, and 256 GB of SSD (N9K-
SUP-B)
Management ports: 1 RJ45
connector
Console serial port: 1 RJ45
connector
USB ports (2)
System Controller A pair of redundant system
controllers offloads chassis
management functions from the
supervisor modules. The controllers
are responsible for managing power
supplies and fan trays and are a
Not Applicable
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Model Description Interfaces
central point for the Gigabit Ethernet
out-of-band channel (EOBC)
between the supervisors, fabric
modules, and line cards.
APIC (Medium - Large)
and clustered
An APIC appliance comprises either
a cluster of Cisco UCS C-Series 220
M4 (second generation appliance) or
Cisco UCS C-Series 220 M3 (first
generation appliance) servers
manufactured with an image secured
with Trusted Platform Module (TPM),
certificates, and an APIC product ID
(PID). The interfaces are the same
between the med, large, and
clustered APIC it is just the
processor, hard drive, memory will
be larger with more I/O ports for
scalability.
Management ports: 2 RJ45
connector
Console serial port: 1 RJ45
connector
Cisco Integrated Management
Controller (CIMC) alternative
console port for 1 Gig Ethernet
USB ports (2)
Virtual Interface Card for optical
or 10BaseT
2000 Series Fabric Extenders
Cisco Nexus C2248PQ-
10GE
48 100/1000BASE-T host interfaces
and 4 10 Gigabit Ethernet fabric
interfaces (SFP+)
I/O ports as described
Cisco Nexus 2248TP-E 48 100/1000BASE-T host interfaces
and 4 10 Gigabit Ethernet fabric
interfaces (SFP+)
I/O ports as described
Cisco Nexus 2248TP-1GE 48 100/1000BASE-T host interfaces
and 4 10 Gigabit Ethernet fabric
interfaces (SFP+) [32MB Shared
Buffer]
I/O ports as described
Cisco Nexus 2232PP-
10GE
32 1/10 Gigabit Ethernet and FCoE
host interfaces (SFP+) and 8 10
Gigabit Ethernet and FCoE fabric
interfaces (SFP+)
I/O ports as described
Cisco Nexus 2232TM-E 32 1/10 G BASE-T host interfaces
and 8 10 Gigabit Ethernet (SFP+)
Uplink Module (Lower power
consumption and improved BER)
I/O ports as described
Cisco Nexus 2348UPQ 48 100Mῖ/1/10 Gigabit Ethernet and
Unified Port host interfaces (SFP+)
and up to 6ῖ QSFP+ 10/40 Gigabit
Ethernet fabric interfaces.
I/O ports as described
ACI Line Cards
N9K-X9732C-EX ACI Ready Spine Line Card: 32p
QSFP28 40/100G (32p line rate)
I/O ports as described
N9K-X9736PQ ACI Ready Spine Line Card: 36p
QSFP 40G (36p line rate)
I/O ports as described
(This is the end of this report).