BSI-DSZ-CC-1139-V2-2021
for
D-TRUST Web-Dienst TSE-CSP, Version 1.1.1
from
D-Trust GmbH
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0 CC-Zert-327 V5.3
BSI-DSZ-CC-1139-V2-2021 (*)
CSPL
D-TRUST Web-Dienst TSE-CSP ,Version 1.1.1
from Bundesdruckerei GmbH
PP Conformance: Protection Profile Cryptographic Service Provider Light (CSPL)
Version 1.0, 12 November 2019, BSI-CC-PP-0111-2019,
Common Criteria Protection Profile Configuration
Cryptographic Service Provider Light – Time Stamp Service
and Audit (PPC-CSPLight-TS-Au) Version 1.0, 26 February
2020, BSI-CC-PP-0112-2020,
Common Criteria Protection Profile Configuration
Cryptographic Service Provider Light - Time Stamp Service
and Audit – Clustering (PPC-CSPLight-TS-Au-Cl), Version 1.0,
26 February 2020, BSI-CC-PP-0113-2020
Functionality: PP conformant
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 2 augmented by ALC_CMS.3 and ALC_LCD.1
The IT Product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation
facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1
extended by Scheme Interpretations for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT
Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1. CC and CEM are also published as ISO/IEC
15408 and ISO/IEC 18045.
(*) This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its
evaluated configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report and
Notification. For details on the validity see Certification Report part A chapter 5.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification
scheme of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions
of the evaluation facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the
evidence adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT Product by the Federal Office for
Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT Product by the Federal Office for Information
Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is
either expressed or implied.
Bonn, 29 January 2021
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Sandro Amendola L.S.
Head of Division
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
SOGIS
Recognition Agreement
Common Criteria
Recognition Arrangement
recognition for components
up to EAL 2 and ALC_FLR
only
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1139-V2-2021
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1139-V2-2021 Certification Report
Contents
A. Certification......................................................................................................................6
1. Preliminary Remarks....................................................................................................6
2. Specifications of the Certification Procedure...............................................................6
3. Recognition Agreements..............................................................................................7
4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification................................................................8
5. Validity of the Certification Result.................................................................................8
6. Publication....................................................................................................................9
B. Certification Results.......................................................................................................10
1. Executive Summary....................................................................................................11
2. Identification of the TOE.............................................................................................12
3. Security Policy............................................................................................................13
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope.....................................................................13
5. Architectural Information.............................................................................................14
6. Documentation...........................................................................................................14
7. IT Product Testing.......................................................................................................14
8. Evaluated Configuration.............................................................................................17
9. Results of the Evaluation............................................................................................17
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE.....................................................18
11. Security Target..........................................................................................................18
12. Regulation specific aspects (eIDAS, QES)..............................................................18
13. Definitions.................................................................................................................18
14. Bibliography..............................................................................................................21
C. Excerpts from the Criteria..............................................................................................23
D. Annexes.........................................................................................................................24
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1139-V2-2021
A. Certification
1. Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of
issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor,
hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according
to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by
BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report
contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed
Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of
the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and
instructions for the user.
2. Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the
following:
● Act on the Federal Office for Information Security1
● BSI Certification and Approval Ordinance2
● BMI Regulations on Ex-parte Costs 3
● Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the
Interior)
● DIN EN ISO/IEC 17065 standard
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-
Produkte) [3]
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility, its
approval and licencing process (CC-Stellen) [3]
1
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
2
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of Security Certificates and approval by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungs- und -Anerkennungsverordnung - BSIZertV) of 17 December
2014, Bundesgesetzblatt 2014, part I, no. 61, p. 2231
3
BMI Regulations on Ex-parte Costs - Besondere Gebührenverordnung des BMI für individuell
zurechenbare öffentliche Leistungen in dessen Zuständigkeitsbereich (BMIBGebV), Abschnitt 7 (BSI-
Gesetz) - dated 2 September 2019, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1365
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1139-V2-2021 Certification Report
● Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.14
[1] also published as
ISO/IEC 15408
● Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 [2] also published
as ISO/IEC 18045
● BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]
3. Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or
CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
3.1. European Recognition of CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in
April 2010. It defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition
level and, in addition, at higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain SOGIS
Technical Domains only.
The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels
EAL 1 to EAL 4. For "Smartcards and similar devices" a SOGIS Technical Domain is in
place. For "HW Devices with Security Boxes" a SOGIS Technical Domains is in place, too.
In addition, certificates issued for Protection Profiles based on Common Criteria are part of
the recognition agreement.
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes, details on
recognition, and the history of the agreement can be seen on the website at
https://www.sogis.eu.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the
terms of this agreement by the related bodies of the signatory nations. A disclaimer
beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of recognition.
This certificate is recognized under SOGIS-MRA for all assurance components selected.
3.2. International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)
The international arrangement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on the CC
(Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement, CCRA-2014) has been ratified on 08
September 2014. It covers CC certificates based on collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP)
(exact use), CC certificates based on assurance components up to and including EAL 2 or
the assurance family Flaw Remediation (ALC_FLR) and CC certificates for Protection
Profiles and for collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP).
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes can be seen on
the website: https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates
that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the related bodies
of the signatory nations. A disclaimer beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of
recognition.
4
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 12 February 2007 in the Bundesanzeiger dated
23 February 2007, p. 3730
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1139-V2-2021
This certificate is recognized under CCRA-2014, i. e. up to and including CC part 3 EAL 2+
ALC_FLR components.
4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a
uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product D-TRUST Web-Dienst TSE-CSP, Version 1.1.1 has undergone the
certification procedure at BSI. This evaluation is a re-evaluation based on BSI-DSZ-CC-
1139-2020. The developer provided an impact analysis [12], which describes the changes
applied to the TOE and its deliverables.
The evaluation of the product D-TRUST Web-Dienst TSE-CSP, Version 1.1.1 was
conducted by TÜV Informationstechnik. The evaluation was completed on 29 January
2021. TÜV Informationstechnik is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)5
recognised by the
certification body of BSI.
For this certification procedure the sponsor and applicant is: D-Trust GmbH.
The product was developed by: Bundesdruckerei GmbH.
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this
Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
5. Validity of the Certification Result
This Certification Report applies only to the version of the product as indicated. The
confirmed assurance package is valid on the condition that
● all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the
following report, are observed,
● the product is operated in the environment described, as specified in the following report
and in the Security Target.
For the meaning of the assurance components and assurance levels please refer to CC
itself. Detailed references are listed in part C of this report.
The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target
at the date of certification. As attack methods evolve over time, the resistance of the
certified version of the product against new attack methods needs to be re-assessed.
Therefore, the sponsor should apply for the certified product being monitored within the
assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme (e.g. by a re-assessment or
re-certification). Specifically, if results of the certification are used in subsequent evaluation
and certification procedures, in a system integration process or if a user's risk
management needs regularly updated results, it is recommended to perform a re-
assessment on a regular e.g. annual basis.
In order to avoid an indefinite usage of the certificate when evolved attack methods would
require a re-assessment of the products resistance to state of the art attack methods, the
maximum validity of the certificate has been limited. The certificate issued on 29 January
2021 is valid until 28 January 2026. Validity can be re-newed by re-certification.
The owner of the certificate is obliged:
5
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1139-V2-2021 Certification Report
1. when advertising the certificate or the fact of the product's certification, to refer to
the Certification Report as well as to provide the Certification Report, the Security
Target and user guidance documentation mentioned herein to any customer of the
product for the application and usage of the certified product,
2. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately about vulnerabilities of the
product that have been identified by the developer or any third party after issuance
of the certificate,
3. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately in the case that security relevant
changes in the evaluated life cycle, e.g. related to development and production sites
or processes, occur, or the confidentiality of documentation and information related
to the Target of Evaluation (TOE) or resulting from the evaluation and certification
procedure where the certification of the product has assumed this confidentiality
being maintained, is not given any longer. In particular, prior to the dissemination of
confidential documentation and information related to the TOE or resulting from the
evaluation and certification procedure that do not belong to the deliverables
according to the Certification Report part B, or for those where no dissemination
rules have been agreed on, to third parties, the Certification Body at BSI has to be
informed.
In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to
the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e.
re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural
requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.
6. Publication
The product D-TRUST Web-Dienst TSE-CSP, Version 1.1.1 has been included in the BSI
list of certified products, which is published regularly (see also Internet:
https://www.bsi.bund.de and [5]). Further information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline
+49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer6
of the
product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet
address stated above.
6
Bundesdruckerei GmbH
Kommandantenstraße 18
10969 Berlin
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1139-V2-2021
B. Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
● the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
● the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
● complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1139-V2-2021 Certification Report
1. Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is named D-TRUST Web-Dienst TSE-CSP and was
evaluated in version 1.1.1. The TOE is a pure software TOE and is provided as a Java
application. The TOE provides the functionality of a Cryptographic Service Provider Light.
The TOE does not provide any kind of interface for direct user interaction. Instead, the
TOE provides its services in form of RESTful service interfaces based on the
HTTP/HTTPS protocol to be consumed by other applications.
The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is based on the certified
Protection Profiles listed in [8].
The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details).
The TOE meets the assurance requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 2
augmented by ALC_CMS.3 and ALC_LCD.1.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the
Security Target [6], chapter 10. They are selected from Common Criteria Part 2 and some
of them are newly defined. Thus the TOE is CC Part 2 extended.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functionality:
TOE Security Functionality
Self Testing and Integrity Protection
User Identification and Authentication
Access Control
Trusted Channel
Log Message creation and verification
Timestamp and Audit
Management of Certificates
Cryptographic Support
TOE Redundancy und Fail-Over Concept
TOE Secure Update
Table 1: TOE Security Functionalities
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6], chapter 11.
The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6], chapters 5.1,
6.1 and 7.1. Based on these assets the TOE Security Problem is defined in terms of
Assumptions, Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security
Target [6], chapters 5, 6 and 7.
This certification covers the configurations of the TOE as outlined in chapter 8.
The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating
for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and
decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1139-V2-2021
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate
and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification
Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2. Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
D-TRUST Web-Dienst TSE-CSP, Version 1.1.1
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
No Type Identifier Release / Version Form of Delivery
1. SW Java Archive (JAR) file (including
the TOE):
de.bdr.dtr.tseweb.server.csplight.
application-1.1.1-jar-with-
dependencies.jar
SHA-256 hash-value:
2516F3E1B1D006074D
BFFAB2CEFB3350A49A
F32BEA4EFEBABD783
31A5CF853C9
Personal delivery, encrypted
and signed mail or secure
download portal. The
deliverable is signed.
2. DOC Dokumentation und
Integratorhandbuch CSP Light
Modul [10]
Version 1.1.0 Personal delivery, encrypted
and signed mail or secure
download portal. The
deliverable is signed.
3. DOC D-TRUST-TSE-WEB
SCHNITTSTELLEN- UND
FUNKTIONSSPEZIFIKATION
CSP-LIGHT-MODUL [11]
Version 1.3.5 Personal delivery, encrypted
and signed mail or secure
download portal. The
deliverable is signed.
4. DATA Initial passwords of the system
users (Administrator,
Timekeeper and Auditor-
Manager)
- Verbal, personal delivery.
Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE
The TOE deliverables are identified by their individual hash value using SHA-256 or the
version number as delivered from the TOE-developer Bundesdruckerei to the applicant D-
Trust either via personal delivery, encrypted and signed mail or via a secure download
portal. All TOE deliverables are signed by Bundesdruckerei.
The unique hash values or version numbers of the TOE deliverables are stated in Table 2
above. The name and version of the TOE can also be verified by the response to the
function GenerateAttestation as described in [11], chap. 5.24.
The TOE is delivered from the TOE-developer Bundesdruckerei to D-Trust either by
personal delivery, encrypted and signed mail or via a secure download portal. Similarly, the
Integration-, configuration and operations manual [10] and the interface definition [11] are
delivered either by personal delivery, encrypted and signed mail or via a secure download
portal. All deliverables are signed by the developer. The initial password for system users
are only delivered via verbal, personal delivery and are not written down in a document.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1139-V2-2021 Certification Report
3. Security Policy
The Security Policy is expressed by the set of Security Functional Requirements and
implemented by the TOE. It covers the following issues:
● Key management,
● Data encryption,
● Hybrid encryption with MAC for user data,
● Data integrity mechanisms,
● Authentication and attestation of the TOE, trusted channel,
● User identification and authentication,
● Access control,
● Security management,
● Protection of the TSF,
● Import and verification of Update Code Package,
● Time stamp,
● Access control on time stamp service,
● Security Audit, and
● Clustering.
Specific details concerning the above mentioned security policies can be found in
Chapters 10.1, 10.2 and 10.3 of the Security Target [6].
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and
Organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to
specific security objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. The following topics are
of relevance:
● OE.CommInf,
● OE.AppComp,
● OE.SecManag,
● OE.SecComm,
● OE.SUCP,
● OE.SecPlatform,
● OE.Audit,
● OE.TimeService,
● OE.ClusterCtrl, and
● OE.TSFdataTrans.
Details can be found in the Security Target [6], chapter 8.2.
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5. Architectural Information
The TOE consists of the following subsystems:
● Client Remote Interface: This subsystem provides the endpoint of the trusted channel
connection to the client remote entity and realizes the TSFI_Client (Client Remote
Interface).
● Administration Interface: This subsystem provides the Administration Interface which is
an endpoint of the trusted channel connection to an administrator and realizes the
TSFI_Admin (Administration Interface). The Administration Interface provides
management and configuration functionality to the owner’s (administrator’s) client
remote entity.
● Seed: This Subsystem utilizes the RNG provided by the HW environment for Seed
generation.
● Cryptocore: This subsystem provides the cryptographic functionality of the TOE by
utilizing the subsystem Bouncy Castle. It provides the functionality for key generation,
hash calculation, trusted channel, signature generation and verification as well as en-
and decryption operations.
● Bouncy Castle: This subsystem implements the cryptographic base functionality and
provides it to the subsystem Cryptocore for the cryptographic operations.
● Datenverwaltung: This subsystem implements the management functionality for internal
and cryptographic data of the TOE.
● Relocate/Failover: This subsystem implements functionality for clustering, such as
export and import functionality.
● Update-Time: This subsystem implements the update functionality for the internal
system time utilizing the subsystem Update-Time-Application.
● Update-Time-Application: This subsystem implements the functionality for setting the
system time.
6. Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the product to
the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of
the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of
this report have to be followed.
7. IT Product Testing
Developer's Test according to ATE_FUN
TOE Configuration:
The TOE was tested in the one and only configuration, which has been executed on Java
runtime version 11.0.9.
Testing approach:
The tests are performed as Unit tests in the development tool. The developer considered
the following aspects when designing his test approach:
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1139-V2-2021 Certification Report
● Tests to cover all actions and interfaces defined in [FSP],
● Good case and bad case tests for each function defined in the document [FSP] and
executable on the TOE, and
● Tests of the cryptographic functionality by test vectors.
Test Results:
All test cases were run successfully on this TOE version.
The developer’s testing results demonstrate that the TOE operates as expected.
Independent Testing according to ATE_IND
TOE Configuration:
The TOE was tested in the one and only configuration which can be executed in the Java
runtime version 11.0.9. All developer tests were repeated by the evaluation body with the
final TOE and all independent tests were performed by the evaluation body with the final
TOE version 1.1.1.
The keys and personalization data used in the test configuration were provided by the
developer.
Testing approach and Setup:
The evaluator tested all TSF using a series of test cases where each test case tests a
specific aspect of the expected behaviour. The TSF is mainly tested by running test scripts
within the test environment at the TOE interface using the commands defined in [11]. The
TSF is stimulated within the test scripts and the behaviour is observed as return value of
the TOE.
The tests are performed by test tools which use scripts. Test attributes, preconditions and
post processing steps that are coded into the scripts ensure that the script execution is
reproducible. The test environment was provided by the developer and the test scripts
were implemented by the evaluator.
The selected tests cover tests of the TSFIs related to
● Self Testing and Integrity Protection,
● User Identification and Authentication,
● Access Control,
● Trusted Channel,
● Log Message creation and verification,
● Timestamp and Audit,
● Management of Certificates,
● Cryptographic Support,
● TOE Redundancy and Fail-Over Concept,
● TOE Secure Update, and
● Preparative procedures, performed by the evaluator according to the guidance [10] and
[11].
Test Results:
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1139-V2-2021
The test reports are mainly automatically generated by the test tool used. If several
manual test steps are required, the evaluator created a log file.
The test logs and the test documentation include details and comments on the test
configuration, on the test equipment used, on the used command structure and the
expected results. The test prerequisites, test steps, and expected results adequately test
the related TSFIs, and they are consistent with the descriptions of the TSFIs in the
functional specification.
The test results have not shown any deviations between the expected test results and the
actual test results.
Penetration Testing according to AVA_VAN
Overview:
The penetration testing was performed at the site of the evaluation body TÜViT with a test
environment provided by the developer on a dedicated test server set up by the developer.
The samples were provided by the sponsor and by the developer. The test samples were
configured and parameterized by the evaluator according to the guidance documentation.
The overall result is that no deviations were found between the expected result and the
actual result of the tests. Moreover, no attack scenario with an attack potential of Basic
was actually successful.
TOE Configuration:
The TOE was tested in the compiled configuration which runs in the runtime environment
on the platform defined in [6] in scope of the certification.
Testing approach:
Based on the list of potential vulnerabilities applicable to the TOE in its operational
environment created within vulnerability analysis evaluation report, the evaluator created
attack scenarios for the penetration tests, where the evaluator is of the opinion that the
vulnerabilities could be exploitable. While doing so, the evaluator also considered all
aspects of the security architecture of the TOE being not covered by the functional
developer tests.
The primary focus for devising penetration tests was to cover all potential vulnerabilities
identified as applicable in the TOE’s operational environment for which an appropriate test
set was devised.
Test Results:
The overall test result is that no deviations were found between the expected and the
actual test results. No attack scenario with the attack potential of Basic was actually
successful in the TOE’s operational environment as defined in the security target provided
that all measures required by the developer are applied.
Summary of all above mentioned Test Results
The test results yielded that no deviations were found between the expected and the
actual test results. No attack scenario with the attack potential basic was actually
successful in the TOE’s operational environment as defined in [6] provided that all
measures required by the developer are applied.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1139-V2-2021 Certification Report
8. Evaluated Configuration
This certification covers the following configurations of the TOE: There is one configuration
of the TOE which requires a specified platform comprising a Java Virtual Machine, a
particular operating system and a dedicated hardware. For all tests the TOE is configured
and parameterized, if necessary, according to the guidance documents.
The TOE needs to be installed according to the guidelines given in [10] and [11] and
requires a specified platform as defined in [6], chap. 2.8, and an operational environment
as defined in [6], chap 2.9.
9. Results of the Evaluation
9.1. CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [7] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used.
The assurance refinements outlined in the Security Target were followed in the course of
the evaluation of the TOE.
As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
● All components of the EAL 2 package including the class ASE as defined in the CC (see
also part C of this report)
● The components ALC_CMS.3 and ALC_LCD.1 augmented for this TOE evaluation.
The evaluation has confirmed:
● PP Conformance:
Protection Profile Cryptographic Service Provider Light (CSPL)
Version 1.0, 12 November 2019, BSI-CC-PP-0111-2019,
Common Criteria Protection Profile Configuration Cryptographic
Service Provider Light – Time Stamp Service and Audit (PPC-
CSPLight-TS-Au) Version 1.0, 26 February 2020, BSI-CC-PP-
0112-2020,
Common Criteria Protection Profile Configuration Cryptographic
Service Provider Light - Time Stamp Service and Audit –
Clustering (PPC-CSPLight-TS-Au-Cl), Version 1.0, 26 February
2020, BSI-CC-PP-0113-2020 [8]
● for the Functionality:
PP conformant
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
● for the Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 2 augmented by ALC_CMS.3 and ALC_LCD.1
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
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9.2. Results of cryptographic assessment
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of this certification
procedure (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2). But cryptographic functionalities with a
security level of lower than 100 bits can no longer be regarded as secure without
considering the application context. Therefore, for these functionalities it shall be checked
whether the related crypto operations are appropriate for the intended system. Some
further hints and guidelines can be derived from the 'Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-02102'
(https://www.bsi.bund.de).
The table presented in chapter 3.5 of the Security Target [6] gives an overview of the
cryptographic functionalities inside the TOE to enforce the security policy and outlines its
rating from cryptographic point of view. In this table, each Cryptographic Functionality
achieves a security level of at least 100 Bits (in general context).
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE
The documents as outlined in table 2 contain necessary information about the usage of the
TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered. In addition all aspects of
Assumptions, Threats and OSPs as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE
itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his
system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and
techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment of the
TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
The limited validity for the usage of cryptographic algorithms as outlined in chapter 9 has
to be considered by the user and his system risk management process, too.
If available, certified updates of the TOE should be used. If non-certified updates or
patches are available the user of the TOE should request the sponsor to provide a re-
certification. In the meantime a risk management process of the system using the TOE
should investigate and decide on the usage of not yet certified updates and patches or
take additional measures in order to maintain system security.
11. Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [6] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is
provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report.
12. Regulation specific aspects (eIDAS, QES)
None
13. Definitions
13.1. Acronyms
AIS Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme
API Application Programming Interface
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BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for
Information Security, Bonn, Germany
BSIG BSI-Gesetz / Act on the Federal Office for Information Security
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
cPP Collaborative Protection Profile
CSP Cryptographic Service Provider
CSPL Cryptographic Service Provider Light
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
HW Hardware
IT Information Technology
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
MAC Message Authentication Code
PACE Password Authenticated Connection Establishment
PP Protection Profile
RNG Random Number Generator
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
ST Security Target
SW Software
TC Trusted Channel
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSE Technische Sicherheitseinrichtung
TSF TOE Security Functionality
TSFI TSF Interfaces
TSS Technical Security System (CSPL-Kontext)
TSS TOE Summary Specification (CC-Kontext)
13.2. Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.
Collaborative Protection Profile - A Protection Profile collaboratively developed by an
International Technical Community endorsed by the Management Committee.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in CC
part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in CC part 3.
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Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on well-
established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - A passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon which
subjects perform operations.
Package - named set of either security functional or security assurance requirements
Protection Profile - A formal document defined in CC, expressing an implementation
independent set of security requirements for a category of IT Products that meet specific
consumer needs.
Security Target - An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific
identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Subject - An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.
Target of Evaluation - An IT Product and its associated administrator and user guidance
documentation that is the subject of an Evaluation.
TOE Security Functionality - Combined functionality of all hardware, software, and
firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs.
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14. Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Part 1: Introduction and general model, Revision 5, April 2017
Part 2: Security functional components, Revision 5, April 2017
Part 3: Security assurance components, Revision 5, April 2017
https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Rev. 5, April 2017,
https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[3] BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-
Produkte) and Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility,
approval and licencing (CC-Stellen), https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierung
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE7
https://www.bsi.bund.de/AIS
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148), periodically updated list published also
on the BSI Website, https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierungsreporte
[6] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-1139-V2-2021, Version 1.2.5, 2021-01-15, D-TRUST
Web-Dienst TSE-CSP Security Target, D-TRUST GmbH
[7] Evaluation Technical Report, Version 1, 2021-01-29, EVALUATION TECHNICAL
REPORT SUMMARY (ETR SUMMARY), TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH –
Evaluation Body for IT Security, (confidential document)
[8] Base-PP: Protection Profile Cryptographic Service Provider Light (CSPL) Version
1.0, 12. November 2019, BSI-CC-PP-0111-2019, BSI
PP-Configuration: Common Criteria Protection Profile Configuration Cryptographic
Service Provider Light – Time Stamp Service and Audit (PPC-CSPLight-TS-Au)
Version 1.0, 26 February 2020, BSI-CC-PP-0112-2020, BSI
PP-Configuration: Common Criteria Protection Profile Configuration Cryptographic
Service Provider Light - Time Stamp Service and Audit – Clustering (PPC-CSPLight-
TS-Au-Cl), Version 1.0, 26 February 2020, BSI-CC-PP-0113-2020, BSI
[9] Configuration list consisting of:
D-TRUST Web-Dienst TSE-CSP – Referenzliste, Version 2.0.3, 2021-01-28, D-
TRUST GmbH
7
specifically
• AIS 19, Version 9, Anforderungen an Aufbau und Inhalt der Zusammenfassung des ETR (Evaluation
Technical Report) für Evaluationen nach CC (Common Criteria)
• AIS 20, Version 3, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für deterministische
Zufallszahlengeneratoren
• AIS 32, Version 7, CC-Interpretationen im deutschen Zertifizierungsschema
• AIS41, Version 2, Guidelines for PPs and Sts
• AIS46, Version 3, Informationen zur Evaluierung von kryptographischen Algorithmen und
ergänzende Hinweise für die Evaluierung von Zufallszahlengeneratoren
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List of all files of the git repository of TSE-SMAERS, files-csp.txt, SHA-256-value:
58b4bba09bc93833493d1948fb84611f37bd93919e8c6bc04af13c5395116b79
[10] Dokumentation und Integratorhandbuch CSP Light Modul, Version 1.1.1, 2021-01-
22, D-TRUST GmbH
[11] D-TRUST-TSE-WEB SCHNITTSTELLEN- UND FUNKTIONSSPEZIFIKATION CSP-
LIGHT-MODUL, Version 1.3.5, 2020-12-07, D-TRUST GmbH
[12] IAR: D-TRUST-TSE-WEB AUSWIRKUNGSANALYSE D-TRUST WEB-DIENST
TSE-CSP, Version 1.0.0, 2020-10-15, D-TRUST GmbH
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C. Excerpts from the Criteria
For the meaning of the assurance components and levels the following references to the
Common Criteria can be followed:
• On conformance claim definitions and descriptions refer to CC part 1 chapter 10.5
• On the concept of assurance classes, families and components refer to CC Part 3
chapter 7.1
• On the concept and definition of pre-defined assurance packages (EAL) refer to CC
Part 3 chapters 7.2 and 8
• On the assurance class ASE for Security Target evaluation refer to CC Part 3
chapter 12
• On the detailed definitions of the assurance components for the TOE evaluation
refer to CC Part 3 chapters 13 to 17
• The table in CC part 3 , Annex E summarizes the relationship between the
evaluation assurance levels (EAL) and the assurance classes, families and
components.
The CC are published at https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/cc/
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D. Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Security Target provided within a separate document.
Note: End of report
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