National Information Assurance Partnership
Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
Validation Report
for
Cisco Expressway X12.5
Report Number: CCEVS-VR-VID10938-2019
Dated: 8/19/19
Version: 1.0
National Institute of Standards and
Technology
National Security Agency
Information Technology Laboratory Information Assurance Directorate
100 Bureau Drive 9800 Savage Road STE 6940
Gaithersburg, MD 20899 Fort Meade, MD 20755-6940
®
TM
2
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Validation Team
Sheldon Durrant
Patrick W Mallett, PhD
Lisa Mitchell,
Michelle Carlson
The MITRE Corporation
James J Donndelinger
Aerospace Corporation
Common Criteria Testing Laboratory
Acumen Security, LLC
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Table of Contents
1 Executive Summary............................................................................................................... 4
2 Identification.......................................................................................................................... 5
3 Architectural Information .................................................................................................... 6
4 Security Features ................................................................................................................... 7
5 Assumptions, Threats & Clarification of Scope ............................................................... 12
5.1 Assumptions..................................................................................................................................................12
5.2 Threats...........................................................................................................................................................13
5.3 Clarification of Scope...................................................................................................................................15
6 Documentation..................................................................................................................... 16
7 TOE Evaluated Configuration ........................................................................................... 17
7.1 Evaluated Configuration..............................................................................................................................17
7.2 Physical Scope of the TOE...........................................................................................................................18
7.3 Excluded Functionality ................................................................................................................................23
8 IT Product Testing............................................................................................................... 25
8.1 Developer Testing .........................................................................................................................................25
8.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing.......................................................................................................25
9 Results of the Evaluation .................................................................................................... 26
9.1 Evaluation of Security Target .....................................................................................................................26
9.2 Evaluation of Development Documentation...............................................................................................26
9.3 Evaluation of Guidance Documents............................................................................................................26
9.4 Evaluation of Life Cycle Support Activities...............................................................................................27
9.5 Evaluation of Test Documentation and the Test Activity .........................................................................27
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity ..............................................................................................................27
9.7 Summary of Evaluation Results..................................................................................................................29
10 Validator Comments & Recommendations ...................................................................... 30
11 Annexes................................................................................................................................. 31
12 Security Target .................................................................................................................... 32
13 Glossary ................................................................................................................................ 33
14 Bibliography......................................................................................................................... 34
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1 Executive Summary
This Validation Report (VR) is intended to assist the end user of this product and any security certification
Agent for that end user in determining the suitability of this Information Technology (IT) product for their
environment. End users should review the Security Target (ST), which is where specific security claims are
made, in conjunction with this VR, which describes how those security claims were tested and evaluated
and any restrictions on the evaluated configuration. Prospective users should carefully read the
Assumptions and Clarification of Scope in Section 5 and the Validator Comments in Section 10, where any
restrictions on the evaluated configuration are highlighted.
This report documents the National Information Assurance Partnership (NIAP) assessment of the
evaluation of the Cisco Expressway X12.5 Target of Evaluation (TOE). It presents the evaluation results,
their justifications, and the conformance results. This VR is not an endorsement of the TOE by any agency
of the U.S. Government and no warranty of the TOE is either expressed or implied. This VR applies only
to the specific version and configuration of the product as evaluated and documented in the ST.
The evaluation was completed by Acumen Security in August 2019. The information in this report is
largely derived from the proprietary Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) and associated test report, all
written by Acumen Security and summarized in the publicly available Assurance Activity Report (AAR) for
this evaluation. The evaluation determined that the product is both Common Criteria Part 2 Extended
and Part 3 Conformant and meets the assurance requirements defined in the U.S. Government Protection
Profile for Security Requirements for the collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, Version 2.0
+ Errata 20180314 (CPP_ND_V2.0E).
The Target of Evaluation identified in this Validation Report has been evaluated at a NIAP approved
Common Criteria Testing Laboratory using the Common Methodology for Information Technology
Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1, Rev. 4, for conformance to the Common Criteria for Information
Technology Security Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev. 4), as interpreted by the Assurance Activities contained
in the NDcPP 2.0e Supporting Document. This Validation Report applies only to the specific version of the
TOE as evaluated. The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the NIAP
Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme (CCEVS) and the conclusions of the testing laboratory
in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence provided.
The validation team provided guidance on technical issues and evaluation processes and reviewed the
individual work units documented in the ETR and the Assurance Activities Report. The validation team
found that the evaluation showed that the product satisfies all the security functional requirements and
assurance requirements stated in the Security Target. Based on these findings, the validation team
concludes that the testing laboratory's findings are accurate, the conclusions justified, and the
conformance results are correct. The conclusions of the testing laboratory in the evaluation technical
report are consistent with the evidence produced.
5
2 Identification
The CCEVS is a joint National Security Agency (NSA) and National Institute of Standards effort to establish
commercial facilities to perform trusted product evaluations. Under this program, security evaluations are
conducted by commercial testing laboratories called Common Criteria Testing Laboratories (CCTLs). CCTLs
evaluate products against Protection Profiles containing Assurance Activities, which are interpretation of
CEM work units specific to the technology described by the PP.
The NIAP Validation Body assigns Validators to monitor the CCTLs to ensure quality and consistency across
evaluations. Developers of information technology products desiring a security evaluation contract with
a CCTL and pay a fee for their product's evaluation. Upon successful completion of the evaluation, the
product is added to NIAP's.
Product Compliance List.
Table 1 provides information needed to completely identify the product, including:
 The Target of Evaluation: the fully qualified identifier of the product as evaluated.
 The Security Target, describing the security features, claims, and assurances of the product.
 The conformance result of the evaluation.
 The Protection Profile(s) to which the product is conformant.
 The organizations and individuals participating in the evaluation.
Table 1: Evaluation Identifiers
Item Identifier
Evaluation Scheme United States NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
TOE Cisco Expressway X12.5
Protection Profile collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, Version 2.0 + Errata
20180314 (CPP_ND_V2.0E)
Security Target Cisco Expressway X12.5 System Common Criteria Security Target
Evaluation
Technical Report
Cisco Expressway X12.5 Evaluation Technical Report
CC Version Version 3.1, Revision 4
Conformance Result CC Part 2 Extended and CC Part 3 Conformant
Sponsor Cisco Systems, Inc.
Developer Cisco Systems, Inc.
Common Criteria
Testing Lab (CCTL)
Acumen Security
CCEVS Validators Patrick W Mallett, James J Donndelinger, Sheldon Durrant, Lisa Mitchell,
Michelle Carlson
6
3 Architectural Information
The TOE is a hardware and software solution that makes up the Cisco Expressway. The TOE hardware
platform is at least one of the following Cisco UCS platforms, UCS C220 M4, UCS C240 M4, UCS C220 M5
or the UCS C240 M5. The TOE software is the Cisco Expressway X12.5 software. The network, on which
the TOE resides is considered part of the environment. The TOE guidance documentation, the Cisco
Expressway Common Criteria Configuration Guide that is also considered to be part of the TOE can be
found listed and are downloadable from the http://cisco.com web site.
7
4 Security Features
The TOE is comprised of several security features. Each of the security features identified above consists
of several security functionalities, as identified below.
 Security Audit
 Communications
 Cryptographic Support
 Identification and Authentication
 Security Management
 Protection of the TSF
 TOE Access
 Trusted Path/Channels
These features are described in more detail in the subsections below. In addition, the TOE implements all
RFCs of the NDcPP v2.0e to satisfy testing/assurance measures prescribed therein.
Security Audit
The TOE provides extensive auditing capabilities. The TOE can audit events related to cryptographic
functionality, identification and authentication, and administrative actions. The Cisco Expressway
generates an audit record for each auditable event. Each security relevant audit event has the date,
timestamp, event description, and subject identity. The administrator configures auditable events,
performs back-up operations, and manages audit data storage. The TOE audit event logging is centralized
and enabled by default. Audit logs can be sent to an external audit server over a secure TLS channel
Communications
The TOE provides the configuration options for the Authorized Administrator to enable the persistent,
dedicated secure connections using SSHv2.0 between the two components, Expressway-C and
Expressway-E. This connection forms a highly secure traversal link to provide a collaboration gateway
solution that extends the services and access to users inside and outside of the organization’s firewall.
Cryptographic Support
The TOE provides cryptography in support of other Cisco Expressway security functionality. The
Expressway software calls the CiscoSSL FIPS Object Module (FOM) v6.2 that has been validated in
accordance with the specified standards to meet the requirements listed below and all the algorithms
claimed have CAVP certificates.
Refer to Table 2 for algorithm certificate references.
Table 2 FIPS References
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Algorithm Description Supported
Mode
CAVP Cert.
#
Module SFR
RSA Signature Verification
and key transport
FIPS PUB
186-4 Key
Generation,
PKCS#1 v.1.5,
2048 bit key
C905
(UCS M5)
C924
(UCS M4)
CiscoSSL
FIPS
Object
Module
(FOM)
v6.2
FCS_CKM.1
FCS_CKM.2
FCS_COP.1/SigGen
ECDSA Cryptographic
Signature services
FIPS 186-4,
Digital
Signature
Standard
(DSS)
C905
(UCS M5)
C924
(UCS M4)
CiscoSSL
FIPS
Object
Module
(FOM)
v6.2
FCS_CKM.1
FCS_COP.1/SigGen
AES Used for symmetric
encryption/decryptio
n
AES Key
Wrap in CBC,
CTR and
GCM (128
and 256 bits)
C905
(UCS M5)
C924
(UCS M4)
CiscoSSL
FIPS
Object
Module
(FOM)
v6.2
FCS_COP.1/DataEncr
yption
SHS (SHA-
1, 256,
384, 512)
Cryptographic
hashing services
Byte
Oriented
C905
(UCS M5)
C924
(UCS M4)
CiscoSSL
FIPS
Object
Module
(FOM)
v6.2
FCS_COP.1//Hash
HMAC
SHA-1,
SHA-256,
SHA-384,
SHA-512
Keyed hashing
services and software
integrity test
Byte
Oriented
C905
(UCS M5)
C924
(UCS M4)
CiscoSSL
FIPS
Object
Module
(FOM)
v6.2
FCS_COP.1/KeyedHas
h
DRBG Deterministic
random bit
generation services
in accordance with
ISO/IEC 18031:2011
CTR_DRBG
(AES 256)
C905
(UCS M5)
C924
(UCS M4)
CiscoSSL
FIPS
Object
Module
(FOM)
v6.2
FCS_RBG_EXT.1
9
Algorithm Description Supported
Mode
CAVP Cert.
#
Module SFR
CVL SSH/
TLS
Key Agreement NIST Special
Publication
800-56A
C905
(UCS M5)
C924
(UCS M4)
CiscoSSL
FIPS
Object
Module
(FOM)
v6.2
FCS_CKM.2
CVL – KAS-
ECC
Key Agreement NIST Special
Publication
800-56A
C905
(UCS M5)
C924
(UCS M4)
CiscoSSL
FIPS
Object
Module
(FOM)
v6.2
FCS_CKM.2
The TOE provides cryptography in support of remote administrative management via HTTPS/TLS, the
secure connection to an external audit server using TLS, and a dedicated SSHv2 secure connection
between the Expressway C and E components. The TOE uses the X.509v3 certificate for securing the SSH
and TLS connections.
The TOE also authenticates software updates to the TOE using a published SHA512 hash.
Identification and Authentication
The TOE provides authentication services for administrative users to connect to the TOE’s GUI
administrator interface. The TOE requires Authorized Administrators to be successfully identified and
authenticated prior to being granted access to any of the management functionality. The TOE can be
configured to require a minimum password length of 15 characters. The TOE provides administrator
authentication against a local user database using the GUI interface accessed via a secure HTTPS
connection.
The TOE also provides an automatic lockout when a user attempts to authenticate and enters invalid
information. When the threshold for the defined number of failed authentication attempts has exceeded
the configured allowable attempts, the user is locked out until an authorized administrator can enable
the user account.
Security Management
The TOE provides secure administrative services for management of general TOE configuration and the
security functionality provided by the TOE. All TOE administration occurs either through a secure HTTPS
session or via a local console connection. The TOE provides the ability to securely manage:
 Ability to administer the TOE locally and remotely;
10
 Ability to configure the access banner;
 Ability to configure the session inactivity time before session termination or locking;
 Ability to update the TOE, and to verify the updates using published hash capability prior to
installing those updates;
 Ability to configure the authentication failure parameters for FIA_AFL.1;
 Ability to configure audit behavior;
 Ability to configure the cryptographic functionality;
 Ability to configure the interaction between TOE components;
 Ability to re-enable an Administrator account;
 Change a user's password;
 Require a user's password to be changed upon next login;
 Configure NTP
The TOE supports the security administrator role. Only the Authorized Administrator can perform the
above security relevant management functions.
Authorized Administrators can create configurable login banners to be displayed at time of login and can
define an inactivity timeout threshold for each admin interface to terminate sessions after a set period of
inactivity has been reached.
Protection of the TSF
The TOE protects against interference and tampering by untrusted subjects by implementing
identification and authentication to Authorized Administrators. The TOE prevents reading of
cryptographic keys and passwords. Additionally, Cisco Expressway is not a general-purpose operating
system and access to Cisco Expressway memory space is restricted to only Cisco Expressway functions.
The TOE initially synchronizes time with an NTP server and then internally maintains the date and time.
This date and time are used as the timestamp that is applied to audit records generated by the TOE.
The TOE performs testing to verify correct operation of the system itself and that of the cryptographic
module.
Finally, the TOE is able to verify any software updates prior to the software updates being installed on the
TOE. The software is verified via a published hash.
TOE Access
The TOE can terminate inactive sessions after an Authorized Administrator configurable time-period.
Once a session has been terminated, the TOE requires the user to re-authenticate to establish a new
session.
The TOE can also display an Authorized Administrator specified banner on the GUI management interface
prior to allowing any administrative access to the TOE.
Trusted Path/Channels
The TOE allows trusted channels to be established to itself from remote Authorized Administrators using
HTTPS, initiates outbound TLS secure connection to transmit audit messages to remote syslog servers and
uses NTPv4 to secure the connection to the NTP server.
11
The TOE can also establish trusted paths between the Expressway C and Expressway E components using
SSHv2 when configured in Mobile and Remote Access (MRA) mode. In MRA mode, the TOE provides a
highly secure traversal link to provide a collaboration gateway solution that extends the services and
access to users inside and outside of the organization’s firewall
In MRA mode, SSHv2 is used to secure the persistent, dedicated connection where Expressway C acts as
the SSH server and the Expressway E acts as the SSH client, therefore creating a distributed TOE.
If any of the established trusted channels/paths are unintentionally broken, the connection will need to
be re-established as described in this document and the referenced Cisco Expressway X12.5 System
Common Criteria Configuration Guide.
12
5 Assumptions, Threats & Clarification of Scope
5.1 Assumptions
The specific conditions listed in the following subsections are assumed to exist in the TOE’s environment.
These assumptions include both practical realities in the development of the TOE security requirements
and the essential environmental conditions on the use of the TOE.
Table 3: TOE Assumptions
Assumption Assumption Definition
A.PHYSICAL_PROTECTION The network device is assumed to be physically protected in its
operational environment and not subject to physical attacks that
compromise the security and/or interfere with the device’s
physical interconnections and correct operation. This protection
is assumed to be sufficient to protect the device and the data it
contains. As a result, the cPP will not include any requirements
on physical tamper protection or other physical attack
mitigations. The cPP will not expect the product to defend
against physical access to the device that allows unauthorized
entities to extract data, bypass other controls, or otherwise
manipulate the device.
A.LIMITED_FUNCTIONALITY The device is assumed to provide networking functionality as its
core function and not provide functionality/services that could
be deemed as general-purpose computing. For example, the
device should not provide computing platform for general
purpose applications (unrelated to networking functionality).
A.NO_THRU_TRAFFIC_PROTECTION A standard/generic network device does not provide any
assurance regarding the protection of traffic that traverses it.
The intent is for the network device to protect data that
originates on or is destined to the device itself, to include
administrative data and audit data. Traffic that is traversing the
network device, destined for another network entity, is not
covered by the ND cPP. It is assumed that this protection will be
covered by cPPs for particular types of network devices (e.g.,
firewall).
A.TRUSTED_ADMINISTRATOR The Security Administrator(s) for the network device are
assumed to be trusted and to act in the best interest of security
for the organization. This includes being appropriately trained,
following policy, and adhering to guidance documentation.
Administrators are trusted to ensure passwords/credentials
have sufficient strength and entropy and to lack malicious intent
when administering the device. The network device is not
expected to be capable of defending against a malicious
administrator that actively works to bypass or compromise the
security of the device.
13
Assumption Assumption Definition
A.RESIDUAL_INFORMATION The Administrator must ensure that there is no unauthorized
access possible for sensitive residual information (e.g.
cryptographic keys, keying material, PINs, passwords etc.) on
networking equipment when the equipment is discarded or
removed from its operational environment.
A.REGULAR_UPDATES The network device firmware and software are assumed to be
updated by an administrator on a regular basis in response to the
release of product updates due to known vulnerabilities.
A.ADMIN_CREDENTIALS_SECURE The administrator’s credentials (private key) used to access the
network device are protected by the platform on which they
reside.
5.2 Threats
The following table lists the threats addressed by the TOE and the IT Environment. The assumed level of
expertise of the attacker for all the threats identified below is Enhanced-Basic.
Table 4: Threats
Threat Threat Definition
T.UNAUTHORIZED_ADMINISTRATOR_
ACCESS
Threat agents may attempt to gain Administrator access to
the network device by nefarious means such as masquerading
as an Administrator to the device, masquerading as the device
to an Administrator, replaying an administrative session (in its
entirety, or selected portions), or performing man-in-the-
middle attacks, which would provide access to the
administrative session, or sessions between network devices.
Successfully gaining Administrator access allows malicious
actions that compromise the security functionality of the
device and the network on which it resides.
T.WEAK_CRYPTOGRAPHY Threat agents may exploit weak cryptographic algorithms or
perform a cryptographic exhaust against the key space.
Poorly chosen encryption algorithms, modes, and key sizes
will allow attackers to compromise the algorithms, or brute
force exhaust the key space and give them unauthorized
access allowing them to read, manipulate and/or control the
traffic with minimal effort.
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Threat Threat Definition
T.UNDETECTED_ACTIVITY Threat agents may attempt to access, change, and/or modify
the security functionality of the network device without
Administrator awareness. This could result in the attacker
finding an avenue (e.g., misconfiguration, flaw in the product)
to compromise the device and the Administrator would have
no knowledge that the device has been compromised.
T.SECURITY_FUNCTIONALITY_COMPR
OMISE
Threat agents may compromise credentials and device data
enabling continued access to the network device and its
critical data. The compromise of credentials includes
replacing existing credentials with an attacker’s credentials,
modifying existing credentials, or obtaining the Administrator
or device credentials for use by the attacker.
T.PASSWORD_CRACKING Threat agents may be able to take advantage of weak
administrative passwords to gain privileged access to the
device. Having privileged access to the device provides the
attacker unfettered access to the network traffic, and may
allow them to take advantage of any trust relationships with
other network devices.
T.SECURITY_FUNCTIONALITY_FAILURE An external, unauthorized entity could make use of failed or
compromised security functionality and might therefore
subsequently use or abuse security functions without prior
authentication to access, change or modify device data,
critical network traffic or security functionality of the device.
T.WEAK_AUTHENTICATION_ENDPOIN
TS
Threat agents may take advantage of secure protocols that
use weak methods to authenticate the endpoints – e.g.,
shared password that is guessable or transported as plaintext.
The consequences are the same as a poorly designed
protocol, the attacker could masquerade as the administrator
or another device, and the attacker could insert themselves
into the network stream and perform a man-in-the-middle
attack. The result is the critical network traffic is exposed and
there could be a loss of confidentiality and integrity, and
potentially the network device itself could be compromised.
15
Threat Threat Definition
T.UPDATE_COMPROMISE Threat agents may attempt to provide a compromised
update of the software or firmware which undermines the
security functionality of the device. Non-validated updates
or updates validated using non-secure or weak cryptography
leave the update firmware vulnerable to surreptitious
alteration.
T.UNDETECTED_ACTIVITY Threat agents may attempt to access, change, and/or modify
the security functionality of the network device without
Administrator awareness. This could result in the attacker
finding an avenue (e.g., misconfiguration, flaw in the
product) to compromise the device and the Administrator
would have no knowledge that the device has been
compromised.
5.3 Clarification of Scope
All evaluations (and all products) have limitations, as well as potential misconceptions that need clarifying.
This text covers some of the more important limitations and clarifications of this evaluation. Note that:
 As with any evaluation, this evaluation only shows that the evaluated configuration meets the
security claims made, with a certain level of assurance. The level of assurance for this evaluation
is defined within the NDcPP 2.0e
 Consistent with the expectations of the Protection Profile, this evaluation did not specifically
search for, nor seriously attempt to counter, vulnerabilities that were not “obvious” or
vulnerabilities to objectives not claimed in the ST. The CEM defines an “obvious” vulnerability as
one that is easily exploited with a minimum of understanding of the TOE, technical sophistication
and resources.
 The evaluation of security functionality of the product was limited to the functionality specified
in the claimed PPs. Any additional security related functional capabilities included in the product
were not covered by this evaluation.
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6 Documentation
The following documents were provided by the vendor with the TOE for evaluation:
 Cisco Expressway X12.5 System Common Criteria Security Target v1.0, dated August 15th, 2019
 Cisco Expressway X12.5 System CC Configuration Guide v1.0, dated August 15, 2019
Any additional customer documentation delivered with the product or that may be available through
download was not included in the scope of the evaluation and hence should not be relied upon when
configuring or using the products in the evaluated configuration.
Consumers are encouraged to download the configuration documentation from the NIAP website to
ensure the device(s) are configured as evaluated.
17
7 TOE Evaluated Configuration
7.1 Evaluated Configuration
The TOE consists of Cisco Expressway software installed on one or more UCS appliances.
The TOE consists of two components, Expressway-C and Expressway-E that work together to form a highly
secure traversal link to provide a collaboration gateway solution that extends the services and access to
users inside and outside of the organization’s firewall.
The TOE connects to an NTP server on its internal network for time services.
The TOE is administered using the Cisco Expressway Administration program from an administrative
workstation. No browser software exists on the Cisco Expressway server. When connecting to Cisco
Expressway the administrative workstation must be connected to an internal network and HTTPS must be
used to secure the connection to the TOE. An external audit server is also used to store Cisco Expressway
audit records. The external audit server must be attached to the internal (trusted) network and TLS is used
to secure the connection and to secure the transmission of data. The internal (trusted) network is meant
to be separated effectively from unauthorized individuals and user traffic and one that is in a controlled
environment where implementation of security policies can be enforced.
The following figure illustrates a typical TOE deployment,
18
Within the evaluated configuration, the following is environmental components are required,
Table 5: IT Environment
Component Required Usage/Purpose Description for TOE performance
Local Console Yes This includes any IT Environment Console that is directly
connected to the TOE via the Serial Console Port and is used
by the TOE administrator to support TOE administration.
Management
Workstation using web
browser for HTTPS
Yes This includes any IT Environment Management workstation
with a web browser installed that is used by the TOE
administrator to support TOE administration through HTTPS
protected channels. Any web browser that supports TLSv1.1
and/or TLSv1.2 included the supported ciphersuites may be
used.
NTP Server Yes The TOE supports communications with an NTP Server to
synchronize the date and time for a reliable timestamp on the
TOE.
Syslog Server Yes This includes any syslog server to which the TOE would
transmit syslog messages using TLSv1.1 and/or TLSv1.2 to
secure the connection. The audit records are automatically
sent to the remote syslog once the configuration and settings
are complete.
Cisco Unified
Communications
Manager (CUCM))
Yes CUCM serves as the component of the Cisco Unified
Communications family of products which provides network-
based presence to endpoints.
DNS Server Yes The TOE supports communications with the DNS Server that is
required for communications with other components.
Certification Authority
(CA)
Yes This includes any IT Environment Certification Authority (CA)
on the TOE network. The CA can be used to provide the TOE
with a valid certificate during certificate enrollment as well as
validating a certificate.
Firewalls Yes This includes any commercially available firewall capable of
separating a company’s internal network from the public
network. They should be installed on both the public and
private side of the Cisco Expressway E device.
7.2 Physical Scope of the TOE
The TOE is a hardware and software solution that makes up the Cisco Expressway. The TOE hardware
platform is at least one of the following Cisco UCS platforms, UCS C220 M4, UCS C240 M4, UCS C220 M5
or the UCS C240 M5. The TOE software is the Cisco Expressway X12.5 software. The network, on which
the TOE resides is considered part of the environment. The TOE guidance documentation, the Cisco
Expressway Common Criteria Configuration Guide that is also considered to be part of the TOE can be
19
found listed and are downloadable from the http://cisco.com web site. The TOE hardware is comprised
of the following physical specifications as described in Table 6 below:
Table 6: Hardware Models and Specifications
20
Hardware/P
rocessor/
Software
Picture Size Power Interfaces
UCS C220
M4
While
tested on
the specific
processor
model
listed, any
Intel®
Xeon®
E526xx v4,
processor
may be
used as part
of the
evaluated
configuratio
n with
VMware
ESXi 6.0
Expressway
X12.5
software
1RU: 1.7 x
16.9 x
29.8 in.
(4.32 x 43
x 75.6 cm)
Up to two
770 W (AC)
hot
swappable
power
supplies or
two 1050 W
(DC) power
supplies.
One is
mandatory;
one more
can be
added for 1
+ 1
redundancy.
Up to 4 LFF or 8 SFF front-
accessible, hot-swappable,
internal SAS, SATA, or SSD drives,
providing redundancy options
and ease of serviceability
Various PCIe card ports
(dependent on which cards are
installed), • Virtual Interface
Card (VIC) ports, Converged
Network Adapter (CNA) ports,
Network Interface Card (NIC)
ports, Host Bus Adapter (HBA)
ports
I/O performance and flexibility
with one x8 half-height and half-
length slot, and one x16 full-
height and half‑length slot
Up to two internal 326GB or two
64GB Cisco FlexFlash drives (SD
cards)
One internal USB flash drive
Front panel - One KVM console
connector (supplies two USB 2.0
connectors, one GA DB15
connector, and one serial port
(RS232) RJ45 connector)
Rear panel - One DB15 VGA
connector, One RJ45 serial port
connector, Two USB 3.0 port
connectors, One RJ-45
10/100/1000 Ethernet
management port, using Cisco
Integrated Management
Controller (CIMC) firmware, two
Intel i350 embedded (on the
motherboard) GbE LOM ports,
One flexible modular LAN on
motherboard (mLOM) slot that
can accommodate various
interface cards
21
Hardware/P
rocessor/
Software
Picture Size Power Interfaces
UCS C240
M4
While
tested on
the specific
processor
model
listed1
, any
Intel®
Xeon®
E526xx v4,
processor
may be
used as part
of the
evaluated
configuratio
n with
VMWare
ESXi 6.0
Expressway
X12.5
software
2RU: 3.43
x 17.65 x
29.0 in.
(8.7 x 44.8
x 73.8 cm)
The server is
available
with four
types of
power
supplies:
 650 W
(AC)
 930 W
(DC)
 1200 W
(AC)
 1400 W
(AC))
 Up to 12 LFF or 24 SFF front-
accessible, hot-swappable, SAS,
SATA, or SSD drives for local
storage, providing redundancy
options and ease of serviceability
Rear panel
 One DB15 VGA connector
 One RJ45 serial port connector
 Two USB 3.0 port connectors
 One RJ-45 10/100/1000
Ethernet management port,
using Cisco Integrated
 Management Controller (CIMC)
firmware
 Two Intel i350 embedded (on
the motherboard) GbE LOM
ports
 One flexible modular LAN on
motherboard (mLOM) slot that
can accommodate various
interface cards, Various PCIe
card ports (dependent on which
cards are installed)
 Virtual Interface Card (VIC)
ports
 Converged Network Adapter
(CNA) ports
 Network Interface Card (NIC)
ports
 Host Bus Adapter (HBA) ports
Front panel
 One KVM console connector
(supplies two USB 2.0
connectors, one VGA, DB15
video connector, and one serial
port (RS232) RJ45 connector)
support the InfiniBand
architecture.
A front panel controller provides
status indications and control
buttons
22
Hardware/P
rocessor/
Software
Picture Size Power Interfaces
UCS C220
M5
While
tested on
the specific
processor
model listed
any Intel®
Xeon®
Scalable
processor
with the
Skylake-SP
microarchit
ecture may
be used as
part of the
evaluated
configuratio
n with
VMware
ESXi 6.0
Expressway
X12.5
software
Height
1.7 in.
(4.32 cm)
Width
16.89 in.
(43.0 cm)
including
handles:
18.98 in.
(48.2 cm)
Depth
29.8 in.
(75.6 cm)
including
handles:
30.98 in.
(78.7 cm
Up to two of
the
following
hot-
swappable
power
supplies:
 770 W
(AC)
 1050 W
(AC)
 1050 W
V2 (DC)
Rear panel
• One 1-Gbps RJ-45 management
port (Marvell 88E6176)
• Two 10GBase-T LOM ports (Intel
X550 controller embedded on the
motherboard)
• One RS-232 serial port (RJ45
connector)
• One DB15 VGA connector
• Two USB 3.0 port connectors
• One flexible modular LAN on
motherboard (mLOM) slot that
can
accommodate various interface
cards
Front panel
• One KVM console connector
(supplies two USB 2.0 connectors,
one
VGA DB15 video connector, and
one serial port (RS232) RJ45
connector)
Modular LAN on Motherboard
(mLOM) slot
The dedicated mLOM slot on the
motherboard can flexibly
accommodate the following cards:
- Cisco Virtual Interface Cards
- Quad Port Intel i350 1GbE RJ45
Network Interface Card (NIC)
23
Hardware/P
rocessor/
Software
Picture Size Power Interfaces
UCS C240
M5
While
tested on
the specific
processor
model
listed, any
Intel®
Xeon®
Scalable
processor
with the
Skylake-SP
microarchit
ecture may
be used as
part of the
evaluated
configuratio
n with
VMware
ESXi 6.0
Expressway
X12.5
software
Height
3.43 in.
(8.70 cm)
Width
(including
slam
latches)
17.65
in.(44.8
cm)
Including
handles:
18.96 in
(48.2 cm)
Depth
29.0 in.
(73.8 cm)
Including
handles:
30.18 in
(76.6 cm)
Up to two of
the
following
hot-
swappable
power
supplies:
 1050 W
(AC)
power
supply
 1050 W
V2 (DC)
power
supply
 1600 W
(AC)
power
supply
Rear panel
• One 1-Gbps RJ-45 management
port (Marvell 88E6176)
• Two 10GBase-T LOM ports (Intel
X550 controller embedded on the
motherboard)
• One RS-232 serial port (RJ45
connector)
• One DB15 VGA connector
• Two USB 3.0 port connectors
• One flexible modular LAN on
motherboard (mLOM) slot that
can accommodate
various interface cards
Front panel
• One KVM console connector
(supplies two USB 2.0 connectors,
one VGA DB15
video connector, and one serial
port (RS232)
Modular LAN on Motherboard
(mLOM) slot
The dedicated mLOM slot on the
motherboard can flexibly
accommodate the following cards:
Cisco Virtual Interface Cards
Quad Port Intel i350 1GbE RJ45
mLOM Network Interface Card
(NIC)
7.3 Excluded Functionality
The following functionality is excluded from the evaluation.
Table 6 Excluded Functionality
Excluded Functionality Exclusion Rationale
Non-FIPS mode of
operation
This mode of operation includes non-FIPS allowed
operations.
24
These services can be disabled by configuration settings as described in the Guidance documents (AGD).
The exclusion of this functionality does not affect the compliance to the NDcPPv2.0e.
25
8 IT Product Testing
This section describes the testing efforts of the developer and the evaluation team. It is derived from
information contained in Evaluation Test Report for Cisco Expressway X12.5, which is not publicly
available. The publicly available Assurance Activities Report provides an overview of testing and the
prescribed assurance activities.
8.1 Developer Testing
No evidence of developer testing is required in the Assurance Activities for this product.
8.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing
The evaluation team verified the product according the vendor-provided guidance documentation and
ran the tests specified in the NDcPP 2.0e. The Independent Testing activity is documented in the Assurance
Activities Report, which is publicly available, and is not duplicated here.
26
9 Results of the Evaluation
The results of the assurance requirements are generally described in this section and are presented in
detail in the proprietary documents: The Detailed Test Report (DTR) and The Evaluation Technical Report
(ETR). The reader of this document can assume that activities and work units received a passing verdict.
A verdict for an assurance component is determined by the resulting verdicts assigned to the
corresponding evaluator action elements. The evaluation was conducted based upon CC version 3.1 rev 4
and CEM version 3.1 rev 4. The evaluation determined the Cisco Expressway X12.5 to be Part 2 extended,
and meets the SARs contained in the PP. Additionally the evaluator performed the Assurance Activities
specified in the NDcPP 2.0e.
9.1 Evaluation of Security Target
The evaluation team applied each ASE CEM work unit. The ST evaluation ensured the ST contains a
description of the environment in terms of policies and assumptions, a statement of security requirements
claimed to be met by the Cisco Expressway X12.5 that are consistent with the Common Criteria, and
product security function descriptions that support the requirements. Additionally, the evaluator
performed an assessment of the Assurance Activities specified in the NDcPP 2.0e.
The validators reviewed the work of the evaluation team and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted in
accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation team
was justified.
9.2 Evaluation of Development Documentation
The evaluation team applied each NDcPPv2.0e ADV CEM work unit. The evaluation team assessed the
design documentation and found it adequate to aid in understanding how the TSF provides the security
functions. The design documentation consists of a functional specification contained in the Security
Target's TOE Summary Specification. Additionally, the evaluator performed the Assurance Activities
specified in the NDcPP 2.0e related to the examination of the information contained in the TOE Summary
Specification.
The validators reviewed the work of the evaluation team and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted in
accordance with the Assurance Activities, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation team was
justified.
9.3 Evaluation of Guidance Documents
The evaluation team applied each NDcPPv2.0e AGD CEM work unit. The evaluation team ensured the
adequacy of the user guidance in describing how to use the operational TOE. Additionally, the evaluation
team ensured the adequacy of the administrator guidance in describing how to securely administer the
TOE. The guides were assessed during the design and testing phases of the evaluation to ensure they were
complete. Additionally, the evaluator performed the Assurance Activities specified in the NDcPP 2.0e
related to the examination of the information contained in the operational guidance documents.
27
The validators reviewed the work of the evaluation team and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the Assurance Activities, and that the conclusion reached by
the evaluation team was justified.
9.4 Evaluation of Life Cycle Support Activities
The evaluation team applied each NDcPPv2.0e ALC CEM work unit. The evaluation team found
that the TOE was identified.
The validators reviewed the work of the evaluation team and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted in
accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation team
was justified.
9.5 Evaluation of Test Documentation and the Test Activity
The evaluation team applied each NDcPPv2.0e ATE CEM work unit. The evaluation team ran the set of
tests specified by the Assurance Activities in the NDcPP 2.0e recorded the results in a Test Report,
summarized in both the Evaluation Technical Report and Assurance Activities Report.
The validators reviewed the work of the evaluation team and found that sufficient evidence was provided
by the evaluation team to show that the evaluation activities addressed the test activities in the NDcPP
2.0e and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation team was justified.
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity
The evaluator examined sources of information publicly available to identify potential vulnerabilities in
the TOE. The sources of the publicly available information are provided below.
The evaluator searched the Internet for potential vulnerabilities in the TOE using the web sites listed
below. The sources of the publicly available information are provided below.
 http://nvd.nist.gov/
The evaluator performed the public domain vulnerability searches using the following key words.
Cisco Systems
Expressway X12.5 System
PKIX-SSH 10.1.1
CiscoSSL 1.0.2n.6.1.368-fips
UCS C220 M4
UCS C240 M4
UCS C220 M5
UCS C240 M5
Cisco UCS platforms
28
VMware ESXi 6.0
Intel Xeon E526xx v4
Intel Xeon Scalable Processors
The evaluator selected the search key words based upon the following criteria.
 The vendor name was searched,
 The product name was searched,
 Key platform features the product leverages were searched
The vulnerability searches were performed on 6th June 2019, 26th June 2019 and 12th July 2019 and
August 8, 2019.
The TOE was evaluated against the NDcPP version 2.0e. The objective of this analysis and testing is to
determine whether the TOE, in its operational environment, has vulnerabilities exploitable by attackers
possessing Basic attack potential.
TOE Vulnerability Analysis
Vulnerabilities: National Vulnerability Database
Search Term: Cisco Systems Total Matches: 50 Potential Matches for TOE: 0
Search Term: Expressway X12.5 System Total Matches: 3 Potential Matches for TOE: 3
Search Term: SSH-2.0-X FIPS Total Matches: 0 Potential Matches for TOE: 0
Search Term: CiscoSSL 1.0.2n.6.1.368-fips Total Matches: 0 Potential Matches for TOE: 0
Search Term: UCS C220 M4 Total Matches: 1 Potential Matches for TOE: 0
Search Term: UCS C240 M4 Total Matches: 1 Potential Matches for TOE: 0
Search Term: UCS C220 M5 Total Matches: 0 Potential Matches for TOE: 0
Search Term: UCS C240 M5 Total Matches: 0 Potential Matches for TOE: 0
Search Term: Cisco UCS Platforms Total Matches: 6 Potential Matches for TOE: 1
Search Term: VMWare ESXi 6.0 Total Matches: 23 Potential Matches for TOE: 2
Search Term: Intel Xeon E526xx v4 Total Matches: 0 Potential Matches for TOE: 0
Search Term: Intel Xeon Scalable Processors Total Matches: 1 Potential Matches for TOE: 0
29
9.7 Summary of Evaluation Results
The evaluation team's assessment of the evaluation evidence demonstrates that the claims in
the ST are met. Additionally, the evaluation team's test activities also demonstrated the
accuracy of the claims in the ST.
The validation team's assessment of the evidence provided by the evaluation team is that it
demonstrates that the evaluation team performed the Assurance Activities in the NDcPP 2.0e, and
correctly verified that the product meets the claims in the ST.
30
10 Validator Comments & Recommendations
The validation team notes that the evaluated configuration is dependent upon the TOE being configured
per the evaluated configuration instructions in Cisco Expressway X12.5 CC Configuration Guide, v1.0 dated
15 August 2019. document. No versions of the TOE and software, either earlier or later were evaluated.
Please note that the functionality evaluated is scoped exclusively to the security functional requirements
specified in the Security Target. Other functionality included in the product was not assessed as part of
this evaluation. Other functionality provided by devices in the operational environment, such as the syslog
server, need to be assessed separately and no further conclusions can be drawn about their effectiveness.
31
11 Annexes
Not applicable.
32
12 Security Target
Cisco Expressway X12.5 Security Target v1.0, dated 15 August 2019
33
13 Glossary
The following definitions are used throughout this document:
 Common Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL). An IT security evaluation facility accredited by the
National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP) and approved by the CCEVS
Validation Body to conduct Common Criteria-based evaluations.
 Conformance. The ability to demonstrate in an unambiguous way that a given implementation
is correct with respect to the formal model.
 Evaluation. The assessment of an IT product against the Common Criteria using the Common
Criteria Evaluation Methodology to determine whether or not the claims made are justified; or
the assessment of a protection profile against the Common Criteria using the Common
Evaluation Methodology to determine if the Profile is complete, consistent, technically sound
and hence suitable for use as a statement of requirements for one or more TOEs that may be
evaluated.
 Evaluation Evidence. Any tangible resource (information) required from the sponsor or
developer by the evaluator to perform one or more evaluation activities.
 Feature. Part of a product that is either included with the product or can be ordered separately.
 Target of Evaluation (TOE). A group of IT products configured as an IT system, or an IT product,
and associated documentation that is the subject of a security evaluation under the CC.
 Validation. The process carried out by the CCEVS Validation Body leading to the issue of a
Common Criteria certificate.
 Validation Body. A governmental organization responsible for carrying out validation and for
overseeing the day-to-day operation of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation
Scheme.
34
14 Bibliography
The Validation Team used the following documents to produce this Validation Report:
1. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation - Part 1: Introduction and
general model, Version 3.1 Revision 4.
2. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation - Part 2: Security functional
requirements, Version 3.1 Revision 4.
3. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation - Part 3: Security assurance
requirements, Version 3.1 Revision 4.
4. Common Evaluation Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1
Revision 4
5. Cisco Expressway X12.5 Security Target v1.0, dated 15 August 2019
6. Cisco Expressway X12.5 CC Configuration Guide, v1.0 dated 15 August, 2019
7. Assurance Activity Report v0.9 for Cisco Expressway X12.5, dated 15 August,2019
8. Cisco Expressway X12.5 Evaluation Technical Report v2.1dated 15 August , 2019
9. Vulnerability Assessment for Cisco Expressway X12.5, Version 1.3, dated 13 August, 2019
10. Test Report for Cisco Expressway X12.5, Version 1.4, dated 15 August, 2019