BSI-DSZ-CC-0555-2009 for NXP Smart Card Controller P5CD081V1A and its major configurations P5CC081V1A, P5CN081V1A, P5CD041V1A, P5CD021V1A and P5CD016V1A each with IC dedicated Software from NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH Business Line Identification BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111 Certification Report V1.0 ZS-01-01-F-327 V4.30 BSI-DSZ-CC-0555-2009 NXP Smart Card Controller P5CD081V1A and its major configurations P5CC081V1A, P5CN081V1A, P5CD041V1A, P5CD021V1A and P5CD016V1A each with IC dedicated Software from NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH Business Line Identification PP Conformance: Security IC Protection Profile, Version 1.0, 23 August 2007, BSI-CC-PP-0035-2007 Functionality: PP conformant plus product specific extensions Common Criteria Part 2 extended Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant EAL 5 augmented by ALC_DVS.2, AVA_VAN.5 and ASE_TSS.2 Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement for components up to EAL 4 The IT product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 4 and guidance specific for the technology of the product for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1. This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report. The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification scheme of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions of the evaluation facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence adduced. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied. Bonn, 10 November 2009 For the Federal Office for Information Security Bernd Kowalski L.S. Head of Department Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111 Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0555-2009 This page is intentionally left blank. 4 / 36 BSI-DSZ-CC-0555-2009 Certification Report Preliminary Remarks Under the BSIG1 Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of issuing certificates for information technology products. Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor, hereinafter called the sponsor. A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria. The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by BSI itself. The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed Certification Results. The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and instructions for the user. 1 Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821 5 / 36 Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0555-2009 Contents A Certification........................................................................................................................7 1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure.................................................................7 2 Recognition Agreements................................................................................................7 2.1 European Recognition of ITSEC/CC - Certificates..................................................7 2.2 International Recognition of CC - Certificates.........................................................8 3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification..................................................................8 4 Validity of the certification result.....................................................................................9 5 Publication......................................................................................................................9 B Certification Results.........................................................................................................10 1 Executive Summary......................................................................................................11 2 Identification of the TOE...............................................................................................12 3 Security Policy..............................................................................................................12 4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope.......................................................................12 5 Architectural Information...............................................................................................12 6 Documentation.............................................................................................................12 7 IT Product Testing.........................................................................................................13 8 Evaluated Configuration...............................................................................................13 9 Results of the Evaluation..............................................................................................13 9.1 CC specific results.................................................................................................13 9.2 Results of cryptographic assessment....................................................................14 10 Obligations and notes for the usage of the TOE........................................................15 11 Security Target............................................................................................................15 12 Definitions...................................................................................................................16 12.1 Acronyms.............................................................................................................16 12.2 Glossary...............................................................................................................16 13 Bibliography................................................................................................................18 C Excerpts from the Criteria................................................................................................21 D Annexes...........................................................................................................................31 6 / 36 BSI-DSZ-CC-0555-2009 Certification Report A Certification 1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the following: ● BSIG2 ● BSI Certification Ordinance3 ● BSI Schedule of Costs4 ● Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the Interior) ● DIN EN 45011 standard ● BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125) [3] ● Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.15 [1] ● Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 [2] ● BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4] 2 Recognition Agreements In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or CC - under certain conditions was agreed. 2.1 European Recognition of ITSEC/CC - Certificates The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (MRA) for certificates based on ITSEC became initially effective in March 1998. This agreement on the mutual recognition of IT security certificates was extended in April 1999 to include certificates based on the Common Criteria for the Evaluation Assurance Levels (EAL 1 – EAL 7). This agreement was signed by the national bodies of Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. The German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) recognises certificates issued by the national certification bodies of France and United Kingdom, and from The Netherlands since January 2009 within the terms of this agreement. 2 Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821 3 Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of a Certificate by the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungsverordnung, BSIZertV) of 07 July 1992, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1230 4 Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519 5 Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 10 May 2006 in the Bundesanzeiger dated 19 May 2006, p. 3730 7 / 36 Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0555-2009 The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the terms of this agreement. 2.2 International Recognition of CC - Certificates An arrangement (Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement) on the mutual recognition of certificates based on the CC Evaluation Assurance Levels up to and including EAL 4 has been signed in May 2000 (CCRA). It includes also the recognition of Protection Profiles based on the CC. As of January 2009 the arrangement has been signed by the national bodies of: Australia, Austria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Republic of Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States of America. The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes can be seen on the web site: http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement. This evaluation contains the components ALC_DVS.2, AVA_VAN.5 and ASE.TSS.2 that are not mutually recognised in accordance with the provisions of the CCRA. For mutual recognition the EAL4 components of these assurance families are relevant. 3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings. The product NXP Smart Card Controller P5CD081V1A and its major configurations P5CC081V1A, P5CN081V1A, P5CD041V1A, P5CD021V1A and P5CD016V1A each with IC dedicated Software has undergone the certification procedure at BSI. The evaluation of the product NXP Smart Card Controller P5CD081V1A and its major configurations P5CC081V1A, P5CN081V1A, P5CD041V1A, P5CD021V1A and P5CD016V1A each with IC dedicated Software was conducted by T-Systems GEI GmbH. The evaluation was completed on 5 October 2009. The T-Systems GEI GmbH is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)6 recognised by the certification body of BSI. For this certification procedure the sponsor and applicant is: NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH The product was developed by: NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI. 4 Validity of the certification result This Certification Report only applies to the version of the product as indicated. The confirmed assurance package is only valid on the condition that ● all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the following report, are observed, 6 Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility 8 / 36 BSI-DSZ-CC-0555-2009 Certification Report ● the product is operated in the environment described, where specified in the following report and in the Security Target. For the meaning of the assurance levels please refer to the excerpts from the criteria at the end of the Certification Report. The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target at the date of certification. As attack methods may evolve over time, the resistance of the certified version of the product against new attack methods can be re-assessed if required and the sponsor applies for the certified product being monitored within the assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme. It is recommended to perform a re- assessment on a regular basis. In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e. re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies. 5 Publication The product NXP Smart Card Controller P5CD081V1A and its major configurations P5CC081V1A, P5CN081V1A, P5CD041V1A, P5CD021V1A and P5CD016V1A each with IC dedicated Software has been included in the BSI list of the certified products, which is published regularly (see also Internet: https:// www.bsi.bund.de and [5]). Further information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline +49 228 9582-111. Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer7 of the product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet address stated above. 7 NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH Georg-Heyken-Str. 1 21147 Hamburg 9 / 36 Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0555-2009 This page is intentionally left blank. 10 / 36 BSI-DSZ-CC-0555-2009 Certification Report B Certification Results The following results represent a summary of ● the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation, ● the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and ● complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body. 11 / 36 Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0555-2009 1 Executive Summary The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is NXP Smart Card Controller P5CD081V1A and its major configurations P5CC081V1A, P5CN081V1A, P5CD041V1A, P5CD021V1A and P5CD016V1A each with IC dedicated Software. It provides a hardware platform for a smartcard operating system. A specific block diagram for the TOE is depicted in figure 1. The TOE consists of the IC hardware and the IC Dedicated Software as composed of IC Dedicated Test Software and IC Dedicated Support Software. All other software is called Security IC Embedded Software and is not part of the TOE. The device is developed for most high-end safeguarded applications, and is designed for embedding into chip cards according to ISO/IEC 7816 and for contactless applications. Usually a Security IC (e.g. a smartcard) is assigned to a single individual only, but it may also be used by multiple applications in a multi-provider environment. Therefore the TOE might store and process secrets of several systems, which must be protected from each other. The TOE then must meet security requirements for each single security module. Secret data shall be used as input for calculation of authentication data, calculation of signatures and encryption of data and keys. The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is based on the certified Protection Profile Security IC Platform Protection Profile, Version 1.0, 23 August 2007, BSI-CC-PP-0035-2007 [10]. 12 / 36 BSI-DSZ-CC-0555-2009 Certification Report The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details). The TOE meets the assurance requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 5 augmented by ALC_DVS.2, AVA_VAN.5 and ASE_TSS.2. The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the Security Target [6], chapter 6. They are selected from Common Criteria Part 2 and some of them are newly defined. Thus the TOE is CC Part 2 extended. The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE Security Functionalities: TOE Security Function Addressed issue SS.RNG Random Number Generator SS.HW_DES Triple-DES coprocessor SS.HW_AES AES coprocessor SF.OPC Control of Operating Conditions SF.PHY Protection against Physical Manipulation SF.LOG Logical Protection SF.COMP Protection of the Mode Control SF.MEM_ACC Memory Access Control SF.SFR_ACC Special Function Register Access Control Table 1: TOE Security Functionality For more details please refer to the Security Target [6], chapter 7. The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6], chapter 3.1. Based on these assets the TOE Security Environment is defined in terms of Assumptions, Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security Target [6], chapter 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4. Six major configuration options are present, which are denoted by product names P5CD016V1A, P5CD021V1A, P5CD041V1A, P5CD081V1A, P5CC081V1A and P5CN081V1A. All of them are equipped with an EEPROM of 80 kBytes and both, the ISO/IEC 7816 contact interface and the ISO/IEC 14443 contactless interface. Their major differences are related to availability of EEPROM space and the contactless interface. This certification covers all configurations mentioned above. Find more details in the Security Target [6] and [9], chapter 1.4 (in particular chapter 1.4.1.1 and 1.4.2.1) The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and decryption (see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2). The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied. 13 / 36 Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0555-2009 2 Identification of the TOE The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called: NXP Smart Card Controller P5CD081V1A and its major configurations P5CC081V1A, P5CN081V1A, P5CD041V1A, P5CD021V1A and P5CD016V1A each with IC dedicated Software The following table outlines the TOE deliverables: No Type Identifier Release Date Form of Delivery 1 HW NXP P5Cx081V1A Secure Smart Card Controller V1A T046B_200902 10.gds2 Wafer or sawn Wafer HW NXP P5CD041V1A Secure Smart Card Controller V1A T046B_200902 10.gds2 Wafer or sawn Wafer HW NXP P5CD021V1A Secure Smart Card Controller V1A T046B_200902 10.gds2 Wafer or sawn Wafer HW NXP P5CD016V1A Secure Smart Card Controller V1A T046B_200902 10.gds2 Wafer or sawn Wafer 2 SW Test ROM Software (the IC Dedicated Test Software) Version 87 16.01.2009 Test ROM on the chip (tmfos_87.lst) 3 SW Boot ROM Software (part of the IC Dedicated Support Software) Version 87 16.01.2009 Test ROM on the chip (tmfos_87.lst) 4 SW MIFARE Operating System (part of the IC Dedicated Support Software) Version 87 16.01.2009 Test ROM on the chip (tmfos_87.lst) 5 Doc Data Sheet, P5CD016/021/041 and P5Cx081 Rev. 3.1 20.08.2009 Document Number: 148931 6 Doc Instruction Set, SmartMX- Family Revision 1.1, 04.07.2006 Document Number: 084111 7 Doc Guidance, Delivery and Operation Manual for the P5CD016/021/041 and P5Cx081 Version 1.3 16.09.2009 Document Number: 171613 Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE The hardware part of the TOE is identified by P5CD081V1A, P5CD041V1A, P5CD021V1A or P5CD016V1A. A so-called nameplate (on-chip identifier) is coded in a metal mask onto 14 / 36 BSI-DSZ-CC-0555-2009 Certification Report the chip during production and can be checked by the customer, too. The nameplate T046B is specific for the SSMC (Singapore) production as outlined in the guidance documentation [14]. This nameplate identifies Version V1A of the hardware, but does not identify specifically the TOE configurations. For identification of a specific configuration, the Device Coding Bytes stored in the EEPROM can be used (see [12], chapter 11.6): ● The value 44 hex in Device Coding Byte DC2 identifies the chip P5CD081V1A ● The value 43 hex in Device Coding Byte DC2 identifies the chip P5CC081V1A ● The value 45 hex in Device Coding Byte DC2 identifies the chip P5CN081V1A ● The value 42 hex in Device Coding Byte DC2 identifies the chip P5CD041V1A ● The value 47 hex in Device Coding Byte DC2 identifies the chip P5CD021V1A ● The value 41 hex in Device Coding Byte DC2 identifies the chip P5CD016V1A Items 2, 3 and 4 in table 2 are not delivered as single pieces, but included in the Test ROM part of the chip. They are identified by their unique version numbers. Items 2 and 3 in table 2 are not delivered as single pieces, but included in the Test ROM part of the chip. They are identified by their unique version numbers. The delivery process from NXP to their customers (to phase 4 or phase 5 of the life cycle) guarantees, that the customer is aware of the exact versions of the different parts of the TOE as outlined above. 3 Security Policy The Security Policy is expressed by the set of Security Functional Requirements and implemented by the TOE. It covers the following issues: Symmetric cryptographic block cipher algorithms (Triple-DES and AES), to ensure the confidentiality of plain text data by encryption and to support secure authentication protocols and it will provide a random number generation of appropriate quality. As the TOE is a hardware security platform, the security policy of the TOE provides countermeasures against: leakage of information, physical probing, malfunctions, physical manipulations, access to code, access to data memory, abuse of functionality. 4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to specific security objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. The following topics are of relevance: Protection during Packaging, Finishing and Personalization, Usage of Hardware Platform, Treatment of User Data, Check of initialisation data by the Smart Card Embedded Software, Usage of Key-dependent Functions. Details can be found in the Security Target [6] chapter 3 and in the Protection Profile BSI-CC-PP-0035-2007 [10]. 5 Architectural Information The NXP P5CD081V1A, P5CC081V1A, P5CN081V1A, P5CD041V1A, P5CD021V1A and P5CD016V1A Smart Card Controllers are integrated circuits (ICs) providing a hardware platform to a Smart Card operating system and Smart Card Embedded Software. A top 15 / 36 Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0555-2009 level block diagram and a list of subsystems can be found within the TOE description of the Security Target [6] resp. [9]. The complete hardware description and the complete instruction set of these Smart Card Controllers can be found in the “Data Sheet, P5CD016/021/041 and P5Cx081”, [12] and “Instruction Set, SmartMX-Family”, [13]. For the implementation of the TOE Security Functionalities basically the components 8-bit CPU, Special Function Registers, Triple-DES Co-Processor, AES Co-Processor, FameXE Co-Processor, Random Number Generator (RNG), Power Module with Security Sensors and Filters are used. The CPU is equipped with a Memory Management Unit and provides different CPU Modes in order to separate different applications running on the TOE. Security measures for Physical Protection are realized within the layout of the whole circuitry. The Special Function Registers provide the interface to the Security Functionalities of the TOE. 6 Documentation The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the product to the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of the TOE in accordance with the Security Target. Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of this report have to be followed. 7 IT Product Testing The tests performed by the developer were divided into six categories: 1. technology development tests as the earliest tests to check the technology against the specification and to get the technology parameters used in simulations of the circuitry (this testing is not strictly related to Security Functionalities); 2. tests which are performed in a simulation environment with different tools for the analogue circuitries and for the digital parts of the TOE; 3. regression tests of the hardware within a simulation environment based on special software dedicated only for the regression tests; 4. regression tests which are performed for the IC Dedicated Test Software and for the IC Dedicated Support Software on emulator versions of the TOE and within a software simulation of chip in special hardware; 5. characterisation and verification tests to release the TOE to production: ● used to determine the behaviour of the chip with respect to different operating conditions and varied process parameters (often also referred to as characterisation tests) ● special verification tests for Security Functionalities which were done with samples of the TOE (referred also as developers security evaluation) and which include also layout tests by automatic means and optical control, in order to verify statements concerning the layout; 6. functional production tests, which are done for every chip to check its correct functionality as a last step of the production process (phase 3). The developer tests cover all Security Functionalities and all security mechanisms as identified in the functional specification. 16 / 36 BSI-DSZ-CC-0555-2009 Certification Report The evaluators were able to repeat the tests of the developer either using the library of programs, tools and prepared chip samples delivered to the evaluator or at the developers site. They performed independent tests to supplement, augment and to verify the tests performed by the developer. The tests of the developer are repeated by sampling, by repetition of complete regression tests and by software routines developed by the evaluators and computed on samples with evaluation operating system. For the developer tests repeated by the evaluators other test parameters are used and the test equipment was varied. Security features of the TOE realised by specific design and layout measures were checked by the evaluators during layout inspections both in design data and on the final product. The evaluation provides evidence that the actual version of the TOE provides the Security Functionalities as specified by the developer. The test results confirm the correct implementation of the TOE Security Functionalities. For penetration testing the evaluators took all Security Functionalities into consideration. Intensive penetration testing was planned based on the analysis results and performed for the underlying mechanisms of Security Functionalities using bespoke equipment and expert know how. The penetration tests considered both the physical tampering of the TOE and attacks which do not modify the TOE physically. 8 Evaluated Configuration There are six major configuration options, denoted by different product names. P5CD016V1A, P5CD021V1A, P5CD041V1A, P5CD081V1A, P5CC081V1A and P5CN081V1A. Their major differences are related to availability of EEPROM space and the contactless interface The major configurations of the TOE support further configuration options as outlined in the Security Target [6] resp. [9], chapter 2.2. All TSF are active and usable. Information on how to use the TOE and its Security Functionalities by the software is provided within the user documentation. 9 Results of the Evaluation 9.1 CC specific results The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [7] was provided by the ITSEF according to the Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE. The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used for those components up to EAL4 extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 4 and guidance specific for the technology of the product [4] (AIS 34). The following guidance specific for the technology was used: (i) The Application of CC to Integrated Circuits (ii) Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards (see [4], AIS 25, AIS 26, AIS 36 and AIS 31). For RNG assessment the scheme interpretations AIS 31 was used (see [4]). 17 / 36 Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0555-2009 The assurance refinements outlined in the Security Target were followed in the course of the evaluation of the TOE. As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance components: ● All components of the EAL 5 package including the class ASE as defined in the CC (see also part C of this report) ● The components ALC_DVS.2, AVA_VAN.5 and ASE_TSS.2 augmented for this TOE evaluation. The evaluation has confirmed: ● PP Conformance: Security IC Protection Profile, Version 1.0, 23 August 2007, BSI-CC-PP-0035-2007 [10] ● for the Functionality: PP conformant plus product specific extensions Common Criteria Part 2 extended ● for the Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant EAL 5 augmented by ALC_DVS.2, AVA_VAN.5 and ASE_TSS.2 For specific evaluation results regarding the development and production environment see annex B in part D of this report. The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above. 9.2 Results of cryptographic assessment The following cryptoalgorithms were part of the rating: ● the TOE Security Functionality SS.HW_DES implements Triple-DES encryption and decryption ● the TOE Security Functionality SS.HW_AES implements AES encryption and decryption The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and decryption (see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2). This holds for: ● the TOE Security Functionality SS.HW_DES for Triple-DES and ● the TOE Security Functionality SS.HW_AES for AES The strength of the cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of this evaluation (see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2). But Cryptographic Functionalities with a security level of 80 bits or lower can no longer be regarded as secure against attacks with high attack potential without considering the application context. Therefore for these functionalities it shall be checked whether the related crypto operations are appropriate for the intended system. Some further hints and guidelines can be derived from the 'Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-02102' (www.bsi.bund.de). The Cryptographic Functionalities: 2-key Triple DES (2TDES) provided by the TOE have got a security level of maximum 80 Bits (in general context). 18 / 36 BSI-DSZ-CC-0555-2009 Certification Report 10 Obligations and notes for the usage of the TOE The guidance documentation ([12], [14] and [13]) contains all necessary information about the usage of the TOE. NXP will also provide either the Security Target [6] to customers or a “Lite” version of the Security Target [9], which omits some technical details within the rationale but contains the relevant information about the TOE itself. This includes the assumptions about the environment and usage of the TOE and the Security Functionality provided by the TOE. Note that this version of the ST conforms to AIS 35 [4]. The user of the TOE must abide by the following requirements: ● to follow the instructions in the user guidance documents and ● to ensure fulfilment of the assumptions about the environment in the Security Target 11 Security Target For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [9] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report. It is a sanitised version of the complete Security Target [6] used for the evaluation performed. Sanitisation was performed according to the rules as outlined in the relevant CCRA policy (see AIS 35 [4]) 12 Definitions 12.1 Acronyms BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for Information Security, Bonn, Germany BSIG BSI-Errichtungsgesetz CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation CPU Central Processing Unit DES Data Encryption Standard; symmetric block cipher algorithm DPA Differential Power Analysis EAL Evaluation Assurance Level EEPROM Electrically Erasable Programmable Read Only Memory ETR Evaluation Technical Report IC Integrated Circuit IT Information Technology ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility MMU Memory Management Unit OTP One Time Programmable (a certain part of the EEPROM) PP Protection Profile RAM Random Access Memory RNG Random Number Generator 19 / 36 Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0555-2009 ROM Read Only Memory SF Security Function SFP Security Function Policy SS Security Services ST Security Target TOE Target of Evaluation Triple-DES Symmetric block cipher algorithm based on the DES TSC TSF Scope of Control TSF TOE Security Functions TSP TOE Security Policy TSS TOE Summary Specification UART Universal Asynchronus Receiver and Transmitter 12.2 Glossary Augmentation - The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package. Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in part 3 of the CC. Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on well- established mathematical concepts. Informal - Expressed in natural language. Object - An passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon which subjects perform operations. Protection Profile - An implementation-independent statement of security needs for a TOE type. Security Target - An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific identified TOE. Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics. Subject - An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects. Target of Evaluation - A set of software, firmware and/or hardware possibly accompanied by guidance. TOE Security Functionality - A set consisting of all hardware, software, and firmware of the TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs. 20 / 36 BSI-DSZ-CC-0555-2009 Certification Report 13 Bibliography [1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1, Part 1: Introduction and general model, Revision 1, September 2006 Part 2: Security functional components, Revision 2, September 2007 Part 3: Security assurance components, Revision 2, September 2007 [2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM), Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Rev. 2, September 2007 [3] BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125) [4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE8 . [5] German IT Security Certifcates (BSI 7148, BSI 7149), periodically updated list published also in the BSI Website [6] Security Target BSI-DSZ-0555-2009, Version 1.3, September 21st, 2009, Security Target P5CD016/021/041V1A and P5Cx081V1A NXP Secure Smart Card, NXP Semiconductors, Business Line Identification (confidential document) [7] Evaluation Technical Report, V. 1.2, 3th November 2009, NXP P5CD081V1A Secure Smart Card Controller, T-Systems Gei GmbH (confidential document) [8] Configuration List for the P5CD016/021/041 and P5Cx081 family, Rev. 1.0, NXP Semiconductors, 24.09.2009 [9] Security Target Lite BSI-DSZ-0555-2009, Version 1.3, 21 September 2009, P5CD016/021/041V1A and P5Cx081V1A NXP Smart Card Controllers, NXP Semiconductors (sanitised public document) [10] Security IC Platform Protection Profile, Version 1.0, 15.06.2007, registered and certified by Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI) under reference BSI-CC-PP-0035 8 specifically • AIS 20, Version 1, 2. December 1999, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für deterministische Zufallszahlengeneratoren • AIS 25, Version 6, 7 September 2009, Anwendung der CC auf Integrierte Schaltungen including JIL Document and CC Supporting Document • AIS 26, Version 6, 7 May 2009, Evaluationsmethodologie für in Hardware integrierte Schaltungen including JIL Document and CC Supporting Document • AIS 31, Version 1, 25 Sept. 2001 Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für physikalische Zufallszahlengeneratoren • AIS 32, Version 1, 2 July 2001, Übernahme international abgestimmter CC-Interpretationen ins deutsche Zertifizierungsschema. • AIS 34, Version 2, 24 October 2008, Evaluation Methodology for CC Assurance Classes for EAL5+ • AIS 35, Version 2.0, 12 November 2007, Öffentliche Fassung des Security Targets (ST-Lite) including JIL Document and CC Supporting Document and CCRA policies • AIS 36, Version 2, 12 November 2007, Kompositionsevaluierung including JIL Document and CC Supporting Document • AIS 38, Version 2.0, 28 September 2007, Reuse of evaluation results 21 / 36 Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0555-2009 [11] ETR for composition according to AIS 36 for the Product NXP P5CD081V1A Secure Smart Card Controller, Version 1.0, 30.09.2009, BSI-DSZ-CC-0555, T-Systems GEI GmbH (confidential document) [12] Data Sheet, P5CD016/021/041 and P5Cx081, Secure dual interface and contact PKI Smart Card Controller, NXP Semiconductors, Revision 3.1, Document, Number: 148931, August 20th, 2009 [13] Instruction Set, SmartMX-Family, Secure and PKI Smart Card Controller, Philips Semiconductors, Revision 1.1, Document Number: 084111, July 04, 2006 [14] Guidance documentation for the TOE, Version 1.3, 16.09.2009, Guidance, Delivery and Operation Manual for the P5CD016/021/041 and P5Cx081, Secure Smart Card Controllers 22 / 36 BSI-DSZ-CC-0555-2009 Certification Report C Excerpts from the Criteria CC Part1: Conformance Claim (chapter 9.4) „The conformance claim indicates the source of the collection of requirements that is met by a PP or ST that passes its evaluation. This conformance claim contains a CC conformance claim that: ● describes the version of the CC to which the PP or ST claims conformance. ● describes the conformance to CC Part 2 (security functional requirements) as either: – CC Part 2 conformant - A PP or ST is CC Part 2 conformant if all SFRs in that PP or ST are based only upon functional components in CC Part 2, or – CC Part 2 extended - A PP or ST is CC Part 2 extended if at least one SFR in that PP or ST is not based upon functional components in CC Part 2. ● describes the conformance to CC Part 3 (security assurance requirements) as either: – CC Part 3 conformant - A PP or ST is CC Part 3 conformant if all SARs in that PP or ST are based only upon assurance components in CC Part 3, or – CC Part 3 extended - A PP or ST is CC Part 3 extended if at least one SAR in that PP or ST is not based upon assurance components in CC Part 3. Additionally, the conformance claim may include a statement made with respect to packages, in which case it consists of one of the following: ● Package name Conformant - A PP or ST is conformant to a pre-defined package (e.g. EAL) if: – the SFRs of that PP or ST are identical to the SFRs in the package, or – the SARs of that PP or ST are identical to the SARs in the package. ● Package name Augmented - A PP or ST is an augmentation of a predefined package if: – the SFRs of that PP or ST contain all SFRs in the package, but have at least one additional SFR or one SFR that is hierarchically higher than an SFR in the package. – the SARs of that PP or ST contain all SARs in the package, but have at least one additional SAR or one SAR that is hierarchically higher than an SAR in the package. Note that when a TOE is successfully evaluated to a given ST, any conformance claims of the ST also hold for the TOE. A TOE can therefore also be e.g. CC Part 2 conformant. Finally, the conformance claim may also include two statements with respect to Protection Profiles: ● PP Conformant - A PP or TOE meets specific PP(s), which are listed as part of the conformance result. ● Conformance Statement (Only for PPs) - This statement describes the manner in which PPs or STs must conform to this PP: strict or demonstrable. For more information on this Conformance Statement, see Annex A. 23 / 36 Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0555-2009 CC Part 3: Class APE: Protection Profile evaluation (chapter 10) “Evaluating a PP is required to demonstrate that the PP is sound and internally consistent, and, if the PP is based on one or more other PPs or on packages, that the PP is a correct instantiation of these PPs and packages. These properties are necessary for the PP to be suitable for use as the basis for writing an ST or another PP. Assurance Class Assurance Components Class APE: Protection Profile evaluation APE_INT.1 PP introduction APE_CCL.1 Conformance claims APE_SPD.1 Security problem definition APE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment APE_OBJ.2 Security objectives APE_ECD.1 Extended components definition APE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements APE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements APE: Protection Profile evaluation class decomposition” Class ASE: Security Target evaluation (chapter 11) “Evaluating an ST is required to demonstrate that the ST is sound and internally consistent, and, if the ST is based on one or more PPs or packages, that the ST is a correct instantiation of these PPs and packages. These properties are necessary for the ST to be suitable for use as the basis for a TOE evaluation.” 24 / 36 BSI-DSZ-CC-0555-2009 Certification Report Assurance Class Assurance Components Class ASE: Security Target evaluation ASE_INT.1 ST introduction ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims ASE_SPD.1 Security problem definition ASE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment ASE_OBJ.2 Security objectives ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition ASE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements ASE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification ASE_TSS.2 TOE summary specification with architectural design summary ASE: Security Target evaluation class decomposition Security assurance components (chapter 7) “The following Sections describe the constructs used in representing the assurance classes, families, and components.“ “Each assurance class contains at least one assurance family.” “Each assurance family contains one or more assurance components.” The following table shows the assurance class decompositon. Assurance Class Assurance Components ADV: Development ADV_ARC.1 Security architecture description ADV_FSP.1 Basic functional specification ADV_FSP.2 Security-enforcing functional specification ADV_FSP.3 Functional specification with complete summary ADV_FSP.4 Complete functional specification ADV_FSP.5 Complete semi-formal functional specification with additional error information ADV_FSP.6 Complete semi-formal functional specification with additional formal specification ADV_IMP.1 Implementation representation of the TSF ADV_IMP.2 Implementation of the TSF ADV_INT.1 Well-structured subset of TSF internals ADV_INT.2 Well-structured internals ADV_INT.3 Minimally complex internals ADV_SPM.1 Formal TOE security policy model ADV_TDS.1 Basic design ADV_TDS.2 Architectural design ADV_TDS.3 Basic modular design ADV_TDS.4 Semiformal modular design ADV_TDS.5 Complete semiformal modular design ADV_TDS.6 Complete semiformal modular design with formal high- 25 / 36 Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0555-2009 Assurance Class Assurance Components level design presentation AGD: Guidance documents AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures ALC: Life cycle support ALC_CMC.1 Labelling of the TOE ALC_CMC.2 Use of a CM system ALC_CMC.3 Authorisation controls ALC_CMC.4 Production support, acceptance procedures and automation ALC_CMC.5 Advanced support ALC_CMS.1 TOE CM coverage ALC_CMS.2 Parts of the TOE CM coverage ALC_CMS.3 Implementation representation CM coverage ALC_CMS.4 Problem tracking CM coverage ALC_CMS.5 Development tools CM coverage ALC_DEL.1 Delivery procedures ALC_DVS.1 Identification of security measures ALC_DVS.2 Sufficiency of security measures ALC_FLR.1 Basic flaw remediation ALC_FLR.2 Flaw reporting procedures ALC_FLR.3 Systematic flaw remediation ALC_LCD.1 Developer defined life-cycle model ALC_LCD.2 Measurable life-cycle model ALC_TAT.1 Well-defined development tools ALC_TAT.2 Compliance with implementation standards ALC_TAT.3 Compliance with implementation standards - all parts ATE_COV.1 Evidence of coverage ATE_COV.2 Analysis of coverage ATE_COV.3 Rigorous analysis of coverage ATE: Tests ATE_DPT.1 Testing: basic design ATE_DPT.2 Testing: security enforcing modules ATE_DPT.3 Testing: modular design ATE_DPT.4 Testing: implementation representation ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing ATE_FUN.2 Ordered functional testing ATE_IND.1 Independent testing – conformance ATE_IND.2 Independent testing – sample ATE_IND.3 Independent testing – complete AVA: Vulnerability assessment AVA_VAN.1 Vulnerability survey AVA_VAN.2 Vulnerability analysis AVA_VAN.3 Focused vulnerability analysis AVA_VAN.4 Methodical vulnerability analysis AVA_VAN.5 Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis Assurance class decomposition 26 / 36 BSI-DSZ-CC-0555-2009 Certification Report Evaluation assurance levels (chapter 8) “ The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that balances the level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of acquiring that degree of assurance. The CC approach identifies the separate concepts of assurance in a TOE at the end of the evaluation, and of maintenance of that assurance during the operational use of the TOE. It is important to note that not all families and components from CC Part 3 are included in the EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful and desirable assurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and components will be considered for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and STs for which they provide utility.” Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview (chapter 8.1) “Table 1 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a hierarchically ordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families. Each number in the resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component where applicable. As outlined in the next Section, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation assurance levels are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE's assurance. They are hierarchically ordered inasmuch as each EAL represents more assurance than all lower EALs. The increase in assurance from EAL to EAL is accomplished by substitution of a hierarchically higher assurance component from the same assurance family (i.e. increasing rigour, scope, and/or depth) and from the addition of assurance components from other assurance families (i.e. adding new requirements). These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as described in Chapter 7 of this CC Part 3. More precisely, each EAL includes no more than one component of each assurance family and all assurance dependencies of every component are addressed. While the EALs are defined in the CC, it is possible to represent other combinations of assurance. Specifically, the notion of “augmentation” allows the addition of assurance components (from assurance families not already included in the EAL) or the substitution of assurance components (with another hierarchically higher assurance component in the same assurance family) to an EAL. Of the assurance constructs defined in the CC, only EALs may be augmented. The notion of an “EAL minus a constituent assurance component” is not recognised by the standard as a valid claim. Augmentation carries with it the obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility and added value of the added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also be augmented with extended assurance requirements. 27 / 36 Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0555-2009 Assurance Class Assurance Family Assurance Components by Evaluation Assurance Level EAL1 EAL2 EAL3 EAL4 EAL5 EAL6 EAL7 Development ADV_ARC 1 1 1 1 1 1 ADV_FSP 1 2 3 4 5 5 6 ADV_IMP 1 1 2 2 ADV_INT 2 3 3 ADV_SPM 1 1 ADV_TDS 1 2 3 4 5 6 Guidance Documents AGD_OPE 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 AGD_PRE 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 Life cycle Support ALC_CMC 1 2 3 4 4 5 5 ALC_CMS 1 2 3 4 5 5 5 ALC_DEL 1 1 1 1 1 1 ALC_DVS 1 1 1 2 2 ALC_FLR ALC_LCD 1 1 1 1 2 ALC_TAT 1 2 3 3 Security Target Evaluation ASE_CCL 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 ASE_ECD 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 ASE_INT 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 ASE_OBJ 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 ASR_REQ 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 ASE_SPD 1 1 1 1 1 1 ASE_TSS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 Tests ATE_COV 1 2 2 2 3 3 ATE_DPT 1 2 3 3 4 ATE_FUN 1 1 1 1 2 2 ATE_IND 1 2 2 2 2 2 3 Vulnerability assessment AVA_VAN 1 2 2 3 4 5 5 Table 1: Evaluation assurance level summary” 28 / 36 BSI-DSZ-CC-0555-2009 Certification Report Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL1) - functionally tested (chapter 8.3) “Objectives EAL1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but the threats to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where independent assurance is required to support the contention that due care has been exercised with respect to the protection of personal or similar information. EAL1 requires only a limited security target. It is sufficient to simply state the SFRs that the TOE must meet, rather than deriving them from threats, OSPs and assumptions through security objectives. EAL1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer, including independent testing against a specification, and an examination of the guidance documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL1 evaluation could be successfully conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE, and for minimal outlay. An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a manner consistent with its documentation.” Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL2) - structurally tested (chapter 8.4) “Objectives EAL2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of design information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the part of the developer than is consistent with good commercial practise. As such it should not require a substantially increased investment of cost or time. EAL2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a low to moderate level of independently assured security in the absence of ready availability of the complete development record. Such a situation may arise when securing legacy systems, or where access to the developer may be limited.” Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL3) - methodically tested and checked (chapter 8.5) “Objectives EAL3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of existing sound development practises. EAL3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a moderate level of independently assured security, and require a thorough investigation of the TOE and its development without substantial re-engineering.” 29 / 36 Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0555-2009 Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL4) - methodically designed, tested, and reviewed (chapter 8.6) “Objectives EAL4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security engineering based on good commercial development practises which, though rigorous, do not require substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other resources. EAL4 is the highest level at which it is likely to be economically feasible to retrofit to an existing product line. EAL4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a moderate to high level of independently assured security in conventional commodity TOEs and are prepared to incur additional security-specific engineering costs.” Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL5) - semiformally designed and tested (chapter 8.7) “Objectives EAL5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security engineering based upon rigorous commercial development practises supported by moderate application of specialist security engineering techniques. Such a TOE will probably be designed and developed with the intent of achieving EAL5 assurance. It is likely that the additional costs attributable to the EAL5 requirements, relative to rigorous development without the application of specialised techniques, will not be large. EAL5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a high level of independently assured security in a planned development and require a rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable costs attributable to specialist security engineering techniques.” Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL6) - semiformally verified design and tested (chapter 8.8) “Objectives EAL6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security engineering techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to produce a premium TOE for protecting high value assets against significant risks. EAL6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in high risk situations where the value of the protected assets justifies the additional costs.” 30 / 36 BSI-DSZ-CC-0555-2009 Certification Report Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL7) - formally verified design and tested (chapter 8.9) “Objectives EAL7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in extremely high risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies the higher costs. Practical application of EAL7 is currently limited to TOEs with tightly focused security functionality that is amenable to extensive formal analysis.” Class AVA: Vulnerability assessment (chapter 16) “The AVA: Vulnerability assessment class addresses the possibility of exploitable vulnerabilities introduced in the development or the operation of the TOE.” Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VAN) (chapter 16.1) "Objectives Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether potential vulnerabilities identified, during the evaluation of the development and anticipated operation of the TOE or by other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses or quantitative or statistical analysis of the security behaviour of the underlying security mechanisms), could allow attackers to violate the SFRs. Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that an attacker will be able to discover flaws that will allow unauthorised access to data and functionality, allow the ability to interfere with or alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorised capabilities of other users.” 31 / 36 Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0555-2009 This page is intentionally left blank 32 / 36 BSI-DSZ-CC-0555-2009 Certification Report D Annexes List of annexes of this certification report Annex A: Security Target provided within a separate document. Annex B: Evaluation results regarding development and production environment 35 33 / 36 Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0555-2009 This page is intentionally left blank. 34 / 36 BSI-DSZ-CC-0555-2009 Certification Report Annex B of Certification ReportBSI-DSZ-CC-0555-2009 Evaluation results regarding development and production environment The IT product NXP Smart Card Controller P5CD081V1A and its major configurations P5CC081V1A, P5CN081V1A, P5CD041V1A, P5CD021V1A and P5CD016V1A each with IC dedicated Software (Target of Evaluation, TOE) has been evaluated at an accredited and approved evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 4 and guidance specific for the technology of the product for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1. As a result of the TOE certification, dated 10 November 2009, the following results regarding the development and production environment apply. The Common Criteria assurance requirements ALC – Life cycle support (i.e. ALC_CMC.4, ALC_CMS.5, ALC_DEL.1, ALC_DVS.2, ALC_LCD.1, ALC_TAT.2) are fulfilled for the development and production sites of the TOE listed below: 1. NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH, Business Line Identification, Georg-Heyken- Str. 1, D-21147 Hamburg (Development Center) 2. NXP Semiconductors (Thailand), Assembly Plant Bangkok, Thailand (APB), 303 Moo 3 Chaengwattana Rd., Laksi, Bangkok 10210 Thailand (Assembly, Test and Delivery) 3. Document Control Office, Mikron-Weg 1, A-8101 Gratkorn (Documentation) 4. Systems on Silicon Manufacturing Co. Pte. Ltd. (SSMC), 70 Pasir Ris Drive 1, Singapore 519527, Singapore (Semiconductor Factory) 5. Toppan Photomasks Korea Ltd., 345-1, Sooha-Ri ShinDoon-Myon, 467-840 Ichon, South Korea (Mask Shop) 6. Chipbond Technology Corporation, No. 3, Li-Hsin Rd. V, Science Based Industrial Park, Hsin-Chu City, Taiwan R.O.C. (Wafer Bumping) 7. NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH, IC Manufacturing Operations - Test Center Hamburg (IMO TeCH), Stresemannallee 101, D-22529 Hamburg (Delivery, Test and Assembly) 8. NedCard B.V., Bijsterhuizen 25-29, 6604 LM Wijchen, The Netherlands (Module Assembly) 9. HID Global Galway, Paic Tionscail na Tulaigh, Balle na hAbhann, Co. Galway, Ireland (Inlay Assembly) 10.Smartrac Technology GmbH, Wernerwerkstr. 2, 93049 Regensburg, Germany (Inlay assembly) 11. HID Global Erfurt, In den Weiden 4 B, 99099 Erfurt, Germany (Inlay assembly) 35 / 36 Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0555-2009 For the sites listed above, the requirements have been specifically applied in accordance with the Security Target [6]. The evaluators verified, that the threats, security objectives and requirements for the TOE life cycle phases up to delivery (as stated in the Security Target [6] and [9]) are fulfilled by the procedures of these sites. 36 / 36