N-PosCore v.1.1.0.0
Version Number 1.3
N-PosCore v.1.1.0.0
Security Target
EnPOS Bilişim
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Table of Contents
1. ST INTRODUCTION...................................................................................................... 6
1.1. ST Reference and TOE Reference................................................................................... 6
1.1.1. Document Conventions, Terminology & Acronyms.................................................. 6
1.1.2. Conventions ................................................................................................................ 6
1.1.3. Acronyms.................................................................................................................... 7
1.2. TOE Overview................................................................................................................. 8
1.2.1. General overview of the TOE and related components.............................................. 9
1.2.2. Required non-TOE hardware/software/firmware ..................................................... 11
1.2.3. Major security and functional features ..................................................................... 14
1.3. TOE Type ...................................................................................................................... 15
1.4. TOE Description............................................................................................................ 15
1.4.1. Physical Scope .......................................................................................................... 15
1.4.2. Logical Scope............................................................................................................ 16
2. CONFORMANCE CLAIM........................................................................................... 18
2.1. CC Conformance Claim................................................................................................. 18
2.2. PP and Package Claim................................................................................................... 18
2.2.1. Protection Profile (PP) Claim ................................................................................... 18
2.2.2. Package Claim .......................................................................................................... 18
2.3. Conformance Claim Rationale....................................................................................... 18
3. SECURITY PROBLEM DEFINITION ........................................................................ 19
3.1. TOE Security Policy...................................................................................................... 19
3.1.1. External Entities........................................................................................................ 19
3.1.2. Roles ......................................................................................................................... 20
3.1.3. Modes of FCR........................................................................................................... 21
3.1.4. Assets........................................................................................................................ 21
3.2. Threats ........................................................................................................................... 23
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3.3. OSP................................................................................................................................ 25
3.4. Assumptions................................................................................................................... 27
4. SECURITY OBJECTIVES ........................................................................................... 29
4.1. Security Objectives for the TOE.................................................................................... 29
4.2. Security Objectives for the Operational Environment................................................... 30
4.3. Security Objective Rationale ......................................................................................... 31
5. EXTENDED COMPONENT DEFINITION................................................................. 36
6. SECURITY REQUIREMENTS.................................................................................... 37
6.1. Security Functional Requirements for the TOE ............................................................ 37
6.1.1. Class FAU Security Audit ........................................................................................ 37
6.1.2. Class FCO Communication ...................................................................................... 38
6.1.3. Class FCS Cryptographic Support............................................................................ 39
6.1.4. Class FDP User Data Protection............................................................................... 43
6.1.5. Class FIA Identification and Authentication ............................................................ 50
6.1.6. Class FMT Security Management ............................................................................ 52
6.1.7. Class FPT Protection of the TSF .............................................................................. 57
6.1.8. Class FTP Trusted Patch/Channels........................................................................... 61
6.2. Security Assurance Requirements for the TOE............................................................. 62
6.3. Security Requirements Rationale................................................................................... 62
6.3.1. Security Functional Requirements Rationale............................................................ 62
6.3.2. Rationale for Security Functional Requirements dependencies ............................... 76
6.3.3. Security Assurance Requirements Rationale............................................................ 80
6.3.4. Security Requirements - Internal Consistency.......................................................... 81
7. TOE SUMMARY SPECIFICATIONS ......................................................................... 82
7.1. Event Log Function ....................................................................................................... 82
7.2. Cryptographic Operation ............................................................................................... 82
7.3. Identification and Authentication Function ................................................................... 83
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7.4. Access Control Function................................................................................................ 83
7.5. Data Integrity Function.................................................................................................. 84
7.6. Import/Export Function ................................................................................................. 84
7.7. TSF Protection............................................................................................................... 84
7.8. TOE Self-Testing Function............................................................................................ 85
7.9. TSF Management Function ........................................................................................... 85
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Version History
Version
No
Reason for Change
Release
Date
0.1 First Release 11/12/2013
0.2 Prepared for Evaluation Application 15/04/2014
0.3 Updated according to the remarks of the evaluation facility 03/06/2014
0.4 EFT-POS Communication requirements introduced 13/08/2014
0.5 Updated according to the Protection Profile 25/11/2014
0.6 Updated According to the Protection Profile 16/12/2014
0.7 Updated According to the Protection Profile v1.8 31/12/2014
0.8 Updated According to the remarks from the evaluation facility 05/12/2014
0.9 Updated According to the remarks from the evaluation facility 09/01/2015
1.0 Updated According to the remarks from the evaluation facility 14/01/2015
1.1 Updated According to the changes in TDS 19/01/2015
1.2 Application Note added by TSF self tests 20/01/2015
1.3 Updated According to the remarks from the evaluation facility 23/03/2015
Approvals
Name Role Date
Mehmet ÇAKIR ST Author (BEAM Teknoloji) 23.03.2015
Emre ÇAKIR ST Author (BEAM Teknoloji) 23.03.2015
Yalçın TAMA ST Author (EnPOS Bilişim) 23.03.2015
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1. ST INTRODUCTION
This section presents the following information:
 Identifies the Security Target (ST) and Target of Evaluation (TOE);
 Specifies the ST conventions,
 Defines the terminology and acronyms used in the ST,
 Defines TOE overview and TOE description.
1.1.ST Reference and TOE Reference
ST Title: N-PosCore v.1.1 Security Target
ST Version: v 1.3
TOE Identification: N-PosCore v.1.1
CC Identification: Common Criteria for Information Technology Security
Evaluations, version 3.1R4
Technical References [5] Technical Guidance, version 1.0, October 2012
[6] PRA Messaging protocol, version 1.0, October 2012
[7] External Device Communication Protocol Document
version 1.0
Keywords: Revenue Administration, Fiscal Application Software, New
Generation Cash Register, EMV, EFT-POS, PRA, Electronic
Registration Unit.
Tablo 1 ST and TOE References
1.1.1. Document Conventions, Terminology & Acronyms
This section specifies the formatting information used in the ST.
1.1.2. Conventions
In this Security Target some notations and conventions which are taken from the Common
Criteria v3.1R3 have been used in order to guide to the reader.
During the specification of the functional requirements under the Section 4, the functional
components are interpreted according to the “assignment” and “selection” operations.
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The outcome of the assignment operations are shown with underlined identified between
“[brackets]”.
The outcome of the selection operations are shown with bold and italic and identified between
“[brackets]”.
Iterated functional requirement components are shown with a “/IDENTIFIER” for the
components which used more than once with varying operations.
Refinement operations are used in the ST. Removed parts of the requirements shown with
strikethrough.
Under the term “Application Note”, an informal explanation added under some of the functional
requirements in order to highlight or to describe the component in detail.
1.1.3. Acronyms
AES : Advanced Encryption Standard
CC : Common Criteria
CCMB : Common Criteria Management Board
DEMA : Differential Electromagnetic Analysis
DFA : Differential Fault Analysis
DPA : Differential Power Analysis
EAL : Evaluation Assurance Level (defined in CC)
EFTPOS : Electronic Funds Transfer at Point of Sale
ERU : Electronic Recording Unit
FCR : Fiscal Cash Register
FCRAS : Fiscal Cash Register Application Software
IT : Information Technology
ITU : International Telecommunication Union
OSP : Organizational Security Policy
PP : Protection Profile
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PKI : Public Key Infrastructure
PRA : Presidency of Revenue Administration
PRA-IS : Presidency of Revenue Administration Information Systems
SAR : Security Assurance Requirements
SEMA : Simple Electromagnetic Analysis
SFR : Security Functional Requirements
SHA : Secure Hash Algorithm
SPA : Simple Power Analysis
SSL - CA : Secure Sockets Layer - Client Authentication
TOE : Target of Evaluation
TSF : TOE Security Functionality (defined in CC)
TSE : Türk Standartları Enstitüsü
TSM : Trusted Service Manager
VAT : Value Added Tax
FMC : Peripheral’s control card of TOE
1.2.TOE Overview
The TOE addressed by this Security Target (ST) is an application which is the main items of a
Fiscal Cash Register (FCR). TOE is used to process the transaction amount of purchases which
can be viewed by both seller and buyer. Since transaction amount is used to determine tax
revenues; secure processing, storing and transmission of this data is very important.
The FCR is mandatory for first-and second-class traders. FCR is not mandatory for sellers who
sell the goods back to its previous seller completely the same as the purchased good.
FCR consists of different parts. The TOE being the main item of an FCR named as N-PosCore,
there are also several additional components necessary to get a fully functional FCR, described
in Section 1.2.2. TOEs related components are given in Figure 1. Usage and major security
features of TOE are described in section 1.2.3.
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N-PosCore v.1.1 (TOE) is used as the fiscal application software for the FCR devices that
satisfies the operational environment requirements and component properties defined in this
Security Target.
TOE is providing the following functionalities as well as the security functions stated in this
document;
 Dynamic promotion support
 Product description in detail for the goods in sale
 User friendly interface designed with consideration of user experience
 Single-click sales via touch screen
 On-Line and Off-Line execution
 Receipt upon completion of transaction
 Customizable user screen and receipt templates
 Providing additional fields for end of receipts
 Alert of users in defined circumstances
 Advanced search capabilities for product with the support of single-click sales
 N-PosCore aided Z-Reports at the end of the day
 Unlimited definition of cash in/out process type
 Sales with 6 different foreign currencies
 Exporting a receipt to an invoice
 Automated preparation of expense invoice
 Unlimited number of authorized user
 Follow-up incentives for the authorized users based of sales
 Exporting sales report per authorized user
 Detailed reporting for the data on Daily Memory, Fiscal Memory and ERU.
1.2.1. General overview of the TOE and related components
Hata! Başvuru kaynağı bulunamadı. shows the general overview of the TOE and its related
components as regarded in this ST. The orange part of Hata! Başvuru kaynağı bulunamadı.
marked as Fiscal Application Software is the TOE. The figure also shows theinput/output
interface, fiscal memory, daily memory, database, ERU, fiscal certificate memory; that are
TOE’s environmental components and crucial for functionality and security. Connections
between the TOE and its environment are also subject to evaluation since these connections are
made over the interfaces of the TOE.
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Figure 1 General Architecture of the TOE
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1.2.2. Required non-TOE hardware/software/firmware
Software, hardware environment of the TOE are described below.
1.2.2.1. Software Environment of TOE
TOE runs at the top of an operating system’s kernel, its file-system as in a typical software
environment. This structure is shown in Hata! Başvuru kaynağı bulunamadı..
Table 1 Typical Software Environment of the TOE
File System
Operating System Kernel
In addition to TOE, following software components are necessary for security and functionality
of the FCR:
 Application runs on an Windows 7 or higher which supports following features
o at least 32 bit data processing capacity
o multi-processing
o IPv4 and IPv6 support
o NTP (Network Time Protocol)
 MSSQL 2008 Express or higher database which is used to store sales data, has
the following features;
i. Database has data recording, organizing, querying, reporting features
ii. Database stores sales records for main product groups (food, clothing, electronics,
glassware etc.) and sub-product groups (milk, cigarette, fruit, trousers etc.) in order
to track detailed statistics
iii. Database has indexing mechanism
1.2.2.2. Hardware Environment of TOE
In addition to TOE, following hardware components are necessary for security and
functionality of the FCR:
 Fiscal memory
i. Fiscal memory has following features;
a. Fiscal memory has the capacity to store at least 10 years (3650 days) of data,
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b. Fiscal memory keeps data at least 5 years after the capacity specified in (a)
has been reached,
c. Fiscal memory has to be fixed within FCR in a way that it cannot be removed
without damaging the chassis.
d. Fiscal memory is protected by mesh cover,
e. Fiscal memory has the ability to be protected against magnetic and electronic
threats,
When the connection between fiscal memory and main processor is broken,
FCR enters in maintenance mode,
f. The data stored in the fiscal memory is not be lost in case of power off,
g. Fiscal memory accepts only positive amounts from the application and the
peripherals,
h. FCR checks "Z" reports from fiscal memory during device start-up. In case
where there are days for which Z report was not generated, FCR will be able
to run in normal mode only after it generates Z reports for the missing days.
Seasonal firms can take cumulative Z report by specifying date and time
range.
ii. Fiscal Memory includes following data;
a. Fiscal symbol, company code and identification number of the device,
b. Cumulative sum of the total sales and Value Added Tax (VAT) amounts for
all sales receipts, starting from the device activation time (i.e. first use),
c. Date and number of "Z" reports with total sales and VAT per day,
d. The number of receipts per day.
 Daily memory has following features;
i. Receipt total and total VAT amount for each receipt are to be stored in the daily
memory instantly. This data can be transmitted to PRA information systems (PRA -
IS), instantly or daily depending on demand.
ii. Data in the daily memory which is not already transmitted to fiscal memory, cannot
be modified in an uncontrolled way.
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iii. Data transmitted from daily memory to fiscal memory is to be kept in daily memory
for at least 10 days.
iv. Z reports, taken at the end of the day; and X reports, taken within the current day are
produced by using the data in the daily memory.
v. Following values are stored in the daily memory
a. total VAT amount per day,
b. total daily sales values per day grouped by payment type
c. payment type (Cash, credit card etc.)
d. number of receipts.
 FCR supports X.509 formatted digital certificate generated by Authorized
Certificate Authority. This Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) compatible digital
certificate is called fiscal certificate and is used for authentication and secure
communication between PRA-IS and FCR through Trusted Service Manager (TSM).
For physical security, FCR is protected by electronic and mechanic systems called
electronic seal. FCR uses cryptographic library for secure communication with
PRA-IS and TSM
 Electronic Record Unit (ERU) is used to keep second copy of the receipt and has
following features;
i. ERU stores information about receipts and reports (X, Z) in a retrievable form.
ii. ERU has at least 1.2 million row capacity. Our ERU has minimum 3.187.297
row capacity.
iii. Data stored in ERU cannot be modified
iv. ERU also supports features specified in “Fiscal Cash Register General
Communique Serial Number: 67, Part A” which is about Law No: 3100 except
item (ii) above.
 FCR devices have an ETHERNET interfaces.
 FCR has a windows firewall to control incoming and outgoing data traffic.
 FCR supports the use of EFTPOS
 FCR has a printer to print sales receipt.
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 FCR needs some input/output devices for functionalities listed below;
i. FCR has keyboard unit. It may optionally use a touch screen additionally.
ii. FCR has separate displays for cashier and buyer.
iii. FCR has internal battery to keep time information.
1.2.3. Major security and functional features
The functional and major security features of the TOE are described below.
1.2.3.1. TOE functional features
The TOE is used as part of a FCR which is an electronic device for calculating and recording
sales transactions and for printing receipts. TOE provides the following services;
i. TOE stores sales data in fiscal memory.
ii. TOE stores total receipt and total VAT amount for each receipt in daily memory.
iii. TOE is able to generate reports (X report, Z report etc.).
iv. TOE is able to transmit Z reports, receipt information, sale statistics and other
information determined by PRA to PRA-IS in PRA Messaging Protocol format.
v. TOE is able to start the communication with PRA-IS and instantly respond to requests
originated from PRA-IS.
vi. TOE stores records of important events as stated in PRA Messaging Protocol Document
[6] and transmits to PRA-IS in PRA Messaging Protocol format in a secure way.
vii. TOE is able to be used by users in secure state mode or maintenance mode. Roles and
modes of operation are described in Hata! Başvuru kaynağı bulunamadı. and Hata!
Başvuru kaynağı bulunamadı. respectively.
1.2.3.2. TOE major security features
The TOE provides following security features;
i. TOE supports access control.
ii. TOE supports secure communication between main processor and fiscal memory.
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However, for the cases where the main processor and the fiscal memory are included
within the same electronic seal secure communication is not mandatory. TOE is able to
detect disconnection between main processor and fiscal memory and enter into the
maintenance mode.
iii. TOE supports usage of ITU X509 v3 formatted certificate and its protected private key
for authentication and secure communication with PRA- IS and TSM.
iv. TOE supports secure communication between FCR-PRA-IS and FCR–TSM.
v. TOE ensures the integrity of event data, sales data, authentication data, characterization
data and FCR parameters.
vi. TOE records important events defined in PRA Messaging Protocol Document [6] and
send urgent event data immediately to PRA-IS in a secure way.
vii. TOE detects physical attacks to FCR and enters into the maintenance mode in such cases.
1.3.TOE Type
TOE is a software application embedded within FCR.
1.4.TOE Description
1.4.1. Physical Scope
The following functional components of the TOE are within the scope of this evaluation;
 User Management
 CORE FCRAS Functionalities
 AKIS Integration
 Event Logging
 Fiscal Memory, ERU, Main Unit, Daily Memory Communication via FMC
 Entity Framework
 TSM and PRA-IS Communication according to GMP
 Printer Management
The connections between control cards in Fiscal unit and CPU and memories on those cards
are shown below diagram.
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1.4.2. Logical Scope
The logical scope of the TOE consists of the security functional features of the fiscal application
software which is subject to a common criteria evaluation. The following security functions are
in the logical scope of TOE;
 Audit/Event Log: The function which generates and stored the events data according to
the PRA Messaging Protocol and the SFRs stated in this Security Target.
 Cryptography: The Cryptographic Libraries which are used by TSF for cryptographic
operations like encrypt and decrypt of imported and exported data. This function also
covers the key generation and destruction.
 Identification and Authentication: TOE has various user roles and access rights during
normal operation and an identification and authentication function controls the user
identification and authentication securely.
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 Access Control: The access rights in the TOE are controlled with an access control
policies and functions. This function is enforced during authentication and data export.
Also TOE enforce information flow control policy for EFTPOS and TSM.
 Data Integrity: TOE protects the integrity of stored and exported data with the support of
a TSF.
 Import/Export: Data import and export are handled securely with an enforced policy with
the control of a TSF.
 TSF Protection: TSF protects the secure operation and in any case of defined corruptions
TOE switches to maintenance mode to continue protecting its core functionality.
 TOE Self Testing: TOE conducts self testing of its functionality during initial startup.
 Security Management: TSF provides the security functions and restrict the access to these
functions with specific capabilities defined in this security target.
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2. CONFORMANCE CLAIM
2.1.CC Conformance Claim
This Security Target and TOE claims conformance to:
 Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 1: Introduction
and General Model, CCMB-2012-09-001, Version 3.1, Revision 4, September 2012,
 Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 2: Security
Functional Components, CCMB-2012-09-002, Version 3.1, Revision 4, September 2012,
 Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 3: Security
Assurance Components, CCMB-2012-09-003, Version 3.1, Revision 4, September 2012,
As follows;
 Part 2 conformant,
 Part 3 conformant.
The
 Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Evaluation
Methodology; CCMB-2012-09-004, Version 3.1, Revision 4, September 2012
has to be taken into account.
2.2.PP and Package Claim
2.2.1. Protection Profile (PP) Claim
This Security Target claims conformance to New Generation Fiscal Application Software
Protection Profile TSE-CCCS/PP-006.
2.2.2. Package Claim
The current ST is conformant to the following security requirements package:
 Assurance package EAL2 conformant to CC, part 3.
2.3.Conformance Claim Rationale
The type of TOE defined in this ST is consistent with the TOE type defined in the PP which is
claimed in the section 2.2.1.
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3. SECURITY PROBLEM DEFINITION
3.1.TOE Security Policy
3.1.1. External Entities
PRA-IS
PRA-IS takes sales data and event data from FCR by sending query with parameters to FCR
through TSM.
Trusted Service Manager
TSM is the system which is used to load parameters, update software and manage FCR.
Attacker
Attacker tries to manipulate the TOE in order to change its expected behavior and functionality.
Attacker tries to breach confidentiality, integrity and availability of the FCR.
PRA On-site Auditor
PRA On-site Auditor is an employee of PRA who performs onsite audits onsite to control the
existence of expected FCR functionalities by using the rights of FCR Authorized User.
Certificate storage
The certificate storage holds certificates and private key used for authentication and secure
communication. Certificate storage is protected inside physical and logical tampering system.
Time Information
FCR gets time information from trusted server. Time information is used during receipt, event,
fiscal memory record, daily memory record and ERU record creation and is also used to send
information to PRA-IS according to FCR Parameters.
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Audit storage
Audit storage can be any appropriate memory unit in FCR. Audit storage stores important events
according to their criticality level (urgent, high, warning and information). List of events can be
found in PRA Messaging Protocol Document [6].
Storage unit
Storage units of FCR are database, fiscal memory, daily memory and ERU.
Input interface
Input interfaces provide necessary input data from input devices to the TOE. Input devices for
FCR may be keyboard, barcode reader, QR code (matrix barcode) reader, order tracking device
and global positioning devices.
External Device
External device is the device which is used to communicate with FCR by using secure channel
according to External Device Communication Protocol Document [7]]
Main Unit
Main Unit is an external device which is used for doing following actions;
 Provides visual interface for fiscal transaction,
 Provides input interface for fiscal transaction,
 Provides secure communication with TOE according to External Device Communication
Protocol Document [7]
Output interface
Output interfaces deliver outputs of the TOE to the output devices. Output devices for FCR may
be printer, display etc.
3.1.2. Roles
FCR Authorised User
FCR Authorised User is the user who uses the functions of FCR and operates FCR by accessing
the device over an authentication mechanism.
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Authorised Manufacturer User
Authorised Manufacturer User works for FCR manufacturer and conducts maintenance works on
FCR.
3.1.3. Modes of FCR
Maintenance Mode: Maintenance Mode is the mode that allows only Authorized Manufacturer
User to fix FCR in case of any technical problem, to change date and time information; to review
event data and to start update operation of TOE.FCR does not allow any fiscal transaction in
maintenance mode. FCR enters this mode when the following occur;
 FCR Certificate check fails,
 Mesh cover monitoring check fails,
 A disconnection between fiscal memory and main processor occurs,
 Electronic seal is opened, or forced by unauthorized persons,
 A technical problem is determined by FCR Manufacturer.
Secure State Mode: Secure State Mode is the mode that allows;
 FCR Authorized User;
 to configure FCR,
 to take fiscal and FCR reports
3.1.4. Assets
Sensitive data
Sensitive data is used for and secure communication with PRA-IS and TSM. Confidentiality and
integrity of this asset needs to be protected.
Application Note 1: Sensitive data may consist of symmetric keys.
Event data
Event data is used to obtain information about important events saved in audit storage. The
integrity of this asset is crucial while stored in FCR and both integrity and confidentiality of this
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asset are important while it is transferred from TOE to PRA-IS. Event data is categorized in PRA
Messaging Protocol Document [6].
Sales data
Sales data is stored in storage unit. Sales data is required by PRA-IS to calculate tax amount and
to provide detailed statistics about sales. The integrity of this asset has to be protected while
stored in FCR; and both integrity and confidentiality have to be protected while it is transferred
from TOE to PRA-IS.
Characterization data (Identification data for devices)
Characterization data is a unique number assigned to each FCR given by the manufacturer. PRA-
IS uses characterization data for system calls to acquire sales data or event data of an FCR.
Integrity of this asset has to be protected.
Authentication data
Authentication data contains authentication information which is required for FCR Authorized
User and Authorized Manufacturer User to gain access to FCR functionalities. Both integrity and
confidentiality of this asset have to be protected.
Time Information
Time information is stored in FCR and synchronized with trusted server. Time information is
important when logging important events and sending reports to the PRA-IS. The integrity of
this asset has to be protected.
FCR Parameters
FCR parameters stored in FCR are updated by TSM after Z report is printed.
FCR parameters set;
 Sales and event data transferring time
 Criticality level of event data sent to the PRA-IS
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 Maximum number of days that FCR will work without communicating with PRA-IS
3.2. Threats
Threats averted by TOE and its environment are described in this section. Threats described
below results from assets which are protected or stored by TOE or from usage of TOE with its
environment.
T.AccessControl
Adverse action: Authenticated users could try to use functions which are not allowed.
(e.g. FCR Authorized users access to FCR Manufacturer User management functions)
Threat agent: An attacker who has basic attack potential, has physical and logical access to
FCR.
Asset: Event data, sales data, time information.
T.Authentication
Adverse action: Unauthorized users could try to use FCR functions.
Threat agent: An attacker who has basic attack potential, has logical and physical access to the
FCR
Asset: Sales data, event data, time information
T.MDData - Manipulation and disclosure of data
Adverse action: This threat deals with four types of data: event data, sales data, characterization
data and FCR parameters.
 An attacker could try to manipulate the event data to hide its actions and unauthorized access
to the FCR, failure reports, and deletion of logs. An attacker also could try to disclose
important events while transmitted between PRA-IS and FCR.
 An attacker could try to manipulate or delete the sales data generated by TOE which may
result in tax fraud. In addition, an attacker also could try to disclose sales data while
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transmitted between PRA-IS and FCR. Manipulation and deletion of sales data may be
caused by magnetic and electronic reasons.
 An attacker could try to manipulate the characterization data to cover information
about tax fraud; to masquerade the user identity.
 An attacker could try to manipulate the FCR parameters to use FCR in undesired
condition.
Threat agent: An attacker who has basic attack potential, has physical and logical access to the
FCR.
Asset: Event data, sales data, characterization data, FCR parameters.
T.Eavesdrop - Eavesdropping on event data, sales data and characterization data
Adverse action: An attacker could try to eavesdrop event data, sales data and characterization
data transmitted between the TOE and the PRA-IS and also between the TOE and the distributed
memory units (Fiscal memory, Database, Daily memory, ERU).
Threat agent: An attacker who has basic attack potential, physical and logical access to the
FCR.
Asset: Characterization data, sales data, and event data.
T.Skimming - Skimming the event data, sales data and characterization data
Adverse action: An attacker could try to imitate PRA-IS to receive information from FCR and
to imitate TSM to set parameters to FCR via the communication channel.
Threat agent: An attacker who has basic attack potential and logical access to the FCR.
Asset : Sales data, and event data, FCR parameters.
T.Counterfeit - FCR counterfeiting
Adverse action: An attacker could try to imitate FCR by using sensitive (session keys) data while
communicating with PRA-IS and TSM to cover information about tax fraud.
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Threat agent: An attacker who has basic attack potential, has physical and logical access
to the FCR.
Asset: Sensitive data (session keys).
T.Malfunction - Cause malfunction in FCR
Adverse action: An attacker may try to use FCR out of its normal operational conditions to cause
malfunction without the knowledge of TOE.
Threat agent: An attacker who has basic attack potential, has physical access to the FCR.
Asset: Sales data, event data.
T.ChangingTime
Adverse action: An attacker may try to change time to invalidate the information about logged
events and reports in FCR.
Threat agent: An attacker who has basic attack potential, has physical and logical access to the
FCR.
Asset: Time Information.
3.3. OSP
This section describes organizational security policies that must be satisfied.
P.Certificate
It has to be assured that certificates which are installed at initialization step, are compatible with
ITU X.509 v3 format. FCR contains FCR certificate, Certification Authority root certificate,
Certification Authority sub-root (subordinate) certificate and UpdateControl certificate.
UpdateControl certificate is used to verify the signature of the TOE.
P.Comm_EXT - Communication between TOE and External Device
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It has to be assured that communication between TOE and external devices is used to encrypted
using AES algorithm with 256 bits according to External Device Communication Protocol
Document [7].
P.InformationLeakage - Information leakage from FCR
It has to be assured that TOE’s environment provides a secure mechanism which prevents
attacker to obtain sensitive information (secret key) when FCR performs encryption operation;
i.e by side channel attacks like SPA (Simple Power Analysis), SEMA (Simple
Electromagnetic Analysis), DPA (Differential Power Analysis), DEMA (Differential
Electromagnetic Analysis).
P.SecureEnvironment
It has to be assured that environment of TOE senses disconnection between fiscal memory and
main processor. Then TOE enters into the maintenance mode and logs urgent event. Moreover, it
has to be assured that fiscal memory doesn't accept transactions with negative amounts which
results in a decrease of total tax value. Also it has to be assured that environment of TOE
provides a mechanism that sales data in daily memory which is not reflected to the fiscal
memory cannot be deleted and modified in an uncontrolled way. In addition to this, it has to be
assured that sales data in ERU cannot be deleted and modified.
P.PhysicalTamper
It has to be assured that TOE environment and TOE provide a tamper respondent system which
is formed by electromechanical seals. It has to be assured that physical tampering protection
system protects the keys (asymmetric key, symmetric key), the certificates, event data,
characterization data, FCR parameters and sales data in FCR. It has to be assured that TOE logs
this type of events and enters into the maintenance mode when physical tampering protection
system detect unauthorized access. On the other hand it has to be assured that authorized access
such as maintenance work or service works are logged.
It has to be also assured that physical tampering protection system (mesh cover) protects fiscal
memory.
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P.PKI - Public key infrastructure
It has to be assured that IT environment of the TOE provides public key infrastructure for
encryption, signing and key agreement.
P.UpdateControl
TOE is allowed to be updated by only TSM or Authorized Manufacturer User to avoid possible
threats during this operation, FCR shall verify the signature of the new version of TOE to ensure
that the TOE to be updated is signed by the correct organization. Thus, the TOE to be updated is
ensured to be the correct certified version because only the certified versions will be signed. In
addition, FCR shall check version of TOE to ensure that it is the latest version.
3.4.Assumptions
This section describes assumptions that must be satisfied by the TOE's operational
environment.
A. TrustedManufacturer
It is assumed that manufacturing is done by trusted manufacturers. They process manufacturing
step in a manner which maintains IT security.
A.Control
It is assumed that PRA-IS personnel performs random controls on FCR. During these controls
PRA-IS personnel should check that if tax amount and total amount printed values on receipt and
sent to PRA-IS are the same. In addition to this, a similar check should be made for events as
well.
A.Initialisation
It is assumed that environment of TOE provides secure initialization steps. Initialization step is
consist of secure boot of operating system, and integrity check for TSF data. Moreover, it is
assumed that environment of TOE provides secure installation of certificate to the FCR in
initialization phase. Before certificate installation it is assumed that asymmetric key pair
generated in a manner which maintains security posture.
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A. TrustedUser
User is assumed to be trusted. It is assumed that for each sale a sales receipt is provided to the
buyer.
A.Activation
It is assumed that environment of TOE provides secure activation steps at the beginning of the
TOE operation phase and after each maintenance process.
A. AuthorisedService
It is assumed that repairing is done by trusted authorized services. The repairing step is processed
in a manner which maintains legal limits.
A.Ext_Key
It is assumed that External Device (EFT-POS, Main Unit) generates strong key for
communicating with TOE.
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4. SECURITY OBJECTIVES
This chapter describes security objectives for the TOE and it's environment.
4.1.Security Objectives for the TOE
This part describes security objectives provided by the TOE.
O.AccessControl
TOE must control authenticated user’s access to functions and data by using authorization
mechanism.
O.Event
TOE must record important events stated as in PRA Messaging Protocol Document [6].
O.Integrity
TOE must provide integrity for sales data, event data, characterization data, authentication data,
sensitive data (session keys) and FCR parameters.
O.Authentication
TOE must run authentication mechanism for users and systems.
O.Function
TOE must ensure that processing of inputs to derive sales data and event data is accurate.
TOE must ensure that time information is accurate by doing anomaly detection.
TOE must enter a maintenance mode when maintenance mode events occur in section 3.1.3
O.Transfer
TOE must provide confidentiality, integrity and authenticity for sales data, event data,
characterization data transferred to the PRA-IS and FCR parameters transferred from TSM.TOE
also provides integrity for sales data and event data transferred from memories to other
memories. TOE must provide confidentiality, integrity and authenticity for information
send/received during external device communication.
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4.2.Security Objectives for the Operational Environment
This part describes security objectives provided by the operational environment.
OE.Manufacturing
Manufacturer should ensure that FCR is protected against physical attacks during manufacturing.
OE.Delivery
Authorised Manufacturer User must ensure that delivery and activation of the TOE done by a
secure way.
OE.KeyGeneration
Asymmetric key generation mechanism shall be accessible only by trusted persons.
OE.SecureStorage
Asymmetric private key shall be stored within smartcard or Secure-IC’s.
Keys (asymmetric key, symmetric key), certificates, event data, characterization data and sales
data shall be stored within secure environment protected by electronic seal.
OE.KeyTransportation
Transportation and installation of asymmetric private key and certificates to the FCR must be
done by protecting its confidentiality and integrity.
OE.TestEnvironment
Before FCR activation; test interfaces (functions, parameters) inserted in TOE shall be disabled
or removed.
OE.StrongAlgorithm
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Environment of TOE shall use asymmetric private keys for signature operation by using libraries
of smartcard and Secure-IC’s. These libraries used in FCR shall be strong. They should also have
protection against side channel analysis (SPA, DPA, SEMA, DEMA, and DFA).
OE.UpgradeSoftware
FCR software updates should be get passed verdict from Common Criteria maintenance or
reevaluation procedures (according to update type) before installed to the FCR. This will be
validated by the FCR, using the cryptographic signature control methods.
OE.TrustedUser
Users shall act responsibly.
OE.Control
PRA Onsite Auditor must check FCR functionality by controlling tax amount on the receipt and
tax amount sent to the PRA-IS.
OE.External Device
External Device should generate strong key for communicating with TOE.
OE.SecureEnvironment
Fiscal memory shall not accept transactions with negative amounts which results in a decrease of
total tax value.
Tampering protection system shall protect fiscal memory with mesh cover.
Environment of TOE provides secure initialization steps. Initialization step is consist of secure
boot of operating system, and integrity check for TSF data.
4.3.Security Objective Rationale
Table provides security problem definition covered by security objectives. Threats and OSPs
are addressed by security objectives of the TOE and it's environment. Assumptions are
addressed by only security objectives of the operational environment.
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Table 2 Security Objectives Rationale
Threats OSPs Assumptions
T.AccessControl
T.
Authentication
T.MDData
T.Eavesdropping
T.Skimming
T.Counterfeit
T.Malfunction
T.ChangingTime
P.Certificate
P.SecureEnvironment
P.PhysicalTamper
P.PKI
P.InformationLeakage
P.Comm_EXT
P.UpdateControl
A.Ext_Key
A.TrustedManufacturer
A.Control
A.
AuthorisedService
A.Initialisation
A.Activation
A.TrustedUser
O.AccessControl X X X
O.Event X X X X X X X X X
O.Integrity X X X X X
O.Authentication X X X X
O.Function X X X
O.Transfer X X X
OE.External Device X
OE.Manufacturing X
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OE.Delivery X X
OE.KeyGeneration X X
OE.SecureStorage X
OE.KeyTransportation X X
OE.TestEnvironment X
OE.StrongAlgorithm X
OE.UpgradeSoftware X
OE.TrustedUser X X
OE.Control X
OE.SecureEnvironme
nt
X X X X X X
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Justification about Hata! Başvuru kaynağı bulunamadı. is given below;
T.AccessControl is addressed by O.AccessControl to control user access to functions and
data; O.Authentication to provide authentication mechanism for users; O.Event to log all access
attempts.
T.Authentication is addressed by O.Authentication to ensure that if user is authenticated to
the FCR; O.Event to log successful/unsuccessful authentication attempts.
T.MDData is addressed by O.Integrity to ensure integrity of sales data, event data,
characterization data and FCR parameters in FCR with logical and physical security features;
O.Transfer to ensure integrity, confidentiality and authenticity of sales data, event data and
characterization data during transferring to PRA-IS and parameters during transfering from
TSM to FCR ; O.Event to log unexpected behavior of these memories and unexpected
behavior in transferring data; OE.SecureEnvironment to provide electronic seal.
T.Eavesdropping is addressed by O.Transfer to ensure confidentiality of sales data, event data
and characterization data during communication with PRA-IS; O.Integrity to ensure the integrity
of event data, sales data and characterization data; O.Event to log physical tamper; by
OE.SecureEnvironment to provide electronic seal.
T.Skimming is addressed by O.Authentication to establish communication only with
permitted systems.
T.Counterfeit is addressed by O.Integrity to ensure the integrity of sensitive data (session keys);
O.Event to log physical tamper; OE.SecureEnvironment to provide electronic seal.
T.Malfunction is addressed by O.Function to ensure functions processing accurately; O.Event to
log unexpected behavior of functions.
T.ChangingTime is addressed by O.Event to log unexpected changes in time information; by
O.Access Control to control user access to time information; by O.Function to ensure accuracy
of time information.
P.Certificate is fulfilled by OE.KeyGeneration.
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P.SecureEnvironment is fulfilled by OE.SecureEnvironment, O.Event, O.Integrity and
O.Function.
P.PhysicalTamper is fulfilled by OE.SecureEnvironment, O.AccessControl, O.Event,
O.Integrity and OE.SecureStorage
P.PKI is fulfilled by OE.Delivery and OE.KeyTransportation
P.InformationLeakage is fulfilled by OE.StrongAlgorithm to ensure that cryptographic
algorithms used by FCR have side channel protection.
P.Comm_EXT is fulfilled by O.Transfer.
P. UpdateControl is upheld by OE.UpgradeSoftware and O.Authentication.
A.Ext_Key is upheld OE.External Device.
A. TrustedManufacturer is upheld by OE.Manufacturing and OE.TestEnvironment.
A.Control is upheld by OE.Control.
A. AuthorisedService is upheld by OE.TrustedUser.
A.Initialisation is upheld by OE.KeyGeneration, OE.SecureEnvironment and
OE.KeyTransportation.
A.Activation is upheld by OE.Delivery.
A. TrustedUser is upheld by OE.TrustedUser.
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5. EXTENDED COMPONENT DEFINITION
This Security Target does not use any components defined as extensions to CC part 2.
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6. SECURITY REQUIREMENTS
6.1.Security Functional Requirements for the TOE
This chapter defines the security functional requirements for the TOE according to the
functional requirements components drawn from the CC part 2 version 3.1 revision 4.
6.1.1. Class FAU Security Audit
6.1.1.1. FAU_GEN Security audit data generation
FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FPT_STM.1 Reliable time stamps
FAU_GEN.1.1 The TSF shall be able to generate an audit record of the following auditable
events:
a) Start-up and shutdown of the audit functions;
b) All auditable events for the [not specified] level of audit; and
c) [the auditable events specified in PRA Messaging Protocol Document[6]].1
FAU_GEN.1.2 The TSF shall record within each audit record at least the following information:
a) Date and time of the event, type of event, subject identity (if applicable), and the
outcome (success or failure) of the event; and
b) For each audit event type, based on the auditable event definitions of the functional
components included in the PP/ST, [none].
6.1.1.2. FAU_SAR Security audit review
FAU_SAR.1 Audit review
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation.
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FAU_SAR.1.1 The TSF shall provide [Authorized Manufacturer User] with the capability
to read [all event data] from the audit records.
FAU_SAR.1.2 The TSF shall provide the audit records in a manner suitable for the user to
interpret the information.
6.1.1.3. FAU_STG Security audit event storage
FAU_STG.1 Protected audit trail storage
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation
FAU_STG.1.1 The TSF shall protect the stored audit records in the audit trail from unauthorized
deletion.
FAU_STG.1.2 The TSF shall be able to [prevent] unauthorized modifications to the
stored audit records in the audit trail.
FAU_STG.4 Prevention of audit data loss
Hierarchical to: FAU_STG.3 Action in case of possible audit data loss
Dependencies: FAU_STG.1 Protected audit trail storage
FAU_STG.4.1 The TSF shall [overwrite the oldest stored audit records] and [none] if the
audit trail is full.
6.1.2. Class FCO Communication
6.1.2.1. FCO_NRO Non-repudiation of origin
FCO_NRO.2 Enforced proof of origin
Hierarchical to: FCO_NRO.1 Selective proof of origin
Dependencies: FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
FCO_NRO.2.1 The TSF shall enforce the generation of evidence of origin for transmitted [Sales
data and event data] at all times.
FCO_NRO.2.2 The TSF shall be able to relate the [originator identity, time of origin] of the
originator of the information, and the [body of the message] of the information to which the
evidence applies.
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FCO_NRO.2.3 The TSF shall provide a capability to verify the evidence of origin of
information to [recipient] given [immediately].
6.1.3. Class FCS Cryptographic Support
6.1.3.1. FCS_CKM Cryptographic key management
FCS_CKM.1/TLS_AES Cryptographic key generation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution, or
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_CKM.1.1 The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key generation algorithm [PRF] and specified cryptographic key sizes [AES:128
bit] that meet the following: [RFC 5246].
FCS_CKM.1/TLS_HMAC Cryptographic key generation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution, or
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_CKM.1.1 The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key generation algorithm [PRF] and specified cryptographic key sizes [256 bit]
that meet the following: [RFC 5246].
FCS_CKM.1/DHE-KEY Cryptographic key generation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution, or
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
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FCS_CKM.1.1 The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key generation algorithm [RNG] and specified cryptographic key sizes [2048 bits]
that meet the following: [none].
FCS_CKM.1/EXT-DEV KHMAC Cryptographic key generation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution, or
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_CKM.1.1 The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key generation algorithm [PRF] and specified cryptographic key sizes [256 bits]
that meet the following: [RFC 5246].
FCS_CKM.1/EXT-DEV KENC Cryptographic key generation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution, or
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_CKM.1.1 The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key generation algorithm [PRF] and specified cryptographic key sizes [AES: 256
bits] that meet the following: [RFC 5246].
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4.1 The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key destruction method [overwrite the previous key] that meets the following:
[none].
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6.1.3.2. FCS_COP/ ENC - DEC Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1/ENC-DEC Cryptographic operation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1.1 The TSF shall perform [encryption and decryption] in accordance with a
specified cryptographic algorithm [AES] and cryptographic key sizes [AES:128 bits and
AES:256 bits] that meet the following: [NIST SP800-38A].
FCS_COP.1/INT-AUTH Cryptographic operation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1.1 The TSF shall perform [authentication and integrity protection] in accordance
with a specified cryptographic algorithm [HMAC-SHA256] and cryptographic key sizes [256
bits] that meet the following: [FIPS 198-1 and NIST FIPS PUB 180-2].
FCS_COP.1/HASHING Cryptographic operation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
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FCS_COP.1.1 The TSF shall perform [hashing] in accordance with a specified
cryptographic algorithm [SHA2] and cryptographic key sizes [none] that meet the following:
[NIST FIPS PUB 180-2].
FCS_COP.1/ EXT-DEV KEYEXCHANGE Cryptographic operation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1.1 The TSF shall perform [key agreement] in accordance with a specified
cryptographic algorithm [DHE]and cryptographic key sizes [2048 bit] that meet the following:
[NIST SP 800-56A].
FCS_COP.1/ EXT-DEV KENC Cryptographic operation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1.1 The TSF shall perform [encryption and decryption] in accordance with a
specified cryptographic algorithm [AES with CBC]and cryptographic key sizes [256 bits] that
meet the following: [NIST SP 800-38A(CBC AES256)].
FCS_COP.1/ EXT-DEV KHMAC Cryptographic operation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
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FCS_COP.1.1 The TSF shall perform [encryption and decryption for integrity protection]
in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [HMAC-SHA256]and cryptographic key
sizes [256 bits] that meet the following: [FIPS 198-1 and NIST FIPS PUB 180-2].
6.1.4. Class FDP User Data Protection
6.1.4.1. FDP_ACC Access control policy
FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control
FDP_ACC.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the [Administrative Access Control SFP] on
[Subjects: FCR Authorized User and Authorized Manufacturer User
Objects: Sales and event data, exchange rates, time information
Operations: Secure state mode and maintenance mode actions],
6.1.4.2. FDP_ACF Access control functions
FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialization
FDP_ACF.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the [Administrative Access Control SFP] to objects
based on the following [Subjects: FCR Authorized User and Authorized Manufacturer User
Subject Attributes: User Identity,Privileges
Objects: Sales and event data, exchange rates, time information
Object Attributes: Access Control List (Secure State Mode and maintenance mode access
rights)
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Operations: Secure State Mode and Maintenance Mode actions describe in Hata!
Başvuru kaynağı bulunamadı.],
FDP_ACF.1.2 The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation
among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed: [verify the operator’s user identity
and privileges].
FDP_ACF.1.3 The TSF shall explicitly authorize access of subjects to objects based on
the following additional rules: [none].
FDP_ACF.1.4 The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the
following additional rules: [none].
6.1.4.3. FDP_ETC Export from the TOE
FDP_ETC.2/TSM Export of user data with security attributes
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
FDP_ETC.2.1 The TSF shall enforce the [Information Flow Control SFP with TSM and
PRA-IS] when exporting user data, controlled under the SFP(s), outside of the TOE.
FDP_ETC.2.2 The TSF shall export the user data with the user data's associated security
attributes.
FDP_ETC.2.3 The TSF shall ensure that the security attributes, when exported outside
the TOE, are unambiguously associated with the exported user data.
FDP_ETC.2.4 The TSF shall enforce the following rules when user data is exported from
the TOE: [secure communication with SSL CA].
FDP_ETC.2 /EFTPOS Export of user data with security attributes
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
FDP_ETC.2.1 The TSF shall enforce the [Information Flow Control SFP with EFT-POS
Device] when exporting user data, controlled under the SFP(s), outside of the TOE.
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FDP_ETC.2.2 The TSF shall export the user data with the user data's associated security
attributes.
FDP_ETC.2.3 The TSF shall ensure that the security attributes, when exported outside
the TOE, are unambiguously associated with the exported user data.
FDP_ETC.2.4 The TSF shall enforce the following rules when user data is exported from
the TOE: [Communication with secure messaging according to External Device Communication
Protocol Document [7]].
FDP_ETC.2/ MAIN UNIT Export of user data with security attributes
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
FDP_ETC.2.1 The TSF shall enforce the [Information Flow Control SFP with Main Unit]
when exporting user data, controlled under the SFP(s), outside of the TOE.
FDP_ETC.2.2 The TSF shall export the user data with the user data's associated security
attributes.
FDP_ETC.2.3 The TSF shall ensure that the security attributes, when exported outside
the TOE, are unambiguously associated with the exported user data.
FDP_ETC.2.4 The TSF shall enforce the following rules when user data is exported from
the TOE: [Communication with secure messaging according to External Device Communication
Protocol Document [7]].
6.1.4.4. FDP_IFC Information flow control policy
FDP_IFC.1/TSMCOMMUNICATION Subset information flow control
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FDP_IFF.1 Simple security attributes
FDP_IFC.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the [Information Flow Control SFP with TSM and PRA-
IS] on [subjects (TSM and PRA-IS) and objects (sales data, event data reports, FCR
parameters) as specified in PRA Messaging Protocol document [6]].
FDP_IFC.1/EFTPOSCOMMUNICATION Subset information flow control
Hierarchical to: No other components.
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Dependencies: FDP_IFF.1 Simple security attributes
FDP_IFC.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the [Information Flow Control SFP with EFT-POS
Device] on [subjects (EFT-POS) and objects (amount information in sales
data) as specified in External Device Communication Protocol Document
[7]].
FDP_IFC.1/MAIN UNIT Subset information flow control
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FDP_IFF.1 Simple security attributes
FDP_IFC.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the [Information Flow Control SFP with Main Unit]
on [subjects (Main Unit) and objects (department information of
purchased good, amount of purchased good, unit price of purchased good )
as specified in External Device Communication Protocol Document [7]].
FDP_IFF Information flow control functions
FDP_IFF.1/TSMCOMMUNICATION Simple security attributes
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation
FDP_IFF.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the [Information Flow Control SFP with TSM and PRA-IS]
based on the following types of subject and information security attributes: [TOE has ability to
send reports related to sales data and event data reports to PRA-IS by using subject
identifier(IP/Port information) and object identifier (file name); TOE has ability to receive
FCR parameters from TSM by using subject identifier (IP/Port information) and object
identifier (information label) according to PRA Messaging Protocol document [6]].
FDP_IFF.1.2 The TSF shall permit an information flow between a controlled subject and
controlled information via a controlled operation if the following rules hold: [secure
communication with SSL CA].
FDP_IFF.1.3 The TSF shall enforce the [none].
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FDP_IFF.1.4 The TSF shall explicitly authorize an information flow based on the following
rules: [none].
FDP_IFF.1.5 The TSF shall explicitly deny an information flow based on the following rules:
[none].
FDP_IFF.1/EFT-POSCOMMUNICATION Simple security attributes
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialization
FDP_IFF.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the [Information Flow Control SFP with EFT-POS Device]
based on the following types of subject and information security attributes: [TOE has ability to
send amount information to EFT-POS Device by using subject identifier (EFT-POS label and
source port).TOE has ability to receive outcome of the operation conducted by the EFT-POS
Device by using subject identifier (source port)]
FDP_IFF.1.2 The TSF shall permit an information flow between a controlled subject and
controlled information via a controlled operation if the following rules
hold: [Communication with secure messaging according to External
Device Communication Protocol Document [7]].
FDP_IFF.1.4 The TSF shall explicitly authorize an information flow based on the following
rules: [none].
FDP_IFF.1.5 The TSF shall explicitly deny an information flow based on the following rules:
[none].
FDP_IFF.1/MAIN UNIT Simple security attributes
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialization
FDP_IFF.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the [Information Flow Control SFP with Main Unit] based
on the following types of subject and information security attributes: [TOE has ability to receive
department information of purchased good, amount of purchased good and unit price of purchased
good by using subject identifier (source port) and object identifier (information label).
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FDP_IFF.1.2 The TSF shall permit an information flow between a controlled subject and
controlled information via a controlled operation if the following rules
hold: [Communication with secure messaging according to External
Device Communication Protocol Document [7]].
FDP_IFF.1.3 The TSF shall enforce the [none].
FDP_IFF.1.4 The TSF shall explicitly authorize an information flow based on the following
rules: [none].
FDP_IFF.1.5 The TSF shall explicitly deny an information flow based on the following rules:
[none].
6.1.4.5. FDP_ITC Import from the outside of the TOE
FDP_ITC.2/TSM Import of user data with security attributes
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
[FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSD trusted channel, or
FTP_TRP.1 Trusted Path]
FPT_TDC.1 Inter-TSF basic TSF data consistency
FDP_ITC.2.1 The TSF shall enforce the [Information Flow Control SFP with TSM and PRA-
IS] when importing user data, controlled under the SFP, from outside of the TOE.
FDP_ITC.2.2 The TSF shall use the security attributes associated with the imported
user data.
FDP_ITC.2.3 The TSF shall ensure that the protocol used provides for the unambiguous
association between the security attributes and the user data received.
FDP_ITC.2.4 The TSF shall ensure that interpretation of the security attributes of the imported
user data is as intended by the source of the user data.
FDP_ITC.2.5 The TSF shall enforce the following rules when importing user data controlled
under the SFP from outside the TOE: [secure communication with SSL CA].
Application Note 2: User data (FCR parameters) is imported from TSM
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FDP_ITC.2/EFTPOS Import of user data with security attributes
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
[FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSD trusted channel, or
FTP_TRP.1 Trusted Path]
FPT_TDC.1 Inter-TSF basic TSF data consistency
FDP_ITC.2.1 The TSF shall enforce the [Information Flow Control SFP with EFT-POS Device]
when importing user data, controlled under the SFP, from outside of the TOE.
FDP_ITC.2.2 The TSF shall use the security attributes associated with the imported user data
FDP_ITC.2.3 The TSF shall ensure that the protocol used provides for the unambiguous
association between the security attributes and the user data received.
FDP_ITC.2.4 The TSF shall ensure that interpretation of the security attributes of the imported
user data is as intended by the source of the user data.
FDP_ITC.2.5 The TSF shall enforce the following rules when importing user data controlled
under the SFP from outside the TOE: [Communication with secure messaging according to
External Device Communication Protocol Document [7]].
FDP_ITC.2/MAIN UNIT Import of user data with security attributes
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
[FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSD trusted channel, or
FTP_TRP.1 Trusted Path]
FPT_TDC.1 Inter-TSF basic TSF data consistency
FDP_ITC.2.1 The TSF shall enforce the [Information Flow Control SFP with Main Unit] when
importing user data, controlled under the SFP, from outside of the TOE.
FDP_ITC.2.2 The TSF shall use the security attributes associated with the imported user data
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FDP_ITC.2.3 The TSF shall ensure that the protocol used provides for the unambiguous
association between the security attributes and the user data received.
FDP_ITC.2.4 The TSF shall ensure that interpretation of the security attributes of the imported
user data is as intended by the source of the user data.
FDP_ITC.2.5 The TSF shall enforce the following rules when importing user data controlled
under the SFP from outside the TOE: [Communication with secure messaging according to
External Device Communication Protocol Document [7]].
FDP_SDI Stored data integrity
FDP_SDI.2/MEMORY Stored data integrity monitoring and action
Hierarchical to: FDP_SDI.1 Stored data integrity monitoring
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FDP_SDI.2.1 The TSF shall monitor user data sales data stored in fiscal memory and
ERU, event data, authentication data, characterization data stored in containers controlled
by the TSF for [integrity errors] on all objects, based on the following attributes: [assignment:
user data attributes].
FDP_SDI.2.2 Upon detection of a data integrity error, the TSF shall [generate an audit
event and transmit it to the PRA-IS according to PRA messaging protocol document [6] and then
enter into the maintenance mode].
FDP_SDI.2/DAILY and PRMTR Stored data integrity monitoring and action
Hierarchical to: FDP_SDI.1 Stored data integrity monitoring
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FDP_SDI.2.1 The TSF shall monitor user data sales data stored in daily memory and
FCR parameters stored in containers controlled by the TSF for [integrity errors] on all objects,
based on the following attributes: [assignment: user data attributes].
FDP_SDI.2.2 Upon detection of a data integrity error, the TSF shall [generate an audit
event and transmit it to the PRA-IS according to PRA messaging protocol document [6] and
print Z report automatically].
6.1.5. Class FIA Identification and Authentication
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6.1.5.1. FIA_AFL Authentication failures
FIA_AFL.1/MANUFACTURER Authentication failure handling
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication
FIA_AFL.1.1 The TSF shall detect when [[3]] unsuccessful authentication attempts occur
related to [Authorized Manufacturer User authentication].
FIA_AFL.1.2 When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has been [met],
the TSF shall [lock authorized manufacturer user account for 30 min].
FIA_AFL.1/AUTHORISED Authentication failure handling
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication
FIA_AFL.1.1 The TSF shall detect when [[3]] unsuccessful authentication attempts occur
related to [FCR Authorized User].
FIA_AFL.1.2 When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has been [met],
the TSF shall [disable authorized user account].
6.1.5.2. FIA_UAU User authentication
FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
FIA_UAU.1.1 The TSF shall allow [to do fiscal sales to get X report] on behalf of the
user to be performed before the user is authenticated.
FIA_UAU.1.2 The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before
allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
FIA_UAU.4 Single-use authentication mechanisms
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
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FIA_UAU.4.1 The TSF shall prevent reuse of authentication data related to [the
authentication mechanism employed to authenticate Authorized Manufacturer User].
6.1.5.3. FIA_UID User Identification
FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FIA_UID.1.1 The TSF shall allow [to do fiscal sales, to get X report] on behalf of the user to be
performed before the user is identified.
FIA_UID.1.2 The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before allowing any
other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
6.1.6. Class FMT Security Management
6.1.6.1. FMT_MOF Management of security functions behavior
FMT_MOF.1 Management of security functions behavior
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_MOF.1.1 The TSF shall restrict the ability to [modify the behavior of] the functions
[new generation cash register fiscal application software normal operation functions] to
[assignment: the authorised identified roles] nobody.
Application Note 3 : No authorized user makes the changes on the behavior of the functions. The
TSF itself makes the behavioral changes according to the FCR parameters received from TSM.
Application Note 4 : Ability to Modification of behavior shall be used according to PRA
directives. Normal operation functions includes all FCR parameters that are sent to FCR by
TSM.
6.1.6.2. FMT_MSA Management of security attributes
FMT_MSA.1/USER IDENTITY Management of security attributes
Hierarchical to: No other components.
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Dependencies: [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_MSA.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the [Administrative Access Control SFP] to restrict the
ability to [modify] the security attributes [User Identity] to [FCR Authorized User].
FMT_MSA.1/PRIVILEGES Management of security attributes
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_MSA.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the [Administrative Access Control SFP] to restrict
the ability to [modify] the security attributes [Privileges] to [none].
FMT_MSA.1/ IP:PORT INFO Management of security attributes
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_MSA.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the [Information Flow Control SFP with TSM and
PRA-IS] to restrict the ability to [modify] the security attributes [IP:Port Information] to
[Authorised Manufacturer User].
FMT_MSA.1/FILE NAME and INFO-LABEL Management of security attributes
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or
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FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_MSA.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the [Information Flow Control SFP with TSM and
PRA-IS] to restrict the ability to [modify] the security attributes [file name and information label]
to [none].
FMT_MSA.1/ INFO-LABEL Management of security attributes
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_MSA.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the [Information Flow Control SFP with Main Unit]
to restrict the ability to [modify] the security attributes [information label] to [none].
FMT_MSA.1/MAIN UNIT SOURCE PORT INFO Management of security attributes
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_MSA.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the [Information Flow Control SFP with Main Unit]
to restrict the ability to [modify] the security attributes [Source Port] to [none].
FMT_MSA.1/EFTPOS SOURCE PORT INFO Management of security attributes
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
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FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_MSA.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the [Information Flow Control SFP with EFT_POS
Device] to restrict the ability to [modify] the security attributes [Source Port] to [none].
FMT_MSA.1/ EFT-POS LABEL INFO Management of security attributes
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_MSA.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the [Information Flow Control SFP with EFT_POS
Device] to restrict the ability to [modify] the security attributes [EFT-POS Label] to [none].
FMT_MSA.3/USERS and SYSTEMS Static attribute initialization
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MSA.3.1 The TSF shall enforce the [Administrative Access Control SFP,
Information Flow Control SFP with TSM and PRA-IS] to provide [restrictive] default values for
security attributes that are used to enforce the SFP.
FMT_MSA.3.2 The TSF shall allow the [none] to specify alternative initial values to
override the default values when an object or information is created.
FMT_MSA.3/EFTPOS Static attribute initialization
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
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FMT_MSA.3.1 The TSF shall enforce the [Information Flow Control SFP with EFT-POS
Device] to provide [permissive] default values for security attributes that are used to enforce the
SFP.
FMT_MSA.3.2 The TSF shall allow the [none] to specify alternative initial values to
override the default values when an object or information is created.
FMT_MSA.3/MAIN UNIT Static attribute initialization
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MSA.3.1 The TSF shall enforce the [Information Flow Control SFP with Main Unit]
to provide [permissive] default values for security attributes that are used to enforce the SFP.
FMT_MSA.3.2 The TSF shall allow the [none] to specify alternative initial values to
override the default values when an object or information is created.
6.1.6.3. FMT_MTD Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1/ FCR AUTHORISED USER Management of TSF data
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_MTD.1.1 The TSF shall restrict the ability to [modify] the [FCR Authorized User’s
authentication data ] to [FCR Authorized User, Authorized Manufacturer User].
FMT_MTD.1/ AUTHORIZED MANUFACTURER USER Management of TSF data
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_MTD.1.1 The TSF shall restrict the ability to [create] the [Authorized Manufacturer
User’s authentication data ] to [assignment: the authorized identified roles] [nobody].
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Application Note 5: No authorized identified roles make the changes on Authorized Manufacturer
User’s authentication data but TSM creates it.
6.1.6.4. FMT_SMF Specification of Management Functions
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FMT_SMF.1.1 The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management
functions: [Authorized Manufacturer User modifies IP: Port Information, FCR Authorized User
modifies User Identity] [none]
6.1.6.5. FMT_SMR Security management roles
FMT_SMR.2 Restrictions on security roles
Hierarchical to: FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
Dependencies: FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
FMT_SMR.2.1 The TSF shall maintain the roles: [FCR Authorized User, Authorized
Manufacturer User],
FMT_SMR.2.2 The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.
FMT_SMR.2.3 The TSF shall ensure that the conditions [Authorized Manufacturer User
shall take action in maintenance works and FCR Authorized User take action in secure
state works], are satisfied.
6.1.7. Class FPT Protection of the TSF
6.1.7.1. FPT_FLS Fail secure
FPT_FLS.1 Failure with preservation of secure state
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
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FPT_FLS.1.1 The TSF shall preserve a secure state when the following types of failures
occur:[except maintenance mode events that specified in section Hata! Başvuru kaynağı
bulunamadı.]
6.1.7.2. FPT_PHP TSF physical protection
FPT_PHP.2 Notification of physical attack
Hierarchical to: FPT_PHP.1 Passive detection of physical attack
Dependencies: FMT_MOF.1 Management of security functions behavior
FPT_PHP.2.1 The TSF shall provide unambiguous detection of physical tampering that
might compromise the TSF.
FPT_PHP.2.2 The TSF shall provide the capability to determine whether physical
tampering with the TSF's devices or TSF's elements has occurred.
FPT_PHP.2.3 For [the devices/elements for which active detection is required in
technical guidance document [5]], the TSF shall monitor the devices and elements and notify
[FCR Authorized User], when physical tampering with the TSF's devices or TSF's elements has
occurred.
6.1.7.3. FPT_RCV Trusted recovery
FPT_RCV.1 Manual recovery
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
FPT_RCV.1.1 After [maintenance mode events which expressed in section 3.1.3 occur]
the TSF shall enter a maintenance mode where the ability to return to a secure state is
provided.
FPT_RCV.4 Function recovery
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FPT_RCV.4.1 The TSF shall ensure that [except maintenance mode events that specified
in section 3.1.3] have the property that the function either completes successfully, or for the
indicated failure scenarios, recovers to a consistent and secure state.
6.1.7.4. FPT_STM Time stamps
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FPT_STM.1 Reliable time stamps
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FPT_STM.1.1 The TSF shall be able to provide reliable time stamps.
6.1.7.5. FPT_TDC Inter-TSF TSF data consistency
FPT_TDC.1 Inter-TSF basic TSF data consistency
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FPT_TDC.1.1 The TSF shall provide the capability to consistently interpret [CheckSum]
when shared between the TSF and another trusted IT product.
FPT_TDC.1.2 The TSF shall use [SSL client authentication] when interpreting the TSF
data from another trusted IT product.
6.1.7.6. FPT_TEE Testing of external entities
FPT_TEE.1/EXT Testing of external entities
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FPT_TEE.1.1 The TSF shall run a suite of tests [during initial start-up and during
fiscal transactions] to check the fulfillment of [proper working of external entities].
FPT_TEE.1.2 If the test fails, the TSF shall [generate an audit event according to
Technical Guidance [5]].
Application Note 6: External entities are ERU,fiscal memory,daily memory, mesh cover and
electronic seal.
FPT_TEE.1/TIME Testing of external entities
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FPT_TEE.1.1 The TSF shall run a suite of tests [during time synchronization with
NTP] to check the fulfillment of [accuracy of time information].
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FPT_TEE.1.2 If the test fails, the TSF shall [assignment: action(s)].
6.1.7.7. FPT_TST TSF self test
FPT_TST.1 TSF testing
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FPT_TST.1.1 The TSF shall run a suite of self-tests [during initial start-up and
periodically during normal operation] to demonstrate the correct operation of [parts of the TSF].
FPT_TST.1.2 The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to
verify the integrity of [parts of the TSF data].
FPT_TST.1.3 The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to
verify the integrity of [part of the TSF].
Application Note:
TSF conducts the following tests to the parts of the TSF during the start-up;
 Fiscal Memory
 Daily Memory
 Certificate
 Time update by NTP
 Integrity of Event Records
 Operating Mode of device
 Incomplete receipt or slip document
 Electronic seal
 Software update from TSM
TSF conducts the following tests to the parts of the TSF periodically;
 Time Information
 Time Update by NTP, before preparing Z Report
 Controlling New parameters, after preparing
 Controlling ERU, before printing each row on receipt printer.
 Checking event records integrity, when a new event occurred.
 Electornic seal.
Authorized users can verify the integrity of the following parts of the TSF;
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 Fiscal Memory records integrity.
 Daily Memory records integrity.
 Event records integrity.
Authorized users can verify the integrity of the following parts of the TSF data
The user shall be warned automatically (whether authorized user or ordinary user), when the
integrity of following parts can not be verified.
 Event data
 Fiscal memory records
 Daily memory records
 Sales data base
6.1.8. Class FTP Trusted Patch/Channels
6.1.8.1. FTP_ITC Inter-TSF trusted channel
FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FTP_ITC.1.1 The TSF shall provide a communication channel between itself and another
trusted IT product that is logically distinct from other communication channels and provides
assured identification of its end points and protection of the channel data from modification or
disclosure.
FTP_ITC.1.2 The TSF shall permit [the TSF] to initiate communication via the trusted
channel.
FTP_ITC.1.3 The TSF shall initiate communication via the trusted channel for [sending user
data (sales and event data) to PRA-IS and receiveing user data (FCR parameters and exchange
rates) from TSM].
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6.2. Security Assurance Requirements for the TOE
The assurance requirements for the evaluation of the TOE and for its development and operating
environment are chosen as the predefined assurance package EAL2.
6.3.Security Requirements Rationale
6.3.1. Security Functional Requirements Rationale
Hata! Başvuru kaynağı bulunamadı. provides an overview for security functional
requirements coverage and also giving an evidence for sufficiency and necessity of the SFRs
chosen.
Table 3 Coverage of security objectives by SFRs for TOE
O.AccessControl
O.Event
O.Integrity
O.Authentication
O.Function
O.Transfer
FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation X
FAU_SAR.1 Audit review X
FAU_STG.1 Protected audit trail
storage
X
FAU_STG.4 Prevention of audit data
loss
X
FCO_NRO.2 Enforced proof of origin X
FCS_CKM.1/TLS_AES Cryptographic key
generation
X
FCS_CKM.1/TLS_HMAC Cryptographic key
generation
X
FCS_CKM.1/ DHE-KEY Cryptographic key
generation
X
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FCS_CKM.1/ EXT-DEV
KENC
Cryptographic key
generation
X
FCS_CKM.1/ EXT-DEV
KHMAC
Cryptographic key
generation
X
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key
destruction
X
FCS_COP.1/ENC-DEC Cryptographic operation X
FCS_COP.1/INT-AUTH Cryptographic operation X
FCS_COP.1/HASHING Cryptographic operation X
FCS_COP.1/EXT-DEV
KENC
Cryptographic operation X
FCS_COP.1/EXT-DEV
KHMAC
Cryptographic operation X
FCS_COP.1/EXT-DEV
KEYEXCHANGE
Cryptographic operation X
FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control X
FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based
access control
X
FDP_ETC.2/TSM Export of user data with
security attributes
X
FDP_ETC.2 /EFTPOS Export of user data with
security attributes
X
FDP_ETC.2 / MAIN UNIT Export of user data with
security attributes
X
FDP_IFC.1/TSMCOMMU
NICATION
Subset information flow
control
X
FDP_IFC.1/EFTPOSCOM
MUNICATION
Subset information flow
control
X
N-PosCore v.1.1.0.0
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FDP_IFC.1/MAIN UNIT Subset information flow
control
X
FDP_IFF.1/TSMCOMMUN
ICATION
Simple security attributes X
FDP_IFF.1/EFT-
POSCOMMUNICATION
Simple security attributes X
FDP_IFF.1/MAIN UNIT Simple security attributes X
FDP_ITC.2/TSM Import of user data with
security attributes
X
FDP_ITC.2/EFTPOS Import of user data with
security attributes
X
FDP_ITC.2/MAIN UNIT Import of user data with
security attributes
X
FDP_SDI.2/MEMORY Stored data integrity
monitoring and action
X
FDP_SDI.2/DAILY and
PRMTR
Stored data integrity
monitoring and action
X
FIA_AFL.1/MANUFACTU
RER
Authentication failure
handling
X
FIA_AFL.1/AUTHORISED Authentication failure
handling
X
FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication X
FIA_UAU.4 Single-use authentication
mechanisms
X
FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification X
FMT_MOF.1 Management of security
functions behaviour
X
FMT_MSA.1/USER
IDENTITY
Management of security
attributes
X
N-PosCore v.1.1.0.0
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FMT_MSA.1/PRIVILEGES Management of security
attributes
X
FMT_MSA.1/IP:PORT
INFO
Management of security
attributes
X
FMT_MSA.1/FILE NAME
and INFO-LABEL
Management of security
attributes
X
FMT_MSA.1/INFO-
LABEL
Management of security
attributes
X
FMT_MSA.1/MAIN UNIT
SOURCE PORT INFO
Management of security
attributes
X
FMT_MSA.1/EFTPOS
SOURCE PORT INFO
Management of security
attributes
X
FMT_MSA.1/EFT-POS
LABEL INFO
Management of security
attributes
X
FMT_MSA.3/USERS and
SYSTEMS
Static attribute
initialisation
X X
FMT_MSA.3/EFTPOS Static attribute
initialisation
X
FMT_MSA.3/MAIN UNIT Static attribute
initialisation
X
FMT_MTD.1/FCR
AUTHORİSED USER
Management of TSF data X
FMT_MTD.1/
AUTHORİZED
MANUFACTURER USER
Management of TSF data X
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of
Management Functions
X
FMT_SMR.2 Restrictions on security
roles
X
N-PosCore v.1.1.0.0
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FPT_FLS.1 Failure with preservation
of secure state
X
FPT_PHP.2 Notification of physical
attack
X X
FPT_RCV.1 Manual recovery X
FPT_RCV.4 Function recovery X
FPT_STM.1 Reliable time stamps X
FPT_TDC.1 Inter-TSF basic TSF data
consistency
X
FPT_TEE.1/EXT Testing of external entities X
FPT_TEE.1/TIME Testing of external entities X
FPT_TST.1 TSF testing X X
FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel X
N-PosCore v.1.1.0.0
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A detailed justification of required for suitability of the security functional requirements to
achieve the security objectives is given in Hata! Başvuru kaynağı bulunamadı..
Table 4 Suitability of the SFRs
Security
Objective
Security Functional Requirement
O.AccessControl
FDP_ACC.1
Provides security
functional policy for
functions and data
FDP_ACF.1
Defines security attributes
for functions and data
FAU_SAR.1
Allows users to read audit
records
FMT_MSA.1/USER IDENTITY
Provides the functions to
restrict the ability to
modify the security
attribute(User Identity) to
FCR Authorised User
FMT_MSA.1/PRIVILEGES
Provides the functions to
restrict the ability to
modify the security
attributes (privileges) to
nobody.
FMT_MSA.3/USERS and SYSTEMS
Provides the functions to
provide restrictive default
values for security
attributes that are used
to enforce the SFP and
allows nobody to
specify alternative initial
values to override the
default values when an
object or information is
N-PosCore v.1.1.0.0
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created.
FMT_SMF.1
Descripe the specification
of management functions
being allowed to use in
maintenance mode and
secure state mode.
FMT_SMR.2
Maintains the roles with
restrictions
FMT_MTD.1/ FCR AUTHORISED
USER
Provides authorised
processing of FCR
Authorised User’s
authentication data
FMT_MTD.1/ AUTHORİZED
MANUFACTURER USER
Provides authorised
processing of FCR
Manufacturer User’s
authentication data
O.Event
FAU_GEN.1
Generates correct audit
events
FPT_STM.1
Provides accurate time for
logging events
O.Integrity
FAU_STG.1
Protects stored audit
data integrity from
unauthorised deletion
FAU_STG.4
Prevents loss of audit data
loss
FPT_PHP.2
Generation of audit event
detection of physical
tampering
FDP_SDI.2/MEMORY
Monitors user data stored
for integrity errors
FDP_SDI.2/DAILY and PRMTR Monitors user data stored
N-PosCore v.1.1.0.0
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for integrity errors
FPT_TST.1
Ensures accuracy of its
functions working by
conducting self test
FPT_TDC.1
Provides the capability to
consistently interpret TSF
data (checksum)
O.Authentication
FIA_AFL.1/MANUFACTURER
Detects and records
authentication failure
events for Autharised
Manufacturer User
FIA_AFL.1/ AUTHORISED
Detects and records
authentication failure
events for FCR
Authorised User
FIA_UAU.1
Defines user
authentication before
allowing to do fiscal sales
FIA_UAU.4
Provides single use
authentication
mechanism for
Autharised Manufacturer
User
FIA_UID.1
Defines user
identification before
allowing to do fiscal sales
FMT_MTD.1/ FCR AUTHORİSED
USER
Provides authorised
processing of FCR
Authorised User’s
authentication data
FCS_COP.1/HASHING
Provides authentication
operation for PRA-IS and
TSM
N-PosCore v.1.1.0.0
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O.Function
FMT_MOF.1
Restricts the ability to
enable the functions to
nobody and, thus,
prevents an unintended
access to data in the
operational phase.
FPT_FLS.1
Failure types which
makes new generation
cash register fiscal
application software
continue working in
secure state
FPT_RCV.1
Provides new generation
cash register fiscal
application software start
working in maintenance
mode in failure. (has
ability to switch to the
secure state manually)
FPT_RCV.4
Provides new generation
cash register
fiscal application
software start working
in maintenance mode in
failure. (has
ability to switch to the
secure state
automatically with
functions)
FPT_TEE.1/EXT
Provides test for IT
environment for
functioning accurately
FPT_TEE.1/TIME Provides test for time
N-PosCore v.1.1.0.0
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information for accuracy
FPT_TST.1
Ensures accuracy of its
functions working by
conducting self test
O.Transfer
FCS_CKM.1/TLS_AES
Generates session keys
for communication
between FCR-PRA-IS
and FCR–TSM
FCS_CKM.1/TLS_HMAC
Generates session keys
for communication
between FCR-PRA-IS
and FCR–TSM
FMT_MSA.1/ EFT-POS LABEL INFO
Provides the functions to
restrict the ability to
modify the security
attribute(EFT-POS label)
to nobody
FMT_MSA.1/FILE NAME and INFO-
LABEL
Provides the functions to
restrict the ability to
modify the security
attribute(file name) to
nobody
FMT_MSA.1/ IP:PORT
Provides the functions to
restrict the ability to
modify the security
attribute(IP/Port)to
Authorized Manufacturer
User
FMT_MSA.1/EFTPOS SOURCE PORT
INFO
Provides the functions to
restrict the ability to
modify the security
attribute(EFT-POS source
N-PosCore v.1.1.0.0
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port) to nobody
FMT_MSA.1/ INFO-LABEL Provides the functions to
restrict the ability to
modify the security
attribute(information
label) to nobody
FMT_MSA.1/MAIN UNIT SOURCE
PORT INFO
Provides the functions to
restrict the ability to
modify the security
attribute(source port) to
nobody
FMT_MSA.3/USERS and SYSTEMS
Provides the functions to
provide restrictive default
values for security
attributes that are used
to enforce the SFP and
allows nobody to
specify alternative initial
values to override the
default values when an
object or information is
created
FMT_MSA.3/EFTPOS
Provides the functions to
provide permissive
default values for security
attributes that are used to
enforce the SFP and
allows nobody to
specify alternative initial
values to override the
default values when an
object or information is
created
N-PosCore v.1.1.0.0
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FMT_MSA.3/MAIN UNIT
Provides the functions to
provide permissive
default values for security
attributes that are used to
enforce the SFP and
allows nobody to
specify alternative initial
values to override the
default values when an
object or information is
created
FCS_CKM.4
Destroys cryptographic
keys in the TOE
FCS_COP.1/ENC-DEC
Provides the
cryptographic operation
for secure communication
between PRA-IS and new
generation cash register
fiscal application
software, and between
TSM and new generation
cash register fiscal
application software
FCS_COP.1/INT-AUTH
Provides authentication
and integrity protection
for comminication
between FCR-PRA-IS
and FCR–TSM
FPT_PHP.2
Generation of audit event
detection of physical
tampering
FCO_NRO.2
Generates evidence of
origin of the data to be
transferred to the PRA-IS
FCS_CKM.1/ DHE-KEY Generates private key for
N-PosCore v.1.1.0.0
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DHE key agreement
FCS_COP.1/EXT-DEV KENC
Provides symmetric
encryption in order to
establish secure
communication with
External Devices.
FCS_COP.1/ EXT-DEV KHMAC
Provides authentication
and integrity protection
for comminication with
External Devices.
FCS_CKM.1/ EXT-DEV KENC
Generates keys for
communication between
TOE and External
Devices
FCS_CKM.1/ EXT-DEV KHMAC
Generates keys for
communication between
TOE and External
Devices
FCS_COP.1/ EXT-DEV
KEYEXCHANGE
Provides agreement
operation with External
Devices
FDP_ETC.2/TSM
Provides export of sales
data and event data from
the TOE to the PRA-IS
using the information
flow control SFP with
TSM and PRA-IS
FDP_ETC.2/EFTPOS
Provides export of
amount information in
sales data from the TOE
to the EFT-POS using the
information flow control
SFP with EFT-POS
Devices
N-PosCore v.1.1.0.0
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FDP_ETC.2 / MAIN UNIT
Provides export of
amount information in
sales data from the TOE
to the Main Unit using
the information flow
control SFP with Main
Unit
FDP_IFC.1/TSMCOMMUNICATION
Provides information
flow control policy for
TSM and PRA-IS
communication
FDP_IFC.1/EFTPOSCOMMUNICATION
Provides information
flow control policy for
EFT-POS communication
FDP_IFC.1/MAIN UNIT
Provides information
flow control policy for
MAIN UNIT
communication
FDP_IFF.1/TSMCOMMUNICATION
Provides information
flow control policy rules
for TSM and PRA-IS
communication
FDP_IFF.1/EFTPOSCOMMUNICATION
Provides information
flow control policy rules
for EFT-POS
communication
FDP_IFF.1/MAIN UNIT
Provides information
flow control policy rules
for Main Unit
communication
FDT_ITC.2/TSM
Provides protection of
FCR Parameters
confidentiality and
integrity during import
N-PosCore v.1.1.0.0
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from TSM
FDT_ITC.2/EFTPOS
Provides protection of
confidentiality and
integrity of outcome of
the operation conducted
by the EFT-POS device
and AES keys (KENC and
KHMAC) during import
from EFT-POS device
FDP_ITC.2/MAIN UNIT
Provides protection of
confidentiality and
integrity of
communication with
Main Unit.
FTP_ITC.1
Provides protection of
sales data and event data
(confidentiality+integrity)
during communication
with PRA-IS by the help
of secure channel
6.3.2. Rationale for Security Functional Requirements dependencies
Selected security functional requirements include related dependencies. Hata! Başvuru kaynağı
bulunamadı. below provides a summary of the security functional requirements dependency
analysis.
Table 5 Security Functional Requirements dependencies
Dependencies: Included / not included
FAU_GEN.1 FPT_STM.1 included
FAU_SAR.1 FAU_GEN.1 included
FAU_STG.1 FAU_GEN.1 included
FAU_STG.4 FAU_STG.1 included
N-PosCore v.1.1.0.0
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FCO_NRO.2 FIA_UID.1 included
FCS_CKM.1/TLS_
AES
FCS_CKM.2 or FCS_COP.1;
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1/ENC-DEC
and
FCS_CKM.4 included
FCS_CKM.1/TLS_
HMAC
FCS_CKM.2 or FCS_COP.1;
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1/INT-AUTH
and
FCS_CKM.4 included
FCS_CKM.1/ EXT-
DEV KENC
FCS_CKM.2 or FCS_COP.1;
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1/EXT-DEV
KENC and
FCS_CKM.4 included
.
FCS_CKM.1/ EXT-
DEV KHMAC
FCS_CKM.2 or FCS_COP.1;
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1/ EXT-DEV
KHMAC and
FCS_CKM.4 included
FCS_CKM.4 FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 or FCS_CKM.1 FCS_CKM.1(FCS_CKM.1
/ EXT-DEV KENC,
FCS_CKM.1/ EXT-DEV
KHMAC,
FCS_CKM.1/TLS_HMAC
, FCS_CKM.1/TLS_AES
and FCS_COP.1/ EXT-
DEV KEYEXCHANGE)
included
FCS_COP.1/ENC-
DEC
FDP_ITC.1 or
FDP_ITC.2 or
FCS_CKM.1 ;FCS_CKM.4
FCS_CKM.1/TLS_AES
and
FCS_CKM.4 included
FCS_COP.1/INT-
AUTH
FDP_ITC.1 or
FDP_ITC.2 or
FCS_CKM.1 ;FCS_CKM.4
FCS_CKM.1/TLS_HMAC
and
FCS_CKM.4 included
FCS_COP.1/HASHI
NG
FDP_ITC.1 or
FDP_ITC.2 or
FCS_CKM.1 ;FCS_CKM.4
No need to include any
dependencies because
there is no need to use any
key for HASHING
FCS_CKM.1/ DHE-
KEY
FCS_CKM.2 or FCS_COP.1;
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1/ EXT-DEV
KEYEXCHANGE and
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1/EXT-
DEV KENC
FDP_ITC.1 or
FDP_ITC.2 or
FCS_CKM.1 ;FCS_CKM.4
FCS_CKM.1/ EXT-DEV
KENC ;
FCS_CKM.4 included
FCS_COP.1/ EXT-
DEV KHMAC
FDP_ITC.1 or
FDP_ITC.2 or
FCS_CKM.1 ;FCS_CKM.4
FCS_CKM.1/ EXT-DEV
KHMAC;
FCS_CKM.4 included
FCS_COP.1/ EXT-
DEV
KEYEXCHANGE
FDP_ITC.1 or
FDP_ITC.2 or
FCS_CKM.1 ;FCS_CKM.4
FCS_CKM.1/ DHE-KEY
and FCS_CKM.4 included
FDP_ACC.1 FDP_ACF.1 included
N-PosCore v.1.1.0.0
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FDP_ACF.1 FDP_ACC.1;
FMT_MSA.3
FDP_ACC.1;
FMT_MSA.3/USERS and
SYSTEMS included
FDP_ETC.2/TSM FDP_ACC.1 or
FDP_IFC.1
FDP_ACC.1;
FDP_IFC.1/TSMCOMMU
NICATION included
FDP_ETC.2
/EFTPOS
FDP_ACC.1 or
FDP_IFC.1
FDP_ACC.1;
FDP_IFC.1/EFTPOSCOM
MUNICATION included
FDP_ETC.2 /
MAIN UNIT
FDP_ACC.1 or
FDP_IFC.1
FDP_ACC.1;
FDP_IFC.1/MAIN UNIT
FDP_IFC.1/TSMCO
MMUNICATION
FDP_IFF.1 FDP_IFF.1/TSMCOMMU
NICATION included
FDP_IFC.1/EFTPO
SCOMMUNICATI
ON
FDP_IFF.1 FDP_IFF.1/EFT-
POSCOMMUNICATION
included
FDP_IFC.1/MAIN
UNIT
FDP_IFF.1 FDP_IFF.1/MAIN UNIT
included
FDP_IFF.1/TSMCO
MMUNICATION
FDP_IFC.1;
FMT_MSA.3
FDP_IFC.1/TSMCOMMU
NICATION;
FMT_MSA.3/USERS and
SYSTEMS included
FDP_IFF.1/EFT-
POSCOMMUNICA
TION
FDP_IFC.1;
FMT_MSA.3
FDP_IFC.1/EFTPOSCOM
MUNICATION;
FMT_MSA.3/EFTPOS
included
FDP_IFF.1/MAIN
UNIT
FDP_IFC.1;
FMT_MSA.3
FDP_IFC.1/MAIN UNIT;
FMT_MSA.3/MAIN
UNIT
FDP_ITC.2/TSM FDP_ACC.1 or
FDP_IFC.1 ;
FTP_ITC.1 or
FTP_TRP.1 ;
FPT_TDC.1
FDP_IFC.1/TSMCOMMU
NICATION; FTP_ITC.1;
FPT_TDC.1 included
FDP_ITC.2/EFTPO
S
FDP_ACC.1 or
FDP_IFC.1 ;
FTP_ITC.1 or
FTP_TRP.1 ;
FPT_TDC.1
FDP_IFC.1/EFTPOSCOM
MUNICATION;
FTP_ITC.1; FPT_TDC.1
included
FDP_ITC.2/MAIN
UNIT
FDP_ACC.1 or
FDP_IFC.1 ;
FTP_ITC.1 or
FTP_TRP.1 ;
FPT_TDC.1
FDP_IFC.1/MAIN UNIT;
FTP_ITC.1; FPT_TDC.1
included
FDP_SDI.2/MEMO
RY
No dependencies. -
N-PosCore v.1.1.0.0
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FDP_SDI.2/DAILY
and PRMTR
No dependencies. -
FIA_AFL.1/MANU
FACTURER
FIA_UAU.1 included
FIA_AFL.1/AUTH
ORISED
FIA_UAU.1 included
FIA_UAU.1 FIA_UID.1 included
FIA_UAU.4 No dependencies -
FIA_UID.1 No dependencies -
FMT_MOF.1 FMT_SMR.1; FMT_SMF.1 FMT_SMR.2 is
hierarchical to
FMT_SMR.1;
FMT_SMF.1
FMT_MSA.1/USER
IDENTITY
FDP_ACC.1 or
FDP_IFC.1
FDP_ACC.1 included
FMT_MSA.1/PRIVI
LEGES
FDP_ACC.1 or
FDP_IFC.1
FDP_ACC.1 included
FMT_MSA.1/
IP:PORT INFO
FDP_ACC.1 or
FDP_IFC.1
FDP_IFC.1/TSMCOMMU
NICATION included
FMT_MSA.1/FILE
NAME and INFO-
LABEL
FDP_ACC.1 or
FDP_IFC.1
FDP_IFC.1/TSMCOMMU
NICATION included
FMT_MSA.1/
INFO-LABEL
FDP_ACC.1 or
FDP_IFC.1
FDP_IFC.1/MAIN UNIT
included
FMT_MSA.1/MAI
N UNIT SOURCE
PORT INFO
FDP_ACC.1 or
FDP_IFC.1
FDP_IFC.1/MAIN UNIT
included
FMT_MSA.1/EFTP
OS SOURCE PORT
INFO
FDP_ACC.1 or
FDP_IFC.1
FDP_IFC.1/EFTPOSCOM
MUNICATION included
FMT_MSA.1/ EFT-
POS LABEL INFO
FDP_ACC.1 or
FDP_IFC.1
FDP_IFC.1/EFTPOSCOM
MUNICATION included
FMT_MSA.3/USER
S and SYSTEMS
FMT_MSA.1 ;
FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MSA.1
( FMT_MSA.1/USER
IDENTITY,
FMT_MSA.1/PRIVILEGE
S,
FMT_MSA.1/IP:PORT
INFO,
FMT_MSA.1/FILE
NAME and INFO-
LABEL) ;
FMT_SMR.1 is
hierarchical to
FMT_SMR.1 included
FMT_MSA.3/EFTP
OS
FMT_MSA.1 ;
FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MSA.1/ EFT-POS
LABEL INFO ) ;
FMT_SMR.2 is
hierarchical to
N-PosCore v.1.1.0.0
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FMT_SMR.1 included
FMT_MSA.3/MAI
N UNIT
FMT_MSA.1 ;
FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MSA.1(FMT_MSA.
1/ INFO-LABEL,
FMT_MSA.1/MAIN
UNIT SOURCE PORT
INFO) ;
FMT_SMR.2 is
hierarchical to
FMT_SMR.1 included
FMT_MTD.1/ FCR
AUTHORİSED
USER
FMT_SMR.1 ;
FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.2 is
hierarchical to
FMT_SMR.1 ;
FMT_SMF.1 included
FMT_MTD.1/
AUTHORİZED
MANUFACTURER
USER
FMT_SMR.1 ;
FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.2 is
hierarchical to
FMT_SMR.1 ;
FMT_SMF.1 included
FMT_SMF.1 No dependencies. -
FMT_SMR.2 FIA_UID.1 FIA_UID.2 is hierarchical
to FIA_UID.1 included
FPT_FLS.1 No dependencies -
FPT_PHP.2 FMT_MOF.1 included
FPT_RCV.1 AGD_OPE.1 included (assurance
component)
FPT_RCV.4 No dependencies -
FPT_STM.1 No dependencies -
FPT_TDC.1 No dependencies -
FPT_TEE.1/EXT No dependencies -
FPT_TEE.1/TIME No dependencies -
FPT_TST.1 No dependencies -
FTP_ITC.1 No dependencies -
6.3.3. Security Assurance Requirements Rationale
The current assurance package was chosen based on the pre-defined assurance packet EAL2.
EAL2 is chosen because the threats that were chosen are consistent with an attacker of basic
attack potential.
N-PosCore v.1.1.0.0
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6.3.4. Security Requirements - Internal Consistency
The following part of the security requirements rationale shows that the set of security
requirements for the TOE consisting of the security functional requirements (SFRs) and the
security assurance requirements (SARs) together forms an internally consistent whole.
The dependency analysis in Hata! Başvuru kaynağı bulunamadı. shows that the basis for
internal consistency between all defined functional requirements is satisfied.
The assurance package EAL2 is a pre-defined set of internally consistent assurance
requirements. The assurance requirements are internally consistent as all (additional)
dependencies are satisfied and no inconsistency appears.
Inconsistency between functional and assurance requirements could only arise, if there are
functional-assurance dependencies being not met. So, there are no inconsistencies between the
goals of these two groups of security requirements.
N-PosCore v.1.1.0.0
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7. TOE SUMMARY SPECIFICATIONS
The following security functions are implemented in order to satisfy the Security Functional
Requirements in Section 6.1 of this Security Target.
7.1.Event Log Function
Audit/Event Function is going to generate the logs for the following events listed in the auditable
event list table which is containing the events specified in PRA Messaging Protocol
Document[6].
For each auditable events in the list TSF will add Date and Time of the event and identity of the
subject to the stored event. However since the list of events defined in the Messaging Protocol
contain if the event is successful or unsuccessful by definition, TOE do not explicitly label the
outcome of the event.
The events will be exported to PRA-IS according to the requirements of the messaging protocol
and they can only be reviewed by authorized manufacturer user.
TOE provides the confidentiality and integrity of the event logs and store them at least 90 days.
When the audit trail is full the TOE start to overwrite the oldest log in order to continue its
function.
This Security Function is satisfying the following SFRs;
FAU_GEN.1, FAU_SAR.1, FAU_STG.1, FAU_STG.4, FDP_SDI.2, FDP_SDI.2/DAILY and
PRMTR, FPT_STM.1
7.2.Cryptographic Operation
TOE will use the cryptographic libraries from the operating system for key generation in
accordance with AES with the key length of 256 bit in order to encrypt and decrypt the user data.
Cryptography function is also responsible for successful SSL Authentication with PRA-IS and
exported files will be signed with a private key in smard card of FCR.
The session keys are destructed securely upon the completion of the communication with PRA-
IS and during the communication the TOE use Hashing.
TOE also establish a secure communication with third party devices like EFT-POS and Main
Unit. In order to install a device to TOE, first a AES key generated by the device should be send
securely to TOE by using public key of the TOE.
TOE also provide a proof of origin for the event and sales data sent to TSM.
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This Security Function is satisfying the following SFRs;
FCS_CKM.1/TLS_AES, FCS_CKM.1/TLS_HMAC, FCS_CKM.1/EXT-DEV KENC,
FCS_CKM.1/EXT-DEV KHMAC, FCS_CKM.1/DHE-KEY, FCS_CKM.4, FCS_COP.1/ENC-
DEC, FCS_COP.1/INT_AUTH, FCS_COP.1/EXT-DEV KENC, FCS_COP.1/EXT-DEV KHMAC,
FCS_COP.1/HASHING, FCS_COP.1/EXT-DEV KEYEXCHANGE, FDP_ITC.2/EFTPOS,
FDP_ITC.2/TSM, FDP_ITC.2/MAIN UNIT, FTP_ITC.1, FCO_NRO.2, FDP_ETC.2/TSM,
FDP_ETC.2 /EFTPOS, FDP_ETC.2 / MAIN UNIT,
7.3.Identification and Authentication Function
Identification and Authentication Function will support the following features;
 Authentication failure handling for 3 consecutive unsuccessful authentication attempts
 Enforce and identification and authentication mechanism for the following users;
o FCR Authorised User – Manager
o Authorized Manufacturer User
Enforce identification and authentication mechanism for the following systems;
o PRA-IS
o TSM
This Security Function is satisfying the following SFRs;
FIA_AFL.1/MANUFACTURER, FIA_AFL.1/AUTHORISED, FIA_UAU.1, FIA_UAU.4,
FIA_UID.1, FIA_UID.1, FDP_ITC.2/TSM, FDP_ETC.2/TSM
7.4.Access Control Function
TOE enforces an access control policy for FCR Authorised Users and Authorized Manufacturer
Users. The TOE will only be accessible to Manufacturer users in maintenance mode and FCR
Authorised Users can use the system only in secure state mode.
This Security Function is satisfying the following SFRs;
FDP_ACC.1, FDP_ACF.1, FDP_IFF.1/TSMCOMMUNICATION,
FDP_IFC.1/TSMCOMMUNICATION, FDP_IFF.1/EFTPOSCOMMUNICATION,
FDP_IFC.1/EFTPOSCOMMUNICATION, FDP_IFC.1/MAIN UNIT, FDP_IFF.1/MAIN UNIT
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7.5.Data Integrity Function
The memory space for Sales Data and Event Data will be subject to an integrity check in order to
provide the integrity of the data. The hash number will be checked after/before writing a new
field to the designated memory space and initialization. An audit event will be generated in case
of integrity corruption and an event to PRA-IS will be transmitted if the type of the event is
“urgent.”
This Security Function is satisfying the following SFRs;
FDP_SDI.2, FDP_SDI.2/DAILY and PRMTR
7.6.Import/Export Function
The TOE will import and export files from/to trusted third parties via a Parameter Block and
Communication Tables imported from TSM.
Import Function will control the import of following files;
 Parameter File
 Communication Tables
 Change Rates
The imported files will be updated to the related memory block and according to the parameter
file and communication tables, TOE export the event and sales data to PRA-IS securely.
The following messages are exported to the PRA-IS;
 Receipt Message
 Receipt Void Message
 Z Report Message
 Event Record Message
 Statistic Message
This Security Function is satisfying the following SFRs;
FDP_ETC.2/TSM, FDP_ETC.2/EFTPOS, FDP_ETC.2/MAIN UNIT, FDP_ITC.2/TSM,
FDP_ITC.2/EFTPOS, FDP_ITC.2/MAIN UNIT
7.7.TSF Protection
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TSF will protect the secure operation of the TOE by conduction the following functionality;
 Support the recovery and secure operation of whole functions in case of generation of
events with the event type “Warning and Information”
 In case of generation of an event with the event type “Urgent”, the function or module
make the TOE switch to “Maintenance Mode”.
 FCR Authorised users can not access to the System in “Maintenance Mode”.
 Only Authorized Manufacturer User can access to the Device in “Maintenance Mode”
 The device should automatically restarted upon switching from Maintenance Mode to
Secure Mode.
 With the support of Electronic Seal, TOE Security Functions will check the external
switches frequently for a possible tampering.
 In case of an internal temparing TOE switches to Maintenance Mode.
This Security Function is satisfying the following SFRs;
FPT_FLS.1, FPT_PHP.2, FPT_RCV.1, FPT_RCV.4, FPT_TDC.1
7.8.TOE Self-Testing Function
TOE will conduct self testing during initial startup and conduct the following tests;
 Testing external entities and components during start-up.
 Testing TOE Functions during each start-up.
 Updating time information at each startup and every time before getting a Z Report.
Upon unsuccessful test results, TSF will generate an event log and take the necessary actions.
This Security Function is satisfying the following SFRs;
FPT_TST.1., FPT_TEE.1/EXT, FPT_TEE.1/TIME
7.9.TSF Management Function
TOE provides the following management functions to the FCR Authorised User-Manager;
 User Management
 Configuration of the FCR
 Reporting
TOE provides the following management functions to the Authorized Manufacturer User;
 Maintenance Mode Operations
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This Security Function is satisfying the following SFRs;
FMT_MOF.1, FMT_MSA.1/USER IDENTITY, FMT_MSA.1/PRIVILEGES,
FMT_MSA.1/IP:PORT INFO, FMT_MSA.1/FILE NAME and INFO-LABEL,
FMT_MSA.1/INFO-LABEL, FMT_MSA.1/MAIN UNIT SOURCE PORT INFO,
FMT_MSA.1/EFTPOS SOURCE PORT INFO, FMT_MSA.1/EFT-POS LABEL INFO,
FMT_MSA.3/USERS and SYSTEMS, FMT_MSA.3/EFTPOS, FMT_MSA.3/MAIN UNIT,
FMT_MTD.1/FCR AUTHORİSED USER, FMT_MTD.1/ AUTHORİZED MANUFACTURER
USER, FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.2