Security Target Lite
STARCOS 3.3 Passport
Edition Version 2.0b
Version 1.0 / Status 24.09.2008
Author G&D/CSOP43
Status Released
Giesecke & Devrient GmbH
Prinzregentenstr. 159
Postfach 80 07 29
D-81607 München
© Copyright 2008 by
Giesecke & Devrient GmbH
Prinzregentenstr. 159
Postfach 80 07 29
D-81607 München
Subject to technical changes.
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Contents
Contents
1 Introduction...................................................................................................................................... 5
1.1 ST Identification................................................................................................................................5
1.2 ST Overview .....................................................................................................................................5
1.3 CC Conformance...............................................................................................................................6
1.4 Change History..................................................................................................................................6
1.5 Tables ................................................................................................................................................6
1.6 Application Notes of the PP..............................................................................................................6
2 TOE Description .............................................................................................................................. 7
2.1 TOE definition ..................................................................................................................................7
2.2 TOE usage and security features for operational use........................................................................8
2.3 TOE life cycle ...................................................................................................................................9
2.3.1 Phase 1 “Development”.................................................................................................................................. 10
2.3.2 Phase 2 “Manufacturing”................................................................................................................................ 10
2.3.3 Phase 3 “Personalization of the MRTD”........................................................................................................ 10
2.3.4 Phase 4 “Operational Use” ............................................................................................................................. 11
3 Security Problem Definition .......................................................................................................... 12
3.1 Introduction.....................................................................................................................................12
3.1.1 Assets.............................................................................................................................................................. 12
3.1.2 Subjects .......................................................................................................................................................... 12
3.2 Assumptions....................................................................................................................................14
3.2.1 A.Pers_Agent Personalization of the MRTD’s chip...................................................................................... 14
3.2.2 A.Insp_Sys Inspection Systems for global interoperability........................................................................... 14
3.3 Threats.............................................................................................................................................14
3.3.1 T.Chip_ID Identification of MRTD’s chip.................................................................................................... 14
3.3.2 T.Skimming Skimming the logical MRTD ................................................................................................... 14
3.3.3 T.Eavesdropping Eavesdropping to the communication between TOE and inspection system .................... 15
3.3.4 T.Forgery Forgery of data on MRTD’s chip ................................................................................................ 15
3.3.5 T.Abuse-Func Abuse of Functionality .......................................................................................................... 15
3.3.6 T.Information_Leakage Information Leakage from MRTD’s chip............................................................... 15
3.3.7 T.Phys-Tamper Physical Tampering ............................................................................................................. 16
3.3.8 T.Malfunction Malfunction due to Environmental Stress ............................................................................. 16
3.3.9 T.Counterfeit MRTD’s chip ........................................................................................................................... 16
3.4 Organisational Security Policies .....................................................................................................17
3.4.1 P.Manufact Manufacturing of the MRTD’s chip........................................................................................... 17
3.4.2 P.Personalization Personalization of the MRTD by issuing State or Organization only............................... 17
3.4.3 P.Personal_Data Personal data protection policy .......................................................................................... 17
3.5 Security Objectives .........................................................................................................................17
3.5.1 Security Objectives for the TOE.................................................................................................................... 17
3.5.2 Security Objectives for the Development and Manufacturing Environment.................................................. 20
3.5.3 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment.................................................................................... 20
4 Extended Components Definition.................................................................................................. 22
4.1 Definition of the Family FAU_SAS ...............................................................................................22
4.1.1 FAU_SAS Audit data storage......................................................................................................................... 22
4.1.2 FAU_SAS.1 Audit storage ............................................................................................................................. 22
4.2 Definition of the Family FCS_RND ...............................................................................................22
4.2.1 FCS_RND Generation of random numbers.................................................................................................... 23
4.3 Definition of the Family FIA_API..................................................................................................23
4.3.1 FIA_API Authentication Prove of Identity..................................................................................................... 23
4.4 Definition of the Family FMT_LIM ...............................................................................................24
4.4.1 FMT_LIM Limited capabilities and availability ............................................................................................ 24
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Contents
4.5 Definition of the Family FPT_EMSEC...........................................................................................25
4.5.1 FPT_EMSEC.1 TOE Emanation.................................................................................................................... 26
5 Security Requirements ................................................................................................................... 27
5.1 Security Functional Requirements for the TOE..............................................................................27
5.1.1 Class FAU Security Audit .............................................................................................................................. 27
5.1.2 Class Cryptographic Support (FCS) ............................................................................................................... 28
5.1.3 Class FIA Identification and Authentication .................................................................................................. 31
5.1.4 Class FDP User Data Protection..................................................................................................................... 34
5.1.5 Class FMT Security Management .................................................................................................................. 38
5.1.6 Class FPT Protection of the Security Functions ............................................................................................. 41
5.2 Security Assurance Requirements for the TOE ..............................................................................44
5.2.1 TOE Security Assurance Requirements ......................................................................................................... 44
5.3 Security Requirements for the IT environment...............................................................................45
5.3.1 Passive Authentication ................................................................................................................................... 45
5.3.2 Basic Inspection Systems ............................................................................................................................... 45
5.3.3 Personalization Terminals .............................................................................................................................. 50
6 TOE Summary Specification ......................................................................................................... 51
6.1 TOE Security Functions..................................................................................................................51
6.1.1 SF.ACCESS (Access Control)........................................................................................................................ 51
6.1.2 SF.ADMIN (Administration of the TOE)....................................................................................................... 52
6.1.3 SF.AUTH (Authentication of the authorized TOE user)................................................................................ 52
6.1.4 SF.CRYPTO (Cryptographic Support)........................................................................................................... 53
6.1.5 SF.PROTECTION (Protection of TSC) ......................................................................................................... 54
6.1.6 SF.IC (Security Functions of the IC).............................................................................................................. 54
6.2 Assurance Measures........................................................................................................................54
7 PP Claims....................................................................................................................................... 56
7.1 PP Reference ...................................................................................................................................56
7.2 PP Additions....................................................................................................................................56
8 Rationale ........................................................................................................................................ 57
8.1 Security Objectives Rationale.........................................................................................................57
8.2 Security Requirements Rationale....................................................................................................60
8.2.1 Security Functional Requirements Rationale ................................................................................................. 60
8.2.2 Dependency Rationale.................................................................................................................................... 66
8.2.3 Security Assurance Requirements Rationale.................................................................................................. 72
8.2.4 Security Requirements – Mutual Support and Internal Consistency .............................................................. 73
8.2.5 Rationale for Strength of Function High ........................................................................................................ 73
8.3 Rationale for TOE Summary Specification ....................................................................................74
8.3.1 Rationale for TOE Security Functions ........................................................................................................... 74
8.3.2 Rationale for Assurance Measures ................................................................................................................. 86
8.4 Rationale for PP Claims..................................................................................................................88
8.5 Statement of compatibility ..............................................................................................................89
8.5.1 Classification of Platform TSFs...................................................................................................................... 89
8.5.2 Matching statement ........................................................................................................................................ 89
9 Appendix........................................................................................................................................ 95
9.1 Glossary and Acronyms ..................................................................................................................95
9.2 Acronyms ......................................................................................................................................100
9.3 References.....................................................................................................................................100
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1 Introduction
1 Introduction
1.1 ST Identification
Title: Security Target Lite STARCOS 3.3 Passport Edition Version 2.0b
Reference: GDM_STA33_MRTD_ ASE_00
Version Number/Date: Version 1.0 / Status 24.09.2008
Origin: Giesecke & Devrient GmbH
Author: Jan Eichholz
Compliant to: Common Criteria Protection Profile — Machine Readable Travel
Document with ”ICAO Application”, Basic Access Control, Version 1.0, 18.08.2005,
BSI-PP-0017 [21a]
TOE name: Security Target Lite STARCOS 3.3 Passport Edition Version 2.0b
TOE version: 2.0b
TOE documentation:
- Administrator Guidance [27]
- User Guidance [28]
- STARCOS33PETABLES [29]
HW-Part of TOE: NXP P5CD080V0B (BSI-DSZ-CC-0410-2007) [24]
1.2 ST Overview
The aim of this document is to describe the Security Target for STARCOS 3.3 Passport
Edition Version 2.0b for Passport Booklet IC.
The related product is the STARCOS 3.3 Passport Edition Version 2.0b Operating
System (OS) on a Smart Card Integrated Circuit. It is intended to be used as Passport
Booklet IC in accordance with [21a] so the TOE consists of the related software in
combination with the underlying hardware ('Composite Evaluation'). 'STARCOS 3.3
Passport Edition Version 2.0b fulfils the requirements specified in [5].
STARCOS 3.3 Passport Edition Version 2.0b is a fully interoperable ISO 7816
compliant multi-application Smart Card OS, including a cryptographic library enabling
the user to apply TDES.
Additionally to BSI-PP-0017 [21a] the STARCOS 3.3 Passport Edition Version 2.0b
supports the Active Authentication mechanism [7].
The software part of the TOE is implemented on the IC NXP P5CD080V0B which is
certified according to CC EAL5+ [24]. So the TOE consists of the software part and the
underlying hardware.
This document describes
• the Target of Evaluation (TOE)
• the security environment of the TOE
• the security objectives of the TOE and its environment
• and the TOE security functional and assurance requirements.
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1 Introduction
The assurance level for the TOE is CC EAL4+.
The minimum strength level for the TOE security functions is high (SOF high).
1.3 CC Conformance
This TOE claims conformance to: Common Criteria V2.3 (ISO 15408) (see [1], [2], [3])
as follows:
- Part 2 extended,
- Part 3 conformant,
- Package conformant to EAL4 augmented with ADV_IMP.2 and ALC_DVS.2.
The TOE meets the specific BSI PP: Protection Profile — Machine Readable Travel
Document with ICAO Application as stated in [21a]).
1.4 Change History
Version Date Changes Remarks
1.0 24.09.08 Final Version eij
1.5 Tables
Table 1 Overview on authentication SFR ............................................................................................. 31
Table 2 Assurance Requirements: EAL (4+) ........................................................................................ 44
Table 3 SOF claims for TOE Security Functions.................................................................................. 51
Table 4 References of Assurance Measures.......................................................................................... 55
Table 5 Security Objective Rationale.................................................................................................... 57
Table 6 Coverage of Security Objective for the TOE by SFR.............................................................. 61
Table 7 Coverage of Security Objectives for the IT environment by SFR ........................................... 65
Table 8 Dependencies between the SFR for the TOE......................................................................... 69
Table 9 Dependencies between the SFR for the IT environment ....................................................... 71
Table 10 Functional Requirements to Security Function mapping......................................................... 76
Table 11 Assurance Requirements to Assurance Measures mapping..................................................... 87
Table 12 Classification of Platform-TSFs............................................................................................... 89
Table 13 Mapping of threats.................................................................................................................... 90
Table 14 Mapping of assumptions .......................................................................................................... 91
Table 15 Mapping of objectives.............................................................................................................. 92
Table 16 Mapping of SFRs...................................................................................................................... 93
1.6 Application Notes of the PP
When applicable the application notes of the PP are discussed in notes.
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2 TOE Description
2 TOEDescription
Parts of this chapter have been taken from [21a].
2.1 TOE definition
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the contactless integrated circuit chip of machine
readable travel documents (MRTD’s chip) programmed according to the Logical Data
Structure (LDS) [6] and providing the Basic Access Control according to the ICAO
document [7].
The TOE comprises of
- the circuitry of the MRTD’s chip (the integrated circuit, IC) with hardware for the
contactless interface, e.g. antenna, capacitors,
- the IC Dedicated Software with the parts IC Dedicated Test Software and IC
Dedicated Support Software,
- the IC Embedded Software (operating system),
- the MRTD application
- the associated guidance documentation Administrator Guidance [27], User Guidance
[28], STARCOS33PETABLES [29] and
- the GMA Verifier1
[30].
NXP P5CD080V0B
certified CC EAL 5+
Operating System
STARCOS 3.3 and Keys
IC
ROM
MRTD Application
PIN
Keys
Access Conditions
Logical MRTD Data
EEPROM
Figure 1 TOE description
1
The GMA Verifier is not part of the TOE delivery. It is solely used by the MRTD Manufacturer for the
correct installation of the TOE and therefore of no use for the Personalisation Agent.
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2 TOE Description
2.2 TOE usage and security features for operational use
State or organisation issues MRTD to be used by the holder for international travel.
The traveller presents a MRTD to the inspection system to prove his or her identity.
The MRTD in context of this security target contains (i) visual (eye readable)
biographical data and portrait of the holder, (ii) a separate data summary (MRZ data) for
visual and machine reading using OCR methods in the Machine readable zone
(MRZ) and (iii) data elements on the MRTD’s chip according to LDS for contactless
machine reading. The authentication of the traveller is based on (i) the possession of a
valid MRTD personalized for a holder with the claimed identity as given on the
biographical data page and (ii) biometrics using the reference data stored in the MRTD.
The issuing State or Organization ensure the authenticity of the data of genuine
MRTD’s. The receiving State trusts a genuine MRTD of an issuing State or
Organization.
For this security target the MRTD is viewed as unit of
(a) the physical MRTD as travel document in form of paper, plastic and chip. It presents
visual readable data including (but not limited to) personal data of the
MRTD holder
(1) the biographical data on the biographical data page of the passport book,
(2) the printed data in the Machine-Readable Zone (MRZ) and
(3) the printed portrait.
(b) the logical MRTD as data of the MRTD holder stored according to the Logical Data
Structure [6] as specified by ICAO on the contactless integrated circuit. It
presents contactless readable data including (but not limited to) personal data of
the MRTD holder
(1) the digital Machine Readable Zone Data (digital MRZ data, DG1),
(2) the digitized portraits (DG2),
(3) the optional biometric reference data of finger(s) (DG3) or iris image(s)
(DG4) or both2
(4) the other data according to LDS (DG5 to DG16) and
(5) the Document security object.
The issuing State or Organization implements security features of the MRTD to maintain
the authenticity and integrity of the MRTD and their data. The MRTD as the passport
book and the MRTD’s chip is uniquely identified by the document number.
The physical MRTD is protected by physical security measures (e.g. watermark on
paper, security printing), logical (e.g. authentication keys of the MRTD’s chip) and
organisational security measures (e.g. control of materials, personalization procedures)
[8]. These security measures include the binding of the MRTD’s chip to the passport
book.
2
These additional biometric reference data are optional.
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2 TOE Description
The logical MRTD is protected in authenticity and integrity by a digital signature created
by the document signer acting for the issuing State or Organization and the security
features of the MRTD’s chip.
The ICAO defines the baseline security methods Passive Authentication and the
optional advanced security methods Basic Access Control to the logical MRTD, Active
Authentication of the MRTD’s chip, Extended Access Control to and the Data
Encryption of additional biometrics as optional security measure in the ICAO Technical
Report [7]. The Passive Authentication Mechanism and the Data Encryption are
performed completely and independently on the TOE by the TOE environment.
This security target addresses the protection of the logical MRTD (i) in integrity by
write-only-once access control and by physical means, and (ii) in confidentiality by the
Basic Access Control Mechanism and the Extended Access Control Mechanism.
The Basic Access Control is a security feature that shall be mandatory implemented by
the TOE. The inspection system (i) reads optically the MRTD, (ii) authenticates itself as
inspection system by means of Document Basic Access Keys. After successful
authentication of the inspection system the MRTD’s chip provides read access to the
logical MRTD by means of private communication (secure messaging) with this
inspection system [7], Annex E, and [6].
The security target requires the TOE to implement the Active Authentication described
in [7]. This protocol provides evidence of the MRTD’s chip authenticity.
2.3 TOE life cycle
The TOE life cycle is described in terms of the four life cycle phases.
Personalisation
Data (5)
Issuing
State
Transponder
Inlays (4) Personalisa ion
t
Agent
IC
Manufacturer
Transponder
Inlays (2)
ROM Mask
including data to ensure
for secure loading of
initialisation (1)
Initialisation
Data (3)
MRTD
Manufacturer
OS
Developer
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2 TOE Description
Figure 2 ROM Mask generation and delivery and Initialisation/Personalisation
(example)
2.3.1 Phase 1 “Development”
The TOE is developed in phase 1. The IC developer develops the integrated circuit, the
IC Dedicated Software and the guidance documentation associated with these TOE
Components.
The software developer uses the guidance documentation for the integrated circuit and
the guidance documentation for relevant parts of the IC Dedicated Software and
develops the IC Embedded Software (operating system), the MRTD application and the
guidance documentation associated with these TOE components.
The manufacturing documentation of the IC including the IC Dedicated Software and
the Embedded Software in the non-volatile non-programmable memories (ROM) is
securely delivered to the IC manufacturer((1) of figure 2). The IC Embedded Software in
the nonvolatile programmable memories, the MRTD application, the initialisation data
((3) of figure 2). and the guidance documentation is securely delivered to the MRTD
manufacturer ((2) of figure 2).
2.3.2 Phase 2 “Manufacturing”
In a first step the TOE integrated circuit is produced containing the MRTD’s chip
Dedicated Software and the parts of the MRTD’s chip Embedded Software in the
nonvolatile non-programmable memories (ROM). The IC manufacturer writes the IC
Identification Data onto the chip to control the IC as MRTD material during the IC
manufacturing and the delivery process to the MRTD manufacturer. The IC is securely
delivered from the IC manufacturer to the MRTD manufacturer ((2) of figure 2)..
The MRTD manufacturer (i) add the parts of the IC Embedded Software in the
nonvolatile programmable memories (for instance EEPROM) if necessary, (ii) creates
the MRTD application, and (iii) equips MRTD’s chip with Per-personalization Data and
(iv) packs the IC with hardware for the contactless interface in the passport book.
The pre-personalized MRTD together with the IC Identifier is securely delivered from
the MRTD manufacturer to the Personalization Agent ((4) of figure 2).. The MRTD
manufacturer also provides the relevant parts of the guidance documentation to the
Personalization Agent.
2.3.3 Phase 3 “Personalization of the MRTD”
The personalization of the MRTD includes (i) the survey of the MRTD holder
biographical data, (ii) the enrolment of the MRTD holder biometric reference data (i.e.
the digitized portraits and the optional biometric reference data), (iii) the printing of the
visual readable data onto the physical MRTD and their secure transfer to the
personalisation agent ((4) of figure 2)., (iv) the writing of the TOE User Data and
TSF Data into the logical MRTD and (v) the writing the TSF Data into the logical
MRTD and configuration of the TSF if necessary. The step (iv) is performed by the
Personalization Agent and includes but is not limited to the creation of (i) the digital
MRZ data (DG1), (ii) the digitised portrait (DG2), and (iii) the Document security
object.
The signing of the Document security object by the Document signer [7] finalizes the
personalization of the genuine MRTD for the MRTD holder. The personalized MRTD
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2 TOE Description
(together with appropriate guidance for TOE use if necessary) is handed over to the
MRTD holder for operational use.
Note 1: This security target distinguishes between the Personalization Agent as entity known to
the TOE and the Document Signer as entity in the TOE IT environment signing the Document
security object as described in [7]. This approach allows but does not enforce the separation of
these roles.. The TOE supports asymmetric and symmetric authentication of the
Personalization Agent.
2.3.4 Phase 4 “Operational Use”
The TOE is used as MRTD’s chip by the traveller and the inspection systems in the
“Operational Use” phase. The user data can be read according to the security policy of
the Issuing State or Organization and used according to the security policy of the Issuing
State but they can never be modified.
Note 2: The TOE does not allow the Re-Personalisation of the MRTD in the Phase 4 Operational Use.
Note 3: The point of TOE delivery according to CC in this ST is after phase 2. The secure transfer of the TOE
between the manufacturer and the personalisation site has to be realised.
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3 Security Problem Definition
3 SecurityProblemDefinition
This chapter has been taken from [21a] with minor modifications by adding the Active
Authentication mechanism indicated by underlined and bold text..
3.1 Introduction
3.1.1 Assets
The assets to be protected by the TOE include the User Data on the MRTD’s chip.
3.1.1.1 Logical MRTD Data
The logical MRTD data consists of the data groups DG1 to DG16 and the Document
Security Object EF.SOD according to LDS [6]. These data are user data of the TOE. The
data groups DG1 to DG14 and.DG16 contain personal data of the MRTD holder. The
Active Authentication Public Key Info in DG 15 is used by the inspection system for
Active Authentication of the chip. The Document security object is used by the
inspection system for Passive Authentication of the logical MRTD. The Active
Authentication public key is stored in EF.DG 15.
A
n
a
d
User Data TSF Data
Personal Data of the MRTD holder (EF.DG1, EF.DG2,
EF.DG5 - EF.DG13, EF.DG16)
Personalisation Agent Reference
Authentication Data
Sensitive biometric reference data (EF.DG3, EF.DG4) Basic Access Control (BAC) Key
Active Authentication Public Key in EF.DG15 Active Authentication Private
Key
Document Security Object (SOD) in EF.SOD
Common data in EF.COM
An Additional asset is the following more general one.
3.1.1.2 Authenticity of the MRTD’s chip
The authenticity of the MRTD’s chip personalized by the issuing State or Organization
for the MRTD’s holder is used by the traveller to proof his possessing of a
genuine MRTD.
3.1.2 Subjects
This security target considers the following subjects:
3.1.2.1 Manufacturer
The generic term for the IC Manufacturer producing the integrated circuit and the
MRTD Manufacturer completing the IC to the MRTD’s chip. The Manufacturer is the
default user of the TOE during the Phase 2 Manufacturing. The TOE does not
distinguish between the users IC Manufacturer and MRTD Manufacturer using this role
Manufacturer.
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3 Security Problem Definition
3.1.2.2 MRTD Holder
The rightful holder of the MRTD for whom the issuing State or Organization
personalised the MRTD.
3.1.2.3 Traveller
Person presenting the MRTD to the inspection system and claiming the identity of the
MRTD holder.
3.1.2.4 Personalization Agent
The agent is acting on the behalf of the issuing State or Organisation to personalize the
MRTD for the holder by some or all of the following activities (i) establishing the
identity the holder for the biographic data in the MRTD, (ii) enrolling the biometric
reference data of the MRTD holder i.e. the portrait, the encoded finger image(s) and/or
the encoded iris image(s) (iii) writing these data on the physical and logical MRTD for
the holder as defined for global, international and national interoperability, (iv) writing the
initial TSF data and and (iv) signing the Document Security Object defined in [6].
3.1.2.5 Inspection system (IS)
A technical system used by the border control officer of the receiving State (i) examining
an MRTD presented by the traveller and verifying its authenticity and (ii) verifying the
traveller as MRTD holder. The Primary Inspection System (PIS) (i) contains a terminal
for the contactless communication with the MRTD’s chip, (ii) and does not implement
the terminals part of the Basic Access Control Mechanism. The Primary Inspection
System can read the logical MRTD only if the Basic Access Control
is disabled. The Basic Inspection System (BIS) (i) contains a terminal for the
contactless communication with the MRTD’s chip, (ii) implements the terminals part of
the Basic Access Control Mechanis and (iii) gets the authorization to read the logical
MRTD under the Basic Access Control by optical reading the MRTD or other parts of
the passport book providing this information. Optionally, a BIS may supports Active
Authentication. The Extended Inspection System (EIS) in addition to the Basic Inspection
System (i) implements the Active Authentication Mechanism, (ii) supports the terminals
part of the Extended Access Control Authentication Mechanism and (iii) is authorized by
the issuing State or Organization to read the optional biometric reference data.
Note: 4: This security target does not distinguish between the BIS and EIS because the Active
Authentication and the Extended Access Control is outside the scope.
3.1.2.6 Terminal
A terminal is any technical system communicating with the TOE through the
contactless interface.
3.1.2.7 Attacker
A threat agent trying (i) to identify and to trace the movement the MRTD’s chip
remotely (i.e. without knowing or reading the printed MRZ data), (ii) to read or to
manipulate the logical MRTD without authorization, or (iii) to forge a genuine MRTD.
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3 Security Problem Definition
3.2 Assumptions
The assumptions describe the security aspects of the environment in which the TOE will
be used or is intended to be used.
3.2.1 A.Pers_Agent Personalization of the MRTD’s chip
The Personalization Agent ensures the correctness of (i) the logical MRTD with respect
to the MRTD holder, (ii) the Document Basic Access Keys, (iii) the Active
Authentication Public Key (DG15) if stored on the MRTD's chip and (iv) the Document
Signer Public Key Certificate (if stored on the MRTD’s chip). The Personalization Agent
signs the Document Security Object. The Personalization Agent bears the
Personalization Agent Authentication to authenticate himself to the TOE by symmetric
cryptographic mechanisms.
3.2.2 A.Insp_Sys Inspection Systems for global interoperability
The Inspection System is used by the border control officer of the receiving State (i)
examining an MRTD presented by the traveller and verifying its authenticity and (ii)
verifying the traveller as MRTD holder. The Primary Inspection System for global
interoperability contains the Country Signing Public Key and the Document Signer
Public Key of each issuing State or Organization [7]. The Primary Inspection System
performs the Passive Authentication to verify the logical MRTD if the logical MRTD is
not protected by Basic Access Control. The Basic Inspection System in addition to the
Primary Inspection System implements the terminal part of the Basic Access Control
and reads the logical MRTD being under Basic access Control.
Note 5: The TOE does not allow the Personalization agent to disable the Basic Access Control for
use with Primary Inspection Systems.
3.3 Threats
This section describes the threats to be averted by the TOE independently or in
collaboration with its IT environment. These threats result from the TOE method of use
in the operational environment and the assets stored in or protected by the TOE.
The TOE in collaboration with its IT environment shall avert the threats as specified
below.
3.3.1 T.Chip_ID Identification of MRTD’s chip
An attacker trying to trace the movement of the MRTD by identifying remotely the
MRTD’s chip by establishing or listening a communication through the contactless
communication interface. The attacker cannot read optically and does not know in
advance the physical MRTD.
3.3.2 T.Skimming Skimming the logical MRTD
An attacker imitates the inspection system to read the logical MRTD or parts of it via
the contactless communication channel of the TOE. The attacker can not read and
does not know in advance the physical MRTD.
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3.3.3 T.Eavesdropping Eavesdropping to the communication between
TOE and inspection system
An attacker is listening to the communication between the MRTD’s chip and an
inspection system to gain the logical MRTD or parts of it. The inspection system uses
the MRZ data printed on the MRTD data page but the attacker does not know this data
in advance.
Note in case of T.Skimming the attacker is establishing a communication with the
MRTD’s chip not knowing the MRZ data printed on the MRTD data page and without a
help of the inspection system which knows these data. In case of T.Eavesdropping the
attacker uses the communication of the inspection system.
3.3.4 T.Forgery Forgery of data on MRTD’s chip
An attacker alters fraudulently the complete stored logical MRTD or any part of it
including its security related data in order to impose on an inspection system by means
of the changed MRTD holder’s identity or biometric reference data.
This threat comprises several attack scenarios of MRTD forgery. The attacker may alter
the biographical data on the biographical data page of the passport book, in the printed
MRZ and in the digital MRZ to claim another identity of the traveller. The attacker may
alter the printed portrait and the digitized portrait to overcome the visual inspection of
the inspection officer and the automated biometric authentication mechanism by face
recognition. The attacker may alter the biometric reference data to defeat automated
biometric authentication mechanism of the inspection system. The attacker may combine
data groups of different logical MRTDs to create a new forged MRTD, e.g. the attacker
write the digitized portrait and optional biometric reference data of finger read from the
logical MRTD of a traveller into an other MRTD’s chip leaving their digital MRZ
unchanged to claim the identity of the holder this MRTD. The attacker may also copy the
complete unchanged logical MRTD in another contactless chip.
3.3.5 T.Abuse-Func Abuse of Functionality
An attacker may use functions of the TOE which shall not be used in TOE operational
phase in order (i) to manipulate User Data, (ii) to manipulate (explore, bypass, deactivate
or change) security features or functions of the TOE or (iii) to disclose or to manipulate
TSF Data.
This threat addresses misuse of the functions for the initialization and the personalization
in the operational state after delivery to MRTD holder.
3.3.6 T.Information_Leakage Information Leakage from MRTD’s
chip
An attacker may exploit information which is leaked from the TOE during its usage in
order to disclose confidential TSF data. The information leakage may be inherent in the
normal operation or caused by the attacker.
Leakage may occur through emanations, variations in power consumption, I/O charac-
teristics, clock frequency, or by changes in processing time requirements. This leakage
may be interpreted as a covert channel transmission but is more closely related to meas-
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3 Security Problem Definition
urement of operating parameters which may be derived either from measurements of the
contactless interface (emanation) or direct measurements (by contact to the chip still
available even for a contactless chip) and can then be related to the specific operation
being performed. Examples are the Differential Electromagnetic Analysis (DEMA) and
the Differential Power Analysis (DPA). Moreover the attacker may try actively to
enforce information leakage by fault injection (e.g. Differential Fault Analysis).
3.3.7 T.Phys-Tamper Physical Tampering
An attacker may perform physical probing of the MRTD’s chip in order (i) to disclose
TSF Data, or (ii) to disclose/reconstruct the MRTD’s chip Embedded Software. An
attacker may physically modify the MRTD’s chip in order to (i) modify security features
or functions of the MRTD’s chip, (ii) modify security functions of the MRTD’s chip
Embedded Software, (iii) to modify User Data or (iv) to modify TSF data.
The physical tampering may be focused directly on the discloser or manipulation of
TOE User Data (e.g. the biometric reference data for the inspection system) or TSF
Data (e.g. authentication key of the MRTD’s chip) or indirectly by preparation of the
TOE to following attack methods by modification of security features (e.g. to enable
information leakage through power analysis). Physical tampering requires direct
interaction with the MRTD’s chip internals. Techniques commonly employed in IC
failure analysis and IC reverse engineering efforts may be used. Before that hardware
security mechanisms and layout characteristics need to be identified. Determination of
software design including treatment of User Data and TSF Data may also be a
prerequisite.
The modification may result in the deactivation of a security function. Changes of
circuitry or data can be permanent or temporary.
3.3.8 T.Malfunction Malfunction due to Environmental Stress
An attacker may cause a malfunction of TSF or of the MRTD’s chip Embedded
Software by applying environmental stress in order to (i) deactivate or modify security
features or functions of the TOE or (ii) circumvent or deactivate or modify security
functions of the MRTD’s chip Embedded Software.
This may be achieved e.g. by operating the MRTD’s chip outside the normal operating
conditions, exploiting errors in the MRTD’s chip Embedded Software or misuse of
administration function. To exploit these vulnerabilities an attacker needs information
about the functional operation.
3.3.9 T.Counterfeit MRTD’s chip
An attacker with high attack potential produces an unauthorized copy or reproduction of
a genuine MRTD’s chip to be used as part of a counterfeit MRTD. This violates the
authenticity of the MRTD’s chip used for authentication of a traveller by possession of a
MRTD.
The attacker may generate a new data set or extract completely or partially the data from
a genuine MRTD’s chip and copy them on another appropriate chip to imitate this
genuine MRTD’s chip.
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3 Security Problem Definition
3.4 Organisational Security Policies
The TOE shall comply with the following organisation security policies (OSP) as
security rules, procedures, practices, or guidelines imposed by an organisation upon its
operations (see CC part 1 [1], sec. 3.2).
3.4.1 P.Manufact Manufacturing of the MRTD’s chip
The IC Manufacturer and MRTD Manufacturer ensure the quality and the security of
the manufacturing process and control the MRTD’s material in the Phase 2
Manufacturing. The Initialization Data are written by the IC Manufacturer to identify the
IC uniquely. The MRTD Manufacturer writes the Pre-personalization Data which
contains at least the Personalization Agent Key.
3.4.2 P.Personalization Personalization of the MRTD by issuing
State or Organization only
The issuing State or Organization guarantees the correctness of the biographical data,
the printed portrait and the digitised portrait, the biometric reference data and other
data of the logical MRTD with respect to the MRTD holder. The personalization of the
MRTD for the holder is performed by authorized agents of the issuing State or
Organization only.
3.4.3 P.Personal_Data Personal data protection policy
The biographical data and their summary printed in the MRZ and stored on the MRTD’s
chip (.DG1), the printed portrait and the digitised portrait (DG2), the biometric reference
data of finger(s) (DG3), the biometric reference data of iris image(s) (DG4) and data
according to LDS (DG5 toDG13, DG16) stored on the MRTD’s chip are personal data of
the MRTD holder. These data groups are intended to be used only with agreement of the
MRTD holder i.e. if the MRTD is presented to an inspection system. Additional to the
Basic Access Control Authentication defined by ICAO in [7] the MRTD’s chip shall
protect the confidentiality and integrity of the personal data during transmission to the
General Inspection System after Chip authentication.
Note 6: The organisational security policy P.Personal_Data is drawn from the ICAO Technical
Report [7]. Note that the Document Basic Access Key is defined by the TOE environment and loaded
to the TOE by the Personalization Agent.
3.5 Security Objectives
This chapter describes the security objectives for the TOE and the security objectives
for the TOE environment. The security objectives for the TOE environment are
separated into security objectives for the development and production environment and
security objectives for the operational environment.
3.5.1 Security Objectives for the TOE
This section describes the security objectives for the TOE addressing the aspects of
identified threats to be countered by the TOE and organisational security policies to be
met by the TOE.
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3 Security Problem Definition
3.5.1.1 OT.AC_Pers Access Control for Personalization of logical MRTD
The TOE must ensure that the logical MRTD data groups DG1 to DG16, the Document
security object according to LDS [6] and the TSF data can be written by authorized
Personalization Agents. The logical MRTD data groups DG1 to DG16 and the TSF
data may be written only during and cannot be changed after its personalisation. The
Document security object can be updated by authorized Personalization Agents if data
in the data groups DG3 to DG16 are added.
Note 7: The TOE does not allow the Re-Personalisation of the MRTD in the Phase 4 Operational
Use.
3.5.1.2 OT.Data_Int Integrity of personal data
The TOE must ensure the integrity of the logical MRTD stored on the MRTD’s chip
against physical manipulation and unauthorized writing. If the TOE is configured for the
use with Basic Inspection Terminals only the TOE must ensure that the inspection
system is able to detect any modification of the transmitted logical MRTD data.
3.5.1.3 OT.Data_Conf Confidentiality of personal data
The TOE must ensure the confidentiality of the data in DG1, DG2 and DG5 to DG16
and the Document Security Object of the logical MRTD by granting read access to
terminals successfully authenticated by as (i) Personalization Agent or (ii) Basic
Inspection System The Basic Inspection System shall authenticate themselves by means
of the Basic Access Control based on knowledge of the Document Basic Access Key.
The TOE must ensure the confidentiality of the logical MRTD data during their
transmission to the Basic Inspection System
If the TOE is configured for the use with Primary Inspection Systems no protection in
confidentiality of the logical MRTD is required.
.
Note 8: The TOE provides read access to these data for terminals successfully authenticated by
means of the Basic Access Control based on knowledge of the Document Basic Access Keys
The TOE to ensures the strength of the security function Basic Access Control Authentication
independent on the quality of the Document Basic Access Keys which is defined by the TOE
environment and loaded into the TOE by the Personalization Agent.
3.5.1.4 OT.Identification Identification and Authentication of the TOE
The TOE must provide means to store IC Identification Data in its non-volatile memory.
The IC Identification Data must provide a unique identification of the IC during Phase
2 “Manufacturing” and Phase 3 “Personalization of the MRTD”. If the TOE is
configured for use with Basic Inspection Terminals only in Phase 4 “Operational Use”
the TOE shall identify themselves only to a successful authenticated Basic Inspection
System or Personalization Agent.
Note 9:. If the TOE is configured to allow a Basic Inspection System only to read these data the
output of any other IC (e.g. integrated circuit serial number ICCSN) or a MRTD identifier
through the contactless interface before successful authentication as Basic Inspection System
or as Personalization Agent is forbidden.
3.5.1.5 OT.Prot_Abuse-Func Protection against Abuse of Functionality
The TOE must prevent that functions of the TOE which may not be used after TOE
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3 Security Problem Definition
Delivery can be abused in order (i) to disclose critical User Data, (ii) to manipulate
critical User Data of the Smartcard Embedded Software, (iii) to manipulate Soft-coded
Smartcard Embedded Software or (iv) bypass, deactivate, change or explore security
features or functions of the TOE.
Details of the relevant attack scenarios depend, for instance, on the capabilities of the
Test Features provided by the IC Dedicated Test Software which are not specified here.
3.5.1.6 OT.Prot_Inf_Leak Protection against Information Leakage
The TOE must provide protection against disclosure of confidential TSF data stored
and/or processed in the MRTD’s chip
• by measurement and analysis of the shape and amplitude of signals or the time
between events found by measuring signals on the electromagnetic field, power
consumption, clock, or I/O lines and
• by forcing a malfunction of the TOE and/or
• by a physical manipulation of the TOE.
3.5.1.7 OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper Protection against Physical Tampering
The TOE must provide protection of the confidentiality and integrity of the User Data,
the TSF Data, and the MRTD’s chip Embedded Software. This includes protection
against attacks with high attack potential by means of
• measuring through galvanic contacts which is direct physical probing on the
chips surface except on pads being bonded (using standard tools for measuring
voltage and current) or
• measuring not using galvanic contacts but other types of physical interaction
between charges (using tools used in solid-state physics research and IC failure
analysis)
• manipulation of the hardware and its security features, as well as
• controlled manipulation of memory contents (User Data, TSF Data)
with a prior
• reverse-engineering to understand the design and its properties and functions.
3.5.1.8 OT.Prot_Malfunction Protection against Malfunctions
The TOE must ensure its correct operation. The TOE must prevent its operation outside
the normal operating conditions where reliability and secure operation has not been
proven or tested. This is to prevent errors. The environmental conditions may include
external energy (esp. electromagnetic) fields, voltage (on any contacts), clock frequency,
or temperature.
3.5.1.9 OT.Active_Auth_Proof Proof of MRTD’S chip authenticity
The TOE shall support the Basic Inspection Systems to verify the identity and
authenticity of the MRTD’s chip as issued by the identified issuing State or Organization
by means of the Active Authentication as defined in [7]. The authenticity prove provided
by MRTD’s chip shall be protected against attacks with high attack potential.
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3.5.2 Security Objectives for the Development and Manufacturing
Environment
3.5.2.1 OD.Assurance Assurance Security Measures in Development and
Manufacturing Environment
The developer and manufacturer ensure that the TOE is designed and fabricated such that
it requires a combination of complex equipment, knowledge, skill, and time to be able to
derive detailed design information or other information which could be used to
compromise security through attack. This includes the use of the Initialization Data for
unique identification of the TOE and the pre-personalization of the TOE including the
writing of the Personalization Agent Authentication key(s). The developer provides
necessary evaluation evidence that the TOE fulfils its security objectives and is resistant
against obvious penetration attacks with high attack potential.
3.5.2.2 OD.Material Control over MRTD Material
The IC Manufacturer, the MRTD Manufacturer and the Personalization Agent must
control all materials, equipment and information to produce, initialise, pre-personalize
genuine MRTD’s materials and to personalize authentic MRTDs in order to prevent
counterfeit of MRTDs using MRTD materials.
3.5.3 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment
3.5.3.1 Issuing State or Organization
The Issuing State or Organization will implement the following security objectives of the
TOE environment.
3.5.3.1.1 OE.Personalization Personalization of logical MRTD
The issuing State or Organization must ensure that the Personalization Agents acting on
behalf of the issuing State or Organisation (i) establish the correct identity of the holder
and create biographical data for the MRTD, (ii) enrol the biometric reference data of the
MRTD holder i.e. the portrait, the encoded finger image(s) and/or the encoded iris
image(s) and (iii) personalize the MRTD for the holder together with the defined
physical and logical security measures (including the digital signature in the Document
Security Object). The Personalization Agents enable or disable the Basic Access
Control function of the TOE according to the decision of the issuing State or
Organization. If the Basic Access Control function is enabled the Personalization
Agents generate the Document Basic Access Keys and store them in the MRTD’s chip
3.5.3.1.2 OE.Pass_Auth_Sign Authentication of logical MRTD by Signature
The Issuing State or Organization must (i) generate a cryptographic secure Country
Signing CA Key Pair, (ii) ensure the secrecy of the Country Signing CA Private Key and
sign Document Signer Certificates in a secure operational environment, and (iii)
distribute the Certificate of the Country Signing CA Public Key to receiving States and
organizations maintaining its authenticity and integrity. The Issuing State or organization
must (i) generate a cryptographic secure Document Signing Key Pair and ensure the
secrecy of the Document Signer Private Keys, (ii) sign Document Security Objects of
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3 Security Problem Definition
genuine MRTD in a secure operational environment only and (iii) distribute the
Certificate of the Document Signing Public Key to receiving States and organizations.
The digital signature in the Document Security Object relates to all data in the data in
DG1 to DG16 if stored in the LDS according to [6].
3.5.3.1.3 OE.Active_Auth_Key_MRTD MRTD ActiveAuthentication Key
The issuing State or Organization has to establish the necessary public key infrastructure
in order to (i) generate the MRTD’s Active Authentication Key Pair, (ii) sign and store
the Active Authentication Public Key in the Active Authentication Public Key data in
DG15 and (iii) support inspection systems of receiving States or organizations to verify
the authenticity of the MRTD’s chip used for genuine MRTD by certification of the
Active Authentication Public Key by means of the Document Security Object.
3.5.3.2 Receiving State or organization
The Receiving State or Organization will implement the following security objectives of
the TOE environment.
3.5.3.2.1 OE.Exam_MRTD Examination of the MRTD passport book
The inspection system of the Receiving State must examine the MRTD presented by the
traveller to verify its authenticity by means of the physical security measures and to
detect any manipulation of the physical MRTD.
3.5.3.2.2 OE.Passive_Auth_Verif Verification by Passive Authentication
The border control officer of the Receiving State uses the inspection system to verify
the traveller as MRTD holder. The inspection systems must have successfully verified
the signature of Document Security Objects and the integrity data elements of the
logical MRTD before they are used. The receiving States and organizations must
manage the Country Signing Public Key and the Document Signing Public Key
maintaining their authenticity and availability in all inspection systems.
3.5.3.2.3 OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD Protection of data of the logical MRTD
The inspection system of the receiving State or Organisation ensures the confidentiality
and integrity of the data read from the logical MRTD. The receiving State examining the
logical MRTD being under Basic Access Control will use inspection systems which
implement the terminal part of the Basic Access Control and use the secure messaging
with fresh generated keys for the protection of the transmitted data (i.e. Basic Inspection
Systems). The receiving State examining the logical MRTD with Primary Inspection
Systems will prevent eavesdropping to the communication between TOE and
inspection system.
3.5.3.3 MRTD Holder
3.5.3.3.1 OE.Secure_Handling Secure handling of the MRTD by MRTD holder
The holder of a MRTD configured for use with Primary Inspection Systems (i.e. MTRD
with disabled Basic Access Control) will prevent unauthorized communication of the
MRTD’s chip with terminals through the contactless interface.
Note 13: The MRTD holder may prevent unauthorized communication of the MRTD’s chip with
terminals e.g. by carrying the MRTD in a metal box working as a Faraday cage.
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4 Extended Components Definition
4 ExtendedComponentsDefinition
This security target uses components defined as extensions to CC part 2 [2]. Some of
these components are defined in [20], other components are defined in [21a].
This chapter has been taken from [21a] with minor modifications.
4.1 Definition of the Family FAU_SAS
To define the security functional requirements of the TOE an additional family
(FAU_SAS) of the Class FAU (Security Audit) is defined in [21a]. This family describes
the functional requirements for the storage of audit data. It has a more general approach
than FAU_GEN, because it does not necessarily require the data to be generated by the
TOE itself and because it does not give specific details of the content of the audit
records.
The family “Audit data storage (FAU_SAS)” is specified as follows.
4.1.1 FAU_SAS Audit data storage
Family behaviour
This family defines functional requirements for the storage of audit data.
Component levelling
FAU_SAS Audit data storage 1
FAU_SAS.1 Requires the TOE to provide the possibility to store audit data.
Management: FAU_SAS.1
There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit: FAU_SAS.1
There are no actions defined to be auditable.
4.1.2 FAU_SAS.1 Audit storage
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FAU_SAS.1.1 The TSF shall provide [assignment: authorised users] with the capability
to store [assignment: list of audit information] in the audit records.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
4.2 Definition of the Family FCS_RND
To define the IT security functional requirements of the TOE an additional family
(FCS_RND) of the Class FCS (cryptographic support) is defined in [21a]. This family
describes the functional requirements for random number generation used for
cryptographic purposes. The component FCS_RND is not limited to generation of
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4 Extended Components Definition
cryptographic keys as the component FCS_CKM.1 is. The similar component
FIA_SOS.2 is intended for non-cryptographic use.
The family “Generation of random numbers (FCS_RND)” is specified as follows.
4.2.1 FCS_RND Generation of random numbers
Family behaviour
This family defines quality requirements for the generation of random numbers which
are intended to be used for cryptographic purposes.
Component levelling:
FCS_RND Generation of random numbers 1
FCS_RND.1 Generation of random numbers requires that random numbers meet a
defined quality metric.
Management: FCS_RND.1
There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit: FCS_RND.1
There are no actions defined to be auditable.
FCS_RND.1 Quality metric for random numbers
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FCS_RND.1.1 The TSF shall provide a mechanism to generate random numbers that
meet [assignment: a defined quality metric].
Dependencies: No dependencies.
4.3 Definition of the Family FIA_API
To describe the IT security functional requirements of the TOE a sensitive family
(FIA_API) of the Class FIA (Identification and authentication) is defined here. This
family describes the functional requirements for the proof of the claimed identity for the
authentication verification by an external entity where the other families of the class FIA
address the verification of the identity of an external entity.
4.3.1 FIA_API Authentication Prove of Identity
Family behaviour
This family defines functions provided by the TOE to prove their identity and to be
verified by an external entity in the TOE IT environment.
Component levelling:
FIA_API Authentication Proof of Identity 1
FIA_API.1 Authentication Prove of Identity.
Management: FIA_API.1
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4 Extended Components Definition
The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:
Management of authentication information used to prove the claimed identity.
Audit: FCS_RND.1
There are no actions defined to be auditable.
4.3.1.1 FIA_API.1 Authentication Proof of Identity
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FIA_API.1.1 The TSF shall provide a [assignment: authentication mechanism] to
prove the identity of the [assignment: authorized user or rule].
Dependencies: No dependencies.
4.4 Definition of the Family FMT_LIM
The family FMT_LIM describes the functional requirements for the Test Features of the
TOE. The new functional requirements were defined in the class FMT because this class
addresses the management of functions of the TSF. The examples of the technical
mechanism used in the TOE show that no other class is appropriate to address the
specific issues of preventing the abuse of functions by limiting the capabilities of the
functions and by limiting their availability.
The family “Limited capabilities and availability (FMT_LIM)” is specified as follows.
4.4.1 FMT_LIM Limited capabilities and availability
Family behaviour
This family defines requirements that limits the capabilities and availability of functions
in a combined manner. Note that FDP_ACF restricts the access to functions whereas
the Limited capability of this family requires the functions themselves to be designed in
a specific manner.
Component levelling:
FMT_LIM Limited capabilities and availability
1
2
FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities requires that the TSF is built to provide only the
capabilities (perform action, gather information) necessary for its genuine purpose.
FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability requires that the TSF restrict the use of functions
(refer to Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)). This can be achieved, for instance, by
removing or by disabling functions in a specific phase of the TOE’s lifecycle.
Management: FMT_LIM.1, FMT_LIM.2
There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit: FMT_LIM.1, FMT_LIM.2
There are no actions defined to be auditable.
To define the IT security functional requirements of the TOE an additional family
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4 Extended Components Definition
(FMT_LIM) of the Class FMT (Security Management) is defined here. This family
describes the functional requirements for the Test Features of the TOE. The new
functional requirements were defined in the class FMT because this class addresses the
management of functions of the TSF. The examples of the technical mechanism used in
the TOE show that no other class is appropriate to address the specific issues of
preventing the abuse of functions by limiting the capabilities of the functions and by
limiting their availability.
The TOE Functional Requirement “Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)” is specified as
follows.
4.4.1.1 FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FMT_LIM.1.1 The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their capabilities
so that in conjunction with “Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)” the following policy is
enforced [assignment: Limited capability and availability policy].
Dependencies: FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability.
The TOE Functional Requirement “Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)” is specified as
follows.
FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FMT_LIM.2.1 The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their availability
so that in conjunction with “Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)” the following policy is
enforced [assignment: Limited capability and availability policy].
Dependencies: FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities.
4.5 Definition of the Family FPT_EMSEC
The additional family FPT_EMSEC (TOE Emanation) of the Class FPT (Protection of
the TSF) is defined in [21a] to describe the IT security functional requirements of the
TOE. The TOE shall prevent attacks against the logical MRTD data and other secret
data where the attack is based on external observable physical phenomena of the TOE.
Examples of such attacks are evaluation of TOE’s electromagnetic radiation, simple
power analysis (SPA), differential power analysis (DPA), timing attacks, etc. This family
describes the functional requirements for the limitation of intelligible emanations which
are not directly addressed by any other component of CC part 2 [2].
The family “TOE Emanation (FPT_EMSEC)” is specified as follows.
Family behaviour
This family defines requirements to mitigate intelligible emanations.
Component levelling:
FPT_EMSEC TOE emanation 1
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4 Extended Components Definition
FPT_EMSEC.1 TOE emanation has two constituents:
FPT_EMSEC.1.1 Limit of Emissions requires to not emit intelligible emissions enabling
access to TSF data or user data.
FPT_EMSEC.1.2 Interface Emanation requires not emit interface emanation enabling
access to TSF data or user data.
Management: FPT_EMSEC.1
There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit: FPT_EMSEC.1
There are no actions defined to be auditable.
4.5.1 FPT_EMSEC.1 TOE Emanation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FPT_EMSEC.1.1 The TOE shall not emit [assignment: types of emissions] in excess of
[assignment: specified limits] enabling access to [assignment: list of types of TSF data]
and [assignment: list of types of user data].
FPT_EMSEC.1.2 The TSF shall ensure [assignment: type of users] are unable to use
the following interface [assignment: type of connection] to gain access to [assignment:
list of types of TSF data] and [assignment: list of types of user data].
Dependencies: No other components.
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5 Security Requirements
5 SecurityRequirements
This chapter has been taken from [21a] with some modifications3
.
The CC allows several operations to be performed on functional requirements
refinement, selection, assignment, and iteration are defined in paragraph 2.1.4 of Part 2
of the CC. Each of these operations is used in this security target.
The refinement operation is used to add detail to a requirement, and thus further restricts
a requirement. Refinement of security requirements is denoted by the word “refinement”
in bold text and the added/changed words are in bold text. In cases where words from a
CC requirement were deleted, a separate attachment indicates the words that were
removed.
The selection operation is used to select one or more options provided by the CC in
stating a requirement. Selections that have been made by the PP authors are denoted as
underlined text and the original text of the component is given by a footnote. Selections
filled in by the ST author appear as double underlined text.
The assignment operation is used to assign a specific value to an unspecified parameter,
such as the length of a password. Assignments that have been made by the PP authors
are denoted by showing as underlined text and the original text of the component is
given by a footnote. Assignments to be filled in by the ST author appear in square
brackets with an indication that an assignment is to be made [assignment:], and are filled
in this ST as underlined text.
The iteration operation is used when a component is repeated with varying operations.
Iteration is denoted by showing a slash “/”, and the iteration indicator after the
component identifier.
5.1 Security Functional Requirements for the TOE
This section on security functional requirements for the TOE is divided into sub-section
following the main security functionality.
5.1.1 Class FAU Security Audit
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Audit storage (FAU_SAS.1)” as specified below
(Common Criteria Part 2 extended).
FAU_SAS.1 Audit storage
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FAU_SAS.1.1
3
The assignmemts filled in by the ST author are double underlined and when applicable the application
notes of the PP are discussed in notes (see chapter 1.7).
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5 Security Requirements
The TSF shall provide the Manufacturer4
with the capability to store the IC Identification
Data5
in the audit records.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
5.1.2 Class Cryptographic Support (FCS)
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic key generation (FCS_CKM.1)” as
specified below (Common Criteria Part 2). The iterations are caused by different
cryptographic key generation algorithms to be implemented and key to be generated by
the TOE.
FCS_CKM.1/BAC_MRTD Cryptographic key generation –Generation of Document
Basic Access Keys by the TOE
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FCS_CKM.1.1/ BAC_MRTD
The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic
key generation algorithm Document Basic Access Key Derivation Algorithm6
and
specified cryptographic key sizes 112 bit7
that meet the following: [7], Annex E.8
Dependencies:
[FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution or
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FMT_MSA.2 Secure security attributes
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction - MRTD
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FCS_CKM.4.1/ MRTD
The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic
key destruction method physical deletion by overwriting the memory data with zeros or
random data that meets the following: none.
Dependencies:
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FMT_MSA.2 Secure security attributes
4
[assignment: authorised users]
5
[assignment: list of audit information]
6
[assignment: cryptographic key generation algorithm]
7 [assignment: cryptographic key sizes]
8 [assignment: list of standards]
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5 Security Requirements
5.1.2.1 Cryptographic operation (FCS_COP.1)
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic operation (FCS_COP.1)” as
specified below (Common Criteria Part 2). The iterations are caused by different
cryptographic algorithms to be implemented by the TOE.
FCS_COP.1/SHA_MRTD Cryptographic operation – Hash for Key Derivation by
MRTD
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FCS_COP.1.1/ SHA_MRTD
The TSF shall perform hashing9
in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm
SHA-110
and cryptographic key sizes none11
that meet the following: FIPS 180-212
.
Dependencies:
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FMT_MSA.2 Secure security attributes
FCS_COP.1/TDES_MRTD Cryptographic operation –Encryption / Decryption
Triple DES
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FCS_COP.1.1/ TDES_MRTD
The TSF shall perform secure messaging – encryption and decryption13
in accordance
with a specified cryptographic algorithm Triple-DES in CBC mode14
and cryptographic
key sizes 112 bit15
that meet the following: FIPS 46-3 [14] and [7]; Annex E16
.
Dependencies:
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FMT_MSA.2 Secure security attributes
FCS_COP.1/MAC_MRTD Cryptographic operation – Retail MAC
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FCS_COP.1.1/MAC_MRTD
9
[assignment: list of cryptographic operations]
10
[assignment: cryptographic algorithm]
11 [assignment: cryptographic key sizes]
12 [assignment: list of standards]
13
[assignment: list of cryptographic operations]
14
[assignment: cryptographic algorithm]
15
[assignment: cryptographic key sizes]
16
[assignment: list of standards]
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5 Security Requirements
The TSF shall perform secure messaging – message authentication code17
in accordance
with a specified cryptographic algorithm Retail MAC18
and cryptographic key sizes 112
bit19
that meet the following: ISO 9797 (MAC algorithm 3, block cipher DES, Sequence
Message Counter, padding mode 2)20
.
Dependencies:
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FMT_MSA.2 Secure security attributes
FCS_COP.1/RSA_MRTD Cryptographic operation – Signature creation by MRTD
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FCS_COP.1.1/RSA_MRTD
The TSF shall perform digital signature creation 21
in accordance with a specified
cryptographic algorithm RSA with SHA-1 and cryptographic key sizes: 1024 - 4000 bit
that meet the following: scheme 1 of ISO/IEC 9796-2:2002 [19].
Dependencies:
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FMT_MSA.2 Secure security attributes
5.1.2.2 Random Number Generation (FCS_RND.1)
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Quality metric for random numbers
(FCS_RND.1)” as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2 extended).
FCS_RND.1/MRTD Quality metric for random numbers
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FCS_RND.1.1/ MRTD
The TSF shall provide a mechanism to generate random numbers that meet the
requirements for SOF high defined in AIS 20 [5a].
Dependencies: No dependencies.
17
[assignment: list of cryptographic operations]
18
[assignment: cryptographic algorithm]
19
[assignment: cryptographic key sizes]
20
[assignment: list of standards]
21
[assignment: list of cryptographic operations]
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5 Security Requirements
5.1.3 Class FIA Identification and Authentication
Note 5: The Table 1 provides an overview on the authentication mechanisms used.
Name SFR for the TOE SFR for the
TOE environment
(terminal)
Algorithms and
key sizes
according to [7],
Annex E, and [22]
Symmetric
Authentication
Mechanism for
Personalization
Agents
FIA_UAU.4/MRTD FIA_API.1/PT Triple-DES with 112
bit keys
Basic Access
Control
Authentication
Mechanism
FIA_UAU.4/MRTD,
FIA_UAU.6/MRTD
FIA_UAU.4/BAC_T
, FIA_UAU.6/T
Triple-DES, 112 bit
keys and
Retail-MAC, 112 bit
keys
Active
Authentication
Mechanism
FIA_API.1/AA FIA_UAU.4/BT RSA with 1024 -
4000 bits. Algorithm
according to [7],
Annex D
Table 1 Overview on authentication SFR
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Timing of identification (FIA_UID.1)” as
specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FIA_UID.1.1
The TSF shall allow
(1) to read the Initialization Data and Pre-personalization Data in Phase 2
“Manufacturing”,
(2) to read the ATS in Phase 3 “Personalization of the MRTD”,
(3) to read the ATS if the TOE is configured for use with Basic Inspection Systems only
in Phase 4 “Operational Use”,
(4) to read the logical MRTD if the TOE is configured for use with Primary Inspection
System s in Phase 4 “Operational Use”22
on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is identified.
FIA_UID.1.2
The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before allowing any other
TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
22
[assignment: list of TSF-mediated actions]
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5 Security Requirements
Note 22: In this ST the user role Personalization Agent for the transition from Phase 2 to Phase 3
“Personalization of the MRTD” is possible. The users in role Personalization Agent identify
themselves by means of selecting the authentication key. After personalization in the Phase 3
(i.e. writing the digital MRZ and the Document Basic Access Keys) the user role Basic
Inspection System is created by writing the Document Basic Access Keys. If the TOE is
configured for use with Primary Inspection Systems any terminal is assumed as Primary
Inspection System and is allowed to read the logical MRTD. If the TOE is configured for use
with Basic Inspection Systems only the Basic Inspection System is identified as default user
after power up or reset of the TOE i.e. the TOE will use the Document Basic Access Key to
authenticate the user as Basic Inspection System according to the SFR FIA_UAU.4/T.
Note 23: In the operation phase the MRTD must not allow anybody to read the ICCSN or any
other unique identification before the user is authenticated as Basic Inspection System (cf.
T.Chip_ID). Note that the terminal and the MRTD’s chip use an identifier for the
communication channel to allow the terminal for communication with more then one RFID.
For the TOE this identifier is randomly selected and will not violate the OT.Identification.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Timing of authentication (FIA_UAU.1)” as
specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FIA_UAU.1.1
The TSF shall allow
(1) to read the Initialization Data in Phase 2 “Manufacturing”,
(2) to read the ATS in Phase 3 “Personalization of the MRTD”,
(3) to read the ATS if the TOE is configured for use with Basic Inspection Systems
only in Phase 4 “Operational Use”,
(4) to read the logical MRTD if the TOE is configured for use with Primary
Inspection System s in Phase 4 “Operational Use”23
on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is authenticated.
FIA_UAU.1.2
The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before allowing any
other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
Dependencies: FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification.
The TOE shall meet the requirements of “Single-use authentication mechanisms
(FIA_UAU.4)” as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
FIA_UAU.4/MRTD Single-use authentication mechanisms - Single-use
authentication of the Terminal by the TOE
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FIA_UAU.4.1/ MRTD
23
[assignment: list of TSF-mediated actions]
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5 Security Requirements
The TSF shall prevent reuse of authentication data related to
1. Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism,
2. Authentication Mechanism based on Triple-DES 24
.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Multiple authentication mechanisms
(FIA_UAU.5)” as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
FIA_UAU.5 Multiple authentication mechanisms
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FIA_UAU.5.1
The TSF shall provide
1. Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism,
2. Symmetric Authentication Mechanism based on Triple-DES 25
to support user authentication.
FIA_UAU.5.2
The TSF shall authenticate any user’s claimed identity according to the following rules:
1. The TOE accepts the authentication attempt as Personalization Agent by one of the
following mechanisms
(a) the Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism with Personalization Agent
Keys,
(b) the Symmetric Authentication Mechanism with Personalization Agent Key,
2. The TOE accepts the authentication attempt as Basic Inspection System only by
means of the Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism with the Document
Basic Access Keys26
.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
Note 24: The successful authenticated Personalization Agent may disable the Basic Access Control
Mechanism before Phase 4
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Re-authenticating (FIA_UAU.6)” as specified
below (Common Criteria Part 2).
FIA_UAU.6/MRTD Re-authenticating – Re-authenticating of Terminal by the TOE
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FIA_UAU.6.1/MRTD
24
[assignment: identified authentication mechanism(s)]
25
[assignment: list of multiple authentication mechanisms]
26
[assignment: rules describing how the multiple authentication mechanisms provide authentication]
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5 Security Requirements
The TSF shall re-authenticate the user under the conditions each command sent to the
TOE after successful authentication of the terminal with Basic Access Control
Authentication Mechanism27
.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
Authentication failure handling (FIA_AFL.1)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FIA_AFL.1.1
The TSF shall detect when an administrator configurable positive integer within range of
acceptable values 1 to 10 unsuccessful authentication attempts occur related to a BAC
authentication protocol.
FIA_AFL.1.2
When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has been met or
surpassed, the TSF shall wait for an administrator configurable time greater 1 second
between receiving the terminal challenge eIFD and sending the TSF response eICC during
the BAC authentication attempts.
Dependencies: FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Authentication Proof of Identity (FIA_API.1)” as
specified below (Common Criteria Part 2 extended).
FIA_API.1/AA Authentication Proof of Identity - MRTD
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FIA_API.1.1/AA
The TSF shall provide a Active Authentication Mechanism according to [7]
28
to prove
the identity of the TOE29
.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
5.1.4 Class FDP User Data Protection
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Subset access control (FDP_ACC.1)” as specified
below (Common Criteria Part 2). The instantiations of FDP_ACC.1 are caused by the
TSF management according to FMT_MOF.1.
27
[assignment: list of conditions under which re-authentication is required]
28
[assignment: authentication mechanism]
29
[assignment: authorized user or rule]
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5 Security Requirements
5.1.4.1 FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control– Primary Access Control
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FDP_ACC.1.1/PRIM
The TSF shall enforce the Primary Access Control SFP30
on terminals gaining write,
read and modification access to data groups DG1 to DG16 of the logical MRTD31
.
Dependencies: FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control
FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control – Basic Access control
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FDP_ACC.1.1/ BASIC
The TSF shall enforce the Basic Access Control SFP32
on terminals gaining write, read
and modification access to data groups DG1 to DG16 of the logical MRTD33
.
Dependencies: FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control
5.1.4.2 FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Security attribute based access control
(FDP_ACF.1)” as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2). The instantiations of
FDP_ACC.1 address different SFP.
FDP_ACF.1 Security attributes based access control – Primary Access Control
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FDP_ACF.1.1/PRIM
The TSF shall enforce the Primary Access Control SFP34
to objects based on the
following:
1. Subjects:
a. Personalization Agent,
b. Terminals,
2. Objects: data into the data groups DG1 to DG16 of the logical MRTD,
3. Security attributes:
a. configuration of the TOE according to FMT_MOF.1
b. authentication status of terminals35
,
30
[assignment: access control SFP]
31 [assignment: list of subjects, objects, and operations among subjects and objects covered by the SFP]
32 [assignment: access control SFP]
33 [assignment: list of subjects, objects, and operations among subjects and objects covered by the SFP]
34
[assignment: access control SFP]
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5 Security Requirements
FDP_ACF.1.2/PRIM
The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among controlled
subjects and controlled objects is allowed: in the TOE configuration for use with Primary
Inspection Systems
1. the successfully authenticated Personalization Agent is allowed to write the data
of the data groups DG1 to DG16 of the logical MRTD,
2. the terminals are allowed to read the data of the groups DG1 to DG16 of the
logical MRTD36
FDP_ACF.1.3/PRIM
The TSF shall explicitly authorize access of subjects to objects based on the following
additional rules: none37
.
FDP_ACF.1.4/PRIM
The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the rule: the
Terminals are not allowed to modify any of the DG1 to DG16 of the logical MRTD 38
.
Dependencies:
FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialization
FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control – Basic Access Control
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FDP_ACF.1.1/ BASIC
The TSF shall enforce the Basic Access Control SFP39
to objects based on the following:
1. Subjects:
a. Personalization Agent
b. Basic Inspection System
c. Terminal
2. Objects: data into the data groups DG1 to DG16 of the logical MRTD
3. Security attributes
a. configuration of the TOE according to FMT_MOF.1
b. authentication status of terminals40
.
FDP_ACF.1.2/ BASIC
35 [assignment: list of subjects and objects controlled under the indicated SFP, and. for each, the
SFP-relevant security attributes, or named groups of SFP-relevant security attributes]
36 [assignment: rules governing access among controlled subjects and controlled objects using
controlled operations on controlled objects]
37 [assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly authorise access of subjects to
objects]
38
[assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly deny access of subjects to objects]
39
[assignment: access control SFP]
40
[assignment: list of subjects and objects controlled under the indicated SFP, and. for each, the SFP-
relevant security attributes, or named groups of SFP-relevant security attributes]
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5 Security Requirements
The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among controlled
subjects and controlled objects is allowed: in the TOE configuration for use with Basic
Inspection Systems only
1. the successfully authenticated Personalization Agent is allowed to write and to
read the data of the data groups DG1 to DG16 of the logical MRTD,
2. the successfully authenticated Basic Inspection System is allowed to read data of
the groups DG1 to DG16 of the logical MRTD41
.
FDP_ACF.1.3/ BASIC
The TSF shall explicitly authorize access of subjects to objects based on the following
additional rules: none42
.
FDP_ACF.1.4/ BASIC
The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the rule: the
terminals are not allowed to modify any of the data groups DG1 to DG16 of the logical
MRTD43
.
Dependencies:
FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialization
5.1.4.3 Inter-TSF-Transfer
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Basic data exchange confidentiality
(FDP_UCT.1)” as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
FDP_UCT.1/MRTD Basic data exchange confidentiality - MRTD
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FDP_UCT.1.1/ MRTD
The TSF shall enforce the Basic Access Control SFP44
to be able to transmit and
receive45
objects in a manner protected from unauthorised disclosure.
Dependencies:
FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel, or FTP_TRP.1 Trusted path]
[FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control or FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Basic data exchange confidentiality
(FDP_UCT.1)” as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
FDP_UIT.1/MRTD Data exchange integrity - MRTD
Hierarchical to: No other components.
41
[assignment: rules governing access among controlled subjects and controlled objects using controlled
operations on controlled objects]
42
[assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects]
43
[assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly deny access of subjects to objects]
44
[assignment: access control SFP(s) and/or information flow control SFP(s)]
45
[selection: transmit, receive]
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5 Security Requirements
FDP_UIT.1.1/ MRTD
The TSF shall enforce the Basic Access Control SFP46
to be able to transmit and
receive47
user data in a manner protected from modification, deletion, insertion and
replay48
.
FDP_UIT.1.2/ MRTD
The TSF shall be able to determine on receipt of user data, whether
modification, deletion, insertion and replay49
has occurred.
Dependencies:
[FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control or FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
[FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel, or FTP_TRP.1 Trusted path]
5.1.5 Class FMT Security Management
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Specification of Management Functions
(FMT_SMF.1)” as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
FMT_MOF.1 Specification of Management Functions
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FMT_MOF.1.1
The TSF shall restrict the ability to enable and disable50
the functions TSF Basic Access
Control51
to none52
.
Dependencies: No Dependencies
Note 25: The TSF Basic Access Control can not be disabled.
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FMT_SMF.1.1
The TSF shall be capable of performing the following security management functions:
1. Initialization,
2. Personalization
3. Configuration53
.
46
[assignment: access control SFP(s) and/or information flow control SFP(s)]
47
[selection: transmit, receive]
48 [selection: modification, deletion, insertion, replay]
49
[selection: modification, deletion, insertion, replay]
50
[selection: determine the behaviour of, disable, enable, modify the behaviour of]
51
[assignment: list of functions]
52
[assignment: the authorised identified roles]. Please notice, that this Security Target tightens the
definition of the SFR SMT_MOF.1.
53
[assignment: list of security management functions to be provided by the TSF]
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5 Security Requirements
Dependencies: No Dependencies
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Security roles (FMT_SMR.1)” as specified below
(Common Criteria Part 2).
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FMT_SMR.1.1
The TSF shall maintain the roles
1. Manufacturer,
2. Personalization Agent,
3. Primary Inspection System,
4. Basic Inspection System54
,
FMT_SMR.1.2
The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.
Hierarchical to:
FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)” as specified
below (Common Criteria Part 2 extended).
FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FMT_LIM.1.1
The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their capabilities so that in conjunction
with “Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)” the following policy is enforced: Deploying
Test Features after TOE Delivery does not allow
1. User Data to be disclosed or manipulated
2. TSF data to be disclosed or manipulated
3. software to be reconstructed and
4. substantial information about construction of TSF to be gathered which may enable
other attacks55
.
Dependencies: FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)” as specified
below (Common Criteria Part 2 extended).
FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability
Hierarchical to: No other components.
54
[assignment: the authorised identified roles]
55
[assignment: Limited capability and availability policy]
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5 Security Requirements
FMT_LIM.2.1
The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their availability so that in conjunction
with “Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)” the following policy is enforced: Deploying
Test Features after TOE Delivery does not allow
1. User Data to be disclosed or manipulated
2. TSF data to be disclosed or manipulated
3. software to be reconstructed and
4. substantial information about construction of TSF to be gathered which may enable
other attacks56
.
Dependencies: FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Management of TSF data (FMT_MTD.1)” a
specified below (Common Criteria Part 2). The iterations address different management
functions and different TSF data.
FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA Management of TSF data – Writing of Initialization Data and
Pre-personalization Data
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FMT_MTD.1.1/ INI_ENA
The TSF shall restrict the ability to write57
the Initialization Data and Pre-personalization
Data58
to the Manufacturer59
.
Dependencies:
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS Management of TSF data – Disabling of Read Access to
Initialization Data and Pre-personalization Data
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FMT_MTD.1.1/ INI_DIS
The TSF shall restrict the ability to disable read access for users to60
the Initialization
Data61
to the Personalization Agent62
.
Dependencies:
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
56
[assignment: Limited capability and availability policy]
57
[selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, clear, [assignment: other operations]]
58
[assignment: list of TSF data]
59
[assignment: the authorised identified roles]
60
[selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, clear, [assignment: other operations]]
61
[assignment: list of TSF data]
62
[assignment: the authorised identified roles]
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5 Security Requirements
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE Management of TSF data – Key Write
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FMT_MTD.1.1/ KEY_WRITE
The TSF shall restrict the ability to write63
the Document Basic Access Keys64
to the
Personalization Agent65
.
Dependencies:
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MTD.1/AAPK Management of TSF data – Active Authentication Private Key
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FMT_MTD.1.1/AAPK
The TSF shall restrict the ability to create and load 66
the Active Authentication Private
Key 67
to the Manufacturer and the Personalisation Agent.
Dependencies:
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ Management of TSF data – Key Read
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FMT_MTD.1.1/ KEY_READ
The TSF shall restrict the ability to read 68
the Document Basic Access Keys and
Personalization Agent Keys 69
and Active Authentication Private Key
to none 70
.
Dependencies:
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
5.1.6 Class FPT Protection of the Security Functions
The TOE shall prevent inherent and forced illicit information flow for User Data and
63
[selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, clear, [assignment: other operations]]
64
[assignment: list of TSF data]
65
[assignment: the authorised identified roles]
66
[selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, clear, [assignment: other operations]]
67
[assignment: list of TSF data]
68
[selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, clear, [assignment: other operations]]
69
[assignment: list of TSF data]
70
[assignment: the authorised identified roles]
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TSF Data. The security functional requirement FPT_EMSEC.1 addresses the inherent
leakage. With respect to forced leakage they have to be considered in combination with
the security functional requirements “Failure with preservation of secure state
(FPT_FLS.1)” and “TSF testing (FPT_TST.1)” on the one hand and “Resistance to
physical attack (FPT_PHP.3)” on the other. The SFR “Non-bypassability of the TSP
(FPT_RVM.1)” and “TSF domain separation (FPT_SEP.1)” together with “Limited
capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)”, “Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)” and “Resistance to
physical attack (FPT_PHP.3)” prevent bypassing, deactivation and manipulation of the
security features or misuse of TOE functions.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “TOE Emanation (FPT_EMSEC.1)” as specified
below (Common Criteria Part 2 extended):
FPT_EMSEC.1 TOE Emanation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FPT_EMSEC.1.1
The TOE shall not emit information about IC power consumption and command
execution time in excess of non useful information enabling access to Personalization
Agent Authentication Key71
and logical MRTD data.
FPT_EMSEC.1.2
The TSF shall ensure any unauthorized users72
are unable to use the following interface
smart card circuit contacts73
to gain access to Personalization Agent Authentication Key
and logical MRTD data and Active Authentication Private Key.
Dependencies: No other components.
The following security functional requirements address the protection against forced
illicit information leakage including physical manipulation.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Failure with preservation of secure state
(FPT_FLS.1)” as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
FPT_FLS.1 Failure with preservation of secure state
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FPT_FLS.1.1
The TSF shall preserve a secure state when the following types of
failures occur:
(1) exposure to operating conditions where therefore a malfunction could occur,
(2) failure detected by TSF according to FPT_TST.174
.
Dependencies:
ADV_SPM.1 Informal TOE security policy model
71
[assignment: list of types of TSF data]
72
[assignment: type of users]
73
[assignment: type of connection]
74
[assignment: list of types of failures in the TSF]
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The TOE shall meet the requirement “TSF testing (FPT_TST.1)” as specified below
(Common Criteria Part 2).
FPT_TST.1 TSF testing
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FPT_TST.1.1
The TSF shall run a suite of self tests during initial start-up, periodically during normal
operation, at the condition Reset of the TOE to demonstrate the correct operation of the
TSF.
FPT_TST.1.2
The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the integrity of TSF
data.
FPT_TST.1.3
The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the integrity of
stored TSF executable code.
Dependencies:
FPT_AMT.1 Abstract machine testing.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Resistance to physical attack (FPT_PHP.3)” as
specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
FPT_PHP.3 Resistance to physical attack
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FPT_PHP.3.1
The TSF shall resist physical manipulation and physical probing75
to the TSF76
by
responding automatically such that the TSP is not violated.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
The following security functional requirements protect the TSF against bypassing. and
support the separation of TOE parts.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Non-bypassability of the TSP (FPT_RVM.1)” as
specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
FPT_RVM.1 Non-bypassability of the TSP
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FPT_RVM.1.1
The TSF shall ensure that TSP enforcement functions are invoked and succeed before
each function within the TSC is allowed to proceed.
75
[assignment: physical tampering scenarios]
76
[assignment: list of TSF devices/elements]
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5 Security Requirements
Dependencies: No dependencies.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “TSF domain separation (FPT_SEP.1)” as
specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
FPT_SEP.1 TSF domain separation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FPT_SEP.1.1
The TSF shall maintain a security domain for its own execution that protects it from
interference and tampering by untrusted subjects.
FPT_SEP.1.2
The TSF shall enforce separation between the security domains of subjects in the TSC.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
5.2 Security Assurance Requirements for the TOE
The for the evaluation of the TOE and its development and operating environment are
those taken from the Evaluation Assurance Level 4 (EAL4) and augmented by taking the
following components:
ADV_IMP.2, ALC_DVS.2
The minimum strength of function is SOF-high.
This security target does not contain any security functional requirement for which an
explicit strength of function claim is required.
5.2.1 TOE Security Assurance Requirements
The following table list the required assurance requirement classes according [21a] with
the components ADV_IMP.2 and ALC_DVS.2 augmented to EAL4.
All final interpretations till now (17.02.2006) are applied.
Assurance Class Assurance Components
ACM ACM_AUT.1 ACM_CAP.4 ACM_SCP.2
ADO ADO_DEL.2 ADO_IGS.1
ADV ADV_FSP.2 ADV_HLD.2 ADV_IMP.2 ADV_LLD.1 ADV_RCR.1
ADV_SPM.1
AGD AGD_ADM.1 AGD_USR.1
ALC ALC_DVS.2 ALC_LCD.1 ALC_TAT.1
ATE ATE_COV.2 ATE_DPT.1 ATE_FUN.1 ATE_IND.2
AVA AVA_MSU.2 AVA_SOF.1 AVA_VLA.2
Table 2 Assurance Requirements: EAL (4+)
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5.3 Security Requirements for the IT environment
This section describes the security functional requirements for the IT environment using
the CC part 2 components.
Due to CCIMB Final Interpretation #58 these components are editorial changed to
express the security requirements for the components in the IT environment where the
original components are directed for TOE security functions. The editorial changes are
indicated in bold.
5.3.1 Passive Authentication
The ICAO, the Issuing States or Organizations and the Receiving States or
Organization run a public key infrastructure for the Passive Authentication. This public
key infrastructure distributes and protects the Country Signing CA Keys and the
Document Signing Keys to support the signing of the User Data (DG1 to DG16) by
means of the Document Security Object. The Technical Report [7] describes the
requirements to the public key infrastructure for the Passive Authentication.
The Document Signer of the Issuing State or Organization shall meet the requirement
“Basic data authentication (FDP_DAU.1)” as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
FDP_DAU.1/DS Basic data authentication – Passive Authentication
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FDP_DAU.1.1/ DS
The Document Signer shall provide a capability to generate evidence that can be used as
a guarantee of the validity of logical the MRTD (DG1 to DG16) and the Document
Security Object77
.
FDP_DAU.1.2/ DS
The Document Signer shall provide Inspection Systems of Receiving States or
Organization78
with the ability to verify evidence of the validity of the indicated
information.
Dependencies: No dependencies
5.3.2 Basic Inspection Systems
This section describes common security functional requirements to the Basic
Inspection Systems and the Personalization Agent if it uses the Basic Access Control
Mechanism with the Personalization Agent Authentication Keys. Both are called “Basic
Terminals” (BT) in this section.
77
[assignment: list of objects or information types]
78
[assignment: list of subjects]
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5 Security Requirements
The Basic Terminal shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic key generation
(FCS_CKM.1)” as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
FCS_CKM.1/BAC_BT Cryptographic key generation – Generation of Document
Basic Access Keys by the Basic Terminal
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FCS_CKM.1.1/ BAC_BT
The Basic Terminal shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key generation algorithm Document Basic Access Key Derivation
Algorithm79
and specified cryptographic key sizes 112 bit80
that meet the following:
[7], Annex E81
.
Dependencies:
[FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FMT_MSA.2 Secure security attributes
FCS_CKM.4/BT Cryptographic key destruction - BT
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FCS_CKM.4.1/BT
The Basic Terminal shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key destruction method physical deletion by overwriting the memory data
with zeros or random data that meets the following: none.
Dependencies:
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes or FDP_ITC.2 Import of user
data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FMT_MSA.2 Secure security attributes
The Basic Terminal shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic operation
(FCS_COP.1)” as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2). The iterations are caused
by different cryptographic algorithms to be implemented by the Basic Terminal.
FCS_COP.1/SHA_BT Cryptographic operation – Hash Function by the Basic
Terminal
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FCS_COP.1.1/ SHA_BT
79
[assignment: cryptographic key generation algorithm]
80 [assignment: cryptographic key sizes]
81
[assignment: list of standards]
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5 Security Requirements
The Basic Terminal shall perform hashing82
in accordance with a specified
cryptographic algorithms SHA-183
and cryptographic key sizes none84
that meet the
following: FIPS 180- 285
.
Dependencies:
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes or FDP_ITC.2 Import of user
data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FMT_MSA.2 Secure security attributes
FCS_COP.1/ENC_BT Cryptographic operation – Secure Messaging Encryption /
Decryption by the Basic Terminal
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FCS_COP.1.1/ ENC_BT
The Basic Terminal shall perform secure messaging – encryption and decryption86
in
accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm Triple-DES in CBC mode87
and
cryptographic key sizes 112 bit88
that meet the following: FIPS 46-3, ISO 11568-2, ISO
9797-1 (padding mode 2)89
.
Dependencies:
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes or FDP_ITC.2 Import of user
data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FMT_MSA.2 Secure security attributes
FCS_COP.1/MAC_BT Cryptographic operation – Secure messaging Message
Authentication Code by the Basic Terminal
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FCS_COP.1.1/MAC_BT
The Basic Terminal shall perform secure messaging – message authentication code90
in
accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm Retail-MAC91
and cryptographic
82
[assignment: list of cryptographic operations]
83
[assignment: cryptographic algorithm]
84
[assignment: cryptographic key sizes]
85
[assignment: list of standards]
86
[assignment: list of cryptographic operations]
87
[assignment: cryptographic algorithm]
88
[assignment: cryptographic key sizes]
89
[assignment: list of standards]
90
[assignment: list of cryptographic operations]
91
[assignment: cryptographic algorithm]
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5 Security Requirements
key sizes 112 bit92
that meet the following: FIPS 46-3, ISO 9797 (MAC algorithm 3,
block cipher DES, zero IV 8 bytes, padding mode 2)93
.
Dependencies:
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes or FDP_ITC.2 Import of user
data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FMT_MSA.2 Secure security attributes
FCS_COP.1/RSA_BT Cryptographic operation – RSA
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FCS_COP.1.1/RSA_BT
The Basic Terminal shall perform digital signature verification94
in accordance with a
specified cryptographic algorithm RSA with SHA-195
and cryptographic key sizes 1024-
4000 bit96
that meet the following: scheme 1 of ISO/IEC 9796-2:200297
[19].
Dependencies:
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes or FDP_ITC.2 Import of user
data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FMT_MSA.2 Secure security attributes
The Basic Terminal shall meet the requirement “Quality metric for random numbers
(FCS_RND.1)” as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2 extended).
FCS_RND.1/BT Quality metric for random numbers by Basic Terminal
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FCS_RND.1.1/BT
The Basic Terminal shall provide a mechanism to generate random numbers that meet
the requirements for SOF high defined in AIS 20 [5a].
Dependencies: No dependencies.
The Basic Terminal shall meet the requirements of “Single-use authentication
mechanisms (FIA_UAU.4)” as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
FIA_UAU.4/BT Single-use authentication mechanisms –Basic Terminal
Hierarchical to: No other components.
92
[assignment: cryptographic key sizes]
93
[assignment: list of standards]
94
[assignment: list of cryptographic operations]
95
[assignment: cryptographic algorithm]
96
[assignment: cryptographic key sizes]
97
[assignment: list of standards]
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5 Security Requirements
FIA_UAU.4.1/BT
The Basic Terminal shall prevent reuse of authentication data related to Basic Access
Control Authentication Mechanism and Active Authentication Mechanism98
.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
The Basic Terminal shall meet the requirement “Re-authentication (FIA_UAU.6)” as
specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
FIA_UAU.6/BT Re-authentication - Basic Terminal
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FIA_UAU.6.1/BT
The Basic Terminal shall re-authenticate the user under the conditions each command
sent to TOE after successful authentication of the terminal with Basic Access Control
Authentication Mechanism99
.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
The General Inspection System shall meet the requirement “Basic data exchange
confidentiality (FDP_UCT.1)” as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
FDP_UCT.1/BT Basic data exchange confidentiality – Basic Terminal
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FDP_UCT.1.1/BT
The Basic Terminal shall enforce the Basic Access Control SFP 100
to be able to
transmit and receive101
objects in a manner protected from unauthorised disclosure.
Dependencies:
[FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel, or FTP_TRP.1 Trusted path]
[FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
The Basic Terminal shall meet the requirement “Basic data exchange confidentiality
(FDP_UIT.1)” as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
FDP_UIT.1/BT Data exchange integrity - Basic Terminal
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FDP_UIT.1.1/BT
The Basic Terminal shall enforce the Basic Access Control SFP 102
to be able to
transmit and receive 103
user data in a manner protected from modification, deletion,
98
[assignment: identified authentication mechanism(s)]
99
[assignment: list of conditions under which re-authentication is required]
100
[assignment: access control SFP(s) and/or information flow control SFP(s)]
101
[selection: transmit, receive]
102
[assignment: access control SFP(s) and/or information flow control SFP(s)]
103
[selection: transmit, receive]
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5 Security Requirements
insertion and replay 104
.
FDP_UIT.1.2/BT
The Basic Terminal shall be able to determine on receipt of user data, whether
modification, deletion, insertion and replay 105
.
Dependencies:
[FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
[FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel, or FTP_TRP.1 Trusted path]
5.3.3 Personalization Terminals
The TOE supports different authentication and access control mechanisms which may be
used for the Personalization Agent depending on the personalization scheme of the
Issuing State or Organization:
(1) The Basic Access Control Mechanism which may be used by the
Personalization Terminal with a Personalization Agent Secret Key Pair. The Basic
Access Control Mechanism establishes strong cryptographic keys for the secure
messaging to ensure the confidentiality by Triple-DES and integrity by Retail-MAC of
the transmitted data. This approach may be used in a personalization environment where
the communication between the MRTD’s chip and the Personalization Terminal may be
listened or manipulated.
(2) In a centralized personalization scheme the major issue is high productivity of
personalization in a high secure environment. In this case the personalization agent may
wish to reduce the protocol to symmetric authentication of the terminal without secure
messaging. Therefore the TOE and the Personalization Terminal support a simple the
Symmetric Authentication Mechanism with Personalization Agent Key as requested by
the SFR FIA_UAU.4/MRTD and FIA_API.1/SYM_PT.
The Personalization Terminal shall meet the requirement “Authentication Prove of
Identity (FIA_API)” as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2 extended).
FIA_API.1/SYM_PT Authentication Proof of Identity - Personalization Terminal
Authentication with Symmetric Key
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FIA_API.1.1/SYM_PT
The Personalization Terminal shall provide an Authentication Mechanism based on
Triple-DES 106
to prove the identity of the Personalization Agent 107
.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
104
[selection: modification, deletion, insertion, replay]
105
[selection: modification, deletion, insertion, replay]
106
[assignment: authentication mechanism]
107
[assignment: authorized user or rule]
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6 TOE Summary Specification
6 TOESummarySpecification
This chapter describes the TOE Security Functions and the Assurance Measures
covering the requirements of the previous chapter.
6.1 TOE Security Functions
This chapter gives the overview description of the different TOE Security Functions
composing the TSF.
In the following table all TOE Security Functions are listed and if appropriate a SOF
claim is stated. The assessment of cryptographic algorithms is not part of this CC
evaluation.
TOE Security
Function
SOF claim Description
SF.ACCESS not appropriate This TOE Security Function is not realised by a
probabilistic or permutational noncryptographic
mechanism.
SF.ADMIN High There is a probabilistic authentication mechanism of the
card manufacturer during initialisation phase.
SF.AUTH High There is a probabilistic authentication mechanism of the
card manufacturer during initialisation phase.
SF.CRYPTO High The random number generators and hash functions are
probabilistic mechanisms. The deterministic random
number generator is rated K3 (high) according to AIS20
[5a].
SF.PROTECTION not appropriate This TOE Security Function is not realised by a
probabilistic or permutational noncryptographic
mechanism.
SF.IC High Several Security Functions of the IC are realised by
probabilistic or permutational noncryptographic
mechanisms. For the rating of the HW-RNG according
to AIS31 [5] see[24]
Table 3 SOF claims for TOE Security Functions
The SFs described in 6.1.1 to 6.1.5 are realised by software components supported by the
underlying hardware in accordance with the description in 6.1.6 (hardware related SF).
The SF.IC.2, covering a failure with preservation of secure state, is not realised by a
probabilistic or permutational noncryptographic mechanism; either a failure is detected
or not.
6.1.1 SF.ACCESS (Access Control)
Before the TSF perform an operation requested by a user, this Security function checks if
the operation specific requirements on user authorisation and protection of
communication data are fulfilled.
This Security Function is composed of
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6 TOE Summary Specification
1) The TSF enforces the following rules to determine if an operation among controlled
subjects and controlled objects is allowed:
• Allowing only the successfully authenticated Personalization Agent to write and
to read the data of the data groups EF.COM, EF.SOD and EF.DG1 to EF.DG16
of the logical MRTD,
• Allowing the successfully authenticated Basic Inspection System to read only
data in EF.COM, EF.SOD, EF.DG1, EF.DG2 and EF.DG5 to EF.DG16 of the
logical MRTD.
2) Not allowing anybody to modify any of the data groups EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the
logical MRTD in the usage phase.
3) TSF mediated actions on behalf of an user require his prior successful identification
and authentication, if it is not specified in this chapter otherwise.
4) Nobody is allowed to read the Document Basic Access Keys, the Active
Authentication Private Key and the Personalization Agent Keys.
6.1.2 SF.ADMIN (Administration of the TOE)
The administration of the TOE is managed by this Security Function.
This Security Function is composed of:
1) Storage of IC Identification Data in audit records through the Manufacturer.
2) Ability before user identification and authentication:
- to read the Initialization Data in Phase 2 “Manufacturing”,
- to read the ATR (different for and after Initialisation)
- to establish the communication channel, and
- to identify themselves by selection of the authentication key.
3) Initialization, personalisation and configuration of the TOE are only allowed for the
Manufacturer and the Personalisation Agent.
4) Ability to write the Initialization Data and Pre-personalization Data is restricted to
the Manufacturer.
5) Ability to disable read access for users to the Initialization Data is restricted to the
Personalization Agent.
6) Ability to write the Document Basic Access Keys is restricted to the Personalization
Agent.
7) Test Features of the TOE are not available for the user in Phase 4 “Operational Use”.
If Test Features are performed by the TOE then no User Data can be disclosed or
manipulated, no TSF data can be disclosed or manipulated, no software can be
reconstructed and no substantial information about construction of TSF can be
gathered which may enable other attacks.
8) Maintenance of the security roles: Manufacturer, Personalization Agent, Basic
Inspection System, Primary Inspection System.
9) Ability to write the data of the data groups EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical
MRTD.
10) The creation and loading of the Active Authentication Private Key is restricted to the
Manufacturer and the Personalisation Agent.
11) Nobody can deactive the Basic Access Control mechanism.
This Security Function has the level of strength SOF-high.
6.1.3 SF.AUTH (Authentication of the authorized TOE user)
The authentication for the authorized TOE user is managed by this Security Function.
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6 TOE Summary Specification
This Security Function is composed of:
1) User authentication provided through:
- Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism
- Secure messaging in MAC-ENC mode
- Symmetric Authentication Mechanism based on Triple-DES
2) Prevention of reuse of authentication data.
3) User authentication for the Personalisation Agent:
(a) for the Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism with
the Personalization Agent Keys,
(b) for the Symmetric Authentication Mechanism with the Personalization Agent
Key
4) User authentication for the Basic Inspection System through: the Basic Access
Control Authentication Mechanism with the Document Basic Access Keys.
5) After successful authentication as Basic Inspection System only commands with
correct message authentication code with key agreed upon with the authenticated
terminal by means of the Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism are
accepted.
6) Re-Authentication:
(a) Each command sent to the TOE after successful authentication of the terminal
with Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism shall be verified as being sent
by the authenticated BIS.
7) The TSF wait for an administrator configurable time between receiving the terminal
challenge and sending the TSF response, if the defined number of unsuccessful
authentication attempts has been met or surpassed.
8) The TSF shall detect when an administrator configurable positive integer within
range of acceptable values 1 to 10 unsuccessful authentication attempts occurs
related to a BAC authentication protocol.
9) Ability to read the data of the groups EF.SOD, EF.COM and EF.DG1 to EF.DG16
of the logical MRTD
10) Active Authentication Mechanism according to [7].
This Security Function has the level of strength SOF-high.
6.1.4 SF.CRYPTO (Cryptographic Support)
This Security Function provides the cryptographic support for the other Security
Functions.
This Security Function is composed of:
1) DES key generation in accordance with the Document Basic Access Control Key
Derivation Algorithm with key sizes of 112 bit that meet: [7], Annex E.
2) Hashing in accordance with SHA-1that meet the following: FIPS 180-2.
3) Secure messaging – encryption and decryption with Triple-DES in CBC mode and
key sizes of 112 bit that meet: FIPS 46-3 [14] and [7]; Annex E.
4) Secure messaging – message authentication with Retail MAC and key sizes of 112
bit that meet: ISO 9797 (MAC algorithm 3, block cipher DES, Sequence Message
Counter, padding mode 2).
5) Random number generation according AIS20 [5a] for key generation and
authentication process.
6) Destroying cryptographic keys by physical deletion by overwriting the memory data
with zeros or random data.
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6 TOE Summary Specification
7) RSA for signature creation according scheme 1 of ISO/IEC 9796-2:2002 [19]
This Security Function has the level of strength SOF-high.
6.1.5 SF.PROTECTION (Protection of TSC)
This Security Function protects the TSF functionality, TSF data and user data.
This Security Function is composed of:
1) Ensuring that transmitted and receiveduser data is protected from modification,
deletion, insertion and replay errors through secure messaging after BAC
Authentication has been performed successfully.
2) Ensuring that transmitted and received objects are protected from unauthorised
disclosure through secure messaging after BAC Authentication has been performed
successfully.
3) Determination on receipt of user data if modification, deletion, insertion and replay
have occurred through secure messaging after BAC has been performed
successfully.
4) Hiding information about IC power consumption and command execution time.
5) The TOE ensures that TSP enforcement functions are invoked and succeed before
each function within the TSC is allowed to proceed.
6) Maintaining a security domain for the TSF execution that protects it from
interference and tampering by untrusted subjects.
7) Enforcing separation between the security domains of subjects in the TSC.
8) Running a suite of self tests during initial start-up, periodically during normal
operation, at the condition Reset of the TOE to demonstrate the correct operation of
the TSF.
9) Providing authorised users with the capability to verify the integrity of TSF data and
stored TSF executable code.
6.1.6 SF.IC (Security Functions of the IC)
This Security Function covers the Security Functions of the IC [5].
This Security Function is composed of:
1) Detection of physical tampering of the TSF with sensors for operating voltage, clock
frequency, temperature and electromagnetic radiation.
2) Resistance to physical tampering of the TSF. If the TOE detects with the above
mentioned sensors, that it is not supplied within the specified limits, a security reset
is initiated and the TOE is not operable until the supply is back in the specified
limits. The design of the hardware protects it against analysing and physical
tampering.
3) Random number generation.
4) Cryptographic support for DES calculations.
This Security Function has the level of strength SOF-high.
6.2 Assurance Measures
This chapter describes the Assurance Measures fulfilling the requirements listed in
chapter 5 Security Requirements.
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6 TOE Summary Specification
The following table lists the Assurance measures and references the corresponding
documents describing the measures.
Assurance
Measures
Description
AM_ACM The configuration management is described in
GDM_STA33_MRTD_ACM_00.
AM_ADO The delivery, installation, generation and start-up of the TOE are described
in GDM_STA33_MRTD _ADO_00.
AM_ADV The representing of the TSF is described in GDM_STA33_MRTD
_ADV_SPM_00 for security policy modelling, in GDM_STA33_MRTD
_ADV_FSP_00 for functional specification, in GDM_STA33_MRTD
_ADV_HLD_00 for high level design, in GDM_STA33_MRTD
_ADV_LLD_00 for low level design, in GDM_STA33_MRTD
_ADV_IMP_00 for implementation representation and in
GDM_STA33_MRTD _ADV_RCR_00 for representation correspondence.
AM_AGD The guidance documentation is described in GDM_STA33_MRTD
_AGD_USR_00 for the user and in GDM_STA33_MRTD
_AGD_ADM_00 for the administrator.
AM_ALC The life cycle support of the TOE during its development and maintenance
is described in GDM_STA33_MRTD _ALC_00
AM_ATE The testing of the TOE is described in GDM_STA33_MRTD _ATE_00.
AM_AVA The vulnerability assessment for the TOE is described in
GDM_STA33_MRTD _AVA_MSU_00 for the misuse, in
GDM_STA33_MRTD _AVA_SOF_00 for the strength of TOE security
functions and in GDM_STA33_MRTD _AVA_VLA_00 for the
vulnerability analysis.
Table 4 References of Assurance Measures
Note: Reference end numbers may change during evaluation process (e.g.
GDM_STA33_MRTD _AVA_VLA_00 may become GDM_STA33_MRTD
_AVA_VLA_02).
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7 PP Claims
7 PPClaims
7.1 PP Reference
The conformance of this ST to the Common Criteria Protection Machine Readable
Travel Document with “ICAO Application, Basic Access Control, Version 1.0,
18.08.2005, BSI-PP-0017, [21a] is claimed.
7.2 PP Additions
Active Authentication based on ICAO PKI v1.1 [7] has been added. The added and
modified SFRs are listed in chapter 8.4
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8 Rationale
8 Rationale
The chapters 8.1 and 8.2 (except 8.2.5) have been taken from [21a] with minor
modification to support the Active Authentication Mechanism and show that the security
objectives cover the TOE security environment and IT security requirements are
appropriate to satisfy the security objectives.
The tables in sub-sections 8.1, 8.2 and 8.3.1 Rationale for TOE Security Functions
provide the mapping of the security objectives and security requirements for the TOE.
8.1 Security Objectives Rationale
The following table provides an overview for security objectives coverage.
OT.AC_Pers
OT.Data_Int
OT.Data_Conf
OT.Identification
OT.Prot_Abuse-Func
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper
OT.Malfuntion
OT.Active_Auth_proof
OD.Assurance
OD.Material
OE.Personalization
OE.Pass_Auth_Sign
OE.Exam_MRTD
OE.Pass_Auth_Verif
OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD
OE.Secure
Handling
OE.Active_Auth_Key_MRTD
T.Chip-ID x x
T.Skimming x x
T.Eavesdropping x
T.Forgery x x x x x x
T.Counterfeit x x
T.Abuse-Func x
T.Information_Leakage x
T.Phys-tamper x
T.Malfunction x
P.Manufact x x
P.Personalization x x x
P.Personal_Data x x
A.Pers_Agent x
A.Insp_Sys x x
Table 5 Security Objective Rationale
The OSP P.Manufact “Manufacturing of the MRTD’s chip” requires the quality and
integrity of the manufacturing process and control the MRTD’s material in the Phase 2
Manufacturing including unique identification of the IC by means of the Initialization
Data and the writing of the Pre-personalization Data. The security objective for the TOE
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8 Rationale
environment OD.Assurance “Assurance Security Measures in Development and
Manufacturing Environment” address these obligations of the IC Manufacturer and
MRTD Manufacturer.
The OSP P.Personalization “Personalization of the MRTD by issuing State or
Organization only” addresses the (i) the enrolment of the logical MRTD by the
Personalization Agent as described in the security objective for the TOE environment
OE.Personalization “Personalization of logical MRTD”, and (ii) the access control for
the user data and TSF data as described by the security objective OT.AC_Pers
“Access Control for Personalization of logical MRTD”. Note, the manufacturer equips
the TOE with the Personalization Agent Authentication key(s) according to
OD.Assurance “Assurance Security Measures in Development and Manufacturing
Environment”. The security objective OT.AC_Pers limits the management of TSF
data (enabling and disabling of the TSF Basic Access Control) to the
Personalization Agent.
The OSP P.Personal_Data “Personal data protection policy” requires the TOE (i) to
support the protection of the confidentiality of the logical MRTD by means of the Basic
Access Control and (ii) enforce the access control for reading as decided by the issuing
State or Organization. This policy is implemented by the security objectives
OT.Data_Int “Integrity of personal data“ which describes the unconditional protection
of the integrity of the stored data and the configurable integrity protection during the
transmission. The security objective OT.Data_Conf “Confidentiality of personal data”
describes the protection of the confidentiality as configured by the Personalization
Agent acting in charge of the issuing State or Organization.
The threat T.Chip_ID “Identification of MRTD’s chip” addresses the trace of the
MRTD movement by identifying remotely the MRTD’s chip through the contactless
communication interface. In case of TOE configuration for use with Basic Inspection
Terminals only this threat is countered as described by the security objective
OT.Identification by Basic Access Control. If the TOE is configured for use with
Primary Inspection Systems this threat shall be adverted by the TOE environment as
described by OE.Secure_Handling.
The threat T.Skimming “Skimming digital MRZ data or the digital portrait” and
T.Eavesdropping “Eavesdropping to the communication between TOE and inspection
system” addresses the reading of the logical MRTD trough the contactless interface
outside the communication between the MRTD’s chip and a terminal. In case of TOE
configuration for use with Basic Inspection Terminals only this threat is countered by
the security objective OT.Identification through Basic Access Control. If the TOE is
configured for use with Primary Inspection Systems the threat T.Skimming shall be
adverted by the TOE environment according to OE.Secure_Handling “Secure
handling of the MRTD by MRTD holder” and the threat T.Eavesdropping shall be
adverted by OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD “Protection of data of the logical MRTD”.
The threat T.Forgery “Forgery of data on MRTD’s chip” addresses the fraudulent
alteration of the complete stored logical MRTD or any part of it. The security objective
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8 Rationale
OT.AC_Pers “Access Control for Personalization of logical MRTD“ requires the TOE
to limit the write access for the logical MRTD to the trustworthy Personalization Agent
(cf. OE.Personalization). The TOE will protect the integrity of the stored logical MRTD
according the security objective OT.Data_Int “Integrity of personal data” and
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper “Protection against Physical Tampering”. The examination of
the presented MRTD passport book according to OE.Exam_MRTD “Examination of
the MRTD passport book” shall ensure that passport book does not contain an additional
contactless chip which may present the complete unchanged logical MRTD. The TOE
environment will detect partly forged logical MRTD data by means of digital signature
which will be created according to OE.Pass_Auth_Sign “Authentication of logical
MRTD by Signature” and verified by the inspection system according to
OE.Passive_Auth_Verif “Verification by Passive Authentication”.
The threat T.Counterfeit “MRTD’s chip” addresses the attack of unauthorised copy or
reproduction of the genuine MRTD chip. This attack is thwarted through the chip by an
identification and authenticity proof required by OT.Active_Auth_Proof “Proof of
MRTD’s chip authentication” using an authentication key pair to be generated by the
issuing state or organisation. The Public Active Authentication Key has to be written into
EF.DG15 and signed by means of Documents Security Objects as demanded by
OE.Active_Auth_Key_MRTD “MRTD Authentication Key”.
The threat T.Abuse-Func “Abuse of Functionality” addresses attacks using the
MRTD’s chip as production material for the MRTD and misuse of the functions for
personalization in the operational state after delivery to MRTD holder to disclose or to
manipulate the logical MRTD. The security objectives for the TOE environment
OD.Material “Control over MRTD Material” ensures the control of the MRTD material.
The security objectives for the TOE environment OD.Assurance “Assurance Security
Measures in Development and Manufacturing Environment” and OE.Personalization
“Personalization of logical MRTD” ensure that the TOE security functions for the
initialization and the personalization are disabled and the security functions for the
operational state after delivery to MRTD holder are enabled according to the intended
use of the TOE.
The threats T.Information_Leakage “Information Leakage from MRTD’s chip”,
T.Phys-Tamper “Physical Tampering” and T.Malfunction “Malfunction due to
Environmental Stress” are typical for integrated circuits like smart cards under direct
attack with high attack potential. The protection of the TOE against these threats is
addressed by the directly related security objectives OT.Prot_Inf_Leak “Protection
against Information Leakage”, OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper “Protection against Physical
Tampering” and OT.Prot_Malfunction “Protection against Malfunctions”.
The assumption A.Pers_Agent “Personalization of the MRTD’s chip” is covered by the
security objective for the TOE environment OE.Personalization “Personalization of
logical MRTD” including the enrolment, the protection with digital signature and the
storage of the MRTD holder personal data and the enabling of security features of the
TOE according to the decision of the Issuing State or Organization concerning the
Basic Access Control.
The examination of the MRTD passport book addressed by the assumption
A.Insp_Sys “Inspection Systems for global interoperability” is covered by the security
objectives for the TOE environment OE.Exam_MRTD “Examination of the MRTD
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8 Rationale
passport book”. If the Issuing State of Organization decides to protect confidentiality of
the logical MRTD than the the security objectives for the TOE environment
E.Prot_Logical_MRTD “Protection of data of the logical MRTD” will require the Basic
Inspection System to implement the Basic Access Control and to protect the logical
MRTD data during the transmission and the internal handling. If the Issuing State of
Organization decides to configure the TOE for use with Primary Inspection Systems than
no protection of the logical MRTD data is required by the inspection system.
8.2 Security Requirements Rationale
8.2.1 Security Functional Requirements Rationale
The following table provides an overview for security functional requirements coverage.
OT.AC_Pers
OT.Data_Int
OT.Data_Conf
OT.Identification
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper
OT.Malfuntion
OT.Prot_Abuse_Func
OT.Active_Auth_Proof
FAU_SAS.1 x
FCS_CKM.1/BAC_MRTD (x) x (x)
FCS_CKM.4 (x) x
FCS_COP.1/SHA_MRTD x x (x)
FCS_COP.1/TDES_MRTD x x x
FCS_COP.1/MAC_MRTD x x x
FCS_COP.1/RSA_MRTD x x x x
FCS_RND.1/MRTD (x)
FIA_UID.1 x x
FIA_UAU.1 x
FIA_UAU.4/MRTD x x x
FIA_UAU.5 x x x
FIA_UAU.6/MRTD x x x
FIA_AFL.1 x
FIA_API.1/AA x
FDP_ACC.1/PRIM x x
FDP_ACF.1/PRIM x x
FDP_ACC.1/BASIC x x x
FDP_ACF.1/BASIC x x x
FDP_UCT.1/MRTD x x x
FDP_UIT.1/MRTD x x x
FMT_MOF.1 x x x
FMT_SMF.1 x x x
FMT_SMR.1 x x x
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8 Rationale
OT.AC_Pers
OT.Data_Int
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper
OT.Malfuntion
OT.Active_Auth_Proof
OT.Prot_Abuse_Func
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak
OT.Identification
OT.Data_Conf
FMT_LIM.1 x
FMT_LIM.2 x
FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA x
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS x
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE x x x
FMT_MTD.1/AAPK x x x
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ x x x x
FPT_EMSEC.1 x x
FPT_TST.1 x x
FPT_RVM.1 x
FPT_FLS.1 x x
FPT_PHP.3 x x
FPT_SEP.1 x x
Table 6 Coverage of Security Objective for the TOE by SFR
The security objective OT.AC_Pers “Access Control for Personalization of logical
MRTD” addresses the access control of the writing the logical MRTD and the
management of the TSF for Basic Access Control. The write access to the logical MRTD
data are defined by the SFR FDP_ACC.1/PRIM, FDP_ACC.1/BASIC,
FDP_ACF.1/PRIM and FDP_ACF.1/BASIC in the same way: only the successfully
authenticated Personalization Agent is allowed to write the data of the groups DG1 to
DG16 of the logical MRTD only once.
The authentication of the terminal as Personalization Agent shall be performed by TSF
according to SRF FIA_UAU.4/MRTD and FIA_UAU.5. In case the Basic Access
Control Authentication Mechanism was used the SFR FIA_UAU.6/MRTD describes the
re-authentication and FDP_UCT.1 and FDP_UIT.1 the protection of the transmitted data
by means of secure messaging implemented by the cryptographic functions according to
FCS_CKM.1/BAC_MRTD, FCS_COP.1/SHA_MRD, FCS_RND.1 (for key generation),
and FCS_COP.1/TDES_MRTD and FCS_COP:1/MAC_MRTD for the
ENC_MAC_Mode.
The SFR FMT_SMR.1 lists the roles (including Personalization Agent) and the SFR
FMT_SMF.1 lists the TSF management functions (including Personalization) because
the Personalization Agent handles the configuration of the TSF Basic Access Control
according to the SFR FMT_MOF.1 and the Document Basic Access Keys
according to the SFR FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE as authentication reference data if
Basic Access Control is enabled. The SFR FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ preventing read
access to the secret key of the Personalization Agent Keys and ensure together with
the SFR FPT_EMSEC.1, FPT_FLS.1 and FPT_PHP.3 the confidentially of these keys.
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8 Rationale
The security objective OT.Data_Int “Integrity of personal data” requires the TOE to
protect the integrity of the logical MRTD stored on the MRTD’s chip against physical
manipulation and unauthorized writing. The write access to the logical MRTD data is
defined by the SFR FDP_ACC.1/PRIM, FDP_ACC.1/BASIC, FDP_ACF.1/PRIM and
FDP_ACF.1/BASIC in the same way: only the Personalization Agent is allowed to write
the data in DG1 to DG16 of the logical MRTD (FDP_ACF.1.2, rule 1) and terminals are
not allowed to modify any of the data in DG1 to DG16 of the logical MRTD (cf.
FDP_ACF.1.4). The SFR FMT_SMR.1 lists the roles (including Personalization Agent)
and the SFR FMT_SMF.1 lists the TSF management functions(including
Personalization).
If the TOE is configured for the use with Basic Inspection Terminals only by means of
FMT_MOF.1 the security objective OT.Data_Int “Integrity of personal data” requires
the TOE to ensure that the inspection system is able to detect any modification of the
transmitted logical MRTD data.. The authentication of the terminal as Personalization
Agent shall be performed by TSF according to SRF FIA_UAU.4/MRTD, FIA_UAU.5
and FIA_UAU.6/MRTD.
The SFR FIA_UAU.6/MRTD, FDP_UCT.1 and FDP_UIT.1 requires the protection of
the transmitted data by means of secure messaging implemented by the cryptographic
functions according to FCS_CKM.1/BAC_MRTD, FCS_COP.1/SHA_MRTD,
FCS_RND.1 (for key generation), and FCS_COP.1/TDES_MRTD and
FCS_COP.1/MAC_MRTD for the ENC_MAC_Mode. The SFR FMT_MTD.1/KEY
requires the Personalization Agent to establish the Document Basic Access Control
Keys and the Personalization Agent handles the configuration of the TSF Basic Access
Control according to the SFR FMT_MOF.1.
The security objective OT.Data_Conf “Confidentiality of personal data” requires the
TOE to ensure the confidentiality of the logical MRTD data in DG1 to DG16 if the
TOE is configured for the use with Basic Inspection Systems by means of FMT_MOF.1.
The SFR FIA_UID.1 and FIA_UAU.1 allow only those actions before identification
respective authentication which do not violate OT.Data_Conf. The read access to the
logical MRTD data is defined by the FDP_ACC.1/BASIC and FDP_ACF.1.2/BASIC:
only the successful authenticated Personalization Agent and the successful authenticated
Basic Inspection System are allowed to read the data of the logical MRTD. The SFR
FMT_SMR.1 lists the roles (including Personalization Agent and Basic Inspection
System) and the SFR FMT_SMF.1 lists the TSF management functions (including
Personalization for the key management for the Document Basic Access Keys).
The SFR FIA_AFL.1 strengthens the authentication function as terminal part of the
Basic Access Control Authentication Protocol or other authentication functions if
necessary. The SFR FIA_UAU.4/MRTD prevents reuse of authentication data to
strengthen the authentication of the user. The SFR FIA_UAU.5 enforces the TOE to
accept the authentication attempt as Basic Inspection System only by means of the Basic
Access Control Authentication Mechanism with the Document Basic Access Keys.
Moreover, the SFR FIA_UAU.6 requests secure messaging after successful
authentication of the terminal with Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism
which includes the protection of the transmitted data in ENC_MAC_Mode by means of
the cryptographic functions according to FCS_COP.1/TDES_MRTD and
FCS_COP.1/MAC_MRTD (cf. the SFR FDP_UCT.1 and FDP_UIT.1). (for key
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8 Rationale
generation), and FCS_COP.1/TDES_MRTD and FCS_COP.1/MAC_MRTD for the
ENC_MAC_Mode.
The SFR FCS_CKM.1/BAC_MRTD, FCS_CKM.4, FCS_COP.1/SHA_MRTD and
FCS_RND.1 establish the key management for the secure messaging keys. The SFR
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE addresses the key management and
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ prevents reading of the Document Basic Access Keys.
Note, neither the security objective OT.Data_Conf nor the SFR FIA_UAU.5 requires the
Personalization Agent to use the Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism or
secure messaging. If the TOE is configured for the use with Primary Inspection
Systems no protection in confidentiality of the logical MRTD is needed to ensure.
The security objective OT.Identification “Identification and Authentication of the TOE”
address the storage of the IC Identification Data uniquely identifying the MRTD’s chip
in its non-volatile memory. This will be ensured by TSF according to SFR FAU_SAS.1.
Furthermore, if the TOE is configured for use with Basic Inspection Terminals the TOE
shall identify themselves only to a successful authenticated Basic Inspection System in
Phase 4 “Operational Use”. The SFR FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA allows only the
Manufacturer to write Initialization Data and Pre-personalization Data.
The SFR FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS allows the Personalization Agent to disable
Initialization Data if their use in the phase 4 “Operational Use” violates the security
objective OT.Identification. The SFR FIA_UID.1 and FIA_UAU.1 do not allow reading
of any data uniquely identifying the MRTD’s chip before successful authentication of the
Basic Inspection Terminal and will stop communication after unsuccessful
authentication attempt (cf. Application note 28 of [21a]). The FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA
restricts the ability to write the Initialization Data and Pre-personalization Datato the
Manufacturer.
The security objective OT.Prot_Abuse-Func “Protection against Abuse of
Functionality” is ensured by (i) the SFR FMT_LIM.1 and FMT_LIM.2 which prevent
misuse of test functionality of the TOE or other which may not be used after TOE
Delivery, (ii) the SFR FPT_RVM.1 which prevents by monitoring the bypass and
deactivation of security features or functions of the TOE, and (iii) the SFR FPT_SEP.1
which prevents change or explore security features or functions of the TOE by means
of separation the other TOE functions.
The security objective OT.Prot_Inf_Leak “Protection against Information Leakage”
requires the TOE to protect confidential TSF data stored and/or processed in the
MRTD’s chip against disclosure
- by measurement and analysis of the shape and amplitude of signals or the time
between events found by measuring signals on the electromagnetic field, power
consumption clock, or I/O lines, which is addressed by the SFR FPT_EMSEC.1,
- by forcing a malfunction of the TOE, which is addressed by the SFR FPT_FLS.1
and FPT_TST.1, and/or
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8 Rationale
- by a physical manipulation of the TOE, which is addressed by the SFR
FPT_PHP.3.
The security objective OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper “Protection against Physical Tampering”
is covered by the SFR FPT_PHP.3.
The security objective OT.Prot_Malfunction “Protection against Malfunctions” is
covered by (i) the SFR FPT_TST.1 which requires self tests to demonstrate the correct
operation and tests of authorized users to verify the integrity of TSF data and TSF
code, (ii) the SFR FPT_FLS.1 which requires a secure state in case of detected failure
or operating conditions possibly causing a malfunction, and (iii) the SFR FPT_SEP.1
limiting the effects of malfunctions due to TSF domain separation.
The security objective OT.Active_Auth_Proof “Proof of MRTD’s chip authenticity” is
ensured by the Active Authentication Protocol provided by FIA_API.1/AA proving the
identity of the TOE. The Active Authentication Protocol defined by FIA_API.1/AA is
performed using a TOE internally stored confidential private key as required by
FMT_MTD.1/AAPK and FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ. The Active Authentication
Protocol [7] requires additional TSF according to FCS_COP.1/RSA_MRTD.
The following table provides an overview how security functional requirements for the
IT environment cover security objectives for the TOE environment. The protection
profile describes only those SFR of the IT environment directly related to the SFR for
the TOE. It does not state any SFR for the IT environment supporting the security
objectives OD.Assurance and OD.Material. The OE.Exam_MRTD uses only security
function of the IT environment, i.e. the passive authentication. The security objective
OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD is directed to Basic Inspection Systems only which cooperate
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8 Rationale
with the TOE in protection of the logical MRTD.
Table 7 Coverage of Security Objectives for the IT environment by SFR
The document signer provides the security function Passive Authentication according
to FDP_DAU.1(DS to support the inspection system to verify the logical MRTD.
The security objective OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD “Protection of data of the logical
address the protection of handling. The SFR FIA_UAU.4/BT and FIA_UAU.6/BT
address the terminal part of the Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism and
FDP_UCT.1/BT and FDP_UIT.1/BT the secure messaging established by this
mechanism. The SFR FCS_CKM.1/BAC_BT, FCS_COP.1/SHA_BT,
FCS_COP.1/ENC_BT, FCS_COP.1/MAC_BT and FCS_RND.1/BT are necessary to
implement this mechanism. The BIS shall destroy the Document Access Control Key
and the secure messaging key after inspection of the MRTD because they are not needed
any more.
The OE.Personalization “Personalization of logical MRTD” requires the MRTD“
personalization terminal to authenticate themselves to the MRTD’s chip to get the write
authorization. This implies to implement the Basic Access Control Authentication
Mechanism with the Personalization Agent Authentication Keys or support the
symmetric authentication protocol according to the SFR FIA_API.1/SYM_PT.
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8 Rationale
8.2.2 Dependency Rationale
The dependency analysis for the security functional requirements shows that the basis
for mutual support and internal consistency between all defined functional requirements
is satisfied. All dependencies between the chosen functional components are analyzed,
and non-dissolved dependencies are appropriately explained.
The table 8 shows the dependencies between the SFR and of the SFR to the SAR of
the TOE.
SFR Dependencies Support of the
Dependencies
FAU_SAS.1 No dependencies n.a.
FCS_CKM. 1/BAC_MRTD [FCS_CKM.2
Cryptographic key distribution
or FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic
operation], FCS_CKM.4
Cryptographic key destruction,
FMT_MSA.2 Secure security
attributes
FCS_CKM.4, FCS
COP.1/TDES MRTD,
FCS_COP. 1/MAC_MRTD
justification 1 for non-
satisfied dependencies
FCS_CKM.4/MRTD [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data
without security attributes or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data
with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic
key generation], FMT_MSA.2
Secure security attributes
FCS_CKM.1, justification
1 for non-satisfied
dependencies
FCS_COP. 1/SHA_MRTD [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data
without security attributes or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user
data with security attributes,
or FCS_CKM.1
Cryptographic key
generation], FCS_CKM.4
Cryptographic key
destruction, FMT_MSA.2
Secure security attributes
FCS_CKM.1,
FCS_CKM.4, justification
2 for non-satisfied
dependencies
FCS_COP.1/TDES_MRTD [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data
without security attributes or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user
data with security attributes,
or FCS_CKM.1
Cryptographic key
generation], FCS_CKM.4
Cryptographic key
destruction, FMT_MSA.2
Secure security attributes
FCS_CKM.1,
FCS_CKM.4, justification
3 for non-satisfied
dependencies
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8 Rationale
SFR Dependencies Support of the
Dependencies
FCS_COP. 1/MAC_MRTD [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data
without security attributes or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user
data with security attributes,
or FCS_CKM.1
Cryptographic key
generation], FCS_CKM.4
Cryptographic key
destruction, FMT_MSA.2
Secure security attributes
FCS_CKM.1,
FCS_CKM.4, justification
3 for non-satisfied
dependencies
FCS_RND.1/MRTD No dependencies n.a.
FCS_COP.1/RSA_MRTD [FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic
key
distribution or FCS_COP.1
Cryptographic operation],
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key
destruction, FMT_MSA.2
Secure security attributes
FCS_CKM.4, see
justification A for non-
satisfied dependencies
FIA_UID.1 No dependencies n.a.
FIA_UAU.1 FIA_UID.1 Timing of
identifiication
Fulfilled
FIA_UAU.4/MRTD No dependencies n.a.
FIA_UAU.5 No dependencies n.a.
FIA_UAU.6/MRTD No dependencies n.a.
FIA_AFL.1 FIA_UAU.1 Timing of
authentication
Fulfilled
FIA_API.1/AA No dependencies n.a.
FDP_ACC.1/PRIM FDP_ACF.1 Security
attribute based access
control
Fulfilled by
FDP_ACF.1/PRIM
FDP_ACC.1/BASIC FDP_ACF.1 Security
attribute based access
control
Fulfilled by
FDP_ACF.1/BASI
C
FDP_ACF.1/PRIM FDP_ACC.1 Subset
access control,
FMT_MSA.3 Static
attribute initialization
FDP_ACC.1/PRIM,
justification 4 for non-
satisfied dependencies
FDP_ACF.1/BASIC FDP_ACC.1 Subset
access control,
FMT_MSA.3 Static
attribute initialization
FDP_ACC.1,
justification 4 for non-
satisfied dependencies
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8 Rationale
SFR Dependencies Support of the
Dependencies
FDP_UCT.1/MRTD [FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted
channel, or FTP_TRP.1
Trusted path], [FDP_ACC.1
Subset access control, or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset
information flow control]
FDP_ACC.1/BASIC,
justification 5 for non-
satisfied dependencies
FDP_UIT.1/MRTD [FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted
channel, or FTP_ TRP.1
Trusted path], [FDP_ACC.1
Subset access control, or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset
information flow control]
FDP_ACC.1/BASIC,
justification 5 for non-
satisfied dependencies
FMT_MOF.1 No dependencies n.a.
FMT_SMF.1 No dependencies n.a.
FMT_SMR.1 FIA_UID.1 Timing of
identification
Fulfilled
FMT_LIM.1 FMT_LIM.2 Fulfilled
FMT_LIM.2 FMT_LIM.1 Fulfilled
FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA FMT_SMF.1 Specification of
management functions,
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
Fulfilled
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS FMT_SMF.1 Specification of
management functions,
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
Fulfilled
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ FMT_SMF.1 Specification
of management functions,
FMT_SMR.1 Security
roles
fulfilled
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRIT
E
FMT_SMF.1 Specification
of management functions,
FMT_SMR.1 Security
roles
Fulfilled
FMT_MTD.1/AAPK FMT_SMF.1 Specification of
management functions,
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
Fulfilled
FPT_EMSEC.1 No dependencies n.a.
FPT_FLS.1 ADV_SPM.1 Fulfilled by EAL4
FPT_PHP.3 No dependencies n.a.
FPT_RVM.1 No dependencies n.a.
FPT_SEP.1 No dependencies n.a.
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8 Rationale
SFR Dependencies Support of the
Dependencies
FPT_TST.1 FPT_AMT.1 Abstract
machine testing
See justification 6 for
non-satisfied
dependencies
Table 8 Dependencies between the SFR for the TOE
Justification for non-satisfied dependencies between the SFR for TOE:
No. 1: The SFR FCS_CKM.1/BAC_MRTD uses only the Document Basic Access Keys
or other shared secrets to generate the secure messaging keys used for
FCS_COP.1/TDES and FCS_COP.1/MAC. The SFR FCS_CKM.4/MRTD destroys
these keys automatically. These simple processes do not need any special security
attributes for the secure messaging keys.
No. 2: The cryptographic algorithm SHA-1 does not use any cryptographic key.
Therefore none of the listed SFRs are needed to be defined for this specific instantiation
of FCS_COP.1.
No. 3: The SFR FCS_COP.1/TDES_MRTD and FCS_COP.1/MAC_MRTD use the
automatically generated secure messaging keys assigned to the session with the
successfully authenticated BIS only. There is no need for any special security attributes
for the secure messaging keys.
No. 4: The access control TSF according to FDP_ACF.1 uses security attributes which
are defined during the personalization and are fixed over the whole life time of the TOE.
No management of these security attribute (i.e. SFR FMT_MSA.1 and FMT_MSA.2) is
necessary here.
No. 5: The SFR FDP_UCT.1/MRTD and FDP_UIT.1/MRTD require the use secure
messaging between the MRTD and the BIS. There is no need for sensitive SFR
FTP_ITC.1, e.g. to require this communication channel to be logically distinct from
other communication channels it is the only one.
No. 6: The TOE consists of the software and its underlying hardware on which it is
running. Thus there is no abstract machine to be tested.
No.A: The SFR FCS_COP.1/RSA_MRTD does not calculate any shared secrets, nor
does it import user data. Therefore there is not need for any special security attributes.
The following table shows the dependencies between the SFR for the IT environment
and of the SFR to the SAR of the TOE.
SFR Dependencies Support of the
Dependencies
FDP_DAU.1 No dependencies n.a.
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8 Rationale
SFR Dependencies Support of the
Dependencies
FCS_CKM.1/BAC_BT [FCS_CKM.2
Cryptographic key
distribution or
FCS_COP.1
Cryptographic operation],
FCS_CKM.4
Cryptographic key
destruction, FMT_MSA.2
Secure security attributes
FCS_CKM.4,
FCS_COP.1/TDES_BT,
FCS_COP.1/MAC_BT
justification 7 for nonsatisfied
dependencies
FCS_CKM.4/BT [FDP_ITC.1 Import of
user data without security
attributes or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of
user data with security
attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1
Cryptographic key
generation], FMT_MSA.2
Secure security attributes
FCS_CKM.1, justification 7 for
non-satisfied dependencies
FCS_COP.1/SHA_BT [FDP_ITC.1 Import of
user data without security
attributes or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user
data with security
attributes, or FCS_CKM.1
Cryptographic key
generation], FCS_CKM.4
Cryptographic key
destruction, FMT_MSA.2
Secure security attributes
FCS_CKM.1, FCS_CKM.4,
justification 8 for non-satisfied
dependencies
FCS_COP.1/ENC_BT [FDP_ITC.1 Import of
user data without security
attributes or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user
data with security
attributes, or FCS_CKM.1
Cryptographic key
generation], FCS_CKM.4
Cryptographic key
destruction, FMT_MSA.2
Secure security attributes
FCS_CKM.1, FCS_CKM.4,
justification 9 for non-satisfied
dependencies
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8 Rationale
SFR Dependencies Support of the
Dependencies
FCS_COP.1/MAC_BT [FDP_ITC.1 Import of
user data without security
attributes or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user
data with security
attributes, or FCS_CKM.1
Cryptographic key
generation], FCS_CKM.4
Cryptographic key
destruction, FMT_MSA.2
Secure security attributes
FCS_CKM.1, FCS_CKM.4,
justification 9 for non-satisfied
dependencies
FCS_COP.1/RSA_BT [FCS_CKM.2
Cryptographic key
distribution or
FCS_COP.1
Cryptographic operation],
FCS_CKM.4
Cryptographic key
destruction, FMT_MSA.2
Secure security attributes
FCS_CKM.4, see justification B
for non-satisfied dependencies
FCS_RND.1/BT No dependencies n.a.
FIA_UAU.4/BT No dependencies n.a.
FIA_UAU.6/BT No dependencies n.a.
FDP_UCT.1/BT [FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF
trusted channel, or FTP_
TRP.1 Trusted path],
[FDP_ACC.1 Subset
access control, or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset
information flow control]
FDP_ACC.1/BASIC,
justification 10 for non-satisfied
dependencies
FDP_UIT.1/BT [FTP_ITC.1 I nter-TSF
trusted channel, or FTP
TRP.1 Trusted path],
[FDP_ACC.1 Subset
access control, or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset
information flow control]
FDP_ACC.1/BASIC,
justification 10 for non-satisfied
dependencies
FIA_API.1/SYM_PT No dependencies n.a.
Table 9 Dependencies between the SFR for the IT environment
Justification for non-satisfied dependencies between the SFR for the IT environment.
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8 Rationale
No. 7: The SFR FCS_CKM.1/KDF_BT derives the Document Basic Access Keys and
uses this key to generate the secure messaging keys used for FCS_COP.1/TDES and
FCS_COP.1/MAC. The SFR FCS_CKM.4/BT destroys these keys. These processes do
not need any special security attributes for the secure messaging keys.
No. 8: The cryptographic algorithm SHA-1 does not use any cryptographic key.
Therefore none of the listed SFR is needed to be defined for this specific instantiation of
FCS_COP.1.
No. 9: The SFR FCS_COP.1/TDES_BT and FCS_COP.1/MAC_BT use the
automatically generated secure messaging keys assigned to the session with the
successfully authenticated MRTD only. There is no need for any special security
attributes for the secure messaging keys.
No. 14: The SFR FDP_UCT.1/MRTD and FDP_UIT.1/MRTD require the use secure
messaging between the MRTD and the BIS. There is no need to provide further
description of this communication.
No.B: The SFR FCS_COP.1/RSA_BT does not calculate any shared secrets, nor does it
import user data. Therefore there is not need for any special security attributes.
8.2.3 Security Assurance Requirements Rationale
The EAL4 was chosen to permit a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive
security engineering based on good commercial development practices which, though
rigorous, do not require substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other resources.
EAL4 is the highest level at which it is likely to be economically feasible to retrofit to
an existing product line. EAL4 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or
users require a moderate to high level of independently assured security in
conventional commodity TOEs and are prepared to incur sensitive security specific
engineering costs.
The selection of component ADV_IMP.2 provides a higher assurance for the
implementation of the MRTD’s chip especially for the absence of unintended
functionality.
The selection of the component ALC_DVS.2 provides a higher assurance of the security
of the MRTD’s development and manufacturing especially for the secure handling of
the MRTD’s material.
The minimal strength of function “high” was selected to ensure resistance against direct
attacks on functions based on probabilistic or permutational mechanisms.
The components ADV_IMP.2 and ALC_DVS.2 augmented to EAL4 has dependencies
to other security requirements fulfilled within EAL4
Dependencies ADV_IMP.2
ADV_LLD.1 Descriptive low-level design
ALC_TAT.1 Well-defined development tools
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8 Rationale
Dependencies ALC_DVS.2: no.
8.2.4 Security Requirements – Mutual Support and Internal Consistency
The following part of the security requirements rationale shows that the set of security
requirements for the TOE consisting of the security functional requirements (SFRs) and
the security assurance requirements (SARs) together forms a mutually supportive and
internally consistent whole.
The analysis of the TOE´s security requirements with regard to their mutual support
and internal consistency demonstrates:
The dependency analysis in section 8.2.2 Dependency Rationale for the security
functional requirements shows that the basis for mutual support and internal
consistency between all defined functional requirements is satisfied. All dependencies
between the chosen functional components are analysed, and non-satisfied
dependencies are appropriately explained.
The assurance class EAL4 is an established set of mutually supportive and internally
consistent assurance requirements. The dependency analysis for the additional
assurance components in section 8.2.3 Security Assurance Requirements Rationale
shows that the assurance requirements are mutually supportive and internally
consistent as all (additional) dependencies are satisfied and no inconsistency appears.
The Personalization Agent may configure the TOE according to the organisational
security policy (i) for use with Primary Inspection Systems or (ii) for use with Basic
Inspection Systems. According to the security objective OT.Data_Conf the TOE
enforces different security functional policies for the chosen (by means of the SFr
FMT_MOF.1) configurations (i.e. the Primary Access Control SFP for the use with
Primary Inspection Systems and the Basic Access Control SFP for the use with Basic
Inspection Systems). These SFP are implemented by two internally consistent sets of
SFR for the cryptographic functions, the user identification, the user authentication, the
access control and - in case of the Basic Access Control SFP - for the data export
protection. All TSF are protected by a common set of SFR of the FPT against any
attempt to bypass, to deactivate, to manipulate or to misuse the TOE security features
or TSF.
Inconsistency between functional and assurance requirements could only arise if there
are functional-assurance dependencies which are not met, a possibility which has been
shown not to arise in sections 8.2.2 Dependency Rationale and 8.2.3 Security
Assurance Requirements Rationale. Furthermore, as also discussed in section 8.2.3
Security Assurance Requirements Rationale, the chosen assurance components are
adequate for the functionality of the TOE. So the assurance requirements and security
functional requirements support each other and there are no inconsistencies between
the goals of these two groups of security requirements.
8.2.5 Rationale for Strength of Function High
The TOE shall demonstrate to be highly resistant against penetration attacks in order to
meet the requirements of the Protection Profile [[21a].] (see 5.2) and its correspondent
SFRs (FIA_UAU.4 , FCS_RND.1 and FPT_FLS.1). The protection against attacks with
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8 Rationale
a high attack potential dictates a strength of function high rating for functions in the
TOE that are realised by probabilistic or permutational mechanisms (SF.ADMIN
(Administration of the TOE), SF.AUTH (Authentication of the authorized TOE user),
SF.CRYPTO (Cryptographic Support), SF.IC (Security Functions of the IC)).
8.3 Rationale for TOE Summary Specification
8.3.1 Rationale for TOE Security Functions
The following table gives the coverage of the TOE Security Functional Requirements by
the TOE Security Functions. The numbers in the table give the corresponding
component of the Security Function covering the requirement.
The identified components obviously satisfy the requirements.
TOE SFR / Security Function
SF.ACCESS
(Access
Control
SF.ADMIN
(Administration
of
the
TOE
SF.AUTH
(Authentication
of
the
SF.CRYPTO
(Cryptographic
Support
SF.PROTECTION
(Protection
of
TSC
SF.IC
(Security
Functions
of
the
IC
FAU_SAS.1.1 1)
FCS_CKM.1.1/BAC_MRTD 1)
FCS_CKM.4.1/ MRTD 6)
FCS_COP.1.1/ SHA_MRTD 2)
FCS_COP.1.1/ TDES_MRTD 3) 4)
FCS_COP.1.1/MAC_MRTD 4)
FCS_RND.1.1/ MRTD 5) 3)
FCS_COP.1.1/RSA_MRTD 7)
FIA_AFL.1.1 8)
FIA_AFL.1.2 7)
FIA_API.1.1/AA 10)
.
FIA_UID.1.1
2)
FIA_UID.1.2 3)
FIA_UAU.1.1 2)
.
FIA_UAU.1.2
3)
FIA_UAU.4.1/ MRTD 2)
FIA_UAU.5.1 1)
FIA_UAU.5.2 3), 4),
5),
FIA_UAU.6.1/MRTD 6)
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8 Rationale
TOE SFR / Security Function
SF.ACCESS
(Access
Control
SF.ADMIN
(Administration
of
the
TOE
SF.AUTH
(Authentication
of
the
SF.CRYPTO
(Cryptographic
Support
SF.PROTECTION
(Protection
of
TSC
SF.IC
(Security
Functions
of
the
IC
FDP_ACC.1.1/PRIM 1),
Fehler!
Verweis
quelle
konnte
nicht
gefunde
n
werden.
FDP_ACC.1.1/BASIC 1), 2), 3)
FDP_ACF.1.1/PRIM 1)
FDP_ACF.1.2/PRIM 1) 9) 9)
FDP_ACF.1.3/PRIM 1)
FDP_ACF.1.4/PRIM 2)
FDP_ACF.1.1/BASIC 1)
FDP_ACF.1.2/BASIC 1)
FDP_ACF.1.3/BASIC 1)
FDP_ACF.1.4/BASIC 2)
FDP_UCT.1.1/ MRTD 2)
FDP_UIT.1.1/ MRTD 1)
FDP_UIT.1.2/ MRTD 3)
FMT_MOF.1.1 11)
FMT_SMF.1.1 3)
FMT_SMR.1.1 8)
FMT_SMR.1.2
8)
FMT_LIM.1.1 7)
FMT_LIM.2.1 7)
FMT_MTD.1.1/ INI_ENA 4)
FMT_MTD.1.1/ INI_DIS 5)
FMT_MTD.1.1/ KEY_WRITE 6)
FMT_MTD.1.1/ KEY_READ 4)
FMT_MTD.1.1/AAPK 10)
FPT_EMSEC.1.1 4)
FPT_EMSEC.1.2 4)
FPT_FLS.1.1 2)
FPT_TST.1.1 8)
FPT_TST.1.2 9)
FPT_TST.1.3 9)
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8 Rationale
TOE SFR / Security Function
SF.ACCESS
(Access
Control
SF.ADMIN
(Administration
of
the
TOE
SF.AUTH
(Authentication
of
the
SF.CRYPTO
(Cryptographic
Support
SF.PROTECTION
(Protection
of
TSC
SF.IC
(Security
Functions
of
the
IC
FPT_PHP.3.1 1)
FPT_RVM.1.1 5)
FPT_SEP.1.1 6)
FPT_SEP.1.2 7)
Table 10 Functional Requirements to Security Function mapping
8.3.1.1 Justifications for the correspondence between functional requirements and security
functions
8.3.1.1.1 FAU_SAS.1.1
The storage of IC Identification Data in audit records through the Manufacturer is
managed by the TSF.ADMIN (Administration of the TOE).
FAU_SAS.1.1 requires that the Manufacturerhas the capability to store the IC
Identification Datain the audit records.
SF.ADMIN.1 states that the Storage of IC Identification Data in audit records through
the Manufacturer is supported by the TOE and therefore meets the above stated TOE
SFR.
8.3.1.1.2 FCS_CKM, FCS_COP, FCS_RND
The cryptographic support for the other Security Functions is managed by
TSF.CRYPTO (Cryptographic Support).
FCS_CKM.1.1/ BAC_MRTD requires that the Document Basic Access Control Key
Derivation Algorithmand specified cryptographic key sizes 112 bit thatmeet the
following: [7], Annex E. are applied. SF.CRYPTO.1 states that DES key generation in
accordance with the Document Basic Access Control Key Derivation Algorithm with
key sizes of 112 bit that meet: [7], Annex E are supported by the TOE and therefore
meets the above stated TOE SFR.
FCS_CKM.4.1/ MRTD requires that cryptographic keys are destroyed in accordance
with a specified cryptographic key destruction method physical deletion by overwriting
the memory data with zeros or random data that meets the following: none.
SF.CRYPTO.6 states that cryptographic keys are destroyed by physical deletion by
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8 Rationale
overwriting the memory data with zeros or random data and therefore meets the above
stated TOE SFR.
FCS_COP.1.1/ SHA_MRTD requires that hashingis performedin accordance with a
specified cryptographic algorithm SHA-1and cryptographic key sizes nonethat meet the
following: FIPS 180-2.
SF.CRYPTO.2 states that hashing by the TOE is performed in accordance with SHA-1
that meets the following: FIPS 180-2 and therefore meets the above stated TOE SFR.
FCS_COP.1.1/ TDES_MRTD requires that secure messaging – encryption and
decryptionis performedin accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm Triple-
DES in CBC modeand cryptographic key sizes 112 bit that meet the following: FIPS 46-
3 [14] and [7]; Annex E.
SF.CRYPTO.3 states that secure messaging – encryption and decryption is performed
with Triple-DES in CBC mode and key sizes of 112 bit that meet: FIPS 46-3 [14]and [7];
Annex E and SF. IC.4 supports the cryptographic support for DES calculations and
therefore meets the above stated TOE SFR.
FCS_COP.1.1/MAC_MRTD requires that secure messaging – message authentication
code is performed in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm Retail MAC
and cryptographic key sizes 112 bitthat meet the following: ISO 9797 (MAC algorithm
3, block cipher DES, Sequence Message Counter, padding mode 2).
SF.CRYPTO.4 states that secure messaging – message authentication is performed with
Retail MAC and key sizes of 112 bit that meet: ISO 9797 (MAC algorithm 3, block
cipher DES, zero IV 8 bytes, padding mode 2) and therefore meets the above stated TOE
SFR.
FCS_RND.1.1/ MRTD requires that the TSF shall provide a mechanism to generate
random numbers that meet AIS 20 [5a].
SF.CRYPTO.5 states that random number generation according AIS20 [5a] for key
generation and authentication process is supported by the TOE and SF.IC.3 states that
the TOE supports random number generation and therefore meets the above stated TOE
SFR.
FCS_COP.1.1/RSA_MRTD requires that the TSF shall provide a signature creation
according to scheme 1 of IOS/IEC 9796-2:2002 [19].
SF.CRYPTO.7 states, that the TOE provides RSA signature creation according to
scheme 1 of ISO/IEC 9796-2:2002 [19] and therefore meets the above stated SFR.
8.3.1.1.3 FIA_AFL, FIA_UID, FIA_UAU
The Timing of identification and authentication is managed by TSF.ADMIN
(Administration of the TOE) if the administrator is involved and additionally by
TSF.AUTH (Authentication of the TOE).
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8 Rationale
FIA_AFL.1.1 requires that the TSF shall detect when an administrator configurable
positive integer within range of acceptable values 1 to 10 unsuccessful authentication
attempts occur related to a BAC authentication protocol.
SF.AUTH.8 states that the TOE shall detect when an administrator configurable positive
integer within range of acceptable values 1 to 10 unsuccessful authentication attempts
occurs related to a BAC authentication protocol and therefore meets the above stated
TOE SFR.
FIA_AFL.1.2 requires that the TSF shall wait for an administrator configurable time
between receiving the terminal challenge eIFD and sending the TSF response eICC during
the BAC authentication attempts when the defined number of unsuccessful
authentication attempts has been met or surpassed
SF.AUTH.7 states that the TOE waits for an administrator configurable time between
receiving the terminal challenge and sending the TSF response, if the defined number of
unsuccessful authentication attempts has been met or surpassed and therefore meets the
above stated TOE SFR.
.
FIA_UID.1.1 requires that the TSF shall allow
(1) to read the Initialization Data and Pre-personalization Data in Phase 2
“Manufacturing”,
(2) to read the ATS in Phase 3 “Personalization of the MRTD”,
(3) to read the ATS if the TOE is configured for use with Basic Inspection Systems only
in Phase 4 “Operational Use”,
(4) to read the logical MRTD if the TOE is configured for use with Primary Inspection
System s in Phase 4 “Operational Use”
on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is identified.
SF.ADMIN.2 states that the TOE realises the possibility to read before user
identification and authentication:
- the Initialization Data in Phase 2 “Manufacturing”,
- the ATR (different for and after Initialisation)
Due to FMT_MOF.1 Basic Access Control can't be disabled for the TOE, hence
FIA_UID.1.1 (4) isn't relevant.
Therefore the above stated TOE SFR is covered.
FIA_UID.1.2 requires that TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified
before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
SF.ACCESS.3 states that the TSF mediated actions on behalf of an user require his prior
successful identification and authentication if it is not specified in this chapter 6
otherwise and therefore meets the above stated TOE SFR.
FIA_UAU.1.1 requires that the TSF shall allow
(1) to read the Initialization Data in Phase 2 “Manufacturing”,
(2) to read the ATS in Phase 3 “Personalization of the MRTD”,
(3) to read the ATS if the TOE is configured for use with Basic Inspection Systems only
in Phase 4 “Operational Use”,
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8 Rationale
(4) to read the logical MRTD if the TOE is configured for use with Primary Inspection
System s in Phase 4 “Operational Use”on behalf of the user to be performed before the
user is authenticated.
SF.ADMIN.2 states that the TOE realises the possibility to read before user
identification and authentication:
- the Initialization Data in Phase 2 “Manufacturing”,
- the ATR (different for and after Initialisation)
Due to FMT_MOF.1 Basic Access Control can't be disabled for the TOE, hence
FIA_UID.1.1 (4) isn't relevant.
Therefore the above stated TOE SFR is covered.
.
FIA_UAU.1.2 requires that the TSF shall require each user to be successfully
authenticated before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
SF.ACCESS.3 states that the TSF mediated actions on behalf of an user require his prior
successful identification and authentication if it is not specified in this chapter otherwise
and therefore meets the above stated TOE SFR.
FIA_UAU.4.1/ MRTD requires that the TSF shall prevent reuse of authentication data
related to
1. Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism,
2. Authentication Mechanism based on Triple-DES.
SF.AUTH.2 realises the prevention of reuse of authentication data and therefore meets the
above stated TOE SFR.
FIA_UAU.5.1 requires that the TSF shall provide
1. Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism,
2. Symmetric Authentication Mechanism based on Triple-DES 108
to support user authentication.
SF.AUTH.1 realises user authentication provided through:
- Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism
- Symmetric Authentication Mechanism based on Triple-DES
and therefore meets the above stated TOE SFR.
FIA_UAU.5.2 requires that the TSF shall authenticate any user’s claimed identity
according
to the following rules:
1. The TOE accepts the authentication attempt as Personalization Agent by one of
the following mechanisms:
a) the Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism with Personalization
Agent Keys,
b) the Symmetric Authentication Mechanism with Personalization Agent Key,
2. The TOE accepts the authentication attempt as Basic Inspection System only by
means of the Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism with the
Document Basic Access Keys.
108
[assignment: list of multiple authentication mechanisms]
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SF.AUTH.3 - 6 realises user authentication for the Personalisation Agent:
(a) for the Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism with
the Personalization Agent Keys,
(b) for the Symmetric Authentication Mechanism with the Personalization Agent
Key
and user authentication for the Basic Inspection System through:
- the Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism with the Document Basic
Access Keys
and therefore meets the above stated TOE SFR.
FIA_UAU.6.1/MRTD requires that the TSF shall re-authenticate the user under the
conditions each command sent to TOE after successful authentication of the terminal with
Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism.
SF.AUTH.5 enables the authentication of a user under the above stated and therefore
meets the above stated TOE SFR.
8.3.1.1.4 FDP_ACC, FDP_ACF
The TSF.ACCESS (Access Control) performs an operation requested by an user, this
Security function checks if the operation specific requirements on user authorisation and
protection of communication data are fulfilled.
FDP_ACC.1.1/PRIM requires that the TSF shall enforce the Primary Access Control SFP
on terminals gaining write, read and modification access to data groups DG1 to DG16 of
the logical MRTD.
Due to FMT_MOF.1 Basic Access Control can't be disabled and therefore the above stated
TOE SFR is covered.
FDP_ACC.1.1/BASIC requires that the TSF shall enforce the Basic Access Control SFP
on terminals gaining write, read and modification access to data in DG1 to DG16 of the
logical MRTD.
SF.ACCESS.1 and 2:
• allows only the successfully authenticated Personalization Agent to write the data
of the data groups DG1 to DG16 of the logical MRTD,
• allows only the the successfully authenticated Basic Inspection System to read
only data in DG1, DG2 and DG5 to DG16 of the logical MRTD.
and therefore meets the above stated TOE SFR.
FDP_ACF.1.1/PRIM requires that the TSF shall enforce the Primary Access Control SFP
to objects based on the following:
1. Subjects:
a. Personalization Agent,
b. Terminals,
2. Objects: data into the data groups DG1 to DG16 of the logical MRTD,
3. security attributes
a. configuration of the TOE according to FMT_MOF.1
b. authentication status of terminals.
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8 Rationale
Due to FMT_MOF.1 Basic Access Control can't be disabled and therefore the above stated
TOE SFR is covered.
FDP_ACF.1.2/PRIM requires that the TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine
if an operation among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed: in the TOE
configuration for use with Primary Inspection Systems
1. the successfully authenticated Personalization Agent is allowed to write the data of the
data groups DG1 to DG16 of the logical MRTD,
2. the terminals are allowed to read the data of the groups DG1 to DG16 of the logical
MRTD.
SF.ACCESS.1
• allows only the successfully authenticated Personalization Agent to write the data
of the data groups DG1 to DG16 of the logical MRTD,
SF.ADMIN.9 realises the ability to write the data of the data groups DG1 to DG16 of the
logical MRTD.
Due to FMT_MOF.1 Basic Access Control can't be disabled and therefore the above stated
TOE SFR is covered.
FDP_ACF.1.3/PRIM requires that the TSF shall explicitly authorize access of subjects to
objects based on the following additional rules: none.
SF.ACCESS.1 in the TOE configuration for use with Primary Inspection Systems:
• allows only the successfully authenticated Personalization Agent to write the data
of the data groups DG1 to DG16 of the logical MRTD,
• allows only successful authenticated Basic Access Terminals to read the data of
the groups DG1 to DG16 of the logical MRTD
and therefore meets the above stated TOE SFR.
FDP_ACF.1.4/PRIM requires that the TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to
objects based on the rule: the terminals are not allowed to modify any of the data groups
DG1 to DG16 of the logical MRTD.
SF.ACCESS.2 is not allowing the terminals to modify any of the data groups DG1 to
DG16 of the logical MRTD and therefore meets the above stated TOE SFR.
FDP_ACF.1.1/BASIC requires that the TSF shall enforce the Access Control SFPto
objects based on the following:
1. Subjects:
a. Personalization Agent,
b. Basic Inspection System,
c. Terminal,
2. Objects: data DG1 to DG16 of the logical MRTD,
3. Security attributes:
a. configuration of the TOE according to FMT_MOF.1
b. authentication status of terminals,
SF.ACCESS.1 and 2:
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8 Rationale
• allows only the successfully authenticated Personalization Agent to write the data
of the data groups COM, SOD and DG1 to DG16 of the logical MRTD,
• allows only the the successfully authenticated Basic Inspection System to read
only data in COM, SOD, DG1, DG2 and DG5 to DG16 of the logical MRTD.
and therefore meets the above stated TOE SFR.
FDP_ACF.1.2/BASIC requires that the TSF shall enforce the following rules to
determine if an operation among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed:
1. the successfully authenticated Personalization Agent is allowed to write and to read
the data of the.DG1 to DG16 of the logical MRTD,
2. the successfully authenticated Basic Inspection System is allowed to read the data in
DG1 to DG16 of the logical MRTD,
SF.ACCESS.1
• Allows only the successfully authenticated Personalization Agent to write and to
read the data of the data groups COM, SOD and DG1 to DG16 of the logical
MRTD,
• Allows the successfully authenticated Basic Inspection System to read only data
in COM, SOD, DG1, DG2 and DG5 to DG16 of the logical MRTD.
SF.ADMIN.9 realises the ability to write the data of the data groups DG1 to DG16 of
the logical MRTD.
SF.AUTH.9 realises the ability to read the data of the groups SOD, COM and DG1 to
DG16 of the logical MRTD and therefore meets the above stated TOE SFR.
FDP_ACF.1.3/BASIC requires that the TSF shall explicitly authorize access of subjects
to objects based on the following additional rules: none.
SF.ACCESS.1 and 2
• Allows only the successfully authenticated Personalization Agent to write and to
read the data of the data groups COM, SOD and DG1 to DG16 of the logical
MRTD,
• Allows the successfully authenticated Basic Inspection System to read only data
in COM, SOD, DG1, DG2 and DG5 to DG16 of the logical MRTD.
and therefore meets the above stated TOE SFR.
FDP_ACF.1.4/BASIC requires that the TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to
objects based on the rules: the Terminals are not allowed to modify any of the DG1 to
DG16 of the logical MRTD.
SF.ACCESS.2 is not allowing the terminals to modify any of the data groups DG1 to
DG16 of the logical MRTD and therefore meets the above stated TOE SFR.
8.3.1.1.5 FDP_UCT, FDP_UIT
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The Security Function TSF.PROTECTION (Protection of TSC) protects the TSF
functionality, TSF data and user data.
FDP_UCT.1.1/ MRTD requires that the TSF shall enforce the Basic Access Control
SFP to be able to transmit and receiveobjects in a manner protected from unauthorised
disclosure.
SF.PROTECTION.2 ensures that transmitted and received objects are protected from
unauthorised disclosure and therefore meets the above stated TOE SFR.
FDP_UIT.1.1/ MRTD requires that the TSF shall enforce the Basic Access Control SFP
to be able to transmit and receiveuser data in a manner protected from modification,
deletion, insertion and replayerrors.
SF.PROTECTION.1 ensures that transmitted and receiveduser data is protected from
modification, deletion, and insertion and replay errors and therefore meets the above
stated TOE SFR.
FDP_UIT.1.2/ MRTD requires that the TSF shall be able to determine on receipt of user
data, whether modification, deletion, insertion and replayhas occurred.
SF.PROTECTION.3 determines on receipt of user data if modification, deletion,
insertion and replay has occurred therefore meets the above stated TOE SFR.
8.3.1.1.6 FMT_MOF.1.1 , FMT_SMF, FMT_MTD
The administration of the TOE is managed by TSF.ADMIN (Administration of the
TOE).
FMT_MOF.1.1 requires that nobody can switch of the Basic Access Control.
SF.ADMIN.11 states, that nobody can disable Basic Access Control and therefore meets the
above stated TOE SFR.
FMT_SMF.1.1 requires that the TSF shall be capable of performing the following
security management functions:
1. Initialization,
2. Personalization
3. Configuration.
SF.ADMIN.3 assigns the security management functions: initialization, personalisation
and configuration to the Manufacturer and Personalisation Agent and therefore meets the
above stated TOE SFR.
FMT_SMR.1.1 requires that the TSF shall maintain the roles
1. Manufacturer,
2. Personalization Agent,
3. Primary Inspection System,
4. Basic Inspection System,
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SF.ADMIN.8 maintains the security roles: Manufacturer, Personalization Agent, Basic
Inspection System, Primary Inspection System and therefore meets the above stated TOE
SFR.
FMT_SMR.1.2 requires that the TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.
SF.ADMIN.8 maintains the security roles: Manufacturer, Personalization Agent, Basic
Inspection System, Primary Inspection System and therefore meets the above stated TOE
SFR.
FMT_LIM.1.1 requires that the TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their
capabilities so that in conjunction with “Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)” the
following policy is enforced: Deploying Test Features after TOE Delivery does not allow
User Data to be disclosed or manipulated, TSF data to be disclosed or manipulated,
software to be reconstructed and no substantial information about construction of TSF to
be gathered which may enable other attacks.
SF.ADMIN.7 deploys Test Features after TOE Delivery that does not allow User Data to
be disclosed or manipulated, TSF data to be disclosed or manipulated, software to be
reconstructed and no substantial information about construction of TSF to be gathered
which may enable other attacks and therefore meets the above stated TOE SFR.
FMT_LIM.2.1 requires that the TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their
availability so that in conjunction with “Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)” the
following policy is enforced: Deploying Test Features after TOE Delivery does not allow
User Data to be disclosed or manipulated TSF data to be disclosed or manipulated,
software to be reconstructed and no substantial information about construction of TSF to
be gathered which may enable other attacks.
SF.ADMIN.7 deploys Test Features after TOE Delivery that does not allow User Data to
be disclosed or manipulated, TSF data to be disclosed or manipulated, software to be
reconstructed and no substantial information about construction of TSF to be gathered
which may enable other attacks and therefore meets the above stated TOE SFR.
FMT_MTD.1.1/ INI_ENA requires that the TSF shall restrict the ability to write the
Initialization Data and Pre-personalization Datato the Manufacturer.
SF.ADMIN.4 has the ability to write the Initialization Data and Pre-personalization Data
restricted to the Manufacturer and therefore meets the above stated TOE SFR.
FMT_MTD.1.1/ INI_DIS requires that the TSF shall restrict the ability to disable read
access for users to the Initialization Data to the Personalization Agent.
SF.ADMIN.5 has the ability to disable read access for users to the Initialization Data
restricted to the Personalization Agent and therefore meets the above stated TOE SFR.
FMT_MTD.1.1/ KEY_WRITE requires that the TSF shall restrict the ability to writethe
Document Basic Access Keysto the Personalization Agent.
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SF.ADMIN.6 restricts the ability to write the Document Basic Access Keys to the
Personalization Agent and therefore meets the above stated TOE SFR.
FMT_MTD.1.1/ KEY_READ requires that the TSF shall restrict the ability to readthe
Document Basic Access Keys, Personalization Agent Keys and the Active
Authentication Private Keyto none.
SF.ACCESS.4 has the ability to disable read access for users to the Initialization Data
restricted to the Personalization Agent and therefore meets the above stated TOE SFR.
FMT_MTD.1.1/AAPK requires that the TSF restricts the ability to create and load the
Active Authentication Private Key to the Manufacturer and the Personalisation Agent.
SF.ADMIN.10 restricts the creation and loading of the Active Authentication Private
Key to the Manufacturer and the Personalisation Agent and therefore meets the above
stated TOE SFR.
8.3.1.1.7 FPT_EMSEC, FPT_FLS, FPT_TST, FPT_PHP, FPT_RVM, FPT_SEP
SF.PROTECTION (Protection of TSC) protects the TSF functionality, TSF data and user
data and SF.IC (Security Functions of the IC) covers the Security Functions of the IC.
FPT_EMSEC.1.1 requires that the TOE shall not emit information about IC power
consumption and command execution time in excess of non useful information enabling
access to Personalization Agent Authentication Key and logical MRTD data.
SF.PROTECTION.4 hides information about IC power consumption and command
execution time, to ensure that the IC contacts VCC, GND and IO can not be used to gain
access to Personalization Agent Authentication Key and logical MRTD data and
therefore meets the above stated TOE SFR.
FPT_EMSEC.1.2 requires that the TSF shall ensure any unauthorized usersare unable
to use the following interface smart card circuit contactsto gain access to Personalization
Agent Authentication Keyand logical MRTD data.
SF.PROTECTION.4 hides information about IC power consumption and command
execution time, to ensure that the IC contacts VCC, GND and IO can not be used to gain
access to Personalization Agent Authentication Key and logical MRTD data and
therefore meets the above stated TOE SFR.
FPT_FLS.1.1 requires that the TSF shall preserve a secure state when the following
types of failures occur:
(1) exposure to operating conditions where therefore a malfunction could occur,
(2) failure detected by TSF according to FPT_TST.1.
SF.IC.2 provides resistance to physical tampering of the TSF. If the TOE detects with the
above mentioned sensors, that it is not supplied within the specified limits, a security
reset is initiated and the TOE is not operable until the supply is back in the specified
limits. The design of the hardware protects it against analysing and physical tampering
and therefore meets the above stated TOE SFR.
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8 Rationale
FPT_TST.1.1 requires that the TSF shall run a suite of self tests during initial start-up,
periodically during normal operation, at the condition Reset of the TOE to demonstrate
the correct operation of the TSF.
SF.PROTECTION.8 demonstrates the correct operation of the TSF and therefore meets
the above stated TOE SFR.
FPT_TST.1.2 requires that the TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability
to verify the integrity of TSF data.
SF.PROTECTION.9 demonstrates the correct operation of the TSF and therefore meets
the above stated TOE SFR.
FPT_TST.1.3 requires that the TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability
to verify the integrity of stored TSF executable code.
SF.PROTECTION.9 demonstrates the correct operation of the TSF and therefore meets
the above stated TOE SFR.
FPT_PHP.3.1 requires that the TSF shall resist physical manipulation and physical
probing to the TSF by responding automatically such that the TSP is not violated.
SF.IC.1 provides detection of physical tampering of the TSF with sensors for operating
voltage, clock frequency, temperature and electromagnetic radiation and therefore meets
the above stated TOE SFR.
FPT_RVM.1.1 requires that the TSF shall ensure that TSP enforcement functions are
invoked and succeed before each function within the TSC is allowed to proceed.
SF.PROTECTION.5 provides the invocation of TSP enforcement functions. After
succeeding each function within the TSC is allowed to proceed and therefore meets the
above stated TOE SFR.
FPT_SEP.1.1 requires that the TSF shall maintain a security domain for its own
execution that protects it from interference and tampering by untrusted subjects.
SF.PROTECTION.6 maintains a security domain for the TSF execution that protects it
from interference and tampering by untrusted subjects and therefore meets the above
stated TOE SFR.
FPT_SEP.1.2 requires that the TSF shall enforce separation between the security
domains of subjects in the TSC.
SF.PROTECTION.7 enforces separation between the security domains of subjects in the
TSC and therefore meets the above stated TOE SFR.
8.3.2 Rationale for Assurance Measures
The following table demonstrates the coverage of the Assurance Requirements by the
Assurance measures by indicating the correspondence with crosses.
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Assurance
Requirements
/ Assurance
Measures
AM_ACM AM_ADO AM_ADV AM_AGD AM_ALC AM_ATE AM_AVA
ACM X
ADO X
ADV X
AGD X
ALC X
ATE X
AVA X
Table 11 Assurance Requirements to Assurance Measures mapping
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8 Rationale
8.4 Rationale for PP Claims
This security target is conformant to the claimed PP [21a]. Additionally, the Active
Authentication Mehcnism is included in the TOE. This implies the below desribed
augmentations:
Addition of new TOE Objectives:
• OT.Active_Auth_Proof
Addition of new IT Environment Objectives:
• OE.Active_Auth_Key_MRTD
Addition of new Threats:
• T.Counterfeit
Addition of new SFR's for the TOE:
• FCS_COP.1/RSA_MRTD
• FIA_API.1/AA
• FMT_MTD.1/AAPK
• FIA_AFL.1.1
• FIA_AFL.1.2
Extension of existing SFR's for the TOE:
• FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ: to include the Active Authentication private key
• FPT_EMSEC.1.2: to include the Active Authentication private key
Restriction of the following SFR:
• FMT_MOF.1
Addition of new IT environment SFRs:
• FCS_COP.1.1/RSA_BT
Extension of IT environment SFRs:
• FIA_UAU.4/BT: include the Active Authentication mechanism
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8.5 Statement of compatibility
This is a statement of compatibility between this Composite Security Target
(Composite-ST) and the Platform Security Target (Platform-ST) of the NXP Chip
P5CD080 [HW ST P5CD].
8.5.1 Classification of Platform TSFs
A classification of TSFs of the Platform-ST has been made. Each TSF has been
classified as ‘relevant’ or ‘not relevant’ for the Composite-ST.
TOE Security Functions Relevant Not
relevant
F.RNG: Random Number Generator x
F.HW_DES: Triple-DES Co-processor x
F.HW_AES: AES Co-processor x
F.OPC: Control of Operating Conditions x
F: PHY: Protection against Physical Manipulation x
F.LOG: Logical Protection x
F.COMP: Protection of Mode Control x
F.MEM_ACC: Memory Access Control x
F.SFR_ACC: Special Function Register Access Control x
Table 12 Classification of Platform-TSFs
F.MEM_ACC and F.SFR_ACC are not relevant of the Composite-ST because the
combination of F.SFR_ACC and F.COMP ensures that the other CPU modes are not
available for the Smartcard Embedded Software, but reserved for specific purposes fulfilled
by the IC Dedicated Software.
8.5.2 Matching statement
The TOE needs the following implicit assumptions of the IC (see 2.1)
• Certified NXP Microcontroller P5CD080
8.5.2.1 TOE Security Environment
8.5.2.1.1 Threats
(See chapter 3.3)
The following threats of this Composite-ST are directly related to IC functionality:
• T.Information_Leakage
• T.Phys-Tamper
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8 Rationale
These threats will be mapped to the following Platform-ST threats and OSPs:
• T.Leak-Inherent
• T.Phys_Probing
• T.Phys_Manipulation
• T.Malfunction
• T.Abuse_Func
• T.Leak-Forced
• P.Add-Components (Additional Specific Security Components )
• P.Process-TOE (Protection during TOE Development and Production)
The table below shows the mapping of the threats.
P.Add-Components
P.Process-TOE
T.Leak-Inherent
T.Phys_Probing
T.Phys_Manipulation
T.Malfunction
T.Abuse_Func
T.Leak-Forced
T.Phys-Tamper X X X X X X
Composite-
ST
T.Information_Leakage X X X X
Table 13 Mapping of threats
The threats from chapter 3.3 not mentioned here are not related to the Platform-ST. T.Phys-
Tamper matches to T.Phys_Probing, T.Phys_Manipulation, T.Malfunction, T.Abuse_Func
as all these threats are directed against the SCP in a direct or indirect physical way.
Additionaly P.Add_components and P.Process-TOE as a specific security components
policy matches with T.Phys-Tamper and T.Information_Leakage because it prevents
modification of configuration data during TOE Development and Production and after TOE
delivery. Information_Leakage matches to T.Leak-Inherent and T.Leak-Forced and also
P.Add_components and P.Process-TOE because all threats and OSP are dealing also with
leakage threats.
8.5.2.1.2 Assumptions
(See chapter 3.2)
The assumptions A.Pers_Agent and A.Insp_Sys do not contain any assumption for the
platform.
The assumption from the Platform-ST:
Assumptions of
Platform-ST
Classification of
significant
assumptions
Mapping to Security Objectives of this
Composite-ST
A.Process-Card IrPA (irrelevant
platform assumption)
n/a
A.Plat-Appl IrPA n/a
A.Resp-Appl CfPA (automatically
fulfilled platform
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak,
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Assumptions of
Platform-ST
Classification of
significant
assumptions
Mapping to Security Objectives of this
Composite-ST
assumption)
CfPA
A.Check-Init OT.Identification
A.Key-Function CfPA OT.Prot_Inf_Leak,
Table 14 Mapping of assumptions
There is no significant platform assumption (SgPA) of the Platform-ST fore this
Composite-ST. There is no conflict between security environments of this Composite-ST
and the Platform-ST.
8.5.2.1.3 Organisational Security Policies
(See chapter3.4)
This composite ST has organisational security policies, which are directly related to the
Platform-ST:
• P.Manufact
These organisational security policies can be mapped directly to the following Plattform-ST
organisational security policy:
• P.Process-TOE
Other organisational security policies of this Composite-ST in chapter 3.4 are not applicable
for the mapping to the Platform-ST. These organisational security policies are:
• P.Personalization
• P.Personal_Data
There is no conflict between organisational security policies of this Composite-ST and
the Platform-ST.
8.5.2.1.4 Security Objctives
(See chapter3.5)
This Composite-ST has security objectives which are directly related to the Platform-ST:
• OT.Identification
• OT.Prot_Inf_Leak
• OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper
• OT.Prot_Malfunction
These objectives can be mapped to the following Platform-ST objectives:
• O.Leak-Inherent
• O.Phys-Probing
• O.Malfunction
• O.Phys-Manipulation
• O.Leak-Forced
• O.Abuse-Func
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O.Leak-Inherent
O.Phys-Probing
O.Malfunction
O.Phys-Manipulation
O.Leak-Forced
O.Abuse-Func
O.Identification
Obejctives for TOE_IC
OT.Identification X
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak X X X X X
OT.Prot_Phys-
Tamper
X X X X X
Composite-ST
OT.Prot_Malfunction X
Table 15 Mapping of objectives
OT.Identification matches directly O.Identification.
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak and OT.Prot_Phys_Tamper are matching O.Leak-Inherent, O.Phys-
Probing, O.Phys-Manipulation, O.Leak-Forced and O.Abuse-Func because they provide
protection against disclosure of primary assets including confidential data (User Data or
TSF data) stored and/or processed in the Smart Card IC to avoid interpretations of
signals extracted from the hardware part of the TOE (Power Supply, Electro Magnetic
emissions, e.g.).
OT.Malfunction matches directly O.Malfunction.
Other objectives of this Composite-ST in chapter 3.5 are not applicable for the mapping
to the Platform-ST. These objectives are:
• OT.AC_Pers
• OT.Data_Int
• OT.Data_Conf
• OT.Prot_Abuse-Func
• OT.Active_Auth_Proof
The other Objectives (see 3.5.2, 3.5.3 and 3.5.3.2) are all not linked to the platform and are
therefore not applicable to this mapping.
There is no conflict between security objectives of this Composite-ST and the Platform-
ST.
8.5.2.1.5 Security requirements
(See chapter 5.1)
This Composite-ST contains the following platform related SFRs:
• FCS_COP.1/TDES_MRTD
• FCS_COP.1/MAC_MRTD
• FCS_RND.1/MRTD
• FMT_LIM.1
• FMT_LIM.2
• FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA
• FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS
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8 Rationale
• FPT_EMSEC.1
• FPT_FLS.1
• FPT_TST.1
• FPT_PHP.3
These SFRs will be matched by the following SFRs of the Platform-ST:
• FPT_FLS.1
• FCS_RND.1
• FRU_FLT.2
• FDP_ITT.1
• FPT_ITT.1
• FPT_PHP.3
• FCS_COP.1 [DES]
• FMT_LIM.1
• FMT_LIM.2
• FPT_SEP.1[CONF]
The matching will be as described in the table below.
FPT_FLS.1
FCS_RND.1
FCS_COP.1[DES]
FRU_FLT.2
FDP_ITT.1
FPT_ITT.1
FPT_PHP.3
FMT_LIM.1
FMT_LIM.2
FPT_SEP.1[CONF]
FCS_COP.1/TDES_MRTD X
FCS_COP.1/MAC_MRTD X
FCS_RND.1/MRTD X
FMT_LIM.1 X
FMT_LIM.2 X
FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA X
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS X
FPT_EMSEC.1 X X
FPT_FLS.1 X X X
FPT_TST.1 X
Table 16 Mapping of SFRs
FCS_COP.1/TDES_MRTD and FCS_COP.1/MAC_MRTD are matching FCS_COP.1
[DES] as the Platform provides encryption and decryprion for the composite product with
the necessary cryptographic key sizes.
FCS_RND.1/MRTD matches FCS_RND.1 as the Platform provides a mechanism to
generate random numbers for the composite product.
FMT_LIM.1 and FMT_LIM.1 are matching directly FMT_LIM.1 and FMT_LIM.2 of the
platform.
Composite-ST
FPT_PHP.3 X X
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8 Rationale
FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA and FMT_INI_DIS are matching FPT_SEP.1[CONF], since
FPT_SEP.1[CONF] offers the possibility to fix special parts of the hardware (including
memory space for the memory blocks).
FPT_EMSEC.1 matches to FPT_ITT.1 and FDP_ITT.1 as the Composite-TOE should not
emit information about IC power consumption and execution time while the Platform
protects user and TSF data by leackage attacks.
FPT_FLS.1 matches to FPT_FLS.1, FRU_FLT.2 and FPT_PHP.3 as the Composite-TOE
should preserve a secure state when the Platform operates out of normal operating
conditions, while the Platform should ensure the robustness and operate always in a secure
state.
FPT_TST.1 matches FRU_FLT.2 as the Platform must ensure that the TOE operates
correctly within some limits.
FPT_PHP.3 matches the robustness requirements of FRU_FLT.2 and FPT_PHP.3.
RSA cryptograhic operations are supported by the ST-Platform through the FameXE co-
processor through basic arithmetic functions for large integer numbers.
8.5.2.1.6 Assurance requirements
The Composite-ST requires EAL 4 augmented by:
ADV_IMP.2
ALC_DVS.2
The Platform-ST requires EAL 5 augmented by:
ALC_DVS.2
AVA_MSU.3
AVA_VLA.4
As EAL 5 covers all assurance requirements of EAL 4 all non augmented parts of the
Composite-ST will match to the Platform-ST assurance requirements. But also the
augmented parts of the Composite-ST match to the Platform-ST:
ADV_IMP.2 is part of EAL 5 and ALC_DVS.2 is augmented for the Platform-ST as well.
8.5.2.1.7 Overall no contracdictions found
Overall there is no conflict between security requirements of this Composite-ST and the
Platform-ST[HW ST P5CD].
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9 Appendix
9 Appendix
9.1 Glossary and Acronyms
Term Definition
Active
Authentication
Security mechanism defined in [7] option by which means the MTRD’s chip proves
and the inspection system verifies the identity and authenticity of the MTRD’s chip
as part of a genuine MRTD issued by a known State of organization.
Application
note
Optional informative part of the PP containing additional supporting information
that is considered relevant or useful for the construction, evaluation, or use of the
TOE (cf. CC part 1, section B.2.7).
Audit records Write-only-once non-volatile memory area of the MRTDs chip to store the
Initialization Data and Pre-personalization Data.
Authenticity Ability to confirm the MRTD and its data elements on the MRTD’s chip were
created by the issuing State or Organization
Basic Access
Control
Security mechanism defined in [7] by which means the MTRD’s chip proves and
the inspection system protects their communication by means of secure messaging
with Basic Access Keys (see there).
Basic
Inspection
System (BIS)
An inspection system which implements the terminals part of the Basic Access
Control Mechanism and authenticates themselves to the MRTD’s chip using the
Document Basic Access Keys drawn form printed MRZ data for reading the logical
MRTD.
Biographical
data
(biodata).
The personalized details of the bearer of the document appearing as text in the
visual and machine readable zones on the biographical data page of a passport book
or on a travel card or visa. [8]
biometric
reference data
Data stored for biometric authentication of the MRTD holder in the MRTD’s chip
as (i) digital portrait and (ii) optional biometric reference data.
Counterfeit An unauthorized copy or reproduction of a genuine security document made by
whatever means. [8]
Country
Signing
CA Certificate
CCSCA)
Certificate of the Country Signing Certification Authority Public Key (KPuCSCA)
issued by Country Signing Certification Authority stored in the inspection system.
Document
Basic
Access Keys
Pair of symmetric Triple-DES keys used for secure messaging with encryption (key
KENC) and message authentication (key KMAC) of data transmitted between the
MRTD’s chip and the inspection system [7]. It is drawn from the printed MRZ of
the passport book to authenticate an entity able to read the printed MRZ of the
passport book.
Document
Security Object
SOD)
A RFC3369 CMS Signed Data Structure, signed by the Document Signer (DS).
Carries the hash values of the LDS Data Groups. It is stored in the MRTD’s chip. It
may carry the Document Signer Certificate (CDS). [7]
Eavesdropper A threat agent with low attack potential reading the communication between the
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9 Appendix
Term Definition
MRTD’s chip and the inspection system to gain the data on the MRTD’s chip.
Enrolment The process of collecting biometric samples from a person and the subsequent
preparation and storage of biometric reference templates representing that person's
identity. [9]
Extended
Access
Control
Security mechanism identified in [7] by which means the MTRD’s chip (i) verifies
the authentication of the inspection systems authorized to read the optional
biometric reference data, (ii) controls the access to the optional biometric reference
data and (iii) protects the confidentiality and integrity of the optional biometric
reference data during their transmission to the inspection system by secure
messaging. The Personalization Agent may use the same mechanism to authenticate
themselves with Personalization Agent Authentication Private Key and to get write
and read access to the logical MRTD and TSF data.
Extended
Inspection
System
A General Inspection System which (i) implements the Chip Authentication
Mechanism, (ii) implements the Terminal Authentication Protocol and (iii) is
authorized by the issuing State or Organization through the Document Verifier
of the receiving State to read the sensitive biometric reference data.
Extended
Inspection
System
EIS)
A role of a terminal as part of an inspection system which is in addition to Basic
Inspection System authorized by the issuing State or Organization to read the
optional biometric reference data and supports the terminals part of the Extended
Access Control Authentication Mechanism.
Forgery Fraudulent alteration of any part of the genuine document, e.g.
changes to the biographical data or the portrait. [8]
Global
Interoperability
The capability of inspection systems (either manual or automated) in different
States throughout the world to exchange data, to process data received from
systems in other States, and to utilize that data in inspection operations in their
respective States. Global interoperability is a major objective of the standardized
specifications for placement of both eye-readable and machine readable data in all
MRTDs. [9]
IC Dedicated
Support
Software
That part of the IC Dedicated Software (refer to above) which provides functions
after TOE Delivery. The usage of parts of the IC Dedicated Software might be
restricted to certain phases.
IC Dedicated
Test
Software
That part of the IC Dedicated Software (refer to above) which is used to test the
TOE before TOE Delivery but which does not provide any functionality thereafter.
Impostor A person who applies for and obtains a document by assuming a false name and
identity, or a person who alters his or her physical appearance to represent himself
or herself as another person for the purpose of using that person’s document. [8]
Improperly
documented
person
A person who travels, or attempts to travel with: (a) an expired travel document or
an invalid visa; (b) a counterfeit, forged or altered travel document or visa; (c)
someone else’s travel document or visa; or (d) no travel document or visa, if
required. [9]
Initialisation
Data
Any data defined by the TOE Manufacturer and injected into the nonvolatile
memory by the Integrated Circuits manufacturer (Phase 2). These data are for
instance used for traceability and for IC identification as MRTD’s material (IC
identification data).
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9 Appendix
Term Definition
Inspection The act of a State examining an MRTD presented to it by a traveller (the MRTD
holder) and verifying its authenticity. [9]
Inspection
system
IS)
A technical system used by the border control officer of the receiving State (i)
examining an MRTD presented by the traveller and verifying its authenticity and
(ii) verifying the traveller as MRTD holder.
Integrated
circuit
(IC)
Electronic component(s) designed to perform processing and/or memory functions.
The MRTD’s chip is an integrated circuit.
Issuing
Organization
Organization authorized to issue an official travel document (e.g. the United
Nations Organization, issuer of the Laissez-passer). [6]
Issuing State The Country issuing the MRTD. [6]
Logical Data
Structure (LDS)
The collection of groupings of Data Elements stored in the optional capacity
expansion technology. [6]
The capacity expansion technology used is the MRTD’s chip.
Logical MRTD Data of the MRTD holder stored according to the Logical Data Structure [6] as
specified by ICAO on the contactless integrated circuit.
It presents contactless readable data including (but not limited to) personal data of
the MRTD holder
(1) personal data of the MRTD holder
(2) the digital Machine Readable Zone Data (digital MRZ data,
(3) the digitized portraits (EF.DG2),
(4) the biometric reference data of finger(s) (EF.DG3) or iris image(s)
(EF.DG4) or both and
(5) the other data according to LDS (EF.DG5 to EF.DG16).
Logical travel
document
Data stored according to the Logical Data Structure as specified by ICAO in the
contactless integrated circuit including (but not limited to)
(1) data contained in the machine-readable zone (mandatory),
(2) digitized photographic image (mandatory) and
(3) fingerprint image(s) and/or iris image(s) (optional).
Machine
readable
travel
document
(MRTD)
Official document issued by a State or Organization which is used by the holder for
international travel (e.g. passport, visa, official document of identity) and which
contains mandatory visual (eye readable) data and a separate mandatory data
summary, intended for global use, reflecting essential data elements capable of
being machine read. [6]
Machine
readable
visa (MRV)
A visa or, where appropriate, an entry clearance (herein after collectively referred to
as visas) conforming to the specifications contained herein, formulated to improve
facilitation and enhance security for the visa holder. Contains mandatory visual (eye
readable) data and a separate mandatory data summary capable of being machine
read. The MRV is normally a label which is attached to a visa page in a passport. [6]
Machine
readable
zone (MRZ)
Fixed dimensional area located on the front of the MRTD or MRP Data Page or, in
the case of the TD1, the back of the MRTD, containing mandatory and optional
data for machine reading using OCR methods. [6]
Machine-
verifiable
A unique physical personal identification feature (e.g. an iris pattern, fingerprint or
facial characteristics) stored on a travel document in a form that can be read and
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9 Appendix
Term Definition
verified by machine. [8]
biometrics
feature
MRTD
application
Non-executable data defining the functionality of the operating system on the IC as
the MRTD’s chip. It includes
- the file structure implementing the LDS [6],
- the definition of the User Data, but does not include the User Data itself (i.e.
content of DG1 to DG13 and DG 16) and
- the TSF Data including the definition the authentication data but except the
authentication data itself.
MRTD Basic
Access Control
Mutual authentication protocol followed by secure messaging between the
inspection system and the MRTD’s chip based on MRZ information as key seed
and access condition to data stored on MRTD’s chip according to LDS.
MRTD holder The rightful holder of the MRTD for whom the issuing State or Organization
personalized the MRTD.
MRTD’s Chip A contactless integrated circuit chip complying with ISO/IEC 14443 and
programmed according to the Logical Data Structure as specified by ICAOT, [10],
p. 14.
MRTD’s chip
Embedded
Software
Software embedded in a MRTD’s chip and not being developed by the IC Designer.
The MRTD’s chip Embedded Software is designed in Phase 1 and embedded into
the MRTD’s chip in Phase 2 of the TOE life-cycle.
Optional
biometric
reference data
Data stored for biometric authentication of the MRTD holder in the MRTD’s chip
as (i) encoded finger image(s) (DG3) or (ii) encoded iris image(s) (DG4) or (iii)
both. Note that the European commission decided to use only finger print and not to
use iris images as optional biometric reference data.
Passive
authentication
(i) verification of the digital signature of the Document Security Object and (ii)
comparing the hash values of the read LDS data fields with the hash values
contained in the Document Security Object.
Personalization The process by which the portrait, signature and biographical data are applied to the
document. [8]
Personalization
Agent
The agent acting on the behalf of the issuing State or organisation to personalize the
MRTD for the holder by (i) establishing the identity the holder for the biographic
data in the MRTD, (ii) enrolling the biometric reference data of the MRTD holder
i.e. the portrait, the encoded finger image(s) or (ii) the encoded iris image(s) and
(iii) writing these data on the physical and logical MRTD for the holder.
Personalization
Agent
Authentication
Information
TSF data used for authentication proof and verification of the Personalization
Agent.
Personalization
Agent
Authentication
Key
Symmetric cryptographic key used (i) by the Personalization Agent to prove
their identity and get access to the logical MRTD according to the SFR
FIA_UAU.4/BT FIA_UAU.6/BT and FIA_API.1/SYM_PT and (ii) by the
MRTD’s chip to verify the authentication attempt of a terminal as
Personalization Agent according to the SFR FIA_UAU.4/MRTD,
FIA_UAU.5 and FIA_UAU.6/MRTD.
Physical travel
document
Travel document in form of paper, plastic and chip using secure printing to present
data including (but not limited to)
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9 Appendix
Term Definition
(1) biographical data,
(2) data of the machine-readable zone,
(3) photographic image and
(4) other data.
Pre-
personalization
Data
Any data that is injected into the non-volatile memory of the TOE by the MRTD
Manufacturer (Phase 2) for traceability of non-personalized MRTD’s and/or to
secure shipment within or between life cycle phases 2 and 3. It contains (but is not
limited to) the Active Authentication Key Pair and the Personalization Agent Key
Pair.
Pre-
personalized
MRTD’s chip equipped with an unique identifier and an unique asymmetric Active
Authentication Key Pair of the chip.
MRTD’s chip
Primary
Inspection
System (PIS)
A inspection system that contains a terminal for the contactless communication
with the MRTD’s chip and does not implement the terminals part of the Basic
Access Control Mechanism.
Receiving
State
The Country to which the MRTD holder is applying for entry. [6]
Reference data Data enrolled for a known identity and used by the verifier to check the verification
data provided by an entity to prove this identity in an authentication attempt.
secondary
image
A repeat image of the holder’s portrait reproduced elsewhere in the document by
whatever means. [8]
secure
messaging
in encrypted
mode
Secure messaging using encryption and message authentication code according to
ISO/IEC 7816-4.
Skimming Imitation of the inspection system to read the logical MRTD or parts of it via the
contactless communication channel of the TOE without knowledge of the printed
MRZ data.
travel
document
A passport or other official document of identity issued by a State or organization,
which may be used by the rightful holder for international travel. [9]
traveller Person presenting the MRTD to the inspection system and claiming the identity of
the MRTD holder.
TSF data Data created by and for the TOE, that might affect the operation of the TOE (CC
part 1 [1]).
unpersonalized MRTD material prepared to produce an personalized MRTD containing an
initialised and pre-personalized MRTD’s chip.
MRTD
User data Data created by and for the user, that does not affect the operation of the TSF (CC
part 1 [1]).
Verification The process of comparing a submitted biometric sample against the biometric
reference template of a single enrolee whose identity is being claimed, to determine
whether it matches the enrolee’s template. [9]
verification
data
Data provided by an entity in an authentication attempt to prove their identity to the
verifier. The verifier checks whether the verification data match the reference data
known for the claimed identity.
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9 Appendix
9.2 Acronyms
Acronym Term
BIS Basic Inspection System
CC Common Criteria
GMA Generic MRTD Application
n.a. Not applicable
OSP Organisational security policy
PIS Primary Inspection System
PT Personalization Terminal
SAR Security assurance requirements
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security functional requirement
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSC TSF Scope of Control
TSF TOE security functions
TSP TOE Security Policy
9.3 References
Common Criteria
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 1: Introduction and
General Model; Version 2.3, August 2005, CCMB-2005-09-001
[2] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 2: Security Functional
Requirements; Version 2.3, August 2005, CCMB-2005-09-002
[3] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 3: Security Assurance
Requirements; Version 2.3, August 2005, CCMB-2005-09-00
Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Evaluation
Methodology, Version 2.3, August 2005, CCMB-2005-09-004
[4]
Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema, AIS31: Funktionalitätsklassen und
Evaluationsmethodologie für physikalische Zufallszahlengeneratoren, Version 1, 25.09.2001,
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
[5]
[5a] Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS), AIS 20; Bundesamt für
Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Version 1.0, 2.12.199
ICAO
[6] Machine Readable Travel Documents Technical Report, Development of a Logical Data
Structure – LDS, For Optional Capacity Expansion Technologies, Revision –1.7, published by
authority of the secretary general, International Civil Aviation Organization, LDS 1.7, 2004-05-
18
[7] Machine Readable Travel Documents Technical Report, PKI for Machine Readable Travel
Documents Offering ICC Read-Only Access, Version - 1.1, Date - October 01, 2004, published
by authority of the secretary general, International Civil Aviation Organization
[8] ANNEX to Section III SECURITY STANDARDS FOR MACHINE READABLE TRAVEL
DOCUMENTS, Excerpts from ICAO Doc 9303, Part 1 - Machine Readable Passports, Fifth
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9 Appendix
Edition – 2003
[9] BIOMETRICS DEPLOYMENT OF MACHINE READABLE TRAVEL DOCUMENTS,
TECHNICAL REPORT Development and Specification of Globally Interoperable Biometric
Standards for Machine Assisted Identity Confirmation using Machine Readable Travel
Documents, Version 1.9, ICAO TAG MRTD/NTWG, 19 May 2003
[10] INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION FACILITATION (FAL) DIVISION,
twelfth session (Cairo, Egypt, 22 March – 1 April 2004)
Cryptography
[12] Geeignete Kryptoalgorithmen In Erfüllung der Anforderungen nach §17 (1) SigG vom 22. Mai
2001 in Verbindung mit Anlage 1, I 2, SigV vom 22. November 2001, Bundesanzeiger Nr. 30,
S.2537-2538, 13.02.04.
[13] ISO/IEC 14888-3: Information technology – Security techniques – Digital signatures with
appendix – Part 3: Certificate-based mechanisms, 1999
[14] FEDERAL INFORMATION PROCESSING STANDARDS PUBLICATION FIPS PUB 46-3,
DATA ENCRYPTION STANDARD (DES), Reaffirmed 1999 October 25, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE/National Institute of Standards and Technology
[15] Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 180-2 SECURE HASH STANDARD (+
Change Notice to include SHA-224), U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE/National Institute
of Standards and Technology, 2002 August 1
[16] Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 186-2 DIGITAL SIGNATURE
STANDARD (DSS) (+ Change Notice), U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE/National
Institute of Standards and Technology, 2002 August 1
[17] Certicom Research: SEC 1: Elliptic Curve Cryptography, September 20, 2000, Version 1.0
[18] AMERICAN NATIONAL STANDARD X9.62-1998: Public Key Cryptography For The
Financial Services Industry: The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
(ECDSA)©,September 20, 1998
[19] ISO/IEC 9796-2, Information Technology – Security Techniques – Digital Signature Schemes
giving message recovery – Part 2: Integer factorisation based mechanisms, 2002
Protection Profiles
[20] PP conformant to Smartcard IC Platform Protection Profile, Version 1.0, July 2001; registered
and certified by Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI) under the reference
BSI-PP-0002-2001
Smartcard Integrated Circuit Platform Augmentations, Version 1.00, March 8th, 2002
[21]
[21a] Common Criteria Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel Document with “ICAO
Application, Basic Access Control, Version 1.0, 18.08.2005, BSI-PP-0017, Bundesamt für
Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Other
[22] Dennis Kügler: „Advanced Security Mechanisms for Machine Readable Travel Documents”,
Version 0.7, BSI, presented 1.12.2004
ISO 7816, Identification cards – Integrated circuit(s) cards with contacts, Part 4: Organization,
security and commands for interchange, FDIS 2004
[23]
[24] Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0410-2007 for NXP Secure Smart Card Controller
P5CD080V0B, P5CN080V0B and P5CC080V0B each with specific IC Dedicated Software from
NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH Business Line Identification, Bundesamt für
Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI), 05.07.07
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9 Appendix
Administrator Guidance STARCOS 3.3 Passport Edition, Version 1.1, 13.08.2008,
Giesecke&Devrient
[27]
User guidance STARCOS 3.3 Passport Edition, Version 1.2, 13.08.2008, Giesecke&Devrient
[28]
STARCOS 3.3 Passport Edition TABLES, Version 1.0, 19.08.2008, Giesecke&Devrient
[29]
Generic MRTD Application Verifier Tool for STARCOS 3.3 Passport Edition, Version 2.0,
26.06.2008, Giesecke&Devrient
[30]
-End of Document-
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