National Information Assurance Partnership
Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
Validation Report
Cisco Embedded Services Router (ESR) 6300
Report Number: CCEVS-VR-VID11162-2021
Dated: May 21, 2021
Version: 1.0
National Institute of Standards and Technology Department of Defense
Information Technology Laboratory ATTN: NIAP, Suite 6982
100 Bureau Drive 9800 Savage Road
Gaithersburg, MD 20899 Fort Meade, MD 20755-6982
Cisco Embedded Services Router (ESR) 6300 Validation Report Version 1.0, May 21, 2021
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Validation Team
Patrick Mallett, Ph.D. Jim
Donndelinger
Marybeth Panock
Aerospace Corporation
Common Criteria Testing Laboratory
Tammy Compton
Cody Cummins
Wasif Sikder
Gossamer Security Solutions, Inc. Columbia,
MD
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Table of Contents
1 Executive Summary .............................................................................................................1
2 Identification ........................................................................................................................1
3 Architectural Information.....................................................................................................2
3.1 TOE Evaluated Platforms .............................................................................................3
3.2 TOE Architecture..........................................................................................................3
3.3 Physical Boundaries......................................................................................................6
4 Security Policy .....................................................................................................................6
4.1 Security audit ................................................................................................................7
4.2 Cryptographic support...................................................................................................7
4.3 Identification and authentication...................................................................................7
4.4 Security management....................................................................................................8
4.5 Packet filtering ..............................................................................................................8
4.6 Protection of the TSF ....................................................................................................9
4.7 TOE access....................................................................................................................9
4.8 Trusted path/channels....................................................................................................9
5 Assumptions & Clarification of Scope ................................................................................9
6 Documentation ...................................................................................................................10
7 IT Product Testing..............................................................................................................10
7.1 Developer Testing .......................................................................................................10
7.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing........................................................................11
8 Evaluated Configuration ....................................................................................................11
9 Results of the Evaluation ...................................................................................................11
9.1 Evaluation of the Security Target (ASE) ....................................................................11
9.2 Evaluation of the Development (ADV) ......................................................................11
9.3 Evaluation of the Guidance Documents (AGD) .........................................................12
9.4 Evaluation of the Life Cycle Support Activities (ALC) .............................................12
9.5 Evaluation of the Test Documentation and the Test Activity (ATE)..........................12
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity (VAN) .................................................................12
9.7 Summary of Evaluation Results..................................................................................13
10 Validator Comments/Recommendations..........................................................................13
11 Annexes............................................................................................................................13
12 Security Target.................................................................................................................13
13 Glossary............................................................................................................................14
14 Bibliography.....................................................................................................................14
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Cisco Embedded Services Router (ESR) 6300 Validation Report Version 1.0, May 21, 2021
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1 Executive Summary
This report documents the assessment of the National Information Assurance Partnership
(NIAP) validation team of the evaluation of Cisco Embedded Services Router (ESR) 6300
solution provided by Cisco Systems, Inc. It presents the evaluation results, their justifications,
and the conformance results. This Validation Report is not an endorsement of the Target of
Evaluation by any agency of the U.S. government, and no warranty is either expressed or
implied.
The evaluation was performed by the Gossamer Security Solutions (Gossamer) Common
Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL) in Columbia, MD, United States of America, and was
completed in May 2021. The information in this report is largely derived from the Evaluation
Technical Report (ETR) and associated test reports, all written by Gossamer Security
Solutions. The evaluation determined that the product is both Common Criteria Part 2
Extended and Part 3 Conformant, and meets the assurance requirements of the collaborative
Protection Profile for Network Devices, version 2.2e, 23 March 2020 with the PP-Module for
Virtual Private Network (VPN) Gateways, version 1.1, 18 June 2020.
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the Cisco Embedded Services Router (ESR) 6300.
The TOE identified in this Validation Report has been evaluated at a NIAP approved Common
Criteria Testing Laboratory using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation
(Version 3.1, Rev 5) for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
(Version 3.1, Rev 5). This Validation Report applies only to the specific version of the TOE
as evaluated. The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the
NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme and the conclusions of the testing
laboratory in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence provided.
The validation team monitored the activities of the evaluation team, provided guidance on
technical issues and evaluation processes, and reviewed the individual work units and
successive versions of the ETR. The validation team found that the evaluation showed that the
product satisfies all of the functional requirements and assurance requirements stated in the
Security Target (ST). Therefore, the validation team concludes that the testing laboratory’s
findings are accurate, the conclusions justified, and the conformance results are correct. The
conclusions of the testing laboratory in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the
evidence produced.
The technical information included in this report was obtained from the Cisco Embedded
Services Router (ESR) 6300 Security Target, version 1.0, April 28, 2021 and analysis
performed by the Validation Team.
2 Identification
The CCEVS is a joint National Security Agency (NSA) and National Institute of Standards
and Technology (NIST) effort to establish commercial facilities to perform trusted product
evaluations. Under this program, security evaluations are conducted by commercial testing
laboratories called Common Criteria Testing Laboratories (CCTLs) using the Common
Evaluation Methodology (CEM) in accordance with National Voluntary Laboratory
Assessment Program (NVLAP) accreditation.
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The NIAP Validation Body assigns Validators to monitor the CCTLs to ensure quality and
consistency across evaluations. Developers of information technology products desiring a
security evaluation contract with a CCTL and pay a fee for their product’s evaluation. Upon
successful completion of the evaluation, the product is added to NIAP’s Validated Products
List.
Table 1 provides information needed to completely identify the product, including:
• The Target of Evaluation (TOE): the fully qualified identifier of the product as evaluated.
• The Security Target (ST), describing the security features, claims, and assurances of the
product.
• The conformance result of the evaluation.
• The Protection Profile to which the product is conformant.
• The organizations and individuals participating in the evaluation.
Table 1: Evaluation Identifiers
Item Identifier
Evaluation Scheme United States NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
TOE Cisco Embedded Services Router (ESR) 6300
(Specific models identified in Section 8)
Protection Profile PP-Configuration for Network Device and Virtual Private Network (VPN)
Gateways, version 1.1, 1 July 2020
• Base-PP: collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices,
version 2.2e, 23 March 2020
• PP-Module: PP-Module for Virtual Private Network (VPN)
Gateways, version 1.1, 18 June 2020
ST Cisco Embedded Services Router (ESR) 6300 Security Target, version 1.0, April
28, 2021
Evaluation Technical
Report
Evaluation Technical Report for Cisco Embedded Services Router (ESR) 6300,
version 0.2, April 28, 2021
CC Version Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
rev 5
Conformance Result CC Part 2 extended, CC Part 3 conformant
Sponsor Cisco Systems, Inc.
Developer Cisco Systems, Inc.
Common Criteria
Testing Lab (CCTL)
Gossamer Security Solutions, Inc.
Columbia, MD
CCEVS Validators Patrick Mallett, Jim Donndelinger, Marybeth Panock
3 Architectural Information
Note: The following architectural description is based on the description presented in the
Security Target.
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The TOE is the Cisco Embedded Services Router (ESR) 6300 (herein after referred to as the
ESR6300). The TOE is comprised of both software and hardware. The hardware models
included in the evaluation are: ESR-6300-NCP-K9 and ESR-6300-CON-K9. The software
is comprised of the Cisco IOS-XE 17.3.
The ESR6300 consists of the following architectural features:
• Compact 3” x 3.75” form factor board optimized for custom solutions
• DRAM: 4-GB DDR4 memory capacity
• Flash Memory: 4-GB usable eMMC flash
• Optional router enclosure
• Integrated multi-pin BTB Interface Connector - provides pins dedicated for power
input, ethernet ports, and console ports. The following interfaces were used during
testing:
• Console: 1 UART RS232 RJ45 console port
• WAN Interfaces: 2 Combo Layer 3 GE WAN ports
• LAN Interfaces: 4 Layer 2 GE LAN ports
The ESR6300 is a purpose-built, routing platform that includes VPN functionality provided
by the Cisco IOS-XE software.
The ESR6300 is an embedded router module with a compact form factor of 3.0 by 3.775
inches. Its compact, modular, ruggedized design allows Cisco partners and integrators to build
a wide variety of custom embedded solutions. The TOE can be inserted into an enclosure that
can accommodate the TOE's size (3.0 x 3.775 in) and provides no compute capabilities. The
ESR6300 is available with a custom-designed cooling plate, as well as without the cooling
plate. Both versions of the ESR6300 board include an integrated multi-pin Board-to-Board
(BTB) interface connector with pins dedicated for power input, ethernet ports, and console
ports. The TOE functionality is implemented inside the ESR 6300 physical chassis, as the
chassis includes the underlying board (with or without a cooling plate) and all electronic
components attached to it; therefore, no computational capabilities outside of the TOE
boundary are required to secure the TOE. Refer to Annex A in the Guidance Document (AGD)
for hardware technical guidance on the ESR6300 board layout and dimensions and Multi-pin
BTB Interface Connector description that includes pinout mapping descriptions for network
interfaces and power inputs.
3.1 TOE Evaluated Platforms
Detail regarding the evaluated configuration is provided in Section 8 below.
3.2 TOE Architecture
The TOE consists of one physical device and includes the Cisco IOS-XE software. The TOE
has two or more network interfaces and is connected to at least one internal and one external
network. The Cisco IOS-XE configuration determines how packets are handled to and from
the TOE’s network interfaces. The router configuration will determine how traffic flows
received on an interface will be handled. Typically, packet flows are passed through the
internetworking device and forwarded to their configured destination.
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The following figures provide a visual depiction of an example TOE deployment, a
LAN/WAN interface diagram, and console port options:
Figure 1 TOE Example Deployment
* The ESR6300 physical chassis pictured includes a multi-pin BTB interface connector on the
underside of the board that is fully integrated when purchased.
** The end user can opt to use an enclosure that can accommodate the TOE's size (3.0 x 3.775
in.) and provides no computational services.
The TOE example deployment in figure 1 includes the following:
• The following are considered to be in the IT Environment:
o VPN Peers o Management Workstation o RADIUS AAA
(Authentication) Server o Audit (Syslog) Server o Local
Console
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o Certification Authority (CA)
Figure 2 TOE LAN/WAN Interfaces
• NOTE: While the previous figure includes several non-TOE IT environment devices,
the TOE is only the ESR6300 device. Only one TOE device is required for deployment
in an evaluated configuration.
BTB Connector
Figure 3 TOE Evaluated RS232 Console Port
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3.3 Physical Boundaries
The physical boundary of the TOE is the hardware appliance. The TOE supports the following
hardware, software, and firmware in its environment when the TOE is configured in its
evaluated configuration:
Table 1 IT Environment Components
Component Required Usage/Purpose Description for TOE performance
RADIUS AAA
Server
Yes This includes any IT environment RADIUS AAA server that provides single-use
authentication mechanisms. This can be any RADIUS AAA server that provides
singleuse authentication. The TOE correctly leverages the services provided by this
RADIUS AAA server to provide single-use authentication to administrators.
Management
Workstation
with SSH Client
Yes This includes any IT Environment Management workstation with a SSH client installed
that is used by the TOE administrator to support TOE administration through SSH
protected channels. Any SSH client that supports SSHv2 may be used.
Local Console Yes This includes any IT Environment Console that is directly connected to the TOE via the
Serial Console Port and is used by the TOE administrator to support TOE
administration.
Certification
Authority (CA)
Yes This includes any IT Environment Certification Authority on the TOE network. This
can be used to provide the TOE with a valid certificate during certificate enrollment.
Remote VPN
Peer
Yes This includes any VPN Peer (Gateway, Endpoint, another instance of the TOE) with
which the TOE participates in VPN communications. Remote VPN Peers may be any
device that supports IPsec VPN communications. Another instance of the TOE used as a
VPN Peer would be installed in the evaluated configuration, and likely administered by
the same personnel.
Audit (syslog)
Server
Yes This includes any syslog server to which the TOE would transmit syslog messages. Also
referred to as audit server in the ST.
Router
Enclosure
Yes The end user can opt to use an enclosure that accommodates the TOE's size (3.0 x 3.775
in.) and provides no compute capabilities. The TOE functionality is implemented inside
the ESR 6300 physical chassis, as the chassis includes the underlying board (with or
without a cooling plate) and all electronic components attached to it; therefore, no
computational capabilities outside of the TOE boundary are required to secure the TOE.
During testing, the TOE was enclosed within a Cisco developed hardened enclosure. It
is a specially designed enclosure used for Cisco internal testing purposes only. It has no
compute capabilities and is not a commercially available product. The enclosure passes
network connections directly to the TOE interfaces and does not change or modify TSF
functionality. In the evaluated configuration, the enclosure used for testing contains the
ESR6300 board including the integrated multi-pin BTB interface connector with pins
dedicated for power input, ethernet ports, and console ports (two combo Gigabit
Ethernet WAN ports, four Gigabit Ethernet LAN ports, and one UART RS232 RJ-45
console port). Refer to Annex A in the Guidance Document (AGD) for hardware
technical guidance on the ESR6300 board layout and dimensions and Multi-pin BTB
Interface Connector description that includes pinout mapping descriptions for network
interfaces and power inputs.
4 Security Policy
This section summaries the security functionality of the TOE:
1. Security audit
2. Cryptographic support
3. Identification and authentication
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4. Security management
5. Packet filtering
6. Protection of the TSF
7. TOE access
8. Trusted path/channels
4.1 Security audit
The TOE provides extensive auditing capabilities. The TOE can audit events related to
cryptographic functionality, identification and authentication, and administrative actions. The
TOE generates an audit record for each auditable event. Each security relevant audit event
has the date, timestamp, event description, and subject identity. The administrator configures
auditable events, performs back-up operations and manages audit data storage. The TOE
provides the administrator with a circular audit trail. The TOE is configured to transmit its
audit messages to an external syslog server over an encrypted channel.
4.2 Cryptographic support
The TOE provides cryptography in support of other TOE security functionality. All the
algorithms claimed have CAVP certificates (Operational Environment – Marvell Armada
ARMv8 Cortex A72). The TOE leverages the IOS Common Cryptographic Module (IC2M)
Rel5.
The TOE provides cryptography in support of VPN connections and remote administrative
management via SSHv2 and IPsec to secure the transmission of audit records to the remote
syslog server. In addition, IPsec is used to secure the session between the TOE and the
authentication servers.
4.3 Identification and authentication
The TOE performs two types of authentication: device-level authentication of the remote
device (VPN peers) and user authentication for the Authorized Administrator of the TOE.
Device-level authentication allows the TOE to establish a secure channel with a trusted peer.
The secure channel is established only after each device authenticates the other. Device-level
authentication is performed via IKE/IPsec mutual authentication. The TOE supports use of
IKEv1 (ISAKMP) and IKEv2 pre-shared keys for authentication of IPsec tunnels. The IKE
phase authentication for the IPsec communication channel between the TOE and
authentication server and between the TOE and syslog server is considered part of the
Identification and Authentication security functionality of the TOE.
The TOE provides authentication services for administrative users to connect to the TOE’s
secure CLI administrator interface. The TOE requires Authorized Administrators to
authenticate prior to being granted access to any of the management functionality. The TOE
can be configured to require a minimum password length of 15 characters. The TOE provides
administrator authentication against a local user database. Password-based authentication can
be performed on the serial console or SSH interfaces. The SSHv2 interface also supports
authentication using SSH keys. The TOE supports the use of a RADIUS AAA server (part of
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the IT Environment) for authentication of administrative users attempting to connect to the
TOE’s CLI.
The TOE provides an automatic lockout when a user attempts to authenticate and enters
invalid information. After a defined number of authentication attempts exceeding the
configured allowable attempts, the user is locked out until an authorized administrator can
enable the user account.
The TOE uses X.509v3 certificates as defined by RFC 5280 to support authentication for IPsec
connections.
4.4 Security management
The TOE provides secure administrative services for management of general TOE
configuration and the security functionality provided by the TOE. All TOE administration
occurs either through a secure SSHv2 session or via a local console connection. The TOE
provides the ability to securely manage:
Administration of the TOE locally and remotely;
All TOE administrative users;
All identification and authentication;
All audit functionality of the TOE;
All TOE cryptographic functionality;
The timestamps maintained by the TOE;
Update to the TOE and verification of the updates; Configuration
of IPsec functionality.
The TOE supports two separate administrator roles: non-privileged administrator and
privileged administrator. Only the privileged administrator can perform the above security
relevant management functions. Management of the TSF data is restricted to Security
Administrators. The ability to enable, disable, determine and modify the behavior of all of the
security functions of the TOE is restricted to authorized administrators.
Administrators can create configurable login banners to be displayed at time of login, and can
also define an inactivity timeout for each admin interface to terminate sessions after a set
period of inactivity.
4.5 Packet filtering
The TOE provides packet filtering and secure IPsec tunneling. The tunnels can be established
between two trusted VPN peers and the TOE. More accurately, these tunnels are sets of
security associations (SAs). The SAs define the protocols and algorithms to be applied to
sensitive packets and specify the keying material to be used. SAs are unidirectional and are
established per the ESP security protocol. An authorized administrator can define the traffic
that needs to be protected via IPsec by configuring access lists (permit, deny, log) and applying
these access lists to interfaces using crypto map sets.
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4.6 Protection of the TSF
The TOE protects against interference and tampering by untrusted subjects by implementing
identification, authentication, and access controls to limit configuration to Authorized
Administrators. The TOE prevents reading of cryptographic keys and passwords.
Additionally, Cisco IOS-XE is not a general-purpose operating system and access to Cisco
IOS-XE memory space is restricted to only Cisco IOS-XE functions.
The TOE internally maintains the date and time. This date and time is used as the timestamp
that is applied to audit records generated by the TOE. Administrators can update the TOE’s
clock manually. Finally, the TOE performs testing to verify correct operation of the router
itself and that of the cryptographic module.
The TOE is able to verify any software updates prior to the software updates being installed
on the TOE to avoid the installation of unauthorized software.
Whenever a failure occurs within the TOE that results in the TOE ceasing operation, the TOE
securely disables its interfaces to prevent the unintentional flow of any information to or from
the TOE and reloads.
4.7 TOE access
The TOE can terminate inactive sessions after an Authorized Administrator configurable time-
period. Once a session has been terminated the TOE requires the user to re-authenticate to
establish a new session. Sessions can also be terminated if an Authorized Administrator enters
the “exit” or “logout” command.
The TOE can also display a Security Administrator specified banner on the CLI management
interface prior to allowing any administrative access to the TOE.
4.8 Trusted path/channels
The TOE allows trusted paths to be established to itself from remote administrators over
SSHv2, and initiates outbound IPsec tunnels to transmit audit messages to remote syslog
servers. In addition, IPsec is used to secure the session between the TOE and the
authentication servers. The TOE can also establish trusted paths of peer-to-peer IPsec
sessions. The peer-to-peer IPsec sessions can be used for securing the communications
between the TOE and authentication server/syslog server, as well as to protect
communications with a CA or remote administrative console.
5 Assumptions & Clarification of Scope
Assumptions
The Security Problem Definition, including the assumptions, may be found in the following
documents:
collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, version 2.2e, 23 March 2020 with
the PP-Module for Virtual Private Network (VPN) Gateways, version 1.1, 18 June 2020
That information has not been reproduced here and the NDcPP22E/MOD_VPNGW11 should
be consulted if there is interest in that material.
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The scope of this evaluation was limited to the functionality and assurances covered in the
NDcPP22E/MOD_VPNGW11 as described for this TOE in the Security Target. Other
functionality included in the product was not assessed as part of this evaluation. All other
functionality provided by the devices needs to be assessed separately, and no further
conclusions can be drawn about their effectiveness.
Clarification of scope
All evaluations (and all products) have limitations, as well as potential misconceptions that
need clarification. This text covers some of the more important limitations and clarifications
of this evaluation. Note that:
• As with any evaluation, this evaluation only shows that the evaluated configuration
meets the security claims made with a certain level of assurance (the assurance
activities specified in the collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices and the
VPN Gateway Module and performed by the evaluation team).
• This evaluation covers only the specific device models and software as identified in
this document, and not any earlier or later versions released or in process.
• This evaluation did not specifically search for, nor attempt to exploit, vulnerabilities
that were not “obvious” or vulnerabilities to objectives not claimed in the ST. The
CEM defines an “obvious” vulnerability as one that is easily exploited with a minimum
of understanding of the TOE, technical sophistication and resources.
• The functionality evaluated is scoped exclusively to the security functional
requirements specified in the NDcPP22E/MOD_VPNGW11 and applicable Technical
Decisions. Any additional security related functional capabilities of the TOE were not
covered by this evaluation.
6 Documentation
The following documents were available with the TOE for evaluation:
Cisco Embedded Services Router (ESR) 6300 CC Configuration Guide, Version 1.0,
March 15, 2021
7 IT Product Testing
This section describes the testing efforts of the developer and the Evaluation Team. It is
derived from information contained in the Assurance Activity Report for Cisco Embedded
Services Router (ESR) 6300, Version 0.2, April 28, 2021 (AAR).
7.1 Developer Testing
No evidence of developer testing is required in the assurance activities for this product.
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7.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing
The evaluation team verified the product according to a Common Criteria Certification
document and ran the tests specified in the NDcPP22E/MOD_VPNGW11 including the tests
associated with optional requirements.
8 Evaluated Configuration
The TOE is comprised of both software and hardware. The hardware models included in the
evaluation are: ESR-6300-NCP-K9 and ESR-6300-CON-K9. The software is comprised of
the Cisco IOS-XE 17.3.
9 Results of the Evaluation
The results of the assurance requirements are generally described in this section and are
presented in detail in the proprietary ETR. The reader of this document can assume that all
assurance activities and work units received a passing verdict.
A verdict for an assurance component is determined by the resulting verdicts assigned to the
corresponding evaluator action elements. The evaluation was conducted based upon CC
version 3.1 rev 5 and CEM version 3.1 rev 5. The evaluation determined the Embedded
Services Router (ESR) 6300 TOE to be Part 2 extended, and to meet the SARs contained in
the NDcPP22E/MOD_VPNGW11.
9.1 Evaluation of the Security Target (ASE)
The evaluation team applied each ASE CEM work unit. The ST evaluation ensured the ST
contains a description of the environment in terms of policies and assumptions, a statement of
security requirements claimed to be met by the Cisco Embedded Services Router (ESR) 6300
product that are consistent with the Common Criteria, and product security function
descriptions that support the requirements.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached
by the evaluation team was justified.
9.2 Evaluation of the Development (ADV)
The evaluation team applied each ADV CEM work unit. The evaluation team assessed the
design documentation and found it adequate to aid in understanding how the TSF provides the
security functions. The design documentation consists of a functional specification contained
in the Security target and Guidance documents. Additionally, the evaluator performed the
assurance activities specified in the NDcPP22E/MOD_VPNGW11 related to the examination
of the information contained in the TSS.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
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conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached
by the evaluation team was justified.
9.3 Evaluation of the Guidance Documents (AGD)
The evaluation team applied each AGD CEM work unit. The evaluation team ensured the
adequacy of the user guidance in describing how to use the operational TOE. Additionally,
the evaluation team ensured the adequacy of the administrator guidance in describing how to
securely administer the TOE. All of the guides were assessed during the design and testing
phases of the evaluation to ensure they were complete.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached
by the evaluation team was justified.
9.4 Evaluation of the Life Cycle Support Activities (ALC)
The evaluation team applied each ALC CEM work unit. The evaluation team found that the
TOE was identified.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached
by the evaluation team was justified.
9.5 Evaluation of the Test Documentation and the Test Activity (ATE)
The evaluation team applied each ATE CEM work unit. The evaluation team ran the set of
tests specified by the assurance activities in the NDcPP22E/MOD_VPNGW11 and recorded
the results in a Test Report, summarized in the AAR.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached
by the evaluation team was justified.
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity (VAN)
The evaluation team applied each AVA CEM work unit. The vulnerability analysis located
in the Detailed Test Report (DTR) was prepared by the evaluator on 4/28/2021. The
vulnerability analysis includes a public search for vulnerabilities. The public search for
vulnerabilities did not uncover any residual vulnerability.
The evaluator searched the National Vulnerability Database
(https://web.nvd.nist.gov/vuln/search), Vulnerability Notes Database
(http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/), Rapid7 Vulnerability Database
(https://www.rapid7.com/db/vulnerabilities), Tipping Point Zero Day Initiative
(http://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories ), Exploit / Vulnerability Search Engine
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(http://www.exploitsearch.net), SecurITeam Exploit Search (http://www.securiteam.com),
Tenable Network Security (http://nessus.org/plugins/index.php?view=search), Offensive
Security Exploit Database (https://www.exploit-db.com/) on 3/16/2021 with the following
search terms: "Cisco IOS XE", "ESR-6300-NCP-K9", "ESR-6300-NCP-K9", "Marvell
Armada Cortex A72", "IOS Common Cryptographic Module", "IC2M".
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached
by the evaluation team was justified.
9.7 Summary of Evaluation Results
The evaluation team’s assessment of the evaluation evidence demonstrates that the claims in
the ST are met. Additionally, the evaluation team’s testing also demonstrated the accuracy of
the claims in the ST.
The validation team’s assessment of the evidence provided by the evaluation team is that it
demonstrates that the evaluation team followed the procedures defined in the CEM, and
correctly verified that the product meets the claims in the ST.
10 Validator Comments/Recommendations
The validation team notes that the evaluated configuration is dependent upon the TOE being
configured per the evaluated configuration instructions in the Cisco Embedded Services
Router (ESR) 6300 CC Configuration Guide, Version 1.0, March 15, 2021 document. No
versions of the TOE and software, either earlier or later were evaluated. Please note that the
functionality evaluated is scoped exclusively to the security functional requirements specified
in the Security Target. Other functionality included in the product was not assessed as part of
this evaluation. Other functionality provided by devices in the operational environment, such
as the syslog server, need to be assessed separately and no further conclusions can be drawn
about their effectiveness.
This product is an embedded device and does not have the physical interface that we normally
review in an NDcPP compliant appliance. See Annex A in the Administrator’s
Guide for information regarding the physical TSF interface and guidance on integration.
11 Annexes
Not applicable
12 Security Target
The Security Target is identified as: Cisco Embedded Services Router (ESR) 6300 Security
Target, Version 1.0, April 28, 2021.
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13 Glossary
The following definitions are used throughout this document:
• Common Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL). An IT security evaluation facility
accredited by the National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP) and
approved by the CCEVS Validation Body to conduct Common Criteria-based evaluations.
• Conformance. The ability to demonstrate in an unambiguous way that a given
implementation is correct with respect to the formal model.
• Evaluation. The assessment of an IT product against the Common Criteria using the
Common Criteria Evaluation Methodology to determine whether or not the claims made
are justified; or the assessment of a protection profile against the Common Criteria using
the Common Evaluation Methodology to determine if the Profile is complete, consistent,
technically sound and hence suitable for use as a statement of requirements for one or
more TOEs that may be evaluated.
• Evaluation Evidence. Any tangible resource (information) required from the sponsor or
developer by the evaluator to perform one or more evaluation activities.
• Feature. Part of a product that is either included with the product or can be ordered
separately.
• Target of Evaluation (TOE). A group of IT products configured as an IT system, or an
IT product, and associated documentation that is the subject of a security evaluation under
the CC.
• Validation. The process carried out by the CCEVS Validation Body leading to the issue
of a Common Criteria certificate.
• Validation Body. A governmental organization responsible for carrying out validation
and for overseeing the day-to-day operation of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and
Validation Scheme.
14 Bibliography
The Validation Team used the following documents to produce this Validation Report:
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation: Part 1:
Introduction and General Model, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017.
[2] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2: Security
functional components, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017.
[3] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 3: Security
assurance components, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017.
[4] collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, version 2.2e, 23 March 2020
with the PP-Module for Virtual Private Network (VPN) Gateways, version 1.1, 18
June 2020.
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[5] Cisco Embedded Services Router (ESR) 6300 Security Target, Version 1.0, April 28,
2021 (ST).
[6] Assurance Activity Report for Cisco Embedded Services Router (ESR) 6300, Version
0.2, April 28, 2021 (AAR).
[7] Detailed Test Report (NDcPP22E/MOD_VPNGW11) for Cisco Embedded Services
Router (ESR) 6300, Version 0.2, April 28, 2021 (DTR).
[8] Evaluation Technical Report for Cisco Embedded Services Router (ESR) 6300,
Version 0.2, April 28, 2021 (ETR).