Certification Report
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
BSI-DSZ-CC-0194-2002
for
AIX 5L for POWER V5.2
Program Number 5765-E62
from
IBM Corporation
- Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Telefon +49 228 9582-0, Infoline +49 228 9582-111, Telefax +49 228 9582-455
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Telefon (0228) 9582-0 - Telefax (0228) 9582-455 - Infoline (0228) 9582-111
SOGIS-MRA
BSI-DSZ-CC-0194-2002
AIX 5L for POWER V5.2
Program Number 5765-E62
from
IBM Corporation Common Criteria Arrangement
The IT product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an recognised evaluation facility
using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Part 1 Version 0.6, Part 2 Version 1.0
extended by CEM supplementation “ALC_FLR – Flaw remediation”, Version 1.1, February 2002 for
conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation, Version 2.1 (ISO/IEC
15408:1999).
Evaluation Results:
PP Conformance: Controlled Access Protection Profile, Issue 1.d, 8 October 1999
Functionality: Controlled Access Protection Profile conformant plus product
specific extensions
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance Package: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL4 augmented by
ALC_FLR.1 (Life cycle support - Basic flaw remediation)
This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated
configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification scheme
of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik and the conclusions of the evaluation
facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence adduced.
The notes mentioned on the reverse side are part of this certificate.
Bonn, 04. November 2002
The Vice President of the Bundesamt für
Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Hange L.S.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and
no warranty of the IT product by Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik or any other
organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
BSI-DSZ-CC-0194-2002 Certification Report
V
Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
(BSI) has the task of issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a
distributor, hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product
according to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised
security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the
BSI or by BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This
report contains among others the Certificate (summarised assessment) and the
detailed Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security
functionality of the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and
weaknesses) and instructions for the user.
1
Act setting up the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI-
Errichtungsgesetz, BSIG) of 17 December 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2834
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0194-2002
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Contents
Part A: Certification
Part B: Certification Results
Part C: Excerpts from the Criteria
BSI-DSZ-CC-0194-2002 Certification Report
A-1
A Certification
1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down
in the following:
· BSIG2
· BSI Certification Ordinance3
· BSI Schedule of Costs4
· Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal
Ministry of the Interior)
· DIN EN 45011 standard
· BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
· Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 2.15
· Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM)
- Part 1, Version 0.6
- Part 2, Version 1.0
· BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme
(AIS)
2
Act setting up the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI-
Errichtungsgesetz, BSIG) of 17 December 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2834
3
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of a Certificate by the Bundesamt für Sicherheit
in der Informationstechnik (BSI-Zertifizierungsverordnung, BSIZertV) of 7 July 1992,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1230
4
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik (BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 29th October 1992,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1838
5
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 22nd September 2000 in the
Bundesanzeiger p. 19445
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0194-2002
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2 Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries
a mutual recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are
based on ITSEC or CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
2.1 ITSEC/CC - Certificates
The SOGIS-Agreement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on
ITSEC became effective on 3 March 1998. This agreement was signed by the
national bodies of Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, The Netherlands,
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. This
agreement on the mutual recognition of IT security certificates based on the CC
was extended to include certificates based on the CC for all evaluation levels
(EAL 1 – EAL 7).
2.2 CC - Certificates
An arrangement (Common Criteria Arrangement) on the mutual recognition of
certificates based on the CC evaluation assurance levels up to and including
EAL 4 was signed in May 2000. It includes also the recognition of Protection
Profiles based on the CC. The arrangement was signed by the national bodies
of Australia, Canada, Finland France, Germany, Greece, Italy, The Netherlands,
New Zealand, Norway, Spain, United Kingdom and the United States. Israel
joined the arrangement in November 2000, Sweden in February 2002.
BSI-DSZ-CC-0194-2002 Certification Report
A-3
3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform
procedure, a uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product AIX 5L for POWER V5.2 Program Number 5765-E62 has
undergone the certification procedure at BSI.
The evaluation of the product AIX 5L for POWER V5.2 Program Number 5765-
E62 was conducted by atsec Information Security GmbH which is an evaluation
facility recognised by BSI (ITSEF)6
.
The sponsor is:
IBM Deutschland GmbH
Pascal Straße 100
70569 Stuttgart.
The developer is:
IBM Corporation, Austin
11400 Burnet Road
Austin, TX 78758
USA.
The certification is concluded with
· the comparability check and
· the production of this Certification Report.
This work was completed by the BSI on 17 October 2002.
The confirmed assurance package is only valid on the condition that
· all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as
given in the following report, are observed,
· the product is operated in the environment described, where specified in
the following report.
This Certification Report only applies to the version of the product indicated
here. The validity can be extended to new versions and releases of the product,
provided the sponsor applies for re-certification of the modified product, in
accordance with the procedural requirements, and the evaluation does not
reveal any security deficiencies.
For the meaning of the assurance levels and the confirmed strength of
functions, please refer to the excerpts from the criteria at the end of the
Certification Report.
6
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0194-2002
A-4
4 Publication
The following Certification Results contain pages B-1 to B-34.
The product AIX 5L for POWER V5.2 Program Number 5765-E62 has been
included in the BSI list of the certified products, which is published regularly
(see also Internet: http:// www.bsi.bund.de). Further information can be obtained
from BSI-Infoline 0228/9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the sponsor of
the product. The Certification Report can also be downloaded from the above-
mentioned website.
BSI-DSZ-CC-0194-2002 Certification Report
B-1
B Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
· the security target of the sponsor for the target of evaluation,
· the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
· complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0194-2002
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Contents of the certification results
1 Executive Summary 3
2 Identification of the TOE 10
3 Security Policy 11
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope 12
5 Architectural Information 14
6 Documentation 18
7 IT Product Testing 20
8 Evaluated Configuration 23
9 Results of the Evaluation 25
10 Evaluator Comments/Recommendations 27
11 Annexes 28
12 Security Target 29
13 Definitions 30
14 Bibliography 33
BSI-DSZ-CC-0194-2002 Certification Report
B-3
1 Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is AIX 5L for POWER V5.2 Program Number
5765-E62 (also named AIX, Version 5.2 in short). It is a UNIX-based Operating
System which has been developed to meet the requirements of the Controlled
Access Protection Profile (CAPP), Issue 1.d, 8 October 1999. By being
compliant to the CAPP the TOE fulfils the requirements of the C2 class of the
U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) Trusted Computer System Evaluation
Criteria (TCSEC) (see [9], chapter 1.2). This includes the fulfilment of the
requirements for Identification and Authentication, Audit, Object Reuse and
Access Control including the use of Access Control Lists.
The TOE can be used on one or more servers running the evaluated version of
AIX which are connected to form a distributed system. The communication
aspects used for this connection are also part of the evaluation. The
communication links themselves are protected against interception and
manipulation by measures which are outside the scope of the evaluation.
The TOE and a various set of user guidance for the TOE is delivered on CD-
ROM (for details refer to chapter 6 of this report). The following Licensed
Product Packages (LPPs) are allowed to be used for the evaluated
configuration of the TOE:
LPP Name Description
bos AIX Base Operating System
devices AIX supported devices
sysmgt System management tools.
Adobe Formats PDF files for on-screen viewing in
an X-Window display.
Java Various libraries, commands and classes
associated with Java.
Netscape Netscape browser and other client
applications
X11 X-Windows server, libraries and applications
The TOE uses the following hardware:
- IBM pSeries Systems using Power3-II CPUs (p610)
- IBM pSeries Systems using RS 64 (III or IV) CPUs (p660)
- IBM pSeries Symmetric Multiprocessor (SMP) Systems, using Power4
CPUs (p690)
The hardware is not part of the TOE but supports TSF by providing a separation
mechanism. The BootPROM firmware is not part of the TOE either.
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0194-2002
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The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) used in the Security Target
are Common Criteria Part 2 extended as shown in the following table:
Security
Functional
Requirement
Identifier
SFRs from CC Part 2, contained in CAPP
FAU_GEN.1 Audit Data Generation
FAU_GEN.2 User Identity Association
FAU_SAR.1 Audit Review
FAU_SAR.2 Restricted Audit Review
FAU_SAR.3 Selectable Audit Review
FAU_SEL.1 Selective Audit
FAU_STG.1 Guarantees of Audit Data Availability
FAU_STG.3 Action in Case of Possible Audit Data Loss
FAU_STG.4 Prevention of Audit Data Loss
FDP_ACC.1 Discretionary Access Control Policy
FDP_ACF.1 Discretionary Access Control Functions
FDP_RIP.2 Object Residual Information Protection
FIA_ATD.1 User Attribute Definition
FIA_SOS.1 Strength of Authentication Data
FIA_UAU.7 Protected Authentication Feedback
FIA_USB.1 User-Subject Binding
FMT_MSA.1 Management of Object Security Attributes
FMT_MSA.3 Static Attribute Initialisation
FMT_MTD.1 Management of the Audit Trail
FMT_MTD.1 Management of Audited Events
FMT_MTD.1 Management of User Attributes
FMT_MTD.1 Management of Authentication Data
FMT_REV.1 Revocation of User Attributes
FMT_REV.1 Revocation of Object Attributes
FMT_SMR.1 Security Management Roles
FPT_AMT.1 Abstract Machine Testing
FPT_RVM.1 Reference Mediation
FPT_SEP.1 Domain Separation
FPT_STM.1 Reliable Time Stamps
SFRs from CC Part 2, contained in CAPP, substituted by
hierarchical higher ones in the ST
FIA_UAU.2 Authentication
FIA_UID.2 Identification
BSI-DSZ-CC-0194-2002 Certification Report
B-5
Security
Functional
Requirement
Identifier
SFRs not in CC Part 2 (Part 2 extended), contained in CAPP
„Note1“
(as in [9],
chapter 5.2.4)
Subject Residual Information Protection
SFRs from CC Part 2, not contained in CAPP
FMT_SMF.17
Specification of Management Functions
The TOE AIX, Version 5.2 was evaluated by:
atsec Information Security GmbH
Steinstraße 68
D-81667 München.
The evaluation was completed on 17 October 2002. The atsec Information
Security GmbH is an evaluation facility recognised by BSI (ITSEF)8
.
The sponsor is:
IBM Deutschland GmbH
Pascal Straße 100
70569 Stuttgart
The developer is:
IBM Corporation, Austin
11400 Burnet Road
Austin, TX 78758
USA
1.1 Assurance package
The TOE security assurance requirements are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C of this report,
or [1], part 3 for details).
The TOE meets the assurance requirements of assurance level EAL4+
(Evaluation Assurance Level 4 augmented). The assurance level 4 is
augmented by: ALC_FLR.1 – Basic Flaw Remediation. For the evaluation of the
CC component ALC_FLR.1 the mutually regognised CEM supplementation
“ALC_FLR – Flaw remediation”, Version 1.1, February 2002 ([5]) had been
used.
7
Added because of AIS32, Final Interpretation 065
8
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0194-2002
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The evaluation assurance level named in the Protection Profile is EAL3 with no
augmentation. The Security Target of the TOE claims an evaluation assurance
level of EAL4 augmented by ALC_FLR.1. Since EAL4 is hierarchical to EAL3
conformance to the assurance requirements of the Protection Profile is given.
1.2 Functionality
The TOE AIX, Version 5.2 provides the following Security Functions:
Identification and Authentication (IA)
IA.1 – User Identification and Authentication Data Management
IA.2 – Common Authentication Mechanism
IA.3 – Interactive Login and Related Mechanisms
IA.4 – User Identity Changing
IA.5 – Login Processing
IA.6 – Logoff Processing
Auditing (AU)
AU.1 – Audit Record Format
AU.2 – Audit Record Generation
AU.3 – Audit Record Processing
AU.4 – Audit Review
AU.5 – Audit File Protection
AU.6 – Audit Record Loss Prevention
Discretionary Access Control (DA)
DA.1 – Permission Bits
DA.2 – Extended Permissions
DA.3 – Discretionary Access Control: File System Objects
DA.4 – Discretionary Access Control: TCP Connections
DA.5 – Discretionary Access Control: IPC Objects
Object Reuse (OR)
OR.1 – Object Reuse: File System Objects
OR.2 – Object Reuse: IPC Objects
OR.3 – Object Reuse: Queuing System Objects
OR.4 – Object Reuse: Miscellaneous Objects
Security Management (SM)
BSI-DSZ-CC-0194-2002 Certification Report
B-7
SM.1 – Roles
SM.2 – Audit Configuration and Management
SM.3 – Access Control Configuration and Management
SM.4 – Management of User, Group and Authentication Data
SM.5 – Time Management
TSF Protection (TP)
TP.1 – TSF Invocation Guarantees
TP.2 – Kernel
TP.3 – Kernel Extensions
TP.4 – Trusted Processes
TP.5 – TSF Databases
TP.6 – Internal TOE Protection Mechanisms
TP.7 – Diagnosis
Only the titles of the SF are provided here because they are very granular and
almost self-explanatory. Please refer for a precise definition and description of
the SF to the TOE Summary Specification of the Security Target ([7], chapter 6)
1.3 Strength of Function
The TOE’s strength of functions is rated ‘medium’ (SOF-medium) for the
identification and authentication function IA.1 (refer to Security Target [7],
chapter 6.5).
1.4 Summary of threats and Organisational Security Policies (OSPs)
addressed by the evaluated IT product
Since the Security Target claims conformance to the CAPP, the OSPs defined
there (refer to [9], chapter 3.2) are applied for the TOE as well.
Because all security objectives of the CAPP are derived from OSPs, no specific
threats have been defined in the Protection Profile. In addition to the PP, the
Security Target adds the following threats T.UAUSER (impersonation of an
attacker as authorised user), T.UAACCESS (access to information by an
unauthorised user) and T.UAACTION (attacker performing unauthorised
actions) which are averted by the TOE (for detailed information on additional
threats please refer to Security Target [7], chapter 3.2.1). Note that also threats
to be averted by the TOEs environment have been defined (refer to Security
Target [7], chapter 3.2.2).
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0194-2002
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1.5 Special configuration requirements
The configuration requirements for the TOE are defined in chapter 2.4 and
subsequent chapters of the Security Target [7] and are summarised here (for
the complete information please refer to the Security Target):
- The CC evaluated file set must be selected at install time.
- If a windowing environment is to be used, the CDE file set must be
selected at install time.
- The role based system administration features of AIX 5.2 are not
included.
- AIX 5.2 supports the use of IPv4 and IPv6, only IPv4 is included in the
evaluated configuration .
- Only 64 bit architectures are included.
- Web Based Systems Management (WebSM) is not included.
- Both network (NIM, Network Install Manager) and CD installations are
supported.
- The default configuration for identification and authentication is to be
used only. Support for other authentication options e.g. smartcard
authentication, is not included in the evaluated configuration.
- If the system console is used, it must be connected directly to the
workstation and the same physical protection as for the workstation is
needed.
- More than one server machine (running AIX 5.2 in the evaluated
configuration) can be used. If more than one so called TOE server is
used they are linked by LAN which may be joined by bridges/routers
or TOE server acting as routers/gateways. No other systems may be
connected to the network.
- Support of the following files systems: AIX journaling file system
(jfs2), network file system (nfs v3), file system for CD-ROM drives
(cdrfsisofs) and the process file system (procfs)
BSI-DSZ-CC-0194-2002 Certification Report
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1.6 Assumptions about the operating environment
The following constraints concerning the allowed hardware and peripherals are
made in the Security Target (refer to [7], chapter 2.4.2):
Hardware Platform:
- IBM pSeries Systems using Power3-II CPUs (p610)
- IBM pSeries Systems using RS 64 (III or IV) CPUs (p660)
- IBM pSeries Symmetric Multiprocessor (SMP) Systems, using
Power4 CPUs (p690)
Peripherals:
- all terminals and printers supported by the TOE
- all storage devices and backup devices supported by the TOE (hard
disks, CD-ROM drives,streamer drives, floppy disk drives)
- all Ethernet and Token-Ring network adapters supported by the TOE
(supporting TCP/IP services over the TCP/IP protocol stack)
- all printer devices supported by the TOE
Since the Security Target claims conformance to the CAPP Protection Profile,
the assumptions defined there on physical, personnel and connectivity aspects
are also valid for the TOE (refer to [9], chapter 3.3). Additionally the Security
Target defines the assumptions A.UTRAIN and A.UTRUST (which are both
personnel assumption) and the assumption A.NET_COMP (concerned with
connectivity aspects). For a detailed description refer to the Security Target [7],
chapter 3.4.2 and 3.4.3.
1.7 Disclaimers
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the
certificate and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in
this Certification Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product
by the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI) or any other
organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of
the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to
this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0194-2002
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2 Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation is called:
AIX 5L for POWER V5.2
Program Number 5765-E62
The TOE documentation is supplied on CD-ROM (see chapter 14 of this report
documents [10] to [30]). The documents [24] (Release Notes) and [25] (Security
Guide) are used as a starting point for an evaluation conformant usage of the
TOE.
The following table contains a list of Licensed Product Packages (LPPs) / File
Sets which are allowed to be installed in the evaluated configuration of the TOE:
LPP Name Description
bos AIX Base Operating System
devices AIX supported devices
sysmgt System management tools.
Adobe Formats PDF files for on-screen viewing
in an X-Window display.
Java Various libraries, commands and classes
associated with Java.
Netscape Netscape browser and other client
applications
X11 X-Windows server, libraries and
applications
BSI-DSZ-CC-0194-2002 Certification Report
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3 Security Policy
The TOE is a UNIX based multi-user multi-tasking operating system, thus
providing service to several users at the same time. After successful login, the
users have access to a general computing environment, allowing the start-up of
user applications, issuing user commands at shell level, creating and accessing
files. The TOE provides adequate mechanisms to separate the users and
protect their data. Privileged commands are restricted to the system
administrator role (root).
The TOE provides facilities for on-line interaction with users. Networking is
covered only to the extent to which the TOE can be considered to be part of a
centrally-managed system that meets a common set of security requirements
(refer to the Security Target [7] for the constraints).
It is assumed that responsibility for the safeguarding of the data protected by
the TOE can be delegated to the TOE users. All data is under the control of the
TOE. The data is stored in named objects, and the TOE can associate with
each controlled object a description of the access rights to that object. All
individual users are assigned a unique user identifier. This user identifier
supports individual accountability. The TOE authenticates the claimed identity of
the user before allowing the user to perform any further actions.
The TOE enforces controls such that access to data objects can only take place
in accordance with the access restrictions placed on that object by its owner or
other suitably authorised user. Access rights (e.g. read, write, execute) can be
assigned to data objects with respect to subjects (users). Once a subject is
granted access to an object, the content of that object may be freely used to
influence other objects accessible to this subject.
A detailed description/definition of the Security Policy enforced by the TOE is
given in the Security Target [7] and with even more detail in the developer
document of the security policy model.
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0194-2002
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4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
4.1 Usage assumptions
Based on the Organisational Security Policies to which the TOE complies the
following usage assumptions arise:
- Only those users who have been authorised to access the information
within the system may access the system (P.AUTHORIZED_-
USERS).
- Implicit and explicit access rights to an object are granted by the
object owner (P.NEED_TO_KNOW).
- The users of the system shall be held accountable for their actions
within the system (P.ACCOUNTABLE).
Based on the personnel assumptions the following usage conditions consist:
- The TOE and the security of information have to be managed by one
or more competent individuals (A.MANAGE).
- The system administrative personnel are not careless, malicious and
abide the instruction provided by the TOE documentation
(A.NO_EVIL_ADMIN).
- TOE users are expected to act in a co-operating manner in a benign
environment (A.COOP).
- TOE users are trained well enough to be able to use the security
functionality appropriately (A.UTRAIN).
- TOE users are trusted to some task or group of tasks within a secure
IT environment by exercising complete control over their data
(A.UTRUST).
For a detailed description of the usage assumptions refer to the Security Target
[7], especially chapter 3.3 and 3.4
4.2 Environmental assumptions
The following assumptions about physical and connectivity aspects defined by
the Security Target have to be met (refer to Security Target [7], chapter 3.4.1
and 3.4.2):
- It is assumed that the processing resources of the TOE are located
within controlled access facilities which will prevent unauthorised
physical access (A.LOCATE).
BSI-DSZ-CC-0194-2002 Certification Report
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- It is assumed that TOE hardware and software (critical to security
policy enforcement) is protected from unauthorised physical
modification (A.PROTECT).
- All network components (like bridges and routers) are assumed to
correctly pass data without modification (A.NET_COMP).
- Any other system with which the TOE communicates is assumed to
be under the same management control and operates under the
same security policy constraints. There are no security requirements
which address the need to trust external systems or the
communication links to such systems (A.PEER).
- It is assumed that all connections to peripheral devices and all
network connections reside within the controlled access facilities.
Internal communication paths to access points such as terminals or
other systems are assumed to be adequately protected
(A.CONNECT).
Please consider also the requirements for the evaluated configuration specified
in chapter 8 of this report.
4.3 Clarification of scope
The threats listed below have to be averted in order to support the TOE security
capabilities but are not addressed by the TOE itself. They have to be addressed
by the operating environment of the TOE (for detailed information about the
threats and how the environment may cover them refer to the Security
Target [7]).
- A unprivileged user or the privileged system administrator is losing
stored data due to hardware malfunction (TE.HWMF).
- Security enforcing or relevant files of the TOE are manipulated or
accidentally corrupted without the system administrator being able to
detect this (TE.COR_FILE).
- The underlying hardware functions of the hardware the TOE is
running on does not provide sufficient capabilities to support the self-
protection of the TSF from unauthorised programs (TE.HW_SEP).
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0194-2002
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5 Architectural Information
General Overview:
The target of evaluation (TOE) is the operating system AIX Version 5.2. AIX is a
general purpose, multi-user, multi-tasking operating system. It is compliant with
all major international standards for UNIX systems, such as the POSIX
standards, X/Open XPG 4, Spec 1170, and FIPS Pub 180. It provides a
platform for a variety of applications in the governmental and commercial
environment. AIX is available on a broad range of computer systems from IBM,
ranging from departmental servers to multi-processor enterprise servers.
The evaluated configuration of AIX 5.2 consist of a distributed, closed network
of high-end, mid-range and low-end IBM pSeries servers running the TOE. The
servers may be either a p610, p660 or p690 system with hardware components
as defined in the Security Target.
The network links and cabling are assumed to be physically protected against
eavesdropping and tampering. All hosts within the network must run the
evaluated version of the TOE software and must be configured in accordance
with the requirements as described in the AIX Security Guide [25] for the
operation of the TOE as CAPP/EAL4 system.
The TOE Security Functions (TSF) consists of those parts of AIX that run in
kernel mode plus some defined trusted processes. These together are the
functions that enforce the security policy as defined in the Security Target.
Tools and commands executed in user mode that are used by the system
administrator need also to be trusted to manage the system in a secure way.
But as with other operating system evaluations they are not considered to be
part of this TSF.
The hardware and the BootProm firmware are considered not to be part of the
TOE but part of the TOE environment.
The TOE includes installation from CDROM and from the network.
The TOE includes standard networking applications, such as ftp, rlogin, rsh and
NFS. Configuration of those network applications has to be performed in
accordance with the guidance provided in [25] and [24] for a CAPP/EAL4+
conformant configuration.
The TOE includes the X-Window graphical interface and X-Window
applications.
System administration tools include the smitty non-graphical system
management tool.
The TOE environment also includes applications that are not evaluated, but are
used as unprivileged tools to access public system services, for example the
Netscape browser or the Adobe Acrobat Reader to access the supplied online
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documentation (which is provided in HTML and PDF formats). No HTTP server
is included in the evaluated configuration.
Major structural units of the TOE:
The TOE contains the following structural units:
- The kernel, which executes in system mode
- A set of trusted processes that execute in user mode but with root
privileges. They also provide some of the security functions of the
TOE.
A set of configuration files that define the system configuration. Those files are
named the “TSF database” and need to be protected by the access control
mechanisms of the TOE such that they can only be modified by the system
administrator. The document [20] provides the detailed specification of those
files and also defines the access modes for each file.
The following figure provides a general overview of the TOE with parts in the
grey shaded area indicating the parts that implement the TSF:
Untrusted
Processes
Trusted
Processes
TSF DB
System Call Interface
Device Drivers Kernel Extensions
Controllers / Adapters
Processor and hardware compliant to the Common Hardware
Reference Platform (CHRP)
User Mode Software
Kernel Mode Software
Hardware
Kernel Subsystems
Security Functions:
The security functions that have been evaluated include (please refer to the
Security Target [7] for a complete listing and precise definition):
- Identification and Authentication.
The TOE requires users to authenticate themselves before they can
work with the TOE. The mechanism used for authentication is a
userid/password combination. The system administrator has a variety
of configuration parameter he can use to enforce users to select
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passwords that are hard to guess. In addition the system
administrator can define the maximum and minimum life-time of
passwords.
Users need to authenticate themselves when they log in but also
when they change their identity using the su command or when using
network applications like rlogin, telnet, ftp. To avoid that normal users
can login as root when they for some reason get hold of the password
for root, direct login as root is prohibited. A system administrator has
to log in under his id using his password and then get root using the
su command. Since the use of the su command to get root can be
restricted to defined users that act as system administrators, any user
without this permission can not log in as root even when he knows the
root password.
- Auditing.
The TOE includes the possibility to audit a large number of events.
The system administrator can configure which events are audited and
is also able to define such events on a per file system object basis,
define audit classes and assign them individually to users. This allows
for a great flexibility in the configuration of the events that are audited.
For the minimal set of events to be audited in the evaluated
configration refer to the Security Target [7], chapter 5.2.
The evaluated configuration supports bin mode auditing only.
- Discretionary Access Control
The TOE supports discretionary access control for three different
types of objects:
- The discretionary access control for file system objects
The discretionary access control for file system objects in the TOE
supports the standard Unix permission bits extended by access
control lists that allow the system administrator and the owner of
the file system object to allow or restrict the access to the file
system object down to the granularity of a single user.
- The discretionary access control for IPC objects
The TOE supports discretionary access control based on Unix
permission bits for semaphore, shared memory segments and
message queues.
- The discretionary access control for TCP ports
The TOE includes a unique access control feature for TCP ports
allowing the system administrator to restrict the use of TCP ports
(binding to this port) to defined users. This feature also allows to
define TCP ports with numbers higher than 1024 to be privileged
ports (i. e. only a process with root authority can bind to this port).
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This feature allows to eliminate some known vulnerabilities for
network programs using port numbers higher than 1024.
- Object Reuse
The TOE ensures that objects are cleared before they are reassigned
to and reused by other subjects. This applies to memory and file
system objects as well as to a number of other objects that could
transmit information a user might not want to be transmitted to other
users.
- System management
The TOE supports only two roles: System administrator and normal
users. Additional privileges that exist within the TOE are not used in
the evaluated configuration.
System management within the TOE is restricted to the system
administrator. He may either use the commands provided for system
management or the “smitty” tool, which provides a non-graphical
interface. The tool will generate scripts using the system management
commands.
- TOE Protection
The TOE protects itself from tampering by untrusted subjects in a
variety of ways. The kernel operates in its own protected address
space, which can not be modified or read by untrusted processes.
The kernel also prohibits any direct access of untrusted processes to
hardware. All non-kernel processes have to use the system call
interface to get access to objects in the file system, inter-process
communication objects or network objects. The kernel controls
access to those objects based on the access control policy for those
objects and the access rights defined for the individual users. There is
also a number of system calls where the use is restricted to the
system administrator. Other system calls have specific parameters
that are restricted to system administrators.
In addition the TOE uses trusted processes which run with system
administrator privileges to implement some of the TOE security
functions. Those trusted processes are separated by the kernel from
untrusted processes. Also the configuration files used by the TSF are
protected by the discretionary access control functions of the TOE
from unauthorized access by untrusted users.
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6 Documentation
The following documentation is provided with the product by the developer to
the customer on CD:
[10] "System Management Concepts: Operating System and Devices",
version AIX 5L 5.2, as of October 2002 (admconc.pdf)
[11] "Technical Reference: Communications, Volume 1", version AIX 5L 5.2,
as of October 2002 (commtrf1.pdf)
[12] "Technical Reference: Communications, Volume 2", version AIX 5L 5.2,
as of October 2002 (commtrf2.pdf)
[13] "Commands Reference, Volume 1", version AIX 5L 5.2, as of October
2002 (aixcmds1.pdf)
[14] "Commands Reference, Volume 2", version AIX 5L 5.2, as of October
2002 (aixcmds2.pdf)
[15] "Commands Reference, Volume 3", version AIX 5L 5.2, as of October
2002 (aixcmds3.pdf)
[16] "Commands Reference, Volume 4", version AIX 5L 5.2, as of October
2002 (aixcmds4.pdf)
[17] "Commands Reference, Volume 5", version AIX 5L 5.2, as of October
2002 (aixcmds5.pdf)
[18] "Commands Reference, Volume 6", version AIX 5L 5.2, as of October
2002 (aixcmds6.pdf)
[19] "Understanding the Diagnostic Subsystem for AIX", version AIX 5L 5.2,
as of October 2002 (diagunsd.pdf)
[20] "Files Reference", version AIX 5L 5.2, as of October 2002 (aixfiles.pdf)
[21] "General Programming Concepts: Writing and Debugging Programs",
version AIX 5L 5.2, as of October 2002 (genprogc.pdf)
[22] "System Management Guide: Operating System and Devices", version
AIX 5L 5.2, as of October 2002 (baseadmn.pdf)
[23] "System Management Concepts: Operating Systems and Devices",
version AIX 5L 5.2, as of October 2002 (admnconc.pdf)
[24] "AIX 5.2 Release Notes", version AIX 5L 5.2, as of October 2002
(10079300.html)
[25] "Security Guide", version AIX 5L 5.2, as of October 2002 (security.pdf)
[26] "System Management Guide: Communications and Networks", version
AIX 5L 5.2, as of October 2002 (commadmn.pdf)
[27] "System User's Guide: Communication and Networks", version AIX 5L
5.2, as of October 2002 (usrcomm.pdf)
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[28] "System User's Guide: Operating System and Devices", version AIX 5L
5.2, as of October 2002 (usrosdev.pdf)
[29] "Technical Reference: Base Operating System and Extensions, Volume
1", version AIX 5L 5.2, as of October 2002 (basetrf1.pdf)
[30] "Technical Reference: Base Operating System and Extensions, Volume
2", version AIX 5L 5.2, as of October 2002 (basetrf2.pdf)
The administrator/user is recommended to use the documents:
- "AIX 5.2 Release Notes", version AIX 5L 5.2, as of October 2002
(10079300.html), [24] and
- "Security Guide", version AIX 5L 5.2, as of October 2002 (security.pdf), [25]
as a starting point for an evaluation conformant usage of the TOE.
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7 IT Product Testing
Test Schedule
Prior to the final developer and evaluator testing several runs of all test cases
on pre-releases of the product have been performed. Those tests have started
when the evaluators conducted tests on a p610, p660 and p690 machine at IBM
in Austin, Texas. Later on the developers conducted the full tests on the last
three pre-releases before the „GOLD“ release to identify remaining potential
problems.
The developer and evaluator did a re-run of the tests after the final release of
the TOE was available.
Test hardware configuration
The Security Target defines three different machine types for the TOE: p610,
p660 and p690.
Tests have been performed on all three machines types using the following
hardware configurations:
p610
- 2 POWER3 CPUs
- 8 GB Main Memory
- ISA Bus Diskette Drive
- Wide/Ultra-3 SCSI I/O Controller
- PCI 4-Channel Ultra3 SCSI RAID Adapter
- 5 SCSI disk drives (hdisk0: 18 GB, hdisk1 to hdisk4: 36 GB each, all
manufactured by IBM)
- SCSI 4 mm tape drive (20 GB), manufactured by HP
- SCSI DVD-RAM drive, manufactured by IBM
- 3 IBM 10/100 Mbits Ethernet PCI adapter
- 1 IBM PCI Token Ring Adapter
- GXT135P 2D Graphics Adapter, manufactured by Matrox
- PS/2 Keyboard
- Three Button Mouse
p660
- 4 RS64-IV CPUs
- 8 GB Main Memory
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- ISA Bus Diskette Drive
- Wide/Ultra-2 SCSI I/O Controller
- 2 LVD SCSI Disk Drive (18200 MB), manufactured by IBM
- 1 SCSI Multimedia CD-ROM Drive, manufactured by IBM
- 1 IBM 10/100 Mbits Ethernet PCI adapter
- Asynchronous Terminal
- Standard I/O Serial Port
p690
- 8 POWER4 CPUs
- 8 GB Main Memory
- ISA Bus Diskette Drive
- Wide/Fast-20 SCSI I/O Controller
- Wide/Ultra-3 SCSI I/O Controller
- USB OHCI Adapter
- 2 LVD SCSI Disk Drive (18200 MB), manufactured by IBM
- 1 SCSI Multimedia CD-ROM Drive, manufactured by IBM
- 1 Gigabit Ethernet-SX PCI Adapter
- IBM 10/100 Mbps Ethernet PCI Adapter
- Asynchronous Terminal
- Standard I/O Serial Port
The detailed hardware configuration for each machine including the version
numbers, serial numbers and additional details have been extracted and stored
in a log file. These log files have been provided during the evaluation.
Summary of Developer Testing Effort
Test configuration:
All the tests have been performed on the configurations defined above.
Testing approach:
IBM has a large number of different test suites and test cases for each
component. Several of the test suites are driven by similar frameworks. This
means, the test suite provides some user space application for building
(compiling, assembling) executables out of the test case files and executing the
test cases. In addition to the user space applications, a library for binary test
programs and several functions for shell code test programs are provided by the
the testing framework. These functions are invoked by the test cases during
their run when the positive or negative result of a test unit is determined.
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The test case files of the framework consist of one or more test units, which are
the individual tests. One test case is aimed to check one particular security
function (although it tests some others indirectly), the test units of one test case
in turn check different aspects of a security function. The framework can be
used in batch mode or manually. In manual mode, the test case files have to be
build and executed one by one by the tester. In batch mode, one user space
tool is configured to build and/or execute one or more test case automatically.
Testing results:
The developer performed the testing of the final product on all three platforms
(p610, p660 and p690). The developer has installed the TOE in accordance
with the guidance provided in [25] and [24] for the CAPP/EAL4 configuration.
The results of the tests are that all test cases show the expected behaviour in
the evaluated configuration.
Summary of Evaluator Testing Effort
Test configuration
The evaluator performed his test on a p610 system located at the IBM office in
Munich as well as on the same systems the developer has used for his testing
in Austin.
Testing approach:
The evaluator testing effort consists of two parts. The first one is the complete
rerun of the developer test cases and the second is the execution of the tests
created by the evaluator.
The testing were carried out at the IBM lab in Austin and at the IBM facility in
Munich. The test environment in Austin consisted of a p610, a p660 and a p690
systems connected to each other via Ethernet. In contrast, the IBM facility in
Munich provided a p610 and an additional server. The additional server was
used to have the p610 being part of a real network while all test cases where
executed for the software running on the p610.
The evaluator performed all the developer tests and his own test cases on the
TOE he has installed in conformance with the Security Target and the
developer’s guidance documentation. The evaluator has verified that all test
cases produced the results that where expected.
Evaluator penetration testing:
The evaluators have devised a set of penetration tests based on the
developer’s vulnerability analysis and based on the evaluator’s knowledge of
the TOE gained by the other evaluation activities. All penetration tests have
been designed to require only a low attack potential as defined in AVA_VLA.2.
The evaluators conducted those tests and did not find any test that resulted in a
successful penetration of the TOE with low attack potential.
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8 Evaluated Configuration
According to the Security Target the evaluated configuration of the TOE (as
specified in chapter 2 of this report) is defined as follows (refer to Security
Target [7]):
General Aspects:
- The CC evaluated file set must be selected at install time (refer to
chapter 2 of this report)
- If a windowing environment is to be used, the CDE file set must be
selected at install time.
- The role based system administration features of AIX 5.2 are not
included.
- AIX 5.2 supports the use of IPv4 and IPv6, only IPv4 is included.
- Only 64 bit architectures are included.
- Web Based Systems Management (WebSM) is not included.
- Both network (NIM, Network Install Manager) and CD installations are
supported.
- The default configuration for identification and authentication is to be
used only. Support for other authentication options e.g. smartcard
authentication, is not included in the evaluation configuration.
- If the system console is used, it must be connected directly to the
workstation and the same physical protection as for the workstation is
needed.
Networking Aspects:
- The TOE can be run on one or more server machines (called „TOE
server“ in [7]). If the product is configured with more than one TOE
server, they are linked by LANs, which may be joined by
bridges/routers or by TOE workstations which act as
routers/gateways.
- No other systems may be connected to the network.
- The following file system types are supported:
- the AIX journaling file system, jfs2;
- the standard remote file system access protocol, nfs (V3);
- the High Sierra file system for CD-ROM drives, cdrfsisofs;
- the process file system, procfs (/proc);
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Technical Aspects:
- The TOE is running on the following hardware platforms:
- IBM pSeries Systems using Power3-II CPUs (p610)
- IBM pSeries Systems using RS 64 (III or IV) CPUs (p660)
- IBM pSeries Symmetric Multiprocessor (SMP) Systems, using
Power4 CPUs (p690)
- The following peripherals can be run with the TOE:
- all terminals and printers supported by the TOE
- all storage devices and backup devices supported by the TOE
(hard disks, CD-ROM drives,streamer drives, floppy disk drives)
- all Ethernet and Token-Ring network adapters supported by the
TOE
- all printer devices supported by the TOE
- Network connectors supported by the TOE (e.g. Ethernet, Token
Ring, etc.) supporting TCP/IP services over the TCP/IP protocol
stack.
For setting up / configuring the TOE all guidance documents especially the
documents [24] and [25] have to be followed (refer to chapter 6 of this report).
Note that LPAR is not a feature in the evaluated configuration of the TOE.
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9 Results of the Evaluation
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [8] was provided by the ITSEF
according to the Common Criteria [1], the Common Evaluation Methodology [2],
the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all interpretations and guidelines of the
Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE (this includes especially the
methodology for flaw remediation, [5]).
The verdicts for the CC, Part 3 assurance components (according to EAL4
augmented by ALC_FLR.1 plus Security Target evaluation) are summarised in
the following table:
Assurance Classes and Components Verdict
Security Target CC Class ASE PASS
TOE description ASE_DES.1 PASS
Security environment ASE_ENV.1 PASS
ST introduction ASE_INT.1 PASS
Security objectives ASE_OBJ.1 PASS
PP claims ASE_PPC.1 PASS
IT security requirements ASE_REQ.1 PASS
Explicitly stated IT security requirements ASE_SRE.1 PASS
TOE summary specification ASE_TSS.1 PASS
Configuration management CC Class ACM PASS
Partial CM automation ACM_AUT.1 PASS
Generation support and acceptance procedures ACM_CAP.4 PASS
Problem tracking CM coverage ACM_SCP.2 PASS
Delivery and Operation CC Class ADO PASS
Detection of modification ADO_DEL.2 PASS
Installation, generation, and start-up procedures ADO_IGS.1 PASS
Development CC class ADV PASS
Fully defined external interfaces ADV_FSP.2 PASS
Security enforcing high-level design ADV_HLD.2 PASS
Subset of the implementation of the TSF ADV_IMP.1 PASS
Descriptive low-level design ADV_LLD.1 PASS
Informal correspondence demonstration ADV_RCR.1 PASS
Informal TOE security policy model ADV_SPM.1 PASS
Guidance documents CC Class AGD PASS
Administrator guidance AGD_ADM.1 PASS
User guidance AGD_USR.1 PASS
Life cycle support CC Class ALC PASS
Identification of security measures ALC_DVS.1 PASS
Basic flaw remediation ALC_FLR.1 PASS
Developer defined life-cycle model ALC_LCD.1 PASS
Well-defined development tools ALC_TAT.1 PASS
Tests CC Class ATE PASS
Analysis of coverage ATE_COV.2 PASS
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Assurance Classes and Components Verdict
Testing: high-level design ATE_DPT.1 PASS
Functional testing ATE_FUN.1 PASS
Independent testing - sample ATE_IND.2 PASS
Vulnerability assessment CC Class AVA PASS
Validation of analysis AVA_MSU.2 PASS
Strength of TOE security function evaluation AVA_SOF.1 PASS
Independent vulnerability analysis AVA_VLA.2 PASS
The evaluation has shown that the TOE fulfils the claimed strength of function
for the authentication function (based on passwords).
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the product AIX 5L for
POWER V5.2 Program Number 5765-E62 in the configuration as defined in the
Security Target and summarised in this report (refer to the Security Target [7]
and the chapters 2, 4 and 8 of this report). The validity can be extended to new
versions and releases of the product, provided the sponsor applies for re-
certification of the modified product, and if the evaluation of the modified
product does not reveal any security deficiencies.
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10 Evaluator Comments/Recommendations
The User Guidance documentation (especially [24] and [25]) contains
necessary information about the secure usage of the TOE. Additionally, for
secure usage of the TOE the fulfilment of the assumptions about the
environment in the Security Target [7] and the Security Target as a whole has to
be taken into account. Therefore a user/administrator has to follow the guidance
in these documents.
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11 Annexes
None.
BSI-DSZ-CC-0194-2002 Certification Report
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12 Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [7] of the Target of Evaluation
(TOE) is provided within a separate document.
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13 Definitions
13.1 Acronyms
AU Security Function Auditing
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
CAPP Controlled Access Protection Profile
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CDE Common Desktop Environment
DA Security Function Discretionary Access Control
DoD U.S. Department of Defense
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
LAN Local Area Network
LPAR Logical partitioning
LPP Licensed Product Package
IP Internet Protocol
IA Security Function Identification and Authentication
IT Information Technology
OR Security Function Object Reuse
OSP Organisational Security Policy
PP Protection Profile
PROM Programmable read only memory
SF Security Function
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
SOF Strength of Function
SM Security Function Security Management
ST Security Target
TCP Transmission Control Protocol
TCSEC Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria
TOE Target of Evaluation
TP TSF Protection
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TSC TSF Scope of Control
TSF TOE Security Functions
TSP TOE Security Policy
13.2 Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more assurance component(s) from CC
Part 3 to an EAL or assurance package.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not
contained in part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in part 3 of the
CC.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics
based on well-established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - An entity within the TSC that contains or receives information and
upon which subjects perform operations.
Protection Profile - An implementation-independent set of security require-
ments for a category of TOEs that meet specific consumer needs.
Security Function - A part or parts of the TOE that have to be relied upon for
enforcing a closely related subset of the rules from the TSP.
Security Target - A set of security requirements and specifications to be used
as the basis for evaluation of an identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined
semantics.
Strength of Function - A qualification of a TOE security function expressing
the minimum efforts assumed necessary to defeat its expected security
behaviour by directly attacking its underlying security mechanisms.
SOF-basic - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that
the function provides adequate protection against casual breach of TOE
security by attackers possessing a low attack potential.
SOF-medium - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows
that the function provides adequate protection against straightforward or
intentional breach of TOE security by attackers possessing a moderate attack
potential.
SOF-high - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that
the function provides adequate protection against deliberately planned or
organised breach of TOE security by attackers possessing a high attack
potential.
Subject - An entity within the TSC that causes operations to be performed.
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Target of Evaluation - An IT product or system and its associated
administrator and user guidance documentation that is the subject of an
evaluation.
TOE Security Functions - A set consisting of all hardware, software, and
firmware of the TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the
TSP.
TOE Security Policy - A set of rules that regulate how assets are managed,
protected and distributed within a TOE.
TSF Scope of Control - The set of interactions that can occur with or within a
TOE and are subject to the rules of the TSP.
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14 Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 2.1, August 1999
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
(CEM), Part 1, Version 0.6; Part 2: Evaluation Methodology, Version 1.0,
August 1999
[3] BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
[4] Applicaton Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for
the TOE:
[5] Applicaton Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme AIS33,
Version 2 – “Methodologie zur Fehlerbehebung – Flaw
Remediation”, 26.07.2002
[6] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148, BSI 7149), periodically
updated list published also on the BSI Web-site
[7] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-0194, Version 1.2, 2002-09-25, AIX5.2
Security Target, IBM Corporation
[8] Evaluation Technical Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0194, Version 1.3, atsec
Security Information GmbH, 17.10.2002 (confidential document)
[9] Controlled Access Protection Profile, Issue 1.d, 8 October 1999, National
Security Agency
User Guidance Documentation:
[10] "System Management Concepts: Operating System and Devices",
version AIX 5L 5.2, as of October 2002 (admconc.pdf)
[11] "Technical Reference: Communications, Volume 1", version AIX 5L 5.2,
as of October 2002 (commtrf1.pdf)
[12] "Technical Reference: Communications, Volume 2", version AIX 5L 5.2,
as of October 2002 (commtrf2.pdf)
[13] "Commands Reference, Volume 1", version AIX 5L 5.2, as of October
2002 (aixcmds1.pdf)
[14] "Commands Reference, Volume 2", version AIX 5L 5.2, as of October
2002 (aixcmds2.pdf)
[15] "Commands Reference, Volume 3", version AIX 5L 5.2, as of October
2002 (aixcmds3.pdf)
[16] "Commands Reference, Volume 4", version AIX 5L 5.2, as of October
2002 (aixcmds4.pdf)
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[17] "Commands Reference, Volume 5", version AIX 5L 5.2, as of October
2002 (aixcmds5.pdf)
[18] "Commands Reference, Volume 6", version AIX 5L 5.2, as of October
2002 (aixcmds6.pdf)
[19] "Understanding the Diagnostic Subsystem for AIX", version AIX 5L 5.2,
as of October 2002 (diagunsd.pdf)
[20] "Files Reference", version AIX 5L 5.2, as of October 2002 (aixfiles.pdf)
[21] "General Programming Concepts: Writing and Debugging Programs",
version AIX 5L 5.2, as of October 2002 (genprogc.pdf)
[22] "System Management Guide: Operating System and Devices", version
AIX 5L 5.2, as of October 2002 (baseadmn.pdf)
[23] "System Management Concepts: Operating Systems and Devices",
version AIX 5L 5.2, as of October 2002 (admnconc.pdf)
[24] "AIX 5.2 Release Notes", version AIX 5L 5.2, as of October 2002
(10079300.html)
[25] "Security Guide", version AIX 5L 5.2, as of October 2002 (security.pdf)
[26] "System Management Guide: Communications and Networks", version
AIX 5L 5.2, as of October 2002 (commadmn.pdf)
[27] "System User's Guide: Communication and Networks", version AIX 5L
5.2, as of October 2002 (usrcomm.pdf)
[28] "System User's Guide: Operating System and Devices", version AIX 5L
5.2, as of October 2002 (usrosdev.pdf)
[29] "Technical Reference: Base Operating System and Extensions, Volume
1", version AIX 5L 5.2, as of October 2002 (basetrf1.pdf)
[30] "Technical Reference: Base Operating System and Extensions, Volume
2", version AIX 5L 5.2, as of October 2002 (basetrf2.pdf)
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C Excerpts from the Criteria
CC Part 1:
Caveats on evaluation results (chapter 5.4)
The pass result of evaluation shall be a statement that describes the extent to which
the PP or TOE can be trusted to conform to the requirements. The results shall be
caveated with respect to Part 2 (functional requirements), Part 3 (assurance
requirements) or directly to a PP, as listed below.
a) Part 2 conformant - A PP or TOE is Part 2 conformant if the functional
requirements are only based upon functional components in Part 2.
b) Part 2 extended - A PP or TOE is Part 2 extended if the functional
requirements include functional components not in Part 2.
c) Part 3 conformant - A PP or TOE is Part 3 conformant if the assurance
requirements are in the form of an EAL or assurance package that is
based only upon assurance components in Part 3.
d) Part 3 augmented - A PP or TOE is Part 3 augmented if the assurance
requirements are in the form of an EAL or assurance package, plus other
assurance components in Part 3.
e) Part 3 extended - A PP or TOE is Part 3 extended if the assurance
requirements are in the form of an EAL associated with additional
assurance requirements not in Part 3 or an assurance package that
includes (or is entirely made up from) assurance requirements not in Part 3.
f) Conformant to PP - A TOE is conformant to a PP only if it is compliant
with all parts of the PP.“
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CC Part 3:
Assurance categorisation (chapter 2.5)
„The assurance classes, families, and the abbreviation for each family are shown in
Table 2.1.
Assurance Class Assurance Family Abbreviated Name
Class ACM:
Configuration
management
CM automation ACM_AUT
CM capabilities ACM_CAP
CM scope ACM_SCP
Class ADO: Delivery
and operation
Delivery ADO_DEL
Installation, generation and start-up ADO_IGS
Class ADV:
Development
Functional specification ADV_FSP
High-level design ADV_HLD
Implementation representation ADV_IMP
TSF internals ADV_INT
Low-level design ADV_LLD
Representation correspondence ADV_RCR
Security policy modeling ADV_SPM
Class AGD: Guidance
documents
Administrator guidance AGD_ADM
User guidance AGD_USR
Class ALC: Life cycle
support
Development security ALC_DVS
Flaw remediation ALC_FLR
Life cycle definition ALC_LCD
Tools and techniques ALC_TAT
Class ATE: Tests Coverage ATE_COV
Depth ATE_DPT
Functional tests ATE_FUN
Independent testing ATE_IND
Class AVA:
Vulnerability
assessment
Covert channel analysis AVA_CCA
Misuse AVA_MSU
Strength of TOE security functions AVA_SOF
Vulnerability analysis AVA_VLA
Table 2.1 -Assurance family breakdown and mapping“
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Evaluation assurance levels (chapter 6)
„The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that balances
the level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of acquiring that degree of
assurance. The CC approach identifies the separate concepts of assurance in a TOE
at the end of the evaluation, and of maintenance of that assurance during the
operational use of the TOE.
It is important to note that not all families and components from Part 3 are included in
the EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful and desirable
assurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and components will be
considered for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and STs for which they provide
utility.
Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview (chapter 6.1)
Table 6.1 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a hierarchically
ordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families. Each number in the
resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component where applicable.
As outlined in the next section, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation assurance
levels are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE's assurance. They are hierarchically
ordered inasmuch as each EAL represents more assurance than all lower EALs. The
increase in assurance from EAL to EAL is accomplished by substitution of a
hierarchically higher assurance component from the same assurance family (i.e.
increasing rigour, scope, and/or depth) and from the addition of assurance components
from other assurance families (i.e. adding new requirements).
These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as
described in chapter 2 of this Part 3. More precisely, each EAL includes no more than
one component of each assurance family and all assurance dependencies of every
component are addressed.
While the EALs are defined in the CC, it is possible to represent other combinations of
assurance. Specifically, the notion of “augmentation“ allows the addition of assurance
components (from assurance families not already included in the EAL) or the
substitution of assurance components (with another hierarchically higher assurance
component in the same assurance family) to an EAL. Of the assurance constructs
defined in the CC, only EALs may be augmented. The notion of an “EAL minus a
constituent assurance component“ is not recognised by the CC as a valid claim.
Augmentation carries with it the obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility
and added value of the added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also be
extended with explicitly stated assurance requirements.
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Assurance
Class
Assurance
Family
Assurance Components by
Evaluation Assurance Level
EAL1 EAL2 EAL3 EAL4 EAL5 EAL6 EAL7
Configuration
management
ACM_AUT 1 1 2 2
ACM_CAP 1 2 3 4 4 5 5
ACM_SCP 1 2 3 3 3
Delivery and
operation
ADO_DEL 1 1 2 2 2 3
ADO_IGS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Development ADV_FSP 1 1 1 2 3 3 4
ADV_HLD 1 2 2 3 4 5
ADV_IMP 1 2 3 3
ADV_INT 1 2 3
ADV_LLD 1 1 2 2
ADV_RCR 1 1 1 1 2 2 3
ADV_SPM 1 3 3 3
Guidance
documents
AGD_ADM 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
AGD_USR 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Life cycle
support
ALC_DVS 1 1 1 2 2
ALC_FLR
ALC_LCD 1 2 2 3
ALC_TAT 1 2 3 3
Tests ATE_COV 1 2 2 2 3 3
ATE_DPT 1 1 2 2 3
ATE_FUN 1 1 1 1 2 2
ATE_IND 1 2 2 2 2 2 3
Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_CCA 1 2 2
AVA_MSU 1 2 2 3 3
AVA_SOF 1 1 1 1 1 1
AVA_VLA 1 1 2 3 4 4
Table 6.1 - Evaluation assurance level summary“
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Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL1) - functionally tested (chapter 6.2.1)
„Objectives
EAL1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but the
threats to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where independent
assurance is required to support the contention that due care has been exercised with
respect to the protection of personal or similar information.
EAL1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer, including
independent testing against a specification, and an examination of the guidance
documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL1 evaluation could be successfully
conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE, and for minimal outlay.
An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a manner
consistent with its documentation, and that it provides useful protection against
identified threats.“
Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL2) - structurally tested (chapter 6.2.2)
„Objectives
EAL2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of design
information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the part of the
developer than is consistent with good commercial practice. As such it should not
require a substantially increased investment of cost or time.
EAL2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require
a low to moderate level of independently assured security in the absence of ready
availability of the complete development record. Such a situation may arise when
securing legacy systems, or where access to the developer may be limited.“
Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL3) - methodically tested and checked
(chapter 6.2.3)
„Objectives
EAL3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from positive
security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of existing sound
development practices.
EAL3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
moderate level of independently assured security, and require a thorough investigation
of the TOE and its development without substantial re-engineering.“
Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL4) - methodically designed, tested, and
reviewed (chapter 6.2.4)
„Objectives
EAL4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security
engineering based on good commercial development practices which, though rigorous,
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do not require substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other resources. EAL4 is the
highest level at which it is likely to be economically feasible to retrofit to an existing
product line.
EAL4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require
a moderate to high level of independently assured security in conventional commodity
TOEs and are prepared to incur additional security-specific engineering costs.“
Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL5) - semiformally designed and tested
(chapter 6.2.5)
„Objectives
EAL5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security engineering
based upon rigorous commercial development practices supported by moderate
application of specialist security engineering techniques. Such a TOE will probably be
designed and developed with the intent of achieving EAL5 assurance. It is likely that
the additional costs attributable to the EAL5 requirements, relative to rigorous
development without the application of specialised techniques, will not be large.
EAL5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require
a high level of independently assured security in a planned development and require a
rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable costs attributable to
specialist security engineering techniques.“
Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL6) - semiformally verified design and
tested (chapter 6.2.6)
„Objectives
EAL6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security
engineering techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to produce a
premium TOE for protecting high value assets against significant risks.
EAL6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in
high risk situations where the value of the protected assets justifies the additional
costs.“
Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL7) - formally verified design and tested
(chapter 6.2.7)
„Objectives
EAL7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in extremely
high risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies the higher costs.
Practical application of EAL7 is currently limited to TOEs with tightly focused security
functionality that is amenable to extensive formal analysis.“
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Strength of TOE security functions (AVA_SOF) (chapter 14.3)
AVA_SOF Strength of TOE security functions
„Objectives
Even if a TOE security function cannot be bypassed, deactivated, or corrupted, it may
still be possible to defeat it because there is a vulnerability in the concept of its
underlying security mechanisms. For those functions a qualification of their security
behaviour can be made using the results of a quantitative or statistical analysis of the
security behaviour of these mechanisms and the effort required to overcome them. The
qualification is made in the form of a strength of TOE security function claim.“
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VLA) (chapter 14.4)
AVA_VLA Vulnerability analysis
„Objectives
Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether vulnerabilities identified,
during the evaluation of the construction and anticipated operation of the TOE or by
other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses), could allow users to violate the TSP.
Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that a user will be able to discover flaws
that will allow unauthorised access to resources (e.g. data), allow the ability to interfere
with or alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorised capabilities of other users.“
„Application notes
A vulnerability analysis is performed by the developer in order to ascertain the
presence of security vulnerabilities, and should consider at least the contents of all the
TOE deliverables including the ST for the targeted evaluation assurance level. The
developer is required to document the disposition of identified vulnerabilities to allow
the evaluator to make use of that information if it is found useful as a support for the
evaluator's independent vulnerability analysis.“
„Independent vulnerability analysis goes beyond the vulnerabilities identified by the
developer. The main intent of the evaluator analysis is to determine that the TOE is
resistant to penetration attacks performed by an attacker possessing a low (for
AVA_VLA.2), moderate (for AVA_VLA.3) or high (for AVA_VLA.4) attack potential.“