BSI-DSZ-CC-1022-2018
for
NXP eDoc Suite v3.0 - cryptovision ePasslet Suite
- Java Card applet configuration providing
Machine Readable Travel Document with "ICAO
Application", Extended Access Control with PACE
from
NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report V1.1 CC-Zert-327 V5.2
BSI-DSZ-CC-1022-2018 (*)
Electronic ID documents: IC with Applications
NXP eDoc Suite v3.0 - cryptovision ePasslet Suite - Java Card applet
configuration providing Machine Readable Travel Document with
"ICAO Application", Extended Access Control with PACE
from NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH
PP Conformance: Machine Readable Travel Document with "ICAO
Application", Extended Access Control with PACE
(EAC PP), Version 1.3.2, 5 December 2012, BSI-
CC-PP-0056-V2-2012-MA-02
Functionality: PP conformant
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 5 augmented by ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5
The IT Product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation
facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1
extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 5 and CC
Supporting Documents as listed in the Certification Report for conformance to the
Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1. CC and CEM are also
published as ISO/IEC 15408 and ISO/IEC 18045.
(*) This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its
evaluated configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report and
Notification. For details on the validity see Certification Report part A chapter 4
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification
scheme of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions
of the evaluation facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the
evidence adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT Product by the Federal Office for
Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT Product by the Federal Office for Information
Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is
either expressed or implied.
Bonn, 18 May 2018
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Joachim Weber L.S.
Head of Branch
SOGIS
Recognition Agreement
Common Criteria
Recognition Arrangement
recognition for components
up to EAL 2 and ALC_FLR
only
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1022-2018
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1022-2018 Certification Report
Contents
A. Certification.......................................................................................................................6
1. Preliminary Remarks.....................................................................................................6
2. Specifications of the Certification Procedure................................................................6
3. Recognition Agreements...............................................................................................7
4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification.................................................................8
5. Validity of the Certification Result..................................................................................8
6. Publication.....................................................................................................................9
B. Certification Results........................................................................................................10
1. Executive Summary.....................................................................................................11
2. Identification of the TOE..............................................................................................12
3. Security Policy.............................................................................................................13
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope......................................................................14
5. Architectural Information..............................................................................................14
6. Documentation............................................................................................................15
7. IT Product Testing........................................................................................................15
8. Evaluated Configuration..............................................................................................18
9. Results of the Evaluation.............................................................................................18
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE......................................................20
11. Security Target...........................................................................................................20
12. Definitions..................................................................................................................20
13. Bibliography...............................................................................................................21
C. Excerpts from the Criteria...............................................................................................24
D. Annexes..........................................................................................................................25
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1022-2018
A. Certification
1. Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1 Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of
issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor,
hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according
to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by
BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report
contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed
Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of
the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and
instructions for the user.
2. Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the
following:
● Act on the Federal Office for Information Security1
● BSI Certification and Approval Ordinance2
● BSI Schedule of Costs3
● Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the
Interior)
● DIN EN ISO/IEC 17065 standard
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-
Produkte) [3]
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility, its
approval and licencing process (CC-Stellen) [3]
● Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.14
[1] also published as
ISO/IEC 15408.
1
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
2
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of Security Certificates and approval by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungs- und -Anerkennungsverordnung - BSIZertV) of 17 December
2014, Bundesgesetzblatt 2014, part I, no. 61, p. 2231
3
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
(BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519
4
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 12 February 2007 in the Bundesanzeiger dated
23 February 2007, p. 3730
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1022-2018 Certification Report
● Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 [2] also published
as ISO/IEC 18045.
● BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]
3. Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or
CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
3.1. European Recognition of CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in
April 2010. It defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition
level and, in addition, at higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain SOGIS
Technical Domains only.
The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels
EAL 1 to EAL 4. For "Smartcards and similar devices" a SOGIS Technical Domain is in
place. For "HW Devices with Security Boxes" a SOGIS Technical Domains is in place, too.
In addition, certificates issued for Protection Profiles based on Common Criteria are part of
the recognition agreement.
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes, details on
recognition, and the history of the agreement can be seen on the website at
https://www.sogisportal.eu.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the
terms of this agreement by the related bodies of the signatory nations. A disclaimer
beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of recognition.
This certificate is recognized under SOGIS-MRA for all assurance components selected.
3.2. International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)
The international arrangement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on the CC
(Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement, CCRA-2014) has been ratified on 08
September 2014. It covers CC certificates based on collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP)
(exact use), CC certificates based on assurance components up to and including EAL 2 or
the assurance family Flaw Remediation (ALC_FLR) and CC certificates for Protection
Profiles and for collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP).
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes can be seen on
the website: http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates
that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the related bodies
of the signatory nations. A disclaimer beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of
recognition.
This certificate is recognized according to the rules of CCRA-2014, i. e. up to and including
CC part 3 EAL 2+ ALC_FLR components.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1022-2018
4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a
uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product NXP eDoc Suite v3.0 - cryptovision ePasslet Suite - Java Card applet
configuration providing Machine Readable Travel Document with "ICAO Application",
Extended Access Control with PACE has undergone the certification procedure at BSI.
The evaluation of the product NXP eDoc Suite v3.0 - cryptovision ePasslet Suite - Java
Card applet configuration providing Machine Readable Travel Document with "ICAO
Application", Extended Access Control with PACE was conducted by TÜV
Informationstechnik GmbH. The evaluation was completed on 23 April 2018. TÜV
Informationstechnik GmbH is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)5
recognised by the certification
body of BSI.
For this certification procedure the sponsor and applicant is: NXP Semiconductors
Germany GmbH.
The product was developed by: cv cryptovision GmbH, Munscheidstr. 14, 45886
Gelsenkirchen, Germany.
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this
Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
5. Validity of the Certification Result
This Certification Report applies only to the version of the product as indicated. The
confirmed assurance package is valid on the condition that
● all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the
following report, are observed,
● the product is operated in the environment described, as specified in the following report
and in the Security Target.
For the meaning of the assurance components and assurance levels please refer to CC
itself. Detailed references are listed in part C of this report.
The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target
at the date of certification. As attack methods evolve over time, the resistance of the
certified version of the product against new attack methods needs to be re-assessed.
Therefore, the sponsor should apply for the certified product being monitored within the
assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme (e.g. by a re-assessment or
re-certification). Specifically, if results of the certification are used in subsequent evaluation
and certification procedures, in a system integration process or if a user's risk
management needs regularly updated results, it is recommended to perform a re-
assessment on a regular e.g. annual basis.
In order to avoid an indefinite usage of the certificate when evolved attack methods would
require a re-assessment of the products resistance to state of the art attack methods, the
maximum validity of the certificate has been limited. The certificate issued on 18 May 2018
is valid until 17 May 2023. Validity can be re-newed by re-certification.
The owner of the certificate is obliged:
5
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1022-2018 Certification Report
1. when advertising the certificate or the fact of the product's certification, to refer to
the Certification Report as well as to provide the Certification Report, the Security
Target and user guidance documentation mentioned herein to any customer of the
product for the application and usage of the certified product,
2. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately about vulnerabilities of the
product that have been identified by the developer or any third party after issuance
of the certificate,
3. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately in the case that security relevant
changes in the evaluated life cycle, e.g. related to development and production sites
or processes, occur, or the confidentiality of documentation and information related
to the Target of Evaluation (TOE) or resulting from the evaluation and certification
procedure where the certification of the product has assumed this confidentiality
being maintained, is not given any longer. In particular, prior to the dissemination of
confidential documentation and information related to the TOE or resulting from the
evaluation and certification procedure that do not belong to the deliverables
according to the Certification Report part B, or for those where no dissemination
rules have been agreed on, to third parties, the Certification Body at BSI has to be
informed.
In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to
the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e.
re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural
requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.
6. Publication
The product NXP eDoc Suite v3.0 - cryptovision ePasslet Suite - Java Card applet
configuration providing Machine Readable Travel Document with "ICAO Application",
Extended Access Control with PACE has been included in the BSI list of certified products,
which is published regularly (see also Internet: https://www.bsi.bund.de and [5]). Further
information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline +49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer6
of the
product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet
address stated above.
6
cv cryptovision GmbH
Munscheidstr. 14
45886 Gelsenkirchen
Deutschland
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1022-2018
B. Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
● the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
● the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
● complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1022-2018 Certification Report
1. Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is a Java Card applet configuration providing a Machine
Readable Travel Document with „ICAO Application”, Extended Access Control with PACE
option. The composite TOE is named NXP eDoc Suite v3.0 - cryptovision ePasslet Suite –
Java Card applet configuration providing Machine Readable Travel Document with „ICAO
Application”, Extended Access Control with PACE and short named ePasslet3.0/MRTD-
EAC. It is intended for use as a Machine Readable Travel Document (MRTD) chip.
It consists of an applet configuration ePasslet3.0/MRTD-EAC provided by the NXP eDoc
Suite v3.0 – cryptovision ePasslet Suite used for electronic travel documents providing
EAC (Extended Access Control) with PACE (Password Authenticated Connection
Establishment), the according guidance documents [11], [12] and [13], the underlying
operating system and the hardware platform with the crypto library. The TOE is available
with different EEPROM sizes and in several variants which however are equivalent w.r.t.
the evaluated security functionality.
The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is based on the certified
Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel Document with "ICAO Application", Extended
Access Control with PACE (EAC PP), Version 1.3.2, 5 December 2012, BSI-CC-PP-0056-
V2-2012-MA-02 [8].
The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details).
The TOE meets the assurance requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 5
augmented by ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the
Security Target [6] and [9], chapter 6. They are selected from Common Criteria Part 2 and
some of them are newly defined. Thus the TOE is CC Part 2 extended.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functionality:
TOE Security Functionality Addressed issue
TSF_Access Access Control
TSF_Admin Administration
TSF_Secret Secret key management
TSF_Crypto Cryptographic operations
TSF_SecureMessaging Secure Messaging
TSF_Auth Authentication protocols
TSF_Integrity Integrity protection
TSF_OS Javacard OS Security Functionalities
Table 1: TOE Security Functionalities
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6] and [9], chapter 7.
The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6] and [9],
chapter 3.1. Based on these assets the TOE Security Problem is defined in terms of
Assumptions, Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security
Target [6] and [9], chapter 3.
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This certification covers the configurations of the TOE as outlined in chapter 8.
The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating
for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and
decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate
and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification
Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2. Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
NXP eDoc Suite v3.0 - cryptovision ePasslet Suite - Java Card applet configuration
providing Machine Readable Travel Document with "ICAO Application", Extended
Access Control with PACE
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
No. Type Item / Identifier Version Form of Delivery
1 HW+SW NXP eDoc Suite v3.0 –
cryptovision ePasslet Suite on
platform NXP JCOP 3 SECID
P60 CS (OSB)
3.0 Two different ways of
delivery of the TOE are
described. Either, the
customer collects the
product at the NXP site
itself, or the product is
sent by NXP to the
customer. Here, the
product is delivered in
parcels sealed with
special tapes to detect
manipulation of the
tapes.
2 DOC NXP eDoc Suite v3.0 –
cryptovision ePasslet Suite –
Java Card applet
configuration providing an
ICAO MRTD application with
Extended Access Control
(EACv1) or with Basic Access
Control (BAC) and
Supplemental Access Control
(SAC) Operational Guidance
(AGD_OPE)
3.0.7 The TOE documentation
is delivered in electronic
form (encrypted)
according to defined
mailing procedures by
NXP.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1022-2018 Certification Report
No. Type Item / Identifier Version Form of Delivery
3 DOC NXP eDoc Suite v3.0 –
cryptovision ePasslet Suite –
Java Card applet
configuration providing an
ICAO MRTD application with
Extended Access Control
(EACv1) or with Basic Access
Control (BAC) and
Supplemental Access Control
(SAC) Preparation Guidance
(AGD_PRE)
3.0.10
4 DOC NXP eDoc Suite v3.0 –
cryptovision ePasslet Suite –
Java Card Applet Suite
providing Electronic ID
Documents applications
Guidance Manual
3.0.9
Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE
The composite TOE consists of the underlying hardware platform, the crypto lib, the JCOP
operating system and the NXP eDoc Suite v3.0 – cryptovision ePasslet Suite in applet
configuration ePasslet3.0/MRTD-EAC. First, the generated applet suite and the guidance
are delivered by encrypted e-mail from the development to the production site. There the
JCOP operating system and the applet is integrated into the ordered IC variant by masking
during the chip production by the manufacturer, according to the configuration information
contained in the OEF (Order Entry Form). Afterwards the composite TOE is delivered in
the sense of Common Criteria. Thereby the delivery process is the same for the composite
product as the delivery process covered by the certified JCOP platform [14].
The TOE identification comprises several steps. The correctness of the IC and the
existence of an additional banking applet can be checked with the custom mask ID by
using GET DATA (Identify) command (see [20]).
The verification of the correct eDoc Suite version can be done by requesting data from the
Issuer Security Domain by using GET DATA (Verify Package) command (see [20]).
Detailed information on the TOE identification can be found in the guidance documents for
the TOE [11] [12] [13] and the platform [20].
3. Security Policy
The Security Policy is expressed by the set of Security Functional Requirements and
implemented by the TOE. It covers the following issues:
● Security Audit,
● Cryptographic Support,
● User Data Protection,
● Identification and Authentication,
● Security Management, and
● Protection of the TSF.
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Specific details concerning the above mentioned security policies can be found in Chapter
6.2 of the Security Target [6] and [9].
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and
Organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to
specific security objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. The following topics are
of relevance:
● OE.Auth_Key_Travel_Document,
● OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data,
● OE.Exam_Travel_Document,
● OE.Prot_Logical_Travel_Document,
● OE.Ext_Insp_Systems,
● OE.Legislative_Compliance,
● OE.Passive_Auth_Sign,
● OE.Personalisation,
● OE.Terminal,
● OE.Travel_Document_Holder,
● OE.Active_Auth_Key_MRTD,
● OE.APPLET,
● OE.VERIFICATION,
● OE.CODE-EVIDENCE,
● OE.APPS-PROVIDE,
● OE.VERIFICATION-AUTHORITY,
● OE.KEY-CHANGE,
● OE.SECURITY-DOMAINS,
● OE.USE_DIAG,
● OE.USE_KEYS, and
● OE.PROCESS_SEC_IC.
Details can be found in the Security Target [6] and [9], chapter 4.3 and in the guidance
documents.
5. Architectural Information
The composite TOE, NXP eDoc Suite v3.0 - cryptovision ePasslet Suite – Java Card
applet configuration providing Machine Readable Travel Document with „ICAO
Application”, Extended Access Control with PACE, is a Java Card applet based on a
certified Java Card platform comprises of eight subsystems, listed with a short description
in the following itemization:
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● Platform: Represents the parts of the underlying hardware platform of the composite
TOE, which interacts with the application in regards of control, including the creation and
selection of applet instance and the internal life cycle control.
● Operating System: Represents the operating system of the underlying JCOP platform of
the composite TOE, which is used by the applications to realize the functionality. It also
comprises the underlying cryptographic library.
● Configuration Manager: Provides services for applet creation and configuration. This
subsystem is called by the platform subsystem each time an application is instantiated.
● Event Manager: Handles events from internal subsystems and from the underlying
platform and calls other subsystems interfaces to process these events.
● Command Processor: Provides the main interface to the platform by passing through
APDU commands from the terminal to the applet. The subsystem decides if special
APDUs have to be handled by the application and ensures their execution by the
responsible applet. It also provides access controlled execution of commands covering
all applet commands.
● Secure Messaging Manager: Handles the secure channel between the application and
the terminal in accordance with the specified cryptographic mechanisms and key sizes.
The responsibility for secure messaging includes the verification of MAC, unwrapping
messages and security mechanisms for secure messaging.
● File System Manager: Provides an interface for file and object access and management
by a representation of the existing elements.
● State Manager: Handles the internal state of the application and provides update
functionality and access to the current DF, EF, KO, security environment, and the
authentication status of the terminal and the challenge.
6. Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in Table 2 is being provided with the product to
the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of
the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of
this report have to be followed.
7. IT Product Testing
Developer's Test according to ATE_FUN
The developer’s testing effort is summarised as follows:
TOE configurations tested:
The tests were performed with the composite smartcard product ePasslet3.0/MRTD-EAC
on NXP JCOP 3 SECID P60 CS by NXP, in all variants as listed in [6, 1.1] (except the
different memory configurations), i.e. with or without Mifare option and with or without an
additional banking applet, including those used for the independent tests:
● J3H145CEX30,
● J3H145CAX30, and
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● J3H145CGX30.
Developer’s testing approach:
The developer considered the following aspects when designing his test approach:
● Tests to cover all actions defined in [21],
● Good case and bad case tests for each command defined in the document [21] and
executable on the TOE,
● Access rules test as part of the requirements on TSF data,
● Conformance tests according to BSI TR03105-Part3 with commercial test suites,
● Tests covering all TSF subsystems in the TOE design.
Verdict for the activity:
All test cases in each test suite were run successfully on this TOE version.
The developer’s testing results demonstrate that the TOE performs as expected.
Independent Testing according to ATE_IND
The evaluator’s testing effort is described as follows, outlining the testing approach,
configuration, depth and results.
Test Approach and Set-up:
The TOE consists of the NXP eDoc Suite v3.0 - cryptovision ePasslet Suite – Java Card
applet configuration providing Machine Readable Travel Document with „ICAO
Application”, Extended Access Control with PACE installed on NXP JCOP 3 SECID P60
CS. The APDU tests were performed using standard PCSC readers, a standard PC, test
software provided by the developer as well as evaluator’s test software. Further, for some
tests, i.e. fuzzing, B0 card readers (supporting also raw communication) were used.
The selected tests cover tests of the TSFI related to:
● Identification and Authentication (interfaces of different authentication mechanisms),
● Protection against interference, logical tampering and bypass (disturbance of interface
execution),
● Secure Messaging (test of interface commands using secure messaging),
● Preparative procedures performed by the evaluator according to the guidance
documentation [12] and [13].
The choice of the subset of interfaces used for testing has been done according to the
following approach:
● Augmentation of developer testing for interfaces and supplementation of developer
testing strategy for interfaces are both used for setting up test cases.
● Besides augmentation and supplementation of developer’s tests the tests are also
selected by the complexity and the susceptibility to vulnerabilities of interfaces and
related functionality.
● Since the developer has tested all interfaces and the rigour of developer testing of the
interfaces is sufficient, the evaluator found that all TSFIs have been suitably tested. The
evaluator had no doubt that an interface is not properly implemented.
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● The APDU interfaces are essential for the TOE and therefore in the focus of testing.
● Implicit testing was sufficiently included in developer testing because preparative steps
were performed and described for nearly each test case.
● The selection process is based on evaluation experience of the evaluation body.
Therefore, all TOE security functionality is included within the subset. Nearly all
cryptographic functionality is provided by the platform and was sufficiently tested during
platform evaluation. Cryptographic functionalities implemented in the applet suite were
tested in the current evaluation.
● Specific tests were conducted that were aligned during meetings with the certification
body.
Configuration:
The TOE was tested in the HW variants:
● J3H145CAX30,
● J3H145CEX30, and
● J3H145CGX30.
All TOE variants were used for different tests with the ROM values, see [6, 1]. The keys
and personalization data used in the test configurations were provided by the developer.
Test Results:
The test reports for the APDU tests are automatically generated by the test tool used. The
test results are logged.
The test logs and the test documentation include details and comments on the test
configuration, on the test equipment used, on the used command structure and the
expected results. The test prerequisites, test steps, and expected results adequately test
the related TSFI, and they are consistent with the descriptions of the TSFI in the functional
specification.
The test results have not shown any deviations between the expected test results and the
actual test results.
Penetration Testing according to AVA_VAN
Overview:
The penetration testing was performed at the site of the evaluation body TÜViT in the
evaluator’s test environment with the evaluator’s test equipment. The samples were
provided by the sponsor and by the developer. The test samples were configured and
parameterized by the evaluator according to the guidance documentation. All
configurations of the TOE being intended to be covered by the current evaluation were
tested. The overall result is that no deviations were found between the expected result and
the actual result of the tests. Moreover, no attack scenario with the attack potential of High
was actually successful.
Penetration testing approach:
Based on the list of potential vulnerabilities applicable to the TOE in its operational
environment created within vulnerability analysis evaluation report, the evaluator created
attack scenarios for penetration tests, where the evaluator is of the opinion, that the
vulnerabilities could be exploitable. While doing this, the evaluator also considered all
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1022-2018
aspects of the security architecture of the TOE, being not covered by the functional
developer tests.
The source code reviews of the provided implementation representation accompanied the
development of test cases and were used to find test input. The code inspection supported
testing activity by enabling the evaluator to verify implementation aspects that could hardly
be covered by test cases.
The primary focus for devising penetration tests was to cover all potential vulnerabilities
identified as applicable in the TOE’s operational environment for which an appropriate test
set was devised.
TOE test configurations:
The tests were performed with the one configuration of the TOE it is delivered in to the
personalization agent, as stated in the security target.
Summary of Test Results and Effectiveness Analysis
The test results yielded that no deviations were found between the expected and the
actual test results. No attack scenario with the attack potential high was actually
successful in the TOE’s operational environment as defined in [6] provided that all
measures required by the developer are applied.
8. Evaluated Configuration
This certification covers the following configurations of the TOE:
There is only one configuration of the TOE. For all tests the TOE is configured and
parameterized, if necessary, according to the guidance documents. The
ePasslet3.0/MRTD-EAC TOE configuration is generated out of the applet suite that is part
of the ROM of platform NXP JCOP 3 SECID P60 CS (OSB) by NXP. The
ePasslet3.0/MRTD-EAC applet needs to be created according to the guidelines given in
[12] and [13].
9. Results of the Evaluation
9.1. CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [7] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used for those components up to EAL 5
extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 5 and guidance
specific for the technology of the product [4] (AIS 34).
The following guidance specific for the technology was used:
● Application of CC to Integrated Circuits,
● Attack Methods for Smartcards and Similar Devices,
● Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards,
● Minimum Requirements for Evaluating Side-Channel Attack Resistance of RSA,
DSA and Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange Implementations,
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1022-2018 Certification Report
● Composite product evaluation for Smart Cards and similar devices (see AIS 36).
According to this concept the relevant guidance documents of the underlying
platform [20] and the documents ETR for Composition from the platform evaluations
(i.e. [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19]) have been applied in the TOE evaluation.
(see [4], 26, 34, 36, 46).
For RNG assessment the scheme interpretations AIS 20 was used (see [4]).
As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
● All components of the EAL 5 package including the class ASE as defined in the CC (see
also part C of this report)
● The components ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5 augmented for this TOE evaluation.
The evaluation has confirmed:
● PP Conformance: Machine Readable Travel Document with "ICAO Application",
Extended Access Control with PACE (EAC PP), Version 1.3.2, 5
December 2012, BSI-CC-PP-0056-V2-2012-MA-02 [8]
● for the Functionality: PP conformant
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
● for the Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 5 augmented by ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5
For specific evaluation results regarding the development and production environment see
annex B in part D of this report.
Since this TOE is a composite TOE it relies on its platform certifications. Please refer to
[14][16][18] for details.
The composite TOE takes care of the recommendations and requirements imposed by the
guidance documentation and ETR for composition of the underlying platform to be
resistant against attackers with attack potential high.
In the course of the evaluation the underlying platform NXP JCOP 3 SECID P60 CS (OSB)
underwent a re-certification and the re-certified platform was chosen as basis for the
current composite evaluation. All composite work units according to [4, AIS36] were
reworked and the evaluation reports are valid for the re-certified platform.
Further, the developer created an ST-Lite for publication. During the examination the
evaluator compared the Security Target [6] with the Security Target Lite [9]. The
Security Target Lite complies with the requirements of [4, AIS35]. Therefore the evaluator
determines that the Security Target Lite is a correct sanitised version of the Security
Target.
After completion of the evaluation report for aspect ALC the developer documents [9],
[11], [12] were changed. The final version of the configuration list [10] which includes the
current version of these documents was provided. The changes in the configuration list
were examined and the evaluator is of the opinion that the evaluation report for aspect
ALC remains valid also for the updated configuration list.
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
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9.2. Results of cryptographic assessment
The table in annex C of part D of this report gives an overview of the cryptographic
functionalities inside the TOE to enforce the security policy and outlines the standard of
application where its specific appropriateness is stated.
The strength of the these cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of this
certification procedure (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE
The documents as outlined in Table 2 contain necessary information about the usage of
the TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered. In addition all aspects of
Assumptions, Threats and OSPs as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE
itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his
system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and
techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment of the
TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
The limited validity for the usage of cryptographic algorithms as outlined in chapter 9 has
to be considered by the user and his system risk management process, too.
11. Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [9] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is
provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report. It is a sanitised version of
the complete Security Target [6] used for the evaluation performed. Sanitisation was
performed according to the rules as outlined in the relevant CCRA policy (see AIS 35 [4]).
12. Definitions
12.1. Acronyms
AIS Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for
Information Security, Bonn, Germany
BSIG BSI-Gesetz / Act on the Federal Office for Information Security
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
cPP Collaborative Protection Profile
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
IT Information Technology
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
JCOP Java Card Openplatform
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1022-2018 Certification Report
MRED Machine-Readable Etronic Document
MRTD Machine-ReadableTravel Document
PACE Password Authenticated Connection Establishment
PP Protection Profile
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
12.2. Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.
Collaborative Protection Profile - A Protection Profile collaboratively developed by an
International Technical Community endorsed by the Management Committee.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in CC
part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in CC part 3.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on well-
established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - A passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon which
subjects perform operations.
Package - named set of either security functional or security assurance requirements
Protection Profile - A formal document defined in CC, expressing an implementation
independent set of security requirements for a category of IT Products that meet specific
consumer needs.
Security Target - An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific
identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Subject - An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.
Target of Evaluation - An IT Product and its associated administrator and user guidance
documentation that is the subject of an Evaluation.
TOE Security Functionality - Combined functionality of all hardware, software, and
firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs.
13. Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Part 1: Introduction and general model, Revision 4, September 2012
Part 2: Security functional components, Revision 4, September 2012
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Part 3: Security assurance components, Revision 4, September 2012
http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Revision 4, September 2012
http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[3] BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-
Produkte) and Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility,
approval and licencing (CC-Stellen), https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierung
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE7
https://www.bsi.bund.de/AIS
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148), periodically updated list published also
on the BSI Website, https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierungsreporte
[6] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-1022-2018, Version 1.7, 12 February 2018, NXP eDoc
Suite v3.0 - cryptovision ePasslet Suite – Java Card applet configuration providing
Machine Readable Travel Document with „ICAO Application” Extended Access
Control with PACE – Security Target, cv cryptovision GmbH (confidential document)
[7] Evaluation Technical Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1023, Version 2, 16 March 2018, NXP
eDoc Suite v3.0 - cryptovision ePasslet Suite – Java Card applet configuration
providing Machine Readable Travel Document with „ICAO Application”, Extended
Access Control with PACE, TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH – Evaluation Body for IT
Security (confidential document)
[8] Protection Profiles PP-0056 and PP-0068: Machine Readable Travel Document with
"ICAO Application", Extended Access Control with PACE (EAC PP), Version 1.3.2, 5
December 2012, BSI-CC-PP-0056-V2-2012-MA-02
[9] Security Target Lite BSI-DSZ-CC-1022-2018, Version 1.7, 22 February 2018, NXP
eDoc Suite v3.0 - cryptovision ePasslet Suite – Java Card applet configuration
providing Machine Readable Travel Document with „ICAO Application” Extended
Access Control with PACE – Security Target Lite, cv cryptovision GmbH (confidential
document) (sanitised public document)
[10] Configuration list for the TOE, Revision 13027, 22 Februar 2018, File 2018-02-
22_conflist-JCOP3_rev13027.xlsx, cv cryptovision GmbH (confidential document)
7
specifically
• AIS 20, Version 3, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für deterministische
Zufallszahlengeneratoren
• AIS 26, Version 9, Evaluationsmethodologie für in Hardware integrierte Schaltungen including JIL
Document and CC Supporting Document
• AIS 32, Version 7, CC-Interpretationen im deutschen Zertifizierungsschema
• AIS 34, Version 3, Evaluation Methodology for CC Assurance Classes for EAL 5+ (CCv2.3 &
CCv3.1) and EAL 6 (CCv3.1)
• AIS 35, Version 2, Öffentliche Fassung des Security Targets (ST-Lite) including JIL Document and
CC Supporting Document and CCRA policies
• AIS 36, Version 5, Kompositionsevaluierung including JIL Document and CC Supporting Document
• AIS 46, Version 3, Informationen zur Evaluierung von kryptographischen Algorithmen und
ergänzende Hinweise für die Evaluierung von Zufallszahlengeneratoren
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[11] Guidance Document for the TOE: NXP eDoc Suite v3.0 – cryptovision ePasslet
Suite – Java Card applet configuration providing an ICAO MRTD application with
Extended Access Control (EACv1) or with Basic Access Control (BAC) and
Supplemental Access Control (SAC) Operational Guidance, Version 3.0.7,
16 February 2018, cv cryptovision GmbH
[12] Guidance Document for the TOE: NXP eDoc Suite v3.0 – cryptovision ePasslet
Suite – Java Card applet configuration providing an ICAO MRTD application with
Extended Access Control (EACv1) or with Basic Access Control (BAC) and
Supplemental Access Control (SAC) Preparation Guidance, Version 3.0.10,
20 February 2018, cv cryptovision GmbH
[13] Guidance Document for the TOE: NXP eDoc Suite v3.0 – cryptovision ePasslet
Suite – Java Card Applet Suite providing Electronic ID Documents applications
Guidance Manual, Version 3.0.9, 26 February 2018, cv cryptovision GmbH
[14] Certification Report NXP JCOP 3 SECID P60 CS (OSB), Report number NSCIB-
CC-98209-CR2, version 2, 15 January 2018, TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V.
[15] Evaluation Technical Report for Composition NXP JCOP 3 SECID P60 CS (OSB) –
EAL5+, version 3.0, 04 December 2017, Brightsight B.V. (confidential document)
[16] Certification Report Crypto Library V3.1.x on P6022y VB, Certificate number CC-17-
67206, Report number NSCIB-CC-67206-CR2, 17 November 2017, TÜV Rheinland
Nederland B.V.
[17] ETR for Composite Evaluation Crypto Library V3.1.x on P6022y VB EAL6+/5+,
Reference 17-RPT-421, version 3.0, 24 October 2017, Brightsight B.V. (confidential
document)
[18] Certification report BSI-DSZ-CC-0973-V2-2016 for NXP Secure Smart Card
Controller P6022y VB including IC Dedicated Software, 11 October 2016,
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
[19] Evaluation Technical Report for Composite Evaluation P6022y VB, version 1, 25
August 2016, TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH (confidential document)
[20] Guidance Document for the platform: JCOP 3 SECID P60 CS User Guidance and
Administration Manual, Rev. 2.5, 16 November 2017, NXP Semiconductors.
[21] NXP eDoc Suite v3.0 – cryptovision ePasslet Suite – Java Card applet configuration
providing an ICAO MRTD application with Extended Access Control (EACv1) or with
Basic Access Control (BAC) and Supplemental Access Control (SAC) Functional
Specification ADV_FSP. Version 3.0.5, 29 September 2017, cv cryptovision GmbH
(confidential document)
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1022-2018
C. Excerpts from the Criteria
For the meaning of the assurance components and levels the following references to the
Common Criteria can be followed:
• On conformance claim definitions and descriptions refer to CC part 1 chapter 10.4
• On the concept of assurance classes, families and components refer to CC Part 3
chapter 7.1
• On the concept and definition of pre-defined assurance packages (EAL) refer to CC
Part 3 chapters 7.2 and 8
• On the assurance class ASE for Security Target evaluation refer to CC Part 3
chapter 11
• On the detailled definitions of the assurance components for the TOE evaluation
refer to CC Part 3 chapters 12 to 16
• The table in CC part 3 , Annex E summarizes the relationship between the
evaluation assurance levels (EAL) and the assurance classes, families and
components.
The CC are published at http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/cc/
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1022-2018 Certification Report
D. Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Security Target provided within a separate document.
Annex B: Evaluation results regarding development
and production environment
Annex C: Overview and rating of cryptographic functionalities implemented in the TOE
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1022-2018
Annex B of Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1022-2018
Evaluation results regarding
development and production
environment
The IT product NXP eDoc Suite v3.0 - cryptovision ePasslet Suite - Java Card applet
configuration providing Machine Readable Travel Document with "ICAO Application",
Extended Access Control with PACE (Target of Evaluation, TOE) has been evaluated at an
approved evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation
(CEM), Version 3.1 extended by CC Supporting Documents for conformance to the
Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1.
As a result of the TOE certification, dated 18 May 2018, the following results regarding the
development and production environment apply. The Common Criteria assurance
requirements ALC – Life cycle support (i.e. ALC_CMC.4, ALC_CMS.5, ALC_DEL.1,
ALC_DVS.2, ALC_LCD.1, ALC_TAT.2 and ALC_COMP.1).
are fulfilled for the development and production sites of the TOE listed below:
a) cv cryptovision GmbH, Munscheidstr. 14, 45886 Gelsenkirchen, Germany
(software development site)
b) Regarding the development and production sites of the platform, please refer
to the certification reports NSCIB-CC-98209-CR2 [14], NSCIB-CC-67206-CR2
[16] and BSI-DSZ-CC-0973-V2-2016 [18].
For the sites listed above, the requirements have been specifically applied in accordance
with the Security Target [6]. The evaluators verified, that the threats, security objectives
and requirements for the TOE life cycle phases up to delivery (as stated in the Security
Target [6] and [9]) are fulfilled by the procedures of these sites.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1022-2018 Certification Report
Annex C of Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1022-2018
Overview and rating of cryptographic functionalities implemented
in the TOE
No. Purpose Cryptograph
ic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementat
ion
Key Size in
Bits
Standard of
Application
Comments
1 Authentici
ty
ECDSA-
signature
verification of
card
verifiable
certificates
using SHA-
{1, 224, 256,
384, 512}
[ISO15946]
(ECDSA),
[FIPS180-4]
(SHA)
160, 192, 224,
256, 320, 384,
512, 521 bit;
elliptic curves
brainpoolP{16
0, 192, 224,
256, 320, 384,
512}r1
[Brainpool],
NIST P-{160,
192, 224, 256,
384, 521}
[FIPS186-3]
[ICAODoc]
(ECDSA),
[TR-03110]
Verification of
certificates for
authenti-
cation;
FCS_COP.1/S
IG_VER
2 RSASSA-
PSS
signature
verification of
card
verifiable
certificates
using SHA-
{1, 224, 256,
384, 512}
[PKCS1]
(RSASSA-
PSS),
[FIPS180-4]
(SHA)
Moduluslength
= 2048 - 4096
bit
[ICAODoc]
(RSA), [TR-
03110]
Verification of
certificates for
authenti-
cation;
FCS_COP.1/S
IG_VER
3 Authentic
ation
PACE [ICAO_SAC] Length of MRZ
or CAN, |
Nonce|=128
[ICAO_SAC],
[TR-03110]
FIA_UID.1/PA
CE,
FIA_UAU.1/P
ACE
4 Chip
Authenticatio
n v.1 for
authenticatio
n of travel
document's
chip to
inspection
system
based on
ephemeral-
static ECDH
in
combination
with AES
[ISO15946]
AES cf.
Confidentialit
y/Integrity
Key sizes
corresponding
to the used
elliptic curve
brainpoolP{22
4, 256, 320,
384, 512}r1
[Brainpool],
NIST P-{256,
384, 521}
[FIPS186-3]
[ICAODoc],
[TR-03110]
FIA_API.1
5 Chip
Authenticatio
n v.1 for
authenticatio
n of travel
[PKCS3],
AES cf.
Confidentialit
y/Integrity
Plength =
2048-4096
[ICAODoc],
[TR-03110]
FIA_API.1
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1022-2018
No. Purpose Cryptograph
ic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementat
ion
Key Size in
Bits
Standard of
Application
Comments
document's
chip to
inspection
system
based on
ephemeral-
static DH in
combination
with AES
6 Terminal
Authenticatio
n v.1 for
authenticatio
n of
inspection
system to
travel
document's
chip based
on ECDSA
using SHA-
{1, 224,
256,384,
512}
[ISO15946]
(ECDSA),
[FIPS180-4]
(SHA)
Key lengths
according to
the elliptic
curves
brainpoolP{16
0, 192, 224,
256, 320, 384,
512}r1
[Brainpool],
NIST P-{160,
192, 224, 256,
384, 521}
[FIPS186-3]
[ICAODoc],
[TR-03110]
FIA_UAU.5/P
ACE
FCS_COP.1/S
IG_VER
7 Terminal
Authenticatio
n v.1 for
authenticatio
n of
inspection
system to
travel
document's
chip based
on RSASSA-
PSS using
SHA-{1, 224,
256,384,
512}
[PKCS1]
(RSASSA-
PSS),
[FIPS180-4]
(SHA)
Moduluslength
= 2048 - 4096
bit
[ICAODoc],
[TR-03110]
FIA_UAU.5/P
ACE
FCS_COP.1/S
IG_VER
8 Active
Authenticatio
n of the
MRTD’s chip
based on
RSA using
SHA-{1, 224,
256, 384,
512}
[ISO9796-2]
(RSA),
[FIPS180-4]
(SHA)
Moduluslength
= 2048 - 4096
bit
[ICAODoc] FCS_COP.1/S
IG_GEN
9 Symmetric
Authenticatio
n Mechanism
based on
AES for
Personalizati
on Agent
Standard
equivalent to
[ISO18013-3]
|k|=128, 192,
256
[ICAODoc]
but with AES
-
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1022-2018 Certification Report
No. Purpose Cryptograph
ic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementat
ion
Key Size in
Bits
Standard of
Application
Comments
10 Key
Derivation
ECDH using
SHA-{1, 256}
[ISO15946]
(ECDH),
[FIPS180-4]
(SHA),
[ICAO_SAC]
Key lengths
according to
the elliptic
curves
brainpoolP{16
0, 192, 224,
256, 320, 384,
512}r1
[Brainpool],
NIST P-{160,
192, 256, 384,
521}
[FIPS186-3]
[TR-03110] For PACE and
Chip Authent-
ication.
[ICAO_SAC]
implicitly
contains the
requirements
for hash
functions;
FCS_CKM.1/
DH_PACE,
FCS_CKM.1/
CA
11 DH using
SHA-{1, 256}
[PKCS3]
(DH),
[FIPS180-4]
(SHA), [TR-
03110],
Annex A.1
(PACE).
Plength =
2048-4096
[TR-03110] For Chip
Authentication
FCS_CKM.1/
CA
12 Confidenti
ality
AES in CBC
mode
[FIPS197]
(AES),
[NIST800-
38A] (CBC)
|k|=128, 192,
256
[ICAO_SAC] FCS_COP.1/P
ACE_ENC
FCS_COP.1.1
/CA_ENC
13 3DES in
CBC mode
[FIPS46-3]
(3DES),
[NIST800-
38A] (CBC)
|k|=112 [ICAO_SAC] FCS_COP.1/P
ACE_ENC
FCS_COP.1.1
/CA_ENC
14 Integrity AES in
CMAC mode
[FIPS197]
(AES),
[NIST800-
38B] (CMAC)
|k|=128, 192,
256
[ICAO_SAC],
[TR-03110]
FCS_COP.1/P
ACE_MAC
FCS_COP.1/
CA_MAC
15 Retail-MAC [FIPS46-3]
(3DES),
[ANSIX9.19]
(RetailMAC)
|k|=112 [ICAO_SAC],
[TR-03110]
FCS_COP.1/P
ACE_MAC
FCS_COP.1/
CA_MAC
16 Trusted
Channel
Secure
messaging in
ENC_MAC
mode
establish
during PACE
[ICAO_SAC] Cf.
Confidentiality/
Integrity
[ICAO_SAC],
[TR-03110]
FIA_UAU.5/P
ACE
17 Secure
messaging in
ENC_MAC
mode is
established
during Chip
Authenticatio
n v1 after
PACE
[ICAO_SAC] Cf.
Confidentiality/
Integrity
[ICAO_SAC],
[TR-03110]
FIA_UAU.5/P
ACE
18 Secure
messaging
for
Standard
equivalent to
[ISO 18013-
|k|=128, 192,
256
[ICAODoc]
but with AES
For
personalizatio
n
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1022-2018
No. Purpose Cryptograph
ic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementat
ion
Key Size in
Bits
Standard of
Application
Comments
personalizati
on
3]
19 Cryptogra
phic
primitive
Deterministic
RNG DRG.3
[AIS20] n.a. - FCS_RND.1
Table 3: TOE cryptographic functionality
Note: End of report
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