BSI-DSZ-CC-1136-2021
for
NXP Smart Card Controller N7121 with IC
Dedicated Software and Crypto Library (R1/R2)
from
NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0 CC-Zert-327 V5.4
BSI-DSZ-CC-1136-2021 (*)
Smartcard Controller
NXP Smart Card Controller N7121 with IC Dedicated Software and
Crypto Library (R1/R2)
from NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH
PP Conformance: Security IC Platform Protection Profile with
Augmentation Packages Version 1.0, 13 January
2014, BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014
Functionality: PP conformant plus product specific extensions
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 extended
EAL 6 augmented by ASE_TSS.2, ALC_FLR.1
The IT Product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation
facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1
extended by Scheme Interpretations by advice of the Certification Body for components
beyond EAL 5 and CC Supporting Documents as listed in the Certification Report for
conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1. CC and
CEM are also published as ISO/IEC 15408 and ISO/IEC 18045.
(*) This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its
evaluated configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report and
Notification. For details on the validity see Certification Report part A chapter 5.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification
scheme of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions
of the evaluation facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the
evidence adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT Product by the Federal Office for
Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT Product by the Federal Office for Information
Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is
either expressed or implied.
Bonn, 10 February 2021
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Sandro Amendola L.S.
Head of Division
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
SOGIS
Recognition Agreement
Common Criteria
Recognition Arrangement
recognition for components
up to EAL 2 and ALC_FLR
only
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1136-2021
This page is intentionally left blank.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1136-2021 Certification Report
Contents
A. Certification......................................................................................................................6
1. Preliminary Remarks....................................................................................................6
2. Specifications of the Certification Procedure...............................................................6
3. Recognition Agreements..............................................................................................7
4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification................................................................8
5. Validity of the Certification Result.................................................................................8
6. Publication....................................................................................................................9
B. Certification Results.......................................................................................................10
1. Executive Summary....................................................................................................11
2. Identification of the TOE.............................................................................................12
3. Security Policy............................................................................................................16
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope.....................................................................16
5. Architectural Information.............................................................................................17
6. Documentation...........................................................................................................17
7. IT Product Testing.......................................................................................................18
8. Evaluated Configuration.............................................................................................20
9. Results of the Evaluation............................................................................................20
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE.....................................................25
11. Security Target..........................................................................................................26
12. Regulation specific aspects (eIDAS, QES)..............................................................26
13. Definitions.................................................................................................................26
14. Bibliography..............................................................................................................28
C. Excerpts from the Criteria..............................................................................................31
D. Annexes.........................................................................................................................32
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1136-2021
A. Certification
1. Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of
issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor,
hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according
to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by
BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report
contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed
Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of
the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and
instructions for the user.
2. Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the
following:
● Act on the Federal Office for Information Security1
● BSI Certification and Approval Ordinance2
● BMI Regulations on Ex-parte Costs3
● Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the
Interior)
● DIN EN ISO/IEC 17065 standard
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-
Produkte) [3]
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility, its
approval and licencing process (CC-Stellen) [3]
1
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
2
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of Security Certificates and approval by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungs- und -Anerkennungsverordnung - BSIZertV) of 17 December
2014, Bundesgesetzblatt 2014, part I, no. 61, p. 2231
3
BMI Regulations on Ex-parte Costs - Besondere Gebührenverordnung des BMI für individuell
zurechenbare öffentliche Leistungen in dessen Zuständigkeitsbereich (BMIBGebV), Abschnitt 7 (BSI-
Gesetz) - dated 2 September 2019, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1365
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1136-2021 Certification Report
● Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.14
[1] also published as
ISO/IEC 15408.
● Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 [2] also published
as ISO/IEC 18045
● BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]
3. Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or
CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
3.1. European Recognition of CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in
April 2010. It defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition
level and, in addition, at higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain SOGIS
Technical Domains only.
The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels
EAL 1 to EAL 4. For "Smartcards and similar devices" a SOGIS Technical Domain is in
place. For "HW Devices with Security Boxes" a SOGIS Technical Domains is in place, too.
In addition, certificates issued for Protection Profiles based on Common Criteria are part of
the recognition agreement.
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes, details on
recognition, and the history of the agreement can be seen on the website at
https://www.sogis.eu.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the
terms of this agreement by the related bodies of the signatory nations. A disclaimer
beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of recognition.
This certificate is recognized under SOGIS-MRA for all assurance components selected.
3.2. International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)
The international arrangement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on the CC
(Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement, CCRA-2014) has been ratified on 08
September 2014. It covers CC certificates based on collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP)
(exact use), CC certificates based on assurance components up to and including EAL 2 or
the assurance family Flaw Remediation (ALC_FLR) and CC certificates for Protection
Profiles and for collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP).
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes can be seen on
the website: https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates
that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the related bodies
4
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 12 February 2007 in the Bundesanzeiger dated
23 February 2007, p. 3730
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1136-2021
of the signatory nations. A disclaimer beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of
recognition.
This certificate is recognized according to the rules of CCRA-2014, i. e. up to and including
CC part 3 EAL 2+ ALC_FLR components.
4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a
uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product NXP Smart Card Controller N7121 with IC Dedicated Software and Crypto
Library (R1/R2) has undergone the certification procedure at BSI.
The evaluation of the product NXP Smart Card Controller N7121 with IC Dedicated
Software and Crypto Library (R1/R2) was conducted by TÜV Informationstechnik. The
evaluation was completed on 8 February 2021. TÜV Informationstechnik is an evaluation
facility (ITSEF)5
recognised by the certification body of BSI.
For this certification procedure the sponsor and applicant is: NXP Semiconductors
Germany GmbH.
The product was developed by: NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH.
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this
Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
5. Validity of the Certification Result
This Certification Report applies only to the version of the product as indicated. The
confirmed assurance package is valid on the condition that
● all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the
following report, are observed,
● the product is operated in the environment described, as specified in the following report
and in the Security Target.
For the meaning of the assurance components and assurance levels please refer to CC
itself. Detailed references are listed in part C of this report.
The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target
at the date of certification. As attack methods evolve over time, the resistance of the
certified version of the product against new attack methods needs to be re-assessed.
Therefore, the sponsor should apply for the certified product being monitored within the
assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme (e.g. by a re-assessment or
re-certification). Specifically, if results of the certification are used in subsequent evaluation
and certification procedures, in a system integration process or if a user's risk
management needs regularly updated results, it is recommended to perform a re-
assessment on a regular e.g. annual basis.
In order to avoid an indefinite usage of the certificate when evolved attack methods would
require a re-assessment of the products resistance to state of the art attack methods, the
maximum validity of the certificate has been limited. The certificate issued on 10 February
2021 is valid until 9 February 2026. Validity can be renewed by re-certification.
5
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1136-2021 Certification Report
The owner of the certificate is obliged:
1. when advertising the certificate or the fact of the product's certification, to refer to
the Certification Report as well as to provide the Certification Report, the Security
Target and user guidance documentation mentioned herein to any customer of the
product for the application and usage of the certified product,
2. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately about vulnerabilities of the
product that have been identified by the developer or any third party after issuance
of the certificate,
3. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately in the case that security relevant
changes in the evaluated life cycle, e.g. related to development and production sites
or processes, occur, or the confidentiality of documentation and information related
to the Target of Evaluation (TOE) or resulting from the evaluation and certification
procedure where the certification of the product has assumed this confidentiality
being maintained, is not given any longer. In particular, prior to the dissemination of
confidential documentation and information related to the TOE or resulting from the
evaluation and certification procedure that do not belong to the deliverables
according to the Certification Report part B, or for those where no dissemination
rules have been agreed on, to third parties, the Certification Body at BSI has to be
informed.
In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to
the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e.
re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural
requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.
6. Publication
The product NXP Smart Card Controller N7121 with IC Dedicated Software and Crypto
Library (R1/R2) has been included in the BSI list of certified products, which is published
regularly (see also Internet: https://www.bsi.bund.de and [5]). Further information can be
obtained from BSI-Infoline +49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer6
of the
product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet
address stated above.
6
NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH
Troplowitzstrasse 20
22529 Hamburg
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1136-2021
B. Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
● the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
● the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
● complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1136-2021 Certification Report
1. Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the hard macro “NXP Secure Smart Card Controller
N7121 with IC Dedicated Software and Crypto Library (R1/R2)”, or in short “N7121”, which
is manufactured by TSMC 40nm (C40) technology and comprises of hardware, software
(security IC Dedicated Software), and documentation. The N7121 is self-sufficient at the
boundary of the hard macro and can be instantiated within packaged products. The TOE
does not include a customer-specific Security IC Embedded Software, however, it provides
secure mechanisms for customers to download and execute their code on the TOE.
The IC Dedicated Software comprises IC Dedicated Test Software for test purposes and
IC Dedicated Support Software. The IC Dedicated Support Software consists of the Boot
Software, which controls the boot process of the hardware platform. Furthermore, it
provides a Firmware Interface and optionally a Library Interface, simplifying access to the
hardware for the Security IC Embedded Software. The IC Dedicated Support Software
also comprises optional software components:
• two logical cards (A and B),
• a System Mode OS which offers ready-to-use resource and access management
for customer applications that do not want to be exposed to the more low-level
features of the TOE, the System Mode OS also provides a Secure User Mode Box,
which further restricts the access of code executed in User Mode (UM),
• a Flash Loader OS which supports download of code and data to Flash by the
Composite Product Manufacturer before Operational Usage (e.g. during
development), and
• a crypto library which provides simplified access to frequently used cryptographic
algorithms AES, TDES, RNG, RSA, ECC, hashing and Utilities.
The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is based on the certified
Protection Profile Security IC Platform Protection Profile with Augmentation Packages
Version 1.0, 13 January 2014, BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014 [8].
The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details).
The TOE meets the assurance requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 6
augmented by ASE_TSS.2, ALC_FLR.1.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the
Security Target [6] and [9], chapter 6. They are selected from Common Criteria Part 2 and
some of them are newly defined. Thus the TOE is CC Part 2 extended.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functionality:
TOE Security Functionality Addressed issue
TSF.Service Service functionalities apart from cryptographic operation
TSF.Protection General security measures to protect the TSF
TSF.Control Operating conditions, memory and hardware access control
TSF.Crypto Cryptographic Services (AES, TDES, RNG, RSA, ECC, Hashing, Utilities)
Table 1: TOE Security Functionalities
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1136-2021
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6] and [9], chapter 6.1.
The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6] and [9],
chapter 3.1 . Based on these assets the TOE Security Problem is defined in terms of
Assumptions, Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security
Target [6] and [9], chapter 3.2 to 3.4.
This certification covers the configurations of the TOE as outlined in chapter 8.
The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating
for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and
decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate
and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification
Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2. Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
NXP Smart Card Controller N7121 with IC Dedicated Software and Crypto Library
(R1/R2)
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
TOE components for all configurations
1 IC Hardware N7121 B1 Hard macro instantiated within a
wafer, modules or package.
2 IC Dedicated
Test Software
Test Software 9.2.3.0 On-chip software.
3 IC Dedicated
Software
Boot Software 9.2.3.0 On-chip software.
Firmware 9.2.3.0 On-chip software
4 Document NXP Secure Smart Card
Controller N7121, Overview,
Product data sheet [13]
3.3 / 2020-04-15 Electronic document (PDF via
NXP DocStore).
5 Document SmartMX3 family N7121,
Wafer and delivery,
specification [11]
3.2 / 2020-06-04 Electronic document (PDF via
NXP DocStore).
6 Document SmartMX3 family P71D321,
Dedicated type creation [14]
3.1 / 2019-03-21 Electronic document (PDF via
NXP DocStore).
7 Document NXP Secure Smart Card
Controller N7121, Instruction
Set Manual, Product data
sheet addendum [15]
3.0 / 2018-11-23 Electronic document (PDF via
NXP DocStore).
8 Document NXP Secure Smart Card
Controller N7121, Chip
Health Mode, Product data
sheet addendum [16]
3.1 / 2020-06-30 Electronic document (PDF via
NXP DocStore).
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1136-2021 Certification Report
No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
9 Document NXP Secure Smart Card
Controller N7121, Peripheral
Configuration and Use,
Product data sheet
addendum [17]
3.2 / 2020-02-18 Electronic document (PDF via
NXP DocStore).
10 Document NXP Secure Smart Card
Controller N7121, MMU
Configuration and NXP
Firmware Interface
Specification, Product data
sheet addendum [18]
3.6 / 2020-10-19 Electronic document (PDF via
NXP DocStore).
11 Document NXP Secure Smart Card
Controller N7121,
Information on Guidance
and Operation, Guidance
and operation manual [12]
3.2 / 2019-05-28 Electronic document (PDF via
NXP DocStore).
12 Document NXP N7121 B1 Hardmacro,
Lifecycle Documentation
[19]
1.30 / 2020-06-
18
Electronic document (PDF via
NXP DocStore).
Deliverables of the Flash Loader OS
13 IC Dedicated
Support
Software
Flashloader OS 1.2.5 On-chip software
14 Document NXP Secure Smart Card
Controller N7121,
Flashloader OS, Product
data sheet addendum [20]
3.0 / 2018-11-01 Electronic document (PDF via
NXP DocStore).
Deliverables of the Library Interface
15 IC Dedicated
Support
Software
Library Interface 9.2.3.0 On-chip software
16 Library Communication Library 6.0.0 Electronic files (object files via
NXP DocStore).
17 Library CRC Library 1.1.8 Electronic files (object files via
NXP DocStore).
18 Library Memory Library 1.2.3 Electronic files (object files via
NXP DocStore).
19 Library Flash Loader Library 3.6.0 Electronic files (object files via
NXP DocStore).
20 Documentation7
NXP Secure Smart Card
Controller N7121, Shared
OS Libraries, Product data
sheet addendum [21]
3.2 / 2019-10-30 Electronic files (PDF via NXP
DocStore).
Deliverables of the System Mode OS (for UM customers)
7
This guidance is available for NXP designers responsible for designing IO sidecar of a derived product only.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1136-2021
No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
21 IC Dedicated
Support
Software
System Mode OS 13.2.3.0 On-chip software.
22 Document NXP Secure Smart Card
Controller N7121, NXP
System Mode OS, Product
data sheet addendum [22]
3.5 / 2020-10-19 Electronic document (PDF via
NXP DocStore).
Deliverables for Card-A Developer (NXP)8
23 Document NXP Secure Smart Card
Controller N7121,
Specification and Design
Documentation [23]
1.0 / 2018-03-30 Electronic document (PDF via
internal NXP network).
Deliverables of the Crypto Library
24 IC Dedicated
Support
Software
Crypto Library 0.7.6 On-chip software.
Package Random Number Generation
25 Library RNG Lib 0.7.6 Electronic files (object files via
NXP DocStore).
26 Library RNG HealthTest Lib 0.7.6 Electronic files (object files via
NXP DocStore).
27 Document N7121 Crypto Library, RNG
Library, Preliminary user
manual [24]
1.2 / 2018-11-09 Electronic files (PDF via NXP
DocStore).
Package Symmetric Ciphers
28 Library Sym. Cipher Lib 0.7.6 Electronic files (object files via
NXP DocStore).
29 Document N7121 Crypto Library,
Symmetric Cipher Library
(SymCfg), Preliminary user
manual [25]
1.4 / 2018-09-19 Electronic files (PDF via NXP
DocStore).
Package KeyStore
30 Library KeyStoreMgr 0.7.6 Electronic files (object files via
NXP DocStore).
31 Document N7121 Crypto Library,
KeyStoreMgr Library,
Preliminary user manual [26]
1.1 / 2018-09-19 Electronic files (PDF via NXP
DocStore).
TOE components required for the packages Random Number Generation and Symmetric Ciphers
32 Library Sym. Utilities Lib 0.7.6 Electronic files (object files via
NXP DocStore).
33 Document N7121 Crypto Library, Utils
Library, Preliminary user
manual [27]
1.1 / 2018-02-02 Electronic files (PDF via NXP
DocStore).
Package RSA Encryption / Decryption
8
NXP develops and owns all code for Card-A. These deliverables are available for NXP only.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1136-2021 Certification Report
No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
34 Library RSA Lib 0.7.6 Electronic files (object files via
NXP DocStore).
35 Document N7121 Crypto Library, RSA
Library, Preliminary user
manual [28]
1.4 / 2019-03-28 Electronic files (PDF via NXP
DocStore).
Package RSA Key Generation
36 Library RSA Key Generation Lib 0.7.6 Electronic files (object files via
NXP DocStore).
37 Document N7121 Crypto Library, RSA
Key Generation Library,
Preliminary user manual [29]
1.3 / 2018-10-11 Electronic files (PDF via NXP
DocStore).
Package ECC over GF(p)
38 Library ECC Lib 0.7.6 Electronic files (object files via
NXP DocStore).
39 Document N7121 Crypto Library, ECC
over GF(p) Library,
Preliminary user manual [30]
2.1 / 2019-03-28 Electronic files (PDF via NXP
DocStore).
Package SHA
40 Library SHA Library & Hash Library 0.7.6 Electronic files (object files via
NXP DocStore).
41 Document N7121 Crypto Library, SHA
Library, Preliminary user
manual [31]
1.1 / 2018-03-20 Electronic files (PDF via NXP
DocStore).
42 Document N7121 Crypto Library, HASH
Library, Preliminary user
manual [32]
1.2 / 2018-03-20 Electronic files (PDF via NXP
DocStore).
TOE components required for the packages RSA Encryption / Decryption, RSA Key Generation, ECC over
GF(p), and SHA
43 Library Asym. Utilities Lib 0.7.6 Electronic files (object files via
NXP DocStore).
44 Document N7121 Crypto Library,
UtilsAsym Library,
Preliminary user manual [33]
1.3 / 2018-04-13 Electronic files (PDF via NXP
DocStore).
Package KoreanSeed
45 Library KoreanSeed Lib 0.7.6 Electronic files (object files via
NXP DocStore).
46 Document N7121 Crypto Library,
Korean Seed Library, User
Manual [34]
1.1 / 2018-03-20 Electronic files (PDF via NXP
DocStore).
TOE components required for all packages
47 Document N7121 Crypto Library,
Information on Guidance
and Operation, Product user
manual [35]
3.2 / 2021-01-19 Electronic files (PDF via NXP
DocStore).
Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1136-2021
The delivery follows with several shipping security requirements. The requirements for the
delivery of the TOE are described in chapter 3 of [11]. The product can be delivered on a
wafer or as a module.
The TOE documentation and related software (items are marked in Table 2) are delivered
in electronic form by the document control centre by NXP Semiconductors with special
protective measures.
The hardware version can be identified by a coded nameplate as described in [12] chapter
2.1.1.
For logical identification the TOE provides a FabKey. It contains all configuration data of
the chip and can be read out by a firmware function call. The identification of the FabKey is
described in [19] chapter 4.1.3.2.
The ST references the version of the Crypto Library. This version number is also noted in
[35] chapter 2. thus the TOE components listed in the guidance are traceable to the
reference given in the Security Target [6] and [9]. Furthermore, [35], chapter 2 describes
the integrity and confidentiality check of files associated with the crypto library. It lists SHA
values for each library file for identification purposes. In addition to identifying the delivered
components, the library identifies itself via its “GetVersion” command.
3. Security Policy
The Security Policy is expressed by the set of Security Functional Requirements and
implemented by the TOE. It covers the following issues: The Security Policy of the TOE is
to provide basic security functionalities to be used by the smart card operating system and
the smart card application thus providing an overall smart card system security. Therefore,
the TOE will implement symmetric and asymmetric cryptographic algorithms to ensure the
confidentiality of plain text data by encryption and to support secure authentication
protocols and it will provide a True Random Number Generator (TRNG) and Deterministic
Random Number Generator (DRNG).
As the TOE is a hardware security platform, the security policy of the TOE is also to
provide protection against leakage of information (e.g. to ensure the confidentiality of
cryptographic keys during cryptographic functions performed by the TOE), against physical
probing, against malfunctions, against physical manipulations and against abuse of
functionality. Hence, the TOE shall
• maintain the integrity and the confidentiality of data stored in the memory of the
TOE, and
• maintain the integrity, the correct operation and the confidentiality of security
functionalities (security mechanisms and associated functions) provided by the
TOE.
Specific details concerning the above mentioned security policies can be found in the
Security Target [6] and [9] chapter 7.
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and
Organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to
specific security objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. The following topics are
of relevance: OE.Resp-Appl, OE.Process-Sec-IC, OE.Lim_Block_Loader,
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1136-2021 Certification Report
OE.Loader_Usage, OE.Check_Init. Details can be found in the Security Target [6] and [9],
chapter 4.2 and 4.3.
5. Architectural Information
The IC hardware is a microcontroller incorporating a central processing unit (CPU),
memories accessible via a Memory Management Unit (MMU), cryptographic
coprocessors, other security components, contact-based and contactless communication
interfaces as well as a general purpose I/O interface which can be used to directly use
peripherals of the TOE such as the cryptographic coprocessors. The central processing
unit supports a 32-/16-bit instruction set optimized for smart card applications. Onchip
memories are ROM, RAM and Flash. The Flash can be used as data or program memory.
It consists of highly reliable memory cells, which are designed to provide data integrity. The
Flash memory is optimized for applications that require reliable non-volatile data storage
for data and program code. Dedicated security functionality protects the contents of all
memories. The logical Flash size can be configured in 1kB steps. The IC integrates
coprocessors for AES, DES (both within the new Crypto2+ coprocessor) and a new 128 bit
Public Key Crypto Coprocessor (Fame3) to support the implementation of asymmetric
cryptographic algorithms.
The IC Dedicated Software comprises IC Dedicated Test Software for test purposes and
IC Dedicated Support Software. The IC Dedicated Support Software consists of the Boot
Software, which controls the boot process of the hardware platform. Furthermore, it
provides a Firmware Interface and optionally a Library Interface, simplifying access to the
hardware for the Security IC Embedded Software. The IC Dedicated Support Software
also comprises optional software components, i.e.,
• two logical cards (A and B),
• a System Mode OS which offers ready-to-use resource and access management
for
• customer applications that do not want to be exposed to the more low-level features
of the TOE,
• the System Mode OS also provides a Secure User Mode Box, which further
restricts the access of code executed in User Mode (UM), a Flash Loader OS which
supports download of code and data to Flash by the Composite Product
Manufacturer before Operational Usage (e.g. during development), and
• a crypto library which provides simplified access to frequently used cryptographic
algorithms AES, TDES, RNG, RSA, ECC, hashing and Utilities.
6. Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the product to
the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of
the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of
this report have to be followed.
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7. IT Product Testing
7.1. Developer's Test according to ATE_FUN
Testing approach:
• All TSF and related security mechanisms, subsystems and modules are tested in
order to assure complete coverage of all SFR.
• Different classes of tests are performed to test the TOE in a sufficient manner:
◦ System Verification:
Test cases that can not be performed at module level are defined and
implemented for system verification. This includes mainly the startup behaviour,
system interoperability, endurance, and system security.
◦ Functional Module Verification: This test category is used to verify the correct
functionality of each of the individual modules that make up the TOE. It includes
the following test groups:
▪ Positive Testing: Tests that are based on the requirement specification and
the expected usage by the customer.
▪ Negative Testing: Tests that extend the scope of the intended usage of the
TOE, assuming a misuse by the user.
▪ Version of the DUT: The tests are run with all possible system configurations.
◦ Security Verification: This test category addresses the security mechanisms
described in the Security Architecture description. Two main categories of
security module verification are defined:
▪ Integrity Protection Module Verification (fault injection) using whitebox and
blackbox testing.
▪ DPA module verification (side-channel analysis).
◦ Characterization: This mostly addresses production tests to measure varying
parameters in post-silicon verification while all parameters are within the
specified limits. The developer performs a Matrix Characterization Run to
measure parameters using varying processes (corner material) and different
temperatures.
◦ Qualification: This test category ensures that a developed IC is production ready
and has the expected quality. This addresses
▪ Electrostatic discharge due to electrostatic stress in the field (contactless
communication),
▪ Fast aging of the device due to high temperatures to guarantee the life time
of the product,
▪ Flash qualification to ensure that features like anti-tearing and wear levelling
work as specified,
▪ Package qualification to ensure that the IC can be placed in the final delivery
form (package) under industrial environments and the final product quality is
achieved, and
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▪ PUF qualification to ensure that the promised PUF properties hold in field
conditions.
◦ Validation: Execution of all customer-visible use cases to ensure that the entire
system works as defined for customer-visible operation. This includes
▪ on-chip test framework developed to use each officially released product
variant and execute each public available API,
▪ a Java Card OS is used to execute reference transactions for banking and
egov, and
▪ MIFARE tests.
7.2. Independent Testing according to ATE_IND
Testing approach:
• The evaluator's objective regarding this aspect was to test the functionality of the
TOE as described in the ST and to verify the developer‘s test results by repeating
developer‘s tests and additionally add independent tests.
• In the course of the evaluation of the TOE the following classes of tests were
carried out:
◦ Module tests,
◦ Simulation tests,
◦ Tests in User Mode of logical card A and B,
◦ Tests in System Mode of card A and B,
◦ Hardware tests, and
◦ Cryptographic library tests.
• With this kind of tests the entire security functionality of the TOE was tested.
7.3. Penetration Testing according to AVA_VAN
Overview:
• The penetration testing was partially performed using the developer’s testing
environment, partially using the test environment of the evaluation body.
• All configurations of the TOE being intended to be covered by the current evaluation
were tested.
• The overall test result is that no deviations were found between the expected and
the actual test results; moreover, no attack scenario with the attack potential high
was actually successful.
Penetration testing approach:
• Systematic search for potential vulnerabilities and known attacks in public domain
sources, use of a list of vulnerabilities, and from a methodical analysis of the
evaluation documents.
• Analysis why these vulnerabilities are unexploitable in the intended environment of
the TOE.
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• If the rationale is suspect in the opinion of the evaluator penetration tests are
devised.
• Even if the rational is convincing in the opinion of the evaluator penetration tests are
devised for some vulnerabilities, especially to support the argument of non-
practicability of exploiting time in case of SPA, DPA and FI attacks.
8. Evaluated Configuration
The TOE can be delivered with various configuration options as described in chapter 1.4.1
of [6] and [9].
Product
option
Choices Description
NVM Size Configurable in 1 kB steps up
to 344 kBytes
The Flash memory size is logically configurable, within the
given step size.
Note: If utilized, the Flashloader occupies 16 kB of storage,
which are freed up after its usage.
Customer
Type
• System Mode Customer
• User Mode Customer
Depending on this choice, the customer has access to the
System Mode of the logical card B (System Mode customer)
or not (User Mode customer). In the first case, customers can
store the Security IC Embedded Software in the System Mode
of the logical card B. Otherwise, the NXP System Mode OS is
placed on each available logical card in System Mode, while
the customer can only access the less privileged User Mode.
Use Flash
Loader
• Yes
• No
Depending on this choice, the TOE provides the functionality
of a Flash Loader such that customers can load their code to
the NVM memory.
If the Flash Loader is available, the Library Interface and the
N7121 Crypto Library become mandatory.
If the Flash Loader is not available, the customer can still
decide whether the Security IC Embedded Software will be
stored in ROM or Flash during the development process. The
Security IC Embedded Software is then programmed to Flash
by NXP and using the Flash Loader which will be removed
afterward.
Table 3: TOE configuration options
9. Results of the Evaluation
9.1. CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [7] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used for those components up to EAL 5
extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 5 and guidance
specific for the technology of the product [4] (AIS 34).
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The following guidance specific for the technology was used:
(i) The Application of CC to Integrated Circuits
(ii) Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards
(iii) Guidance, Smartcard Evaluation
(see [4], AIS 25, AIS 37).
For RNG assessment the scheme interpretations AIS 31 was used (see [4]).
To support composite evaluations according to AIS 36 the document ETR for composite
evaluation [10] was provided and approved. This document provides details of this
platform evaluation that have to be considered in the course of a composite evaluation on
top.
As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
● All components of the EAL 6 package including the class ASE as defined in the CC (see
also part C of this report)
● The components ASE_TSS.2, ALC_FLR.1 augmented for this TOE evaluation.
The evaluation has confirmed:
● PP Conformance: Security IC Platform Protection Profile with Augmentation
Packages Version 1.0, 13 January 2014, BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014
[8]
● for the Functionality: PP conformant plus product specific extensions
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
● for the Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 6 augmented by ASE_TSS.2, ALC_FLR.1
For specific evaluation results regarding the development and production environment see
annex B in part D of this report.
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
9.2. Results of cryptographic assessment
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of this certification
procedure (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2). But cryptographic functionalities with a
security level of lower than 100 bits can no longer be regarded as secure without
considering the application context. Therefore, for these functionalities it shall be checked
whether the related crypto operations are appropriate for the intended system. Some
further hints and guidelines can be derived from the 'Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-02102'
(https://www.bsi.bund.de).
The following table gives an overview of the cryptographic functionalities inside the TOE to
enforce the security policy and outlines its rating from cryptographic point of view. Any
Cryptographic Functionality that is marked in column 'Security Level above 100 Bits' of the
following table with 'no' achieves a security level of lower than 100 Bits (in general context)
only.
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No. Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size in
Bits
Security Level
above 100 Bits
TOE Hardware/Firmware
1 Cryptographic
primitive
AES [FIPS197] 128, 192,
256
Yes
2 Confidentiality AES encryption and
decryption in ECB
mode
[FIPS197] (AES),
[NIST SP800-38A] (ECB)
128, 192
256
No
3 Cryptographic
primitive
Triple-DES [NIST SP800-67] 168 Yes
4 Confidentiality Triple-DES
encryption and
decryption in ECB
mode
[NIST SP800-67] (TDES),
[NIST SP800-38A] (ECB)
168 No
5 Confidentiality AES encryption and
decryption in CBC
mode using PUF key
[FIPS197] (AES),
[NIST SP800-38A] (CBC),
[PUF]
128 Yes
6 Integrity AES MAC generation
and verification in
CBC-MAC mode
[FIPS197] (AES),
Algorithm 1 in [ISO_9797-1]
(CBC-MAC), [PUF]
128 No
7 Key
Derivation
Proprietary PUF key
derivation
[PUF] 128 Yes
8 Random
number
generation
PTG.2 Comformant to [AIS31] N/A Yes
TOE Software(Crypto Library)
9 Cryptographic
primitive
AES [FIPS197] 128, 192,
256
Yes
10 Confidentiality AES encryption and
decryption in CBC
mode or CTR mode
[FIPS197] (AES),
[NIST SP800-38A] (CBC,
CTR)
128, 192,
256
Yes
11 Integrity AES MAC generation
in CBC-MAC mode
[FIPS197] (AES),
Algorithm 1 in [ISO_9797-1]
(CBC-MAC)
128, 192,
256
No
12 Integrity AES MAC generation
in CMAC mode
[FIPS197] (AES),
[NIST SP800-38B] (CMAC)
128, 192,
256
Yes
13 Cryptographic
primitive
Triple-DES [NIST SP800-67] 168 Yes
14 Confidentiality Triple-DES
encryption and
decryption in CBC
mode
[NIST SP800-67] (TDES),
[NIST SP800-38A] (CBC)
168 Yes
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No. Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size in
Bits
Security Level
above 100 Bits
15 Integrity Triple-DES MAC
generation in CBC-
MAC and Retail-MAC
[NIST SP800-67] (TDES),
Algorithm 1 in [ISO_9797-1]
(CBC-MAC), Algorithm 3 in
[ISO_9797-1] (CBC-MAC)
168 No
16 Integrity Triple-DES MAC
generation in CMAC
mode
[NIST SP800-67] (TDES),
[NIST SP800-38B] (CMAC)
168 Yes
17 Cryptographic
primitive
RSAEP, RSADP,
RSASP1, RSAVP1
[PKCS #1] 215-1975 No
18 Cryptographic
primitive
RSAEP, RSADP,
RSASP1, RSAVP1
[PKCS #1] 1976 - 4096 Yes
19 Confidentiality RSA encryption and
decryption with EME-
OAEP encoding
[PKCS #1] 512 - 1975 No
20 Confidentiality RSA encryption and
decryption with EME-
OAEP encoding
[PKCS #1] 1976 - 4096 Yes
21 Cryptographic
primitive
RSA signature
generation and
verification with
EMSA-PSS encoding
[PKCS #1] 512 - 1975 No
22 Cryptographic
primitive
RSA signature
generation and
verification with
EMSA-PSS encoding
[PKCS #1] 1976 - 4096 Yes
23 Key derivation RSA derivation of
public key from
private key
[AGD_CL_RSA, 4.4] 512 - 4096 N/A
24 Key
generation
RSA key generation [ALGO] 512 - 1975 No
25 Key
generation
RSA key generation9
[ALGO], [FIPS 186-4] 1976 - 4096 Yes
26 Cryptographic
primitive
ECDSA signature
generation and
verification
[ISO_14888-3],
[ANS X9.62], [FIPS186-4],
[IEEE_P1363]
224, 256,
320, 384,
512, 521
Yes
27 Key
Exchange
ECDH [ISO_11770-3],
[ANS X9.62], [IEEE_P1363]
224, 256,
320, 384,
512, 521
Yes
28 Key
generation
ECDSA Key
Generation
[ISO_14888-3],
[ANS X9.62], [FIPS186-4]
224, 256,
320, 384,
512, 521
Yes
9
For the modulus n (n = p*q) the prime numbers p and q generated by the key generator are congruent to 3
modulo 4
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No. Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size in
Bits
Security Level
above 100 Bits
29 Cryptographic
primitive
SHA-1 [FIPS180-4] N/A No
30 Cryptographic
primitive
SHA-224, SHA-256,
SHA-384, SHA-512
[FIPS180-4] N/A Yes
31 Random
number
generation
PTG.3 based AES or
TDES in CTR mode
[FIPS197] (AES),
[NIST SP800-67] (TDES),
[NIST SP800-38A] (CTR),
[NIST SP800-90A]
(CTR_DRBG)
Conformant to [AIS20]
N/A Yes
32 Random
number
generation
DRG.4 based AES or
TDES in CTR mode
[FIPS197] (AES), [NIST
SP800-67] (TDES), [NIST
SP800-38A] (CTR), [NIST
SP800-90A] (CTR_DRBG)
Conformant to [AIS20]
N/A Yes
TOE Software (Flash Loader)
33 Authenticity MAC verification with
AES in CMAC mode
[FIPS197] (AES),
[NIST SP800-38B] (CMAC)
128 Yes
34 Authentication MAC generation and
verification with AES
in CMAC mode
[FIPS197] (AES),
[NIST SP800-38B] (CMAC)
128 Yes
35 Key derivation Key derivation using
AES in CMAC mode
as pseudo-random
function
[FIPS197] (AES),
[NIST SP800-38B] (CMAC),
[NIST SP800-108] (KBKDF)
128 Yes
36 Confidentiality Decryption with AES
in CBC mode
[FIPS197] (AES),
[NIST SP800-38A] (CBC)
128 Yes
Table 4: TOE cryptographic functionality
[AGD_CL_RSA] N7121 Krypto Library, Product user manual, Version 1.4, 2019-03-28,
Herausgeber: NXP Germany.
[AIS20] Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS) – AIS 20,
Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für deterministische
Zufallszahlengeneratoren, Version 3, 2013-05-15, Herausgeber:
Zertifizierungsstelle des BSI im Rahmen des Zertifizierungsschemas,
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik.
[AIS31] Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS) – AIS 31,
Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für physikalische
Zufallszahlengeneratoren, Version 3, 2013-05-15, Bundesamt für Sicherheit
in der Informationstechnik.
[ALGO] Bekanntmachung zur elektronischen Signatur nach dem Signaturgesetz
und der Signaturverordnung (Übersicht über geeignete Algorithmen),
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07.12.2016 Veröffentlicht: BAnz AT 2016-12-30 B5, Bundesnetzagentur für
Elektrizität, Gas, Telekommunikation, Post und Eisenbahnen.
[ANS X9.62] Public Key Cryptography for the Financial Service Industry: The Elliptic
Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA), 2005-11-16, American National
Standards Institute
[FIPS180-4] Federal Information Processing Standard Publication 180-4, Secure Hash
Standards (SHS), August 2015, National Institute of Standards and
Technology..
[FIPS186-4] Federal Information Processing Standard Publication 186-4, Digital
Signature Standards (DSS), July 2013, National Institute of Standards and
Technology.
[FIPS197] Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 197, Announcing the
ADVANCED ENCRYPTION STANDARD (AES), 2001-11-26, National
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST).
[IEEE_P1363] IEEE P1363. Standard specifications for public key cryptography. IEEE,
2000.
[ISO_9797-1] ISO 9797-1: Information technology – Security techniques - Message
Authentication Codes (MACs) - Part 1: Mechanisms using a block cipher,
1999-12, ISO/IEC
[ISO_11770-3] ISO 11770-3: Information technology – Security techniques – Key
management – Part 3: Mechanisms using asymmetric techniques, August
2015, ISO/IEC
[ISO_14888-3] ISO 11770-3: Information technology – Security techniques – Digital
signatures with appendix Part 3: Discrete logarithm based mechanisms,
August 2015, ISO/IEC
[NIST SP800-38A] NIST Special Publication 800-38A 2001 Edition Recommendation for
BlockCipher Modes of Operation Method and Techniques, National Institute
of Standards and Technology (NIST), Technology Administration, U.S.
Department of Commerce.
[NIST SP800-38B] NIST Special Publication 800-38B, Recommendation for BlockCipher
Modes of Operation: The CMAC Mode for Authentication, May 2005
National Institute of Standards and Technology.
[NIST SP800-67] NIST Special Publication 800-67 –Revision 2, Recommendation for the
Triple Data Encryption Algorithm (TDEA) Block Cipher – Revised January
2017, National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), Technology
Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce
[NIST SP800-90A] NIST SP 800-90A, A Deterministic Random Bit Generator Validation System
(DRBGVS), 2015-10-29, National Institute of Standards and Technology.
[NIST SP800-108] NIST SP 800-108, Recommendation for Key Derivation Using
Pseudorandom Functions (Revised), October 2009, National Institute of
Standards and Technology.
[PKCS #1] PKCS #1: RSA Cryptography Standard, Version 2.1, 2002-06-14, RSA
Laboratories.
[PUF] PUF Key derivation function specification, 2014, NXP Semiconductors
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE
The documents as outlined in table 2 contain necessary information about the usage of the
TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered. In addition all aspects of
Assumptions, Threats and OSPs as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE
itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
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The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his
system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and
techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment of the
TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
The limited validity for the usage of cryptographic algorithms as outlined in chapter 9 has
to be considered by the user and his system risk management process, too.
Some security measures are partly implemented in this certified TOE, but require
additional configuration or control or measures to be implemented by a product layer on
top, e.g. the IC Dedicated Support Software and/or Embedded Software using the TOE.
For this reason the TOE includes guidance documentation (see table 2) which contains
obligations and guidelines for the developer of the product layer on top on how to securely
use this certified TOE and which measures have to be implemented in order to fulfil the
security requirements of the Security Target of the TOE. In the course of the evaluation of
the composite product or system it must be examined if the required measures have been
correctly and effectively implemented by the product layer on top. Additionally, the
evaluation of the composite product or system must also consider the evaluation results as
outlined in the document "ETR for composite evaluation" [10].
At the point in time when evaluation and certification results are reused there might be an
update of the document "ETR for composite evaluation" available. Therefore, the certified
products list on the BSI website has to be checked for latest information on
reassessments, recertifications or maintenance result available for the product.
11. Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [9] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is
provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report. It is a sanitised version of
the complete Security Target [6] used for the evaluation performed. Sanitisation was
performed according to the rules as outlined in the relevant CCRA policy (see AIS 35 [4]).
12. Regulation specific aspects (eIDAS, QES)
None
13. Definitions
13.1. Acronyms
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
AIS Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for
Information Security, Bonn, Germany
BSIG BSI-Gesetz / Act on the Federal Office for Information Security
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
cPP Collaborative Protection Profile
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DES Data Encryption Standard
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ECB Electronic Code Book Mode
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
IT Information Technology
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
PP Protection Profile
RSA Random Sequential Absorption
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
13.2. Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.
Collaborative Protection Profile - A Protection Profile collaboratively developed by an
International Technical Community endorsed by the Management Committee.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in CC
part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in CC part 3.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on well-
established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - A passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon which
subjects perform operations.
Package - named set of either security functional or security assurance requirements
Protection Profile - A formal document defined in CC, expressing an implementation
independent set of security requirements for a category of IT Products that meet specific
consumer needs.
Security Target - An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific
identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Subject - An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.
Target of Evaluation - An IT Product and its associated administrator and user guidance
documentation that is the subject of an Evaluation.
TOE Security Functionality - Combined functionality of all hardware, software, and
firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs.
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14. Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Part 1: Introduction and general model, Revision 5, April 2017
Part 2: Security functional components, Revision 5, April 2017
Part 3: Security assurance components, Revision 5, April 2017
https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Rev. 5, April 2017,
https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[3] BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-
Produkte) and Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility,
approval and licencing (CC-Stellen), https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierung
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE10
https://www.bsi.bund.de/AIS
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148), periodically updated list published also
on the BSI Website, https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierungsreporte
[6] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-1136-2021, Version 2.2, 2021-01-19, NXP Secure
Smart Card Controller N7121 with IC Dedicated Software and Crypto Library
(R1/R2), NXP Semiconductors (confidential document)
10
specifically
• AIS 1, Version 14, Durchführung der Ortsbesichtigung in der Entwicklungsumgebung des Herstellers
• AIS 14, Version 7, Anforderungen an Aufbau und Inhalt der ETR-Teile (Evaluation Technical Report)
für Evaluation nach CC (Common Criteria)
• AIS 19, Version 9, Anforderungen an Aufbau und Inhalt der Zusammenfassung des ETR (Evaluation
Technical Report) für Evaluationen nach CC (Common Criteria)
• AIS 20, Version 3, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für deterministische
Zufallszahlengeneratoren
• AIS 25, Version 9, Anwendung der CC auf Integrierte Schaltungen including JIL Document and CC
Supporting Document
• AIS 26, Version 10, Evaluationsmethodologie für in Hardware integrierte Schaltungen including JIL
Document and CC Supporting Document
• AIS 31, Version 3, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für physikalische
Zufallszahlengeneratoren
• AIS 32, Version 7, CC-Interpretationen im deutschen Zertifizierungsschema
• AIS 34, Version 3, Evaluation Methodology for CC Assurance Classes for EAL 5+ (CCv2.3 &
CCv3.1) and EAL 6 (CCv3.1)
• AIS 35, Version 2, Öffentliche Fassung des Security Targets (ST-Lite) including JIL Document and
CC Supporting Document and CCRA policies
• AIS 36, Version 5, Kompositionsevaluierung including JIL Document and CC Supporting Document
• AIS 37, Version 3, Terminologie und Verbreitung von Smartcard-Evaluierungen
• AIS 39, Version 3, Formal Methods
• AIS 46, Version 3, Informationen zur Evaluierung von kryptographischen Algorithmen und
ergänzende Hinweise für die Evaluierung von Zufallszahlengeneratoren
• AIS 47, Version 1.1, Regelungen zu Site Certification
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[7] Evaluation Technical Report, Version 3, 2021-02-05, Evaluation Technical Report
Summary, TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH (confidential document)
[8] Security IC Platform Protection Profile with Augmentation Packages Version 1.0, 13
January 2014, BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014
[9] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-1136-2021, Version 1.8, 2021-01-19, NXP Secure
Smart Card Controller N7121 with IC Dedicated Software and Crypto Library
(R1/R2), NXP Semiconductors (sanitised public document)
[10] ETR for composite evaluation according to AIS 36 for the Product 7121,
BSI-DSZ-CC-1136-2021, Version 3, 2021-02-05, Evaluation Technical Report For
Composite Evaluation (ETR Comp), TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH (confidential
document)
[11] SmartMX3 family N7121, Wafer and delivery specification, Version 3.2, 2020-06-04,
NXP Semiconductors (confidential document)
[12] NXP Secure Smart Card Controller N7121, Information on Guidance and Operation,
Version 3.2, 2019-05-28, NXP Semiconductors (confidential document)
[13] NXP Secure Smart Card Controller N7121, Overview Product data sheet,
Version 3.3, 2020-04-15, NXP Semiconductors
[14] SmartMX3 family P71D321, Dedicated type creation, Version 3.1, 2019-06-21,
NXP Semiconductors
[15] NXP Secure Smart Card Controller N7121, Instruction Set Manual, Product data
sheet addendum, Version 3.0, 2018-11-23, NXP Semiconductors
[16] NXP Secure Smart Card Controller N7121, Chip Health Mode, Product data sheet
addendum, Version 3.1, 2020-06-30, NXP Semiconductors
[17] NXP Secure Smart Card Controller N7121, Peripheral Configuration and Use,
Product data sheet addendum, Version 3.2, 2020-02-18, NXP Semiconductors
[18] NXP Secure Smart Card Controller N7121, MMU Configuration and NXP Firmware
Interface Specification, Product data sheet addendum, Version 3.6, 2020-10-19,
NXP Semiconductors
[19] NXP N7121 B1 Hardmacro, Lifecycle Documentation, Version 1.30, 2020-06-18,
NXP Semiconductors
[20] NXP Secure Smart Card Controller N7121, Flashloader OS, Product data sheet
addendum, Version 3.0, 2018-11-01, NXP Semiconductors
[21] NXP Secure Smart Card Controller N7121, Shared OS Libraries, Product data
sheet addendum, Version 3.2, 2019-10-30, NXP Semiconductors
[22] NXP Secure Smart Card Controller N7121, NXP System Mode OS, Product data
sheet addendum, Version 3.5, 2020-10-19, NXP Semiconductors
[23] NXP Secure Smart Card Controller N7121, Specification and Design
Documentation, Version 1.0, 2018-03-30, NXP Semiconductors
[24] N7121 Crypto Library, RNG Library, Preliminary user manual, Version 1.2,
2018-11-09, NXP Semiconductors
[25] N7121 Crypto Library, Symmetric Cipher Library (SymCfg), Preliminary user
manual, Version 1.4, 2018-09-19, NXP Semiconductors
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[26] N7121 Crypto Library, KeyStoreMgr Library, Preliminary user manual, Version 1.1,
2018-09-19, NXP Semiconductors
[27] N7121 Crypto Library, Utils Library, Preliminary user manual, Version 1.1,
2018-02-02, NXP Semiconducors
[28] N7121 Crypto Library, RSA Library, Preliminary user manual, Version 1.4,
2019-03-28, NXP Semiconductors
[29] N7121 Crypto Library, RSA Key Generation Library, Preliminary user manual,
Version 1.3, 2018-10-11, NXP Semiconductors
[30] N7121 Crypto Library, ECC over GF(p) Library, Preliminary user manual, Version
2.1, 2019-03-28, NXP Semiconductors
[31] N7121 Crypto Library, SHA Library, Preliminary user manual, Version 1.1,
2018-03-20, NXP Semiconductors
[32] N7121 Crypto Library, HASH Library, Preliminary user manual, Version 1.2,
2018-03-20, NXP Semiconductors
[33] N7121 Crypto Library, UtilsAsym Library, Preliminary user manual, Version 1.3,
2018-04-13, NXP Semiconductors
[34] N7121 Crypto Library, Korean Seed Library, User Manual, Version 1.1, 2018-03-20,
NXP Semiconductors
[35] N7121 Crypto Library, Information on Guidance and Operation, Product user
manual, Version 3.2, 2021-01-19, NXP Semiconductor
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1136-2021 Certification Report
C. Excerpts from the Criteria
For the meaning of the assurance components and levels the following references to the
Common Criteria can be followed:
• On conformance claim definitions and descriptions refer to CC part 1 chapter 10.5
• On the concept of assurance classes, families and components refer to CC Part 3
chapter 7.1
• On the concept and definition of pre-defined assurance packages (EAL) refer to CC
Part 3 chapters 7.2 and 8
• On the assurance class ASE for Security Target evaluation refer to CC Part 3
chapter 12
• On the detailed definitions of the assurance components for the TOE evaluation
refer to CC Part 3 chapters 13 to 17
• The table in CC part 3 , Annex E summarizes the relationship between the
evaluation assurance levels (EAL) and the assurance classes, families and
components.
The CC are published at https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/cc/
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D. Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Security Target provided within a separate document.
Annex B: Evaluation results regarding development
and production environment
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Annex B of Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1136-2021
Evaluation results regarding
development and production
environment
The IT product NXP Smart Card Controller N7121 with IC Dedicated Software and Crypto
Library (R1/R2) (Target of Evaluation, TOE) has been evaluated at an approved evaluation
facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1
extended by Scheme Interpretations by advice of the Certification Body for components
beyond EAL 5 and CC Supporting Documents for conformance to the Common Criteria for
IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1.
As a result of the TOE certification, dated 10 February 2021, the following results
regarding the development and production environment apply. The Common Criteria
assurance requirements ALC – Life cycle support (i.e. ALC_CMC.5, ALC_CMS.5,
ALC_DEL.1, ALC_DVS.2, ALC_LCD.1, and ALC_TAT.3)
are fulfilled for the development and production sites of the TOE listed below:
Name of site / Company
name
Address Function
Development Sites
NXP Hamburg NXP Semiconductors
Germany GmbH
Troplowitzstr. 20
22529 Hamburg
Germany
Project management, central design database,
HW/FW/SW development and verification, security
architecture and evaluation, flaw remediation, trust
provisioning, and customer support.
NXP Gratkorn NXP Semiconductors
Austria GmbH
Mikronweg 1
8101 Gratkorn
Austria
Project management, HW/FW/SW development
and verification, security architecture and
evaluation, trust provisioning, and document
control system (DocStore).
NXP Eindhoven
Development
NXP Semiconductors
Building 46, High Tech
Campus HTC-46.3-west
5656 AE Eindhoven
The Netherlands
HW/FW/SW development, security architecture.
NXP Glasgow 2 NXP Glasgow EK
Pegasus House, Scottish
Enterprise Technology Park,
3 Bramah Ave
East Kilbride, Glasgow
Hardware development, security architecture and
reviews.
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G75 0RD Scotland, UK
NXP Leuven NXP Semiconductors
Interleuvenlaan 80
3001 Leuven
Belgium
Hardware development, security reviews.
NXP Munich North NXP Semiconductors
Germany GmbH
Schatzbogen 7
81829 Munich
Germany
SW development.
NXP Nijmegen NXP Semiconductors
Nijmegen B.V.
Gerstweg 2
6534AE Nijmegen
The Netherlands
Verification of design data and mask data, sample
preparation.
GlobalLogic Wroclaw GlobalLogic REC sp. z o.o.
Strzegomska 56B Street
53-611 Wroclaw
Poland
SW development and verification.
Sii Gdansk 2 SII
Olivia Prime Building,
10th floor,
Grunwaldzka 472E
80-309 Gdansk
Poland
SW development and verification.
NXP Eindhoven IT NXP Semiconductors
Netherlands B.V.
Building 60, High Tech
Campus HTC60,
Secure Room (rooms 131,
133)
5656 AG Eindhoven
The Netherlands
IT engineering and generic support.
Colt Datacenter
Hamburg
Colt Datacenter Hamburg
Obenhauptstrasse 1C
22335 Hamburg
Germany
Data center.
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Akquinet Datacenter
Hamburg
Akquinet Datacenter
Hamburg
Ulzburger Strasse 201
22850 Norderstedt
Germany
Data center.
Digital Realty Phoenix Digital Realty Data Center
120 E Van Buren St,
Phoenix
AZ 85004,
U.S.A.
Data center.
Equinix Singapore EQUINIX
20 Ayer Rajah Crescent,
IBX SG1, Level 5 Unit 5,
Ayer Rajah Industrial Park
139964 Singapore
Data center.
NXP Bucharest NXP Semiconductors
Romania
Campus 6,
Bulevardul Iuliu Maniu 6L,
061103 Bucureşti
Romania
IT engineering and support.
NXP Guadalajara NXP Guadalajara
Periferico Sur #8110 Col. El
Mante JALISCO,
45609 Tlaquepaque
Mexico
IT engineering and support.
Chipbond Hsinchu Chipbond Technology
Corporation
No. 3, Li-Hsin Rd. V
Science Based Industrial
Park Hsin-Chu City
Taiwan, R.O.C.
Bumping.
NXP Hamburg TC See NXP Hamburg. Test Centre, personalization, and delivery.
NXP ATBK NXP Semiconductors
Thailand (ATBK)
303 Moo 3 Chaengwattana
Rd., Laksi
Bangkok 10210
Thailand
Test centre, wafer treatment, module assembly,
(pre-) personalization, delivery, and test program
engineering (TPE).
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NXP ATKH NXP Semiconductors
Taiwan Ltd (ATKH)
#10, Chin 5th Road, N.E.P.Z
Kaohsiung 81170
Taiwan, R.O.C.
Test centre, wafer treatment, module assembly,
(pre-) personalization, and delivery.
Global Foundries
Singapore (Fab 7)
GLOBALFOUNDRIES
Singapore Pte Ltd
60 Woodlands Industrial
Park D, Street 2
Singapore, 738406
Mask and wafer production.
AMTC Dresden Advanced Mask Technology
Center GmbH & Co KG
(AMTC)
Rähnitzer Allee 9
01109 Dresden
Germany
Wafer mask production.
Linxens Thailand Linxens Co., Ltd.
142 Moo, Hi-Tech Industrial
Estate, Tambon Ban Laean,
Amphor Bang Pa-In
13160 Ayutthaya
Thailand
Inlay production.
HID Malaysia HID Global Sdn. Bhd.
No. 2, Jalan i-Park 1/1
Kawasan Perindustrian
i-Park Bandar Indahpura
81000 Kulai, Johor
Malaysia
Inlay production.
Table 5: Relevant development/production sites
For the sites listed above, the requirements have been specifically applied in accordance
with the Security Target [6]. The evaluators verified, that the threats, security objectives
and requirements for the TOE life cycle phases up to delivery (as stated in the Security
Target [6] and [9]) are fulfilled by the procedures of these sites.
Note: End of report
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