NetNumen™ U31
Network Element Management
Security Target
Version: R13 V12.11.10 for Linux/HP
ZTE CORPORATION
NO. 55, Hi-tech Road South, ShenZhen, P.R.China
Postcode: 518057
Tel: +86-755-26771900
Fax: +86-755-26770801
URL: http://ensupport.zte.com.cn
E-mail: support@zte.com.cn
Revision History
Revision No. Revision Date Revision Reason
0.1 November 1, 2010 First version, suitable for application for certification
0.2 November 20, 2010 Added FPT_ITT.1, removed duplicate ToC, aligned with ZXSS10
ST, corrected SAR listing
0.3 December 3, 2010 Added clarifications resulting from first evaluator review.
0.4 December 10, 2010 Modified FTA_SSL.3, added placeholder to FDP_ACF.1
0.5 January 15, 2011 Corrected ZTE comments of 12/2010
0.6 January 21, 2011 Removed dual-server functionality, removed LDAP-server, added
USB-tokens, submitted for evaluation
0.7 January 31, 2011 Corrected evaluator comments from ST evaluation
0.8 February 10, 2011 Corrected comments from:
l Evaluator on ST v0.7
l Certifier on ST v0.7
l Evaluator on ADVAGD document
Replaced telnet client by CLI, as this was confusing people. Removed
anti-virus from the TOE to the environment
Removed the possibility of restricting login to either EMS-Client or CLI.
Clarified that the TOE is configured to use passwords by itself or by
RADIUS for all users
Corrected that the TOE can use passwords or USB-token (and not
both)
0.9 March 1, 2011 Removed USB tokens, removed FAU_ARP.1 and references to
alarms, restricted scope of FAU_GEN.1.
0.91 March 16, 2011 Changed endpoints of trusted channels from workstation to clients.
Changed definition of CLI. Removed RADIUS. Moved start/stop
logging to system log instead of syslog and therefore also removed
syslog.
1.0 April 5, 2011 ,Final
Serial Number: SJ-20101109101114-019
Publishing Date: 2011-04-05(R1.0)
References
[CCp1] Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation, Part 1, v3.1r3, July 2009
[CCp2] Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation, Part 2, v3.1r3, July 2009
[CCp3] Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation, Part 3, v3.1r3, July 2009
[CEMe] Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, v3.1r3, July 2009
I
II
Contents
References ...................................................................................................... I
Chapter 1 ST Introduction .........................................................................1-1
1.1 ST and TOE References..................................................................................... 1-1
1.2 TOE Overview and usage ................................................................................... 1-1
1.2.1 Major security features ............................................................................. 1-3
1.2.2 Non-TOE Hardware/Software/Firmware..................................................... 1-3
1.3 TOE Description................................................................................................. 1-4
1.3.1 Physical scope......................................................................................... 1-4
1.3.2 Logical scope........................................................................................... 1-5
1.4 Excluded from the evaluation .............................................................................. 1-7
Chapter 2 Conformance Claims................................................................2-1
Chapter 3 Security Problem Definition.....................................................3-1
3.1 Organisational Security Policies .......................................................................... 3-1
3.2 Threats.............................................................................................................. 3-1
3.2.1 Assets and threat agents .......................................................................... 3-1
3.2.2 Threats.................................................................................................... 3-2
3.3 Assumptions ...................................................................................................... 3-2
Chapter 4 Security Objectives...................................................................4-1
4.1 Security objectives for the TOE ........................................................................... 4-1
4.2 Security objectives for the Operational Environment ............................................. 4-2
Chapter 5 Security Requirements.............................................................5-1
5.1 Extended components definition.......................................................................... 5-1
5.2 Definitions.......................................................................................................... 5-1
5.3 Security Functional Requirements ....................................................................... 5-2
5.3.1 Identification & Authentication ................................................................... 5-2
5.3.2 Roles & Authorisation ............................................................................... 5-3
5.3.3 Logging & Auditing ................................................................................... 5-4
5.3.4 Communication........................................................................................ 5-5
5.3.5 Management............................................................................................ 5-6
5.4 Security Assurance Requirements....................................................................... 5-7
5.5 Security Assurance Requirements Rationale........................................................ 5-9
Chapter 6 TOE Summary Specification....................................................6-1
I
Chapter 7 Rationales..................................................................................7-1
7.1 Security Objectives Rationale.............................................................................. 7-1
7.2 Security Functional Requirements Rationale ........................................................ 7-3
7.3 Dependencies.................................................................................................... 7-4
Appendix A Roles and Operations .......................................................... A-1
Figures............................................................................................................. I
II
Chapter 1
ST Introduction
Table of Contents
ST and TOE References ............................................................................................1-1
TOE Overview and usage ..........................................................................................1-1
TOE Description.........................................................................................................1-4
Excluded from the evaluation .....................................................................................1-7
1.1 ST and TOE References
This is version 1.0 of the Security Target for the NetNumen U31 R13 v12.11.10 Element
Management System (EMS) for Linux/HP .
1.2 TOE Overview and usage
The TOE is an EMS plus client. The TOE is used to manage a wireless telecommunications
network.
The TOE consists of two parts:
l An EMS Client, consisting of a Java application. This application is intended to run
on a workstation. This client is a graphical user interface to the EMS Server.
l An EMS Server, consisting of a server plus software.
The EMS is intended to be the highest management workstation for a certain supplier in
a telecommunication network. It manages one or more OMMs (see below) and provides
information to the NMS (see below).
The TOE is depicted in Figure 1-1, together with relevant entities in its environment. The
TOE communicates with these entities using the IP protocol.
1-1
SJ-20101109101114-019|2011-04-05(R1.0) ZTE CORPORATION
NetNumen™ U31 Security Target
Figure 1-1 The TOE in its environment
These entities are:
l A NMS: Network Management System1. This is a system that is used by a network
operator to monitor its entire wireless telecommunications network. This network may
contain several EMSs (usually from different suppliers). The TOE sends performance
data, alarm data, configuration data and similar information to the NMS. The NMS is
trusted by the TOE.
l One or more OMMs: (Operation Maintenance Module). An OMM manages a
telecommunication network for a specific telecommunication technology (such as
CDMA or WiMAX). The EMS can manage multiple OMMs at once. The OMMs are
trusted by the TOE.
l Network Elements: These are the parts of the wireless telecommunications network
that is managed by the OMMs and the TOE.
l One or more management workstations:
à Some with an EMS Client installed on them, which is used as a graphical user
interface to the EMS Server.
à Some with no EMS Client installed on them. These use a command line interface
running over a non-TOE ssh-client2) to access the EMS Server.
1. Some operators refer to an NMS as an OSS (Operations Support System).
2. This command line interface running on a non-TOE ssh-client is collectively referred to as CLI in this ST.
1-2
SJ-20101109101114-019|2011-04-05(R1.0) ZTE CORPORATION
Chapter 1 ST Introduction
1.2.1 Major security features
The TOE:
l supports a flexible role-based authorization framework with predefined and
customizable roles. These roles can use the TOE to manage the wireless
telecommunications network, and manage the TOE itself.
l supports a flexible authentication framework, allowing the TOE to accept/reject users
based on: username/password and a configurable subset of IP/MAC-address and
time of login.
l supports flexible logging and auditing of events.
l protects communication between EMS Server and the NMS, the OMMs the EMS
Client and the CLI against masquerading, disclosure and modification.
1.2.2 Non-TOE Hardware/Software/Firmware
The EMS Client requires:
Type Name and version
Workstation A Workstation suitable to run the OS (see below)
OS Windows, Linux or Solaris
Java Java(TM) SE Runtime Environment (build 1.6.0_21-b06)
Java HotSpot(TM) Client VM (build 17.0-b16, mixed mode)
The command line interface requires:
Type Name and version
Workstation A Workstation suitable to run the OS (see below)
OS Any OS suitable to run a ssh client (see below)
SSH client Any software suitable to run ssh, such as putty.
The EMS Server does not require any non-TOE Hardware/Software/Firmware, but is
always delivered with:
Type Name and version
Anti Virus A recent version of Trend Micro for CGS Linux (SPLX3.0 or higher with a recent
virus library)
1-3
SJ-20101109101114-019|2011-04-05(R1.0) ZTE CORPORATION
NetNumen™ U31 Security Target
1.3 TOE Description
1.3.1 Physical scope
There are 4 hardware configurations3 (called Modes) for the EMS Server. These are
functionally identical, but differ in computing power.
Mode 1 Mode 2 Mode 3 Mode 4
Platform HP BL460cG6
2 E5504 CPUs
8GB Memory
2 300GB SAS
Disks
SAS adapter
HP BL680cG5
4 E7420 CPUs
8GB Memory
2 300GB SAS
Disks
SAS adapter
HP BL680cG5
4 E7420 CPUs
16GBMemory
2 300GB SAS
Disks, SAS
adapter
HP BL680cG5
4 E7450 CPUs
32GBMemory
2 300GB SAS
Disks, SAS
adapter
Disk Array HP
MSA2000sa G2
5 x HP 300GB
SAS 15K
3.5''HDD
HP
MSA2000sa G2
5 x HP 300GB
SAS 15K
3.5''HDD
HP
MSA2000sa G2 6
x HP 300GB SAS
15K 3.5''HDD
HP
MSA2000sa G2 8
x HP 300GB SAS
15K 3.5''HDD
The TOE contains the following software:
EMS Client Name and version
Application Software EMS Client version NetNumen U31 R13
V12.11.10
EMS Server Name and version
Application Software EMS Server version NetNumen U31 R13
V12.11.10
Java Java(TM) SE Runtime Environment (build
1.6.0_21-b06)
Java HotSpot(TM) Client VM (build 17.0-b16,
mixed mode)
OS CGS Linux V3.02.00_P03/64bit
DB Oracle 10.2.0.4 EE 64bit for Linux
The TOE is delivered with the following guidance:
3. There are also configurations available that provide the exact same functionality for Dell/Windows and
Sun/Solaris, but these have not been evaluated. Similarly, there are also fault-tolerant dual server configurations
available, but these also have not been evaluated.
1-4
SJ-20101109101114-019|2011-04-05(R1.0) ZTE CORPORATION
Chapter 1 ST Introduction
Guidance (all prefixed with NetNumenTM U31 (R13 V12.11.10))
Standard Guidance:
l Network Element Management Technical Manual version 1.3
l Network Element Management Security Management Manual version 1.2
l Network Element Management Command Manual version 1.2
Maintenance:
l Network Element Management Routine Maintenance Manual version 1.2
1.3.2 Logical scope
The primary function of the TOE is to manage a telecommunications network by providing
the following services:
l Topology Management: viewing, editing, and operating on the location, network
structure, link connection and service distribution of the network resources in the
network.
l Fault Management: monitor the running status of all devices in the network
l Performance Management: monitoring and analyzing the performance of the network
l Configuration Management: managing network elements and network services
To protect access to these services, the TOE provides four groups of security functionality:
Authentication: The TOE supports a flexible authentication framework, allowing the TOE to
accept/reject users based on: username/password and a configurable subset of IP/MAC-address
and time of login.
Whenever a user of the TOE wishes to use the TOE, the user needs to use either the
graphical EMS-client or the CLI. The first action required by the user is then to log-in.
The TOE allows the Administrator4 to configure (for each user), how that user must log-in:
l The user must always provide a username/password
l Whether the user can only login from a predefined IP-addresses and/or MAC-address
l Whether the user is only allowed to be logged in during a certain time (e.g. office
hours)
l How the account is locked when the user repeatedly fails authentication (until unlocked
by an Administrator5 or until a predefined time elapses)
Authorization: The TOE supports a flexible role-based authorization framework with predefined and
customizable roles. These roles can use the TOE to manage the wireless telecommunications
network, and manage the TOE itself.
4. Or a customisable role that has been assigned this right.
5. Or a customisable role that has been assigned this right.
1-5
SJ-20101109101114-019|2011-04-05(R1.0) ZTE CORPORATION
NetNumen™ U31 Security Target
The TOE allows management of the telecommunications network and itself by different
users. The TOE can be configured to give each user precisely the access to the TOE and
the resources of the telecommunication network that user needs to do his job. To assist in
this, the role has a number of pre-defined roles:
l Administrator: a role with unrestricted access rights over all resources, including right
to modify critical information of accounts.
l Maintenance: a role with high access rights, but only to resources assigned to him.
l Operator: a role with limited access rights, but only to resources assigned to him.
l Supervisor: a role with only viewing rights, but only to resources assigned to him
and can assign these roles to specific users. The last three roles can also be assigned per
resource, that is: a user can have the Maintenance role for one resource, but Operator
role for another, and no role at all for all other resources.
In addition, the TOE allows the Administrator6 to define, modify and name customized roles
and assign rights to these roles.
Note that none of the roles above has full “root” access to the TOE. This is reserved for
ZTE maintenance staff that regularly service the TOE using the systems console, but this
is out of scope for this ST.
Accounting: The TOE supports flexible logging and auditing of security, operation and system events.
The TOE maintains 3 separate logs:
l A security log for authentication events
l An operation log for operations performed by users
l A system log for server tasks that are not directly related to users performing
operations
The logs are only accessible to the Administrator7, who is only able to read the logs (not
modify/delete them). Once logs become full, the oldest records are overwritten.
Secure communication: The TOE protects communication between the EMS Server and the NMS,
the OMMs, the EMS Client and the CLI against masquerading, disclosure and modification
As shown in Figure 1-1, the TOE maintains communication between the EMS Server and
the:
l EMS Client
l CLI
l NMS
l OMMs
All of this communication is performedusing standard protocols (such as SSH, SNMPv3
and SFTP) that protect against disclosure, modification and masquerading.
6. Or a customisable role that has been assigned this right.
7. Or a customisable role that has been assigned this right.
1-6
SJ-20101109101114-019|2011-04-05(R1.0) ZTE CORPORATION
Chapter 1 ST Introduction
1.4 Excluded from the evaluation
The TOE is always delivered with anti-virus software installed on the EMS Server. As
anti-virus software is updated almost daily, this software was not included in the evaluation.
In addition, the TOE can be used in conjunction with a NetBackup server to support backup
and disaster recovery. This option was not assessed at all during the evaluation.
1-7
SJ-20101109101114-019|2011-04-05(R1.0) ZTE CORPORATION
NetNumen™ U31 Security Target
This page intentionally left blank.
1-8
SJ-20101109101114-019|2011-04-05(R1.0) ZTE CORPORATION
Chapter 2
Conformance Claims
This ST conforms to:
l CC, version 3.1R3, as defined by [CCp1], [CCp2], [CCp3] and [CEMe].
l CC Part 2 as CC Part 2 conformant
l CC Part 3 as CC Part 3 conformant
This ST conforms to no Protection Profile.
This ST conforms to EAL 2+ALC_FLR.2, and to no other packages.
2-1
SJ-20101109101114-019|2011-04-05(R1.0) ZTE CORPORATION
NetNumen™ U31 Security Target
This page intentionally left blank.
2-2
SJ-20101109101114-019|2011-04-05(R1.0) ZTE CORPORATION
Chapter 3
Security Problem Definition
Table of Contents
Organisational Security Policies .................................................................................3-1
Threats.......................................................................................................................3-1
Assumptions ..............................................................................................................3-2
3.1 Organisational Security Policies
The TOE is intended to be used by many different telecom operators. Each operator
will have a different wireless telecommunication network structure, different network
technologies (such as CDMA, WiMAX), and a different organizational structure with
different roles. The TOE must be able to support all of these operators. This leads to the
following organizational security policy:
OSP.FLEXIBLE_MANAGEMENT
The TOE must be able to support:
l a flexible role-based authorization framework with predefined and customizable roles,
both to manage the wireless telecommunications network, and manage the TOE itself.
l a flexible authentication framework, allowing the TOE to accept/reject users based on
username/password and a configurable subset of IP/MAC-address and time of login.
l flexible logging and auditing of events.
3.2 Threats
3.2.1 Assets and threat agents
The purpose of the TOE is to allow various roles to manage the TOE and use the
TOE to manage other equipment connected to the TOE (OMMs and equipment further
downstream).
The relevant asset of the TOE is the ability of the organization owning the TOE to do the
above properly.
This asset is threatened by the following threat agents:
1. TA.ROGUE_USER A TOE user seeking to act outside his/her authorization
2. TA.NETWORK An attacker with IP-access to the network that the TOE is part of
3. TA.PHYSICAL An attacker with physical access to the TOE
3-1
SJ-20101109101114-019|2011-04-05(R1.0) ZTE CORPORATION
NetNumen™ U31 Security Target
3.2.2 Threats
The combination of assets and threats gives rise to the following threats:
T.UNAUTHORISED
TA.ROGUE_USER performs actions on the TOE that he is not authorized to do.
T.AUTHORISED
TA.ROGUE_USER performs actions on the TOE that he is authorized to do, but these are
undesirable8 and it cannot be shown that this user was responsible.
T.UNKNOWN_USER
TA.NETWORK gains unauthorized access to the TOE and is able to use its functionality.
T. NETWORK
l Modify network traffic originating from / destined for the TOE or
l Impersonate the TOE
and thereby perform management actions on other entities on the network that the TOE
manages or provide false information to the NMS.
T.PHYSICAL_ATTACK
TA.PHYSICAL gains physical access to the TOE (either client or server) and is able to use
its functionality.
3.3 Assumptions
This Security Target uses a single assumption:
A.TRUSTED_NMS_AND_OMMs
It is assumed that the NMS and OMMs are trusted, and will not be used to attack the TOE.
8. For example, the user is allowed to modify data all over the telecommunications network to ensure that the
network keeps functioning properly, but he misuses this to delete all this data thereby ensuring the network no
longer operates properly.
3-2
SJ-20101109101114-019|2011-04-05(R1.0) ZTE CORPORATION
Chapter 4
Security Objectives
These security objectives describe how the threats described in the previous section will
be addressed. It is divided into:
l The Security Objectives for the TOE, describing what the TOE will do to address the
threats
l The Security Objectives for the Operational Environment, describing what other
entities must do to address the threats
A rationale that the combination of all of these security objectives indeed addresses the
threats may be found in section 7.1 of this Security Target.
Table of Contents
Security objectives for the TOE ..................................................................................4-1
Security objectives for the Operational Environment...................................................4-2
4.1 Security objectives for the TOE
O.AUTHORISE
The TOE shall support a flexible role-based authorization framework with predefined
and customizable roles. These roles can use the TOE to manage the wireless
telecommunications network, and manage the TOE itself. Each role allows a user to
perform certain actions, and the TOE shall ensure that users can only perform actions
when they have a role that allows this.
O.AUTHENTICATE
The TOE shall support a flexible authentication framework, allowing the TOE to
accept/reject users based on: username/password and a configurable subset of
IP/MAC-addressand time of login.
O.AUDITING
The TOE shall support flexible logging and auditing of events.
O.PROTECT_COMMUNICATION
The TOE shall:
l protect communication between the EMS Server and the NMS and OMMs against
disclosure, modification and masquerading
4-1
SJ-20101109101114-019|2011-04-05(R1.0) ZTE CORPORATION
NetNumen™ U31 Security Target
l protect communication between the EMS Client/CLI and the EMS Server against
disclosure and modification.
l authenticate itself to the NMS and OMMs to prevent other entities masquerading as
the TOE
l ensure that the NMS and OMMs authenticate themselves to prevent other entities
masquerading as the NMS and OMMs.
4.2 Security objectives for the Operational Environment
OE.SERVER_SECURITY
The customer shall ensure that the EMS Server shall be protected from physical attacks.
OE.CLIENT_SECURITY
The customer shall ensure that management workstations that are used to connect to the
EMS Server, either by CLI or by EMS Client, are protected from physical and logical attacks
that would allow attackers to subsequently:
l Disclose passwords or other sensitive information
l Hijack the client
l Execute man-in-the-middle attacks between client and EMS Server or similar attacks.
OE.TRUST&TRAIN_USERS
The customer shall ensure that roles are only assigned to users that are sufficiently
trustworthy and sufficiently trained to fulfill those roles.
OE.TRUSTED_NMS_AND_OMMs
The customer shall ensure that the NMS and OMMs can be trusted, so that they will not
be used to attack the TOE.
OE.TIME
At least one OMM connected to the TOE shall supply the TOE with reliable time.
4-2
SJ-20101109101114-019|2011-04-05(R1.0) ZTE CORPORATION
Chapter 5
Security Requirements
Table of Contents
Extended components definition.................................................................................5-1
Definitions ..................................................................................................................5-1
Security Functional Requirements..............................................................................5-2
Security Assurance Requirements..............................................................................5-7
Security Assurance Requirements Rationale..............................................................5-9
5.1 Extended components definition
There are no extended components.
5.2 Definitions
The following terms are used in the security requirements:
Subjects
l Administrator: a role with unrestricted access rights over all resources, including right
to modify critical information of accounts.
l Maintenance: a role with high access rights, but only to resources assigned to him.
l Operator: a role with limited access rights, but only to resources assigned to him.
l Supervisor: a role with only viewing rights, but only to resources assigned to him.
l Customized roles: these roles can be defined in the TOE by the Administrator (or by
a configurable role who has the right to create roles) and have customizable rights.
None of the roles above has full “root” access to the TOE. This is reserved for ZTE
maintenance staff that regularly service the TOE using the systems console, but this is
out of scope and not described further in this ST.
Objects
Resource: An entity managed by the TOE, such as an OMM, or network equipment further
downstream from an OMM, such as a base station. Also called network elements.
Operations
Operations in the TOE are divided into:
l Topology Management
l Fault Management
l Performance Management
l Configuration Management
l Maintenance Management
5-1
SJ-20101109101114-019|2011-04-05(R1.0) ZTE CORPORATION
NetNumen™ U31 Security Target
l Security Management
A more detailed overview of operations may be found in Appendix A. A full list of operations
is outside the scope of this ST, and can be found in the TOE Guidance.
The following notational conventions are used in the requirements. Operations
are indicated in bold, except refinements, which are indicated in bold italic. In
general refinements were applied to clarify requirements and/or make them more
readable. Iterations were indicating by adding three letters to the component name
(FTP_ITC.1.NMS).
5.3 Security Functional Requirements
The SFRs have been divided into six major groups:
l Identification & Authentication
l Roles & Authorisation
l Logging & Auditing
l Communication
l Management
5.3.1 Identification & Authentication
FIA_UID.2 User identification before any action
FIA_UID.2.1 The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified
l by username (in all cases), and
l by IP-address (if so configured for that user)
l by MAC-address (if so configured for that user)
and ensure that the user is allowed to login at this time (if so configured for that
user) before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
FIA_UAU.2 User authentication before any action
FIA_UAU.2.1 The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated by
password before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
FTA_SSL.3 TSF-initiated termination
FTA_SSL.3.1 The TSF shall terminate an interactive session
l when 9the allowed work time (if so configured for that user) expires, or
l when one of the user roles is being locked while he is logged in.
9. The sentence was refined to make it more readable.
5-2
SJ-20101109101114-019|2011-04-05(R1.0) ZTE CORPORATION
Chapter 5 Security Requirements
FIA_AFL.1 Authentication failure handling
FIA_AFL.1.1 The TSF shall detect when an administrator configurable positive integer
within 2-3 unsuccessful authentication attempts occur related to the same user account.
FIA_AFL.1.2When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has been
met, the TSF shall lock the account10
l until unlocked by the administrator, or
l until an administrator configurable positive integer within [24-infinity] of hours
have passed, if the account has not been set to permanent locking.
FIA_SOS.1 Verification of secrets
FIA_SOS.1.1 The TSF shall provide a mechanism to verify that passwords meet:
l At least 6 characters including three of the four types: number, small letter,
capital letter, other characters
l cannot be the same as the user name, the user name twice11, the username in
reverse12 or a common dictionary word
l can be configured to expire after a configurable amount of time < 6 months
l can be configured to be different from the previous 5 or more passwords when
changed
FTA_MCS.1 Basic limitation on multiple concurrent sessions
FTA_MCS.1.1 The TSF shall restrict the maximum number of concurrent sessions that
belong to the same user.
FTA_MCS.1.2 The TSF shall enforce, by default, a limit of 1 sessions per user and a
configurable limit of:
l 20 sessions for Mode13 1
l 50 sessions for Mode 2
l 100 sessions for Mode 3
l 200 sessions for Mode 4
for all users together.
5.3.2 Roles & Authorisation
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_SMR.1.1 The TSF shall maintain the roles:
l Administrator
10. Unless this account has been set to unlockable.
11. If the username is chang, “changchang” is not allowed.
12. If the username is chang, “gnahc” is not allowed.
13. Modes are hardware configurations. See the TOE description for details.
5-3
SJ-20101109101114-019|2011-04-05(R1.0) ZTE CORPORATION
NetNumen™ U31 Security Target
l Maintenance
l Operator
l Supervisor
l customized roles.
FMT_SMR.1.2 The TSF shall be able to associate users with one or more roles.
FDP_ACC.2 Complete access control
FDP_ACC.2.1 The TSF shall enforce the Role Policy on all roles and resources and all
operations among roles and resources and the TOE.
FDP_ACC.2.2 The TSF shall ensure that all operations between any role and any
resource are covered by an access control SFP.
FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control
FDP_ACF.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the Role Policy to objects based on the following:
all roles, all resources14.
FDP_ACF.1.2 The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among
roles and resources and the TOE is allowed:
l for the roles Administrator, Maintenance, Operator and Supervisor, as defined
in Appendix A
l for the customized roles, as defined by their customization
l the Administrator and appropriately customized roles can perform the functions
in FMT_SMF.115
l if a user has multiple roles, it is sufficient if only one role is allowed to do the
operation
l while a role is locked no user has this role
FDP_ACF.1.3, FDP_ACF.1.4 (refined away).
5.3.3 Logging & Auditing
The TOE maintains 3 separate logs:
l A security log for authentication events
l An operation log for operations performed by users
l A system log for EMS server tasks that are not directly related to users performing
operations
FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation
FAU_GEN.1.1 The TSF shall be able to generate an audit record of the following auditable
events:
14. The attributes have been refined away as there are no relevant attributes.
15. Note that these are also among the functions defined in Appendix A, but the list at FMT_SMF.1 is in more detail
as it is more relevant to the security of the TOE.
5-4
SJ-20101109101114-019|2011-04-05(R1.0) ZTE CORPORATION
Chapter 5 Security Requirements
1. Start-up and shutdown of the audit functions (in the system log)
2. (refined away)
In the security log:
l authentication success/failure
l user account is locked
l user account is unlocked
l user account is enabled
l user account is disabled
FAU_GEN.1.2 The TSF shall record within each audit record at least the following
information:
1. Date and time of the event, type of event, subject identity (if applicable), and the
outcome (success or failure) of the event; and
2. (refined away)
3. (in the system log): task start and end time) (in the security log): access method,
client IP address
FAU_SAR.1 Audit review
FAU_SAR.1.1 The TSF shall provide Administrator and suitably customized roles with
the capability to read operation log, system log and security log from the audit records.
FAU_SAR.1.2 The TSF shall provide the audit records in a manner suitable for the user
to interpret the information.
FAU_STG.1 Protected audit trail storage
FAU_STG.1.1 The TSF shall protect the stored audit records in the audit trail from
unauthorised deletion.
FAU_STG.1.2 The TSF shall be able to prevent unauthorised modifications to the stored
audit records in the audit trail.
FAU_STG.4 Prevention of audit data loss
FAU_STG.4.1 The TSF shall overwrite the oldest stored audit records16 if the audit trail
is full.
5.3.4 Communication
FDP_ITT.1 Basic internal transfer protection
FDP_ITT.1.1 The TSF shall17 prevent the disclosure or modification of all data when it
is transmitted between the EMS Client and the EMS Server.
16. The operation was completed to “take no other actions”, and this was subsequently refined away to make the
sentence more readable.
17. Reference to policy refined away since the policy would simply restate the requirement
5-5
SJ-20101109101114-019|2011-04-05(R1.0) ZTE CORPORATION
NetNumen™ U31 Security Target
FTP_ITC.1.CLM Inter-TSF trusted channel
FTP_ITC.1.1 The EMS Server shall provide a communication channel between itself and
the CLI that is logically distinct from other communication channels and provides assured
identification of its end points and protection of the channel data from modification or
disclosure.
FTP_ITC.1.2 The EMS Server shall permit the EMS Server and the CLI to initiate
communication via the trusted channel.
FTP_ITC.1.3 The EMS Server shall initiate communication via the trusted channel for
providing the results of commands to the CLI.
FTP_ITC.1.NMS Inter-TSF trusted channel
FTP_ITC.1.1 The EMS Server shall provide a communication channel between itself and
the NMS that is logically distinct from other communication channels and provides assured
identification of its end points and protection of the channel data from modification or
disclosure.
FTP_ITC.1.2 The EMS Server shall permit the EMS Server and the NMS to initiate
communication via the trusted channel.
FTP_ITC.1.3 The EMS Server shall initiate communication via the trusted channel for
transporting network performance data, configuration data and alarms to the NMS.
FTP_ITC.1.OMM Inter-TSF trusted channel
FTP_ITC.1.1 The EMS Server shall provide a communication channel between itself and
OMMs that is logically distinct from other communication channels and provides assured
identification of its end points and protection of the channel data from modification or
disclosure.
FTP_ITC.1.2 The EMS Server shall permit the EMS Server and the OMMs to initiate
communication via the trusted channel.
FTP_ITC.1.3 The EMS Server shall initiate communication via the trusted channel for
l commanding the OMMs
l requesting and receiving small amounts of data from the OMMs.
5.3.5 Management
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_SMF.1.1 The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management
functions:
5-6
SJ-20101109101114-019|2011-04-05(R1.0) ZTE CORPORATION
Chapter 5 Security Requirements
Management function Related to SFR18
Set whether a user can only login from certain IP-addresses, and if so, which
IP addresses
FIA_UID.2
Set whether a user can only login from certain MAC-addresses, and if so,
which MAC-addresses
FIA_UID.2
Set whether a user can only login at certain times, and if so, at which times FIA_UID.2
Set the time that a user may remain logged in while inactive FTA_SSL.3
Set whether a user is only allowed to work at certain times, and if so, at
which times
FTA_SSL.3
Set the number of allowed unsuccessful authentication attempts FIA_AFL.1
Set the number of hours that an account remains locked FIA_AFL.1
Set whether a user account should be:
l unlockable, or
l locked (either permanently or temporarily) when it exceeds the number of
allowed consecutive unsuccessful authentication attempts.
FIA_AFL.1
Unlock a user account FIA_AFL.1
Set whether a user password expires after a certain time, and if so, after
how long
FIA_SOS.1
Set whether the new password of a user must be different from the last n
passwords when the password is changed by the user and configure n
FIA_SOS.1
Set the maximum number of concurrent sessions for the same user FTA_MCS.1
Create, edit and delete customized roles FMT_SMR.1
Add or remove roles to/from users FMT_SMR.1
Add or delete types of events to be logged in the security log FAU_GEN.1.1
Create, edit and delete user accounts -
Disable/enable19 user accounts -
Lock/unlock20 roles -
5.4 Security Assurance Requirements
The assurance requirements are EAL2+ALC_FLR.2 and have been summarized in the
following table:
18. This column of the table is for reference only, and is not part of the SFR.
19. The effect is the same as locking of a user account, but disabling is actively done by the administrator, while
locking a user account is done by failing to authenticate too many times.
20. Locking and unlocking roles is done by the administrator. The effect is that any user with that role loses all access
rights provided by that role, unless he has those rights also by a non-locked role.
5-7
SJ-20101109101114-019|2011-04-05(R1.0) ZTE CORPORATION
NetNumen™ U31 Security Target
Assurance Components
Assurance Class
Identifier Name
ADV_ARC.1 Security architecture description
ADV_FSP.2 Security-enforcing functional
specification
ADV: Development
ADV_TDS.1 Basic design
AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
AGD: Guidance documents
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
ALC_CMC.2 Use of a CM system
ALC_CMS.2 Parts of the TOE CM coverage
ALC_DEL.1 Delivery procedures
ALC: Life-cycle support
ALC_FLR.2 Flaw reporting procedures
ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
ASE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
ASE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
ASE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
ASE: Security Target
evaluation
ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification
ATE_COV.1 Evidence of coverage
ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing
ATE: Tests
ATE_IND.2 Independent testing - sample
AVA: Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_VAN.2 Vulnerability analysis
The following refinements apply to the SARs:
l ADV_ARC.1 is refined with “The developer shall show, as part of the security
architecture description, that the firewall in the EMS Server is configured to
close all unnecessary ports.”
l ATE_COV.1 is refined with “The developer tests in the test documentation shall
include penetration testing of the appropriate TSFI with recent versions of the
OpenVAS and MetaSploit21penetration testing tools.”
21. See www.openvas.org and www.metasploit.com
5-8
SJ-20101109101114-019|2011-04-05(R1.0) ZTE CORPORATION
Chapter 5 Security Requirements
5.5 Security Assurance Requirements Rationale
The Security Assurance Requirements for this Security Target are EAL2+ALC_FLR.2. The
reasons for this choice are that:
l EAL 2 is deemed to provide a good balance between assurance and costs and is in
line with ZTE customer requirements.
l ALC_FLR.2 provides assurance that ZTE has a clear and functioning process of
accepting security flaws from users and updating the TOE when required. This is
also in line with ZTE customer requirements.
l The refinements are derived from ZTE customer requirements as well.
5-9
SJ-20101109101114-019|2011-04-05(R1.0) ZTE CORPORATION
NetNumen™ U31 Security Target
This page intentionally left blank.
5-10
SJ-20101109101114-019|2011-04-05(R1.0) ZTE CORPORATION
Chapter 6
TOE Summary Specification
Authentication: The TOE supports a flexible authentication framework, allowing the TOE to
accept/reject users based on: username/password and a configurable subset of IP/MAC-address
and time of login.
General:
This functionality is implemented through a standard login screen.
FIA_UID.2, FIA_UAU.2, FIA_AFL.1
Whenever a user of the TOE wishes to use the TOE, the user needs to use either the
graphical EMS-client or the CLI. The first action required by the user is then to log-in.
The TOE allows theAdministrator22 to configure (for each user), how that user must log-in:
l The user must always provide a username and a password
l Whether the user can only login from a predefined IP-addresses and/or MAC-address
l Whether the user is only allowed to be logged in during a certain time interval (e.g.
office hours)
l Whether an account is unlockable or not, and when an account is not unlockable:
à how many times a user can fail consecutive authentication attempts before that
account is locked
à how the account is unlocked by the Administrator or until a predefined time
elapses
FTA_MCS.1
Even if all of the above is correct, the user can still be denied access when:
l the user is already logged in
l too many other users are already logged in
FTA_SSL.3
The TOE will log a user out when:
l The Administrator locks one of the roles that that user currently has. The user can
subsequently log in again, but he will not have that role.
l The user is only allowed to be logged in during a certain time interval, and this interval
expires.
FIA_SOS.1
22. Or a customisable role that has been assigned this right. Note that this footnote applies to all uses of the term
“Administrator” in this section.
6-1
SJ-20101109101114-019|2011-04-05(R1.0) ZTE CORPORATION
NetNumen™ U31 Security Target
Whenever the user has to provide a new password to the TSF (all passwords expire in 6
months or less), these passwords have to meet certain rules to ensure that the passwords
cannot be easily guessed or broken by brute force. Passwords that do not meet these
rules are rejected by the TOE.
Authorization: The TOE supports a flexible role-based authorization framework with predefined and
customizable roles. These roles can use the TOE to manage the wireless telecommunications
network, and manage the TOE itself.
General
This functionality is implemented by the TOE not providing access to certain actions:
l by graying them out in the EMS Client
l by returning an error message in the CLI
or certain resources
l by not displaying these resources in the EMS Client
l by returning an error message in the CLI
for users whose roles do not allow this.
FMT_SMR.1, FDP_ACC.2, FDP_ACF.1, FMT_SMF.1
The TOE allows management of the telecommunications network by different users. The
TOE can be configured to give each user precisely the access to the resources of the
telecommunication network that user needs to do his job. To assist in this, the TOE has a
number of pre-defined roles:
l Administrator: a role with unrestricted access rights over all resources
l Maintenance: a role with high access rights, but only to resources assigned to him
l Operator: a role with limited access rights, but only to resources assigned to him
l Supervisor: a role with only viewing rights, but only to resources assigned to him
and can assign these roles to specific users.
The role of Administrator is a global role: he has all rights for all resources. The other
three roles are assigned per resource, that is: a user can have the Maintenance role for
one resource, but Operator role for another, and no role at all for all other resources.
Finally, theAdministrator23 can manage the TOE itself (see section 5.3.5 Management for a
list of management functions), through a series of configuration and management screens.
An example (how to lock a role) is given here:
23. Or a customisable role that has been assigned this right.
6-2
SJ-20101109101114-019|2011-04-05(R1.0) ZTE CORPORATION
Chapter 6 TOE Summary Specification
Note that none of the roles above has full “root” access to the TOE. This is reserved for
ZTE maintenance staff that regularly service the TOE using the systems console, but this
is out of scope for this ST.
Accounting: The TOE supports flexible logging and auditing of events.
General
This functionality is implemented by a set of screens like this log viewing screen:
FAU_GEN.1, FAU_SAR.1, FAU_STG.1, FAU_STG.4
The TOE maintains 3 separate logs:
l A security log for authentication events
l An operation log for operations performed by users
l A system log for server tasks that are not directly related to users performing
operations (including starting and stopping the TOE)
The logs are only accessible to the Administrator24，who is only able to read the logs (not
modify/delete them). Once logs become full, the oldest records are overwritten.
24. Or a customisable role that has been assigned this right.
6-3
SJ-20101109101114-019|2011-04-05(R1.0) ZTE CORPORATION
NetNumen™ U31 Security Target
Secure communication: The TOE protects communication between the EMS Server and the NMS,
OMMs, EMS Client and CLI masquerading, disclosure and modification
FTP_ITC.1.CLM, FTP_ITC.1.NMS, FTP_ITC.1.OMM, FDP_ITT.1
As shown in Figure 1-1, the TOE maintains communication between the EMS Server and
the:
l EMS Client
l CLI
l NMS
l OMMs
All of these use standard protocols (such as SSH, SNMPv3 and SFTP) that protect against
disclosure, modification and masquerading. In addition, the EMS Server obtains a NTP
time signal from one of its OMMs, using the standard MD5-authentication to protect against
masquerading and modification (disclosure is not relevant as time is public).
6-4
SJ-20101109101114-019|2011-04-05(R1.0) ZTE CORPORATION
Chapter 7
Rationales
Table of Contents
Security Objectives Rationale.....................................................................................7-1
Security Functional Requirements Rationale ..............................................................7-3
Dependencies ............................................................................................................7-4
7.1 Security Objectives Rationale
Assumptions/OSPs/ThreatsObjectives
OSP.FLEXIBLE_MANAGEMENT
The TOE must be able to support:
l a flexible role-based authorization framework
with predefined and customizable roles, both
to manage the wireless telecommunications
network, and to manage the TOE itself.
l a flexible authentication framework, allowing
the TOE to accept/reject users based on
username/password and a configurable
subset of: IP/MAC-address, time of login.
l flexible logging and auditing of events.
This OSP is primarily implemented by the
combination of three security objectives:
l O.AUTHORISE that restates the first item of
the OSP
l O.AUTHENTICATE that restates the second
item of the OSP, and
l O.AUDITING that restates the third bullet of
the OSP
Additionally, to perform logging (part of the
third item), the TOE must have a time source.
OE.TIME states that this time source will be one
of the OMMs connected to the TOE
T.UNAUTHORISED
TA.ROGUE_USER performs actions on the TOE
that he is not authorized to do.
This threat is countered by three security
objectives:
l OE.TRUST&TRAIN that ensures that only
users that are properly trusted and trained
will be able to gain access to certain roles
l O.AUTHENTICATE that ensures users are
properly authenticated so the TOE knows
which roles they have
l O.AUTHORISE that ensures that only users
with certain roles can do certain actions.
So the only way that a user can perform a
management action is when he has a role,
and the only way he can get this role is if he is
properly trained and trusted. Therefore this threat
is countered.
7-1
SJ-20101109101114-019|2011-04-05(R1.0) ZTE CORPORATION
NetNumen™ U31 Security Target
Assumptions/OSPs/ThreatsObjectives
T.AUTHORISED
TA.ROGUE_USER performs actions on the
TOE that he is authorized to do, but these are
undesirable and it cannot be shown that this user
was responsible.
This threat is countered by:
l OE.TRUST&TRAIN that ensures that only
users that are properly trusted and trained
will be able to gain access to certain roles.
This should go a long way to prevent the
threat from being realized.
l Should this prove insufficient, O.AUDITING
will ensure that the actions of the user can
be traced back to him.
Together these two security objectives counter
the threat.
T.UNKNOWN_USER
TA.NETWORK gains unauthorized access to the
TOE and is able to use its functionality.
This threat is countered by:
l OE.CLIENT_SECURITY, preventing the
attacker to gain access to the clients
l O.AUTHENTICATE, preventing the attacker
to gain access to the EMS Server
Together these two security objectives counter
the threat.
T. NETWORK
TA.NETWORK is able to:
l Modify traffic on the network or
l Impersonate the TOE
and thereby perform management actions on
other entities on the network that the TOE
manages or provide false information to the NMS.
This threat is countered by O.PROTECT_COM-
MUNICATION that protects traffic between
the TOE and the entities that are managed to
the TOE against disclosure, modification and
masquerading.
The same O. PROTECT_COMMUNICATION
protects traffic between the TOE and the
clients against disclosure, modification and
masquerading.
Therefore this threat is countered.
T.PHYSICAL_ATTACK
TA.PHYSICAL gains physical access to the TOE
(either client or server) and is able to use its
functionality.
This threat is countered by two security
objectives:
l OE.SERVER_SECURITY stating that the
server part of the TOE must be protected
from physical attack
l OE.CLIENT_SECURITY stating that the
client part of the TOE must be protected from
physical attack
Together these two counter the entire threat.
A.TRUSTED_NMS_AND_OMMs
It is assumed that the NMS and OMMs are
trusted, and will not be used to attack the TOE.
This assumption is upheld by the objective
OE.TRUSTED_NMS_AND_OMMs which
restates the assumption.
7-2
SJ-20101109101114-019|2011-04-05(R1.0) ZTE CORPORATION
Chapter 7 Rationales
7.2 Security Functional Requirements Rationale
Security objectives SFRs addressing the security objectives
O.AUTHORISE
The TOE shall support a flexible
role-based authorization framework
with predefined and customizable
roles. These roles can use the
TOE to manage the wireless
telecommunications network, and
manage the TOE itself. Each role
allows a user to perform certain
actions, and the TOE shall ensure
that users can only perform actions
when they have a role that allows
this.
This objective is met by:
l FMT_SMR.1 stating the predefined and customizable
roles
l FDP_ACC.2 and FDP_ACF.1 defining a Role Policy,
which states how the various roles manage the network
and the TOE. These also state that only roles can
perform actions (operations on resources) and therefore
users can only do this when they have the correct role
l FMT_SMF.1 configuring all of the above
Together, these SFRs support a flexible, role-based
authorization framework.
O.AUTHENTICATE
The TOE shall support a flexible
authentication framework, allowing
the TOE to accept/reject users
based on: username/password
and a configurable subset of
IP/MAC-address, time of login.
This objective is met by:
l FIA_UID.2 stating that identification will be done by
username, password, IP/MAC-address, login time
l FIA_UAU.2 stating that users must be authenticated
l FIA_SOS.1 stating that passwords must have a minimum
quality
l FIA_AFL.1 stating what happens when authentication
fails repeatedly
l FTA_SSL.3 logging users off when they are no longer
allowed to work or when their role is locked
l FTA_MCS.1 preventing a user of having too many
sessions or all users together having too many sessions
l FMT_SMF.1 configuring all of the above
Together, these SFRs support a flexible authentication
framework.
O.AUDITING
The TOE shall support flexible
logging and auditing events.
This objective is met by:
l FAU_GEN.1 showing which events are logged in the
security log and system log
l FAU_SAR.1 showing that the logged events can be
audited and by whom
l FAU_STG.1 showing how the audit logs are protected
l FAU_STG.4 stating what happens when the audit log
becomes full
l FMT_SMF.1 configuring all of the above
7-3
SJ-20101109101114-019|2011-04-05(R1.0) ZTE CORPORATION
NetNumen™ U31 Security Target
Security objectives SFRs addressing the security objectives
Together, these SFRs support a flexible logging and auditing
framework.
O.PROTECT_COMMUNICATION
The TOE shall:
l protect communication between
the EMS Server and the NMS
and OMMs against disclosure,
modification and masquerading
l protect communication between
EMS Client/CLI and the EMS
Server against disclosure and
modification
l authenticate itself to the NMS
and OMMs to prevent other
entities masquerading as the
TOE
l ensure that the NMS and
OMMs authenticate themselves
to prevent other entities
masquerading as the NMS and
OMMs
This objective is met by:
l FTP_ITC.1.NMS protecting the communication between
TSF and NMS from modification and disclosure and
ensuring that TSF and NMS authenticate (“assured
identification”) themselves to each other, thus preventing
masquerading
l FTP_ITC.1.OMM protecting the communication between
TSF and OMMs from modification and disclosure and
ensuring that TSF and OMMs authenticate (“assured
identification”) themselves to each other
l FTP_ITC.1.CLM protecting the communications between
CLI and the EMS Server from modification and disclosure
of data
l FDP_ITT.1 protecting the communications between EMS
Client and EMS Server from modification and disclosure
of data
Together these SFRs cover all parts of the objective.
7.3 Dependencies
SFR Dependencies
FAU_GEN.1 FPT_STM.1: met in the environment by OE.TIME
FAU_SAR.1 FAU_GEN.1: met
FAU_STG.1 FAU_GEN.1: met
FAU_STG.4 FAU_GEN.1: met
FAU_STG.1: met
FDP_ACC.2 FDP_ACF.1: met
FDP_ACF.1 FDP_ACC.1: met by FDP_ACC.2
FMT_MSA.3: not met, since there are no security attributes
FDP_ITT.1 FDP_ACC.1 or FDP_IFC.1: not met, as the policy was refined
away, the dependency is unnecessary.
FIA_AFL.1 FIA_UAU.1: met by FIA_UAU.2
FIA_SOS.1 -
FIA_UAU.2 FIA_UID.1: met by FIA_UID.2
7-4
SJ-20101109101114-019|2011-04-05(R1.0) ZTE CORPORATION
Chapter 7 Rationales
SFR Dependencies
FIA_UID.2 -
FMT_SMF.1 -
FMT_SMR.1 FIA_UID.1: met by FIA_UID.2
FTA_MCS.1 FIA_UID.1: met by FIA_UID.2
FTA_SSL.3 -
FTP_ITC.1.CLM -
FTP_ITC.1.NMS -
FTP_ITC.1.OMM -
FMT_SMF.1 -
SAR Dependencies
EAL 2 All dependencies within an EAL are satisfied
ALC_FLR.2 -
7-5
SJ-20101109101114-019|2011-04-05(R1.0) ZTE CORPORATION
NetNumen™ U31 Security Target
This page intentionally left blank.
7-6
SJ-20101109101114-019|2011-04-05(R1.0) ZTE CORPORATION
Appendix A
Roles and Operations
This Appendix provides a graphical overview of which roles can do what operations for the
various roles.
A.1 Administrator
A.2 Maintenance
A-1
SJ-20101109101114-019|2011-04-05(R1.0) ZTE CORPORATION
NetNumen™ U31 Security Target
A.3 Operator
A.4 Supervisor
A-2
SJ-20101109101114-019|2011-04-05(R1.0) ZTE CORPORATION
Figures
Figure 1-1 The TOE in its environment......................................................................1-2
I