KECS-CR-12-70
WAPPLES v4.0
Certification Report
Certification No.: KECS-NISS-0426-2012
2012. 11. 9
IT Security Certification Center
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History of Creation and Revision
No. Date
Revised
Pages
Description
00 2012.10.12 -
Certification report for WAPPLES v4.0
- First documentation
01 2012.11.9 5, 7 evaluation completion date
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This document is the certification report for WAPPLES v4.0 of PENTA
SECURITY SYSTEMS INC.
The Certification Body
IT Security Certification Center
The Evaluation Facility
Korea System Assurance, Inc. (KoSyAs)
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Table of Contents
1. Executive Summary.............................................................................................5
2. Identification.........................................................................................................7
3. Security Policy .....................................................................................................8
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope............................................................8
5. Architectural Information ..................................................................................10
6. Documentation...................................................................................................13
7. TOE Testing........................................................................................................13
8. Evaluated Configuration....................................................................................14
9. Results of the Evaluation ..................................................................................14
9.1 Security Target Evaluation (ASE) ........................................................14
9.2 Life Cycle Support Evaluation (ALC) ..................................................15
9.3 Guidance Documents Evaluation (AGD).............................................16
9.4 Development Evaluation (ADV) ...........................................................16
9.5 Test Evaluation (ATE)...........................................................................17
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment (AVA)..........................................................18
9.7 Evaluation Result Summary ................................................................18
10. Recommendations.............................................................................................19
11. Security Target ...................................................................................................20
12. Acronyms and Glossary....................................................................................20
13. Bibliography.......................................................................................................22
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1. Executive Summary
This report describes the certification result drawn by the certification body on the
results of the EAL4 evaluation of WAPPLES v4.0 developed by PENTA SECURITY
SYSTEMS INC. with reference to the Common Criteria for Information Technology
Security Evaluation (“CC” hereinafter)[1]. It describes the evaluation result and its
soundness and conformity.
WAPPLES v4.0 (hereinafter TOE) is a Web Application Firewall (WAF) that securely
protects the web server and web application by detecting and blocking attacks in
advance by judging normality web traffics. The TOE is a software type that is delivered
to the final user as loaded on a dedicated hardware model of WAPPLES-100 eco,
WAPPLES-1000 Type2 and WAPPLES-1000 Type2 Plus.
The TOE is composed of a “detection engine” from external web attacks which protects
the web application and the web server located in the web zone by analyzing the web
traffic entering from outside and a “management console” which provides the security
management functions such as security policies and the TOE operational environment
setting to the remote administrator.
The evaluation of the TOE has been carried out by KoSyAs and completed on Oct. 19,
2012. This report grounds on the evaluation technical report (ETR)[2] that KoSyAs had
submitted and the Security Target (ST)[3].
The ST has no conformance claim to the Protection Profile (PP). All Security Assurance
Requirements (SARs) in the ST are based only upon assurance component in CC Part
3, and the TOE satisfies the SARs of Evaluation Assurance Level EAL4. Therefore the
ST and the resulting TOE is CC Part 3 conformant. The Security Functional
Requirements (SFRs) are based only upon functional components in CC Part 2, and
the TOE satisfies the SFRs in the ST. Therefore the ST and the resulting TOE is CC
Part 2 conformant.
The TOE operational environment is classified into an “Inline mode [Figure 1]” and a
“Reverse proxy mode [Figure 2],” depending on the location of its installation and
operation.
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[Figure 1] Inline mode
[Figure 2] Reverse proxy mode
Certification Validity: The certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the
government of Republic of Korea or by any other organization that recognizes or gives
effect to the certificate, and no warranty of the IT Product by the government of
Republic of Korea or by any other organization that recognizes or gives effect to the
certificate, is either expressed or implied
Certification Report Page 7
2. Identification
The TOE title is WAPPLES v4.0, consisting of the following components and related
guidance documents and they are identified as described in [Table 1].
Type Identifier Delivery Form
SW WAPPLES v4.0.5 Detection engine 4.0.2 Software loaded
on a Hardware
Management Console 4.0.3 Software
DOC WAPPLES v4.0 Operation and Installation Guidance v4.0 Booklet
[Table 1] TOE identification
[Table 2] summarizes additional information for scheme, developer, sponsor, evaluation
facility, certification body, etc..
Scheme Korea Evaluation and Certification Guidelines for IT Security
(September. 1, 2009)[4]
Korea Evaluation and Certification Regulation for IT Security
(July 20, 01, 2011)[5]
TOE WAPPLES v4.0
Common Criteria Common Criteria for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 3, CCMB-2009-07-001 ~
CCMB-2009-07-003, July 2009
EAL EAL 4
Developer PENTA SECURITY SYSTEMS INC.
Sponsor PENTA SECURITY SYSTEMS INC.
Evaluation Facility Korea System Assurance, Inc. (KoSyAs)
Completion Date of
Evaluation
October 19, 2012
Certification Body IT Security Certification Center
[Table 2] Additional identification information
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3. Security Policy
The TOE complies with security policies defined in the ST [3] by security objectives and
security requirements. The TOE provides the security functions to protect web server
and web application by detecting and blocking web attack based on main security
features as follows :
 Web request and response analysis for web security
 Access control of the network level
 Provision of security management function
 Provision of traceability in case of security related events
 TSF and TSF data protection
In addition, the TOE provides security features to identify and authenticate authorized
users, to generate audit records of the auditable events including start-up and shut-
down of audit functions, and to securely manage the TOE including setting of detection
rules.
For more details refer to the ST [3].
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The following assumptions describe the security aspects of of the environment in which
the TOE will be used or is intended to be used in order to limit the scope of security
consideration(for the detailed and precise definition of the assumption refer to the ST
[3], chapter 3.4) :
 It is assumed that the TOE is located in a physically secure environment where
only authorized administrator can access
 It is assumed that the authorized administrator performs the latest security
update of the TOE S/W platform (e.g. operating system, web browser) and,
when changing the network configuration, keeps the TOE operational
environment to be consistent with the security policy
 It is assumed that administrators who manage the TOE have no malicious
intentions are appropriately trained and follow all administrator guidance
 It is assumed that the database used by the TOE operates stably and is
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securely configured and managed
 It is assumed that the authorized administrator shall operate the firewall in a
manner which only the web traffic among all imported traffics are sent to the
web server by passing through the TOE
 It is assumed that the TOE and the CLI console are connected directly
An external threatening agent is an unauthorized user of the TOE and the web client
that causes a threat to the website and the application. The threatening agent has the
enhanced-basic level of knowledge, resources, and motives. It may damage the
resources of the target website by easily obtaining the vulnerability information and the
attacking tools that may abuse the operational system and the application; it may also
damage the TOE assets by using unauthorized methods. The TOE protects its asset
from these obvious threats to vulnerabilities. For the detailed information on the lists of
threats, refer to the ST [3], chapter 3.2:
For any other threat not included in this list, the evaluation results of the product
security properties and the associated certificate, do not guarantee any resistance.
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5. Architectural Information
This chapter explains the logical scope of the TOE and the main components as shown
in [Figure 3].
The TOE is composed of a software-form detection engine that is delivered to the user
by being loaded on a dedicated hardware, a software-form management console that is
installed on the administrator PC and a guidance document that is delivered as a form
of a booklet. The management console is included in the detection engine installation
image to be delivered and the administrator access the detection engine and
downloads and installs the management console on the administrator PC.
[Figure 3] Logical scope of the TOE
The management console is operated in the .NET Framework environment of the
administrator’s PC. The TOE accesses the start-up web page of the security engine
through the internet explorer in order to operate the management console and
installs the management console on the administrator’s PC through the web page
and operates it.
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The management console provides a security management function in the form of
GUI to an authorized administrator enabling the TOE operation. The SSL
cryptography channel that is developed in .NET Framework and Apache HTTP
server is used when the authorized administrator requests through a management
console or for the secure transmission of set TSF data.
The security functions provided by the management console are as follows :
 Remote Administrator Login
 Security management
 Monitoring
Detection engine protects the web server and web application based on
WEBCLIENT SFP and WEB SFP saved in PostgreSQL. In addition, it provides the
security management interface such as the network setting to the authorized local
administrator, and operates self-protection and audit data protection for the security
of TOE security functions,
The security functions provided by the security engine are as follows :
 WEB SFP-based Web Attack Block, Protection of Web Contents and Web
Security Elements
 WEBCLIENT SFP-based Unauthorized Access Block
 Self-Protection and Audit Data Protection Function
 CLI Security Management Function
For detailed information on security functions, please refer to chapters 1.3, 1.4.2 and
7 of ST [3].
The minimum specifications for the administrator PC on which the management
console is installed and operated are as follows :
[Table 3] HW specification for management console
Components Description
CPU Intel Pentium4 1.6 GHz or above
HDD 100 GB or above
Memory 1 GB or above
Network interface 100/1000 Mbps
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The TOE hardware that operates the detection engine includes 100 eco, 1000 Type2,
and 1000 Type2 Plus. Those specifications are as follows :
[Table 4] HW specification for detection engine
Hardware
Model
Components Description
WAPPLES-
100 eco
CPU Intel Core2 Quad 2.66 GHz
HDD 500 GB
Memory 4 GB
Network interface
▪ Management port : 10/100/1000 BaseTX * 2
▪ Service port : 10/100/1000 BaseTX * 8
WAPPLES-
1000 Type2
CPU Intel Xeon Quad Core 2.33 GHz * 2
HDD 500 GB
Memory 8 GB
Network interface
▪ Management port : 10/100/1000 BaseTX *2
▪ Service port:
- 10/100/1000 BaseTX * 8
- 1000 BaseSFP * 2
▪ Optional Service port:
- 1000 Base Optical * 2
WAPPLES-
1000 Type2
Plus
CPU Intel Xeon Quad Core 2.50 GHz * 2
HDD 500 GB
Memory 8 GB
Network interface
▪ Management port : 10/100/1000 BaseTX *2
▪ Service port:
- 10/100/1000 BaseTX * 8
- 1000 BaseSFP * 2
▪ Optional Service port:
- 1000 Base Optical * 2
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6. Documentation
The following documentation is evaluated and provided with the TOE by the developer
to the customer.
Identifier Release Date
WAPPLES v4.0 Operation and Installation
Guidance
v4.0 September 28, 2012
[Table 5] Documentation
7. TOE Testing
The developer took a testing approach deriving test cases regarding the TOE
components and security functions including detection rules against web vulnerabilities,
which are described in the tests. Each test case includes the following information :
 Test no. and conductor: Identifier of each test case and its conductor
 Test purpose: Includes the security functions and modules to be tested
 Test configuration: Details about the test configuration
 Test procedure detail: Detailed procedures for testing each security function
 Expected result: Result expected from testing
 Actual result: Result obtained by performing testing
 Test result compared to the expected result: Comparison between the
expected and actual result
The developer tested all the TSF and analyzed testing results according to the
assurance component ATE_COV.2. This means that the developer tested all the TSFI
defined for each life cycle state of the TOE, and demonstrated that the TSF behaves as
described in the functional specification.
The developer tested both subsystems (including their interactions) and all the SFR-
enforcing modules (including their interfaces), and analyzed testing results according to
the assurance component ATE_DPT.1
The evaluator has installed the product using the same evaluation configuration and
tools as the developer's test and performed all tests provided by the developer. The
evaluator has confirmed that, for all tests, the expected results had been consistent
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with the actual results. In addition, the evaluator conducted penetration testing based
upon test cases devised by the evaluator resulting from the independent search for
potential vulnerabilities. The penetration testing approach includes web vulnerabilities
provided by the certification body and high-level techniques such as fuzzing and source
code static analysis using Fortify tool. The evaluator testing effort, the testing approach,
configuration, depth, and results are summarized in the ETR [2].
8. Evaluated Configuration
The evaluated configuration of the TOE is identified by the name, major version and
minor version as mentioned in [Table 2]. Especially, the detection engine will be
delivered on three different types of hardware platform denoted by model names of
WAPPLES-100 eco, WAPPLES-1000 Type2 and WAPPLES-1000 Type2 Plus.
For information about type names in relation to the hardware platform and software,
please read chapters 1.3 and 1.4 of ST [3].
9. Results of the Evaluation
The evaluation facility provided the evaluation result in the ETR [2] which references
Single Evaluation Reports for each assurance requirement and Observation Reports.
The evaluation result was based on the CC [1] and CEM [6].
As a result of the evaluation, the verdict PASS is assigned to all assurance
components of EAL 4.
9.1 Security Target Evaluation (ASE)
The ST Introduction correctly identifies the ST and the TOE, and describes the TOE in
a narrative way at three levels of abstraction (TOE reference, TOE overview and TOE
description), and these three descriptions are consistent with each other. Therefore the
verdict PASS is assigned to ASE_INT.1.
The Conformance Claim properly describes how the ST and the TOE conform to the
CC and how the ST conforms to PPs and packages. Therefore the verdict PASS is
assigned to ASE_CCL.1.
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The Security Problem Definition clearly defines the security problem intended to be
addressed by the TOE and its operational environment. Therefore the verdict PASS is
assigned to ASE_SPD.1.
The Security Objectives adequately and completely address the security problem
definition and the division of this problem between the TOE and its operational
environment is clearly defined. Therefore the verdict PASS is assigned to ASE_OBJ.2.
The ST doesn't define any extended component. Therefore the verdict PASS is
assigned to ASE_ECD.1.
The Security Requirements is defined clearly and unambiguously, and it is internally
consistent and the SFRs meet the security objectives of the TOE. Therefore the verdict
PASS is assigned to ASE_REQ.2.
The TOE Summary Specification addresses all SFRs, and it is consistent with other
narrative descriptions of the TOE. Therefore the verdict PASS is assigned to
ASE_TSS.1.
Thus, the ST is sound and internally consistent, and suitable to be use as the basis for
the TOE evaluation.
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class ASE.
9.2 Life Cycle Support Evaluation (ALC)
The developer has used a documented model of the TOE life-cycle. Therefore the
verdict PASS is assigned to ALC_LCD.1.
The developer clearly identifies the TOE and its associated configuration items, that the
ability to modify these items is properly controlled by automated tool, and that as a
result, the errors caused by someone's mistake or negligence in the configuration
management system decrease. Therefore the verdict PASS is assigned to ALC_CMC.4.
The configuration management document verifies that the configuration list includes
the TOE, the TOE elements, the TOE implementation representation, security flaws,
evaluation deliverables, and development tools. Therefore, the verdict of ALC_CMS.4
is the Pass.
The developer's security controls on the development environment are adequate to
provide the confidentiality and integrity of the TOE design and implementation that is
necessary to ensure that secure operation of the TOE is not compromised. Therefore
the verdict PASS is assigned to ALC_DVS.1.
The delivery documentation describes all procedures used to maintain security of the
TOE when distributing the TOE to the user. Therefore the verdict PASS is assigned to
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ALC_DEL.1.
Thus, the security procedures that the developer uses during the development and
maintenance of the TOE are adequate. These procedures include the life-cycle model
used by the developer, the configuration management, the security measures used
throughout TOE development, and the delivery activity.
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class ALC.
9.3 Guidance Documents Evaluation (AGD)
The procedures and steps for the secure preparation of the TOE have been
documented and result in a secure configuration. Therefore the verdict PASS is
assigned to AGD_PRE.1.
The operational user guidance describes for each user role the security functionality
and interfaces provided by the TSF, provides instructions and guidelines for the secure
use of the TOE, addresses secure procedures for all modes of operation, facilitates
prevention and detection of insecure TOE states, or it is misleading or unreasonable.
Therefore the verdict PASS is assigned to AGD_OPE.1.
Thus, the guidance documents are adequately describing the user can handle the TOE
in a secure manner. The guidance documents take into account the various types of
users (e.g. those who accept, install, administrate or operate the TOE) whose incorrect
actions could adversely affect the security of the TOE or of their own data.
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class AGD.
9.4 Development Evaluation (ADV)
The security architecture document is structured to ensure that TSF cannot be
compromised or bypassed, and appropriately describes that the TSF which provides
the security domain separates these domains from each other. Therefore, the verdict of
ADV_ARC.1 is the Pass.
The functional specifications specifies the objective, way of using, input parameter,
operation, and error message to the TSFI(SFR-enforcing, SFR-supporting, and SFR-
non-interfering) at equal detail level, and accurately and completely describes the TSFI.
Therefore, the verdict of ADV_FSP.4 is the Pass.
The implementation representation is adequate to be used for other evaluators’
analysis, and is sufficient to understand the detailed internal workings. Therefore, the
verdict of ADV_IMP.1 is the Pass.
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The TOE design description provides environment and overall TSF description to
describe TSF, provides sufficient TOE description with respect to subsystem to
determine the TSF boundary, and provides description about the TSF internals with
respect to module. Also, it also provides detailed description of the SFR-enforcing
module and sufficient information about the SFR-supporting, and SFR-non-interfering
modules to determine that the SFRs are completely and accurately implemented.
Hence the TOE design provides the description about the implementation
representation. Therefore, the verdict of ADV_TDS.3 is the Pass.
Therefore, the security architecture document (the TSF architecture attribute which
describes how to the TSF security enforcement is not compromised or bypassed),
functional specification(TSF interface description), design description and
implementation representation(architecture description about how the TSF behaves to
execute the functions related to the claimed SFR), and implementation
representation(description of source code level), which are included in the development
documentation, are adequate to give understanding about how the TSF satisfies the
SFRs, and how these SFRs implementation are not damaged or bypassed.
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class ADV.
9.5 Test Evaluation (ATE)
The developer has tested all of the TSFIs, and that the developer's test coverage
evidence shows correspondence between the tests identified in the test documentation
and the TSFIs described in the functional specification. Therefore the verdict PASS is
assigned to ATE_COV.2.
The developer has tested the TSF subsystems against the TOE design and the
security architecture description. Therefore the verdict PASS is assigned to ATE_DPT.1.
The developer correctly performed and documented the tests in the test documentation.
Therefore the verdict PASS is assigned to ATE_FUN.1.
By independently testing a subset of the TSF, the evaluator confirmed that the TOE
behaves as specified in the design documentation, and had confidence in the
developer's test results by performing all of the developer's tests. Therefore the verdict
PASS is assigned to ATE_IND.2.
Thus, the TOE behaves as described in the ST and as specified in the evaluation
evidence (described in the ADV class).
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class ATE.
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9.6 Vulnerability Assessment (AVA)
By penetrating testing, the evaluator confirmed that there are no exploitable
vulnerabilities by attackers possessing enhanced-basic attack potential in the
operational environment of the TOE. Therefore the verdict PASS is assigned to
AVA_VAN.3.
Thus, potential vulnerabilities identified, during the evaluation of the development and
anticipated operation of the TOE or by other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses), don’t
allow attackers possessing enhanced-basic attack potential to violate the SFRs.
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class AVA.
9.7 Evaluation Result Summary
Assurance
Class
Assurance
Component
Evaluator
Action
Elements
Verdict
Evaluator
Action
Elements
Assurance
Component
Assurance
Class
ASE ASE_INT.1 ASE_INT.1.1E PASS PASS PASS
ASE_INT.1.2E PASS
ASE_CCL.1 ASE_CCL.1.1E PASS PASS
ASE_SPD.1 ASE_SPD.1.1E PASS PASS
ASE_OBJ.2 ASE_OBJ.2.1E PASS PASS
ASE_ECD.1 ASE_ECD.1.1E PASS PASS
ASE_ECD.1.2E PASS
ASE_REQ.2 ASE_REQ.2.1E PASS PASS
ASE_TSS.1 ASE_TSS.1.1E PASS PASS
ASE_TSS.1.2E PASS
ALC ALC_LCD.1 ALC_LCD.1.1E PASS PASS PASS
ALC_CMS.4 ALC_CMS.4.1E PASS PASS
ALC_CMC.4 ALC_CMC.4.1E PASS PASS
ALC_DVS.1 ALC_DVS.1.1E PASS PASS
ALC_DVS.1.2E PASS
ALC_DEL.1 ALC_DEL.1.1E PASS PASS
AGD AGD_PRE.1 AGD_PRE.1.1E PASS PASS PASS
AGD_PRE.1.2E PASS PASS
AGD_OPE.1 AGD_OPE.1.1E PASS PASS
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Assurance
Class
Assurance
Component
Evaluator
Action
Elements
Verdict
Evaluator
Action
Elements
Assurance
Component
Assurance
Class
ADV ADV_TDS.3 ADV_TDS.3.1E PASS PASS PASS
ADV_TDS.3.2E PASS PASS
ADV_FSP.4 ADV_FSP.4.1E PASS PASS
ADV_FSP.4.2E PASS
ADV_ARC.1 ADV_ARC.1.1E PASS PASS
ATE ATE_COV.2 ATE_COV.2.1E PASS PASS PASS
ATE_DPT.1 ATE_DPT.1.1E PASS PASS
ATE_FUN.1 ATE_FUN.1.1E PASS PASS
ATE_IND.2 ATE_IND.2.1E PASS PASS
ATE_IND.2.2E PASS
ATE_IND.2.3E PASS
AVA AVA_VAN.3 AVA_VAN.3.1E PASS PASS PASS
AVA_VAN.3.2E PASS
AVA_VAN.3.3E PASS
AVA_VAN.3.4E PASS
[Table 6] Evaluation Result Summary
10. Recommendations
The TOE security functionality can be ensured only in the evaluated TOE operational
environment with the evaluated TOE configuration, thus the TOE shall be operated by
complying with the followings:
 The TOE shall be set and operated within a controlled access facility physically
available to authorized administrators only, and the detection engine shall not
allow any other remote management from externals except for management
console.
 The administrator shall be able to guarantee the reliability and stability for an
operation system through periodical security updates of the TOE operation
system.
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 The administrator shall maintain and counter the security of web server against
vulnerabilities of OWASP TOP 10 which cannot be countered by the TOE.
11. Security Target
The WAPPLES v4.0 Security Target v4.0, September. 28, 2012 [3] is included in this
report by reference.
12. Acronyms and Glossary
CC Common Criteria
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
PP Protection Profile
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SFR Security Functional Requirement
SSL Secure Socket Layer
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
SFP Security Functional Policies
Management Console TOE component used by a remote administrator for the
operation of security management functions such as
establishing of security policies and confirming of audit
data
Detection Engine TOE component that securely protects the web
application and web server by analyzing and detecting
the externally imported web traffics by receiving the
remote administrator set security policies and
operational environment information from Management
Console, and blocking harmful web traffics
Bridge Mode The operation mode in which a web client’s IP is
preserved as the web application intrusion block system
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is constructed as a firewall
Reverse proxy mode The operation mode in which a web firewall operates as
a type of web proxy and the communication between the
web server and the web client passes through the web
firewall via the changes of the DNS setting
Transparent proxy mode The operation mode in which a web firewall operates as
a type of web proxy but takes in the Proxy IP by
selecting a physical composition mode similar to the
bridge mode
Hidden field The field hidden inside the HTML that is not visible in the
web browsers but used to deliver the data
SQL syntax validator The syntax analyzer, among the web attack detection
rules that are provided by the TOE, which is used to
detect the attack syntax by analyzing the SQL query that
exists in HTTP request message in order to defend
against the SQL injection attack
Accumulated risk The degree of risk calculated by using the weighted
values and the number of attacks of each detection rules
and the time over which the attacks progressed that is
used to automatically register the IP on the IP block list
of the TOE if it satisfies the administrator-set threshold
Web application Web-based computer application that is developed for
the user client to receive various services of the web
server based on a network such as the internet or the
intranet. The representative programming languages
include Java, XML, PHP, ASP and JSP for the
development of this web application
Web contents All auditory and visionary representations that are
delivered through the web. These are provided to the
user in the form of documentation, data, application,
image, audio, video file, web page, mail message, etc
Administrators The user who accesses the TOE for purposes of secure
operation and management of the TOE. The
administrators are authorized through identification
authentication of the TOE and are classified into a
“remote administrator” who remotely operates the TOE
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security management functions by using a management
console and a “local administrator” who directly connects
via a serial port of hardware in which the security engine
is installed and operated.
13. Bibliography
The certification body has used following documents to produce this report.
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1
Revision 3, CCMB-2009-07-001 ~ CCMB-2009-07-003, July 2009
Part 1: Introduction and general model
Part 2: Security functional components
Part 3: Security assurance components
[2] KOSYAS-2011-20, WAPPLES v4.0 Evaluation Technical Report V1.00, October
5, 2012
[3] WAPPLES v4.0 Security Target v4.0, September 28, 2012
[4] Korea Evaluation and Certification Guidelines for IT Security(September 1,
2009)
[5] Korea Evaluation and Certification Regulation for IT Security (July 20, 2011)
[6] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version
3.1 Revision 3, CCMB-2009-07-004, July 2009