NXP Secure Smart Card Controllers
P5CD016/021/041V1A and P5Cx081V1A
Security Target Lite
Rev. 1.3 — 21 September 2009 Evaluation documentation
- PUBLIC
BSI-DSZ-CC-0555
Document information
Info Content
Keywords CC, Security Target Lite, P5CD016/021/041V1A and P5Cx081V1A,
P5CD081
Abstract The document at hand is the Security Target of NXP Secure Smart Card
Controllers P5CD016/021/041V1A and P5Cx081V1A, which are
developed and provided by NXP Semiconductors, Business Line
Identification according to the Common Criteria for Information
Technology Security Evaluation Version 3.1 at Evaluation Assurance
Level 5 augmented.
NXP Semiconductors P5CD016/021/041V1A and P5Cx081V1A
Security Target Lite
PUBLIC
- © NXP B.V. 2009. All rights reserved.
Evaluation documentation Rev. 1.3 — 21 September 2009 2 of 67
Contact information
For additional information, please visit: http://www.nxp.com
For sales office addresses, please send an email to: salesaddresses@nxp.com
Revision history
Rev Date Description
1.2 7-Sep-2009 Derived from full ST V1.2
1.3 21-Sep-2009 corrections in sections 1.4.1.2 and 1.4.1.3
NXP Semiconductors
P5CD016/021/041V1A and P5Cx081V1A
Security Target Lite
PUBLIC
- © NXP B.V. 2009. All rights reserved.
Evaluation documentation Rev. 1.3 — 21 September 2009 3 of 67
1. ST Introduction
This chapter is divided into the following sections: “ST reference”, “TOE reference”, “TOE
overview” and “TOE Description”.
1.1 ST reference
“NXP Secure Smart Card Controllers P5CD016/021/041V1A and P5Cx081V1A Security
Target Lite, Rev. 1.2, NXP Semiconductors, 31 August 2009”.
1.2 TOE reference
NXP Secure Smart Card Controllers P5CD016/021/041V1A and P5Cx081V1A
1.3 TOE overview
1.3.1 Usage and major security functionality of the TOE
The TOE is the IC hardware of the microcontroller chip family of NXP Secure Smart Card
Controllers P5CD016/021/041V1A and P5Cx081V1A. The TOE also comprises IC
Dedicated Test Software for test purposes and IC Dedicated Support Software, both
stored in the Test-ROM of the microcontroller. The Smart Card Controller hardware
incorporates an 8-bit processing unit, volatile and non-volatile memories accessible via a
Memory Management Unit, cryptographic coprocessors, other security components and
two communication interfaces.
The TOE also includes a Data Sheet, a document describing the Instruction Set and the
Guidance Document. This documentation provides a description of the architecture and
the secure configuration and usage of the IC hardware by the Security IC Embedded
Software.
The security functionality of the TOE is designed to act as an integral part of a complete
security system in order to strengthen the design as a whole. Several security
mechanisms are completely implemented in and controlled by the TOE. Other security
mechanisms allow for configuration or even require handling of exceptions by the
Security IC Embedded Software. With different CPU modes and a Memory Management
Unit the TOE is intended to support multi-application projects.
On-chip memories are ROM, EEPROM and RAM. The non-volatile EEPROM can be
used as data or program memory. It contains high reliability cells, which guarantee data
integrity. This is perfect for applications requiring non-volatile data storage and important
for the use as memory for native programs. Security functionality protects the contents of
all memories.
A Security IC must provide high security in particular when being used in the banking and
finance market or in electronic commerce applications. Hence the TOE shall
• maintain the integrity and the confidentiality of code and data stored in its memories
and
• maintain the different CPU modes with the related capabilities for configuration and
memory access and
• maintain the integrity, the correct operation and the confidentiality of security
functionality provided by the TOE.
This is ensured by the construction of the TOE and its security functionality.
NXP Semiconductors
P5CD016/021/041V1A and P5Cx081V1A
Security Target Lite
PUBLIC
- © NXP B.V. 2009. All rights reserved.
Evaluation documentation Rev. 1.3 — 21 September 2009 4 of 67
P5CD016/021/041V1A and P5Cx081V1A basically provides a hardware platform for a
smartcard with
• functionality to calculate the Data Encryption Standard (Triple-DES) with up to three
keys,
• functionality to calculate the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) with different key
lengths,
• support for large integer arithmetic operations like multiplication, addition and logical
operations, which is suitable for public key cryptography and elliptic curve
cryptography,
• a Random Number Generator,
• memory management control,
• cyclic redundancy check (CRC) calculation,
• ISO/IEC 7816 contact interface with UART,
• contactless interface supporting MIFARE and ISO/IEC 14443 A.
In addition, several security mechanisms are implemented to ensure proper operation as
well as integrity and confidentiality of stored data. For example, this includes security
mechanisms for memory protection and sensors, which allow operation under specified
conditions only.
Note: Large integer arithmetic operations are intended to be used for calculation
of asymmetric cryptographic algorithms. Any asymmetric cryptographic
algorithm utilising the support for large integer arithmetic operations has to
be implemented in Security IC Embedded Software. Thus, the support for
large integer arithmetic operations itself does not provide security
functionality like cryptographic support. The Security IC Embedded
Software implementing an asymmetric cryptographic algorithm is not
included in this evaluation. Nevertheless the support for large integer
arithmetic operations is part of the Security IC and therefore a security
relevant component of the TOE, that must resist to the attacks mentioned in
this Security Target and that must operate correctly as specified in the Data
Sheet. The same scope of evaluation is applied to the CRC calculation.
1.3.2 TOE type
The TOE is the family of NXP Secure Smart Card Controllers P5CD016/021/041V1A and
P5Cx081V1A. The TOE includes the IC hardware, IC Designer/Manufacturer proprietary
IC Dedicated Test Software and IC Dedicated Support Software.
The TOE is delivered in a module, inlay or package, or as a sawn wafer.
1.3.3 Required non-TOE hardware/software/firmware
None
NXP Semiconductors
P5CD016/021/041V1A and P5Cx081V1A
Security Target Lite
PUBLIC
- © NXP B.V. 2009. All rights reserved.
Evaluation documentation Rev. 1.3 — 21 September 2009 5 of 67
1.4 TOE Description
1.4.1 Physical Scope of TOE
P5CD016/021/041V1A and P5Cx081V1A is manufactured in an advanced CMOS
process. A block diagram is depicted in Fig 1.
RF
INTERFACE
LA
LB
IO1
IO3
PROGRAMMABLE
IO 1, 2, 3
IO2
CLK
RST_N
VDD VSS
CIU
ISO 14443
ROM
264 KB
PROGRAM
MEMORY
SECURE_MX51 CPU
7680 B
DATA
MEMORY
EEPROM
16 KB/40 KB/
80 KB
DATA AND
PROGRAM
MEMORY
CRC16
FAST
RNG
TIMERS
16-bit
T0
16-bit
T1
RAM
FameXE
ENHANCED PUBLIC
KEY
COPROCESSOR e.g.
RSA, ECC
AES
COPROCESSOR
TRIPLE-DES
COPROCESSOR
UART
ISO 7816
CLOCK
FILTER
SECURITY SENSORS
RESET GENERATION
VOLTAGE REGULATOR
MEMORY MANAGEMENT UNIT (MMU)
CLOCK
GENERATION
P5CD016 P5CD041 P5CD081
Fig 1. Block Diagram of P5CD016/021/041V1A and P5Cx081V1A
The TOE consists of the IC hardware and the IC Dedicated Software as composed of IC
Dedicated Test Software and IC Dedicated Support Software. All other software is called
Security IC Embedded Software and is not part of the TOE. The following table lists the
TOE components.
TOE components
Table 1. Components of the TOE
Type Name Release Date Form of delivery
IC
Hardware
NXP Secure Smart Card
Controllers
P5CD016/021/041V1A and
P5Cx081V1A
V1A T046B_20090210
.gds2
Wafer, modules
and packages (dice
include reference
T046B)
IC
Dedicated
Test
Software
Test-ROM Software 87 16 January 2009 Test-ROM on the
chip, tmfos_87.lst
NXP Semiconductors
P5CD016/021/041V1A and P5Cx081V1A
Security Target Lite
PUBLIC
- © NXP B.V. 2009. All rights reserved.
Evaluation documentation Rev. 1.3 — 21 September 2009 6 of 67
Type Name Release Date Form of delivery
Boot-ROM Software 87 16 January 2009 Test-ROM on the
chip, tmfos_87.lst
IC
Dedicated
Support
Software MIFARE Operating System 87 16 January 2009 Test-ROM on the
chip, tmfos_87.lst
Document Data Sheet P5CD016/021/041
and P5Cx081 family, Secure
dual interface and contact PKI
smart card controller
Electronic
document
Document Instruction Set, SmartMX-
Family, Secure and PKI Smart
Card Controller
1.1 4 July 2006 Electronic
document
Document Guidance, Delivery and
Operation Manual NXP Secure
Smartcard Controllers
P5CD016/021/041 and
P5Cx081
Electronic
document
1.4.1.1 Evaluated hardware configurations
Six major configuration options are present, which are denoted by product names
P5CD016V1A, P5CD021V1A, P5CD041V1A, P5CD081V1A, P5CC081V1A and
P5CN081V1A. All of them are equipped with an EEPROM of 80 kBytes and both, the
ISO/IEC 7816 contact interface and the ISO/IEC 14443 contactless interface. Their major
differences are related to availability of EEPROM space and the contactless interface as
detailed below.
The minor configuration options of all major configurations are described in
subsection 1.4.1.2.
Major configuration P5CD016V1A
P5CD016V1A supports all minor configuration options presented in subsection 1.4.1.2.
Its major differences to other configurations are as follows.
• The EEPROM space available to the Security IC Embedded Software is reduced to
16 kBytes minus 256 Bytes, which are reserved for Security Rows (128 Bytes) and
configuration data (128 Bytes).
• The contactless interface is enabled and configured for contactless communication
according to ISO/IEC 14443 A in [22] and [23].
Major configuration P5CD021V1A
P5CD021V1A supports all minor configuration options presented in subsection 1.4.1.2.
Its major differences to other configurations are as follows.
• The EEPROM space available to the Security IC Embedded Software is reduced to
20 kBytes minus 256 Bytes, which are reserved for Security Rows (128 Bytes) and
configuration data (128 Bytes).
• The contactless interface is enabled and configured for contactless communication
according to ISO/IEC 14443 A in [22] and [23].
NXP Semiconductors
P5CD016/021/041V1A and P5Cx081V1A
Security Target Lite
PUBLIC
- © NXP B.V. 2009. All rights reserved.
Evaluation documentation Rev. 1.3 — 21 September 2009 7 of 67
Major configuration P5CD041V1A
P5CD041V1A supports all minor configuration options presented in subsection 1.4.1.2.
Its major differences to other configurations are as follows.
• The EEPROM space available to the Security IC Embedded Software is reduced to
40 kBytes minus 256 Bytes, which are reserved for Security Rows (128 Bytes) and
configuration data (128 Bytes).
• The contactless interface is enabled and configured for contactless communication
according to ISO/IEC 14443 A in [22] and [23].
Major configuration P5CD081V1A
P5CD081V1A supports all minor configuration options presented in subsection 1.4.1.2.
Its major differences to other configurations are as follows.
• The physically implemented EEPROM of 80 kBytes is available to the Security IC
Embedded Software except for 256 Bytes, which are reserved for Security Rows
(128 Bytes) and configuration data of the manufacturer (128 Bytes).
• The contactless interface is enabled and configured for contactless communication
according to ISO14443 A in [22] and [23].
Major configuration P5CC081V1A
P5CC081V1A supports all minor configuration options presented in subsection 1.4.1.2.
Its major differences to other configurations are as follows.
• The physically implemented EEPROM of 80 kBytes is available to the Security IC
Embedded Software except for 256 Bytes, which are reserved for Security Rows
(128 Bytes) and configuration data (128 Bytes).
• The contactless interface is disabled.
Major configuration P5CN081V1A
P5CN081V1A supports all minor configuration options presented in subsection 1.4.1.2.
Its major differences to other configurations are as follows.
• The physically implemented EEPROM of 80 kBytes is available to the Security IC
Embedded Software except for 256 Bytes, which are reserved for Security Rows
(128 Bytes) and configuration data (128 Bytes).
• The contactless interface is enabled and configured in S²C mode. The TOE now can
be used for Near Field Communication (NFC) [24], for which an additional NFC
helper IC is connected to IO3/SIGIN and LB/SIGOUT. However, it is possible that the
TOE is powered in an appropriate electrical field when an antenna is connected to
LA and LB. Pad I/O3 is connected to the NFC helper IC and can not be used for
contact communication according to ISO 7816.
1.4.1.2 Common minor configuration options
The following minor configuration options can be selected by the customer via order
entry forms.
NXP Semiconductors
P5CD016/021/041V1A and P5Cx081V1A
Security Target Lite
PUBLIC
- © NXP B.V. 2009. All rights reserved.
Evaluation documentation Rev. 1.3 — 21 September 2009 8 of 67
Table 2. Evaluated minor configuration options
Name Values Description
EDATASCALE 10h up to FFh This value determines the size of the memory area
available for the extended stack pointer. Refer to
section 10.5 of [8].
Card Disable
Function
Yes or No When the Card Disable Function is enabled, the TOE
can be locked completely. Once set by the Security IC
Embedded Software, the execution of the Security IC
Embedded Software is inhibited after the next reset.
Refer to section 29.4 of [8].
Block ROM read
instructions
executed from
EEPROM
Yes or No Instructions executed from EEPROM are allowed or
not to read ROM contents. Refer to section 10.1.1.9
of [8].
Inverse EEPROM
Error Correction
Yes or No If inverse error correction is activated the detection
probability of fault injections to the EEPROM can be
increased. Refer to section 10.9.9 of [8].
128 Byte Page
Mode
Yes or No In the 128 Byte Page Mode up to 128 Bytes of
EEPROM can be programmed simultaneously,
instead of up to 64 Bytes. Refer to section 10.9.1 of
[8].
MIFARE Emulation A, B1 or B4 Different MIFARE configurations refer to chapter 21 of
[8].
UID in MIFARE
Emulation A
Single or Double The size of the UID can be 4 bytes (Single UID) or 7
bytes (Double UID). Refer to section 11.1.1 of [8].
Contactless
communication
protocol
(i) “proprietary
protocol (compliant
to ISO 14443 part
3)”;
(ii) “T=CL protocol
(compliant to ISO
14443 part 3 and
part 4)”
Refer to section 21 of [8].
Maximum CIU
Baudrate
106, 212, 424 or
848 kBaud
Defines the maximum available baudrate of the
contactless interface. Refer to section 21 of [8].
Extended Voltage
Class B activated
Yes or No If Extended Voltage Class B is activated, the usable
"3V supply voltage range" is extended to lower values
than the minimum Class B supply voltage 2.7 V, and
Class C operation is not supported.
“Class BE” supply voltage range: 2.2 V VDD 3.3 V.
Refer to sections 34.1.3, 35.2, 29.2.2, 5 and 33 of [8].
Voltage Class C
operation activated
Yes or No If Voltage Class C is activated, supply voltage range
is: 1.62 V VDD 1.98 V.
Refer to sections 34.1.3, 35.2, 29.2.2, 5 and 33 of [8].
NXP Semiconductors
P5CD016/021/041V1A and P5Cx081V1A
Security Target Lite
PUBLIC
- © NXP B.V. 2009. All rights reserved.
Evaluation documentation Rev. 1.3 — 21 September 2009 9 of 67
Name Values Description
Requested LA/LB
input capacitance
17 pF or 69 pF Additional capacitance (2x26 pF) between LA/LB
required to meet resonance frequency at ID1/2
operation.
Simultaneous
Operation of
ISO/IEC 7816 and
ISO/IEC 14443
applications
Yes or No Disables the Low Frequency Sensor to allow parallel
operation via contact and contactless interfaces. The
Low Frequency Sensor is disabled only when the
CPU is free-running or runs at an internal clock.
The values of all options listed in Table 2 can be chosen independently.
The Order Entry Forms [11], [12], [13], [14], [15] and [16] contain a further option, which
must be selected with a fixed value:
• The option “Allow execution from RAM” must be selected with “No”.
1.4.1.3 Evaluated package types
A number of package types is supported for each major configuration of the TOE. The
commercial types are named according to the following format.
• P5CD016pp/T1Arrffz for major configuration P5CD016V1A
• P5CD021pp/T1Arrffz for major configuration P5CD021V1A
• P5CD041pp/T1Arrffz for major configuration P5CD041V1A
• P5CD081pp/T1Arrffz for major configuration P5CD081V1A
• P5CC081pp/T1Arrffz for major configuration P5CC081V1A
• P5CN081pp/T1Arrffz for major configuration P5CN081V1A
The commercial type name of each major configuration varies with the package type as
indicated by the variable pp, - and with the Security IC Embedded Software as indicated
by the variables rr, ff and z. The variables are replaced according to the rules in Table 3.
Table 3. Variable definitions for commercial type names
Variable Definition
pp This is a two character identifier for the package type, e.g. “UA” for a sawn wafer of
150µm thickness with electronically marked defects. The different types are defined
in Table 4.
rr ROM code number, different for every Security IC Embedded Software
ff FabKey number, multiple keys are supported for each Security IC Embedded
Software
z MIFARE Configuration (0=A, 1=B1, 4=B4)
Table 4 depicts the package types, which are supported in this Security Target, and
assigns these to the major configuration types. The two characters in each entry of the
table stand for pp, and identify the package type. An empty cell means that the Security
Target does not support the respective package type for the corresponding major
configuration.
NXP Semiconductors
P5CD016/021/041V1A and P5Cx081V1A
Security Target Lite
PUBLIC
- © NXP B.V. 2009. All rights reserved.
Evaluation documentation Rev. 1.3 — 21 September 2009 10 of 67
Table 4. Supported commercial types
P5CD016V1A
P5CD021V1A
P5CD041V1A
P5CD081V1A
P5CC081V1A
P5CN081V1A
UA UA UA UA UA UA 150µm sawn wafer, inkless
UE UE UE UE 75µm sawn wafer, inkless
X0 X0 PCM1.1 module
XS XS PCM1.1 module dual source
XD XD PCM1.1 silver module
X0 X0 X0 X0 PDM1.1 module
X1 X1 X1 X1 PDM1.1 plug-in module
XD XD XD XD PDM1.1 silver module
XE XE XE XE PDM1.1 plug-in silver module
XG PDM1.1 silver module special bonding IO3
A4 A4 A4 MOB4 module
A6 A6 A6 MOB6 module
Ai Ai
Inlay
(The letter ‘i” in “Ai” stands for a capital letter,
which identifies both, the inlay type and the
module type inside the inlay.)
For example, the commercial type name “P5CD081A4/T1Arrffz” denotes a P5CD081V1A
in a MOB4 module and “P5CD081UA/T1Arrffz” denotes a P5CC081V1A on a 150µm
sawn wafer inkless, which means that the defect ICs are electronically marked.
The package types do not influence the security functionality of the TOE. They only
define which pads are connected in the package and for what purpose the chip can be
used. Note that the security of the TOE is not dependent on which pad is connected or
not – the connections just define how the product can be used. If the TOE is delivered as
wafer the customer can choose the connection on his own.
Security during development and production is ensured for all package types listed
above, please refer to section 1.4.3.
As already described above the complete resulting commercial type name is dependent
on the customer software, i.e. the Security IC Embedded Software. Thus, a full
commercial product name, which fits in the variable forms described in Table 4,
determines an evaluated hardware, but gives no conclusion on the Security IC
Embedded Software and whether it uses the proper hardware configuration as detailed in
subsection 1.4.1.2.
1.4.2 Logical Scope of TOE
1.4.2.1 Hardware Description
The CPU of P5CD016/021/041V1A and P5Cx081V1A has an 8-bit architecture with an
instruction set, that is extended from the 80C51 family instruction set. The first and in
some cases the second byte of an instruction are used for operation encoding.
NXP Semiconductors
P5CD016/021/041V1A and P5Cx081V1A
Security Target Lite
PUBLIC
- © NXP B.V. 2009. All rights reserved.
Evaluation documentation Rev. 1.3 — 21 September 2009 11 of 67
P5CD016/021/041V1A and P5Cx081V1A distinguishes five CPU modes, which are
summarised in the following table.
Table 5. CPU modes of the TOE
Super System Mode
Boot Mode Test Mode MIFARE Mode System Mode User Mode
Boot Mode, Test Mode and MIFARE Mode are sub-modes of the so-called Super System
Mode. These three modes are not available to the Security IC Embedded Software, they
are reserved for the IC Dedicated Software. The IC Dedicated Software is composed of
the Boot-ROM Software, the Test-ROM Software and the MIFARE Operating System as
introduced in section 1.4.1. The three software components are mapped one-to-one to
the three modes: In Boot Mode the TOE executes the Boot-ROM Software, in Test Mode
the TOE executes the Test-ROM Software and in MIFARE Mode the TOE executes the
MIFARE Operating System. Please note that the Super System Mode is not a mode on
its own: When the TOE is in Super System Mode, it is always either in Boot Mode, Test
Mode or MIFARE Mode, depending on the settings of an internal register, which is not
available to the Security IC Embedded Software.
P5CD016/021/041V1A and P5Cx081V1A is able to control two different logical phases.
After production of the IC hardware every start-up or reset completes with Test Mode and
execution of the Test-ROM Software. The Test Mode is disabled at the end of the
production test. Afterwards, every start-up or reset ends up in System Mode and
execution of the Security IC Embedded Software.
System Mode and User Mode are available to the developer of the Security IC
Embedded Software. The System Mode provides unlimited access to the hardware
components. In User Mode the access is restricted to the CPU and specific Special
Function Registers. Access rights to hardware components for software running in User
Mode can be granted by software running in System Mode. The hardware components
are controlled by the Security IC Embedded Software via Special Function Registers.
Special Function Registers are interrelated to the the activities of the CPU, the Memory
Management Unit, interrupt control, I/O configuration, EEPROM, timers, UART, the
contactless interface and the coprocessors.
Communication with P5CD016/021/041V1A and P5Cx081V1A can be established via the
contact interface through UART or direct usage of the I/O ports. Contactless
communication is done via the contactless interface unit (CIU) compatible to MIFARE
and ISO/IEC 14443. P5CD016/021/041V1A and P5Cx081V1A provides two types of
interrupts: (i) exception interrupts, called “exception” in the following and (ii) event
interrupts, called “interrupts” in the following. Exceptions and interrupts each force a jump
to a specific fixed vector address in the ROM. Any exception and interrupt can therefore
be controlled and guided by a specific part of the Security IC Embedded Software. In
conjunction with the jump to a specific fixed vector address the IC hardware always
enables a pre-defined CPU mode, which is either System Mode or User Mode. In
addition, the P5CD016/021/041V1A and P5Cx081V1A provides eight configuration
vectors (CVEC) and 32 system call vectors (SVEC). These vectors have to be explicitly
called by the Security IC Embedded Software. A jump to a configuration vector forces
MIFARE Mode, a jump to a system call vector forces System Mode.
Special hardware protects and separates the CPU modes from each other in particular
consideration of Boot Mode and Test Mode.
NXP Semiconductors
P5CD016/021/041V1A and P5Cx081V1A
Security Target Lite
PUBLIC
- © NXP B.V. 2009. All rights reserved.
Evaluation documentation Rev. 1.3 — 21 September 2009 12 of 67
P5CD016/021/041V1A and P5Cx081V1A incorporates 288 kBytes of ROM, 7680 Bytes
of RAM and 80 kBytes of EEPROM. Access control to all three memory types is enforced
by a Memory Management Unit. The Memory Management Unit partitions each memory
into two parts: The ROM is partitioned in 264 kBytes Application-ROM and 24 kBytes
Test-ROM. The EEPROM is partitioned depending on the configuration, 128 Bytes are
always reserved for the manufacturer and either zero, one or four kBytes are additionally
reserved for the MIFARE Operating System according to the MIFARE configurations A,
B1 or B4. The RAM is also partitioned depending on the configuration, either 0 Byte for
MIFARE configuration A and the whole 7680 Bytes for the application, or 128 Bytes for
MIFARE configurations B1 or B4 and the remaining 7552 Bytes for the application. Note
that the ROM size is displayed as 264 kBytes in the block diagram in Fig 1 because only
264 kBytes are available to the Security IC Embedded Software.
In Test Mode the CPU has unrestricted access to the all memories. In Boot Mode and
MIFARE Mode access is limited to the Test-ROM, the 128 kBytes EEPROM plus its
configured part of zero, one or four kBytes and the configured part of 0 or 128 kBytes
RAM. All other parts of the memories are accessible in System Mode and User Mode,
namely the Application-ROM and the larger parts of EEPROM and RAM. User Mode is
further restricted by the Memory Management Unit, which can be configured in System
Mode.
The RAM, which is available to the Security IC Embedded Software, is further split in two
parts. These are 5120 or 4992 Bytes general purpose RAM depending on the MIFARE
configuration and 2560 Bytes FameXE RAM. Both parts are accessible to the CPU, but
the FameXE coprocessor can only access the FameXE RAM. The FameXE can access
the FameXE RAM without control of access rights by the Memory Management Unit.
Since the Memory Management Unit does not control accesses of the FameXE, software
which has access to the FameXE implicitly has access to the FameXE RAM. This also
holds for the EEPROM, which is available to the Security IC Embedded Software.
FameXE accesses to this part of the EEPROM are not controlled by the Memory
Management Unit, i.e. software, which has access to the FameXE, implicitly has access
to this part of the EEPROM.
The Triple-DES coprocessor supports single DES and Triple-DES operations. Only
Triple-DES is used in this evaluation, in 2-key or 3-key operation. The AES coprocessor
supports AES operation with three different key lengths. The FameXE coprocessor
supplies basic arithmetic functions to support implementation of asymmetric
cryptographic algorithms by the Security IC Embedded Software. The random generator
provides true random numbers without pseudo random calculation.
P5CD016/021/041V1A and P5Cx081V1A operates with a single power supply of 1.8 V, 3
V or 5 V nominal. The maximum external clock frequency is 10 MHz nominal.
P5CD016/021/041V1A and P5Cx081V1A can be operated as well with an internal clock.
This decreases the calculation time of security algorithms. P5CD016/021/041V1A and
P5Cx081V1A provides power saving modes with reduced activity. These are named
IDLE Mode and SLEEP Mode, of which the latter one includes CLOCK STOP Mode.
The TOE protects secret data, which are stored to and operated by the TOE, against
physical tampering. The security functionality of a Security IC is partially provided by the
TOE, and completed by the Security IC Embedded Software. This causes dependencies
between the security functionality of the TOE and the security functionality provided by
the Security IC Embedded Software.
NXP Semiconductors
P5CD016/021/041V1A and P5Cx081V1A
Security Target Lite
PUBLIC
- © NXP B.V. 2009. All rights reserved.
Evaluation documentation Rev. 1.3 — 21 September 2009 13 of 67
1.4.2.2 Software Description
Operating system and applications of a Security IC are developed by the customers and
included under the heading Security IC Embedded Software. The Security IC Embedded
Software is stored in the Application-ROM and/or in the EEPROM and is not part of the
TOE. The Security IC Embedded Software depends on the usage of the Security IC.
The IC Dedicated Test Software, which is named Test-ROM Software, is stored to the
Test-ROM and used by the manufacturer of the Security IC during production test. The
test functionality is disabled before operational use of the Security IC by disabling the
Test Mode of the CPU in hardware. The IC Dedicated Test Software is developed by
NXP and embedded in the Test-ROM. The Test-ROM Software includes the test
operating system, test routines for the various blocks of the circuitry, control flags for the
status of the EEPROM’s Security Rows and shutdown functions to ensure that security
relevant test operations can not be executed illegally after phase 3.
The Dedicated Support Software is also stored to the Test-ROM and consists of two
parts.
• The Boot-ROM Software, which is executed during start-up or reset of the TOE, i.e.
each time when the TOE powers up or resets. It sets up the TOE and its basic
configuration.
• The MIFARE Operating System, which provides MIFARE functionality to the Security
IC Embedded Software. The MIFARE Operating System provides support for
contactless communication. Please refer to [25] for more information.
1.4.2.3 Documentation
The data sheet “Data Sheet P5CD016/021/041 and P5Cx081 family, Secure dual
interface and contact PKI smart card controller” [8] contains a functional description and
guidelines for the use of the security functionality, as needed to develop Security IC
Embedded Software. The instruction set of the CPU is described in “Instruction Set,
SmartMX-Family, Secure and PKI Smart Card Controller” [9]. The manual “Guidance,
Delivery and Operation Manual NXP Secure Smartcard Controllers P5CD016/021/041
and P5Cx081” [10] describes aspects of the program interface and the use of
programming techniques to improve the security. The whole documentation shall be
used by the developer to develop the Security IC Embedded Software.
1.4.3 Security during Development and Production
The Security IC product life-cycle is scheduled in phases as introduced in the PP [6]. IC
Development as well as IC Manufacturing and Testing, which are phases 2 and 3 of the
life-cycle, are part of the evaluation. The Security IC is delivered at the end of phase 3 or
after IC Packaging, which is phase 4 in the life-cycle, and then part of the evaluation as
well. The development and production environment of the TOE ranges from phase 2 to
TOE Delivery.
With respect to Application Note 3 in [6] the TOE supports the authentic delivery using
the FabKey feature. For details on this feature please refer to the data sheet in [8] and
the manual in [10].
During the design and the layout process only people involved in the specific
development project for an IC have access to sensitive data. Different people are
responsible for the design data and for customer related data. The security measures
installed within NXP ensure a secure computer system and provide appropriate
equipment for the different development tasks.
NXP Semiconductors
P5CD016/021/041V1A and P5Cx081V1A
Security Target Lite
PUBLIC
- © NXP B.V. 2009. All rights reserved.
Evaluation documentation Rev. 1.3 — 21 September 2009 14 of 67
The verified layout data is provided by the developers of NXP Semiconductors, Business
Line Identification directly to the wafer fab. The wafer fab generates and forwards the
layout data related to the different photo masks to the manufacturer of the photo masks.
The photo masks are generated off-site and verified against the design data of the
development before the usage. Accountability and traceability are ensured among the
wafer fab and the photo mask provider.
The production of the wafers includes two different steps regarding the production flow.
In the first step the wafers are produced with the fixed masks independent of the
customer. After that step the wafers are completed with the customer specific mask and
the remaining fixed masks. The computer tracking ensures control of the complete
process including storage of the semi-finished wafers.
The test process of every die is performed by a test centre of NXP. Delivery processes
between the involved sites provide accountability and traceability of the produced wafers.
NXP embeds the dice into modules, inlays or packages based on customer demand.
Information about non-functional items is stored on magnetic/optical media enclosed with
the delivery or the non-functional items are physically marked. In summary, the TOE can
be delivered in four different forms, which are
• dice on wafers
• smartcard modules on a module reel
• inlays
• packaged devices in tubes or reels
The availability of major configuration options of the TOE in package types is detailed in
section 1.4.1.3.
1.4.4 TOE Intended Usage
The end-consumer environment of the TOE is phase 7 of the Security IC product life-
cycle in the PP [6]. In this phase the Security IC product is in usage by the end-
consumer. Its method of use now depends on the application. Security ICs are used to
assure authorised conditional access in a wide range of applications. Examples are
identity cards, Banking Cards, Pay-TV, Portable communication SIM cards, Health cards,
Transportation cards. The end-user environment covers a wide spectrum of very different
functions, thus making it difficult to monitor and avoid abuse of the TOE. The TOE is
intended to be used in an insecure environment, which does not protect against threats.
The device is developed for most high-end safeguarded applications, and is designed for
embedding into chip cards according to ISO/IEC 7816 [20] and for contactless
applications. Usually a Security IC (e.g. a smartcard) is assigned to a single individual
only, but it may also be used by multiple applications in a multi-provider environment.
Therefore the TOE might store and process secrets of several systems, which must be
protected from each other. The TOE then must meet security requirements for each
single security module. Secret data shall be used as input for calculation of
authentication data, calculation of signatures and encryption of data and keys.
In development and production environment of the TOE the Security IC Embedded
Software developer and system integrators such as the terminal software developer may
use samples of the TOE for their testing purposes. It is not intended that they are able to
change the behaviour of the Security IC in another way than an end-consumer.
The user environment of the TOE ranges from TOE delivery to phase 7 of the Security IC
product life-cycle, and must be a controlled environment up to phase 6.
NXP Semiconductors
P5CD016/021/041V1A and P5Cx081V1A
Security Target Lite
PUBLIC
- © NXP B.V. 2009. All rights reserved.
Evaluation documentation Rev. 1.3 — 21 September 2009 15 of 67
Note: The phases from TOE Delivery to phase 7 of the Security IC Product life-
cycle are not part of the TOE construction process in the sense of this
Security Target. Information about these phases is just included to describe
how the TOE is used after its construction. Nevertheless such security
functionality of the TOE, that is independent of the Security IC Embedded
Software, is active at TOE Delivery and can not be disabled by the Security
IC Embedded Software in the following phases.
1.4.5 Interface of the TOE
The electrical interface of the TOE are the pads to connect the lines power supply, reset
input, clock input, ground, serial communication pads I/O1, I/O2 and I/O3 as well as two
pads (called LA and LB) for the antenna of the contactless interface unit.
The software interface of the TOE depends on the CPU mode.
• In the Boot Mode the Boot-ROM Software is executed which provides no interface.
There is no possibility to interact with this software.
• In the Test Mode (used after production before delivery of the TOE) the logical
interface that is visible on the electrical interface is defined by the IC Dedicated Test
Software. This IC Dedicated Test Software comprises the test operating system and
the package of test function calls stored in the Test-ROM.
• In the MIFARE Mode the MIFARE Operating System is executed by the CPU – only
on request by the Security IC Embedded Software.
• In the System Mode and User Mode (used after TOE Delivery) the software interface
is the set of instructions, the bits in the special function registers that are related to
these modes and the physical address map of the CPU including memories. The
access to the special function registers as well as to the memories depends on the
CPU mode configured by the Security IC Embedded Software.
Note: The logical interface of the TOE that is visible on the electrical interface
after TOE Delivery is based on the Security IC Embedded Software
developed by the software developer. The identification and authentication
of the user for the different CPU modes must be controlled by the Security
IC Embedded Software.
The chip surface can be seen as an interface of the TOE, too. This interface must be
taken into account regarding environmental stress e.g. like temperature and in the case
of an attack where the attacker manipulates the chip surface.
Note: An external voltage and timing supply as well as a data interface are
necessary for the operation of the TOE. Beyond the physical behaviour the
data interface is defined by the Security IC Embedded Software.
NXP Semiconductors
P5CD016/021/041V1A and P5Cx081V1A
Security Target Lite
PUBLIC
- © NXP B.V. 2009. All rights reserved.
Evaluation documentation Rev. 1.3 — 21 September 2009 16 of 67
2. Conformance Claims
This chapter is divided into the following sections: “CC Conformance Claim", "Package
claim", "PP claim", and "Conformance Claim Rationale”.
2.1 CC Conformance Claim
This Security Target claims to be conformant to version 3.1 of Common Criteria for
Information Technology Security Evaluation according to
• “Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation – Part 1:
Introduction and general model, Version 3.1, Revision 1, September 2006, CCMB-
2006-09-001” [1]
• “Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation – Part 2: Security
functional requirements, Version 3.1, Revision 2, September 2007, CCMB-2007-09-
002” [2]
• “Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation – Part 3: Security
Assurance Requirements, Version 3.1, Revision 2, September 2007, CCMB-2007-
09-003” [3]
The following methodology will be used for the evaluation.
• “Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation CEM-99/045
Part 2: Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Revision 2, September 2007, CCMB-
2007-09-004” [4]
This Security Target claims to be CC Part 2 extended and CC Part 3 conformant. The
extended Security Functional Requirements are defined in chapter 5.
2.2 Package claim
This Security Target claims conformance to the assurance package EAL 5 augmented.
The augmentations to EAL5 are ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5. In addition, the Security
Target is augmented using the component ASE_TSS.2, which is chosen to include
architectural information on the security functionality of the TOE.
Note: The PP “Security IC Platform Protection Profile” [6] to which this Security
Target claims conformance (refer to section 2.3) requires assurance level
EAL4 augmented. The changes, which are needed for EAL5, are described
in the relevant sections of this Security Target.
The level of evaluation and the functionality of the TOE are chosen in order to allow the
confirmation that the TOE is suitable for use within devices compliant with the German
Digital Signature Law.
2.3 PP claim
This Security Target claims conformance to the Protection Profile (PP)
“Security IC Platform Protection Profile, Version 1.0, registered and certified by
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI) under the reference BSI-PP-
0035” [6].
Since the Security Target claims conformance to this PP [6], the concepts are used in the
same sense. For the definition of terms please refer to the PP [6]. These terms also
apply to this Security Target.
NXP Semiconductors
P5CD016/021/041V1A and P5Cx081V1A
Security Target Lite
PUBLIC
- © NXP B.V. 2009. All rights reserved.
Evaluation documentation Rev. 1.3 — 21 September 2009 17 of 67
The TOE provides additional functionality, which is not covered in the PP [6]. In
accordance with Application Note 4 of [6] this additional functionality is added using the
policy “P.Add-Components” (see section 3.3 of this Security Target).
2.4 Conformance Claim Rationale
According to section 2.3 this Security Target claims conformance to the PP “Security IC
Platform Protection Profile” [6].
The TOE type defined in section 1.3.2 of this Security Target is a smartcard controller.
This is consistent with the TOE definition for a Security IC in section 1.2.2 of [6].
All sections of this Security Target, where security problem definition, objectives and
security requirements are defined, clearly state which of these items are taken from the
PP [6] and which are added in this Security Target. Therefore this is not repeated here.
Moreover, all additionally stated items in this Security Target do not contradict the items
included from the PP (see the respective sections in this document). The operations
done for the SFRs taken from the PP [6] are also clearly indicated.
The evaluation assurance level claimed for this target (EAL5+) is shown in section 6.2 to
include respectively exceed the requirements claimed by the PP (EAL4+).
These considerations show that the Security Target correctly claims conformance to the
PP [6].
NXP Semiconductors
P5CD016/021/041V1A and P5Cx081V1A
Security Target Lite
PUBLIC
- © NXP B.V. 2009. All rights reserved.
Evaluation documentation Rev. 1.3 — 21 September 2009 18 of 67
3. Security Problem Definition
This Security Target claims conformance to the PP “Security IC Platform Protection
Profile”, [6]. Assets, threats, assumptions and organisational security policies are taken
from the PP [6]. This chapter lists these assets, threats, assumptions and organisational
security policies, and describes extensions to these elements in detail.
The chapter is divided into the following sections: “Description of Assets", "Threats",
"Organisational Security Policies", and "Assumptions".
3.1 Description of Assets
Since this Security Target claims conformance to the PP “Security IC Platform Protection
Profile” [6] the assets defined in section 3.1 of [6] are applied here. These assets are
cited here.
The assets related to standard functionality are:
• the User Data,
• the Security IC Embedded Software, stored and in operation,
• the security services provided by the TOE for the Security IC Embedded Software.
To be able to protect these assets the TOE shall protect its security functionality.
Therefore critical information about the TOE shall be protected. Critical information
includes:
• logical design data, physical design data, IC Dedicated Software, configuration data,
• Initialisation Data and Pre-personalisation Data, specific development aids, test and
characterisation related data, material for software development support,
photomasks.
Note that the keys for the cryptographic coprocessors are seen as User Data.
3.2 Threats
Since this Security Target claims conformance to the PP “Security IC Platform Protection
Profile” [6] the threats defined in section 3.2 of [6] are valid for this Security Target. The
following table lists the threats defined in the PP [6].
Table 6. Threats defined by the PP [6]
Name Title
T.Leak-Inherent Inherent Information Leakage
T.Phys-Probing Physical Probing
T.Malfunction Malfunction due to Environmental Stress
T.Phys-Manipulation Physical Manipulation
T.Leak-Forced Forced Information Leakage
T.Abuse-Func Abuse of Functionality
T.RND Deficiency of Random Numbers
NXP Semiconductors
P5CD016/021/041V1A and P5Cx081V1A
Security Target Lite
PUBLIC
- © NXP B.V. 2009. All rights reserved.
Evaluation documentation Rev. 1.3 — 21 September 2009 19 of 67
Considering Application Note 5 in [6] there are no additional threats defined in this
Security Target.
3.3 Organisational Security Policies
Since this Security Target claims conformance to the PP “Security IC Platform Protection
Profile” [6] the policy P.Process-TOE “Protection during TOE Development and
Production” in [6] is applied here as well.
In accordance with Application Note 6 in [6] there is one additional policy defined in this
Security Target as detailed below.
The TOE provides specific security functionality, which can be used by the Security IC
Embedded Software. In the following, specific security functionality is listed, which is not
derived from threats identified for the TOE’s environment. It can only be decided in the
context of the application against which threats the Security IC Embedded Software will
use this specific security functionality.
The IC Developer/Manufacturer therefore applies the policy “Additional Specific Security
Components (P.Add-Components)” as specified below.
P.Add-Components Additional Specific Security Components
The TOE shall provide the following additional security
functionality to the Security IC Embedded Software:
• Triple-DES encryption and decryption
• AES encryption and decryption
• Area based Memory Access Control
• Memory separation for different software parts (including IC
Dedicated Software and Security IC Embedded Software)
• Special Function Register Access Control.
3.4 Assumptions
Since this Security Target claims conformance to the PP “Security IC Platform Protection
Profile” [6] the assumptions defined in section 3.4 of [6] are valid for this Security Target.
The following table lists these assumptions.
Table 7. Assumptions defined in the PP [6]
Name Title
A.Process-Sec-IC Protection during Packaging, Finishing and Personalisation
A.Plat-Appl Usage of Hardware Platform
A.Resp-Appl Treatment of User Data
The following additional assumptions are added in this Security Target according to
Application Notes 7 and 8 in [6].
A.Check-Init Check of initialisation data by the Security IC Embedded
Software
The Security IC Embedded Software must provide a function
to check initialisation data. The data is defined by the
customer and injected by the TOE Manufacturer into the non-
NXP Semiconductors
P5CD016/021/041V1A and P5Cx081V1A
Security Target Lite
PUBLIC
- © NXP B.V. 2009. All rights reserved.
Evaluation documentation Rev. 1.3 — 21 September 2009 20 of 67
volatile memory to provide the possibility for TOE identification
and for traceability.
The following additional assumption considers specialised encryption hardware of the
TOE.
The developer of the Security IC Embedded Software must ensure the appropriate
“Usage of Key-dependent Functions (A.Key-Function)” while developing this software in
Phase 1 as specified below.
A.Key-Function Usage of Key-dependent Functions
Key-dependent functions (if any) shall be implemented in the
Security IC Embedded Software in a way that they are not
susceptible to leakage attacks (as described under T.Leak-
Inherent and T.Leak-Forced).
Note that here the routines which may compromise keys when
being executed are part of the Security IC Embedded
Software. In contrast to this the threats T.Leak-Inherent and
T.Leak-Forced address (i) the cryptographic routines which
are part of the TOE and (ii) the processing of User Data
including cryptographic keys.
NXP Semiconductors
P5CD016/021/041V1A and P5Cx081V1A
Security Target Lite
PUBLIC
- © NXP B.V. 2009. All rights reserved.
Evaluation documentation Rev. 1.3 — 21 September 2009 21 of 67
4. Security Objectives
This chapter contains the following sections: "Security Objectives for the TOE", "Security
Objectives for the Security IC Embedded Software development Environment" "Security
Objectives for the Operational Environment", and "Security Objectives Rationale".
4.1 Security Objectives for the TOE
The TOE shall provide the following security objectives, which are taken from the PP
“Security IC Platform Protection Profile” [6].
Table 8. Security objectives defined in the PP [6]
Name Title
O.Leak-Inherent Protection against Inherent Information Leakage
O.Phys-Probing Protection against Physical Probing
O.Malfunction Protection against Malfunctions
O.Phys-Manipulation Protection against Physical Manipulation
O.Leak-Forced Protection against Forced Information Leakage
O.Abuse-Func Protection against Abuse of Functionality
O.Identification TOE Identification
O.RND Random Numbers
Regarding the Application Notes 9 and 10 in [6] the following additional security
objectives are defined based on additional functionality provided by the TOE as specified
below.
O.HW_DES3 Triple DES Functionality
The TOE shall provide the cryptographic functionality to
calculate a Triple DES encryption and decryption to the
Security IC Embedded Software. The TOE supports directly
the calculation of Triple DES with up to three keys.
Note: The TOE will ensure the confidentiality of the User Data
(and especially cryptographic keys) during Triple DES
operation. This is supported by O.Leak-Inherent.
O.HW_AES AES Functionality
The TOE shall provide the cryptographic functionality to
calculate an AES encryption and decryption to the Security IC
Embedded Software. The TOE supports directly the
calculation of AES with three different key lengths.
Note: The TOE will ensure the confidentiality of the User Data
(and especially cryptographic keys) during AES operation.
This is supported by O.Leak-Inherent.
NXP Semiconductors
P5CD016/021/041V1A and P5Cx081V1A
Security Target Lite
PUBLIC
- © NXP B.V. 2009. All rights reserved.
Evaluation documentation Rev. 1.3 — 21 September 2009 22 of 67
O.MF_FW MIFARE Firewall
The TOE shall provide separation between the “MIFARE
Operating System” as part of the IC Dedicated Support
Software and the Security IC Embedded Software. The
separation shall comprise software execution and data
access.
O.MEM_ACCESS Area based Memory Access Control
Access by processor instructions to memory areas is
controlled by the TOE. The TOE decides based on the CPU
mode (Boot Mode, Test Mode, MIFARE Mode, System Mode
or User Mode) and the configuration of the Memory
Management Unit if the requested type of access to the
memory area addressed by the operands in the instruction is
allowed.
O.SFR_ACCESS Special Function Register Access Control
The TOE shall provide access control to the Special Function
Registers depending on the purpose of the Special Function
Register or based on permissions associated to the memory
area from which the CPU is currently executing code. The
access control is used to restrict access to hardware
components of the TOE.
The possibility to define access permissions to specialised
hardware components of the TOE shall be restricted to code
running in System Mode.
4.2 Security Objectives for the Security IC Embedded Software
development Environment
In addition to the security objectives for the operational environment as required by CC
Part 1 [1] the PP “Security IC Platform Protection Profile” [6] defines security objectives
for the Security IC Embedded Software development environment which are listed below.
Table 9. Security objectives for the Security IC Embedded Software development
environment, taken from the PP [6]
Security objective Description Applies to phase...
OE.Plat-Appl Usage of Hardware Platform Phase 1
OE.Resp-Appl Treatment of User Data Phase 1
Clarification of “Usage of Hardware Platform (OE.Plat-Appl)”
The TOE supports cipher schemes as additional specific security functionality. If required
the Security IC Embedded Software shall use these cryptographic services of the TOE
and their interface as specified. When key-dependent functions implemented in the
Security IC Embedded Software are just being executed, the Security IC Embedded
Software must provide protection against disclosure of confidential data (User Data)
stored and/or processed in the TOE by using the methods described under “Inherent
Information Leakage (T.Leak-Inherent)” and “Forced Information Leakage (T.Leak-
Forced)“.
NXP Semiconductors
P5CD016/021/041V1A and P5Cx081V1A
Security Target Lite
PUBLIC
- © NXP B.V. 2009. All rights reserved.
Evaluation documentation Rev. 1.3 — 21 September 2009 23 of 67
If the Random Number Generator is used for leakage countermeasures, cryptographic
operations (e.g. key generation) or cryptographic protocols (e.g. challenge response)
these random numbers must be tested appropriately.
For multi-applications the Security IC Embedded Software (Operating System) can
implement a memory management scheme based upon security functionality of the TOE
to ensure the separation of applications.
Clarification of “Treatment of User Data (OE.Resp-Appl)”
By definition cipher or plain text data and cryptographic keys are User Data. The Security
IC Embedded Software shall treat these data appropriately, use only proper secret keys
(chosen from a large key space) as input for the cryptographic function of the TOE and
use keys and functions appropriately in order to ensure the strength of cryptographic
operation.
This means that keys are treated as confidential as soon as they are generated. The
keys must be unique with a very high probability, as well as cryptographically strong. For
example, if asymmetric algorithms are used, it must be ensured that it is not possible to
derive the private key from a related public key using the attacks defined in this Security
Target. If keys are imported into the TOE and/or derived from other keys, quality and
confidentiality must be maintained. This implies that appropriate key management has to
be realised in the environment.
The treatment of User Data is also required when a multi-application operating system is
implemented as part of the Security IC Embedded Software on the TOE. In this case the
multi-application operating system will not disclose security relevant user data of one
application to another application when it is processed or stored on the TOE.
4.3 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment
The following security objectives for the operational environment are specified according
to the PP “Security IC Platform Protection Profile” [6].
Table 10. Security objectives for the operational environment, taken from the PP [6]
Security objective Description Applies to phase...
OE.Process-Sec-IC Protection during composite product
manufacturing
TOE delivery up to the end of
phase 6
Check of initialisation data
The TOE provides specific functionality that requires the TOE Manufacturer to implement
measures for the unique identification of the TOE. Therefore, OE.Check-Init is defined to
allow a TOE specific implementation (refer also to A.Check-Init).
OE.Check-Init Check of initialisation data by the Security IC Embedded
Software
To ensure the receipt of the correct TOE, the Security IC
Embedded Software shall check a sufficient part of the pre-
personalisation data. This shall include at least the FabKey
Data that is agreed between the customer and the TOE
Manufacturer.
NXP Semiconductors
P5CD016/021/041V1A and P5Cx081V1A
Security Target Lite
PUBLIC
- © NXP B.V. 2009. All rights reserved.
Evaluation documentation Rev. 1.3 — 21 September 2009 24 of 67
4.4 Security Objectives Rationale
Section 4.4 in the PP “Security IC Platform Protection Profile” [6] provides a rationale
how the assumptions, threats, and organisational security policies are addressed by the
objectives that are specified in the PP [6]. The following Table 11 reproduces the table in
section 4.4 of [6].
Table 11. Security Objectives versus Assumptions, Threats or Policies
Assumption, Threat or OSP Security Objective Notes
A.Plat-Appl OE.Plat-Appl Phase 1
A.Resp-Appl OE.Resp-Appl Phase 1
P.Process-TOE O.Identification Phase 2 – 3
A.Process-Sec—IC OE.Process-Sec-IC Phase 4 – 6
T.Leak-Inherent O.Leak-Inherent
T.Phys-Probing O.Phys-Probing
T.Malfunction O.Malfunction
T.Phys-Manipulation O.Phys-Manipulation
T.Leak-Forced O.Leak-Forced
T.Abuse-Func O.Abuse-Func
T.RND O.RND
The following Table 12 provides the justification for the additional security objectives.
They are in line with the security objectives of the PP [6] and supplement these
according to the additional assumptions and organisational security policy.
Table 12. Additional Security Objectives versus Assumptions or Policies
Assumption/Policy Security Objective Note
P.Add-Components O.HW_DES3
O.HW_AES
O.MF_FW
O.MEM_ACCESS
O.SFR_ACCESS
A.Key-Function OE.Plat-Appl
OE.Resp-Appl
Phase 1
A.Check-Init OE.Check-Init Phase 1 and
Phase 4 - 6
The justification related to the policy “Additional Specific Security Components (P.Add-
Components)” is detailed below.
The justification related to the security objectives O.HW_DES3, O.HW_AES, O.MF_FW,
O.MEM_ACCESS and O.SFR_ACCESS is as follows. Since these objectives require the
NXP Semiconductors
P5CD016/021/041V1A and P5Cx081V1A
Security Target Lite
PUBLIC
- © NXP B.V. 2009. All rights reserved.
Evaluation documentation Rev. 1.3 — 21 September 2009 25 of 67
TOE to implement exactly the same specific security functionality as required by P.Add-
Components, the organisational security policy is covered by the objectives.
Nevertheless the security objectives O.Leak-Inherent, O.Phys-Probing, O.Malfunction,
O.Phys-Manipulation and O.Leak-Forced define how to implement the specific security
functionality required by P.Add-Components. These security objectives are also valid for
the additional specific security functionality since they must avert the related threats also
for the components added related to the policy.
The requirements for a multi-application platform necessitate the separation of users.
Therefore it is volitional that most of the security functionality can not be influenced or
used in User Mode.
The justification related to the assumption A.Key-Function is as follows:
• Compared to [6] a clarification has been made for the security objective “Usage of
Hardware Platform (OE.Plat-Appl)”: If required the Security IC Embedded Software
shall use the cryptographic service of the TOE and its interface as specified. In
addition, the Security IC Embedded Software (i) must implement operations on keys
(if any) in such a manner that they do not disclose information about confidential data
and (ii) must configure the memory management in a way that different applications
are sufficiently separated. If the Security IC Embedded Software uses random
numbers provided by the security service SS.RNG these random numbers must be
tested as appropriate for the intended purpose. This addition ensures that the
assumption A.Key-Function is still covered by the objective OE.Plat-Appl although
additional functions are being supported according to P.Add-Components.
• Compared to [6] a clarification has been made for the security objective “Treatment
of User Data (OE.Resp-Appl)”: By definition cipher or plain text data and
cryptographic keys are User Data. So, the Security IC Embedded Software will
protect such data if required and use keys and functions appropriately in order to
ensure the strength of cryptographic operation. Quality and confidentiality must be
maintained for keys that are imported and/or derived from other keys. This implies
that appropriate key management has to be implemented in the environment. In
addition, the treatment of User Data comprises the implementation of a multi-
application operating system that does not disclose security relevant User Data of
one application to another one. These measures make sure that the assumption
A.Key-Function is still covered by the security objective OE.Resp-Appl although
additional functions are being supported according to P.Add-Components.
The justification related to the assumption "Check of initialisation data by the Security IC
Embedded Software (A.Check-Init)" is as follows:
Since OE.Check-Init requires the Security IC Embedded Software developer to
implement a function assumed in A.Check-Init, the assumption is covered by the
objective.
The justification of the additional policy and the additional assumptions show that they do
not contradict to the rationale already given in the PP [6] for the assumptions, policy and
threats defined there.
NXP Semiconductors
P5CD016/021/041V1A and P5Cx081V1A
Security Target Lite
PUBLIC
- © NXP B.V. 2009. All rights reserved.
Evaluation documentation Rev. 1.3 — 21 September 2009 26 of 67
5. Extended Components Definition
This Security Target does not define extended components.
Note that the PP “Security IC Platform Protection Profile” [6] defines extended security
functional requirements in chapter 5, which are included in this Security Target.
NXP Semiconductors
P5CD016/021/041V1A and P5Cx081V1A
Security Target Lite
PUBLIC
- © NXP B.V. 2009. All rights reserved.
Evaluation documentation Rev. 1.3 — 21 September 2009 27 of 67
6. Security Requirements
This chapter consists of the sections “Security Functional Requirements”, “Security
Assurance Requirements” and “Security Requirements Rationale”.
6.1 Security Functional Requirements
The Security Functional Requirements (SFRs) of the TOE are presented in the following
sections to support a better understanding of the combination of PP “Security IC Platform
Protection Profile” [6] and Security Target.
6.1.1 SFRs of the Protection Profile
Table 13 below shows all SFRs, which are specified in the PP [6] (in the order of
definition in the PP). Some of the SFRs are CC Part 2 extended and defined in the PP
[6]. This is shown in the third column of the table.
Table 13. SFRs taken from the PP [6]
SFR Title Defined in
FRU_FLT.2 Limited fault tolerance CC, Part 2
FPT_FLS.1 Failure with preservation of secure state CC, Part 2
FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities PP, Section 5.2
FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability PP, Section 5.2
FAU_SAS.1 Audit storage PP, Section 5.3
FPT_PHP.3 Resistance to physical attack CC, Part 2
FDP_ITT.1 Basic internal transfer protection CC, Part 2
FPT_ITT.1 Basic internal TSF data transfer protection CC, Part 2
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control CC, Part 2
FCS_RNG.1 Random number generation PP, Section 5.1
All operations except for the following assignments and selections are already performed
in the PP [6].
For the SFR FAU_SAS.1 the PP [6] leaves the assignment operation open for the
non-volatile memory type in which intialisation data, pre-personalisation data and/or other
supplements for the Security IC Embedded Software are stored. This assignment
operation is filled in by the following statement. Note that the assignment operations for
the list of subjects and the list of audit information have already been filled in by the PP
[6].
FAU_SAS.1 Audit storage
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FAU_SAS.1.1 The TSF shall provide the test process before TOE Delivery
1
with the capability to store the Initialisation Data and/or Pre-
1
[assignment: list of subjects]
NXP Semiconductors
P5CD016/021/041V1A and P5Cx081V1A
Security Target Lite
PUBLIC
- © NXP B.V. 2009. All rights reserved.
Evaluation documentation Rev. 1.3 — 21 September 2009 28 of 67
personalisation Data and/or supplements of the Security IC
Embedded Software
2
in the EEPROM
3
.
For FCS_RNG.1.1 the PP [6] partially fills in the assignment for the security capabilities
of the RNG by requiring a total failure test of the random source and adds an assignment
operation for additional security capabilities of the RNG.
In addition, for FCS_RNG.1.2 the PP [6] partially fills in the assignment operation for the
defined quality metric for the random numbers by replacing it by a selection and
assignment operation.
For the above operations the original operations defined in chapter 5 of the PP [6] have
been replaced by the open operations of the partially filled in operations in the statement
of the security requirements in chapter 6 of [6] for better readability. Note that the
selection operation for the RNG type has already been filled in by the PP [6].
FCS_RNG.1 Random number generation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FCS_RNG.1.1 The TSF shall provide a physical
4
Random Number
Generator that implements total failure test of the random
source and none
5
.
FCS_RNG.1.2 The TSF shall provide random numbers that meet
independent bits with Shannon entropy of 7.976 bits per
octet
6
.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
Note: Application Note 20 in [6] requires that the Security Target
specifies for the security capabilities in FCS_RNG.1.1 how the
results of the total failure test of the random source are
provided to the Security IC Embedded Software. The TOE
features a hardware test which is called by the Security IC
Embedded Software. The results of the internal test sequence
are provided to the Security IC Embedded Software as a pass
or fail criterion by means of a special function register.
The entropy of the random number is measured by the
Shannon-Entropy as follows:
=
⋅
−
=
255
0
2
log
i
i
i p
p
E , where i
p is the probability that the
byte )
,
,
,
( 0
6
7 b
b
b is equal to i as binary number. Here
term “bit” means measure of the Shannon-Entropy.
The value “7.976” is assigned due to the requirements of
“AIS31”, [5].
By this, all assignment/selection operations are performed. This Security Target does not
perform any other/further operations than stated in the PP [6].
2
[assignment: list of audit information]
3
[assignment: type of persistent memory]
4
[selection: physical, non-physical true, deterministic, hybrid]
5
[assignment: list of additional security capabilities]
6
[selection: independent bits with Shannon entropy of 7.976 bits per octet, Min-entropy of 7.95 bit per
octet, [assignment: other comparable quality metric]]
NXP Semiconductors
P5CD016/021/041V1A and P5Cx081V1A
Security Target Lite
PUBLIC
- © NXP B.V. 2009. All rights reserved.
Evaluation documentation Rev. 1.3 — 21 September 2009 29 of 67
Considering the Application Note 12 of [6] in the following paragraphs the additional
functions for cryptographic support and access control are defined. These SFRs are not
required in the PP [6].
As required by the Application Note 14 of [6] the secure state is described in
section 7.2.1 in the rationale for SF.OPC.
Regarding the Application Note 15 of [6] an additional generation of audit is not defined
for “Limited fault tolerance” (FRU_FLT.2) and “Failure with preservation of secure state”
(FPT_FLS.1).
As required by the Application Note 18 of [6] the automatic response of the TOE is
described in section 7.2.1 in the rationale for SF.PHY.
6.1.2 Additional SFRs regarding cryptographic functionality
The (DES coprocessor of the) TOE shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic operation
(FCS_COP.1[DES])” as specified below.
FCS_COP.1[DES] Cryptographic operation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FCS_COP.1.1 The TSF shall perform encryption and decryption
7
in
accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm Triple
Data Encryption Algorithm (TDEA)
8
and cryptographic key
sizes of 112 or 168 bit
9
that meet the following list of
standards
10
:
FIPS PUB 46-3 FEDERAL INFORMATION PROCESSING
STANDARDS PUBLICATION DATA ENCRYPTION
STANDARD (DES) Reaffirmed 1999 October 25, keying
options 1 and 2.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation],
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction.
The (AES coprocessor of the) TOE shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic operation
(FCS_COP.1[AES])” as specified below.
FCS_COP.1[AES] Cryptographic operation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FCS_COP.1.1 The TSF shall perform encryption and decryption
11
in
accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) algorithm
12
and
cryptographic key sizes of 128, 192 or 256 bit
13
that meet the
following list of standards
14
:
7
[assignment: list of cryptographic operations]
8
[assignment: cryptographic algorithm]
9
[assignment: cryptographic key sizes]
10
[assignment: list of standards]
11
[assignment: list of cryptographic operations]
12
[assignment: cryptographic algorithm]
13
[assignment: cryptographic key sizes]
14
[assignment: list of standards]
NXP Semiconductors
P5CD016/021/041V1A and P5Cx081V1A
Security Target Lite
PUBLIC
- © NXP B.V. 2009. All rights reserved.
Evaluation documentation Rev. 1.3 — 21 September 2009 30 of 67
FIPS PUB 197 FEDERAL INFORMATION PROCESSING
STANDARDS PUBLICATION, ADVANCED ENCRYPTION
STANDARD (AES), National Institute of Standards and
Technology, 2001 November 26.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation],
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction.
6.1.3 Additional SFRs regarding access control
Access Control Policy
The hardware shall provide different CPU modes to the IC Dedicated Software and
Security IC Embedded Software. The TOE shall separate IC Dedicated Software and
Security IC Embedded Software from each other by both, partitioning of memory and
different CPU modes. The management of access to code and data as well as the
configuration of the hardware shall be performed each in a dedicated CPU mode. The
hardware shall enforce a separation between different applications (i.e. parts of the
Security IC Embedded Software) running on the TOE. An application shall not be able to
access hardware components without explicitly granted permission.
The following table provides an overview on the differences in the “xD”-configuration and
the “xC”-configuration of the TOE. This must be considered for the following access
control policy and the related Security Functional Requirements.
Table 14. Differences between TOE configurations with regard to the Access Control Policy
TOE major configurations
P5CD016V1A,
P5CD021V1A,
P5CD041V1A,
P5CD081V1A,
P5CN081V1A
TOE major configuration
P5CC081V1A
Remark
Access to
special area
in the
EEPROM
depends on the MIFARE
configuration
fixed described in detail below,
function in general not
influenced by the
configuration
Access to
RAM
depends on the MIFARE
configuration
completely accessible described in detail below,
function in general not
influenced by the
configuration
MIFARE
firewall for
the RAM
access
configuration of the MIFARE
firewall supports the
separation between IC
Dedicated Support Software
and Security IC Embedded
Software
MIFARE firewall can be
configured because the
Special Function Registers
are accessible as for
P5CD016V1A,
P5CD021V1A
P5CD041V1A,
P5CD081V1A and
P5CN081V1A. System
Mode and User Mode
always have access to the
RAM, but the configuration
can allow access of the
refer to the description of the
MIFARE firewall below,
function in general not
influenced by the
configuration
NXP Semiconductors
P5CD016/021/041V1A and P5Cx081V1A
Security Target Lite
PUBLIC
- © NXP B.V. 2009. All rights reserved.
Evaluation documentation Rev. 1.3 — 21 September 2009 31 of 67
TOE major configurations
P5CD016V1A,
P5CD021V1A,
P5CD041V1A,
P5CD081V1A,
P5CN081V1A
TOE major configuration
P5CC081V1A
Remark
MIFARE Operating System
to a RAM area. This
configuration has no impact
since the MIFARE Mode is
disabled.
MIFARE
firewall for
the Special
Function
Register
access
the configuration of the
MIFARE firewall restricts the
access of the MIFARE
Operating System to the
hardware related Special
Function Registers
MIFARE firewall can be
configured because the
Special Function Registers
are accessible as for
P5CD016V1A,
P5CD021V1A
P5CD041V1A,
P5CD081V1A and
P5CN081V1A, but has no
impact since the MIFARE
Mode is disabled.
refer to the description of the
MIFARE firewall below,
function in general not
influenced by the
configuration
supported
CPU mode
System Mode, User Mode
and MIFARE Mode
System Mode and User
Mode. The change of these
two modes to the MIFARE
Mode is suppressed in this
configuration
If the MIFARE Mode is
suppressed the related
“lcall” commands (CVEC
calls) do not force a change
of the CPU mode. Thereby
they are executed as a
normal “lcall” command.
The Security Function Policy (SFP) Access Control Policy uses the following definitions.
The subjects are
• The Security IC Embedded Software i.e. data in the memories of the TOE executed
as instructions by the CPU
• The Test-ROM Software as IC Dedicated Test Software
• The Boot-ROM Software as part of the IC Dedicated Support Software
• The MIFARE Operating System as part of the IC Dedicated Support Software
The objects are
• the memories consisting of
− ROM, which is partitioned into Test-ROM and Application-ROM,
− EEPROM, which is partitioned into two parts. For the ease of referencing the part
reserved for the MIFARE Operating System is called MIFARE-EEPROM, the
other part Application-EEPROM.
− RAM, which is partitioned into two parts. For the ease of referencing the part
reserved for the MIFARE Operating System is called MIFARE-RAM, the other part
Application-RAM.
NXP Semiconductors
P5CD016/021/041V1A and P5Cx081V1A
Security Target Lite
PUBLIC
- © NXP B.V. 2009. All rights reserved.
Evaluation documentation Rev. 1.3 — 21 September 2009 32 of 67
− the code and data in the Memory Segments defined by the Memory Management
Unit in Application-ROM, Application-EEPROM and Application-RAM. Note that
this memory is a subset of the first three.
• the physical memory locations within the three memories that are used by the
Memory Management Unit for the MMU Segment Table.
• the Special Function Registers consisting of
− Special Function Registers to configure the MMU segmentation. This group
contains the registers that define the pointer to the MMU Segment Table.
− Special Function Registers related to system management, a number of Special
Function Registers that are intended to be used for overall system management
by the operating system.
− Special Function Registers to configure the MIFARE firewall. These Special
Function Registers allow to modify the MIFARE firewall regarding data exchange
and Special Function Register access control.
− Special Function Registers used by the MIFARE Operating System. The MIFARE
Operating System uses a number of internal Special Function Registers.
− Special Function Registers related to testing. These Special Function Registers
are reserved for testing purposes.
− Special Function Registers related to hardware components. These Special
Function Registers are used to utilise hardware components like the coprocessors
or the interrupt system.
− Special Function Registers related to general CPU functionality. This group
contains e.g. the accumulator, stack pointer and data pointers.
The memory operations are
• read data from the memory,
• write data into the memory and
• execute data in the memory.
The Special Function Register operations are
• read data from a Special Function Register and
• write data into a Special Function Register.
The security attributes are
• CPU mode: There are five CPU modes based on the configuration of the Special
Function Register “Program Status Word High (PSWH)” and two internal bits defining
whether the instruction is executed in Boot Mode, Test Mode, MIFARE Mode,
System Mode or User Mode.
• The values of the Special Function Registers to configure the MMU segmentation
and Special Function Registers related to system management. These groups
contain the pointer to the MMU Segment Table and those relevant for the overall
system management of the TOE, especially PSWH.
• MMU Segment Table: Configuration of the Memory Segments comprising access
rights (read, write and execute), the virtual code memory base address of the first
and last valid address, and the relocation offset to the physical memory location for
each of the 64 possible Memory Segments. For every segment also the access
rights to the Special Function Registers related to hardware components are defined.
NXP Semiconductors
P5CD016/021/041V1A and P5Cx081V1A
Security Target Lite
PUBLIC
- © NXP B.V. 2009. All rights reserved.
Evaluation documentation Rev. 1.3 — 21 September 2009 33 of 67
• The values of the Special Function Registers FWCTRLL, FWCTRLH, MXBASL,
MXBASH, MXSZL and MXSZH belonging to the group Special Function Registers to
configure the MIFARE firewall that define the access rights to the Special Function
Registers related to hardware components for code executed in MIFARE Mode and
the RAM area used for data exchange between IC Dedicated Support Software
(MIFARE OS) and Security IC Embedded Software.
In the following the term “code running” combined with a CPU mode (e.g. “code running
in System Mode”) is used to name subjects.
Note: Use of a Memory Segment is disabled in case no access permissions are
granted. It is not necessary to define all 64 possible Memory Segments, the
Memory Management Unit is capable of managing an arbitrary number of
segments up to the limit of 64.
The amount of the partitioned memory for EEPROM and RAM depends on the
configuration of the TOE. For P5CD016V1A, P5CD021V1A, P5CD041V1A,
P5CD081V1A, and P5CN081V1A it depends on the MIFARE configuration A, B1 or B4,
refer to section 1.4. 128 bytes of the EEPROM are always reserved for the manufacturer.
The TOE shall meet the requirements “Subset access control (FDP_ACC.1)” as specified
below.
FDP_ACC.1[MEM] Subset access control
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FDP_ACC.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the Access Control Policy
15
on all code
running on the TOE, all memories and all memory
operations
16
.
Dependencies: FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control
Application Note: The Access Control Policy shall be enforced by implementing
a Memory Management Unit, which maps virtual addresses to
physical addresses. The CPU always uses virtual addresses,
which are mapped to physical addresses by the Memory
Management Unit. Prior to accessing the respective memory
address, the Memory Management Unit checks if the access
is allowed.
FDP_ACC.1[SFR] Subset access control
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FDP_ACC.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the Access Control Policy
17
on all code
running on the TOE, all Special Function Registers, and all
Special Function Register operations
18
.
Dependencies: FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control
Application Note: The Access Control Policy shall be enforced by implementing
hardware access control to each Special Function Register.
For every access the CPU mode is used to determine if the
15
[assignment: access control SFP]
16
[assignment: list of subjects, objects, and operations among subjects and objects covered by the
SFP]
17
[assignment: access control SFP]
18
[assignment: list of subjects, objects, and operations among subjects and objects covered by the
SFP]
NXP Semiconductors
P5CD016/021/041V1A and P5Cx081V1A
Security Target Lite
PUBLIC
- © NXP B.V. 2009. All rights reserved.
Evaluation documentation Rev. 1.3 — 21 September 2009 34 of 67
access shall be granted or denied. In addition, in User Mode
and MIFARE Mode the access rights to the Special Function
Registers related to hardware components are provided by
the MMU Segment Table and the Special Function Registers
to configure the MIFARE firewall. A denied read access
returns “0” instead of the actual value, a denied write access
is in fact ignored. The read and/or write access to a Special
Function Register may be not allowed depending on the
function of the register or on the CPU mode to enforce the
access control policy or ensure a secure operation.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Security attribute based access control
(FDP_ACF.1)” as specified below.
FDP_ACF.1[MEM] Security attribute based access control
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FDP_ACF.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the Access Control Policy
19
to objects
based on the following: all subjects and objects and the
attributes CPU mode, the MMU Segment Table, the Special
Function Registers to configure the MMU segmentation and
the Special Function Registers related to system
management
20
.
FDP_ACF.1.2 The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an
operation among controlled subjects and controlled objects is
allowed:
Code executed in the Boot Mode
• has read and execute access to all code/data in the Test-
ROM,
• has read, write and execute access to all code/data in the
MIFARE-EEPROM
• has read and write access to all data in the MIFARE-RAM
Code executed in the Test Mode
• has read and execute access to all code/data in the whole
ROM,
• has read, write and execute access to all code/data in the
whole EEPROM
• has read and write access to all data in the whole RAM
Code executed in the MIFARE Mode
• has read and execute access to all code/data in the Test-
ROM,
• has read, write and execute access to all code/data in the
MIFARE-EEPROM
• has read and write access to all data in the MIFARE-RAM
Code executed in the System Mode
19
[assignment: access control SFP]
20
[assignment: list of subjects and objects controlled under the indicated SFP, and for each, the SFP-
relevant security attributes, or named groups of SFP-relevant security attributes]
NXP Semiconductors
P5CD016/021/041V1A and P5Cx081V1A
Security Target Lite
PUBLIC
- © NXP B.V. 2009. All rights reserved.
Evaluation documentation Rev. 1.3 — 21 September 2009 35 of 67
• has read and execute access to all code/data in the
Application-ROM,
• has read, write and execute access to all code/data in the
Application-EEPROM,
• has read and write access to all data in the Application-
RAM,
Code executed in the User Mode
• has read and/or execute access to code/data in the
Application-ROM controlled by the MMU Segment Table
used by the Memory Management Unit,
• has read and/or write and/or execute access to code/data
in the Application-EEPROM controlled by the MMU
Segment Table used by the Memory Management Unit,
• has read and/or write access to data in the Application-
RAM controlled by the MMU Segment Table used by the
Memory Management Unit.
21
FDP_ACF.1.3 The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects
based on the following additional rules: Code running in
MIFARE Mode has read access to 64 bytes in the Application-
ROM storing the “Access Condition Matrix”. Code running in
MIFARE Mode has access to the Application-RAM defined by
the Special Function Register MXBASL, MXBASH, MXSZL
and MXSZH. Code running in Boot Mode or MIFARE Mode
has read access to the Security Rows stored in the
Application-EEPROM. The FameXE coprocessor has read
access to the EEPROM and read/write access to the FameXE
RAM.
22
FDP_ACF.1.4 The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects
based on the rules: no explicit rules
23
.
Dependencies: FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation
FDP_ACF.1[SFR] Security attribute based access control
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FDP_ACF.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the Access Control Policy
24
to objects
based on the following: all subjects and objects and the
attributes CPU mode, the MMU Segment Table and the
Special Function Registers FWCTRLL and FWCTRLH
25
.
FDP_ACF.1.2 The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an
operation among controlled subjects and controlled objects is
allowed:
21
[assignment: rules governing access among controlled subjects and controlled objects using
controlled operations on controlled objects]
22
[assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects]
23
[assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly deny access of subjects to objects]
24
[assignment: access control SFP]
25
[assignment: list of subjects and objects controlled under the indicated SFP, and for each, the SFP-
relevant security attributes, or named groups of SFP-relevant security attributes]
NXP Semiconductors
P5CD016/021/041V1A and P5Cx081V1A
Security Target Lite
PUBLIC
- © NXP B.V. 2009. All rights reserved.
Evaluation documentation Rev. 1.3 — 21 September 2009 36 of 67
• The code executed in Boot Mode is allowed to access all
Special Function Register groups.
• The code executed in Test Mode is allowed to access all
Special Function Register groups.
• The code executed in MIFARE Mode is allowed to read
Special Function Registers to configure the MIFARE
firewall and to read/write Special Function Registers used
by the MIFARE Operating System. Access to Special
Function Registers related to hardware components is
based on the access rights determined by the Special
Function Registers FWCTRLL and FWCTRLH.
• The code executed in System Mode is allowed to access
Special Function Registers to configure the MMU
segmentation, Special Function Registers related to system
management, Special Function Registers to configure the
MIFARE firewall and Special Function Registers related to
hardware components.
• The code executed in the User Mode is allowed to access
Special Function Registers related to hardware
components based on the access rights defined in the
respective Memory Segment in the MMU Segment Table
from which the code is actually executed
26
.
FDP_ACF.1.3 The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects
based on the following additional rules: In any CPU mode
access to the Special Function Registers related to general
CPU functionality is allowed. The Special Function Register
PSWH belonging to group Special Function Registers related
to system management is additionally readable in MIFARE
Mode and User Mode. The Special Function Register
CLKSEL of the group Special Function Registers related to
hardware components can be read in the MIFARE Mode
regardless of the MIFARE firewall settings given by FWCTRLL
and FWCTRLH.
27
FDP_ACF.1.4 The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects
based on the rules: Access to Special Function Registers to
configure the MMU segmentation is denied in all CPU modes
except System Mode. The Special Function Registers RPT0,
RPT1 and RPT2 of the group Special Function Registers
related to system management are not readable. The Special
Function Register RNR of the group Special Function
Registers related to hardware components is read-only. The
Special Function Registers AKEY and DKEY of the group
Special Function Registers related to hardware components
are not readable.
28
26
[assignment: rules governing access among controlled subjects and controlled objects using
controlled operations on controlled objects]
27
[assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects]
28
[assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly deny access of subjects to objects]
NXP Semiconductors
P5CD016/021/041V1A and P5Cx081V1A
Security Target Lite
PUBLIC
- © NXP B.V. 2009. All rights reserved.
Evaluation documentation Rev. 1.3 — 21 September 2009 37 of 67
Dependencies: FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation
Implications of the Access Control Policy
The Access Control Policy has some implications, that can be drawn from the policy and
that are essential parts of the TOE security functionality.
• Code executed in the Boot Mode or the Test Mode is quite powerful and used to
configure and test the TOE.
• Code executed in the MIFARE Mode is separated from code executed in System
Mode or User Mode. The separation is enforced by the partition of the memories
provided by the Memory Management Unit. Only small memory areas are used for
data exchange between the MIFARE Operating System and the Security IC
Embedded Software. Furthermore, the exchange area in RAM is fully controlled by
code running in System Mode.
• Code executed in the System Mode can administrate the configuration of Memory
Management Unit, because it has access to the respective Special Function
Registers. Configuration means that the code can change the address of the MMU
Segment Table and also modify the contents of it (as long as the table is located in
write-able memory).
• Code executed in the User Mode cannot administrate the configuration of the
Memory Management Unit, because it has no access to the Special Function
Registers to configure the MMU segmentation. Therefore changing the pointer to the
MMU Segment Table is not possible.
• It may be possible for User Mode code to modify the MMU Segment Table contents if
the table itself is residing in a memory location that is part of a Memory Segment that
the code has write access to.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Static attribute initialisation (FMT_MSA.3)” as
specified below.
FMT_MSA.3[MEM] Static attribute initialisation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FMT_MSA.3.1 The TSF shall enforce the Access Control Policy
29
to provide
restrictive
30
default values for security attributes that are used
to enforce the SFP.
FMT_MSA.3.2 The TSF shall allow no subject
31
to specify alternative initial
values to override the default values when an object or
information is created.
Dependencies: FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
Application Note: Restrictive means here that the reset values of the Special
Function Register regarding the address of the MMU Segment
Table are set to zero, which effectively disables any memory
segment so that no User Mode code can be executed by the
CPU. Furthermore, the memory partition can not be
configured at all.
29
[assignment: access control SFP, information flow control SFP]
30
[selection, choose one of: restrictive, permissive, [assignment: other property]]
31
[assignment: the authorised identified roles]
NXP Semiconductors
P5CD016/021/041V1A and P5Cx081V1A
Security Target Lite
PUBLIC
- © NXP B.V. 2009. All rights reserved.
Evaluation documentation Rev. 1.3 — 21 September 2009 38 of 67
The TOE does not provide objects or information that can be
created, since it provides access to memory areas. The
definition of objects that are stored in the TOE’s memory is
subject to the Security IC Embedded Software.
FMT_MSA.3[SFR] Static attribute initialisation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FMT_MSA.3.1 The TSF shall enforce the Access Control Policy
32
to provide
restrictive
33
default values for security attributes that are used
to enforce the SFP.
FMT_MSA.3.2 The TSF shall allow no subject
34
to specify alternative initial
values to override the default values when an object or
information is created.
Dependencies: FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
Application Note: The TOE does not provide objects or information that can be
created since no further security attributes can be derived (i.e.
the set of Special Function Registers that contain security
attributes is fixed). The definition of objects that are stored in
the TOE’s memory is subject to the Security IC Embedded
Software.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Management of security attributes (FMT_MSA.1)”
as specified below.
FMT_MSA.1[MEM] Management of security attributes
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FMT_MSA.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the Access Control Policy
35
to restrict
the ability to modify
36
the security attributes Special Function
Registers to configure the MMU segmentation
37
to code
executed in the System Mode
38
.
Dependencies: [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
Application Note: The MMU Segment Table is not included in this requirement
because it is located in the memory of the TOE and access to
it is possible for every role that has access to the respective
memory locations.
This component does not include any management
functionality for the configuration of the memory partition. This
32
[assignment: access control SFP, information flow control SFP]
33
[selection, choose one of: restrictive, permissive, [assignment: other property]]
34
[assignment: the authorised identified roles]
35
[assignment: access control SFP(s), information flow control SFP(s)]
36
[selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, [assignment: other operations]]
37
[assignment: list of security attributes]
38
[assignment: the authorised identified roles]
NXP Semiconductors
P5CD016/021/041V1A and P5Cx081V1A
Security Target Lite
PUBLIC
- © NXP B.V. 2009. All rights reserved.
Evaluation documentation Rev. 1.3 — 21 September 2009 39 of 67
is because the memory partition is fixed and cannot be
changed after TOE delivery.
FMT_MSA.1[SFR] Management of security attributes
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FMT_MSA.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the Access Control Policy
39
to restrict
the ability to modify
40
the security attributes defined in Special
Function Registers
41
to code executed in a CPU mode which
has write access to the respective Special Function
Registers
42
.
Dependencies: [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Specification of Management Functions
(FMT_SMF.1)” as specified below.
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FMT_SMF.1.1 The TSF shall be capable of performing the following security
management functions:
Change of the CPU mode by calling a system call vector
(SVEC) or configuration vector (CVEC) address,
change of the CPU mode by invoking an exception or
interrupt,
change of the CPU mode by finishing an exception/interrupt
(with a RETI instruction),
change of the CPU mode with a special
LCALL/ACALL/ECALL address,
change of the CPU mode by writing to the respective bits in
the PSWH Special Function Register and
modification of the Special Function Registers containing
security attributes, and
modification of the MMU Segment Table.
43
Dependencies: No dependencies
Application Note: The iteration of FMT_MSA.1 with the dependency to
FMT_SMF.1 may imply a separation of the Specification of
Management Functions. Iteration of FMT_SMF.1 is not
needed because all management functions rely on the same
features implemented in the hardware.
39
[assignment: access control SFP(s), information flow control SFP(s)]
40
[selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, [assignment: other operations]]
41
[assignment: list of security attributes]
42
[assignment: the authorised identified roles]
43
[assignment: list of management functions to be provided by the TSF]
NXP Semiconductors
P5CD016/021/041V1A and P5Cx081V1A
Security Target Lite
PUBLIC
- © NXP B.V. 2009. All rights reserved.
Evaluation documentation Rev. 1.3 — 21 September 2009 40 of 67
6.2 Security Assurance Requirements
Table 15 below lists all security assurance components that are valid for this Security
Target. With one exception these security assurance components are required by EAL5
(see section 2.2) or by the PP “Security IC Platform Protection Profile” [6].
The exception is the component ASE_TSS.2 which is chosen as an augmentation in this
Security Target to give architectural information on the security functionality of the TOE.
Considering Application Note 21 of [6] the column “Required by” shows the differences in
the requirements of security assurance components between the PP [6] and the Security
Target. The entry “EAL5 / PP” denotes, that an SAR is required by both EAL5 and the
requirement of the PP [6], “EAL5” means that this requirement is due to EAL5 and
beyond the requirement of the PP [6], and “PP” identifies this component as a
requirement of the PP which is beyond EAL5. The augmentation ASE_TSS.2 chosen in
this Security Target is denoted by "ST". The refinements of the PP [6], that must be
adapted for EAL5, are described in section 6.2.1.
Table 15. Security Assurance Requirements
SAR Title Required by
ADV_ARC.1 Security architecture description EAL5 / PP
ADV_FSP.5 Complete semi-formal functional specification with
additional error information
EAL5
ADV_IMP.1 Implementation representation of the TSF EAL5 / PP
ADV_INT.2 Well-structured internals EAL5
ADV_TDS.4 Semiformal modular design EAL5
AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance EAL5 / PP
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures EAL5 / PP
ALC_CMC.4 Production support, acceptance procedures and
automation
EAL5 / PP
ALC_CMS.5 Development tools CM coverage EAL5
ALC_DEL.1 Delivery procedures EAL5 / PP
ALC_DVS.2 Sufficiency of security measures PP
ALC_LCD.1 Developer defined life-cycle model EAL5 / PP
ALC_TAT.2 Compliance with implementation standards EAL5
ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims EAL5 / PP
ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition EAL5 / PP
ASE_INT.1 ST introduction EAL5 / PP
ASE_OBJ.2 Security objectives EAL5 / PP
ASE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements EAL5 / PP
ASE_SPD.1 Security problem definition EAL5 / PP
NXP Semiconductors
P5CD016/021/041V1A and P5Cx081V1A
Security Target Lite
PUBLIC
- © NXP B.V. 2009. All rights reserved.
Evaluation documentation Rev. 1.3 — 21 September 2009 41 of 67
SAR Title Required by
ASE_TSS.2 TOE summary specification with architectural design
summary
ST
ATE_COV.2 Analysis of coverage EAL5 / PP
ATE_DPT.3 Testing: modular design EAL5
ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing EAL5 / PP
ATE_IND.2 Independent testing - sample EAL5 / PP
AVA_VAN.5 Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis PP
6.2.1 Refinements of the Security Assurance Requirements
The Security Target claims conformance to the PP [6] and therefore it has to be conform
to the refinements of the TOE security assurance requirements (see Application Note 22
in [6]). Because the refinements in the PP [6] are defined for the security assurance
components of EAL4, some refinements have to be applied to assurance components of
the higher level EAL5 stated in the Security Target.
Table 16 lists the influences of the refinements of the PP [6] on the Security Target. Most
of the refined security assurance components have the same level in both documents
(PP [6] and Security Target). The following two subsections apply the refinements to
ALC_CMS.5 and ADV_FSP.5 which are different between the PP [6] and the Security
Target.
Table 16. Security Assurance Requirements, overview of differences of refinements
Refined in PP [6] Influence on Security Target
ALC_DEL Same as in PP, refinement valid without change
ALC_DVS Same as in PP, refinement valid without change
ALC_CMS ALC_CMS.5, refinements valid without change
ALC_CMC Same as in PP, refinement valid without change
ADV_ARC Same as in PP, refinement valid without change
ADV_FSP ADV_FSP.5, refinements have to be adapted
ADV_IMP Same as in PP, refinement valid without change
ATE_COV Same as in PP, refinement valid without change
AGD_OPE Same as in PP, refinement valid without change
AGD_PRE Same as in PP, refinement valid without change
AVA_VAN Same as in PP, refinement valid without change
44
44 According to the Application Note 30 in [6] the Security Target should indicate the version of the
document Supporting Document Mandatory Technical Document Application of Attack Potential to
Smartcards [7] used for the vulnerability analysis. The current version is given in the bibliography.
NXP Semiconductors
P5CD016/021/041V1A and P5Cx081V1A
Security Target Lite
PUBLIC
- © NXP B.V. 2009. All rights reserved.
Evaluation documentation Rev. 1.3 — 21 September 2009 42 of 67
6.2.1.1 Refinements regarding CM scope (ALC_CMS)
This Security Target requires a higher evaluation level for the CC family ALC_CMS,
namely ALC_CMS.5 instead of ALC_CMS.4. The refinement of the PP [6] regarding
ALC_CMS.4 is a clarification of the configuration item “TOE implementation
representation”. Since in ALC_CMS.5, the content and presentation of evidence element
ALC_CMS.5.1C only adds a further configuration item to the list of items to be tracked by
the CM system, the refinement can be applied without changes.
The refinement of the configuration item “TOE implementation representation” of
ALC_CMS.4 can be found in section 6.2.1.3 of [6] and is not cited here.
6.2.1.2 Refinements regarding functional specification (ADV_FSP)
This Security Target requires a higher evaluation level for the CC family ADV_FSP,
namely ADV_FSP.5 instead of ADV_FSP.4. The refinement of the PP [6] regarding
ADV_FSP.4 is concerned with the complete representation of the TSF, the purpose and
method of use of all TSFI, and the accuracy and completeness of the SFR instantiations.
The refinement is not a change in the wording of the action elements, but a more detailed
definition of the above items.
The higher level ADV_FSP.5 requires a Functional Specification in a “semi-formal style"
(ADV_FSP.5.2C).
The component ADV_FSP.5 enlarges the scope of the error messages to be described
from those resulting from an invocation of a TSFI (ADV_FSP.5.6C) to also those not
resulting from an invocation of a TSFI (ADV_FSP.5.7C). For the latter a rationale shall be
provided (ADV_FSP.5.8C).
Since the higher level ADV_FSP.5 only affects the style of description and the scope of
and rationale for error messages, the refinements can be applied without changes and
are valid for ADV_FSP.5.
The refinement of the original component ADV_FSP.4 can be found in section 6.2.1.6 of
the Protection Profile [6] and is not cited here.
6.3 Security Requirements Rationale
6.3.1 Rationale for the security functional requirements
Section 6.3.1 in [6] provides a rationale for the mapping between security functional
requirements and security objectives defined in the PP [6]. The mapping is reproduced in
the following table.
Table 17. Security Requirements versus Security Objectives
Objective TOE Security Functional Requirements
O.Leak-Inherent FDP_ITT.1 “Basic internal transfer protection”
FPT_ITT.1 “Basic internal TSF data transfer protection”
FDP_IFC.1 “Subset information flow control”
O.Phys-Probing FPT_PHP.3 “Resistance to physical attack”
O.Malfunction FRU_FLT.2 “Limited fault tolerance
FPT_FLS.1 “Failure with preservation of secure state”
O.Phys-Manipulation FPT_PHP.3 “Resistance to physical attack”
NXP Semiconductors
P5CD016/021/041V1A and P5Cx081V1A
Security Target Lite
PUBLIC
- © NXP B.V. 2009. All rights reserved.
Evaluation documentation Rev. 1.3 — 21 September 2009 43 of 67
Objective TOE Security Functional Requirements
O.Leak-Forced All requirements listed for O.Leak-Inherent
FDP_ITT.1, FPT_ITT.1, FDP_IFC.1
plus those listed for O.Malfunction and
O.Phys-Manipulation
FRU_FLT.2, FPT_FLS.1, FPT_PHP.3
O.Abuse-Func FMT_LIM.1 “Limited capabilities”
FMT_LIM.2 “Limited availability”
plus those for O.Leak-Inherent, O.Phys-Probing, O.Malfunction,
O.Phys-Manipulation, O.Leak-Forced
FDP_ITT.1, FPT_ITT.1, FDP_IFC.1, FPT_PHP.3, FRU_FLT.2,
FPT_FLS.1
O.Identification FAU_SAS.1 “Audit storage”
O.RND FCS_RNG.1 “Quality metric for random numbers”
plus those for O.Leak-Inherent, O.Phys-Probing, O.Malfunction,
O.Phys-Manipulation, O.Leak-Forced
FDP_ITT.1, FPT_ITT.1, FDP_IFC.1, FPT_PHP.3, FRU_FLT.2,
FPT_FLS.1
OE.Plat-Appl not applicable
OE.Resp-Appl not applicable
OE.Process-Sec-IC not applicable
The Security Target additionally defines the SFRs for the TOE that are listed in Table 18.
In addition Security Requirements for the Environment are defined. The following table
gives an overview, how the requirements are combined to meet the security objectives.
Table 18. Mapping of security objectives and requirements
Objective TOE Security Functional Requirement
O.HW_DES3 FCS_COP.1[DES]
O.HW_AES FCS_COP.1[AES]
O.MF_FW FDP_ACC.1[MEM]
FDP_ACF.1[MEM]
FMT_MSA.3[MEM]
O.MEM_ACCESS FDP_ACC.1[MEM]
FDP_ACF.1[MEM]
FMT_MSA.3[MEM]
FMT_MSA.1[MEM]
FMT_MSA.1[SFR]
FMT_SMF.1
O.SFR_ACCESS FDP_ACC.1[SFR]
FDP_ACF.1[SFR]
FMT_MSA.3[SFR]
FMT_MSA.1[SFR]
NXP Semiconductors
P5CD016/021/041V1A and P5Cx081V1A
Security Target Lite
PUBLIC
- © NXP B.V. 2009. All rights reserved.
Evaluation documentation Rev. 1.3 — 21 September 2009 44 of 67
Objective TOE Security Functional Requirement
FMT_SMF.1
OE.Check-Init not applicable
The justification related to the security objective “Triple DES Functionality”
(O.HW_DES3) is as follows:
O.HW_DES3 requires the TOE to support Triple DES encryption and decryption. Exactly
this is the requirement of FCS_COP.1[DES]. Therefore FCS_COP.1[DES] is suitable to
meet O.HW_DES3.
The justification related to the security objective “AES Functionality” (O.HW_AES) is as
follows:
O.HW_AES requires the TOE to support AES encryption and decryption. Exactly this is
the requirement of FCS_COP.1[AES]. Therefore FCS_COP.1[AES] is suitable to meet
O.HW_AES.
The justification related to the security objective “MIFARE Firewall” (O.MF_FW) is as
follows:
The security functional requirement “Subset access control (FDP_ACC.1[MEM])” with the
related Security Function Policy (SFP) “Access Control Policy” exactly require to
implement a memory partition as demanded by O.MF_FW. Therefore,
FDP_ACC.1[MEM] with its SFP is suitable to meet the security objective.
The security functional requirement “Security attribute based access control
(FDP_ACF.1[MEM])” with the related Security Function Policy (SFP) “Access Control
Policy” defines the rules to implement the partition as demanded by O.MF_FW.
Therefore, FDP_ACF.1[MEM] with its SFP is suitable to meet the security objective.
The security functional requirement “Static attribute initialisation (FMT_MSA.3[MEM])”
requires that the TOE provide default values for the security attributes used by the
Memory Management Unit to enforce the memory partition. These default values are
generated by the reset procedure and the Boot-ROM Software for the related Special
Function Register. Restrictive with respect to memory partition means that the partition
cannot be changed at all and for the memory segmentation means that the initial setting
is very restrictive since it effectively disables any memory segment. They are needed by
the TOE to provide a default configuration after reset. Therefore this requirement (as
dependency from FDP_ACF.1) is suitable to meet the security objective.
The security functional requirement “Management of security attributes (FMT_MSA.1)”
requires that the ability to update the security attributes is restricted to privileged
subject(s). No management ability is specified in the two iterations of FMT_MSA.1 that
can be used to change the memory partition. Also no related management function is
specified by FMT_SMF.1. Therefore the memory partition is fixed and cannot be
changed any subject, which is the requirement of O.MF_FW.
The justification related to the security objective “Area based Memory Access Control
(O.MEM_ACCESS)” is as follows:
The security functional requirement “Subset access control (FDP_ACC.1[MEM])” with the
related Security Function Policy (SFP) “Access Control Policy” exactly require to
implement an area based memory access control as demanded by O.MEM_ACCESS.
Therefore, FDP_ACC.1[MEM] with its SFP is suitable to meet the security objective.
NXP Semiconductors
P5CD016/021/041V1A and P5Cx081V1A
Security Target Lite
PUBLIC
- © NXP B.V. 2009. All rights reserved.
Evaluation documentation Rev. 1.3 — 21 September 2009 45 of 67
The security functional requirement “Security attribute based access control
(FDP_ACF.1[MEM])” with the related Security Function Policy (SFP) “Access Control
Policy” defines the rules to implement the area based memory access control as
demanded by O.MEM_ACCESS. Therefore, FDP_ACF.1[MEM] with its SFP is suitable
to meet the security objective.
The security functional requirement “Static attribute initialisation (FMT_MSA.3[MEM])”
requires that the TOE provide default values for the security attributes used by the
Memory Management Units. Since the TOE is a hardware platform these default values
are generated by the reset procedure for the related Special Function Register. They are
needed by the TOE to provide a default configuration after reset. Therefore this
requirement (as dependency from FDP_ACF.1) is suitable to meet the security objective.
The security functional requirement “Management of security attributes (FMT_MSA.1)”
requires that the ability to update the security attributes is restricted to privileged
subject(s). These management functions ensure that the required access control can be
realised using the functions provided by the TOE. The iteration of FMT_MSA.1 into
FMT_MSA.1[MEM] and FMT_MSA.1[SFR] is needed because the different types of
objects have different security attributes. The security attributes of the Memory
Management Unit can be changed by the Security IC Embedded Software. Since the
pointer to the MMU Segment Table can only be changed in System Mode and this
protection is implemented by access control to the respective Special Function Registers,
both iterations are needed for O.MEM_ACCESS.
Finally, the security functional requirement “Specification of Management Functions
(FMT_SMF.1)” is used for the specification of the management functions to be provided
by the TOE as demanded by O.MEM_ACCESS. Therefore, FMT_SMF.1 is suitable to
meet the security objective.
The justification related to the security objective “Special Function Register Access
Control (O.SFR_ACCESS)” is as follows:
The security functional requirement “Subset access control (FDP_ACC.1[SFR])” with the
related Security Function Policy (SFP) “Access Control Policy” require to implement
access control for Special Function Register as demanded by O.SFR_ACCESS.
Therefore, FDP_ACC.1[SFR] with its SFP is suitable to meet the security objective.
The access to Special Function Register is related to the CPU mode. The Special
Function Register used to configure the Memory Management Unit can only be accessed
in the System Mode. The Special Function Register required to use hardware
components like e.g. the coprocessors or the Random Number Generator can be
accessed in the System Mode as specified by the Security Function Policy (SFP)
“Access Control Policy”. In the User Mode only Special Function Register required to run
the CPU are accessible by default. In addition, specific Special Function Registers
related to hardware components can be made accessible for the User Mode if the
Memory Management Unit is configured to allow this.
The security functional requirement “Security attribute based access control
(FDP_ACF.1[SFR])” with the related Security Function Policy “Access Control Policy”
exactly require certain security attributes to implement the access control to Special
Function Register as demanded by O.SFR_ACCESS. Therefore, FDP_ACF.1[SFR] with
its SFP is suitable to meet the security objective.
The security functional requirement “Static attribute initialisation (FMT_MSA.3[SFR])”
requires that the TOE provides default values for the Special Function Register (values
as well as access control). The default values are needed to ensure a defined setup for
NXP Semiconductors
P5CD016/021/041V1A and P5Cx081V1A
Security Target Lite
PUBLIC
- © NXP B.V. 2009. All rights reserved.
Evaluation documentation Rev. 1.3 — 21 September 2009 46 of 67
the operation of the TOE. Therefore this requirement (as dependency from FDP_ACF.1)
is suitable to meet the security objective.
The security functional requirement “Management of security attributes
(FMT_MSA.1[SFR])” is realised in a way that – besides the definition of access rights to
Special Function Registers related to hardware components in User Mode and MIFARE
Mode - no management of the security attributes is possible because the attributes are
implemented in the hardware and cannot be changed.
Finally, the security functional requirement “Specification of Management Functions
(FMT_SMF.1)” is used for the specification of the management functions to be provided
by the TOE as demanded by O.SFR_ACCESS. Therefore, FMT_SMF.1 is suitable to
meet the security objective.
Note that the iteration of FDP_ACF.1 and FDP_ACC.1 with the respective dependencies
are needed to separate the different types of objects because they have different security
attributes.
6.3.2 Dependencies of security functional requirements
The dependencies listed in the PP [6] are independent of the additional dependencies
listed in the table below. The dependencies of the PP [6] are fulfilled within the PP [6]
and at least one dependency is considered to be satisfied.
The following discussion demonstrates how the dependencies defined by Part 2 of the
Common Criteria for the requirements specified in sections 6.1.2 and 6.1.3 are satisfied.
The dependencies defined in the Common Criteria are listed in the table below:
Table 19. Dependencies of security functional requirements
Security Functional
Requirement
Dependencies Fulfilled by security
requirements in this ST
FCS_COP.1[DES] FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2, or
FCS_CKM.1
FCS_CKM.4
See discussion below
FCS_COP.1[AES] FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2, or
FCS_CKM.1
FCS_CKM.4
See discussion below
FDP_ACC.1[MEM] FDP_ACF.1 Yes, by FDP_ACF.1[MEM]
FDP_ACC.1[SFR] FDP_ACF.1 Yes, by FDP_ACF.1[SFR]
FDP_ACF.1[MEM] FDP_ACC.1
FMT_MSA.3
Yes, by FDP_ACC.1[MEM]
Yes
FDP_ACF.1[SFR] FDP_ACC.1
FMT_MSA.3
Yes, by FDP_ACC.1[SFR]
Yes
FMT_MSA.3[MEM] FMT_MSA.1
FMT_SMR.1
Yes, by FMT_MSA.1[MEM]
See discussion below
FMT_MSA.3[SFR] FMT_MSA.1
FMT_SMR.1
Yes, by FMT_MSA.1[SFR]
See discussion below
FMT_MSA.1[MEM] FDP_ACC.1 or FDP_IFC.1 Yes, by FDP_ACC.1[MEM]
NXP Semiconductors
P5CD016/021/041V1A and P5Cx081V1A
Security Target Lite
PUBLIC
- © NXP B.V. 2009. All rights reserved.
Evaluation documentation Rev. 1.3 — 21 September 2009 47 of 67
Security Functional
Requirement
Dependencies Fulfilled by security
requirements in this ST
FMT_SMR.1
FMT_SMF.1
See discussion below
Yes
FMT_MSA.1[SFR] FDP_ACC.1 or FDP_IFC.1
FMT_SMR.1
FMT_SMF.1
Yes, by FDP_ACC.1[SFR]
See discussion below
Yes
The developer of the Security IC Embedded Software must ensure that the additional
security functional requirements FCS_COP.1[DES] and FCS_COP.1[AES] are used as
specified and that the User Data processed by the related security functionality is
protected as defined for the application context.
The dependent requirements of FCS_COP.1[DES] and FCS_COP.1[AES] completely
address the appropriate management of cryptographic keys used by the specified
cryptographic function and the management of access control rights as specified for the
memory access control function. All requirements concerning these management
functions shall be fulfilled by the environment (Security IC Embedded Software).
The functional requirements [FDP_ITC.1, or FDP_ITC.2 or FCS_CKM.1] and
FCS_CKM.4 are not included in this Security Target since the TOE only provides a pure
engine for encryption and decryption without additional features for the handling of
cryptographic keys. Therefore the Security IC Embedded Software must fulfil these
requirements related to the needs of the realised application.
The dependency FMT_SMR.1 introduced by the two components FMT_MSA.1 and
FMT_MSA.3 must be fulfilled by the Security IC Embedded Software. The definition and
maintenance of the roles that act on behalf of the functions provided by the hardware
must be subject of the Security IC Embedded Software.
6.3.3 Rationale for the Assurance Requirements
The selection of assurance components is based on the underlying PP [6]. The Security
Target uses the same augmentations as the PP, but chooses a higher assurance level.
The level EAL5 is chosen in order to meet assurance expectations of digital signature
applications and electronic payment systems. Additionally, the requirement of the PP [6]
to choose at least EAL4 is fulfilled.
The rationale for the augmentations is the same as in the PP. The assurance level EAL5
is an elaborated pre-defined level of the CC, part 3 [3]. The assurance components in an
EAL level are chosen in a way that they build a mutually supportive and complete set of
components. The requirements chosen for augmentation do not add any dependencies,
which are not already fulfilled for the corresponding requirements contained in EAL 5.
Therefore, these components add additional assurance to EAL 5, but the mutual support
of the requirements is still guaranteed.
As stated in the section 6.3.3 of [6], it has to be assumed that attackers with high attack
potential try to attack smart cards used for digital signature applications or payment
systems. Therefore specifically AVA_VAN.5 was chosen by the PP [6] in order to assure
that even these attackers cannot successfully attack the TOE.
NXP Semiconductors
P5CD016/021/041V1A and P5Cx081V1A
Security Target Lite
PUBLIC
- © NXP B.V. 2009. All rights reserved.
Evaluation documentation Rev. 1.3 — 21 September 2009 48 of 67
6.3.4 Security Requirements are Internally Consistent
The discussion of security functional requirements and assurance components in the
preceding sections has shown that mutual support and consistency are given for both
groups of requirements. The arguments given for the fact that the assurance components
are adequate for the functionality of the TOE also show that the security functional and
assurance requirements support each other and that there are no inconsistencies
between these groups.
The security functional requirements required to meet the security objectives O.Leak-
Inherent, O.Phys-Probing, O.Malfunction, O.Phys-Manipulation and O.Leak-Forced also
protect the cryptographic algorithms and the memory access/separation control function
as well as the access control to Special Function Register implemented according to the
security functional requirement FCS_COP.1[DES], FCS_COP.1[AES] and
FDP_ACC.1[MEM], FDP_ACC.1[SFR] with reference to the Access Control Policies
defined in FDP_ACF.1[MEM] and FDP_ACF.1[SFR]. Therefore, these security functional
requirements support the secure implementation and operation of FCS_COP.1[DES],
FCS_COP.1[AES] and of FDP_ACC.1 with FDP_ACF.1 as well as the dependent
security functional requirements.
A Security IC hardware platform requires Security IC Embedded Software to build a
secure product. Thereby the Security IC Embedded Software must support the security
functionality of the hardware and implement a sufficient management of the security
services implemented in the hardware. The realisation of the Security Functional
Requirements within the TOE provides a good balance between flexible configuration
and restrictions to ensure a secure behaviour of the TOE.
NXP Semiconductors
P5CD016/021/041V1A and P5Cx081V1A
Security Target Lite
PUBLIC
- © NXP B.V. 2009. All rights reserved.
Evaluation documentation Rev. 1.3 — 21 September 2009 49 of 67
7. TOE Summary Specification
This chapter is composed of sections “Portions of the TOE Security Functionality” and
“TOE Summary Specification Rationale”.
7.1 Portions of the TOE Security Functionality
The TOE Security Functionality (TSF) directly corresponds to the TOE security functional
requirements defined in chapter 6. It is split into Security Services (SS) and Security
Features (SF), which are applicable to phases 4 to 7 of the Security IC product life-cycle.
Note: Parts of the security functionality are configured at the end of phase 3 and
all security functionality is active after phase 3.
The TOE also comprises security mechanisms, which are not listed as security
functionality in the following. Such mechanisms do not provide a complete portion of TOE
security functionality, but they can be used to support a portion of security functionality
implemented by the Security IC Embedded Software, e.g. the FameXE coprocessor for
asymmetric cryptographic algorithms or the CRC calculation for the control of data
integrity.
7.1.1 Security Services
SS.RNG: Random Number Generator
The Random Number Generator continuously produces random numbers with a length of
one byte. The TOE implements SS.RNG by means of a physical hardware Random
Number Generator working stable within the valid ranges of operating conditions, which
are guaranteed by SF.OPC.
The TSF provides a hardware test functionality, which can be used by the Security IC
Embedded Software to detect faults in the hardware of the Random Number Generator.
According to “AIS31” [5] the Random Number Generator claims the fulfilment of the
requirements of functionality class P2. This means that the Random Number Generator
is suitable for generation of signature key pairs, generation of session keys for symmetric
encryption mechanisms, random padding bits, zero-knowledge proofs and the generation
of seeds for DRNGs.
SS.HW_DES: Triple-DES coprocessor
The TOE provides the Triple Data Encryption Algorithm (TDEA) according to the Data
Encryption Standard (DES). SS.HW_DES is a modular basic cryptographic function,
which provides the TDEA algorithm as defined by FIPS PUB 46 by means of a hardware
coprocessor and supports (a) the 3-key Triple-DEA algorithm according to keying option
1 and (b) the 2-key Triple DEA algorithm according to keying option 2 in FIPS PUB 46-3
[17]. The two/three 56-bit keys (112-/168-bit) for the 2-key/3-key Triple DES algorithm
shall be provided by the Security IC Embedded Software. For encryption the Security IC
Embedded Software provides 8 bytes of the plain text and SS.HW_DES calculates
8 bytes cipher text. The calculation output is read by the Security IC Embedded
Software. For decryption the Security IC Embedded Software provides 8 bytes of cipher
text and SS.HW_DES calculates 8 bytes plain text. The calculation output is read by the
Security IC Embedded Software.
SS.HW_AES: AES coprocessor
The TOE provides the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) algorithm according to the
Advanced Encryption Standard as defined by FIPS PUB 197 [18]. SS.HW_AES is a
modular basic cryptographic function, which provides the AES algorithm by means of a
NXP Semiconductors
P5CD016/021/041V1A and P5Cx081V1A
Security Target Lite
PUBLIC
- © NXP B.V. 2009. All rights reserved.
Evaluation documentation Rev. 1.3 — 21 September 2009 50 of 67
hardware coprocessor and supports the AES algorithm with three different key lengths of
128, 192 or 256 bit. The keys for the AES algorithm shall be provided by the Security IC
Embedded Software. For encryption the Security IC Embedded Software provides
16 bytes of the plain text and SS.HW_AES calculates 16 bytes cipher text. The
calculation output is read by the Security IC Embedded Software. For decryption the
Security IC Embedded Software provides 16 bytes of cipher text and SS.HW_AES
calculates 16 bytes plain text. The calculation output is read by the Security IC
Embedded Software.
7.1.2 Security Features
SF.OPC: Control of Operating Conditions
SF.OPC ensures correct operation of the TOE (functions offered by the microcontroller
including the standard CPU as well as the Triple-DES coprocessor, AES coprocessor,
the arithmetic coprocessor, the memories, registers, I/O interfaces and the other system
peripherals) during execution of the IC Dedicated Support Software and Security IC
Embedded Software. This includes all specific security mechanisms of the TOE, which
are able to provide an active response.
The TOE ensures its correct operation and prevents from any malfunction using the
following mechanisms: filtering of power supply and clock frequency input as well as
monitoring of voltage supply, clock frequency input and the temperature of the chip by
means of sensors. There are multiple sensors for the different ISO/IEC 7816 voltage
classes and the contactless operation mode. Light sensors are distributed over the chip
surface and used to detect light attacks. Thresholds of the parameters, which are
monitored by the mechanisms, are set appropriate to the range where the TOE ensures
its correct operation. In addition to the light sensors the EEPROM provides two functions
to detect light attacks. The Security IC Embedded Software can select one function and
also disable both functions of the EEPROM detection function.
Specific functional units of the TOE are equipped with the Secure Fetch or other special
circuitry to detect fault injection attacks. These are the Program Counter, the stack
pointer, the PSWH register, the MMU address cache registers, the DES coprocessor,
AES coprocessor, and the FameXE coprocessor.
If one of the monitored parameters is out of the specified range, either (i) a reset is forced
and the actually running program is aborted or (ii) an exception is raised which interrupts
the program flow and allows a reaction of the Security IC Embedded Software. A reset is
forced by the sensors for voltage, frequency, temperature and light, the Secure Fetch
and the single fault injection detection in the MMU address cache registers. An exception
is forced by the EEPROM light detector and the other single fault injection detection
circuitry. In case the inverse error correction of the EEPROM is enabled (refer to section
1.4.1.2) the probability to detect fault injection errors increases and the error correction
logic raises an exception when detecting an error. In case the TOE resets all
components of the TOE are initialised with their reset values and the TOE provides a
reset cause indicator to the Security IC Embedded Software. In the case an exception is
raised an indicator for the reason of the exception is provided.
Test Mode is disabled before TOE delivery. In all other modes except Test Mode the
TOE automatically enables the sensors when operated. Furthermore the TOE defends
the sensors from being disabled by the Security IC Embedded Software. The assignment
which sensor raises an exception or forces a reset is hard-wired and can not be changed
by the Security IC Embedded Software.
NXP Semiconductors
P5CD016/021/041V1A and P5Cx081V1A
Security Target Lite
PUBLIC
- © NXP B.V. 2009. All rights reserved.
Evaluation documentation Rev. 1.3 — 21 September 2009 51 of 67
The TOE also controls the specified range of the stack pointer. The stack pointer and the
control logic are implemented threefold for the User Mode, System Mode and Super
System Mode (comprising Boot Mode, Test Mode and MIFARE Mode). An exception is
generated in case the specified limits are exceeded.
In addition, SF.OPC comprises a sensor, which checks the high voltage of the write
process to the EEPROM during each write sequence. The result of this sensor must be
read from a Special Function Register and does not force an automatic event (e.g.
exception).
SF.PHY: Protection against Physical Manipulation
SF.PHY protects the TOE against manipulation of (i) the IC hardware, (ii) the IC
Dedicated Software in ROM, (iii) the Security IC Embedded Software in ROM and
EEPROM, (iv) the Application Data in EEPROM and RAM including TSF data in the
Security Rows. It also protects User Data and TSF data against disclosure by physical
probing when stored or while being processed by the TOE.
The protection of the TOE comprises several security mechanisms in design and
construction, which make reverse-engineering and tamper attacks more difficult. These
mechanisms comprise dedicated shielding techniques for different components and
specific encryption mechanisms for the memories. SF.PHY supports the efficiency of
other portions of the security functionality.
SF.PHY also supports the integrity of the EEPROM and the ROM. The EEPROM is able
to correct a 1-bit error within each byte. The ROM provides a parity check. The EEPROM
corrects errors automatically without user interaction, a ROM parity error forces a reset.
SF.LOG: Logical Protection
SF.LOG implements security mechanisms to limit or eliminate the information in the
shape and amplitude of signals or in the time between events, which might be found by
measuring such signals. This comprises the power supply and signals on other pads,
which are not intentionally used for communication by the terminal or the Security IC
Embedded Software. Therby SF.LOG prevents from disclosure of User Data and TSF
data stored and/or processed in the Security IC through measurement of power
consumption and subsequent complex signal analysis. This protection of the TOE is
enforced by several security mechanisms in the design, which support other portions of
security functionality.
The Triple-DES coprocessor includes security mechanisms to prevent SPA/DPA analysis
of shape and amplitude of the power consumption and ensures that the calculation time
is independent from any key and plain/cipher text.
The AES coprocessor includes security mechanisms to prevent SPA/DPA analysis of
shape and amplitude of the power consumption and ensures that the calculation time is
with respect to the key length independent from any plain/cipher text.
The FameXE coprocessor provides measures to prevent timing attacks on basic modular
function. The calculation time of an operation depends on the lengths of the operands,
but not on the value of the operands, with the following exceptions: multiplication with
reduction, modular inversion and modular division. These three operations have no
constant timing due to correction cycles that are needed based on the calculation
method. In addition, mechanisms are included, which provide limitations of the capability
for the analysis of shape and amplitude of the power consumption. Of course the
FameXE does not realise an algorithm on its own and algorithm-specific leakage
NXP Semiconductors
P5CD016/021/041V1A and P5Cx081V1A
Security Target Lite
PUBLIC
- © NXP B.V. 2009. All rights reserved.
Evaluation documentation Rev. 1.3 — 21 September 2009 52 of 67
countermeasures have to be added by the Security IC Embedded Software when using
the FameXE.
Additional security mechanisms being configured by the Security IC Embedded Software
comprise (i) FameXE HIGHSEC mode, which adds dummy calculations, and (ii) CPU
clock configurations, that can be used to prevent the possibility to synchronise the
internal operation with the external clock or to synchronise with the characteristics of the
power consumption that can be used as trigger signal to support leakage attacks (DPA or
timing attacks)
Some mechanisms described for SF.PHY (e.g. the encryption mechanisms) and for
SF.OPC (e.g. the filter mechanisms) also support SF.LOG.
SF.COMP: Protection of Mode Control
SF.COMP provides control of the CPU mode for (i) Boot Mode, (ii) Test Mode and (iii)
MIFARE Mode. This includes protection of electronic fuses stored in a protected memory
area, the so-called Security Rows, and the possibility to store initialisation or pre-
personalisation data in the so-called FabKey Area.
Control of the CPU mode for Boot Mode, Test Mode and MIFARE Mode prevents from
abuse of test functions after TOE delivery. It also inhibits abuse of features, which are
used during start-up or reset to configure the TOE. The initial – but not user visible –
CPU mode during start-up or reset is the Boot Mode. Hardware circuitry determines
whether Test Mode is available or not. If available, the TOE jumps to the IC Dedicated
Test Software in Test Mode. Otherwise, the TOE switches to System Mode – the initial
user visible CPU mode – and starts execution of the Security IC Embedded Software.
The protection of electronic fuses ensures secure storage of configuration and calibration
data, which are set up in Test Mode. SF.COMP protects CPU mode switches regarding
Boot Mode, Test Mode and MIFARE Mode in the following way: Switching from Boot
Mode to Test Mode or MIFARE Mode is allowed, switching from these modes back to
Boot Mode is prevented. Switching to Test Mode is prevented as well after TOE delivery,
because Test Mode then is permanently disabled. SF.COMP also ensures that Boot
Mode is active only in the boot phase during start-up or reset of the TOE, and can not be
invoked afterwards. Therefore, once the TOE has left the test phase and each time the
TOE completed start-up or reset, the MIFARE Mode is the only one available out of
Super System Mode. Super System Mode is indicated by PSWH.SSM being set and
means, that one CPU mode out of Boot Mode, Test Mode and MIFARE Mode is active.
SF.COMP controls the mode, which is used, when bit PSWH.SSM is set.
The protection of electronic fuses especially ensures that configuration options with
regard to the security functionality can not be changed, abused or influenced in any way.
SF.COMP ensures that activation or deactivation of security mechanisms can not be
influenced by the Security IC Embedded Software so that the TSF provides self-
protection against interference and tampering by untrusted Security IC Embedded
Software.
The TSF controls access to the Security Rows, the top-most 128 Bytes of the EEPROM
memory, accessible at reserved addresses in the memory map. The available EEPROM
memory space for the Security IC Embedded Software is reduced by this area.
SF.COMP provides three memory areas in the Security Rows,that can be used by the
Security IC Embedded Software. These are
• the User Read Only Area
• the User Write Protected Area and
NXP Semiconductors
P5CD016/021/041V1A and P5Cx081V1A
Security Target Lite
PUBLIC
- © NXP B.V. 2009. All rights reserved.
Evaluation documentation Rev. 1.3 — 21 September 2009 53 of 67
• the User Write Once Area.
The User Read Only Area contains 32 bytes, which are read-only for the Security IC
Embedded Software. The User Write Protected area contains 16 bytes, which can be
write-protected by the Security IC Embedded Software on demand. The User Write Once
Area contains 32 bytes of which each bit can separately be set to ‘1’ once only, and not
reset to ‘0’.
If the Card Disable Function is used (refer to section 1.4.1.2) SF.COMP inhibits any start-
up of the Security IC Embedded Software once the Security IC Embedded Software
disables the card.
SF.COMP also provides the FabKey Area in which initialisation and identification data
can be stored. The FabKey area does not belong to the Security Rows and is not
protected by hardware mechanisms. The FabKey Area as well as the Security Rows can
be used by SF.COMP to store a unique identification for each die.
For all areas the initial values are set during chip testing and pre-personalisation. They
depend on the choice of the Security IC Embedded Software developer and are included
in the Order Entry Form. The User Write Protected Area and the User Write Once Area
are designed to store the identification of a (fully personalised) Security IC (e.g.
smartcard) or a sequence of events over the life cycle, that can be coded by an
increasing number of bits set to "one" or protecting bytes, respectively.
SF.COMP limits the capabilities of the test functions and provides test personnel during
phase 3 with the capability to store identification and/or pre-personalisation data and/or
supplements of the Security IC Embedded Software in the EEPROM. SF.COMP provides
self-protection against interference and tampering by untrusted subjects both in the Test
Mode and in the other modes. It also enforces the separation of domains regarding the
IC Dedicated Software and the Security IC Embedded Software.
SF.MEM_ACC: Memory Access Control
SF.MEM_ACC controls access of any subject (program code comprising processor
instructions) to the memories of the TOE through the Memory Management Unit.
Memory access is based on virtual addresses that are mapped to physical addresses.
The CPU always uses virtual addresses. The Memory Management Unit performs the
translation from virtual to physical addresses and the physical addresses are passed
from the Memory Management Unit to the memory interfaces to access the memories.
The access control is performed in two ways:
• Memory partitioning: Each memory type ROM, RAM and EEPROM is partitioned into
two parts. In Boot Mode, MIFARE Mode, System Mode and User Mode the CPU has
access to only one part of each memory type. Access to both parts of each type is
allowed in Test Mode for testing.
• Memory segmentation in User Mode: The three accessible parts of the memory in
ROM, RAM and EEPROM can be segmented into smaller areas. Access rights
(readable, writeable or executable) can be defined for these segments. In addition,
access rights to Special Function Registers related to hardware components can be
defined for code that is executed in a segment.
Memory partitioning is fixed and can not be changed. It is determined during production
of the TOE and is solely dependent on the MIFARE configuration (refer to section 0).
Memory segmentation can be defined in System Mode. The segmentation is active when
the CPU switches to User Mode. The segments, their access rights and the access rights
to Special Function Registers related to hardware components are defined in the MMU
NXP Semiconductors
P5CD016/021/041V1A and P5Cx081V1A
Security Target Lite
PUBLIC
- © NXP B.V. 2009. All rights reserved.
Evaluation documentation Rev. 1.3 — 21 September 2009 54 of 67
Segment Table. The MMU Segment Table stores five values for each segment: The
memory access rights, the virtual start address of the segment, the virtual end address of
the segment, the address offset for the segment and the access rights to Special
Function Registers for code that is executed in the segment. The address offset is used
to relocate the segment anywhere in the memory map. The resulting address computed
by the Memory Management Unit can not overrule memory partitioning. Up to 64
segments can be defined in the MMU Segment Table. Special configurations of the
memory access rights allow to specify less than 64 segments and to split the MMU
Segment Table into several parts being stored at different locations in memory.
Note that the MMU Segment Table itself is stored in the memory and therefore the table
itself can be placed in a segment accessible in User Mode.
In addition, SF.MEM_ACC permanently checks whether accessed addresses point to
physically implemented memory. Access to forbidden memory addresses in User Mode
and accesses outside the boundaries of the physical memory are notified by raising an
exception.
As stated above the Memory Management Unit handles access rights to Special
Function Registers related to hardware components for code running in User Mode. This
information is used by SF.SFR_ACC to grant or block a certain access. The access
rights can be defined for up to 16 groups of Special Function Registers, which are related
to 16 hardware components. SF.SFR_ACC receives the access rights to these 16
groups from the Memory Management Unit as well for the other CPU modes. In Boot
Mode, Test Mode and System Mode the Memory Management Unit indicates full access
to the 16 groups. In MIFARE Mode the Memory Management Unit indicates access
rights as set in two Special Function Registers, which can not be modified in MIFARE
Mode. Thus, MIFARE Mode can be restricted in its access to the 16 hardware
components on demand of the Security IC Embedded Software. Note that SF.MEM_ACC
only provides the access rights to SF.SFR_ACC, the access control is enforced by
SF.SFR_ACC.
SF.SFR_ACC: Special Function Register Access Control
SF.SFR_ACC controls access to the Special Function Registers and CPU mode
switches based on Special Function Register PSWH.
SF.SFR_ACC implements access control to the Special Function Registers as specified
in the Access Control Policy and the Security Functional Requirements
FDP_ACC.1[SFR] and FDP_ACF.1[SFR].
The function of the Special Function Register and the CPU mode determine, whether
read and/or write access to a Special Function Register is allowed or not. For example,
read access to the DES key register is write-only according to its function and its write
access is granted depending on the CPU mode. Similar for the output register of the
Random Number Generator, which is read-only based on its function, and read access is
granted based on the CPU mode.
SF.SFR_ACC ignores accesses to Special Function Registers, which are not allowed.
Ignoring means that a write access has no influence and/or a read access always returns
a fixed value independent of the true value of the Special Function Register.
Some Special Function Registers are implemented threefold, one for User Mode, a
second one for System Mode and a third one for Super System Mode meaning Boot
Mode, Test Mode and MIFARE Mode. Hence, such Special Function Registers are
already separated from the outset.
NXP Semiconductors
P5CD016/021/041V1A and P5Cx081V1A
Security Target Lite
PUBLIC
- © NXP B.V. 2009. All rights reserved.
Evaluation documentation Rev. 1.3 — 21 September 2009 55 of 67
SF.SFR_ACC relies on access rights to Special Function Registers related to hardware
components, which are provided by SF.MEM_ACC. Access rights to all other Special
Function Registers are pre-defined and can not be changed.
This implies that code running in User Mode or MIFARE Mode is not able to use
SS.RNG, SS.HW_DES, and SS.HW_AES until access to the respective group of Special
Function Registers is explicitly granted by code running in System Mode. This holds for
all 16 hardware components, which are controlled by the 16 groups of Special Function
Registers related to hardware components.
SF.SFR_ACC also implements transitions among CPU modes based on Special
Function Register PSWH. This Special Function Register contains two bits, which are
PSWH.SSM and PSWH.SM. Bit PSWH.SSM indicates Super System Mode when set,
which means, that one out of Boot Mode, Test Mode and MIFARE Mode is active. Bit
PSWH.SM indicates System Mode when set. If both bits are zero, the CPU operates in
User Mode.
The CPU mode changes by the following operations.
• Call of a system call vector (SVEC) address or a configuration vector (CVEC)
address. A call of a SVEC sets bit PSWH.SM and enables System Mode, a call of a
CVEC sets bit PSWH.SSM and enables MIFARE Mode. Calls of SVEC addresses
are only allowed in User Mode, otherwise an exception is raised. For P5CC081V1A
calls to the CVEC addresses do not set bit PSWH.SSM. Instead, the call is executed
like any other call.
• Execution of an exception or interrupt. Any event that leads to the execution of an
exception sets bit PSWH.SM. Interrupts can be executed in User Mode or in System
Mode. The Security IC Embedded Software running in System Mode can configure
this option at run time and based on this configuration bit PSWH.SM is modified or
not.
• Return from an exception/interrupt or vector call with a RETI instruction. This
restores the value of PSWH to the value before the event occurred. A RETI in User
Mode is allowed only in case interrupts are allowed to be executed in User Mode and
an interrupt is actually active, otherwise an exception is raised.
• Execution of an LCALL/ACALL/ECALL instruction to a specific address. A call of
address 0x800000 in System Mode enables User Mode and starts execution at this
(virtual) address. This is similar to a CVEC or SVEC call, but no return address is
pushed onto the stack.
• Direct modification of the two bits in PSWH. Hardware provided by SF.SFR_ACC
ensures that the bits can only be cleared. Therefore it is not possible for code
running in User Mode to enter System Mode, but System Mode can switch to User
Mode.
Two CPU modes are available to the Security IC Embedded Software, which are System
Mode and User Mode. System Mode is the more privileged CPU mode since it allows
access to all Special Function Registers of the hardware components and for system
management (i.e. configuration of Memory Management Unit, clock settings and some
mechanisms provided by SF.LOG). User Mode is the less privileged, but with regard to
the hardware components it can be made as powerful as System Mode.
SF.SFR_ACC and SF.COMP together ensure that other CPU modes are not available to
the Security IC Embedded Software, but reserved for specific purposes fulfilled by the IC
Dedicated Software. In addition, SF.MEM_ACC provides separation of the memories and
access control information.
NXP Semiconductors
P5CD016/021/041V1A and P5Cx081V1A
Security Target Lite
PUBLIC
- © NXP B.V. 2009. All rights reserved.
Evaluation documentation Rev. 1.3 — 21 September 2009 56 of 67
7.2 TOE Summary Specification Rationale
7.2.1 Rationale for the portions of the TOE security functionality
The following table provides a mapping of portions of the TOE security functionality to the
Security Functional Requirements. The mapping is described in detail in the text
following the table only in the full verison of the Security Target.
Table 20. Mapping of Security Functional Requirements and the portions of the TOE
Security Functionality
SS.RNG
SS.HW_DES
SS.HW_AES
SF.OPC
SF.PHY
SF.LOG
SF.COMP
SF.MEM_ACC
SF.SFR_ACC
FAU_SAS.1 X X
FCS_RNG.1 X X
FDP_IFC.1 X X
FDP_ITT.1 X X
FMT_LIM.1 X X
FMT_LIM.2 X X
FPT_FLS.1 X X
FPT_ITT.1 X X
FPT_PHP.3 X
FRU_FLT.2 X X
FCS_COP.1[DES] X X
FCS_COP.1[AES] X X
FDP_ACC.1[MEM] X X
FDP_ACC.1[SFR] X X
FDP_ACF.1[MEM] X X
FDP_ACF.1[SFR] X X
FMT_MSA.1[MEM] X X
FMT_MSA.1[SFR] X X
FMT_MSA.3[MEM] X X
FMT_MSA.3[SFR] X X
FMT_SMF.1 X X X
An "X" in the above table means that the specific portion of the TOE security functionality
realises or supports the functionality required by the respective Security Functional
Requirement.
As already stated in the definition of the portions of the TOE security functionality there
are additional security mechanisms, which can contribute to security when they are
sufficiently controlled by the Security IC Embedded Software. The CRC calculation can
be used to verify the integrity of memory areas defined by the Security IC Embedded
Software, the FameXE coprocessor can be used to build leakage-resistant asymmetric
cryptographic algorithms.
NXP Semiconductors
P5CD016/021/041V1A and P5Cx081V1A
Security Target Lite
PUBLIC
- © NXP B.V. 2009. All rights reserved.
Evaluation documentation Rev. 1.3 — 21 September 2009 57 of 67
7.2.2 Security architectural information
Since this Security Target claims the assurance requirement ASE_TSS.2 security
architectural information on a very high level is supposed to be included in the TSS to
inform potential customers on how the TOE protects itself against interference, logical
tampering and bypass. In the security architecture context, this covers the aspects self-
protection and non-bypassability.
As described in section 7.2.1, the aspects self-protection and non-bypassability are
implemented by SF.PHY, SF.OPC, and SF.COMP.
SF.PHY covers the physical protection of the TOE. SF.OPC contributes by covering the
aspects failure with preservation of secure state and limited fault tolerance. SF.COMP
limits capability and availability of the Test Features.
NXP Semiconductors
P5CD016/021/041V1A and P5Cx081V1A
Security Target Lite
PUBLIC
- © NXP B.V. 2009. All rights reserved.
Evaluation documentation Rev. 1.3 — 21 September 2009 58 of 67
8. Annexes
8.1 Further Information contained in the PP
Chapter 7 of the PP “Security IC Platform Protection Profile” [6] provides further
information. Section 7.1 in [6] describes the development and production process of
Security ICs including a detailed life-cycle description and a description of the assets of
the IC Designer/Manufacturer. Section 7.2 in [6] comprises security aspects of the
Security IC Embedded Software, i.e further information regarding A.Resp-Appl and
examples of specific Functional Requirements for the Security IC Embedded Software.
Section 7.3 in [6] gives examples of Attack Scenarios.
8.2 Glossary and Vocabulary
Administrator (in the sense of the Common Criteria) The TOE may
provide security functionality which can or need to be
administrated (i) by the Security IC Embedded
Software or (ii) using services of the TOE after
delivery to Phases 4-6. Then a privileged user (in the
sense of the Common Criteria, refer to definition
below) becomes an administrator.
Application Data All data managed by the Security IC Embedded
Software in the application context. Application data
comprise all data in the final Security IC.
Boot Mode CPU mode of the TOE dedicated to start-up and
reset of the TOE. This mode is not accessible for the
Security IC Embedded Software.
Composite Product Integrator Role installing or finalising the IC
Embedded Software and the applications on platform
transforming the TOE into the unpersonalised
Composite Product after TOE delivery
The TOE Manufacturer may implement IC Embedded
Software delivered by the Security IC Embedded
Software Developer before TOE delivery (e.g. if the
IC Embedded Software is implemented in ROM or is
stored in the non-volatile memory as service provided
by the IC Manufacturer or IC Packaging
Manufacturer).
Composite Product Manufacturer The Composite Product Manufacturer has the
following roles (i) the Security IC Embedded Software
Developer (Phase 1), (ii) the Composite Product
Integrator (Phase 5) and (iii) the Personaliser (Phase
6). If the TOE is delivered after Phase 3 in form of
wafers or sawn wafers (dice) he has the role of the IC
Packaging Manufacturer (Phase 4) in addition.
The customer of the TOE Manufacturer, who receives
the TOE during TOE Delivery. The Composite
ProducT Manufacturer includes the Security IC
Embedded Software developer and all roles after
NXP Semiconductors
P5CD016/021/041V1A and P5Cx081V1A
Security Target Lite
PUBLIC
- © NXP B.V. 2009. All rights reserved.
Evaluation documentation Rev. 1.3 — 21 September 2009 59 of 67
TOE Delivery up to Phase 6 (refer to [6], Figure 2 on
page 240H10 and Section 7.1.1)
CPU mode Mode in which the CPU operates. The TOE supports
five CPU modes, which are Boot Mode, Test Mode,
MIFARE Mode, System Mode and User Mode.
exception interrupt Non-maskable interrupt of program execution
jumping to fixed addresses (depending on the
exception source) and enabling System Mode.
Sources of exceptions are hardware breakpoints,
single fault injection detections, illegal instructions,
stack overflows, unauthorised system call vector
calls, execution of RETI instruction in User Mode, and
the MMU exceptions access violation and access
collision.
FabKey Area A memory area in the EEPROM containing data,
which are programmed during testing by the IC
Manufacturer. The amount of data and the type of
information can be selected by the customer.
IC Dedicated Software IC proprietary software embedded in a Security IC
(also known as IC firmware) and developed by the IC
Developer. Such software is required for testing
purpose (IC Dedicated Test Software) but may
provide additional services to facilitate usage of the
hardware and/or to provide additional services (IC
Dedicated Support Software).
IC Dedicated Support Software That part of the IC Dedicated Software (refer to
above) which provides functions after TOE Delivery.
The usage of parts of the IC Dedicated Software
might be restricted to certain phases.
IC Dedicated Test Software That part of the IC Dedicated Software (refer to
above) which is used to test the TOE before TOE
Delivery but which does not provide any functionality
thereafter.
End-consumer User of the Composite Product in Phase 7
Initialisation Data Initialisation Data defined by the TOE Manufacturer to
identify the TOE and to keep track of the Security IC’s
production and further life-cycle phases are
considered as belonging to the TSF data. These data
are for instance used for traceability and for TOE
identification (identification data).
Integrated Circuit (IC) Electronic component(s) designed to perform
processing and/or memory functions.
Memory IC hardware component, that stores code and/or
data, i.e. ROM, RAM or EEPROM of the TOE.
Memory Management Unit The MMU maps the virtual addresses used by the
CPU into the physical addresses of RAM, ROM and
EEPROM. This mapping is done based on (a)
NXP Semiconductors
P5CD016/021/041V1A and P5Cx081V1A
Security Target Lite
PUBLIC
- © NXP B.V. 2009. All rights reserved.
Evaluation documentation Rev. 1.3 — 21 September 2009 60 of 67
memory partitioning and (b) memory segments for
code running in User Mode. Memory partitioning is
fixed, whereas up to 64 memory segments can be
configured individually. Each segment can be (i)
positioned and sized (ii) enabled and disabled, (iii)
configured for access rights in terms of read, write
and execute in User Mode and (iv) configured for
User Mode access rights to Special Function
Registers related to hardware components of code
executed in this segment.
Memory Segment Address space provided by the Memory Management
Unit according to the configuration in the MMU
Segment Table. A memory segment defines a
memory area, are accessible for code running in User
Mode. Memory segments may address RAM, ROM
and EEPROM.
MIFARE Contactless smartcard interface standard complying
with ISO/IEC 14443 A.
MIFARE Mode CPU mode of the TOE dedicated to execution of the
MIFARE Operating System, which is part of the IC
Dedicated Support Software. This mode is not
accessible for the Security IC Embedded Software.
MMU Segment Table This structure defines the memory segments for code
running in User Mode, which are controlled by the
MMU. The structure can be located anywhere in the
memory that is available in System Mode. It also
contains User Mode access rights to Special Function
Registers related to hardware components of code
executed in each segment.
Pre-personalisation Data Any data supplied by the Card Manufacturer that is
injected into the non-volatile memory by the
Integrated Circuits manufacturer (Phase 3). These
data are for instance used for traceability and/or to
secure shipment between phases.
S²C Smart card interface standard complying with
ISO/IEC 18092.
Security IC (as used in the PP [6]) Composition of TOE, Security
IC Embedded Software, User Data and package
(Security IC carrier).
Security IC Embedded Software Software embedded in a Security IC and normally not
being developed by the IC Designer. The Security IC
Embedded Software is designed in Phase 1 and
embedded into the Security IC in Phase 3 or in later
phases of the Security IC product life-cycle.
Some part of that software may actually implement a
Security IC application others may provide standard
services. Nevertheless, this distinction does not
matter here so that the Security IC Embedded
NXP Semiconductors
P5CD016/021/041V1A and P5Cx081V1A
Security Target Lite
PUBLIC
- © NXP B.V. 2009. All rights reserved.
Evaluation documentation Rev. 1.3 — 21 September 2009 61 of 67
Software can be considered as being application
dependent whereas the IC Dedicated Software is
definitely not.
Security IC Product Composite product which includes the Security
Integrated Circuit (i.e. the TOE) and the Embedded
Software and is evaluated as composite target of
evaluation in the sense of the Supporting Document
Security Rows Top-most 128 bytes of the EEPROM memory
reserved for configuration purposes as well as
dedicated memory area for the Security IC
Embedded Software to store life-cycle information
about the TOE.
Special Function Registers Registers used to access and configure the functions
for communication with an external interface device,
the cryptographic coprocessors for Triple-DES or
AES, the FameXE coprocessor for basic arithmetic
functions to perform asymmetric cryptographic
algorithms, the random numbers generator and chip
configuration.
Super System Mode This term represents either Boot Mode, Test Mode or
MIFARE Mode.
System Mode CPU mode of the TOE with unrestricted access to the
hardware resources. The Memory Management Unit
can be configured in System Mode.
Test Features All features and functions (implemented by the IC
Dedicated Test Software and/or hardware) which are
designed to be used before TOE Delivery only and
delivered as part of the TOE.
Test Mode CPU mode of the TOE for its configuration and
execution of the IC Dedicated Test Software. The
Test Mode is permanently and irreversible disabled
after production testing. Specific Special Function
Registers are accessible in Test Mode for test
purposes.
TOE Delivery The period when the TOE is delivered which is (refer
to [6], Figure 2 on page 242H10) either (i) after Phase
3 (or before Phase 4) if the TOE is delivered in form
of wafers or sawn wafers (dice) or (ii) after Phase 4
(or before Phase 5) if the TOE is delivered in form of
packaged products.
TOE Manufacturer The TOE Manufacturer must ensure that all
requirements for the TOE (as defined in [6], Section
243H1.2.2) and its development and production
environment are fulfilled (refer to [6], Figure 2 on
page 24H10).
The TOE Manufacturer has the following roles: (i) IC
Developer (Phase 2) and (ii) IC Manufacturer (Phase
NXP Semiconductors
P5CD016/021/041V1A and P5Cx081V1A
Security Target Lite
PUBLIC
- © NXP B.V. 2009. All rights reserved.
Evaluation documentation Rev. 1.3 — 21 September 2009 62 of 67
3). If the TOE is delivered after Phase 4 in form of
packaged products, he has the role of the (iii) IC
Packaging Manufacturer (Phase 4) in addition.
TSF data Data created by and for the TOE, which might affect
the operation of the TOE. This includes information
about the TOE’s configuration, if any is coded in non-
volatile non-programmable memories (ROM), in
specific circuitry, in non-volatile programmable
memories (for instance EEPROM) or a combination
thereof.
User (in the sense of the Common Criteria) The TOE
serves as a platform for the Security IC Embedded
Software. Therefore, the “user” of the TOE (as used
in the Common Criteria assurance class AGD:
guidance) is the Security IC Embedded Software.
Guidance is given for the Security IC Embedded
Software Developer.
On the other hand the Security IC (with the TOE as a
major element) is used in a terminal where
communication is performed through the ISO/IEC
interface provided by the TOE. Therefore, another
“user” of the TOE is the terminal (with its software).
User Data All data managed by the Security IC Embedded
Software in the application context. User data
comprise all data in the final Security IC except the
TSF data.
User Mode CPU mode of the TOE. Access to memories is
controlled by the Memory Management Unit. Access
to Special Function Registers is restricted.
8.3 List of Abbreviations
CC Common Criteria Version 3.1
CIU Contactless Interface Unit
CPU Central Processing Unit
DEA Data Encryption Algorithm
DES Data Encryption Standard
DRNG Deterministic Random Number Generator
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ECC Elliptic Curve Cryptography
IC Integrated circuit
IT Information Technology
MMU Memory Management Unit
MX Memory eXtension
NDA Non Disclosure Agreement
NXP Semiconductors
P5CD016/021/041V1A and P5Cx081V1A
Security Target Lite
PUBLIC
- © NXP B.V. 2009. All rights reserved.
Evaluation documentation Rev. 1.3 — 21 September 2009 63 of 67
NFC Near Field Communication
PKC Public Key Cryptography
PP Protection Profile
PSWH Program Status Word (High byte)
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SFR as abbreviation of the CC term: Security Functional
Requirement, as abbreviation of the technical term of the
SmartMX-family: Special Function Register
45
SIM Subscriber Identity Module
SOF Strength of Function
SF Security Feature
SS Security Service
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TRNG True Random Number Generator
TSC TSF Scope of Control
TSF TOE Security Functionality
TSFI TSF Interface
TSP TOE Security Policy
UART Universal Asynchronous Receiver and Transmitter
45
To avoid confusion this Security Target does not use SFR as abbreviation for Special Function
Register in the explanatory text. However, the abbreviation is used in objective or security
functionality identifiers and to distinguish iterations.
NXP Semiconductors
P5CD016/021/041V1A and P5Cx081V1A
Security Target Lite
PUBLIC
- © NXP B.V. 2009. All rights reserved.
Evaluation documentation Rev. 1.3 — 21 September 2009 64 of 67
9. Bibliography
9.1.1 Evaluation Documents
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation – Part 1:
Introduction and general model, Version 3.1, Revision 1, September 2006, CCMB-
2006-09-001
[2] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation – Part 2: Security
functional requirements, Version 3.1, Revision 2, September 2007, CCMB-2007-
09-002
[3] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation – Part 3: Security
Assurance Requirements, Version 3.1, Revision 2, September 2007, CCMB-2007-
09-003
[4] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation CEM-99/045
Part 2: Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Revision 2, September 2007, CCMB-
2007-09-004
[5] Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema, AIS31:
Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für physikalische
Zufallszahlengeneratoren, Version 1, 25.09.2001, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik
[6] Security IC Platform Protection Profile, Version 1.0, registered and certified by
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI) under the reference BSI-
PP-0035
[7] Supporting Document Mandatory Technical Document Application of Attack
Potential to Smartcards, Version 2.7, Revision 1, March 2009, CCDB-2009-03-001
9.1.2 Developer Documents
[8] Data Sheet P5CD016/021/041 and P5Cx081 family, Secure dual interface and
contact PKI smart card controller, NXP Semiconductors
[9] Instruction Set, SmartMX-Family, Secure and PKI Smart Card Controller, Philips
Semiconductors, Revision 1.1, Document Number 084111, 4 July 2006
[10] Guidance, Delivery and Operation Manual NXP Secure Smartcard Controllers
P5CD016/021/041 and P5Cx081, NXP Semiconductors, Business Line
Identification
[11] Order Entry Form P5CD016, NXP Semiconductors, Business Line Identification,
Release 4.1
[12] Order Entry Form P5CD021, NXP Semiconductors, Business Line Identification,
Release 4.1
[13] Order Entry Form P5CD041, NXP Semiconductors, Business Line Identification,
Release 4.1
[14] Order Entry Form P5CD081, NXP Semiconductors, Business Line Identification,
Release 4.1
[15] Order Entry Form P5CC081, NXP Semiconductors, Business Line Identification,
Release 4.1
[16] Order Entry Form P5CN081, NXP Semiconductors, Business Line Identification,
Release 4.1
NXP Semiconductors
P5CD016/021/041V1A and P5Cx081V1A
Security Target Lite
PUBLIC
- © NXP B.V. 2009. All rights reserved.
Evaluation documentation Rev. 1.3 — 21 September 2009 65 of 67
9.1.3 Other Documents
[17] FIPS PUB 46-3 FEDERAL INFORMATION PROCESSING STANDARDS
PUBLICATION DATA ENCRYPTION STANDARD (DES) Reaffirmed 1999 October
25
[18] FIPS PUB 197 FEDERAL INFORMATION PROCESSING STANDARDS
PUBLICATION, ADVANCED ENCRYPTION STANDARD (AES), National Institute
of Standards and Technology, 2001 November 26
[19] PKCS #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications, Version 2.0. RSA Laboratories,
September 1998
[20] ISO/IEC 7816-2:1996 Information technology – Identification cards – Integrated
circuit(s) cards with contacts – Part 2: Dimensions and location of contacts
[21] ISO/IEC 7816-3:1997 Information technology – Identification cards – Integrated
circuit(s) cards with contacts – Part 3: Electronic signals and transmission protocols
[22] ISO/IEC 14443-3:2001 Identification cards – Contactless integrated circuit(s) cards
– Proximity cards – Part 3: Initialization and anticollision
[23] ISO/IEC 14443-4:2001 Identification cards – Contactless integrated circuit(s) cards
– Proximity cards – Part 4: Transmission protocol
[24] ISO/IEC 18092:2004: Information technology – Telecommunications and
information exchange between systems – Near Field Communication – Interface
and Protocol (NFCIP-1)
[25] Mifare Interface Platform, V2.11, Philips Semiconductors, BL Identification
NXP Semiconductors P5CD016/021/041V1A and P5Cx081V1A
Security Target Lite
PUBLIC
- © NXP B.V. 2009. All rights reserved.
Evaluation documentation Rev. 1.3 — 21 September 2009 66 of 67
10. Legal information
10.1 Definitions
Draft — The document is a draft version only. The content is still under
internal review and subject to formal approval, which may result in
modifications or additions. NXP Semiconductors does not give any
representations or warranties as to the accuracy or completeness of
information included herein and shall have no liability for the consequences
of use of such information.
10.2 Disclaimers
General — Information in this document is believed to be accurate and
reliable. However, NXP Semiconductors does not give any representations
or warranties, expressed or implied, as to the accuracy or completeness of
such information and shall have no liability for the consequences of use of
such information.
Right to make changes — NXP Semiconductors reserves the right to make
changes to information published in this document, including without
limitation specifications and product descriptions, at any time and without
notice. This document supersedes and replaces all information supplied prior
to the publication hereof.
Suitability for use — NXP Semiconductors products are not designed,
authorized or warranted to be suitable for use in medical, military, aircraft,
space or life support equipment, nor in applications where failure or
malfunction of a NXP Semiconductors product can reasonably be expected
to result in personal injury, death or severe property or environmental
damage. NXP Semiconductors accepts no liability for inclusion and/or use of
NXP Semiconductors products in such equipment or applications and
therefore such inclusion and/or use is for the customer’s own risk.
Applications — Applications that are described herein for any of these
products are for illustrative purposes only. NXP Semiconductors makes no
representation or warranty that such applications will be suitable for the
specified use without further testing or modification.
Export control — This document as well as the item(s) described herein
may be subject to export control regulations. Export might require a prior
authorization from national authorities.
10.3 Licenses
ICs with DPA Countermeasures functionality
NXP ICs containing functionality
implementing countermeasures to
Differential Power Analysis and Simple
Power Analysis are produced and sold
under applicable license from
Cryptography Research, Inc.
10.4 Patents
Notice is herewith given that the subject device uses one or more of the
following patents and that each of these patents may have corresponding
patents in other jurisdictions.
<Patent ID> — owned by <Company name>
10.5 Trademarks
Notice: All referenced brands, product names, service names and
trademarks are property of their respective owners.
FabKey — is a trademark of NXP B.V.
MIFARE — is a trademark of NXP B.V.
NXP Semiconductors P5CD016/021/041V1A and P5Cx081V1A
Security Target Lite
PUBLIC
Please be aware that important notices concerning this document and the product(s)
described herein, have been included in the section 'Legal information'.
© NXP B.V. 2009. All rights reserved.
For more information, please visit: http://www.nxp.com
For sales office addresses, email to: salesaddresses@nxp.com
Date of release: 21 September 2009
Contents
1. ST Introduction....................................................3
1.1 ST reference ......................................................3
1.2 TOE reference....................................................3
1.3 TOE overview.....................................................3
1.3.1 Usage and major security functionality of the
TOE....................................................................3
1.3.2 TOE type............................................................4
1.3.3 Required non-TOE hardware/software/firmware 4
1.4 TOE Description.................................................5
1.4.1 Physical Scope of TOE ......................................5
1.4.1.1 Evaluated hardware configurations....................6
1.4.1.2 Common minor configuration options.................7
1.4.1.3 Evaluated package types ...................................9
1.4.2 Logical Scope of TOE ......................................10
1.4.2.1 Hardware Description.......................................10
1.4.2.2 Software Description........................................13
1.4.2.3 Documentation.................................................13
1.4.3 Security during Development and Production ..13
1.4.4 TOE Intended Usage .......................................14
1.4.5 Interface of the TOE.........................................15
2. Conformance Claims ........................................16
2.1 CC Conformance Claim ...................................16
2.2 Package claim..................................................16
2.3 PP claim...........................................................16
2.4 Conformance Claim Rationale .........................17
3. Security Problem Definition .............................18
3.1 Description of Assets .......................................18
3.2 Threats.............................................................18
3.3 Organisational Security Policies.......................19
3.4 Assumptions.....................................................19
4. Security Objectives ...........................................21
4.1 Security Objectives for the TOE.......................21
4.2 Security Objectives for the Security IC
Embedded Software development Environment
.........................................................................22
4.3 Security Objectives for the Operational
Environment.....................................................23
4.4 Security Objectives Rationale ..........................24
5. Extended Components Definition....................26
6. Security Requirements .....................................27
6.1 Security Functional Requirements ...................27
6.1.1 SFRs of the Protection Profile..........................27
6.1.2 Additional SFRs regarding cryptographic
functionality ......................................................29
6.1.3 Additional SFRs regarding access control .......30
6.2 Security Assurance Requirements ...................40
6.2.1 Refinements of the Security Assurance
Requirements...................................................41
6.2.1.1 Refinements regarding CM scope (ALC_CMS)42
6.2.1.2 Refinements regarding functional specification
(ADV_FSP).......................................................42
6.3 Security Requirements Rationale.....................42
6.3.1 Rationale for the security functional requirements
.........................................................................42
6.3.2 Dependencies of security functional
requirements ....................................................46
6.3.3 Rationale for the Assurance Requirements......47
6.3.4 Security Requirements are Internally Consistent
.........................................................................48
7. TOE Summary Specification.............................49
7.1 Portions of the TOE Security Functionality.......49
7.1.1 Security Services..............................................49
7.1.2 Security Features .............................................50
7.2 TOE Summary Specification Rationale ............56
7.2.1 Rationale for the portions of the TOE security
functionality ......................................................56
7.2.2 Security architectural information .....................57
8. Annexes..............................................................58
8.1 Further Information contained in the PP...........58
8.2 Glossary and Vocabulary .................................58
8.3 List of Abbreviations .........................................62
9. Bibliography.......................................................64
9.1.1 Evaluation Documents......................................64
9.1.2 Developer Documents......................................64
9.1.3 Other Documents .............................................65
10. Legal information ..............................................66
10.1 Definitions.........................................................66
10.2 Disclaimers.......................................................66
10.3 Licenses ...........................................................66
10.4 Patents .............................................................66
10.5 Trademarks ......................................................66
Contents ..........................................................................67