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Certification Report
Sponsor and developer: Waterfall Security Solutions Ltd.,
16 Hamelacha St., Afek Industrial Park
Rosh Ha’ayin, 48091
Israel
Evaluation facility: Brightsight
Delftechpark 1
2628 XJ Delft
The Netherlands
Report number: NSCIB-CC-11-34146-CR
Report version: 1
Project number: NSCIB-CC-11-34146
Authors(s): NLNCSA
Date: July 10, 2012
Number of pages: 17
Number of appendices: 0
Reproduction of this report is authorized provided the report is reproduced in its entirety.
Product and Waterfall Unidirectional Security Gateway model WF-400,
assurance level version 1
Evaluation facility
A
tortg■
Him
Validity
Certificate
Standard Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CC),
Version 3.1 Revision 3 (ISO/IEC 15408)
Certificate number PC 4603306
TV Rheinland Nederland B.V. certifies:
Certificate holder
and developer
Waterfall Security Solutions Ltd.
Located in Hamelacha 16 Afek Ind. Part,
48091 ROSH HA'AYIN ISRAEL
Assurance Package:
• EAL4 augmented with ALC_DVS.2, ALC_FLR.2 and AVA_VAN.5
Project number NSCIB-CC-11-34146-CR
Registration number
Notified Body 0336
PRODUCTS
RvA C 078
Accredited by the Dutch
Council for Accreditation
Brightsight BV located in Delft, the Netherlands
Applying the Common Methodology for Information Technology Security
Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 Revision 3 (ISO/IEC 18045)
The IT product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an accredited and licensed/approved
evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation version 3.1 Revision 3 for
conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation version 3.1 Revision 3. This certificate
applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated configuration and in
conjunction with the complete certification report. The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with
the provisions of the Netherlands scheme for certification in the area of IT secuhty [NSCIB] and the
conclusions of the evaluation facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence
adduced. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by TV Rheiniand Nederland B.V. or by
other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by
TV Rheinland Nederland B.V. or by any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, is either expressed or implied.
Date of issue : 12-07-2012
Certificate expiry : 12-07-2022
Managing Director
TV Rheinland Nederland B.V.
P.O. Box 541
7300 AM Apeldoorn
The Netherlands
www.tuv.com/nl
IIL
TUVRheinland®
Precisely Right.
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CONTENTS:
Foreword 4
Recognition of the certificate 5
1 Executive Summary 6
2 Certification Results 7
2.1 Identification of Target of Evaluation 7
2.2 Security Policy 7
2.3 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope 7
2.4 Architectural Information 8
2.5 Documentation 8
2.6 IT Product Testing 9
2.7 Evaluated Configuration 10
2.8 Results of the Evaluation 10
2.9 Comments/Recommendations 11
3 Security Target 12
4 Definitions 12
5 Bibliography 13
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Foreword
The Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security (NSCIB) provides a third-party
evaluation and certification service for determining the trustworthiness of Information Technology (IT)
security products. Under this NSCIB, TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V. has the task of issuing
certificates for IT security products.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according to the
Common Criteria assessment guidelines published by the NSCIB. Evaluations are performed by an IT
Security Evaluation Facility (ITSEF) under the oversight of the NSCIB Certification Body, which is
operated by TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V. in cooperation with the Ministry of the Interior and
Kingdom Relations.
An ITSEF in the Netherlands is a commercial facility that has been licensed by TÜV Rheinland
Nederland B.V. to perform Common Criteria evaluations; a significant requirement for such a license is
accreditation to the requirements of ISO Standard 17025, General requirements for the accreditation
of calibration and testing laboratories.
By awarding a Common Criteria certificate, TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V. asserts that the product
complies with the security requirements specified in the associated Security Target. A Security Target
is a requirements specification document that defines the scope of the evaluation activities. The
consumer of certified IT products should review the Security Target, in addition to this certification
report, in order to gain an understanding of any assumptions made during the evaluation, the IT
product's intended environment, its security requirements, and the level of confidence (i.e., the
evaluation assurance level) that the product satisfies the security requirements.
Reproduction of this report is authorized provided the report is reproduced in its entirety.
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Recognition of the certificate
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement and SOG-IS logos are printed on the certificate to
indicate that this certificate is issued in accordance with the provisions of the CCRA and the SOG-IS
agreement
The CCRA has been signed by the Netherlands in May 2000 and provides mutual recognition of
certificates based on the CC evaluation assurance levels up to and including EAL4. The current list of
signatory nations and approved certification schemes can be found on:
http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
The European SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) version 3 effective from April
2010 provides mutual recognition of Common Criteria and ITSEC certificates at a basic evaluation
level for all products. A higher recognition level for evaluation levels beyond EAL4 (resp. E3-basic) is
provided for products in the technical domain of Smart cards and similar Devices. This agreement was
initially signed by Finland, France, Germany, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the
United Kingdom. Italy joined the SOGIS-MRA in December 2010. The current list of signatory nations
and approved certification schemes can be found on: http://www.sogisportal.eu.
This evaluation contains assurance components beyond EAL4 and the product type does not fall in a
technical domain for which a higher recognition level applies. Therefore the mutual recognition under
the terms of the CCRA and SOGIS-MRA by the nations listed above is limited to the EAL 4
components of these assurance families.
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1 Executive Summary
This Certification Report states the outcome of the Common Criteria security evaluation of the
Waterfall Unidirectional Security Gateway model WF-400, version 1. The developer of the WF-400 is
Waterfall Security Solutions Ltd. located in Rosh Ha’ayin, Israel and they also act as the sponsor of
the evaluation and certification. A Certification Report is intended to assist prospective consumers
when judging the suitability of the IT security properties of the product for their particular requirements.
The Target of Evaluation – TOE (i.e., the Waterfall Unidirectional Security Gateway model WF-400,
version 1) is a network gateway that enforces a unidirectional information flow policy on network traffic
flowing through the gateway. The TOE consists of two appliances. The transceiver appliance (TX)
picks up network frames from a sending network, and forwards them to the receiver appliance (RX) for
transmission to a receiving network. The TOE hardware ensures that no information can flow from the
receiving network to the sending network. The two appliances are connected via a single standard
fiber-optic cable. This cable is not part of the TOE.
The TOE has been evaluated by Brightsight B.V. located in Delft, The Netherlands and was completed
on July 4th
2012 with the final delivery of the ETR. The certification procedure has been conducted in
accordance with the provisions of the Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security
[NSCIB]. The certification was completed on July 10th
2012 with the preparation of this Certification
Report.
The scope of the evaluation is defined by the Security Target [ST], which identifies assumptions made
during the evaluation, the intended environment for the Unidirectional Security Gateway, the security
requirements, and the level of confidence (evaluation assurance level) at which the product is
intended to satisfy the security requirements. Consumers of the Unidirectional Security Gateway are
advised to verify that their own environment is consistent with the Security Target, and to give due
consideration to the comments, observations and recommendations in this certification report.
The results documented in the evaluation technical report [ETR]
1
for this product provide sufficient
evidence that it meets the EAL4 augmented (EAL4+) assurance requirements for the evaluated
security functionality. This assurance level is augmented with ALC_DVS.2 (Sufficiency of security
measures), ALC_FLR.2 (Flaw reporting procedures) and AVA_VAN.5 (Advanced methodical
vulnerability analysis).
The evaluation was conducted using the Common Methodology for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 3 [CEM], for conformance to the Common Criteria for Information
Technology Security Evaluation, version 3.1 Revision 3 [CC].
TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V., as the NSCIB Certification Body, declares that the Waterfall
Unidirectional Security Gateway model WF-400, version 1 evaluation meets all the conditions for
international recognition of Common Criteria Certificates and that the product will be listed on the
NSCIB Certified Products list. It should be noted that the certification results only apply to the specific
version of the product as evaluated.
1
The Evaluation Technical Report contains information proprietary to the developer and/or the
evaluator, and is not releasable for public review.
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2 Certification Results
2.1 Identification of Target of Evaluation
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) for this evaluation is the Waterfall Unidirectional Security Gateway
model WF-400, version 1 from Waterfall Security Solutions Ltd. located in Rosh Ha’ayin, Israel. It is
comprised of a pair of WF-400 appliances, including one TX appliance and one RX appliance. For
each appliance type (TX or RX), two variants are supported: a single power supply variant, and a dual
power-supply variant (for redundancy).
This report pertains to the TOE which is comprised of the following main components:
Delivery
item
type
Identifier Version Medium
Hardware WF-400 (containing a pair of WF-400 appliances,
including one TX appliance and one RX appliance)
Appliance Part Number
¡ WF-400TX
¡ WF-400RX
¡ WF-400TX- 2PS (Dual Power)
¡ WF-400RX- 2PS (Dual Power)
1 19” rack
Firmware Internal, part of WF-400 40 Preloaded on an
appliance during
manufacturing
After delivery of the TOE the packing list must be checked for the product labels (S/N on rear side).
To ensure secure usage a set of guidance documents is provided together with the Unidirectional
Security Gateway. Details can be found in section 2.5 of this report.
2.2 Security Policy
The TOE is a network gateway that enforces a unidirectional information flow policy on network traffic
flowing through the gateway. The TOE consists of two appliances. The transceiver appliance (TX)
picks up network frames from a sending network, and forwards them to the receiver appliance (RX) for
transmission to a receiving network. The TOE hardware ensures that no information can flow from the
receiving network to the sending network.
2.3 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
2.3.1 Assumptions
The Assumptions defined in the Security Target are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead
to specific Security Objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. The following topics are of
relevance:
Ø The intended operation environment shall prevent unauthorized physical access to the TOE
and to the fiber-optic cable connecting its separate parts.
Ø Physical access to the TOE shall be authorized only to personnel that will not attempt to
circumvent the TOE's security functionality.
Ø The TOE is the only interconnection between the sending and receiving networks.
2.3.2 Clarification of scope
The Security Target [ST] assumes an operational environment such that threats could come only from
the attached networks. From these threats T. HACK_LOW as defined in the Security Target [ST]
requires the IT environment to filter or transform the information transmitted through the TOE to the
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receiving network such that it cannot result in compromise of the integrity of hosts or processes on the
receiving network.
The evaluation did not reveal any other threats to the TOE that are not countered by the evaluated
security functions of the product.
2.4 Architectural Information
This chapter provides a high-level description of the IT product and its major components based on
the evaluation evidence described in the Common Criteria assurance family entitled “TOE design
(ADV_TDS)”. The intent of this chapter is to characterise the degree of architectural separation of the
major components.
The Waterfall Unidirectional Security gateway is comprised of a pair of WF-400 appliances, including
one transceiver appliance (TX) appliance and one receiver appliance (RX). For each appliance type
(TX or RX), two variants are supported: a single power supply variant, and a dual power-supply variant
(for redundancy).
The TX appliance contains a laser LED that converts electronic signals to light. The RX appliance
contains a photoelectric cell that can sense light and convert it to electronic signals. The TX appliance
and RX appliance are connected via a single standard fiber-optic cable, allowing light to move from
the TX LED to the RX photoelectric cell. The cable is not included in the TOE.
The TOE Security Functionality is implemented entirely in hardware. The TOE also contains firmware
that implements functionality such as control of the front-panel display LEDs.
In Figure 1 the TOE is depicted in its operational environment. The TOE will be located within a
controlled access facility. The information flows through the primary RJ45 port (PRIM). The secondary
RJ45 port (SEC) is disabled. The TOE contains LED to on the front panel to indicate the status of the
TOE.
Figure 1: The TOE in its environment
2.5 Documentation
The following documentation is provided with the product by the developer to the customer:
Identifier Version Medium
Waterfall Unidirectional Security Gateway Common Criteria Evaluated
Configuration Guide
June 2012 Paper / pdf
Network
A
Network
B
Status
LEDs
Status
LEDs
TOE boundary
RJ45
RJ45
RJ45
RJ45
TX RX
Fiber
OUT IN
PRIM PRIM
SEC SEC
Mains A Mains B
Mains B
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2.6 IT Product Testing
Testing (depth, coverage, functional tests, independent testing): The evaluators examined the
developer’s testing activities documentation and verified that the developer has met their testing
responsibilities.
2.6.1 Testing approach and depth
The developer has performed testing on FSP and subsystem level including all TSFI with four defined
tests.
The independent testing performed by the evaluator comprised of:
Ø Sample testing (4:ATE_IND.2-4) to validate the developer testing by repeating all four
developer tests, as the number is small.
Ø Independent testing (4:ATE_IND.2-6) was performed based on 6 new tests defined by the
evaluator for the validation of the correct information flow.
Before these tests were conducted it was verified that the TOE was suitable for testing and has a
unique reference number as identified in the ST introduction.
2.6.2 Independent Penetration Testing
The evaluator independent penetration tests were conducted according to the following testing
approach:
Ø The evaluators assessed all possible vulnerabilities found during evaluation of the classes.
This resulted in a shortlist with a number of possible vulnerabilities to be tested.
Ø The evaluators used CEM Annex B.2 as an additional source for possible vulnerabilities and
penetration tests
Ø These were presented, under NSP#6, to the Scheme, and in discussion with the Scheme
more penetration tests emerged.
The combination of all these sources led to 5 separate penetration tests that cover the following:
Ø Possible side channels that allow bystanders to eavesdrop information passing through the
TOE;
Ø Trying to cause a TOE failure such that the TOE comes in a state that it passes information
through from the receiving network to the sending network.
2.6.3 Test Configuration
The tests are performed on a pair of appliances: WF-400-RX-2PS and WF-400-TX-2PS, that is with
dual power supply.
The following figure indicates the components used in the tests.
TX
HOST
‘Optical’
HOST
WF-400 TX
WF-400 RX
RX
HOST
Rx in
Tx out
RJ45
RJ45
fiber
fiber
Purpose ‘Optical’ host:
- sniffing data over fiber
- sending data to TX or RX
Figure 2: TOE test set-up
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The penetration test set-up also included an oscilloscope to measure internal signals and an EMA coil
to measure EMA signals.
2.6.4 Testing Results
The testing activities, including configurations, procedures, test cases, expected results and observed
results are summarised in the [ETR], with references to the documents containing the full details.
The developer’s tests and the independent functional tests produced the expected results, giving
assurance that the TOE behaves as specified in its ST and functional specification.
No exploitable vulnerabilities were found with the independent penetration tests.
2.7 Evaluated Configuration
The TOE is defined uniquely by its name and version number Waterfall Unidirectional Security
Gateway model WF-400, version 1 and can be identified by its identification at the backside of the
appliances.
The TOE needs no specific configuration settings because there is only one configuration defined.
2.8 Results of the Evaluation
The evaluation lab documented their evaluation results in the [ETR]
2
which references a ASE
Intermediate Report and several other evaluator documents. The verdict of each claimed assurance
requirement is given in the following tables:
Development Pass
Security architecture ADV_ARC.1 Pass
Functional specification ADV_FSP.4 Pass
Implementation representation ADV_IMP.1 Pass
TOE design ADV_TDS.3 Pass
Guidance documents Pass
Operational user guidance AGD_OPE.1 Pass
Preparative procedures AGD_PRE.1 Pass
Life-cycle support Pass
Configuration Management capabilities ALC_CMC.4 Pass
Configuration Management scope ALC_CMS.4 Pass
Delivery ALC_DEL.1 Pass
Development security ALC_DVS.2 Pass
Flaw remediation ALC_FLR.2 Pass
Life-cycle definition ALC_LCD.1 Pass
Tools and techniques ALC_TAT.1 Pass
Security Target Pass
Conformance claims ASE_CCL.1 Pass
Extended components definition ASE_ECD.1 Pass
ST introduction ASE_INT.1 Pass
2
The Evaluation Technical Report contains information proprietary to the developer and/or the
evaluator, and is not releasable for public review.
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Security objectives ASE_OBJ.2 Pass
Security requirements ASE_REQ.2 Pass
Security problem definition ASE_SPD.1 Pass
TOE summary specification ASE_TSS.1 Pass
Tests Pass
Coverage ATE_COV.2 Pass
Depth ATE_DPT.1 Pass
Functional tests ATE_FUN.1 Pass
Independent testing ATE_IND.2 Pass
Vulnerability assessment Pass
Vulnerability analysis AVA_VAN.5 Pass
Based on the above evaluation results the evaluation lab concluded the Waterfall Unidirectional
Security Gateway model WF-400, version 1 to be CC Part 2 conformant, CC Part 3 conformant,
and to meet the requirements of EAL 4 augmented by ALC_DVS.2, ALC_FLR.2 and AVA_VAN.5.
This implies that the product satisfies the security technical requirements specified in Waterfall
Unidirectional Security Gateway WF-400 Security Target, version 0.72, June 29, 2012. The Security
Target does not claim conformance to any Protection Profile.
2.9 Comments/Recommendations
2.9.1 Obligations and hints for the developer
None.
2.9.2 Recommendations and hints for the customer
Ø The two appliances and the fiber optic link should be located within a controlled access facility
that prevents any possible physical access by unauthorized personnel. Authorized personnel
must not attempt to circumvent security functionality or tamper with the appliances, or rewire
network connections to bypass the TOE.
Ø Use separate power and network infrastructure for the sending and receiving networks,
connected to the TX and RX, respectively.
Ø Ensure that besides through the TOE there are no information paths between the sending and
the receiving networks that might bypass the gateway, allowing information to flow in the other
direction. In particular, it is recommended to use physically separate network infrastructure for
the separate networks. Relying on virtual separation mechanisms (e.g. VLANs on a shared
switch) is not considered to be best practice.
Ø The TOE is normally delivered together with TX and RX agent software running on servers in
the sending and receiving networks, respectively. These servers cannot affect the
enforcement of unidirectional information flow by the TOE and are not considered during the
evaluation.
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3 Security Target
The Waterfall Unidirectional Security Gateway WF-400 Security Target, version 0.72, June 29, 2012 is
included here by reference.
4 Definitions
This list of Acronyms and the glossary of terms contains elements that are not already defined by the
CC or CEM:
CC Common Criteria
EMA Electromagnetic Analysis
IT Information Technology
ITSEF IT Security Evaluation Facility
LED Light Emitting Diode
NSCIB Nederlands Schema voor Certificatie op het gebied van IT-Beveiliging
NSP NSCIB Scheme Procedure
PP Protection Profile
RX Receiver appliance
TX Transceiver appliance
TOE Target of Evaluation
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5 Bibliography
This section lists all referenced documentation used as source material in the compilation of this
report:
[CC] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Parts I version
3.1 revision 1, and Part II and III, version 3.1 revision 3.
[CEM] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, version 3.1,
Revision 3, July 2009.
[ETR] Brightsight, Evaluation Technical Report Waterfall Unidirectional Security Gateway
WF-400 – EAL4+, Version 1.0, July 4, 2012.
[NSCIB] Nederlands Schema for Certification in the Area of IT Security, Version 1.2, 9
December 2004.
[ST] Waterfall Unidirectional Security Gateway WF-400 Security Target, version 0.72,
June 29, 2012.
(This is the end of this report).