TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V.
Head Office:
Westervoortsedijk 73
NL-6827 AV Arnhem
P.O. Box 2220
NL-6802 CE Arnhem
The Netherlands
Location Leek:
Eiberkamp 10
NL-9351 VT Leek
P.O. Box 37
NL-9350 AA Leek
The Netherlands
info@nl.tuv.com
www.tuv.com/nl
Tel. +31 (0)88 888 7 888
Fax +31 (0)88 888 7 879
TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V. is a
registered company at the
Netherlands Chamber of Commerce
(KVK), under number 27288788.
VAT number: NL815820380B01
IBAN: NL61DEUT0265155096
Version
2022-01
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Certification Report
TnD v5.1 on ID-One Cosmo J V2 (BAC Configuration)
Sponsor and developer: IDEMIA
2 place Samuel de Champlain
92400 Courbevoie
France
Evaluation facility: SGS Brightsight B.V.
Brassersplein 2
2612 CT Delft
The Netherlands
Report number: NSCIB-CC-0237686-CR2
Report version: 1
Project number: 0237686_2
Author(s): Andy Brown
Date: 07 December 2022
Number of pages: 13
Number of appendices: 0
Reproduction of this report is authorised only if the report is reproduced in its entirety.
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CONTENTS
Foreword 3
Recognition of the Certificate 4
International recognition 4
European recognition 4
1 Executive Summary 5
2 Certification Results 7
2.1 Identification of Target of Evaluation 7
2.2 Security Policy 7
2.3 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope 7
2.3.1 Assumptions 7
2.3.2 Clarification of scope 8
2.4 Architectural Information 8
2.5 Documentation 8
2.6 IT Product Testing 9
2.6.1 Testing approach and depth 9
2.6.2 Independent penetration testing 9
2.6.3 Test configuration 10
2.6.4 Test results 10
2.7 Reused Evaluation Results 10
2.8 Evaluated Configuration 10
2.9 Evaluation Results 10
2.10 Comments/Recommendations 11
3 Security Target 12
4 Definitions 12
5 Bibliography 13
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Foreword
The Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security (NSCIB) provides a third-party
evaluation and certification service for determining the trustworthiness of Information Technology (IT)
security products. Under this NSCIB, TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V. has the task of issuing
certificates for IT security products, as well as for protection profiles and sites.
Part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product, protection profile or site
according to the Common Criteria assessment guidelines published by the NSCIB. Evaluations are
performed by an IT Security Evaluation Facility (ITSEF) under the oversight of the NSCIB Certification
Body, which is operated by TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V. in cooperation with the Ministry of the
Interior and Kingdom Relations.
An ITSEF in the Netherlands is a commercial facility that has been licensed by TÜV Rheinland
Nederland B.V. to perform Common Criteria evaluations; a significant requirement for such a licence is
accreditation to the requirements of ISO Standard 17025 “General requirements for the accreditation
of calibration and testing laboratories”.
By awarding a Common Criteria certificate, TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V. asserts that the product or
site complies with the security requirements specified in the associated (site) security target, or that
the protection profile (PP) complies with the requirements for PP evaluation specified in the Common
Criteria for Information Security Evaluation. A (site) security target is a requirements specification
document that defines the scope of the evaluation activities.
The consumer should review the (site) security target or protection profile, in addition to this
certification report, to gain an understanding of any assumptions made during the evaluation, the IT
product's intended environment, its security requirements, and the level of confidence (i.e., the
evaluation assurance level) that the product or site satisfies the security requirements stated in the
(site) security target.
Reproduction of this report is authorised only if the report is reproduced in its entirety.
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Recognition of the Certificate
The presence of the Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement (CCRA) and the SOG-IS logos on the
certificate indicates that this certificate is issued in accordance with the provisions of the CCRA and
the SOG-IS Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOG-IS MRA) and will be recognised by the participating
nations.
International recognition
The CCRA was signed by the Netherlands in May 2000 and provides mutual recognition of certificates
based on the Common Criteria (CC). Since September 2014 the CCRA has been updated to provide
mutual recognition of certificates based on cPPs (exact use) or STs with evaluation assurance
components up to and including EAL2+ALC_FLR.
For details of the current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes, see
http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
European recognition
The SOG-IS MRA Version 3, effective since April 2010, provides mutual recognition in Europe of
Common Criteria and ITSEC certificates at a basic evaluation level for all products. A higher
recognition level for evaluation levels beyond EAL4 (respectively E3-basic) is provided for products
related to specific technical domains. This agreement was signed initially by Finland, France,
Germany, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Italy joined the SOG-IS
MRA in December 2010.
For details of the current list of signatory nations, approved certification schemes and the list of
technical domains for which the higher recognition applies, see https://www.sogis.eu.
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1 Executive Summary
This Certification Report states the outcome of the Common Criteria security evaluation of the TnD
v5.1 on ID-One Cosmo J V2 (BAC Configuration). The developer of the TnD v5.1 on ID-One Cosmo J
V2 (BAC Configuration) is IDEMIA located in Courbevoie, France and they also act as the sponsor of
the evaluation and certification. A Certification Report is intended to assist prospective consumers
when judging the suitability of the IT security properties of the product for their particular requirements.
The TOE is a composite product that consists of an IDEMIA applet named TnD v5.1 and its supporting
“Common” library package and Adapter package on top of the NXP JCOP 4 P71 Platform in BAC
configuration.
The TnD v5.1 applet on ID-One Cosmo J V2 has support for the [ICAO-9303] and [TR-3110-1] and
[TR-3110-3] defined protocols for Basic Access Control (BAC), Chip Authentication v1 (CAv1) and
Active Authentication (AA). In addition, the TOE supports Chip Authentication v1 with AES secure
messaging.
For compliance with the protection profiles claimed in this security target, the BAC protocol MUST be
configured on the TOE for each configured ID document application mentioned below.
Within the scope of the TOE’s [ST], the TnD v5.1 applet on ID-One Cosmo J V2 can be configured as
a stand-alone application or as a combination of the following official ID document applications:
 ICAO/EAC eMRTD and
 EU/ISO Driving Licence compliant to ISO/IEC 18013 or ISO/IEC TR 19446.
The TnD v5.1 applet on ID-One Cosmo J V2 may be used as an ISO Driving Licence (IDL) compliant
to ISO/IEC 18013 or ISO/IEC TR 19446, as both eMRTD and IDL applications share the same
protocols and data structure organization.
Different configurations of the TnD v5.1 applet on ID-One Cosmo J V2 have been subject to separate
evaluations. All functions mentioned above are in the scope of the certification of this TOE. This
Certification Report states the outcome of the Common Criteria security evaluation of the TnD v5.1 on
ID-One Cosmo J V2 (BAC Configuration).
The TOE was evaluated initially by SGS Brightsight B.V. located in Delft and was certified on 22 April
2021. The re-evaluation of the TOE has also been conducted by SGS Brightsight B.V. and was
completed on 07 December 2022 with the approval of the ETR. The re-certification procedure has
been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the
Area of IT Security [NSCIB].
This second issue of the Certification Report is a result of a “recertification with major changes”.
The major changes were an update of the underlying platform (leading to an updated TOE reference)
and an update of the TOE ST and guidance documents.
The security evaluation reused the evaluation results of previously performed evaluations. A full, up-
to-date vulnerability analysis has been made.
The scope of the evaluation is defined by the security target [ST], which identifies assumptions made
during the evaluation, the intended environment for the TnD v5.1 on ID-One Cosmo J V2 (BAC
Configuration), the security requirements, and the level of confidence (evaluation assurance level) at
which the product is intended to satisfy the security requirements. Consumers of the TnD v5.1 on ID-
One Cosmo J V2 (BAC Configuration) are advised to verify that their own environment is consistent
with the security target, and to give due consideration to the comments, observations and
recommendations in this certification report.
The results documented in the evaluation technical report [ETR]
1
for this product provides sufficient
evidence that the TOE meets the EAL4: augmented (EAL4+) assurance requirements for the
evaluated security functionality. This assurance level is augmented with ALC_DVS.2 (Sufficiency of
security measures), ADV_FSP.5 (Complete semi-formal functional specification with additional error
1
The Evaluation Technical Report contains information proprietary to the developer and/or the
evaluator, and is not releasable for public review.
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information), ADV_INT.2 (Well-structured internals), ADV_TDS.4 (Semiformal modular design),
ALC_CMS.5 (Development tools CM coverage), ALC_TAT.2 (Compliance with implementation
standards) and ATE_DPT.3 (Testing: modular design).
The evaluation was conducted using the Common Methodology for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5 [CEM] for conformance to the Common Criteria for Information
Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5 [CC] (Parts I, II and III).
TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V., as the NSCIB Certification Body, declares that the evaluation meets
all the conditions for international recognition of Common Criteria Certificates and that the product will
be listed on the NSCIB Certified Products list. Note that the certification results apply only to the
specific version of the product as evaluated.
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2 Certification Results
2.1 Identification of Target of Evaluation
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) for this evaluation is the TnD v5.1 on ID-One Cosmo J V2 (BAC
Configuration) from IDEMIA located in Courbevoie, France.
The TOE is comprised of the following main components together with the configuration identified as
specified in [ST] section 1.2:
Delivery
item type
Identifier Version
Hardware NXP Smart Card Controller N7121 with IC Dedicated Software and
Crypto Library (R1/R2/R3/R4)
B1
Software
NXP JCOP4 on P71 v4.7 R1.02.4
TnD applet (SAAAAR 203462FF) 05 01 00 00
(00 00 02 08)*
Common Package (SAAAAR 418402FF) 01 00 00 00
(01 01 02 0C)*
Adapter Package (SAAAAR 417652FF) 01 01 00 00
(00 00 01 08)*
*Applet GET DATA (DF67) response
To ensure secure usage a set of guidance documents is provided, together with the TnD v5.1 on ID-
One Cosmo J V2 (BAC Configuration). For details, see section 2.5 “Documentation” of this report.
The secure identification of the TOE has been specified in [AGD_PRE].
For a detailed and precise description of the TOE lifecycle, see the [ST], Chapter 4.
2.2 Security Policy
The TOE in the PACE/EAC1/Polymorphic/LDS2 configuration encompasses the following features:
 In Personalization phase:
o authentication protocol for personalization agent authentication;
o 3DES, AES128, AES192 and AES256 Global Platform secure messaging;
access control;
o Creation and configuration of application instances and their logical data structure;
o Secure data loading;
o Secure import and/or on-chip generation of Chip Authentication key pair for CAv1;
o Secure import and/or on-chip generation of the AA key pair;
o life-cycle phase switching to operational phase;
 In operational phase:
o Chip Authentication v1 (CAv1);
o Active Authentication (AA);
o After CAv1: restart ICAO secure messaging in 3DES, AES128, AES192 or AES256 cipher
mode.
2.3 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
2.3.1 Assumptions
The assumptions defined in the Security Target are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead
to specific Security Objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. For detailed information on the
security objectives that must be fulfilled by the TOE environment, see section 7.2 of the [ST].
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2.3.2 Clarification of scope
The evaluation did not reveal any threats to the TOE that are not countered by the evaluated security
functions of the product.
Note that the ICAO MRTD infrastructure critically depends on the objectives for the environment to be
met. These are not weaknesses of this particular TOE, but aspects of the ICAO MRTD infrastructure
as a whole.
The environment in which the TOE is personalised must perform proper and safe personalisation
according to the guidance and referred ICAO guidelines.
The environment in which the TOE is used must ensure that the inspection system protects the
confidentiality and integrity of the data send and read from the TOE.
2.4 Architectural Information
The TOE is a configuration of a composition that consists of an IDEMIA applet named TnD v5.1 and
its supporting “Common” and “Adapter” packages on top of the NXP JCOP 4 P71 contact and/or
contactless chip Platform.
The physical part of the TOE is a bare microchip with its external interfaces for communication. The
physical medium on which the microchip is mounted is not part of the target of evaluation because it
does not alter nor modify any security functions of the TOE.
The TOE may be used on several form factors (like Chip module, Chip modules on a reel, Chip
modules embedded in ID3 passport booklets, Chip modules embedded in ID1 cards or ID3 holder
pages, Chip modules embedded in antenna inlays, Passport booklet).
The logical architecture, originating from the Security Target [ST] of the TOE can be depicted as
follows:
The TOE is an electronic travel document representing a contactless/contact based smart card or
passport programmed according to Logical data structure (LDS). Electronic Passport is specified in
[ICAO-9303], additionally providing the Chip Authentication v1 (CAv1) and Active Authentication
according to [ICAO-9303].
The TOE may also be used as an ISO driving license, compliant to ISO/IEC 18013 or ISO/IEC TR
19446.
2.5 Documentation
The following documentation is provided with the product by the developer to the customer:
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Identifier Version
TnD v5.1 on ID-One Cosmo J - Preparative Procedures (AGD_PRE), FQR 220 1495 Ed 13
TnD v5.1 on ID-One Cosmo J - Operational User Guidance (AGD_OPE), FQR 220
1496
Ed 7
JCOP 4 P71 User Manual for JCOP 4 P71 Rev. 4.2
2.6 IT Product Testing
Testing (depth, coverage, functional tests, independent testing): The evaluators examined the
developer’s testing activities documentation and verified that the developer has met their testing
responsibilities.
2.6.1 Testing approach and depth
The developer has performed extensive testing on functional specification, subsystem and SFR-
enforcing module level. The developer has tested the TOE both using a standardised accreditation
test suite and a proprietary test suite for CC to ensure that all SFRs in the Security Target are tested.
By performing an extensive requirements analysis and testing accordingly, the developer ensured that
the required depth and coverage of testing was achieved.
For the testing performed by the evaluators, the sample of repeated developer tests was chosen to get
a coverage of all the features while ensuring to cover all product configurations, i.e., including CA, AA
and BAC. Additionally, this sample allowed the evaluator to observe different cryptographic algorithms
including RSA, ECDSA, and ECDH. Finally, the sample included a range of different important
(internal) applet security features, such as the state machine, access control of the file system and
slow down mechanism on authentication failure, covering both the personalization as well as the
operational phase. The repetition was performed through witnessing of developer testing.
The developer test strategy already included a high depth of testing. The evaluator-defined tests
focused on the verification of specific countermeasures and on passport traceability in addition to a
verification of the preparatory guidance.
During the re-certification, no additional repeated developer tests nor independent developer tests,
were executed by the evaluator. It was determined that the only change to the TOE implementation
was in the underlying Crypto Library which was determined not to impact the functional test results of
the TOE.
2.6.2 Independent penetration testing
The methodical analysis performed was conducted along the following steps:
 When evaluating the evidence in the classes ASE, ADV and AGD the evaluator considered
whether potential vulnerabilities can already be identified due to the TOE type and/or specified
behaviour in such an early stage of the evaluation.
 For ADV_IMP a thorough implementation representation review was performed on the TOE.
During this attack-oriented analysis, the protection of the TOE was analysed using the
knowledge gained from all previous evaluation classes. This resulted in the identification of
(additional) potential vulnerabilities. This analysis was performed according to the attack
methods in [JIL-AAPS]. An important source for assurance in this step was the technical
report [PF-ETRfC] of the underlying platform.
 All potential vulnerabilities were analysed using the knowledge gained from all evaluation
classes and information from the public domain. A judgment was made on how to assure that
these potential vulnerabilities are not exploitable. The potential vulnerabilities were addressed
by penetration testing, a guidance update or in other ways that were deemed appropriate.
In the baseline evaluation no penetration tests were defined. There was no exploitable potential
vulnerability that is commensurate with the AVA_VAN.3 attack potential.
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In this first re-certification it was determined that the changes did not modify the results of vulnerability
analysis and that all previous conclusions remained valid.
2.6.3 Test configuration
In the baseline evaluation there was some testing on an earlier version of the TOE. The final version
of the TOE as described in the [ST] was analysed to confirm that the test results remained valid for
these test. All other testing was on configurations of the samples as described in the ST
In this first re-certification, samples were not required since, as described in section 2.6.1 and 2.6.2,
no additional developer testing nor independent testing was required as a result of the updated
vulnerability analysis.
2.6.4 Test results
The testing activities, including configurations, procedures, test cases, expected results and observed
results are summarised in the [ETR], with references to the documents containing the full details.
The developer’s tests and the independent functional tests produced the expected results, giving
assurance that the TOE behaves as specified in its [ST] and functional specification.
No exploitable vulnerabilities were found with the independent penetration tests.
The algorithmic security level of cryptographic functionality has not been rated in this certification
process, but the current consensus on the algorithmic security level in the open domain, i.e., from the
current best cryptanalytic attacks published, has been taken into account.
The TOE supports a wider range of key sizes (see [ST]), including those with sufficient algorithmic
security level to exceed 100 bits as required for high attack potential (AVA_VAN.5).
2.7 Reused Evaluation Results
This is a re-certification. Documentary evaluation results of the earlier version of the TOE have been
reused, but vulnerability analysis and any resultant need for penetration testing has been renewed.
For this first re-certification it has been determined from the analysis that no further penetration testing
was required.
There has been extensive reuse of the ALC aspects for the sites involved in the development and
production of the TOE, by use of 11 site certificates and Site Technical Audit Reports.
No sites have been visited as part of this evaluation.
2.8 Evaluated Configuration
The TOE is defined uniquely by its name and version number TnD v5.1 on ID-One Cosmo J V2 (BAC
Configuration) together with the configuration identified as specified in [ST] section 1.2.
2.9 Evaluation Results
The evaluation lab documented their evaluation results in the [ETR], which references an ASE
Intermediate Report and other evaluator documents, and Site Technical Audit Report(s) for the site(s)
[STAR]
2
.
The verdict of each claimed assurance requirement is “Pass”.
Based on the above evaluation results the evaluation lab concluded the TnD v5.1 on ID-One Cosmo J
V2 (BAC Configuration), to be CC Part 2 extended, CC Part 3 conformant, and to meet the
requirements of EAL 4 augmented with ALC_DVS.2, ADV_FSP.5, ADV_INT.2, ADV_TDS.4,
ALC_CMS.5, ALC_TAT.2 and ATE_DPT.3. This implies that the product satisfies the security
requirements specified in Security Target [ST].
The Security Target claims ’strict’ conformance to the Protection Profile [PP_0055].
2
The Site Technical Audit Report contains information necessary to an evaluation lab and
certification body for the reuse of the site audit report in a TOE evaluation.
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2.10 Comments/Recommendations
The user guidance as outlined in section 2.5 “Documentation” contains necessary information about
the usage of the TOE. Certain aspects of the TOE’s security functionality, in particular the
countermeasures against attacks, depend on accurate conformance to the user guidance of both the
software and the hardware part of the TOE. There are no particular obligations or recommendations
for the user apart from following the user guidance. Please note that the documents contain relevant
details concerning the resistance against certain attacks
In addition, all aspects of assumptions, threats and policies as outlined in the Security Target not
covered by the TOE itself must be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his system risk
management process. For the evolution of attack methods and techniques to be covered, the
customer should define the period of time until a re-assessment for the TOE is required and thus
requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms and protocols was not rated in the course of this
evaluation. This specifically applies to the following proprietary or non-standard algorithms, protocols
and implementations: None
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3 Security Target
The Security Target TnD v5.1 on ID-One Cosmo J V2 (BAC configuration), FQR 220 1511, Ed 11, 16
September 2022 [ST] is included here by reference.
Please note that, to satisfy the need for publication, a public version [ST-lite] has been created and
verified according to [ST-SAN].
4 Definitions
This list of acronyms and definitions contains elements that are not already defined by the CC or CEM:
AA Active Authentication
BAC Basic Access Control
CA Chip Authentication
CAM Chip Authentication Mapping
EAC Extended Access Control
ECDH Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman algorithm
ECDSA Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
eMRTD electronic MRTD
IC Integrated Circuit
ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization
IT Information Technology
ITSEF IT Security Evaluation Facility
JIL Joint Interpretation Library
JIL Joint Interpretation Library
LDS Logical Data Structure
MAC Message Authentication Code
MRTD Machine Readable Travel Document
NSCIB Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the area of IT security
PACE Password Authenticated Connection Establishment
PP Protection Profile
TOE Target of Evaluation
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5 Bibliography
This section lists all referenced documentation used as source material in the compilation of this
report.
[CC] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Parts I, II and
III, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017
[CEM] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017
[ETR] Evaluation Technical Report “TnD V5.1 on COSMO J” – EAL5+, 20-RPT-1030,
Version 12.0, 06 December 2022
[ICAO-9303] International Civil Aviation Organization, ICAO Doc 9303, Machine Readable
Travel Documents – 7th edition, 2015
[JIL-AAPS] JIL Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards, Version 3.1, June 2020
[JIL-AM] Attack Methods for Smartcards and Similar Devices, Version 2.4, January 2020
(sensitive with controlled distribution)
[LDS2_TR] TECHNICAL REPORT LDS2 – Protocols, Version 0.8, 27 April 2017.
[NSCIB] Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security, Version 2.5,
28 March 2019
[PF-CERT] Certification Report JCOP 4 P71, NSCIB-CC-180212-CR5, v1
[PF-ETRfC] Evaluation Technical Report for Composition NXP “JCOP 4 P71” – EAL6+, 19-
RPT-177, v14.0, 14 September 2022
[PF-ST] JCOP 4 P71, Security Target Lite, Rev. 4.8, 08 August 2022
[PP_0055] Common Criteria Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel Document with
“ICAO Application”, Extended Access Control, Version 1.10, 25 March 2009,
registered under the reference BSI-CC-PP-0055-2009
[ST] Security Target TnD v5.1 on ID-One Cosmo J V2 (BAC configuration), FQR
220 1511, Ed 11, 16 September 2022
[ST-lite] TnD v5.1 on ID-One Cosmo J V2 (BAC Configuration) Public Security Target,
FQR 550 0185, Ed 3, 28 September 2022
[ST-SAN] ST sanitising for publication, CC Supporting Document CCDB-2006-04-004,
April 2006
[TR-03110-1] Technical Guideline TR-03110-1, Advanced Security Mechanisms for Machine
Readable Travel Documents –Part 1 – eMRTDs with BAC/PACEv2 and
EACv1, Version 2.10, 20 March 2012
[TR-03110-2] Technical Guideline TR-03110-2, Advanced Security Mechanisms for Machine
Readable Travel Documents –Part 2 – Extended Access Control Version 2
(EACv2), Password Authenticated Connection Establishment (PACE),and
Restricted Identification (RI), Version 2.10, 20 March 2012
[TR-03110-3] TR-03110-3 Advanced Security Mechanisms for Machine Readable Travel
Documents – Part 3: Common Specifications, version 2.10, 07 March 2012
(This is the end of this report.)