BSI-DSZ-CC-0952-V2-2016
for
STARCOS 3.5 ID GCC C3
from
Giesecke & Devrient GmbH
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0 CC-Zert-327 V5.14
BSI-DSZ-CC-0952-V2-2016 (*)
Security IC with ID Card Application
STARCOS 3.5 ID GCC C3
from Giesecke & Devrient GmbH
PP Conformance: Common Criteria Protection Profile Electronic
Identity Card (ID_Card PP), Version 1.03,
15 December 2009, BSI-CC-PP-0061-2009 (**)
and in accordance with BSI Technische Richtlinie
BSI-TR-03116-2, 2016
Functionality: PP conformant
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 4 augmented by
ALC_DVS.2, ATE_DPT.2 and AVA_VAN.5
The IT Product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation facility
using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 extended by
Scheme Interpretations, by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 5 and CC
Supporting Documents as listed in the Certification Report for conformance to the Common Criteria
for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1. CC and CEM are also published as ISO/IEC 15408
and ISO/IEC 18045.
(*) This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated
configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report and Notification. For details
on the validity see Certification Report part A chapter 4
(**) The IT Product identified in this certificate fulfils also PP EN 419211-2:2013 and is therefore a
compliant signature creation device according to Article 30(3.(a)) of Regulation No 910/2014 OF
THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 23 July 2014.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification scheme of
the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions of the evaluation
facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT Product by the Federal Office for Information
Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty
of the IT Product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
Bonn, 16 December 2016
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Thomas Gast L.S.
Head of Divison
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
SOGIS
Recognition Agreement
Common Criteria
Recognition Arrangement
for components up to
EAL 4
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0952-V2-2016
This page is intentionally left blank.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0952-V2-2016 Certification Report
Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of
issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor,
hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according
to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by
BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report
contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed
Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of
the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and
instructions for the user.
1
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0952-V2-2016
Contents
A. Certification........................................................................................................................7
1. Specifications of the Certification Procedure.................................................................7
2. Recognition Agreements................................................................................................7
3. Performance of Evaluation and Certification..................................................................9
4. Validity of the Certification Result...................................................................................9
5. Publication....................................................................................................................10
B. Certification Results.........................................................................................................11
1. Executive Summary.....................................................................................................12
2. Identification of the TOE...............................................................................................13
3. Security Policy..............................................................................................................14
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope.......................................................................15
5. Architectural Information...............................................................................................15
6. Documentation.............................................................................................................15
7. IT Product Testing.........................................................................................................15
8. Evaluated Configuration...............................................................................................16
9. Results of the Evaluation..............................................................................................17
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE.......................................................18
11. Security Target............................................................................................................18
12. Definitions...................................................................................................................18
13. Bibliography................................................................................................................21
C. Excerpts from the Criteria................................................................................................25
CC Part 1:........................................................................................................................25
CC Part 3:........................................................................................................................26
D. Annexes...........................................................................................................................33
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0952-V2-2016 Certification Report
A. Certification
1. Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the
following:
● Act on the Federal Office for Information Security2
● BSI Certification and Approval Ordinance3
● BSI Schedule of Costs4
● Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the
Interior)
● DIN EN ISO/IEC 17065 standard
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process
(CC-Produkte) [3]
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility, its
approval and licencing process (CC-Stellen) [3]
● Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.15
[1] also published as
ISO/IEC 15408.
● Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 [2] also published
as ISO/IEC 18045.
● BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]
2. Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or
CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
2.1. European Recognition of ITSEC/CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in
April 2010. It defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition
level and, in addition, at higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain SOGIS
Technical Domains only.
2
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
3
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of Security Certificates and approval by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungs- und -Anerkennungsverordnung - BSIZertV) of 17 December
2014, Bundesgesetzblatt 2014, part I, no. 61, p. 2231
4
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
(BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519
5
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 12 February 2007 in the Bundesanzeiger dated
23 February 2007, p. 3730
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0952-V2-2016
The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels
EAL 1 to EAL 4 and ITSEC Evaluation Assurance Levels E1 to E3 (basic). For
"Smartcards and similar devices" a SOGIS Technical Domain is in place. For "HW Devices
with Security Boxes" a SOGIS Technical Domain is in place, too. In addition, certificates
issued for Protection Profiles based on Common Criteria are part of the recognition
agreement.
The new agreement has been signed by the national bodies of Austria, Finland, France,
Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. The
current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes, details on recognition,
and the history of the agreement can be seen on the website at https://www.sogisportal.eu.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the
terms of this agreement by the nations listed above.
This certificate is recognized under SOGIS-MRA for all assurance components selected.
2.2. International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)
The international arrangement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on the CC
(Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement, CCRA-2014) has been ratified on 08
September 2014. It covers CC certificates based on collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP)
(exact use), CC certificates based on assurance components up to and including EAL 2 or
the assurance family Flaw Remediation (ALC_FLR) and CC certificates for Protection
Profiles and for collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP).
The CCRA-2014 replaces the old CCRA signed in May 2000 (CCRA-2000). Certificates
based on CCRA-2000, issued before 08 September 2014 are still under recognition
according to the rules of CCRA-2000. For on 08 September 2014 ongoing certification
procedures and for Assurance Continuity (maintenance and re-certification) of old
certificates a transition period on the recognition of certificates according to the rules of
CCRA-2000 (i.e. assurance components up to and including EAL 4 or the assurance
family Flaw Remediation (ALC_FLR)) is defined until 08 September 2017.
As of September 2014 the signatories of the new CCRA-2014 are government
representatives from the following nations: Australia, Austria, Canada, Czech Republic,
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, India, Israel, Italy, Japan,
Malaysia, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Republic of Korea,
Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom, and the United States.
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes can be seen on
the website: http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates
that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the nations listed
above.
As this certificate is a re-certification of a certificate issued according to CCRA-2000
this certificate is recognized according to the rules of CCRA-2000, i.e. up to and including
CC part 3 EAL 4 components. The evaluation contained the components ALC_DVS.2,
ATE_DPT.2 and AVA_VAN.5 that are not mutually recognised in accordance with the
provisions of the CCRA-2000, for mutual recognition the EAL 4 components of these
assurance families are relevant.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0952-V2-2016 Certification Report
3. Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a
uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product STARCOS 3.5 ID GCC C3 has undergone the certification procedure at BSI.
This is a re-certification based on BSI-DSZ-CC-0952-2014. Specific results from the
evaluation process BSI-DSZ-CC-0952-2014 were re-used.
The evaluation of the product STARCOS 3.5 ID GCC C3 was conducted by SRC Security
Research & Consulting GmbH. The evaluation was completed on 15 December 2016.
SRC Security Research & Consulting GmbH is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)6
recognised
by the certification body of BSI.
For this certification procedure the sponsor and applicant is:
Giesecke & Devrient GmbH.
The product was developed by:
Giesecke & Devrient GmbH.
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this
Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
4. Validity of the Certification Result
This Certification Report only applies to the version of the product as indicated. The
confirmed assurance package is only valid on the condition that
● all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the
following report, are observed,
● the product is operated in the environment described, as specified in the following report
and in the Security Target.
For the meaning of the assurance levels please refer to the excerpts from the criteria at
the end of the Certification Report or in the CC itself.
The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target
at the date of certification. As attack methods evolve over time, the resistance of the
certified version of the product against new attack methods needs to be re-assessed.
Therefore, the sponsor should apply for the certified product being monitored within the
assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme (e.g. by a re-certification).
Specifically, if results of the certification are used in subsequent evaluation and certification
procedures, in a system integration process or if a user's risk management needs regularly
updated results, it is recommended to perform a re-assessment on a regular e.g. annual
basis.
In order to avoid an indefinite usage of the certificate when evolved attack methods require
a re-assessment of the products resistance to state of the art attack methods, the
maximum validity of the certificate has been limited. The certificate issued on 16
December 2016 is valid until 15 December 2021. Validity can be re-newed by
re-certification.
6
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0952-V2-2016
The owner of the certificate is obliged:
1. when advertising the certificate or the fact of the product's certification, to refer to
the Certification Report as well as to provide the Certification Report, the Security
Target and user guidance documentation mentioned herein to any customer of the
product for the application and usage of the certified product,
2. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately about vulnerabilities of the
product that have been identified by the developer or any third party after issuance
of the certificate,
3. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately in the case that security relevant
changes in the evaluated life cycle, e.g. related to development and production sites
or processes, occur, or the confidentiality of documentation and information related
to the Target of Evaluation (TOE) or resulting from the evaluation and certification
procedure where the certification of the product has assumed this confidentiality
being maintained, is not given any longer. In particular, prior to the dissemination of
confidential documentation and information related to the TOE or resulting from the
evaluation and certification procedure that do not belong to the deliverables
according to the Certification Report part B, or for those where no dissemination
rules have been agreed on, to third parties, the Certification Body at BSI has to be
informed.
In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to
the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e.
re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural
requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.
5. Publication
The product STARCOS 3.5 ID GCC C3 has been included in the BSI list of certified
products, which is published regularly (see also Internet: https://www.bsi.bund.de and [5]).
Further information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline +49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer7
of the
product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet
address stated above.
7
Giesecke & Devrient GmbH
Prinzregentenstr. 159
81677 München
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0952-V2-2016 Certification Report
B. Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
● the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
● the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
● complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0952-V2-2016
1. Executive Summary
Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the product STARCOS 3.5 ID GCC C3 including the
identified TOE hardware M7820 A11 by Infineon Technologies. The TOE is an electronic
Identity Card (ID_Card) representing a contactless smart card programmed according to
the Technical Guideline TR-03110 Version 2.028
[17]. Additionally it meets the
requirements of the Technische Richtlinie TR-03116-2 [18] as part of the qualification for
the use within Identity Card projects of the Federal Republic of Germany.
The TOE can be used in two different configurations: without (configuration 1) and with the
ability to support chaining for the verify certificate command (configuration 2).
The TOE comprises of
● the circuitry of the contactless chip including all IC Dedicated Software being active in
the Operational Phase of the TOE (the integrated circuit, IC),
● the hardware for the contactless interface (e.g. antenna),
● the IC Embedded Software (operating system),
● the ePassport-, the eID- and optionally the eSign-application, and
● the associated guidance documentation.
The Security Target [6] and [8] is the basis for this certification. It is based on the following
certified Protection Profile:
● Common Criteria Protection Profile Electronic Identity Card (ID_Card PP), Version 1.03,
15 December 2009, BSI-CC-PP-0061-2009 [7].
The Protection Profile [7] itself is strict conformant to the Protection Profile:
● EN 419211-2:2013 - Protection profiles for secure signature creation device - Part 2:
Device with key generation, CEN/ISSS - Information Society Standardization System,
BSI-CC-PP-0059-2009-MA-02 [30].
Please note that in [31] the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union
has codified the conceptional requirements for qualified electronic signature devices used
in the European Union. This regulation is clarified in the Commission Implementing
Decision [32]. In this decision the requirements are stated an electronic signature device
must fullfill to be compliant to [31] (Article 1 and Annex). According to this the TOE must be
certified using ISO/IEC 15408 and ISO/IEC 18045 in its 2008/2009 versions and [30]. The
evaluation process of STARCOS 3.5 ID GCC C3 used the latest available version of
Common Criteria [1] which is as used compatible to the ISO version cited in [31]. The
evaluation showed that the TOE in its intended usage fulfils these standards and is
therefore a compliant signature creation device according to Article 30(3.(a)) of Regulation
[31], where the electronic signature creation data is held in an entirely but not necessarily
exclusively user-managed environment.
The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details).
8
Please note that additional the TOE fulfils the stronger requirements of the Version 2.10 [25], [26],
[27] of the Technical Guideline TR-03110, whereas the Protection Profile [7] is based on the Version
2.02 [17] only.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0952-V2-2016 Certification Report
The TOE meets the assurance requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 4
augmented by ALC_DVS.2, ATE_DPT.2 and AVA_VAN.5.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the
Security Target [6] and [8], chapter 6. They are selected from Common Criteria Part 2 and
some of them are newly defined. Thus the TOE is CC Part 2 extended.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functionality:
● Access control for different users,
● Protection of assets in the TOE,
● Resistance against physical tampering,
● Key management for generating and using cryptographic keys,
● Creation of digital signatures, and
● Protection of the communication channel.
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6] and [8], chapter 7.1.
The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6] and [8],
chapter 3.1. Based on these assets the TOE Security Environment is defined in terms of
Assumptions, Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security
Target [6] and [8], chapter 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4.
This certification covers the following configuration of the TOE:
STARCOS 3.5 ID GCC C3, as described in the Guidance Documents [13] and [14] (for
details refer to chapter 8).
The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating
for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and
decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate
and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification
Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2. Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
STARCOS 3.5 ID GCC C3
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0952-V2-2016
No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
1 HW/
SW
M7820 A11 by Infineon Technologies9
with hardware for the contactless
interface and including its IC Dedicated
Test Software
Rom Mask
CIF9DSCSR35-01c
_V200
An initialised module
(type: FTM8 or bare
die) embedded into
an inlay
2 SW IC Embedded Software (the operating
system)
STARCOS 3.5 Implemented in
ROM/EEPROM of the
IC
3 SW IC Embedded ePassport, eID and
(activated or not activated) eSign
Applications
CIF9DSCSI35-1A-
8309_V001
or
CIF9DSCSI35-1A-
830A_V001
Implemented by the
File System
4 KEYS Cryptographic keys for initialisation or
personalisation, securing the TOE from
modification by illegal entities, e.g.
during transport.
Item in electronic
form, encrypted and
signed to protect
against disclosure
and modification.
5 DOC Guidance Documentation STARCOS
3.5 ID – Main Document
Version 0.5,
31.08.2011 [13]
Document in
electronic form
6 DOC Guidance Documentation for the
Personalisation Phase for STARCOS
3.5 ID GCC C3
Version 1.3,
20.10.2016 [14]
Document in
electronic form
7 DOC Guidance Documentation for the
Usage Phase for STARCOS 3.5 ID
GCC C2
Version 1.6,
19.03.2013 [15]
Document in
electronic form
Table 1: Deliverables of the TOE
The customer specific ROM mask for the STARCOS 3.5 ID GCC C3 is labelled by IFX as
GDGD. The name of the ROM file transferred from G&D to IFX is
CIF9DSCSR35-01c_V200.hex.
The initialisation of the TOE takes place using the following initialisation tables. These
tables include the patch code and filesystem data:
● Initialisation table 1 (Configuration 1): CIF9DSCSI35-1A-8309_V001.hex
● Initialisation table 2 (Configuration 2): CIF9DSCSI35-1A-830A_V001.hex
The TOE is finalized after the Initialisation resp. Pre-Personalisation phase. Delivery of the
initialised inlay is performed from the Initialisation facility to the Personalisation facility by a
secured transport to a specific person of contact at the Personalisation site. Furthermore,
the Personaliser receives information about the Personalisation commands and process
requirements. To ensure that the Personaliser receives this certified version, the
procedures to start the Personalisation process as described in the Guidance
Documentation for the Personalisation Phase [14] have to be followed.
3. Security Policy
The Security Policy is expressed by the set of Security Functional Requirements and
implemented by the TOE. It is defined according to the Common Criteria Protection Profile
9
For details on the ID Card chip and the IC Dedicated Software see Certification Report
BSI-DSZ-CC-0829-V2-2015 [16].
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0952-V2-2016 Certification Report
Electronic Identity Card (ID_Card PP) [7] by the Security Objectives and Requirements for
the contactless chip of electronic Identity Cards based on the Requirements and
Recommendations of the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) and the
Technische Richtlinie BSI-TR-03110 [17], BSI-TR-03116-2 [18], BSI-TR-03117 [19] and
BSI-TR-03127 [20].
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and
Organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to
specific security objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. The following topics are
of relevance: Obligations for ID_Card Issuer, Obligations for ID_Card issuer and CSCA,
Obligations for ID_Card Issuer and CVCA, and Obligations for ID_Card holder. Details can
be found in the Security Target [6] and [8], chapter 4.2.
5. Architectural Information
The TOE is a composite product. It is composed from an Integrated Circuit (IC) with
hardware for the contactless interface, IC Embedded Software and IC Application Software
containing the ePassport, the eID and the eSign Application. The IC Embedded software
contains the operations system STARCOS 3.5. For details concerning the CC evaluation
of the Infineon IC see the evaluation documentation under the certification ID
BSI-DSZ-CC-0829-V2-2015 [16].
According to the TOE Design the Security Functionality of the TOE listed in chap. 1 are
enforced by the following subsystems:
● System Library (contains the application framework),
● Runtime System (main loop and command interpreter),
● Chip Card Commands (pre-processor and processor of all implemented commands),
● Security Management (manages the security environment, security states and rule
analysis),
● Key Management (search, pre-process, use and post-process of keys),
● Secure Messaging (SM handling), and
● Crypto Functions (library with an API to all cryptographic operations).
6. Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 1 is being provided with the product to
the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of
the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of
this report have to be followed.
7. IT Product Testing
The developer tested all TOE Security Functions either on real cards or with emulator
tests. For all commands and functionality tests, test cases are specified in order to
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demonstrate its expected behavior including error cases. Hereby a representative sample
including all boundary values of the parameter set, e.g. all command APDUs with valid and
invalid inputs were tested and all functions were tested with valid and invalid inputs.
Repetition of developer tests were performed during the independent evaluator tests.
Since many Security Functions can be tested by TR-03110 APDU command sequences,
the evaluators performed these tests with real cards. This is considered to be a reasonable
approach because the developer tests include a full coverage of all security functionality.
Furthermore penetration tests were chosen by the evaluators for those Security Functions
where internal secrets of the card could maybe be modified or observed during testing.
During their independent testing, the evaluators covered:
● testing APDU commands related to Key Management and Crypto Functions,
● testing APDU commands related to NVM Management and File System,
● testing APDU commands related to Security Management,
● testing APDU commands related to Secure Messaging,
● testing APDU commands related to Runtime System and System Library,
● penetration testing related to verify the Reliability of the TOE,
● source code analysis performed by the evaluators,
● testing the commands which are used to execute the PACE protocol,
● side channel analysis for SHA, AES and ECC (including ECC key generation),
● fault injection attacks (LFI and BBI),
● testing APDU commands for the initialization, personalization and usage phase,
● testing APDU commands for the commands using cryptographic mechanisms, and
● fuzzy testing on APDU processing.
The evaluators have tested the TOE systematically against high attack potential during
their penetration testing.
The achieved test results correspond to the expected test results.
8. Evaluated Configuration
This certification covers the following configuration of the TOE:
STARCOS 3.5 ID GCC C3 as described in the Guidance Documents [13] and [14]. The
initialisation and personalisation agent can use the „GET PROTOCOL DATA command to
‟
read out the chip information and identify the chip. The following table describes the
evaluated configuration:
Command
parameters
Response Description
P1=’9F’
P2=’6B’
First eight bytes:
’05 77 33 00 A7 00 23 00
(configuration 1 and 2)’
Chip manufacturer data (Chip
manufacturer’s ROM mask ID)
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0952-V2-2016 Certification Report
Command
parameters
Response Description
P1=’9F’
P2=’6A’
First five bytes:
’47 44 00 B5 02’
(configuration 1 and 2)
Version of the operating system
(OS manufacturer /
OS version number /
Version of ROM mask)
P1=’9F’
P2=’67’
First three bytes:
’03 08 09’ (configuration 1)
'03 08 0A' (configuration 2)
Version of the completion level of the
operating system and initialisation table
Table 2: Chip information for the identification of the TOE
9. Results of the Evaluation
9.1. CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [9] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used and guidance specific for the technology
of the product [4] (AIS 34).
The following guidance specific for the technology was used:
● The Application of CC to Integrated Circuits,
● Application of Attack Potential to Smart Cards,
● Composite product evaluation for Smart Cards and similar devices (see AIS 36).
According to this concept the relevant guidance documents of the underlying platform
and the documents ETR for Composition from the platform evaluations (i.e. on hardware
[10], [16]) have been applied in the TOE evaluation.
(see [4], AIS 25, AIS 26, AIS 36).
For RNG assessment the scheme interpretations AIS 31 was used (see [4]).
As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
● All components of the EAL 4 package including the class ASE as defined in the CC (see
also part C of this report)
● The components ALC_DVS.2, ATE_DPT.2 and AVA_VAN.5 augmented for this TOE
evaluation.
As the evaluation work performed for this certification procedure was carried out as a
re-evaluation based on the certificate BSI-DSZ-CC-0952-2014 [21], re-use of specific
evaluation tasks was possible. The focus of this re-evaluation was on the change of the
underlying hardware platform and an updated version of the embedded software.
The evaluation has confirmed:
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● PP Conformance: Common Criteria Protection Profile Electronic Identity Card
(ID_Card PP), Version 1.03, 15 December 2009,
BSI-CC-PP-0061-2009 [7] and in accordance with
BSI Technische Richtlinie BSI-TR-03116-2 [16], 2016;
PP EN 419211-2:2013, BSI-CC-PP-0059-2009-MA-02 [30]
● for the Functionality: PP conformant
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
● for the Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 4 augmented by ALC_DVS.2, ATE_DPT.2 and AVA_VAN.5.
For specific evaluation results regarding the development and production environment see
annex B in part D of this report.
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
9.2. Results of cryptographic assessment
All cryptographic functionalities are described in detail in the Crypto Disclaimer of the
Security Target [6] and [8], chap. 9. The strength of the cryptographic algorithms was not
rated in the course of this certification procedure (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE
The documents as outlined in table 1 contain necessary information about the usage of the
TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered. In addition all aspects of
Assumptions, Threats and OSPs as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE
itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his
system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and
techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment for the
TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate
11. Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [8] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is
provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report. It is a sanitised version of
the complete Security Target [6] used for the evaluation performed. Sanitisation was
performed according to the rules as outlined in the relevant CCRA policy (see AIS 35 [4]).
12. Definitions
12.1. Acronyms
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
APDU Application Protocol Data Unit
BBI Body Biased Injection
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for
Information Security, Bonn, Germany
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BSIG BSI-Gesetz / Act on the Federal Office for Information Security
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
CSCA Country Signing Certification Authority
CVCA Country Verifying Certification Authority
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ECC Elliptic Curve Cryptography
EEPROM Electrically Erasable Programmable Read-Only Memory
eID Electronic Identity Card
IC Integrated Circuit
ICAO International Civil Aviation Organisation
ID_Card Identity Card
IT Information Technology
ITSEC Information Technology Security Evaluation Criteria
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
LFI Laser Fault Injection
NVM Non-Volatile Memory
PACE Password Authenticated Connection Establishment
PP Protection Profile
ROM Read Only Memory
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
SF Security Function
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionalities
12.2. Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.
Collaborative Protection Profile - A Protection Profile collaboratively developed by an
International Technical Community endorsed by the Management Committee.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in CC
part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in CC part 3.
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Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on
well-established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - A passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon which
subjects perform operations.
Package - named set of either security functional or security assurance requirements
Protection Profile - A formal document defined in CC, expressing an implementation
independent set of security requirements for a category of IT Products that meet specific
consumer needs.
Security Target - An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific
identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Subject - An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.
Target of Evaluation - An IT Product and its associated administrator and user guidance
documentation that is the subject of an Evaluation.
TOE Security Functionality - Combined functionality of all hardware, software, and
firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs.
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13. Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Part 1: Introduction and general model, Revision 4, September 2012
Part 2: Security functional components, Revision 4, September 2012
Part 3: Security assurance components, Revision 4, September 2012
http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Rev. 4, September 2012,
http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[3] BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process
(CC-Produkte) and Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation
Facility, approval and licencing (CC-Stellen), https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierung
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE10
https://www.bsi.bund.de/AIS
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148), periodically updated list published also
on the BSI Website, https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierungsreporte
[6] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-0952-V2-2016, Version 1.10, 06.12.2016, STARCOS
3.5 ID GCC C3 Security Target, Giesecke & Devrient GmbH (confidential document)
[7] Common Criteria Protection Profile Electronic Identity Card (ID_Card PP), Version
1.03, 15 December 2009, BSI-CC-PP-0061-2009, BSI
[8] Security Target Lite BSI-DSZ-CC-0952-V2-2016, Version 1.10, 06.12.2016,
STARCOS 3.5 ID GCC C3 Security Target lite, Giesecke & Devrient GmbH
(sanitised public document)
[9] Evaluation Technical Report, Version 1.3, 15.12.2016, Evaluation Technical Report
(ETR) STARCOS 3.5 ID GCC C3, SRC Security Research & Consulting GmbH
(confidential document)
10
specifically
• AIS 20, Version 3, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für deterministische
Zufallszahlengeneratoren
• AIS 25, Version 8, Anwendung der CC auf Integrierte Schaltungen including JIL Document and CC
Supporting Document
• AIS 26, Version 9, Evaluationsmethodologie für in Hardware integrierte Schaltungen including JIL
Document and CC Supporting Document
• AIS 31, Version 3, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für physikalische
Zufallszahlengeneratoren
• AIS 32, Version 7, CC-Interpretationen im deutschen Zertifizierungsschema
• AIS 34, Version 3, Evaluation Methodology for CC Assurance Classes for EAL 5+ (CCv2.3 &
CCv3.1) and EAL 6 (CCv3.1)
• AIS 35, Version 2, Öffentliche Fassung des Security Targets (ST-Lite) including JIL Document and
CC Supporting Document and CCRA policies
• AIS 36, Version 4, Kompositionsevaluierung including JIL Document and CC Supporting Document
• AIS 38, Version 2, Reuse of evaluation results
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[10] ETR for composite evaluation according to AIS 36 for the Product M7820 A11,
Version 5, 16.07.2015, TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH, Evaluation Body for IT
Security (confidential document)
[11] STARCOS 3.5 ID GCC C2 Configuration 1, Application Specification, Version 1.0,
14.03.2013, Giesecke & Devrient GmbH
[12] STARCOS 3.5 ID GCC C2 Configuration 2, Application Specification, Version 1.0,
14.03.2013, Giesecke & Devrient GmbH
[13] Guidance Documentation STARCOS 3.5 ID – Main Document, Version 0.5,
31.08.2011, Giesecke & Devrient GmbH
[14] Guidance Documentation for the Personalisation Phase STARCOS 3.5 ID GCC C3,
Version 1.3, 20.10.2016, Giesecke & Devrient GmbH
[15] Guidance Documentation for the Usage Phase STARCOS 3.5 ID GCC C2, Version
1.6, 19.03.2013, Giesecke & Devrient GmbH
[16] Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0829-V2-2015 for Infineon smart card IC (Security
Controller) M7820 A11 with optional RSA2048/4096 v1.02.013, ECv1.02.013,
SHA-2 v1.01 and Toolbox v1.02.013 libraries and with specific IC dedicated
software, 03 August 2015, BSI
Including the maintenance report BSI-DSZ-CC-0829-V2-2015-MA-01: Assurance
Continuity Maintenance Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0829-V2-2015-MA-01, Infineon smart
card IC (Security Controller) M7820 A11with optional RSA2048/4096 v1.02.013,
ECv1.02.013, SHA-2 v1.01and Toolbox v1.02.013 libraries and with specific IC
dedicated software, 30 March 2016, BSI
[17] BSI-TR-03110, Version 2.02, 09.11.2009, Advanced Security Mechanisms for
Machine Readable Travel Documents – Extended Access Control (EAC), Password
Authenticated Connection Establishment (PACE), and Restricted Identification (RI),
BSI
[18] BSI-TR-3116-2, Stand: 10.03.2016, eCard-Projekte der Bundesregierung, Teil 2 –
Hoheitliche Ausweisdokumente, BSI
[19] BSI-TR-03117, Version 1, 2009, eCards mit kontaktloser Schnittstelle als sichere
Signaturerstellungseinheit, BSI
[20] BSI-TR-03127, Version 1.15, 01.10.2012, Architektur elektronischer
Personalausweis und elektronischer Aufenthaltstitel, BSI
[21] Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0952-2014 for STARCOS 3.5 ID GCC C2R from
Giesecke & Devrient GmbH, 17.11.2014, BSI
[22] Site Certificate BSI-DSZ-CC-S-0070-2016 for Development Center Germany
(DCG), Zamdorfer Straße 88, 81677 München, Germany, 09.08.2016, BSI
[23] Site Certificate BSI-DSZ-CC-S-0057-2015 for SMT1, SMARTRAC TECHNOLOGY
Ltd. (Thailand),142 Moo, Hi-Tech Industrial Estate, Tambon BanLaean, Amphor
Bang-pa-In, 13160 Ayutthaya, Thailand, 28.12.2015, BSI
[24] Site Certificate BSI-DSZ-CC-S-0062-2016 for Giesecke & Devrient Slovakia, s.r.o.,
Dolné Hony11, 94901 Nitra, Slovakia, 13.05.2016, BSI
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[25] Site Certificate BSI-DSZ-CC-S-0053-2016 for Bundesdruckerei GmbH, Site for
ePassport, eCover, eID card, RP card, -inlay Production of Bundesdruckerei GmbH,
21.04.2016, BSI
[26] BSI-TR-03110-1, Version 2.10, 20.03.2012, Advanced Security Mechanisms for
Machine Readable Travel Documents – Part 1, BSI
[27] BSI-TR-03110-2, Version 2.10, 20.03.2012, Advanced Security Mechanisms for
Machine Readable Travel Documents – Part 2, BSI
[28] BSI-TR-03110-3, Version 2.10, 20.03.2012, Advanced Security Mechanisms for
Machine Readable Travel Documents – Part 3, BSI
[29] Configuration list for the TOE, Version 1.2, 06.12.2016, Konfigurationsliste von
STARCOS 3.5 ID GCC C3, Giesecke & Devrient GmbH (confidential document)
[30] BSI-CC-PP-0059-2009-MA-02, Common Criteria Protection Profile:
EN 419211-2:2013 - Protection profiles for secure signature creation device - Part 2:
Device with key generation, CEN/ISSS - Information Society Standardization
System, 18 May 2013
The standard is available at the Technical Bodies of the European Committee for
Standardization (CEN): https://standards.cen.eu/
For Germany, it can be obtained at Beuth Verlag, DIN's publishing house:
http://www.beuth.de/
[31] REGULATION (EU) No 910/2014 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF
THE COUNCIL of 23 July 2014 on electronic identification and trust services for
electronic transactions in the internal market and repealing Directive 1999/93/EC
[32] COMMISSION IMPLEMENTING DECISION (EU) 2016/650 of 25 April 2016, laying
down standards for the security assessment of qualified signature and seal creation
devices pursuant to Articles 30(3) and 39(2) of Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 of the
European Parliament and of the Council on electronic identification and trust
services for electronic transactions in the internal market
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C. Excerpts from the Criteria
CC Part 1:
Conformance Claim (chapter 10.4)
“The conformance claim indicates the source of the collection of requirements that is met
by a PP or ST that passes its evaluation. This conformance claim contains a CC
conformance claim that:
● describes the version of the CC to which the PP or ST claims conformance.
● describes the conformance to CC Part 2 (security functional requirements) as either:
– CC Part 2 conformant - A PP or ST is CC Part 2 conformant if all SFRs in that
PP or ST are based only upon functional components in CC Part 2, or
– CC Part 2 extended - A PP or ST is CC Part 2 extended if at least one SFR in
that PP or ST is not based upon functional components in CC Part 2.
● describes the conformance to CC Part 3 (security assurance requirements) as either:
– CC Part 3 conformant - A PP or ST is CC Part 3 conformant if all SARs in that
PP or ST are based only upon assurance components in CC Part 3, or
– CC Part 3 extended - A PP or ST is CC Part 3 extended if at least one SAR in
that PP or ST is not based upon assurance components in CC Part 3.
Additionally, the conformance claim may include a statement made with respect to
packages, in which case it consists of one of the following:
● Package name Conformant - A PP or ST is conformant to a pre-defined package
(e.g. EAL) if:
– the SFRs of that PP or ST are identical to the SFRs in the package, or
– the SARs of that PP or ST are identical to the SARs in the package.
● Package name Augmented - A PP or ST is an augmentation of a predefined package
if:
– the SFRs of that PP or ST contain all SFRs in the package, but have at least
one additional SFR or one SFR that is hierarchically higher than an SFR in the
package.
– the SARs of that PP or ST contain all SARs in the package, but have at least
one additional SAR or one SAR that is hierarchically higher than an SAR in the
package.
Note that when a TOE is successfully evaluated to a given ST, any conformance claims of
the ST also hold for the TOE. A TOE can therefore also be e.g. CC Part 2 conformant.
Finally, the conformance claim may also include two statements with respect to Protection
Profiles:
● PP Conformant - A PP or TOE meets specific PP(s), which are listed as part of the
conformance result.
● Conformance Statement (Only for PPs) - This statement describes the manner in
which PPs or STs must conform to this PP: strict or demonstrable. For more
information on this Conformance Statement, see Annex D.”
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CC Part 3:
Class APE: Protection Profile evaluation (chapter 10)
“Evaluating a PP is required to demonstrate that the PP is sound and internally consistent,
and, if the PP is based on one or more other PPs or on packages, that the PP is a correct
instantiation of these PPs and packages. These properties are necessary for the PP to be
suitable for use as the basis for writing an ST or another PP.
Assurance Class Assurance Components
Class APE: Protection
Profile evaluation
APE_INT.1 PP introduction
APE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
APE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
APE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment
APE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
APE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
APE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
APE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
APE: Protection Profile evaluation class decomposition”
Class ASE: Security Target evaluation (chapter 11)
“Evaluating an ST is required to demonstrate that the ST is sound and internally
consistent, and, if the ST is based on one or more PPs or packages, that the ST is a
correct instantiation of these PPs and packages. These properties are necessary for the
ST to be suitable for use as the basis for a TOE evaluation.”
Assurance Class Assurance Components
Class ASE: Security
Target evaluation
ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
ASE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
ASE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment
ASE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
ASE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
ASE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification
ASE_TSS.2 TOE summary specification with architectural design
summary
ASE: Security Target evaluation class decomposition
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Security assurance components (chapter 7)
“The following Sections describe the constructs used in representing the assurance
classes, families, and components.“
“Each assurance class contains at least one assurance family.”
“Each assurance family contains one or more assurance components.”
The following table shows the assurance class decomposition.
Assurance Class Assurance Components
ADV: Development ADV_ARC.1 Security architecture description
ADV_FSP.1 Basic functional specification
ADV_FSP.2 Security-enforcing functional specification
ADV_FSP.3 Functional specification with complete summary
ADV_FSP.4 Complete functional specification
ADV_FSP.5 Complete semi-formal functional specification with
additional error information
ADV_FSP.6 Complete semi-formal functional specification with
additional formal specification
ADV_IMP.1 Implementation representation of the TSF
ADV_IMP.2 Implementation of the TSF
ADV_INT.1 Well-structured subset of TSF internals
ADV_INT.2 Well-structured internals
ADV_INT.3 Minimally complex internals
ADV_SPM.1 Formal TOE security policy model
ADV_TDS.1 Basic design
ADV_TDS.2 Architectural design
ADV_TDS.3 Basic modular design
ADV_TDS.4 Semiformal modular design
ADV_TDS.5 Complete semiformal modular design
ADV_TDS.6 Complete semiformal modular design with formal
high-level design presentation
AGD:
Guidance documents
AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
ALC: Life cycle support
ALC_CMC.1 Labelling of the TOE
ALC_CMC.2 Use of a CM system
ALC_CMC.3 Authorisation controls
ALC_CMC.4 Production support, acceptance procedures and
automation
ALC_CMC.5 Advanced support
ALC_CMS.1 TOE CM coverage
ALC_CMS.2 Parts of the TOE CM coverage
ALC_CMS.3 Implementation representation CM coverage
ALC_CMS.4 Problem tracking CM coverage
ALC_CMS.5 Development tools CM coverage
ALC_DEL.1 Delivery procedures
ALC_DVS.1 Identification of security measures
ALC_DVS.2 Sufficiency of security measures
ALC_FLR.1 Basic flaw remediation
ALC_FLR.2 Flaw reporting procedures
ALC_FLR.3 Systematic flaw remediation
ALC_LCD.1 Developer defined life-cycle model
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Assurance Class Assurance Components
ALC_LCD.2 Measurable life-cycle model
ALC_TAT.1 Well-defined development tools
ALC_TAT.2 Compliance with implementation standards
ALC_TAT.3 Compliance with implementation standards - all parts
ATE: Tests
ATE_COV.1 Evidence of coverage
ATE_COV.2 Analysis of coverage
ATE_COV.3 Rigorous analysis of coverage
ATE_DPT.1 Testing: basic design
ATE_DPT.2 Testing: security enforcing modules
ATE_DPT.3 Testing: modular design
ATE_DPT.4 Testing: implementation representation
ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing
ATE_FUN.2 Ordered functional testing
ATE_IND.1 Independent testing – conformance
ATE_IND.2 Independent testing – sample
ATE_IND.3 Independent testing – complete
AVA: Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_VAN.1 Vulnerability survey
AVA_VAN.2 Vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.3 Focused vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.4 Methodical vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.5 Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis
Assurance class decomposition
Evaluation assurance levels (chapter 8)
“The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that balances the
level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of acquiring that degree of
assurance. The CC approach identifies the separate concepts of assurance in a TOE at
the end of the evaluation, and of maintenance of that assurance during the operational use
of the TOE.
It is important to note that not all families and components from CC Part 3 are included in
the EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful and desirable
assurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and components will be considered
for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and STs for which they provide utility.”
Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview (chapter 8.1)
“Table 1 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a hierarchically
ordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families. Each number in the
resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component where applicable.
As outlined in the next Section, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation assurance levels
are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE's assurance. They are hierarchically ordered
inasmuch as each EAL represents more assurance than all lower EALs. The increase in
assurance from EAL to EAL is accomplished by substitution of a hierarchically higher
assurance component from the same assurance family (i.e. increasing rigour, scope,
and/or depth) and from the addition of assurance components from other assurance
families (i.e. adding new requirements).
These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as described
in Chapter 7 of this CC Part 3. More precisely, each EAL includes no more than one
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component of each assurance family and all assurance dependencies of every component
are addressed.
While the EALs are defined in the CC, it is possible to represent other combinations of
assurance. Specifically, the notion of “augmentation” allows the addition of assurance
components (from assurance families not already included in the EAL) or the substitution
of assurance components (with another hierarchically higher assurance component in the
same assurance family) to an EAL. Of the assurance constructs defined in the CC, only
EALs may be augmented. The notion of an “EAL minus a constituent assurance
component” is not recognised by the standard as a valid claim. Augmentation carries with
it the obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility and added value of the
added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also be augmented with extended
assurance requirements.
Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL 1) - functionally tested (chapter 8.3)
“Objectives
EAL 1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but the threats
to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where independent assurance is
required to support the contention that due care has been exercised with respect to the
protection of personal or similar information.
EAL 1 requires only a limited security target. It is sufficient to simply state the SFRs that
the TOE must meet, rather than deriving them from threats, OSPs and assumptions
through security objectives.
EAL 1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer, including
independent testing against a specification, and an examination of the guidance
documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL 1 evaluation could be successfully
conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE, and for minimal outlay.
An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a manner
consistent with its documentation.”
Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL 2) - structurally tested (chapter 8.4)
“Objectives
EAL 2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of design
information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the part of the
developer than is consistent with good commercial practise. As such it should not require a
substantially increased investment of cost or time.
EAL 2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
low to moderate level of independently assured security in the absence of ready
availability of the complete development record. Such a situation may arise when securing
legacy systems, or where access to the developer may be limited.”
Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL 3) - methodically tested and checked (chapter 8.5)
“Objectives
EAL 3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from positive
security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of existing sound
development practises.
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EAL 3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a moderate
level of independently assured security, and require a thorough investigation of the TOE
and its development without substantial re-engineering.”
Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL 4) - methodically designed, tested, and reviewed
(chapter 8.6)
“Objectives
EAL 4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security engineering
based on good commercial development practises which, though rigorous, do not require
substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other resources. EAL 4 is the highest level at
which it is likely to be economically feasible to retrofit to an existing product line.
EAL 4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
moderate to high level of independently assured security in conventional commodity TOEs
and are prepared to incur additional security-specific engineering costs.”
Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL 5) - semiformally designed and tested (chapter
8.7)
“Objectives
EAL 5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security engineering based
upon rigorous commercial development practises supported by moderate application of
specialist security engineering techniques. Such a TOE will probably be designed and
developed with the intent of achieving EAL 5 assurance. It is likely that the additional costs
attributable to the EAL 5 requirements, relative to rigorous development without the
application of specialised techniques, will not be large.
EAL 5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
high level of independently assured security in a planned development and require a
rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable costs attributable to
specialist security engineering techniques.”
Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL 6) - semiformally verified design and tested
(chapter 8.8)
“Objectives
EAL 6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security engineering
techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to produce a premium TOE for
protecting high value assets against significant risks.
EAL 6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in high
risk situations where the value of the protected assets justifies the additional costs.”
Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL 7) - formally verified design and tested
(chapter 8.9)
“Objectives
EAL 7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in extremely high
risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies the higher costs. Practical
application of EAL 7 is currently limited to TOEs with tightly focused security functionality
that is amenable to extensive formal analysis.”
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Assurance
Class
Assurance
Family
Assurance Components by
Evaluation Assurance Level
EAL 1 EAL 2 EAL 3 EAL 4 EAL 5 EAL 6 EAL 7
Development ADV_ARC 1 1 1 1 1 1
ADV_FSP 1 2 3 4 5 5 6
ADV_IMP 1 1 2 2
ADV_INT 2 3 3
ADV_SPM 1 1
ADV_TDS 1 2 3 4 5 6
Guidance
Documents
AGD_OPE 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
AGD_PRE 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Life cycle
Support
ALC_CMC 1 2 3 4 4 5 5
ALC_CMS 1 2 3 4 5 5 5
ALC_DEL 1 1 1 1 1 1
ALC_DVS 1 1 1 2 2
ALC_FLR
ALC_LCD 1 1 1 1 2
ALC_TAT 1 2 3 3
Security Target
Evaluation
ASE_CCL 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_ECD 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_INT 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_OBJ 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
ASR_REQ 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
ASE_SPD 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_TSS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Tests ATE_COV 1 2 2 2 3 3
ATE_DPT 1 1 3 3 4
ATE_FUN 1 1 1 1 2 2
ATE_IND 1 2 2 2 2 2 3
Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_VAN 1 2 2 3 4 5 5
Table 1: Evaluation assurance level summary”
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Class AVA: Vulnerability assessment (chapter 16)
“The AVA: Vulnerability assessment class addresses the possibility of exploitable
vulnerabilities introduced in the development or the operation of the TOE.”
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VAN) (chapter 16.1)
“Objectives
Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether potential vulnerabilities
identified, during the evaluation of the development and anticipated operation of the TOE
or by other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses or quantitative or statistical analysis of the
security behaviour of the underlying security mechanisms), could allow attackers to violate
the SFRs.
Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that an attacker will be able to discover flaws
that will allow unauthorised access to data and functionality, allow the ability to interfere
with or alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorised capabilities of other users.”
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D. Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Security Target provided within a separate document.
Annex B: Evaluation results regarding development
and production environment
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Annex B of Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0952-V2-2016
Evaluation results regarding
development and production
environment
The IT product STARCOS 3.5 ID GCC C3 (Target of Evaluation, TOE) has been evaluated
at an approved evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security
Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 extended by advice of the Certification Body for
components beyond EAL 5 and guidance specific for the technology of the product for
conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1.
As a result of the TOE certification, dated 16 December 2016, the following results
regarding the development and production environment apply. The Common Criteria
assurance requirements ALC – Life cycle support (i.e. ALC_CMC.4, ALC_CMS.4,
ALC_DEL.1, ALC_DVS.2, ALC_LCD.1, ALC_TAT.1)
are fulfilled for the development and production sites of the TOE listed below:
a) Giesecke & Devrient GmbH, Development Center Germany, Zamdorfer-
strasse 88, 81677 Munich, Germany, Site Certificate
BSI-DSZ-CC-S-0070-2016 [22] (Development)
b) SMT1, SMARTRAC TECHNOLOGY Ltd. (Thailand),142 Moo, Hi-Tech
Industrial Estate, Tambon BanLaean, Amphor Bang-pa-In, 13160 Ayutthaya,
Thailand, Site Certificate BSI-DSZ-CC-S-0057-2015 [23] (Inlay embedding)
c) Giesecke & Devrient Slovakia, s.r.o., Dolné Hony11, 94901 Nitra, Slovakia, Site
Certificate BSI-DSZ-CC-S-0062-2016 [24] (Storage facility)
d) Bundesdruckerei GmbH, Site for ePassport,eCover, eID card, RP card, -inlay
Production of Bundesdruckerei GmbH, Germany, Site Certificate
BSI-DSZ-CC-S-0053-2016 [25] (Initialisation and inlay embedding)
For development and production sites regarding the chip platform please refer to the
certification report BSI-DSZ-CC-0829-V2-2015 [16].
For the sites listed above, the requirements have been specifically applied in accordance
with the Security Target [6]. The evaluators verified, that the threats, security objectives
and requirements for the TOE life cycle phases up to delivery (as stated in the Security
Target [6] and [8]) are fulfilled by the procedures of these sites.
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