



# NUVOTON TECHNOLOGY CORPORATION

## NPCT7xx TPM1.2 rev 116 Security Target

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Hardware LAG019  
Firmware 7.4.0.0

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**Table of Contents**

**1 INTRODUCTION ..... 5**

1.1 ST and TOE Identification ..... 5

1.2 TOE Global Overview..... 6

1.3 Organization of the Security Target ..... 7

1.4 Common Criteria Conformance ..... 8

**2 TOE DESCRIPTION..... 9**

2.1 TPM - General Remarks..... 9

2.1.1 Algorithms..... 12

2.1.2 Random Number Generator (RNG) ..... 13

2.1.3 Key Generation..... 13

2.1.4 Self Tests ..... 13

2.1.5 Identification and Authentication ..... 13

2.1.6 Access Control ..... 14

2.2 Security Attributes and Data ..... 14

2.3 TOE Overview ..... 15

**3 CONFORMANCE CLAIMS .....21**

3.1 CC Conformance Claim ..... 21

3.2 PP Claim..... 21

3.3 Package Claim..... 21

3.4 Conformance Claim Rationale ..... 21

**4 TOE SECURITY PROBLEM DEFINITION .....22**

4.1 Assets ..... 22

4.2 Threats to Security ..... 22

4.3 Organizational Security Policies ..... 23

4.4 Secure Usage Assumptions ..... 24

**5 SECURITY OBJECTIVES.....25**

5.1 Security Objectives for the TOE ..... 25

5.2 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment ..... 27

**6 SECURITY REQUIREMENTS.....28**

6.1 Security Functional Requirements for the TOE ..... 28

6.1.1 General SFR ..... 28

6.1.2 Cryptographic Support ..... 30

6.1.3 TPM Operational Modes ..... 32

6.1.4 Identification, Authentication and Binding ..... 36

6.1.5 Data Protection and Privacy ..... 41

6.1.6 Data Import and Export ..... 61

6.1.7 DAA ..... 67

6.1.8 TSF Protection..... 69

6.2 Security Assurance Requirements for the TOE..... 70

**7 TOE SUMMARY SPECIFICATION .....71**

7.1 TOE Security Features ..... 71

- 7.1.1 SF1 – Cryptographic Operations ..... 71
- 7.1.2 SF2 – Self Test ..... 71
- 7.1.3 SF3 – Access Control ..... 71
- 7.1.4 SF4 – Hacking and Physical Tampering Protection/Detection ..... 72
- 7.1.5 SF5 – Key Management ..... 72
- 7.1.6 SF6 – Random Number Generation ..... 72
- 7.1.7 SF7 – Identification and Authentication..... 72
- 7.1.8 SF8 – Firmware Field Upgrade ..... 73
- 7.1.9 Assignment of SFs to Security Functional Requirements ..... 74
- 8 RATIONALE .....76**
  - 8.1 Rationale for Security Problem Definition..... 76
  - 8.2 Rationale for Security Requirements ..... 78
- 9 APPENDIX 1 .....83**
  - 9.1 Commands from TCG Specification Implemented in the TOE ..... 83
  - 9.2 Nuvoton-Specific Commands ..... 85
- 10 APPENDIX 2 .....86**
  - 10.1 References ..... 86
  - 10.2 Acronyms and Glossary ..... 87

# 1 Introduction

This section contains document management and overview information. The Security Target (ST) identification provides the labelling and descriptive information necessary to identify, catalogue, register, and cross-reference a ST. The ST overview summarizes the ST in narrative form and provides sufficient information for a potential user to determine whether the ST is of interest. The overview can also be used as a standalone abstract for ST catalogues and registers.

## 1.1 ST and TOE Identification

The title of this document is: “NPCT7xx TPM1.2 rev 116 Security Target, version 1.0.5”.

The Target of Evaluation (**TOE**) is the TPM1.2 with HW LAG019 and FW 7.4.0.0. This TPM (Trusted Platform Module) is a security processor with embedded firmware, compliant with TCG specification version 1.2.

The identification of the TOE is defined in [ERT], Section 1.0.

The internal code name for the TOE is **NPCT7xx TPM1.2 rev 116**.

The Security Target is based on the following Trusted Computing Group (TCG) Protection Profile: “TCG Protection Profile PC client specific TPM – TPM family 1.2; level 2 revision 116” from July 14, 2014 (certificate BSI-CC-PP-0030-2008-MA-02, December 18, 2014).

The Protection Profile built with Common Criteria V3.1 Revision 4 and the Security Target is built with Common Criteria V3.1 Revision 5.

## 1.2 TOE Global Overview

The TOE, named in this document also TPM1.2, is a single-chip Trusted Platform Module (TPM) device, a member of the Nuvoton SafeKeeper™ family, implements the Trusted Computing Group (TCG) specification for PC-Client TPM, supporting SPI host interface.

The TOE is designed to reduce system boot time. It provides a security solution for a wide range of applications.

The TOE is Microsoft® Windows® compliant.

Main TOE features:

- **General**
  - Single-chip TPM solution; no external parts required
    - Three package options: QFN32, UQFN16 and TSSOP28
  - TCG compliance: [TCG-x] and [TCG\_PC]
  - Pre-loaded EK certificate compliant to *TCG Credential Profiles Specification Version 1.1 Revision 1.014 for TPM Family 1.2; Level 2*
  - Low standby power consumption
  - Dedicated Physical Presence (PP) pin
  - Field Upgrade - allows secure firmware updates
- **Host Interfaces**
  - TIS-Compliant SPI
    - Up to 64-byte data transfer size
    - Maximum frequency of 54 MHz
    - Five localities
- **Clocking and Supply**
  - On-Chip Clock Generator
  - Power Supply
    - Separate pins for interface ( $V_{HIO}$ ) and internal ( $V_{SB}$ ) power supplies
    - Supply options
      - $V_{HIO} = 3.3V$  or  $1.8V$
      - $V_{SB} = 3.3V$  or  $1.8V$
- **Security and Attack Countermeasures**
  - Defends against
    - Fault injection attacks
    - Physical attacks
    - Side channel attacks
    - Differential fault analysis attacks
    - RNG attacks
    - Sensor and test mode attacks
    - Dictionary attacks

### 1.3 Organization of the Security Target

The main sections of the ST are the TOE Description, TOE Security Problem Definition, Security Objectives, IT Security Requirements, TOE Summary Specification and Rationale.

Section 2, the TOE Description, provides general information about a Trusted Platform Module and the TOE itself, serves as an aid to understanding the TOE security requirements, and provides context for the ST evaluation.

Conformance Claims are given in Section 3 in the form of claims versus the Common Criteria and the Protection Profile used for this Security Target.

The TOE Security Problem Definition in Section 4 describes security aspects of the environment in which the TOE is to be used and the manner in which it is to be employed. The TOE security environment includes:

- Assumptions regarding the TOE intended usage and environment of use
- Threats relevant to secure TOE operation
- Organizational security policies with which the TOE must comply

Section 5 contains the security objectives that reflect the stated intent of the ST. The objectives define how the TOE will counter identified threats and how it will cover identified organizational security policies and assumptions. Each security objective is categorized as being for the TOE or for the environment.

Section 6 contains the applicable Security Requirements taken from the Common Criteria, with appropriate refinements. The IT security requirements are subdivided as follows:

- TOE Security Functional Requirements
- TOE Security Assurance Requirements

The TOE Summary Specification in chapter 7 summarizes the security features of this specific TOE, the TPM1.2.

The Rationale in Section 8 presents evidence that the ST is a complete and cohesive set of requirements and that the TOE provides an effective set of IT security countermeasures within the security environment. The Rationale is in three main parts. First, a Security Objectives Rationale demonstrates that the stated security objectives are traceable to all of the aspects identified in the TOE security environment and are suitable to cover them.

Then, a Security Requirements Rationale demonstrates that the security requirements (TOE and environment) are traceable to the security objectives and are suitable to meet them. Finally the TOE summary specification rationale consists of a TOE security functions rationale and an assurance measures rationale.

Section 9 identifies the TPM commands provided by the TOE, while Section 10 gives a glossary of acronyms and terms used in the ST along with references.

## 1.4 Common Criteria Conformance

This ST has been built with Common Criteria (CC) Version 3.1 Revision 5 (ISO/IEC 15408 Evaluation Criteria for Information Technology Security; Part 1: Introduction and general model, Part 2: Security functional requirements, and Part 3: Security assurance requirements).

The Security Target is conformant with the protection profile TCG TPMPP version 1.3 [PP]. It means that the Security Target is conformant with Common Criteria Version 3.1 Revision 5, part 2 “extended” and part 3 [CC].

The assurance level for the TOE is **EAL 4 augmented** with ALC\_FLR.1, AVA\_VAN.4 and ALC\_DVS.2



## 2 TOE Description

The TOE description helps to understand the specific security environment and the security policy. In this context the assets, threats, security objectives and security functional requirements can be employed. After some general remarks about the Trusted Platform Module in chapters 2.1 and 2.2, chapter 2.3 presents a more detailed description of the TOE than in the [PP] as it refers to this particular TOE implementation.

### 2.1 TPM - General Remarks

The Trusted Platform Module is an integrated circuit and software platform that provides computer manufacturers with the core components of a subsystem used to assure authenticity, integrity and confidentiality in e-commerce and Internet communications within a Trusted Computing Platform as defined in [TCG-x]. The TPM is a complete solution implementing the Trusted Computing Group specification [TCG-x] which is an industry group originally founded in 1999 by COMPAQ, HP, IBM, Intel, Microsoft as “TCPA”, and later changed to the current TCG organization.

A Trusted Platform is a platform that can be trusted by local users and by remote entities. The basis for trusting a platform is a declaration by a known authority that a platform with a given identity can be trusted to measure and report the way it is operating. That operating information can be associated with data stored on the platform, to prevent the release of that data if the platform is not operating as expected. Other authorities provide declarations that describe the operating information the platform ought to produce when it is operating properly. The local user and remote entities trust the judgment of the authorities; so, when they receive proof of the identity of the platform, information about the current platform environment, and proof about the expected platform environment, they can decide whether to trust the platform to behave in a sufficiently trustworthy and predictable manner. The local user and/or remote entities must take this decision themselves because the level of trust in a platform can vary with the intended use of that platform, and only the local user and/or remote entities know that intended purpose.

The trusted mechanism of the platform uses cryptographic processes, including secrets. The trusted mechanisms are required to be isolated from the platform in order to protect secrets from disclosure and protect methods from subversion.

The subsystem protects itself against physical and software attacks to provide protection against attacks to the platform.

Some, but not all, subsystem capabilities must be trustworthy for the subsystem to be trustworthy. These are called the “Trusted Set” (TS). Other capabilities must work properly if the subsystem is to work properly, but they do not affect the level of trust in a Subsystem. These are called the “Trusted platform Support Set” (TSS).

The Trusted Set of capabilities can be partitioned into measurement capabilities, reporting capabilities, and storage capabilities. The trusted measurement capabilities are called the

“Root of Trust for Measurement” (RTM). The trusted reporting capabilities are called the “Root of Trust for Reporting” (RTR). The trusted storage capabilities are called the “Root of Trust for Storage” (RTS). The RTM makes reliable measurements about the platform and puts the measurement results into the RTR. The RTR prevents unauthorized changes to the measurement results, and reliably reports those measurement results. The RTS provides methods to minimize the amount of trusted storage that is required. The “Root of Trust for Measurement” and the “Root of Trust for Reporting” cooperate to permit an entity to believe measurements that describe the current computing environment in the platform. An entity can assess those measurement results and compare them with values that are to be expected if the platform is operating as expected. If there is sufficient match between the measurement results and the expected values, the entity can trust computations within the platform (not just within the TS) to execute as expected.

The RTR have a cryptographic identity in order to prove to a remote entity that RTR messages come from genuine trusted capabilities, and not from bogus trusted capabilities.

The TCG subsystem is a trusted subsystem that is an integral part of a computing platform. The evaluated components that make up the TCG subsystem are called the Trusted Building Blocks (TBB). The TBB provide useful trust and security capabilities, while minimizing the number of functions that must be trusted. The TBB consists of logical components including the Trusted Platform Module (TPM), the Connection module (PCCON) and the Trusted Platform Support Services (TSS). In general the TPM contains all trusted capabilities except for the RTM, so a TPM is common to all types of trusted platforms. The TPM uses cryptographic techniques to reliably report its identity and the measurement results. Since this raises privacy issues, the Subsystem includes features that provide privacy controls to the Owner. The PCCON provides the connection to the computing platform and the Root of Management Trust (RMT). The TSS is a set of functions and data that are common to all types of platforms, which are not required to be trustworthy.

The TPM is a collection of hardware, firmware and/or software that among others support the following security features:

- Algorithms: RSA, SHA-1, SHA-256, HMAC, AES, MGF1
- Random number generation
- Key generation
- Self Tests

The TPM may be used to provide secure storage for an unlimited number of private keys or other data by using RSA key technology to encrypt data and keys. The resulting encrypted file, which contains header information in addition to the data or key, is called a blob and is output by the TPM and can be loaded in the TPM when needed. The functionality of the

TPM can also be used so that private keys generated on the TPM can be stored outside the TPM (encrypted) in a way that allows the TPM to use them later without ever exposing such keys in the clear outside the TPM.

The functionality used to provide secure storage is:

- Seal and Unseal, which perform RSA encrypt and decrypt, respectively, on data that is externally generated. The sealing operation encrypts not only the data, but also the platform configuration values that are stored in the platform configuration registers (PCRs) in the TPM and tpmProof which is a unique identifier for that TPM. To unseal the data, three conditions must exist: 1) the appropriate key must be available for unseal, 2) the TPM PCRs must contain the same values that existed at the time of the seal operation, and 3) the value of tpmProof must be the same as that encrypted during the seal operation. By requiring the PCR values to be duplicated at unseal and the tpmProof value to be checked, the seal operation allows software to explicitly state the future “trusted” configuration that the platform must be in for the decrypted key to be used and for decrypt to only occur on the specified TPM.
- Unbind, which RSA decrypts a blob created outside the TPM that has been encrypted using a public key where the associated private key is stored in the TPM.

A number of key types are defined within the TPM. Keys may be migratable or non-migratable. A migratable key is a key that may be transported outside the specific TPM. A non-migratable key is a key that cannot be transported outside a specific TPM. Key types include:

- The Storage Root key (SRK), which is the root key of a hierarchy of keys associated with a TPM; it is generated within a TPM and is a non-migratable key. Each TPM contains a SRK, generated by the TPM at the request of the Owner. Under that SRK are two trees: one dealing with migratable data and the other dealing with non-migratable data
- Signing Keys, which must be a leaf of the Storage Root Key hierarchy. The private key of the key pair is used for signing operations only.
- Storage keys, which are used for RSA encrypt and RSA decrypt of other keys in the Protected Storage hierarchy only.
- Identity Keys, which are used for operations that require a TPM identity only.
- Binding Keys, which are used for TPM\_Unbind operations only. A bind operation (performed outside the TPM) associates identification and authentication data with a particular data set and the entire data blob is encrypted outside the TPM using a binding key, which is an RSA key. The TPM\_Unbind operation uses a private key stored in the TPM to decrypt the blob so that the data (often a key pair) stored in the blob may be used.

- The Endorsement key pair, which is an asymmetric key pair inserted in a TPM that is used as proof that a TPM is a genuine TPM. This key is non-revocable and cannot be substituted by a new one<sup>1</sup>.

Each TPM is identified and validated by its Endorsement Key. A TPM has only one endorsement key pair. The Endorsement Key is transitively bound to the Platform via the TPM as follows:

- An Endorsement Key is bound to one and only one TPM (i.e., there is a one to one correspondence between an Endorsement Key and a TPM.)
- A TPM is bound to one and only one Platform, (i.e., there is a one to one correspondence between a TPM and a Platform.)
- Therefore, an Endorsement Key is bound to a Platform, (i.e., there is a one to one correspondence between an Endorsement Key and a Platform.)

TPM algorithms, protocols, identification and authentication, and access control functions are described in the subsections below.

### 2.1.1 Algorithms

The TPM supports the RSA algorithm and must use the RSA algorithm for encryption and digital signatures. The TPM supports RSA key sizes of 512, 1024, and 2048 bits. The RSA public exponent must be  $e$ , where  $e = 2^{16} + 1$ . All TPM Storage keys are of strength equivalent to a 2048bit RSA key. The TPM does not load a Storage key whose strength is less than that of a 2048bit RSA key. All TPM identity keys are of strength equivalent to a 2048bit RSA key or greater.

The TPM supports the Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA-1) hash algorithm as defined by United States Federal Information Processing Standard 180-1. The output of SHA-1 is 160 bits and all areas that expect a hash value are required to support the full 160 bits. A SHA-1 digest is used in the early stages of a boot process, before more sophisticated computing resources are available. Secure Hash is also used in the process of preparing data for signature or signature verification.

The TPM also supports symmetric 128-bit AES algorithm and MGF1 algorithm.

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<sup>1</sup> The TOE does not implement the optional function „revoke of trust“ documented in the claimed PP (see [PP], §8).

### **2.1.2 Random Number Generator (RNG)**

The RNG capability is only accessible to valid TPM commands. Intermediate results from the RNG are not available to any user. When the data is for internal use by the TPM (e.g., asymmetric key generation) the data is held in a shielded location and is not accessible to any user.

### **2.1.3 Key Generation**

The TPM generates asymmetric key pairs. The generate function is a protected capability and the private key is held in a shielded location.

The TPM generates the HMAC key by taking the next  $n$  bits from the TPM RNG.

The creation of all nonce values uses the next  $n$  bits from the TPM RNG.

### **2.1.4 Self Tests**

The TPM provides start-up self tests and a mechanism to allow the self tests to be run on demand. The response from the self tests is either pass or fail. Self tests include checks of the following:

- RNG functionality, as defined by [FIPS140-2] and [SP800-90A].
- Integrity of the protected capabilities of the TPM. This consists of checks that ensure that the TPM FW has not changed.
- Cryptographic services – the SHA-1, SHA-256, HMAC, AES and RSA modules are checked by performing the corresponding action on a known value and comparing the result to the known/expected result.

On failure of any of the above specified test the TPM enters Failure Mode.

### **2.1.5 Identification and Authentication**

The TPM identification and authentication capability is used to authenticate an entity owner and to authorize use of an entity. The basic premise is to prove knowledge of a shared secret. This shared secret is the identification and authentication data. The TCG Specification calls the identification and authentication process and this data authorization.

The identification and authentication data for the TPM Owner and the owner of the Storage Root Key are held within the TPM itself. The identification and authentication data for other owners of entities are held and protected with the entity.

### 2.1.6 Access Control

Access control is enforced in the TPM on all data and operations performed on that data. The TPM provides access control by denying access to some data and operations and allowing access to other data and operations based on the authorization and policy-related attributes of the data.

Access control is detailed in [TCG-1] Clause 13 “Transport Sessions and Authorization Protocols”.

## 2.2 Security Attributes and Data

All data, including user key pairs, user data, and TSF data, have associated security attributes, stored as flags in the TPM or associated with the data in an encrypted blob. The following security attributes are defined:

- Migration attribute, which determines if the data (or key pair) can migrate from one TPM to another. This security attribute is stored in TCG\_KEY\_FLAGS.
- TCG\_AUTHDATA\_USAGE flag is used to define whether the data can be access only by the owner or by the world.
- Attribute key type, stored in TCG\_KEY\_USAGE, which indicates if the data is a key or key pair and the type of key (e.g., storage, binding, etc., as defined in Section 2.1, above).
- Volatility attribute, which defines whether the data must be stored in volatile or non-volatile storage and if it is cleared at TPM start-up. This security attribute is stored in TCG\_KEY\_FLAGS.

Within the TPM, for the purposes of Common Criteria evaluation, TSF data is defined as:

- The Endorsement Key Pair,
- The Storage Root Key (SRK),
- TPMProof, i.e., the random number (nonce) that each TPM maintains to validate that the data originated at this TPM,
- PCR values,
- TPM owner identification and authentication data,
- Entity owner identification and authentication data,
- Migration authorization data, which is used in creating migratable key blobs,
- Security attributes as defined above.

User data is defined as all user keys and other data that may be passed to the TPM for signature, decryption, etc.

## 2.3 TOE Overview

The Target of Evaluation (TOE), the TPM1.2 with HW LAG019 and FW 7.4.0.0, is a Trusted Platform Module, which provides TCG-compliant security functionality.

This section describes the TOE and provides further info on top of Section 1.2.

The TPM1.2 device, developed by Nuvoton Technology Corporation, includes an embedded RISC core for hidden execution of security code, flash memory-based secured information storage, performance accelerators that support the cryptographic algorithms SHA-1, SHA-256, RSA and AES engines and a true Random Number Generator. In addition, the TPM1.2 integrates a variety of system functions, enabling efficient implementation of a highly secure trustworthy system.

The TPM1.2 device provides target platforms with:

- System integrity checks: Enables checking of the TOE integrity.
- Authentication: Provides assurance that the source of the data is valid and as expected.
- Data integrity checks: Provides assurance that received data is exactly as sent.
- Secure storage: supplies shielded location and protected storage mechanism to protect sensitive and confidential data, such as credit card numbers, passwords and keys.

The TOE TPM module includes the TPM hardware and the embedded firmware. The host software needed to build a TCG system is not a part of the TOE. The hardware part of the TOE (see Figure 1) representing the physical scope of the TOE is comprised of:

- Processing Unit Module
- On-Chip Clock Generator
- Secured Time Counter
- RSA Accelerator Module
- SHA-1/SHA-256 Accelerator Module
- CIPHER (AES) Accelerator Module
- The RNG Module (Random Number Generator)
- The GPIO Ports Module (General-Purpose Input/Output).
- SPI interface with the following features
  - Up to 64-byte data transfer size
  - Maximum frequency of 54 MHz
  - Five localities
  - Host interface voltage level options: 1.8 Volts, 3.3 Volts.




Figure 1 – TPM1.2 Block Diagram



The **firmware part of the TOE** provides an API set that matches the TCG specification [TCG-x], at which the API represents the logical scope of the TOE. TCG capabilities that must be trustworthy can be accessed only through the authentication mechanism or by supplying physical presence proof.

In addition to the TCG mandatory functions, the firmware implements NTC proprietary commands and additional non-TPM related functionality.

The TPM1.2 can be used in a wide field of applications, e.g. in a remote access network to authenticate platforms to a server and vice versa. Concerning e-commerce transactions, contracts can be signed with digital signatures using the TPM1.2 asymmetric encryption functionality. Regarding a network scenario, the client PCs equipped with a TPM1.2 are able to report their platform status to the server so that the network administration is aware of their trustworthiness. In conclusion, the TPM1.2 acting as a service provider to a system helps to make transactions more secure and trustworthy.

**Hardware interface:** The physical interface as well as the electrical interface of the TOE is comprised of the pins of the device. The electrical interface of the TOE to the external environment is comprised by the active pins of the device. Some of the pins are configurable; the life cycle of the TOE details the phases when configuration is possible. The device pins, include power and ground, SPI interface, a Physical Presence pin and general purpose I/Os. TPM commands and response may be transferred between the TPM and the host via SPI.

**Software interface:** The interface to the firmware is constituted by the communication buffer. The host sends an input message block (command for execution) to the TOE; the TOE processes the message block, executes the command and sends a reply (status and return values).

In the communication process, there are two sides involved: The device side (the TPM) and the host side. The host side refers globally to any process in the host computer that communicates with the TPM (e.g. the BIOS or the OS resident drivers).

**Guidance documentation:** The guidance documentation consists of:

- The device datasheet [Datasheet], which details the specific vendor software commands and the drivers protocols,
- The TOE's programmer's guide [PRG] and security guidance [AGD] documents used during this evaluation, which detail all aspects of the TOE that are relevant for its user and administrator,
- The TOE's errata [ERT],
- The TCG main specification [TCG-x], which details all the standard TCG commands and the protocols for device initialisation, starting from endorsement key-pair generation.

**TOE life cycle description:** The life cycle of the TOE includes several processes and conforms to the 7 phases specified in [PP]:

1. TPM development
2. TPM manufacturing
3. Platform manufacturing and delivery
4. Platform deployment phase
5. Platform identity registration
6. Platform operation
7. Platform recycling and retirement

**Sites of the Development Environment:**

<b>Design Center</b>	
Design Center 1: Nuvoton Technology Israel Ltd.	Israel
Design Center 2: Nuvoton Technology Israel Ltd	Israel
<b>Mask Fab</b>	
TSMC Fab 14A	Taiwan, R.O.C.
<b>Wafer Fab</b>	
TSMC Fab 14A (mask and wafer manufacturing)	Taiwan, R.O.C.
TSMC Fab 8 (data center)	Taiwan, R.O.C.
TSMC Fab 3 (eFlash IP merge)	Taiwan, R.O.C.
TSMC Fab 2 and 5 (mask data preparation)	Taiwan, R.O.C.
<b>Assembly Plants</b>	
ASE Group Chung-Li	Taiwan, R.O.C
UTL (UTAC Thailand 1 / QFN)	Thailand
UTL (UTAC Thailand 2 / TSSOP)	Thailand
<b>Wafer Test &amp; Final Test Plants</b>	
Nuvoton Technology Corporation	Taiwan, R.O.C.
ASE Group Chung-Li	Taiwan, R.O.C

Information on TOE delivery to customer:

<b>TOE Part</b>	<b>Sent from Nuvoton Technology Corp.?</b>	<b>Deliverable Format</b>	<b>Delivery Method</b>
TPM chip	Yes	Packaged IC (final product) – tested and locked chip	Courier
Guidance documents: [Datasheet], [PRG], [AGD] and [ERT]	Yes	PDF document	email
TCG main specification [TCG-x]	No. publicly available for download from the TCG website	PDF or DOC document	Download from web
Field Upgrade package	Yes	Zip file with the encrypted field upgrade payload	email

## **3 Conformance Claims**

### **3.1 CC Conformance Claim**

This Security Target is conformant with the Common Criteria version 3.1 Revision 5, Part 2 extended.

This Security Target is conformant with the Common Criteria version 3.1 Revision 5, Part 3.

### **3.2 PP Claim**

This Security Target is in strict conformance to the TCG PC client specific TPM family 1.2 Level 2 revision 116 Protection Profile [PP].

There is an additional OSP dealing with the TOE firmware field upgrade capability. This OSP implies an additional TOE objective and an additional TOE environment objective. The relevant PP SFRs are updated for the firmware upgrade capability.

The Protection Profile is registered and certified by the BSI under the reference BSI-CC-PP-0030-2008-MA-02 dated December 18, 2014.

### **3.3 Package Claim**

This Security Target is conformant to the assurance package defined in the claimed Protection Profile: EAL4 augmented with ALC\_FLR.1, AVA\_VAN.4 and ALC\_DVS.2

### **3.4 Conformance Claim Rationale**

This Security Target claims strict conformance only to one PP ([PP]).

The TOE is a complete solution implementing the TCG Trusted Platform Module specification version 1.2 as defined in the PP ([TCG-x]), so the TOE is consistent with the TOE type defined in the claimed PP.

The security problem definition is consistent with the statement of the security problem definition of the PP (an organisational security policy has been added for the TOE firmware field upgrade capability).

The security objectives are consistent with the statement of the security objectives of the PP (a TOE objective and a TOE environment objective have been added).

The security requirements are consistent with the statement of the security requirements of the PP (two SFRs are added for the firmware field upgrade security features). All assignments and selections of the PP SFRs are reproduced in this Security Target.

## 4 TOE Security Problem Definition

The content of the PP ([PP], chapter 4) applies to this chapter completely (no other assumptions, threats and organisational security policies are added) with the addition of Section 4.1 which describes the TOE assets. It is reproduced here to ease the independent reader’s understanding.

### 4.1 Assets

The assets of the TOE are:

- TOE Hardware and Firmware
- TSF data
- User data

### 4.2 Threats to Security

Threats to the TOE are defined in Table 4.1, below.

**Table 4.1 – Threats**

#	Threat	Description
1	T.Compromise	An undetected compromise of the data in shielded locations may occur as a result of an attacker (whether an insider or outsider) attempting to perform actions that the individual or capability is not authorized to perform.
2	T.Bypass	An unauthorized individual or user may tamper with TSF, security attributes or other data in order to bypass TOE security functions and gain unauthorized access to TOE assets.
3	T.Export	A user or an attacker may export data from shielded locations without security attributes or with insecure security attributes, causing the data exported to be erroneous and unusable, to allow erroneous data to be added or substituted for the original data, and/or to reveal secrets.
4	T.Hack_Crypto	Cryptographic key generation or operation may be incorrectly implemented, allowing an unauthorized individual or user to compromise keys generated within the TPM or encrypted data or to modify data undetected.
5	T.Hack_Physical	An unauthorised individual or user of the TOE may cause unauthorised disclosure or modification of TOE assets by physically interacting with the TOE The attacker may be a hostile user of the TOE.
6	T.Imperson	An unauthorized individual may impersonate an authorized user of the TOE (e.g. by dictionary attacks to guess the authorization data) and thereby gain access to TOE data in shielded location and protected capabilities.

#	Threat	Description
7	T.Import	A user or attacker may import data without security attributes or with erroneous security attributes, causing key ownership and authorization to be uncertain or erroneous and the system to malfunction or operate in an unsecure manner.
8	T.Insecure_State	The TOE may start up in an insecure state or enter an insecure state, allowing an attacker to obtain sensitive data or compromise the system.
9	T.Intercept	An attacker may intercept the communication between a user and the TPM subjects to gain knowledge of the commands and data sent to the subject or manipulate the communication.
10	T.Malfunction	TOE assets may be modified or disclosed to an unauthorised individual or user of the TOE, through malfunction of the TOE.
11	T.Modify	An attacker may modify data in shielded locations or their security attributes in order to gain access to the TOE and its assets.
12	T.Object_Attr_Change	A user or attacker may create an object with no security attributes or make unauthorized changes to security attribute values for an object to enable attacks.
13	T.Replay	An unauthorized individual may gain access to the system and sensitive data through a “replay” or “man-in-the-middle” attack that allows the individual to capture identification and authentication data.
14	T.Repudiate_Transact	An originator of data may deny originating the data to avoid accountability.
15	T.Residual_Info	A user may obtain information that the user is not authorized to have when the data in shielded locations is no longer actively managed by the TOE (“data scavenging”).

### 4.3 Organizational Security Policies

OSPs are defined in Table 4.2, below.

**Table 4.2 – Organizational Security Policies**

#	OSP	Description
1	OSP.Anonymity	Authorized users shall be able to hide temporarily the TPM attestation identity.
2	OSP.Context_Management	A resource manager shall be able to secure caching of resources without knowledge or assistance from the application that loaded the resource.
3	OSP.Delegation	The TPM supports multiple trusted processes obeying the principle of least privilege by means of role-based administration and separation of duty by allowing delegation of individual TPM Owner privileges to individual entities, which may be trusted processes.

#	OSP	Description
4	OSP.Locality	The TCG platform supports multiple transitive trust chains by means of a mechanism known as locality. The Host Platform's trusted processes assert their locality to the TPM. The TPM guards access to resources, PCRs and NV Storage Space, to keys and data to be imported, and to defined commands depending on the execution environment's privilege level.
5	OSP.RT_Measurement	The root of trust for measurement calculates and stores the measurement digests as hash values of a representation of embedded data or program code (measured values) for reporting.
6	OSP.RT_Reporting	The root of trust for reporting attests the authenticity of measurement digests based on trusted platform identities by means of digital signatures with the certified AIK.
7	OSP.RT_Storage	The root of trust for storage protects the keys and data entrusted to the TPM in confidentiality and integrity.
8	OSP.Anonymous_Attestation	The DAA issuer and the TPM owner establish a procedure for attestation without revealing the attestation information (i.e. the identity of the TPM).
9	OSP.FieldUpgrade	The Platform software is allowed to perform Field Upgrade within the certified TPM or installing a new certified TPM before and after delivery to the end user. The end user shall be aware of the certification and the version of the TPM.

#### 4.4 Secure Usage Assumptions

TOE secure usage assumptions are defined in Table 4.3, below.

**Table 4.3 – Secure Usage Assumptions**

#	Assumption	Description
1	A.Configuration	The TOE will be properly installed and configured.
2	A.Physical_Presence	The Host Platform's trusted processes assert physical presence of local operator to the TPM.



## 5 Security Objectives

Table 5.1 lists security objectives TOE. It is derived from the PP ([PP], Table 5) with one additional security objective related to Field Upgrade.

### 5.1 Security Objectives for the TOE

TOE security objectives are defined in Table 5.1, below.

**Table 5.1 – Security Objectives for the TOE**

#	Objective	Description
1	O.Anonymity	The TOE must allow the user authenticated by operatorAuth and the user “World” under physical presence temporarily to deactivate the TPM and hence hide the TPM attestation identity during a user session.
2	O.Context_Management	The TOE must ensure a secure wrapping of a resource (except EK and SRK) in a manner that securely protects the confidentiality and the integrity of the data of this resource and allows the restoring of the resource on the same TPM and during the same operational cycle only.
3	O.Crypto_Key_Man	The TOE must manage cryptographic keys in a secure manner including generation of cryptographic keys using the TOE random number generator as source of randomness.
4	O.DAC	The TOE must control and restrict user access to the TOE protected capabilities and shielded location in accordance with a specified access control policy where the object owner manages the access rights for their data objects using the principle of least privilege.
5	O.Export	When data are exported outside the TPM, the TOE must securely protect the confidentiality and the integrity of the data as defined for the protected capability. The TOE shall ensure that the data security attributes being exported are unambiguously associated with the data.
6	O.Fail_Secure	The TOE must enter a secure failure mode in the event of a failure.
7	O.General_Integ_Checks	The TOE must provide checks on system integrity and user data integrity.
8	O.I&A	The TOE must identify all users, and shall authenticate the claimed identify except the user “World” before granting a user access to the TOE facilities.
9	O.Import	When data are being imported into the TOE, the TOE must ensure that the data security attributes are being imported with the data and the data is from authorized source. In addition, the TOE shall verify those security attributes according to the TSF access control rules. TOE supports the protection of confidentiality and the verification of the integrity of imported data (except the verification of the integrity of the data within a sealed data blob).

#	Objective	Description
10	O.Limit_Actions_Auth	The TOE must restrict the actions a user may perform before the TOE verifies the identity of the user. This includes requirements for physical presence of the user.
11	O.Locality	The TOE must control access to objects based on the locality of the process communicating with the TPM.
12	O.Record_Measurement	The TOE must support calculating hash values and recording the result of a measurement.
13	O.MessageNR	The TOE must provide user data integrity, source authentication, and the basis for source non-repudiation when exchanging data with a remote system.
14	O.No_Residual_Info	The TOE must ensure there is no "object reuse," i.e. there is no residual information in information containers or system resources upon their reallocation to different users.
15	O.Reporting	The TOE must report measurement digests and attestations to the authenticity of measurement digests.
16	O.Security_Attr_Mgt	The TOE must allow only authorized users to initialize and change object security attributes of objects and subjects. The management of security attributes shall support the principle of least privilege by means of role based administration and separation of duty.
17	O.Security_Roles	The TOE must maintain security-relevant roles and association of users with those roles.
18	O.Self_Test	The TOE must provide the ability to test itself, verify the integrity of the shielded data objects and the protected capabilities operate as designed and enter a secure state in case of detected errors.
19	O.Single_Auth	The TOE must provide a single use authentication mechanism and require re-authentication to prevent "replay" and "man-in-the-middle" attacks.
20	O.Transport_Protection	The TOE must provide the confidentiality of the payload of the commands within a transport session and the integrity of the transport log of commands.
21	O.DAA	The TPM must support the TPM owner for attestation to the authenticity of measurement digests without revealing the attestation information by implementation of the TPM part of the Direct Anonymous Attestation Protocol.
22	O.Tamper_Resistance	The TOE must resist physical tampering of the TSF by hostile users.

#	Objective	Description
23	O.FieldUpgradeControl	<p>The TOE provides a field upgrade capability with the following security features:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Control of authenticity and integrity of the loaded firmware</li> <li>• If the field upgrade process succeeds, then the resulting product is the Final TOE; otherwise (in case of interruption or incident which prevents the forming of the Final TOE), the Initial TOE remains in its initial state or fail secure</li> <li>• Control of the loaded version (no possibility of loading an uncertified firmware version)</li> <li>• Identification of the final TOE (allowing identification of the Initial TOE and of the loaded firmware)</li> </ul>

## 5.2 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment

Table 5.2 lists security objectives for the operational environment. It is derived from the PP ([PP], Table 6) with one additional security objective related to Field Upgrade.

**Table 5.2 – Security Objectives for the Environment**

#	Objective Name	Objective Description
1	OE.Configuration	The TOE must be installed and configured properly for starting up the TOE in a secure state. The security attributes of subjects and objects shall be managed securely by the authorized user.
2	OE.Locality	The developer of the host platform must ensure that trusted processes indicate their correct locality to the TPM and untrusted processes are able to assert just the locality 0 or Legacy only to the TPM.
3	OE.Physical_Presence	The developer of the host platform must ensure that physical presence indicated to the TOE implies interaction by an operator and is difficult or impossible to spoof by rogue software or remote attackers.
4	OE.Int_Prot_Sealed_Blob	The IT environment must protect the integrity of sealed data blobs.
5	OE.Credential	The IT environment must create EK and AIK credentials by trustworthy procedures for the root of trust for reporting.
6	OE.Measurement	The platform part of the root of trust for measurement provides a representation of embedded data or program code (measured values) to the TPM for measurement.
7	OE.DAA	The DAA issuer must support a procedure for attestation without revealing the attestation information based on the Direct Anonymous Attestation Protocol.
8	OE.FieldUpgradeInfo	The end user shall be aware of the Field Upgrade process, its result and the version of the certified TPM.

## 6 Security Requirements

This section defines the TOE security functional requirements and assurance requirements. All Security Functional Requirements (but FCS\_RNG.1) are from the CC Part 2. “FCS\_RNG.1” is the only extended component; it is fully described in [PP] §3 (and it is not reproduced here).

Selections, assignments, and refinements performed in the [PP] are indicated by *italics*. Unperformed operations from the [PP] (selections, assignments) and additional refinements and iterations which are performed within this ST are indicated by ***bold italics***.

All iterations from the PP are kept in the following text. The many application notes from the PP are not reproduced.

The Subjects, Objects, Operations, User roles used in the Security Functional Requirements are all defined in the [PP] §1.3.4 (and it is not reproduced here).

All Assurance Requirements are from the CC Part 3.

### 6.1 Security Functional Requirements for the TOE

This section states the TOE security functional requirements. The full text of the security functional requirements is contained below (the Application Notes from the PP have not been reproduced).

#### 6.1.1 General SFR

##### Security Management

##### FMT\_SMR.1 Security roles

Hierarchical to:	No other components.
Dependencies:	FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
FMT_SMR.1.1	The TSF shall maintain the roles 1) <i>TPM owner</i> , 2) <i>Entity owner</i> , 3) <i>Delegated entity</i> , 4) <i>Entity user</i> , 5) <i>User using operatorAuth</i> , 6) <i>“World”</i> .
FMT_SMR.1.2	The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.

### FMT\_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions

- Hierarchical to: No other components.
- Dependencies: No dependencies.
- FMT\_SMF.1.1 The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions:
- 1) *Management of the TPM modes of operation,*
  - 2) *Management of Delegation Tables and Family Tables,*
  - 3) *Management of security attributes of keys,*
  - 4) *Management of security attributes of PCR,*
  - 5) *Management of security attributes of NV storage areas,*
  - 6) *Management of security attributes of monotonic counters,*
  - 7) *Reset the Action Flag of TPM dictionary attack mitigation mechanism,*
  - 8) **None.**

### FMT\_MSA.2 Secure security attributes

- Hierarchical to: No other components.
- Dependencies: [FDP\_ACC.1 Subset access control, or FDP\_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
- FMT\_MSA.1 Management of security attributes
- FMT\_SMR.1 Security roles
- FMT\_MSA.2.1 The TSF shall ensure that only secure values are accepted for ***security attributes of keys, PCR, NV storage areas and monotonic counters and TPM\_FieldUpgrade command security attributes related.***

### FPT\_TDC.1 Inter-TSF basic TSF data consistency

- Hierarchical to: No other components.
- Dependencies: No dependencies.
- FPT\_TDC.1.1 The TSF shall provide the capability to consistently interpret ***digest of migrated Key, migratable Key Flag, payload field of migrated key, MSA ticket*** when shared between the TSF and another trusted IT product.
- FPT\_TDC.1.2 The TSF shall *use roles defined in [TCG-2] and [TCG-3]* when interpreting the TSF data from another trusted IT product.

## 6.1.2 Cryptographic Support

### FCS\_CKM.1/RSA Cryptographic key generation

- Hierarchical to: No other components.
- Dependencies: [FCS\_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution, or FCS\_COP.1 Cryptographic operation]  
FCS\_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
- FCS\_CKM.1.1/RSA The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm *RSA key generator* and specified cryptographic key sizes *RSA 512, 1024, 2048* that meet the following: *P1363 [P1363]*.

### FCS\_CKM.1/AES Cryptographic key generation

- Hierarchical to: No other components.
- Dependencies: [FCS\_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution, or FCS\_COP.1 Cryptographic operation]  
FCS\_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
- FCS\_CKM.1.1/AES The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm *AES key generator* and specified cryptographic key sizes *128 bits* that meet the following: *none*

***Application note: all 128-bit AES keys are generated by the internal TPM random number generator.***

### FCS\_RNG.1 Random number generation

- Hierarchical to: No other components.
- Dependencies: No dependencies.
- FCS\_RNG.1.1 The TSF shall provide a *hybrid* random number generator that implements: *an entropy source based on a hardware RNG. The hardware RNG output bits are used as input of a FIPS approved DRNG algorithm (NIST SP 800-90A) that relies on an implementation of the SHA-256 algorithm at the firmware level.*
- FCS\_RNG.1.2 The TSF shall provide random numbers that meet: *Statistical test NIST SP 800-90B Entropy Estimation Suite cannot practically distinguish the random numbers from output sequences of an ideal RNG.*

**FCS\_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction**

- Hierarchical to: No other components.
- Dependencies: [FDP\_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or FDP\_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or FCS\_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
- FCS\_CKM.4.1 The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key destruction method **zeroisation** that meets the following: **FIPS 140-2, Section 4.7.6**

**FCS\_COP.1**

- Hierarchical to: No other components.
- Dependencies: [FDP\_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or FDP\_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or FCS\_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]  
FCS\_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
- FCS\_COP.1.1 The TSF shall perform *the cryptographic operations identified in the table below* in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm *identified in the table below* and cryptographic keys of size *identified in the table below* that meet the following standards *(see table below)*.

SFR:	Operation:	Algorithm:	Key size (bits):	Standards:
FCS_COP.1/SHA	Hash calculation	SHA-1	Not applicable	FIPS180-2
FCS_COP.1/HMAC	HMAC calculation and verification	HMAC SHA-1	160	RFC2104, FIPS180-2
FCS_COP.1/RSA_Sig	Signature generation and verification	RSA signature [TCG-1] 31.2.1, 31.2.2 and 31.2.3	512, 1024, 2048	PKCS#1 V2.0 FIPS180-2
FCS_COP.1/RSA_Enc	Encryption and decryption	RSA encryption [TCG-1] 31.1.1	512, 1024, 2048	PKCS#1 V2.0
FCS_COP.1/MGF	Symmetric encryption and decryption	TPM_ALG_MGF1	(variable)	PKCS#1 V2.0

<b>SFR:</b>	<b>Operation:</b>	<b>Algorithm:</b>	<b>Key size (bits):</b>	<b>Standards:</b>
FCS_COP.1/AES	<i>Symmetric encryption and decryption</i>	<i>AES mode CTR</i>	<i>128</i>	<i>FIPS 197</i>

### 6.1.3 TPM Operational Modes

#### FDP\_ACC.1/Modes Subset access control

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: FDP\_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control

FDP\_ACC.1.1/Modes The TSF shall enforce the *TPM Mode Control SFP* on *all subjects, all objects and all commands*.

#### FDP\_ACF.1/Modes Security attribute based access control

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: FDP\_ACC.1 Subset access control

FMT\_MSA.3 Static attribute initialization

FDP\_ACF.1.1/Modes The TSF shall enforce the *TPM Mode Control SFP* to objects based on the following: *all subjects and all objects, flags disable, deactivated, owner and ownership*.

FDP\_ACF.1.2/Modes The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed:

- 1) *The TPM shall prevent the execution of a command if the TPM is disabled and the command to be executed for the operation is not available according to table 9.1, column Avail Disabled,*
- 2) *The TPM shall prevent the execution of a command if the TPM is permanently or temporarily inactive and the command to be executed for the operation is not available according to table 9.1, column Avail Deactivated,*
- 3) *The TPM shall prevent the execution of a command if the TPM is unowned and the command to be executed for the operation is not allowed according to table 9.1, column No Owner.*
- 4) ***The TPM will prevent use of firmware update data when authenticity of these data is not successfully verified.***



FDP\_ACF.1.3/Modes The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules:

- 1) *The command marked with “A” in table 9.1, column Avail Disabled is allowed to be executed if the TPM is disabled and the underlying NV storage does not require authorization*
- 2) *The command to be executed for the operation is marked with “A” in table 9.1, column Avail Deactivated, is allowed to be executed if the TPM is permanently or temporarily inactive and the underlying NV storage does not require authorization.*

FDP\_ACF.1.4/Modes The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules: *none*.

**FDP\_UIT.1/Firmware Data exchange integrity**

Hierarchical to: No other components.  
Dependencies: [FDP\_ACC.1 Subset access control, or  
FDP\_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]  
[FTP\_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel, or  
FTP\_TRP.1 Trusted path]

FDP\_UIT.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the TPM Mode Control SFP to receive user data in a manner protected from modification errors.

FDP\_UIT.1.2 The TSF shall be able to determine on receipt of user data, whether modification has occurred.

Note: this SFR is not part of the claimed PP. It has been added to cover the TOE firmware upgrade capability (source: TPM2.0 draft PP, where “firmware update data” are considered as “user data”).

**FDP\_UCT.1/Firmware Data exchange confidentiality**

Hierarchical to: No other components.  
Dependencies: [FDP\_ACC.1 Subset access control, or  
FDP\_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]  
[FTP\_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel, or  
FTP\_TRP.1 Trusted path]

FDP\_UCT.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the TPM Mode Control SFP to receive user data in a manner protected from unauthorised disclosure.

Note: this SFR is not part of the claimed PP. It has been added to cover the TOE firmware upgrade capability (source: TPM2.0 draft PP, where “firmware update data” are considered as “user data”).

**FMT\_MSA.1/Modes Management of security attributes**

- Hierarchical to: No other components.
- Dependencies: [FDP\_ACC.1 Subset access control, or FDP\_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]  
FMT\_SMR.1 Security roles  
FMT\_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions

FMT\_MSA.1.1/Modes The TSF shall enforce the *TPM Mode Control SFP* to restrict the ability to *modify* the security attributes *TPM operational mode flags disable, deactivated and ownership to TPM owner, role using operatorAuth and user "World" under physical presence based on the rules:*

- 1) *the TPM is disabled, inactive and unowned when created,*
- 2) *the TPM owner is allowed to set the TPM operational modes to disabled, inactive and unowned,*
- 3) *the TPM owner is allowed to set the TPM operational modes to enabled and disabled,*
- 4) *a user "World" is allowed to own an enabled and unowned TPM if the flag ownership is TRUE,*
- 5) *a user "World" under physical presence is allowed to set the TPM operational modes to disabled, inactive and unowned at once,*
- 6) *a user "World" under physical presence is allowed to set permanently an enabled TPM to active and inactive,*
- 7) *the user "World" under physical presence is allowed to deactivate temporarily an enabled and active TPM,*
- 8) *the user authenticated by operatorAuth is allowed to deactivate temporarily an enabled and active TPM,*
- 9) *a user "World" under physical presence is allowed to set the TPM operational modes to enabled and to disabled,*
- 10) *a user is not allowed to own a disabled or owned TPM,*
- 11) *a user is not allowed to activate or deactivate a disabled TPM without setting unowned at the same time.*
- 12) *a user "World" under physical presence is allowed to set the flag ownership to TRUE,*
- 13) *the TPM owner is allowed to modify the flag ownership.*

**FMT\_MSA.1/PhysP Management of security attributes**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: [FDP\_ACC.1 Subset access control, or FDP\_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]

FMT\_SMR.1 Security roles

FMT\_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions

FMT\_MSA.1.1/PhysP The TSF shall enforce the *TPM Mode Control SFP, Delegation SFP, Key Management SFP, NVS SFP* to restrict the ability to set to the default value, assert by HW, assert by command, enable HW setting, disable HW setting, enable SW setting, disable SW setting, locking temporarily, locking permanently the security attributes *physical presence* to user "World" based on the additional rules:

- 1) If *TPM\_STCLEAR\_FLAGS* ->*physicalPresenceLock* is *TRUE* then assertion by command locking temporarily is not allowed.
- 2) If *TPM\_PERMANENT\_FLAGS* ->*physicalPresenceHWEEnable* is *FALSE* then assertion by hardware is not allowed.
- 3) If *TPM\_PERMANENT\_FLAGS* ->*physicalPresenceCMDEnable* is *FALSE* then assertion by command and locking temporarily are not allowed.
- 4) If *TPM\_PERMANENT\_FLAGS* ->*physicalPresenceLifetimeLock* is *TRUE* then modifications to the states of flags that enable HW setting, disable HW setting, enable SW setting, disable SW setting, and locking permanently are not allowed.

## 6.1.4 Identification, Authentication and Binding

### FMT\_MTD.1/AuthData Management of TSF data

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: FMT\_SMR.1 Security roles

FMT\_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions

FMT\_MTD.1.1/AuthData The TSF shall restrict the ability to *modify and create* the *authentication data* to *TPM Owner, user under physical presence and Entity Owner* based on the rules:

- 1) *The registering user creates the authentication data for the role TPM Owner by successful execution of the command TPM\_TakeOwnership.*
- 2) *The registering user under physical presence creates the authentication data operatorAuth by successful execution of the command TPM\_SetOperatorAuth.*
- 3) *The Entity Owner creates the authentication data for a new object by creating this object within an ADIP session.*
- 4) *The TPM owner modifies the authentication data for the role TPM Owner and for the object Storage Root Key by successful execution of the command TPM\_ChangeAuthOwner.*
- 5) *The user under physical presence modifies the authentication data operatorAuth by successful execution of the command TPM\_SetOperatorAuth.*
- 6) *The Entity Owner modifies the authentication data for the owned object by successful execution of the command TPM\_ChangeAuth.*
- 7) *The Entity Owner modifies the authentication data for the owned object by successful execution of the commands TPM\_ChangeAuthAsymStart and TPM\_ChangeAuthAsymFinish.*

### FMT\_MTD.1/Deleg Management of TSF data

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: FMT\_SMR.1 Security roles

FMT\_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions

FMT\_MTD.1.1/Deleg The TSF shall restrict the ability to *modify and create* the *authentication data of a delegation blob* to *TPM Owner and authorized users* based on the rules:

- 1) *If TPM owner creates authentication data for a delegation blob by means of the command TPM\_Delegate\_CreateOwnerDelegation then the delegated access rights are equal to the permissions defined by publicInfo.*
- 2) *If the authorization of the command TPM\_Delegate\_CreateOwner-Delegation is a delegation of an*

*enabled delegation family with valid verificationCount, the publicInfo identifies a delegation row of this family, and the access rights bits set in the publicInfo are a subset of the access rights bits set in this identified delegation table row then the delegated access rights are equal to the publicInfo.*

### **FIA\_UID.1 Timing of identification**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: No dependencies.

FIA\_UID.1.1 The TSF shall allow

- 1) *to execute commands indicated in table 9.1 column RQU as not requesting authentication,*
- 2) *accessing objects where entity owner has given the user "World" access based on the value of TPM\_AUTH\_DATA\_USAGE,*
- 3) **None.**

on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is identified.

FIA\_UID.1.2 The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.

### **FIA\_UAU.1 Timing of authentication**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: FIA\_UID.1 Timing of identification

FIA\_UAU.1.1 The TSF shall allow

- 1) *to execute commands indicated in table 9.1 column RQU as not requesting authentication,*
- 2) *accessing objects where entity owner has given the user "World" access based on the value of TPM\_AUTH\_DATA\_USAGE,*
- 3) **None.**

on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is authenticated.

FIA\_UAU.1.2 The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.

#### FIA\_UAU.4 Single-use authentication

- Hierarchical to: No other components.
- Dependencies: No dependencies.
- FIA\_UAU.4.1 The TSF shall prevent reuse of authentication data related to
- 1) *OIAP authorization session,*
  - 2) *OSAP authorization session,*
  - 3) *DSAP authorization session,*
  - 4) *Transport session.*

#### FIA\_UAU.5 Multiple authentication mechanisms

- Hierarchical to: No other components.
- Dependencies: No dependencies.
- FIA\_UAU.5.1 The TSF shall provide
- 1) *OIAP authorization session,*
  - 2) *OSAP authorization session,*
  - 3) *DSAP authorization session,*
  - 4) *Transport session,*
  - 5) *Commands which require authorization and are executed outside an authorization session.*
- to support user authentication.
- FIA\_UAU.5.2 The TSF shall authenticate any user's claimed identity according to the ***rule "Dictionary attack": to detect and mitigate dictionary attacks, any wrong authorization increments a number of failures counter and switches the TPM in a lockout state for a period function of this counter. The lockout period grows exponentially with the number of authorization failure. The number of failures counter can be reset by the TPM owner via a specific command (TMP\_ResetLockValue) or the elapsing of 24 hours. While in a lockout state, only a restricted set of commands are allowed, any other ones provoking an exception failure (at the exception of an unsuccessful TPM\_ResetLockValue command that will provoke the restart of an incremented lockout period). The counter is common for all authentication attempts independently to the aimed entity.***

#### FIA\_UAU.6 Re-authenticating

- Hierarchical to: No other components.
- Dependencies: No dependencies.
- FIA\_UAU.6.1 The TSF shall re-authenticate the user under the condition *the user sent a command that requires authentication within a session.*

### FIA\_AFL.1 Authentication failure handling

- Hierarchical to: No other components.
- Dependencies: FIA\_UAU.1 Timing of authentication
- FIA\_AFL.1.1 The TSF shall detect when **1** unsuccessful authentication attempts occur related to *authentication attempts for the same user*.
- FIA\_AFL.1.2 When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has been **met**, the TSF shall
- 1) *Set the Action Flag to TRUE,*
  - 2) ***Increment a number of failure counter and switch the TPM to a lockout state during a period depending of the counter value and growing exponentially. The set of allowed commands is reduced to authorization not-required commands. The whole set of commands is available again after the period is elapsed.***

### FMT\_MTD.1/Lock Management of TSF data

- Hierarchical to: No other components.
- Dependencies: FMT\_SMR.1 Security roles  
FMT\_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
- FMT\_MTD.1.1/Lock The TSF shall restrict the ability to *reset to FALSE the Action Flag of TPM dictionary attack mitigation mechanism to the TPM Owner and Delegated Entity*.

### FIA\_USB.1 User-subject binding

- Hierarchical to: No other components.
- Dependencies: FIA\_ATD.1 User attribute definition
- FIA\_USB.1.1 The TSF shall associate the following user security attributes with subjects acting on the behalf of that user:
- 1) *authData,*
  - 2) *locality,*
  - 3) *physical presence,*
  - 4) *authorization handle and shared secret if the subject is a OSAP or DSAP session,*
  - 5) *authorization associated with the delegation blob if the subject is a DSAP session.*

FIA\_USB.1.2

The TSF shall enforce the following rules on the initial association of user security attributes with subjects acting on the behalf of users:

- 1) *the shared secret is associated with the authorization gained by the user providing the AuthData for the entity identified in the TPM\_OSAP command establishing the OSAP session,*
- 2) *the shared secret is associated with the authorization gained by the user providing the AuthData and the delegation blob for establishing the DSAP session,*
- 3) *the present value of the users locality is assigned to the command executed by this user,*
- 4) *the physical presence of the user is assigned to the command executed by that user.*

FIA\_USB.1.3

The TSF shall enforce the following rules governing changes to the user security attributes associated with subjects acting on the behalf of users:

- 1) *The TSF shall set the security attributes of the subject TPM Owner to values defined by the command TPM\_OwnerClear*
  - a) *if the subject executing the command TPM\_OwnerClear is bound to the TPM owner and all command parameters and the security attribute DisableOwnerClear are FALSE,*
  - b) *if the subject with physical presence is executing the command TPM\_ForceClear and the security attribute disableForceClear is FALSE.*
- 2) *The TSF shall delete the shared secret for the authorization of the OSAP session if the user executes the command TPM\_Reset.*
- 3) *The TSF shall delete the shared secret for the authorization of the OSAP session and DSAP session if*
  - a) *the user executes the command TPM\_FlushSpecific or TPM\_Terminate\_Handle,*
  - b) *the user clears the TPM Owner by executing the command TPM\_OwnerClear or TPM\_ForceClear,*
  - c) *the user is the TPM owner and executes the command TPM\_ChangeAuthOwner,*
  - d) *any of the following commands are executed:*
    - I. *TPM\_Delegate\_Manage*
    - II. *TPM\_Delegate\_CreateOwnerDelegation with Increment=TRUE*
    - III. *TPM\_Delegate\_LoadOwnerDelegation.*
- 4) *The TSF shall delete enforced by the user the shared secret for the authorization of all OSAP sessions associated with the counter by executing the command TPM\_ReleaseCounter or TPM\_ReleaseCounterOwner,*
- 5) *The TSF shall delete the shared secret for the authorization of the session if the user sets the continueUse flag to FALSE in the command within an OSAP or DSAP session,*



6) *The TSF shall delete automatically the shared secret for the authorization of the OSAP session and DSAP session acting on the behalf of users after*

- a) the session executes a command that returns an error,*
- b) the session uses a resource evicted from the TOE or otherwise invalidated,*
- c) the session executes any command for which the shared secret is used to encrypt an input parameter (TPM\_ENCAUTH).*

## **6.1.5 Data Protection and Privacy**

### **FDP\_RIP.1 Subset residual information protection**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: No dependencies.

FDP\_RIP.1.1            The TSF shall ensure that any previous information content of a resource is made unavailable upon the *deallocation of the resource* from the following objects: *any object*.

## **Delegation**

### **FDP\_ACC.1/Deleg Subset access control**

Hierarchical to:        No other components.

Dependencies:         FDP\_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control

FDP\_ACC.1.1/Deleg    The TSF shall enforce the *Delegation SFP* on *Delegated Entities, user data and commands*.

### **FDP\_ACF.1/Deleg Security attribute based access control**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: FDP\_ACC.1 Subset access control  
FMT\_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation

FDP\_ACF.1.1/Deleg The TSF shall enforce the *Delegation SFP* to objects based on the following: *Delegated Entities and commands with the delegated permission defined in the delegation table row, locality, pcrInfo and key handle of the key in the Delegation owner blob.*

FDP\_ACF.1.2/Deleg The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed:

- 1) *The TSF shall disallow the execution of a command in a DSAP session if the permission of this command is not set in the delegation table row in the Delegation owner blob used for the DSAP session,*
- 2) *The TSF shall disallow the execution of a command in a DSAP session if the PCR\_SELECTION of the DSAP session is not NULL and the pcrInfo of the DSAP session does not match the current PCR value of the PCR\_SELECTION and locality.*

FDP\_ACF.1.3/Deleg The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules:

- 1) *The TSF shall allow the delegation of the TPM Owner authorized commands listed in [TCG-2], table of section 20.2.1.***
- 2) *The TSF shall allow the delegation of the TPM Key authorized commands listed in [TCG-2], table of section 20.2.3.***

FDP\_ACF.1.4/Deleg The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules:

- 1) *The TSF shall deny the delegation of the TPM Owner authorized commands listed in [TCG-2], table of section 20.2.2.***
- 2) *The TSF shall deny the delegation of the TPM Key authorized commands listed in [TCG-2], table of section 20.2.4.***

### **FMT\_MSA.1/DFT Management of security attributes**

- Hierarchical to: No other components.
- Dependencies: [FDP\_ACC.1 Subset access control, or FDP\_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]  
FMT\_SMR.1 Security roles  
FMT\_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
- FMT\_MSA.1.1/DFT The TSF shall enforce the *Delegation SFP* to restrict the ability to *modify, to delete, to enable, to disable and to create* the security attributes *Family table* to
- 1) *TPM owner,*
  - 2) *User under physical presence if*
    - a) *the opCode is TPM\_FAMILY\_CREATE,*
    - b) *DisableForceClear is FALSE and*
    - c) *TPM\_Delegate\_Admin\_Lock is false.*

### **FMT\_MSA.1/DT Management of security attributes**

- Hierarchical to: No other components.
- Dependencies: [FDP\_ACC.1 Subset access control, or FDP\_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]  
FMT\_SMR.1 Security roles  
FMT\_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
- FMT\_MSA.1.1/DT The TSF shall enforce the *Delegation SFP* to restrict the ability to *query, modify, create* the security attributes *Delegation table* to
- 1) *TPM owner,*
  - 2) *User "World" if the TPM owner is not installed and max NV writes without an owner is not exceeded and TPM\_Delegate\_Admin\_Lock is false.*

### **FMT\_MSA.3/Deleg Static attribute initialisation**

- Hierarchical to: No other components.
- Dependencies: FMT\_MSA.1 Management of security attributes  
FMT\_SMR.1 Security roles
- FMT\_MSA.3.1/Deleg The TSF shall enforce the *Delegation SFP* to provide *permissive* default values for security attributes that are used to enforce the SFP.
- FMT\_MSA.3.2/Deleg The TSF shall allow the *TPM owner* to specify alternative initial values to override the default values when an object or information is created.

## Key Management

### FDP\_ACC.1/KeyMan Subset access control

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: FDP\_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control

FDP\_ACC.1.1/KeyMan The TSF shall enforce the *Key Management SFP* on

- 1) *Subjects: commands executing on behalf of users.*
- 2) *Objects: keys.*
- 3) *Operations: create, activate AIK, delete, export, import, signature generation, encryption, decryption.*

### FDP\_ACF.1/KeyMan Security attribute based access control

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: FDP\_ACC.1 Subset access control

FMT\_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation

FDP\_ACF.1.1/KeyMan The TSF shall enforce the *Key Management SFP* to objects based on the following:

- 1) *subjects: commands with security attributes ownerAuth, srkAuth, AuthData, locality, physical presence;*
- 2) *objects:*
  - a) *EK with the SFR-related security attribute ownership of the TOE,*
  - b) *SRK with the SFR-related security attribute disableOwnerClear and disableForceClear of the TOE,*
  - c) *User keys with security attributes authDataUsage, keyUsage, keyFlags, and OwnerEvict,*
  - d) *Wrapped Key Blob with the security attributes keyUsage, keyFlags, algorithmParms and pcrInfo.*

FDP\_ACF.1.2/KeyMan The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed:

- 1) *The user "World" is allowed to create an EK if the EK does not exist already.*
- 2) *The user "World" is allowed to read the public part of an EK if the TOE is unowned.*
- 3) *The TPM owner is allowed to read the public part of an EK.*
- 4) *The user "World" is allowed to create an SRK if the ownership flag is TRUE.*
- 5) *The TPM owner is allowed to delete an SRK if the disableOwnerClear flag is FALSE.*
- 6) *The user "World" under physical presence is allowed to delete an SRK if the disableForceClear flag is FALSE.*

- 7) *The user authenticated as TPM owner and the owner of the SRK is allowed to generate an AIK.*
- 8) *The TPM owner is allowed to activate the AIK if the imported blob is a TPM\_EK\_BLOB structure and the actual state meets the identified PCR values and the locality.*
- 9) *The TPM owner is allowed to use the AIK for signing audit data, quoted data, or a tick stamped blob.*
- 10) *The entity owner of a key with the security attribute keyUsage, TPM\_KEY\_STORAGE = TRUE, is allowed to generate a User Key and export this User key wrapped with the key he owns except if this entity owner is not the TPM owner and the key generated is an AIK.*
- 11) *The Entity owner of the key to be used for import of Wrapped Key Blob is allowed to import a User key in a Wrapped Key Blob if the security attribute keyUsage, TPM\_KEY\_STORAGE = TRUE, of the import key is set.*
- 12) *The entity owner is not allowed to use a User key if at least one of the following conditions is met:*
  - a) *the security attribute authDataUsage of the User Key object for access does not match the authentication status of the subject,*
  - b) *the security attribute usageAuth of the User Key object for access does not match the authentication data used by the user bound to the subject,*
  - c) *the security attributes keyUsage or algorithmParms or keyFlags of the User Key object does not allow use of the command to be executed,*
  - d) *the security attribute PCRInfo of the User Key object does not allow use of the object in the current state of the identified PCR and locality.*
- 13) *The TPM owner is allowed to delete a User key if the security attribute OwnerEvict, OwnerEvict = FALSE.*

FDP\_ACF.1.3/KeyMan    The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules:

- 1) ***Bits setting of the security attribute keyFlags impacts the capacity of the TPM commands to perform management operation on the objects User keys or Wrapped Key Blob. Commands impacted by this rule are: TPM\_Unseal, TPM\_CreateWrapKey, TPM\_LoadKey, TPM\_LoadKey2, TPM\_GetPubKey, TPM\_CMK\_SetRestrictions, TPM\_CMK\_CreateKey, TPM\_CMK\_CreateBlob, TPM\_CMK\_ConvertMigration, TPM\_CertifyKey, TPM\_CerifyKey2, TPM\_Makeldentity, TPM\_DSAP, TPM\_ChangeAuthAsymStart, TPM\_LoadKey.***
- 2) ***The value of the authDataUsage security attribute impacts the capacity of the TPM commands to use the object User keys - under authentication conditions. Commands impacted by this rule are :***

*TPM\_TakeOwnership, TPM\_CreateWrapKey,  
TPM\_LoadKey2, TPM\_GetPubKey,  
TPM\_CMK\_CreateKey, TPM\_CertifyKey,  
TPM\_CertifyKey2, TPM\_MakeIdentity,  
TPM\_EstablishedTransport,  
TPM\_ChangeAuthAsymStart, TPM\_LoadKey.*

- 3) *The value of the keyUsage security attribute impacts the capacity of the TPM commands to use the object User keys or Wrapped Key Blob for specific type of operations. Commands impacted by this rule are:  
TPM\_CMK\_SetRestrictions,  
TPM\_ChangeAuthAsymStart,  
TPM\_Take\_Ownership, TPM\_Seal, TPM\_Unseal,  
TPM\_Sealx, TPM\_Unbind, TPM\_Sign, TPM\_CertifyKey,  
TPM\_LoadKey, TPM\_LoadKey2, TPM\_CreateWrapKey,  
TPM\_MakeIdentity, TPM\_GetPubKey, TPM\_MigrateKey,  
TPM\_DSAP, TPM\_Quote, TPM\_ActivateIdentity,  
TPM\_ConvertMogrationBlob, TPM\_CertiySelfTest,  
TPM\_CMK\_CreateKey,  
TPM\_CMK\_ConvertMigrationBlob,  
TPM\_TickStampBlob and TMK\_EstablishTransport.*
- 4) *The status of ownerEvict security attribute impacts the capacity of the TPM commands to evict the object User keys.*
- 5) *The values contained by the algorithmParms security attributes impact the capacity of the TPM commands to perform configuration operations on the User keys object Commands impacted by this rule :  
TPM\_TakeOwnership, TPM\_AuthorizeMigrationKey,  
TPM\_CMK\_CreateTicket and TPM\_CMK\_CreateBlob,  
TPM\_CreateEndorsementKeyPair.*
- 6) *The values of pcrInfo security attributes impact the capacity of TPM commands to access the object Wrapped Key Blob for certain management operations. Commands impacted by this rule are: TPM\_Seal,  
TPM\_Unseal, TPM\_LoadKey, TPM\_LoadKey2,  
TPM\_MakeIdentity, TPM\_GetPubKey, TPM\_Sealx,  
TPM\_CertifyKey, TPM\_CertifyKey2,  
TPM\_CMK\_CreateKey, TPM\_NV\_WriteValue,  
TPM\_NV\_WriteValueAuth, and  
TPM\_NV\_ReadValueAuth.*
- 7) *The status of disableOwnerClear security attribute can allow the possibility to the owner to clear the object SRK.*
- 8) *The status of disableForceClear security attribute can allow the possibility to the command TPM\_ForceClear to be executed.*

**9) *The status of the owner authorization (through flag TPM\_PF\_READPUBEK in TPM\_PERMANENT\_FLAGS) security attribute can allow the reading of the public portion of the object EK. Command impacted by this rule: TPM\_readPubek.***

FDP\_ACF.1.4/KeyMan The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules: ***same rules as in FDP\_ACF.1.3/KeyMan with different values.***

***Application note: the values of the flags and attributes outlined in this requirement are defined in the TCG specification ([TCG-2], [TCG-3]). They are not detailed here to avoid overloading the text.***

#### **FMT\_MSA.1/KeyMan Management of security attributes**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: [FDP\_ACC.1 Subset access control, or  
FDP\_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]  
FMT\_SMR.1 Security roles  
FMT\_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions

FMT\_MSA.1.1/KeyMan The TSF shall enforce the *Key Management SFP* to restrict the ability to assign the initial value the security attributes

- 1) *srkParams* of the SRK to user "World",
- 2) *authDataUsage*, *usageAuth*, *keyUsage*, *algorithmParms*, *keyFlags* and *PCRInfo* associated with the generated User key to the entity owner.

#### **FMT\_MSA.1/KEvi Management of security attributes**

*Hierarchical to: No other components.*

*Dependencies: [FDP\_ACC.1 Subset access control, or  
FDP\_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]  
FMT\_SMR.1 Security roles  
FMT\_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions*

*FMT\_MSA.1.1/KEvi The TSF shall enforce the Key Management SFP to restrict the ability to modify the security attributes TPM\_KEY\_CONTROL\_OWNER\_EVICT of a loaded key to the Entity owner.*

### **FMT\_MSA.3/KeyMan Static attribute initialisation**

Hierarchical to:	No other components.
Dependencies:	FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MSA.3.1/KeyMan	The TSF shall enforce the <i>Key Management SFP</i> to provide <i>restrictive</i> default values for security attributes that are used to enforce the SFP.
FMT_MSA.3.2/KeyMan	The TSF shall allow <b>entity owner</b> to specify alternative initial values to override the default values when an object or information is created.

### **Key Migration**

#### **FDP\_ACC.1/MigK Subset access control**

Hierarchical to:	No other components.
Dependencies:	FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control
FDP_ACC.1.1/Mig	The TSF shall enforce the <i>Key Migration SFP</i> on 1) <i>Subjects: TPM owner, Entity owner;</i> 2) <i>Objects: User key, Wrapped Key Blob, Migration Key Blob, Certified Migration Key Blob;</i> 3) <i>Operations: commands TPM_CreateMigrationBlob, TPM_CMK_CreateKey, TPM_CMK_CreateBlob, TPM_CMK_ConvertMigration, TPM_ConvertMigrationBlob, TPM_MigrateKey.</i>

#### **FDP\_ACF.1/MigK Security attribute based access control**

Hierarchical to:	No other components.
Dependencies:	FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation
FDP_ACF.1.1/MigK	The TSF shall enforce the <i>Key Migration SFP</i> to objects based on the following: 1) <i>Subjects: TPM owner, Entity owner of the key with security attributes restrictDelegate and migrationScheme,</i> 2) <i>Objects:</i> a) <i>User key with security attribute migratable,</i> b) <i>Wrapped Key Blob with the security attribute payload type,</i> c) <i>Migration Key Blob with the security attribute payload type,</i> d) <i>Certified Migration Key Blob with the security attributes payload type and migrationAuth.</i>



FDP\_ACF.1.2/MigK

The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed:

- 1) *The Entity owner of a certifiable migratable User key is allowed to create a Wrapped Key Blob for this migratable key by means of the command TPM\_CMK\_CreateKey, if it is authorized by use of the CMK Migration Approval Ticket and in case of delegated commands the restrictions for the migration of keys are fulfilled.*
- 2) *The Entity owner of a migratable User key authorized for use of the Migration key authorization ticket is allowed to create a Migration Key Blob for this migratable key by means of the command TPM\_CreateMigrationBlob,*
- 3) *The Entity owner of a certifiable migratable User key authorized for use of the Migration key authorization ticket and the Restriction Ticket is allowed to create a Certified Migration Key Blob for this migratable key by means of the command TPM\_CMK\_CreateBlob,*
- 4) *The Entity owner of private part of the migration User key is allowed to migrate a Migration Key Blob and a Certified Migration Key Blob to a conversion key by means of the command TPM\_MigrateKey,*
- 5) *The Entity owner of the private part of migration User key is allowed to convert a Migration Key Blob by means of the command TPM\_ConvertMigrationBlob and a Certified Migration Key Blob by means of the command PM\_CMK\_ConvertMigration if in case of delegated commands the restrictions for the migration of keys are fulfilled.*

FDP\_ACF.1.3/MigK

The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules:

- 1) ***The value of the migrationScheme security attribute impacts the capacity of the subject TPM owner or Entity owner to create an object Migration Key Blob. Commands impacted by this rule are: TPM\_CreateMigrationBlob and TPM\_CreateBlob.***
- 2) ***The value of the migratable security attribute impacts the capacity of the subject Entity owner to access an object User key to perform operations related to migration. Commands impacted by this rule are: TPM\_CMK\_CreateKey, TPM\_CMK\_CreateBlob and TPM\_CMK\_ConvertMigration.***
- 3) ***The value of the payload type security attribute impacts the capacity of the subject Entity owner or TPM owner to access an object Wrapped Key Blob, Migration Key Blob or Certified Migration Key Blob to perform***

*migration related operations. Commands impacted by this rule are: TPM\_CreateMigrationBlob, TPM\_ConvertMigrationBlob, TPM\_CMK\_CreateKey, TPM\_CMK\_CreateBlob and TPM\_CMK\_ConvertMigration.*

- 4) *The value of the migrationAuth security attribute impacts the capacity of the subject Entity owner or TPM owner to create the Migration Key Blob. Commands impacted by this rule are: TPM\_CreateMigrationBlob and TPM\_CMK\_CreateBlob.*

FDP\_ACF.1.4/MigK The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules: *same rules as in FDP\_ACF.1.3/MigK with different values.*

*Application note: the values of the flags and attributes outlined in this requirement are defined in the TCG specification ([TCG-2], [TCG-3]). They are not detailed here to avoid overloading the text.*

#### **FMT\_MSA.1/MigK Management of security attributes**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: [FDP\_ACC.1 Subset access control, or FDP\_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]  
FMT\_SMR.1 Security roles  
FMT\_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions

FMT\_MSA.1.1/MigK The TSF shall enforce the *Key Migration SFP* to restrict the ability to *assign initial value* the security attributes *restrictDelegate*, *migrationScheme*, *migrationAuthorityApproval* to *TPM owner*.

#### **FMT\_MTD.1/MigK Management of TSF data**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: FMT\_SMR.1 Security roles  
FMT\_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions

FMT\_MTD.1.1/MigK The TSF shall restrict the ability to create *the CMK Migration Approval Ticket, Migration Key Authorization Ticket, Restrict Ticket* to *TPM owner*.

## Measurement and Reporting

### FDP\_ACC.1/M&R Subset access control

- Hierarchical to: No other components.
- Dependencies: FDP\_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control
- FDP\_ACC.1.1/M&R The TSF shall enforce the *Measurement and Reporting SFP* on
- 1) *Subjects: SHA-1 session, user "World" and entity owner,*
  - 2) *Objects: PCR, User key,*
  - 3) *Operations: commands TPM\_SHA1Start, TPM\_SHA1Update, TPM\_SHA1Complete, TPM\_SHA1CompleteExtend, TPM\_PCR\_Reset, TPM\_Extend, TPM\_PCRRead, TPM\_Quote TPM\_Quote2, TPM\_HASH\_START, TPM\_HASH\_DATA and TPM\_HASH\_END.*

### FDP\_ACF.1/M&R Security attribute based access control

- Hierarchical to: No other components.
- Dependencies: FDP\_ACC.1 Subset access control  
FMT\_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation
- FDP\_ACF.1.1/M&R The TSF shall enforce the *Measurement and Reporting SFP* to objects based on the following:
- 1) *Subjects:*
    - a) *SHA-1 session,*
    - b) *user with the security attributes locality,*
    - c) *entity owner of the signature key with the security attribute usageAuth,*
  - 2) *Objects:*
    - a) *PCR with the security attributes pcrReset, pcrResetLocal,*
    - b) *pcrExtendLocalUser key with the security attribute keyUsage.*
- FDP\_ACF.1.2/M&R The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed:
- 1) *The SHA-1 session is allowed to reset the digest of the SHA-1 session by command TPM\_SHA1Start.*
  - 2) *The SHA-1 session is allowed to calculate the new digest of the SHA-1 session as SHA-1 hash value of the digest of the SHA-1 session and the presented data by command TPM\_SHA1Update.*

- 3) *The SHA-1 session is allowed (i) to finish the calculation of the digest of the SHA-1 session as SHA-1 hash value of the digest of the SHA-1 session and the presented data and (ii) to output the hash value by command TPM\_SHA1Complete.*
- 4) *The SHA-1 session is allowed (i) to finish the calculation of the digest of the SHA-1 session as SHA-1 hash value of the digest of the SHA-1 session and the presented data and (ii) to extend the value of the indicated PCR by command PM\_SHA1CompleteExtend.*
- 5) *If the pcrReset is TRUE the command TPM\_Startup is allowed to set a PCR to 0xFF...FF.*
- 6) *If the pcrReset is FALSE the command TPM\_Startup is allowed to set a PCR to 0x00...00.*
- 7) *If the user presents the locality matching the security attribute pcrResetLocal of the selected PCR and the pcrReset of this PCR is TRUE then the command TPM\_PCR\_Reset is allowed to reset this PCR to 0x00...00 or 0xFF...FF, where the concrete value is defined in the platform specific specification of the TOE.*
- 8) *If the user presents the locality matching the security attribute pcrExtendLocal of the selected PCR the command TPM\_SHA1CompleteExtend is allowed (i) to finish the calculation of the digest of the SHA-1 session as SHA-1 hash value of the digest of the SHA-1 session and the presented data and (ii) to extend the value of the selected PCR with the final digest of the SHA-1 session.*
- 9) *If the user presents the locality matching the security attribute pcrExtendLocal of the selected PCR the command TPM\_Extend is allowed to extend the value of the selected PCR with the presented data.*
- 10) *The user "World" is allowed to read the PCR object with the command TPM\_PCRRead.*
- 11) *The entity owner is allowed to quote the PCR indicated by the parameter targetPCR with the User key, which security attribute keyUsage equals to TPM\_KEY\_SIGNING, TPM\_KEY\_IDENTITY, or TPM\_KEY\_LEGACY, by means of the command TPM\_Quote or TPM\_Quote2.*
- 12) *The user "World" under locality 4 is allowed to execute the TPM Interface commands TPM\_HASH\_START, TPM\_HASH\_DATA and TPM\_HASH\_END.*
- 13) **None.**

FDP\_ACF.1.3/M&R

The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules:

- 1) *The value of the pcrReset and pcrResetLocal security attributes impacts the capacity of a user with specific locality security attribute to access a PCR object to interfere in Measurement and Reporting operations mechanism. Command impacted by this rule is TPM\_PCR\_Reset.***

2) *The value of the pcrExtendLocal security attribute impacts the capacity of the entity owner of a key to access the User key object to perform Measurement and Reporting operations. Commands impacted by this rule are: TPM\_SHA1CompleteExtend and TPM\_Extend.*

3) *The value of the keyUsage security attribute impacts the capacity of the user with specific locality security attribute to access the object PCR to perform Measurement and Reporting operations. Commands impacted by this rule are: TPM\_Quote, TPM\_Quote2.*

FDP\_ACF.1.4/M&R

The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules: *same rules as in FDP\_ACF.1.3/M&R with different values.*

*Application note: the values of the flags and attributes outlined in this requirement are defined in the TCG specification ([TCG-2], [TCG-3]). They are not detailed here to avoid overloading the text.*

#### **FMT\_MSA.3/M&R Static attribute initialisation**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: FMT\_MSA.1 Management of security attributes  
FMT\_SMR.1 Security roles

FMT\_MSA.3.1/M&R The TSF shall enforce the *Measurement and Reporting SFP* to provide *restrictive* default values for security attributes that are used to enforce the SFP.

FMT\_MSA.3.2/M&R The TSF shall allow *no role* to specify alternative initial values to override the default values when an object or information is created.

**FCO\_NRO.1/M&R Selective proof of origin**

Hierarchical to:	No other components.
Dependencies:	FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
FCO_NRO.1.1/M&R	The TSF shall be able to generate evidence of origin for transmitted <i>TPM_QUOTE_INFO</i> or <i>TPM_QUOTE_INFO2 structure</i> at the request of the <i>originator</i> .
FCO_NRO.1.2/M&R	The TSF shall be able to relate the <i>attributes</i>  1) <i>PCR values of the requested PCR indices in case of TPM_QUOTE_INFO,</i> 2) <i>PCR values of the requested PCR indices, and locality at release in case of TPM_QUOTE_INFO2</i> of the originator of the information, and  1) <i>external data in the TPM_QUOTE_INFO,</i> 2) <i>external data in the TPM_QUOTE_INFO2</i> of the information to which the evidence applies.
FCO_NRO.1.3/M&R	The TSF shall provide a capability to verify the evidence of origin of information to <i>recipient</i> given <i>the attributes of the Attestation Identity Key Credential</i> if an <i>Attestation Identity Key</i> is used.

**Non-volatile Storage**

**FDP\_ACC.1/NVS Subset access control**

Hierarchical to:	No other components.
Dependencies:	FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control
FDP_ACC.1.1/NVS	The TSF shall enforce the <i>NVS SFP</i> on  1) <i>Subjects: user "World", entity owner and TPM owner,</i> 2) <i>Objects: NV storage areas,</i> 3) <i>Operations: create, write, read.</i>

**FDP\_ACF.1/NVS Security attribute based access control**

- Hierarchical to: No other components.
- Dependencies: FDP\_ACC.1 Subset access control  
FMT\_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation
- FDP\_ACF.1.1/NVS The TSF shall enforce the NVS SFP to objects based on the following:
- 1) *Subjects: user “World”, entity owner and TPM owner with the security attributes physical presence, locality and current PCR values,*
  - 2) *Objects: NV storage with the security attributes nvLocked, noOwnerNVWrite, pcrInfoRead, pcrInfoWrite, localityAtRelease, and permissions TPM\_NV\_PER\_READ\_STCLEAR, TPM\_NV\_PER\_WRITE\_STCLEAR, TPM\_NV\_PER\_AUTHWRITE, TPM\_NV\_PER\_OWNERWRITE, TPM\_NV\_PER\_PPWRITE, TPM\_NV\_PER\_AUTHREAD, TPM\_NV\_PER\_PPREAD, TPM\_NV\_PER\_OWNERREAD, TPM\_MAX\_NV\_WRITE\_NOOWNER.*
- FDP\_ACF.1.2/NVS The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed:
- 1) *The user “World” under physical presence is allowed to create NV storage by means of the command TPM\_NV\_DefineSpace if nvLocked is 0 and noOwnerNVWrite does not exceed TPM\_MAX\_NV\_WRITE\_NOOWNER.*
  - 2) *The TPM owner is allowed to create a NV storage area by means of the command TPM\_NV\_DefineSpace.*
  - 3) *The user “World” is allowed to write the NV storage area if nvLocked of the TPM\_PERMANENT\_FLAGS is FALSE and max NV writes without an owner is not exceeded.*
  - 4) *The TPM owner is allowed to write an NV storage area by means of the command TPM\_NV\_WriteValue if*
    - α) TPM\_NV\_PER\_OWNERWRITE is TRUE,*
    - β) the user satisfies the requirement for physical presence defined in TPM\_NV\_PER\_PPWRITE,*
    - χ) the locality of the user matches the localityAtRelease defined for the TPM\_NV\_DATA\_AREA and*
    - δ) if pcrInfoWrite defines a PCR selection the actual values of the selected PCR shall match the digestAtRelease in pcrInfoWrite.*

- 5) *The entity owner is allowed to write an NV storage area by means of the command TPM\_NV\_WriteValueAuth if*
  - a) *TPM\_NV\_PER\_AUTHWRITE is TRUE,*
  - b) *the user match the requirement for physical presence defined in TPM\_NV\_PER\_PPWRITE,*
  - c) *the locality of the user matches the localityAtRelease defined for the TPM\_NV\_DATA\_AREA and*
  - d) *if pcrInfoWrite defines a PCR selection the actual values of the selected PCR shall match the digestAtRelease in pcrInfoWrite.*
- 6) *The TPM owner is allowed to read an NV storage area by means of the command TPM\_NV\_ReadValue if*
  - a) *TPM\_NV\_PER\_OWNERREAD is TRUE,*
  - b) *the user matches the requirement for physical presence defined in TPM\_NV\_PER\_PPREAD,*
  - c) *the locality of the user matches the localityAtRelease defined in the pcrInfoRead and*
  - d) *if pcrInfoRead defines a PCR selection the actual values of the selected PCR shall match the digestAtRelease in pcrInfoRead.*
- 7) *TheEntity owner is allowed to read an NV storage area by means of the command TPM\_NV\_ReadValueAuth if*
  - a) *TPM\_NV\_PER\_AUTHREAD is TRUE,*
  - b) *the user matches the requirement for physical presence defined in TPM\_NV\_PER\_PPREAD,*
  - c) *the locality of the user matches the localityAtRelease defined in the pcrInfoRead and*
  - d) *if pcrInfoRead defines a PCR selection the actual values of the selected PCR shall match the digestAtRelease in pcrInfoRead.*

FDP\_ACF.1.3/NVS

The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules:

- 1) Subjects are allowed to access NV storage object through the command TPM\_NV\_DefineSpace depending on the values of the security attributes nvLocked, pcrInfoRead, pcrInfoWrite, TPM\_MAX\_NV\_WRITE\_NOOWNER, TPM\_NV\_PER\_OWNERWRITE, TPM\_NV\_PER\_AUTHWRITE, TPM\_NV\_PER\_AUTHREAD, TPM\_NV\_PER\_WRITEDEFINE and TPM\_NV\_PER\_PPWRITE.**
- 2) Subjects are allowed to access NV storage object through the command TPM\_NV\_WriteValue depending on the values of the security attributes nvLocked, pcrInfoWrite, localityAtRelease TPM\_MAX\_NV\_WRITE\_NOOWNER, TPM\_NV\_PER\_OWNERWRITE, TPM\_NV\_PER\_AUTHWRITE, TPM\_NV\_PER\_PPWRITE and TPM\_NV\_PER\_WRITE\_STCLEAR. Subjects are**



*allowed to access NV storage object through the command TPM\_NV\_WriteValueAuth depending on the values of the security attributes pcrInfoWrite, localityAtRelease TPM\_NV\_PER\_AUTHWRITE, TPM\_NV\_PER\_PPWRITE, TPM\_NV\_PER\_WRITEDEFINE and TPM\_NV\_PER\_WRITE\_STCLEAR.*

- 3) *Subjects are allowed to access NV storage object through the command TPM\_NV\_ReadValue depending on the values of the security attributes nvLocked, pcrInfoRead, PM\_NV\_PER\_AUTHREAD, TPM\_NV\_PER\_OWNERREAD, TPM\_NV\_PER\_PPREAD and TPM\_NV\_PER\_READ\_STCLEAR.*
- 4) *Subjects are allowed to access NV storage object through the command TPM\_NV\_ReadValueAuth depending on the values of the security attributes pcrInfoRead, localityAtRelease, TPM\_NV\_PER\_AUTHREAD, TPM\_NV\_PER\_PPREAD and TPM\_NV\_PER\_READ\_STCLEAR.*

FDP\_ACF.1.4/NVS

The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules:

- 1) *If TPM\_NV\_PER\_READ\_STCLEAR is TRUE the NV storage area can not be read after read with a data size of 0 until successful write or TPM\_Startup(ST\_Clear).*
- 2) *If TPM\_NV\_PER\_WRITE\_STCLEAR is TRUE the NV storage area can not be written after write to the specified index with a data size of 0 until TPM\_Startup(ST\_Clear).*
- 3) *If TPM\_NV\_PER\_WRITEDEFINE is TRUE the NV storage area can not be written after performing the TPM\_NV\_DefineSpace command and one successful write to the index with datasize of 0.*
- 4) *If TPM\_NV\_PER\_GLOBALLOCK is TRUE the NV storage area can not be written after successful write to index 0 until TPM\_Startup(ST\_Clear)*
- 5) *The access to the commands:*
  - a) *TPM\_NV\_WriteValue is denied if the security attributes TPM\_NV\_PER\_OWNERWRITE and TPM\_NV\_PER\_AUTHWRITE are both set to TRUE.*
  - b) *TPM\_NV\_ReadValue is denied if the security attributes TPM\_NV\_PER\_OWNERREAD and TPM\_NV\_PER\_AUTHREAD are both set to TRUE.*
- 6) *Same rules as in FDP\_ACF.1.3/NVS with different values.*

*Application note: the values of the flags and attributes outlined in this requirement are defined in the TCG specification ([TCG-2], [TCG-3]). They are not detailed here to avoid overloading the text.*

### FMT\_MSA.3/NVS Static attribute initialisation

Hierarchical to:	No other components.
Dependencies:	FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MSA.3.1/NVS	The TSF shall enforce the <i>NVS SFP</i> to provide <i>restrictive</i> default values for security attributes that are used to enforce the SFP.
FMT_MSA.3.2/NVS	The TSF shall allow <b><i>no role</i></b> to specify alternative initial values to override the default values when an object or information is created.

***Application note: (refinement) by enforcing restrictive default values for security attributes and authorising nobody to specify alternative default initial values, the security objective O.DAC is strengthened.***

## Counter

### FDP\_ACC.1/MC Subset access control

Hierarchical to:	No other components.
Dependencies:	FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control
FDP_ACC.1.1/MC	The TSF shall enforce the <i>Monotonic Counter SFP</i> on 1) <i>Subjects: TPM owner, Delegated entity, Entity owner of the monotonic counter object, user "World",</i> 2) <i>Objects: Monotonic counter,</i> 3) <i>Operations: create, increment, read, release.</i>

### FDP\_ACF.1/MC Security attribute-based access control

Hierarchical to:	No other components.
Dependencies:	FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation
FDP_ACF.1.1/MC	The TSF shall enforce the <i>Monotonic Counter SFP</i> to objects based on the following: 1) <i>Subjects: TPM owner, Delegated entity, Entity owner of the monotonic counter object, user "World",</i> 2) <i>Objects: Monotonic counter with security attribute countID.</i>

FDP\_ACF.1.2/MC

The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed:

- 1) *The TPM owner and Delegated entity are allowed to create a Monotonic counter, OSAP and DSAP sessions are required for creation of the Monotonic counter.*
- 2) *The Entity owner of the monotonic counter object is allowed to increment the Monotonic counter if the countID is set in TPM\_STCLEAR\_DATA for the current boot cycle.*
- 3) *The user "World" is allowed to read the Monotonic counter value if he addresses the Monotonic counter object correctly with valid countID.*
- 4) *The Entity owner of the monotonic counter object is allowed to release the Monotonic counter.*
- 5) *The TPM owner is allowed to release the Monotonic counter.*

FDP\_ACF.1.3/MC

The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rule:

- 1) ***The value of the countID security attribute impacts the capacity of a subject to access the object Monotonic counter to perform operations on the monotonic counter. Commands impacted by this rule are: TPM\_IncrementCounter, TPM\_ReadCounter, TPMReleaseCounter and TPM\_ReleaseCounterOwner depends on the values of the security attribute countID.***

FDP\_ACF.1.4/MC

The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rule:

- 1) *The TSF shall disallow the operation read or increment the monotonic counter if the countID is invalid.*

***Application note: the values of the flags and attributes outlined in this requirement are defined in the TCG specification ([TCG-2], [TCG-3]). They are not detailed here to avoid overloading the text.***

### FMT\_MSA.1/MC Management of security attributes

Hierarchical to:	No other components.
Dependencies:	[FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control] FMT_SMR.1 Security roles FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_MSA.1.1/MC	The TSF shall enforce the <i>Monotonic Counter SFP</i> to restrict the ability to <ol style="list-style-type: none"><li>1) <i>modify the security attributes countID to the Entity owner executing TPM_IncrementCounter.</i></li><li>2) <i>set to NULL the security attributes countID to TPM_Startup(ST_CLEAR),</i></li><li>3) <i>set to invalid value the security attributes countID to</i><ol style="list-style-type: none"><li>a) <i>Entity owner of the monotonic counter executing the command TPM_ReleaseCounter</i></li><li>b) <i>TPM owner executing the command TPM_ReleaseCounterOwner.</i></li></ol></li></ol>

### FMT\_MSA.3/MC Static attribute initialisation

Hierarchical to:	No other components.
Dependencies:	FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MSA.3.1/MC	The TSF shall enforce the <i>Monotonic Counter SFP</i> to provide <i>restrictive</i> default values for security attributes that are used to enforce the SFP.
FMT_MSA.3.2/MC	The TSF shall allow <b>no role</b> to specify alternative initial values to override the default values when an object or information is created.

### FPT\_STM.1 Reliable time stamps

Hierarchical to:	No other components.
Dependencies:	No dependencies.
FPT_STM.1.1	The TSF shall be able to provide reliable time stamps as <i>number Tick Count Value of ticks since start of the tick session to an accuracy of tickRate microseconds.</i>

### **FCO\_NRO.1/STS Selective proof of origin**

Hierarchical to:	No other components.
Dependencies:	FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
FCO_NRO.1.1/STS	The TSF shall be able to generate evidence of origin for transmitted <i>TPM_SIGN_INFO</i> structure at the request of the <i>originator</i> .
FCO_NRO.1.2/STS	The TSF shall be able to relate <i>the current tick count</i> of the originator of the information, and <i>external data in the TPM_SIGN_INFO</i> structure of the information to which the evidence applies.
FCO_NRO.1.3/STS	The TSF shall provide a capability to verify the evidence of origin of information to <i>recipient</i> given <i>the attributes of the Attestation Identity Key Credential</i> if an <i>Attestation Identity Key</i> is used.

## **6.1.6 Data Import and Export**

### **FDP\_ACC.1/EID Subset access control**

Hierarchical to:	No other components.
Dependencies:	FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control
FDP_ACC.1.1/IED	The TSF shall enforce the <i>Export and Import of Data SFP</i> on <ol style="list-style-type: none"><li>1) Subjects: <i>TPM owner, Entity owner</i>;</li><li>2) Objects: <i>Sealed Data, Context, Bound Blob</i>;</li><li>3) Operations: <i>export, import, save, load, unbind</i>.</li></ol>

### **FDP\_ACF.1/EID Security attribute based access control**

Hierarchical to:	No other components.
Dependencies:	FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation
FDP_ACF.1.1/EID	The TSF shall enforce the <i>Export and Import of Data SFP</i> to objects based on the following: <ol style="list-style-type: none"><li>1) Subjects: <i>TPM owner with security attribute locality, Entity owner with security attribute locality, user "World"</i>;</li><li>2) Objects:<ol style="list-style-type: none"><li>a) <i>Sealed data with security attribute pcrInfo and tpmProof</i>,</li><li>b) <i>Context with the security attribute resourceType and tpmProof</i>,</li><li>c) <i>Bound Blob with the security attributes payload type</i>.</li></ol></li></ol>

FDP\_ACF.1.2/EID

The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed:

- 1) *The Entity owner of the key to be used for export of sealed data is allowed to export Sealed Data if this export key has the security attribute TPM\_KEY\_STORAGE and is not migratable.*
- 2) *The Entity owner of the key to be used for import of sealed data is allowed to import Sealed Data if*
  - a) *this import key has the security attribute TPM\_KEY\_STORAGE and is not migratable,*
  - b) *the security attributes pcrInfo of sealed data blob match the values in the PCR indicated by pcrInfo,*
  - c) *the security attributes tmpProof of sealed data blob match the values tmpProof in the TPM\_PERMANENT\_DATA of the TOE.*
- 3) *The user "World" is allowed to save Context if the resourceType is TPM\_RT\_KEY, TPM\_RT\_AUTH, TPM\_RT\_TRANS or TPM\_RT\_DAA\_TPM.*
- 4) *The user "World" is allowed to load Context if*
  - a) *the resourceType is TPM\_RT\_KEY, TPM\_RT\_AUTH, TPM\_RT\_TRANS or TPM\_RT\_DAA\_TPM and*
  - b) *the tmpProof used as secret for the HMAC of the context matches the tmpProof in TPM\_PERMANENT\_DATA.*
- 5) *The Entity owner of the private part of the bind key is allowed to unbind a Bound blob if the payload type is TPM\_PT\_BIND.*

FDP\_ACF.1.3/EID

The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules:

- a) ***The execution of the command TPM\_Unseal depends on the value of the security attributes TPMproof and payload type.***

FDP\_ACF.1.4/EID

The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules: ***same rules as in FDP\_ACF.1.3/EID with different values.***

***Application note: the values of the flags and attributes outlined in this requirement are defined in the TCG specification ([TCG-2], [TCG-3]). They are not detailed here to avoid overloading the text.***

### FMT\_MSA.3/EID Static attribute initialisation

Hierarchical to:	No other components.
Dependencies:	FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MSA.3.1/EID	The TSF shall enforce the <i>Export and Import of Data SFP</i> to provide <i>restrictive</i> default values for security attributes that are used to enforce the SFP.
FMT_MSA.3.2/EID	The TSF shall allow the <b>Entity owner</b> to specify alternative initial values to override the default values when an object or information is created.

### FDP\_ETC.2 Export of user data with security attributes

Hierarchical to:	No other components.
Dependencies:	[FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
FDP_ETC.2.1	The TSF shall enforce the <i>Key Management SFP</i> , <i>Key Migration SFP</i> , <i>Export and Import of Data SFP</i> when exporting user data, controlled under the SFP(s), outside of the TOE.
FDP_ETC.2.2	The TSF shall export the user data with the user data's associated security attributes.
FDP_ETC.2.3	The TSF shall ensure that the security attributes, when exported outside the TOE, are unambiguously associated with the exported user data.
FDP_ETC.2.4	The TSF shall enforce the following rules when user data is exported from the TOE: <ol style="list-style-type: none"><li>1) <i>User keys exported by means of the command TPM_CreateWrapKey shall be exported with the security attributes</i><ol style="list-style-type: none"><li>a) <i>keyUsage,</i></li><li>b) <i>keyFlags,</i></li><li>c) <i>algorithmParms and</i></li><li>d) <i>PCRInfo with structure identified in KeyInfo if the key is bound to PCRs.</i></li></ol></li><li>2) <i>AIK keys shall be exported with the security attributes</i><ol style="list-style-type: none"><li>a) <i>keyUsage,</i></li><li>b) <i>keyFlags,</i></li><li>c) <i>algorithmParms and</i></li><li>d) <i>PCRInfo with structure identified in idKeyParms.</i></li></ol></li></ol>

- 3) *Migration key blobs shall be exported with the security attributes*
  - a) *keyUsage,*
  - b) *keyFlags,*
  - c) *algorithmParms and*
  - d) *PCRInfo with structure identified in KeyInfo if the key is bound to PCRs.*
- 4) *Certified migration key blobs shall be exported with the security attributes*
  - a) *keyUsage,*
  - b) *keyFlags,*
  - c) *algorithmParms and*
  - d) *PCRInfo with structure TPM\_PCR\_INFO\_LONG.*
- 5) *Sealed Data shall be exported with the security attributes pcrInfo and tpmProof.*
- 6) *Context shall be exported with the security attributes resource type and use the tpmProof as secret for the HMAC of the context.*

**FDP\_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes**

Hierarchical to:	No other components.
Dependencies:	[FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]  [FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel, or FTP_TRP.1 Trusted path]  FPT_TDC.1 Inter-TSF basic TSF data consistency
FDP_ITC.2.1	The TSF shall enforce the <i>Key Management SFP, Key Migration SFP, Export and Import of Data SFP</i> when importing user data, controlled under the SFP, from outside of the TOE.
FDP_ITC.2.2	The TSF shall use the security attributes associated with the imported user data.
FDP_ITC.2.3	The TSF shall ensure that the protocol used provides for the unambiguous association between the security attributes and the user data received.
FDP_ITC.2.4	The TSF shall ensure that interpretation of the security attributes of the imported user data is as intended by the source of the user data.
FDP_ITC.2.5	The TSF shall enforce the following rules when importing user data controlled under the SFP from outside the TOE:  1) <i>User keys imported by means of the command TPM_LoadKey2 shall be imported with the security attributes contained in Wrapped key blob.</i>



**FDP\_UCT.1/Exp Basic data exchange confidentiality**

Hierarchical to:	No other components.
Dependencies:	[FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel, or FTP_TRP.1 Trusted path] [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
FDP_UCT.1.1/Exp	The TSF shall enforce the <i>Key Management SFP, Key Migration SFP, Export and Import of Data SFP</i> to be able to <i>transmit</i> user data  <ol style="list-style-type: none"><li>1) <i>data together with the security attributes pcrInfo of an imported sealed data,</i></li><li>2) <i>migratable key of an imported Migration Key Blob or Certified Migration Key Blob,</i></li><li>3) <i>private portion of the key of an imported Wrapped Key Blob,</i></li><li>4) <i>data of the TPM_CONTEXT_SENSITIVE structure in the exported Context,</i> in a manner protected from unauthorised disclosure.</li></ol>

**FDP\_UCT.1/Imp Basic data exchange confidentiality**

Hierarchical to:	No other components.
Dependencies:	[FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel, or FTP_TRP.1 Trusted path] [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
FDP_UCT.1.1/Imp	The TSF shall enforce the <i>Key Management SFP, Key Migration SFP, Export and Import of Data SFP</i> by <i>providing the ability to receive</i> user data  <ol style="list-style-type: none"><li>1) <i>data together with the security attributes TPM_PCR_INFO in a sealed data object,</i></li><li>2) <i>migratable key exported in a created or converted Migration Key Blob,</i></li><li>3) <i>migratable key exported in a created or converted Certified Migration Key Blob,</i></li><li>4) <i>private portion of the key exported in a Wrapped Key Blob,</i></li><li>5) <i>data of the TPM_CONTEXT_SENSITIVE structure in the loaded context,</i></li><li>6) <i>data of the wrapped command within a transport session</i> in a manner protected from unauthorised disclosure.</li></ol>

**FDP\_UIT.1/Data Data exchange integrity**

Hierarchical to:	No other components.
Dependencies:	[FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]  [FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel, or FTP_TRP.1 Trusted path]
FDP_UIT.1.1/Data	The TSF shall enforce <i>the Key Management SFP, Key Migration SFP, Export and Import of Data SFP</i> to be able to <i>transmit and receive</i> user data in a manner protected from <i>modification, deletion and insertion</i> errors.
FDP_UIT.1.2/Data	The TSF shall be able to determine on receipt of user data <ol style="list-style-type: none"><li>1) <i>exported key,</i></li><li>2) <i>migratable key and its security attributes in a created or converted Migration Key Blob,</i></li><li>3) <i>migrated migratable key and its security attributes in a Wrapped Key,</i></li><li>4) <i>certified migratable key and its security attributes in a created or converted Certified Migration Key Blob,</i></li><li>5) <i>migrated Certified Migratable Key and its security attributes in a Wrapped Key Blob,</i></li><li>6) <i>saved Context,</i></li></ol> whether <i>modification, deletion and insertion</i> has occurred.

**FDP\_UIT.1/Session Data exchange integrity**

Hierarchical to:	No other components.
Dependencies:	[FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]  [FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel, or FTP_TRP.1 Trusted path]
FDP_UIT.1.1/Session	The TSF shall enforce <i>the TPM Mode Control SFP, Delegation SFP, Measurement and Reporting SFP, NVS SFP, Monotonic Counter SFP Key Management SFP, Key Migration SFP, Export and Import of Data SFP</i> to be able to <i>transmit and receive</i> <ol style="list-style-type: none"><li>1) <i>command input,</i></li><li>2) <i>return output data and</i></li><li>3) <i>ordinal, header information and data of the wrapped command in a transport session</i></li></ol> in a manner protected from <i>modification, deletion, insertion and replay</i> errors.
FDP_UIT.1.2/Session	The TSF shall be able to determine on receipt of user data <i>command input,</i> whether <i>modification, deletion and insertion and replay</i> has occurred.

**FAU\_GEN.1 Audit data generation**

Hierarchical to:	No other components.
Dependencies:	FPT_STM.1 Reliable time stamps
FAU_GEN.1.1	The TSF shall be able to generate an audit record of the following auditable events: <ol style="list-style-type: none"><li>1) Start-up and shutdown of the audit functions;</li><li>2) All <i>auditable</i> events for the <i>not specified</i> <sup>191</sup> level of audit; and</li><li>3) <i>Transport session</i>.</li></ol>
FAU_GEN.1.2	The TSF shall record within each audit record at least the following information: <ol style="list-style-type: none"><li>1) Date <i>and</i> time of the event, type of event, subject identity (if applicable), and the outcome (success or failure) of the event; and</li><li>2) For each audit event type, based on the auditable event definitions of the functional components included in the PP/ST,</li><li>3) <i>Signed hash value of the TPM_TRANSPORT_LOG_IN structures of the received commands and TPM_TRANSPORT_LOG_OUT structures of the command responses.</i></li></ol>

**6.1.7 DAA**

**FDP\_ACC.1/DAA Subset access control - DAA**

Hierarchical to:	No other components.
Dependencies:	FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control
FDP_ACC.1.1/DAA	The TSF shall enforce the <i>DAA SFP</i> on <ol style="list-style-type: none"><li>1) <i>Subjects: TPM owner,</i></li><li>2) <i>Objects: DAA_tpmSpecific,</i></li><li>3) <i>Operations: commands TPM_DAA_Join, TPM_DAA_Sign.</i></li></ol>

**FDP\_ACF.1/DAA Security attribute based access control - DAA**

Hierarchical to:	No other components.
Dependencies:	FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation
FDP_ACF.1.1/DAA	The TSF shall enforce the <i>DAA SFP</i> to objects based on the following: <ol style="list-style-type: none"><li>1) <i>Subjects: TPM owner,</i></li><li>2) <i>Objects: DAA_tpmSpecific.</i></li></ol>

FDP_ACF.1.2/DAA	The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed:  1) <i>The TPM owner is allowed to execute the commands TPM_DAA_Join and TPM_DAA_Sign.</i>
FDP_ACF.1.3/DAA	The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules: <i>none</i> .
FDP_ACF.1.4/DAA	The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rule:  1) <i>The TSF shall disallow the TPM_DAA_Sign if the DAA_tpmSpecific is not generated by the same TOE.</i>

**FMT\_MSA.1/DAA Management of security attributes**

Hierarchical to:	No other components.
Dependencies:	[FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]  FMT_SMR.1 Security roles FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_MSA.1.1/DAA	The TSF shall enforce the <i>DAA SFP</i> to restrict the ability to <i>modify</i> the security attributes <i>DAA parameters</i> to the <i>Entity owner</i> .

**FMT\_MSA.3/DAA Static attribute initialisation**

Hierarchical to:	No other components.
Dependencies:	FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MSA.3.1/DAA	The TSF shall enforce the <i>DAA SFP</i> to provide <i>restrictive</i> default values for security attributes that are used to enforce the SFP.
FMT_MSA.3.2/DAA	The TSF shall allow the <i>entity owner</i> to specify alternative initial values to override the default values when an object or information is created.

**FPR\_UNL.1 Unlinkability**

Hierarchical to:	No other components.
Dependencies:	No dependencies.
FPR_UNL.1.1	The TSF shall ensure that <i>users</i> are unable to determine whether <i>Direct Anonymous Attestation with randomized base name of the verifier is related as follows: performed by the same identity</i> .

## 6.1.8 TSF Protection

### FPT\_FLS.1 Failure with preservation of secure state

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: No dependencies.

FPT\_FLS.1.1 The TSF shall preserve a secure state when the following types of failures occur: *failure of any crypto operations including RSA encryption, RSA decryption, SHA-1, RNG, RSA signature generation, HMAC generation; failure of any commands or internal operations, **dictionary attack on authorization, failure of the firmware field upgrade process.***

### FPT\_TST.1 TSF testing

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: No dependencies.

FPT\_TST.1.1 The TSF shall run a suite of self tests *at the request of an authorised user, at the condition: after each power-on and reset, prior to execution of the first call to a capability that uses those functions* to demonstrate the correct operation of the TSF operation of *the TSF*.

FPT\_TST.1.2 The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the integrity of *TSF data*.

FPT\_TST.1.3 The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the integrity of *TSF*.

#### *Refinement:*

*After power-on and reset the TOE shall self test all internal functions that are necessary to perform the following operations:*

- a) *TPM\_SHA1Start,*
- b) *TPM\_SHA1Update,*
- c) *TPM\_SHA1Complete,*
- d) *TPM\_SHA1CompleteExtend,*
- e) *TPM\_Extend,*
- f) *TPM\_Startup,*
- g) *TPM\_ContinueSelfTest,*
- h) *TPM\_SelfTestFull,*
- i) *TPM\_HASH\_START / TPM\_HASH\_DATA / TPM\_HASH\_END,*
- j) *TPM\_NV\_ReadValue for indices with the attributes TPM\_NV\_PER\_AUTHREAD and TPM\_NV\_PER\_OWNERREAD set to FALSE,*
- k) *TSC\_ORD\_PhysicalPresence,*
- l) *TSC\_ORD\_ResetEstablishmentBit,*
- m) *TPM\_GetCapability with the property TPM\_CAP\_PROPERTY, subcap property TPM\_CAP\_PROP\_TIS\_TIMEOUT.*

**FPT\_PHP.3 Resistance to physical attack**

Hierarchical to:	No other components.
Dependencies:	No dependencies.
FPT_PHP.3.1	The TSF shall resist <i>physical manipulation and physical probing</i> to the TSF by responding automatically such that the SFRs are always enforced.

**6.2 Security Assurance Requirements for the TOE**

The Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) for the TOE are the assurance components of Evaluation Assurance Level 4 (EAL4) as defined in [CC] and augmented with ALC\_FLR.1 ,AVA\_VAN.4 and ALC\_DVS.2

This assurance package is the assurance package of the claimed Protection Profile ([PP]).

## 7 TOE Summary Specification

The TOE summary specification in the following section specifies the security functionality as well as the assurance measures of the TOE.

### 7.1 TOE Security Features

The TOE consists of eight security features (SF) to meet the Security Functional Requirements.

- SF1: Cryptographic Operations
- SF2: Self Test
- SF3: Access Control
- SF4: Hacking and physical tampering protection/detection
- SF5: Key Management
- SF6: Random Number Generation
- SF7: Identification and Authentication
- SF8: Firmware field upgrade

#### 7.1.1 SF1 – Cryptographic Operations

There are four functions within the TPM related to cryptographic operations: RSA digital signature generation and verification, RSA encryption and decryption and the generation of hash, AES encryption/decryption and HMAC values.

The AES encryption/decryption module operates with conformance to FIPS-197 with key size of 128 bits using counter mode encryption/decryption.

#### 7.1.2 SF2 – Self Test

The TOE supports a suite of self tests to check and demonstrate the correct operation of the TOE security functions.

#### 7.1.3 SF3 – Access Control

The TOE provides a set of access control security function policies (called hereafter globally *Protected Operations Access Controls (POAC)*), comprising access control policies documented in the FDP\_ACC.1 iterations) to protect the sensitive subjects, objects and operations of the TPM.

The TOE enforces the POAC policy on subjects (commands), objects (keys and user data) and operations (signature generation/verification, encryption or decryption). The TOE provides access control by denying access to some subjects, objects and operations and allowing access to other subjects, objects and operations based on three different security attributes, stored as flags in the TPM or associated with the data in an encrypted blob.

#### **7.1.4 SF4 – Hacking and Physical Tampering Protection/Detection**

The TOE supports the following functionality for protection against and detection of hacking and physical tampering:

- Tamper evidence: The TOE is provided in a monolithic package. Any intent to gain physical access to the TPM protected areas will result in evident damage to the TOE enclosure.
- Snooping protection/detection: The TOE is equipped with a mechanism for protection against snooping the user data or the design during operation.

#### **7.1.5 SF5 – Key Management**

There are three functions within the TPM related to key management: generation of asymmetric key pairs, key storing and key destruction.

The TOE supports generation of asymmetric cryptographic key pairs in accordance with the specified cryptographic key generation algorithm RSA and specified cryptographic key sizes RSA 512, 1024 and 2048 bits as defined by PKCS#1 V2.0.

The TOE supports storing of cryptographic keys by storing them in the shielded location.

The TPM supports destruction of cryptographic keys by invalidating the keys in accordance with FIPS 140-2.

#### **7.1.6 SF6 – Random Number Generation**

The TPM supports generation of random numbers using HW RNG module. The HW Random Number Generator is based on physical probabilistic controlled effects. It is implemented with conformance to [SP800-90A] (HASH\_DRBG) and [FIPS 140-2].

#### **7.1.7 SF7 – Identification and Authentication**

The TOE identification and authentication capability is used to authenticate an entity owner and to authorize use of an entity. The basic premise is to prove knowledge of a shared secret. This shared secret is the identification and authentication data. The TCG Specification [TCG-x] calls the identification and authentication process and this data authorization. In both cases, the protocol exchanges nonce-data so that both sides of the transaction can compute a HMAC using secrets or shared secrets and nonce-data. Each side computes the hash value and can compare to the value transmitted. Network listeners



cannot directly infer the authorization data from the hashed objects sent over the network. The identification and authentication data for the TOE Owner and the owner of the Storage Root Key are held within the TOE itself. The identification and authentication data for other owners of entities are held and protected with the entity.

The TPM provides two protocols for authentication and identification to authenticate an entity owner and to authorize use of an entity without revealing the authorization data on the network or the connection to the TOE. The first protocol is the “*Object-Independent Authorization Protocol*” (OIAP), which allows the exchange of nonces with a specific TPM. The second protocol is the “*Object Specific Authorization Protocol*” (OSAP)”, allowing establishment of an authentication session for a single entity. Both identification and authentication protocols use a random nonce. This requires that a nonce from one side be in use only for a message and its reply. For instance, the TOE would create a nonce and send that on a reply. The requestor would receive that nonce and then include it in the next request. The TOE would validate that the correct nonce was in the request and then create a new nonce for the reply. This mechanism is in place to prevent replay attacks and man-in-the-middle attacks.

The TOE prevents the reuse of authentication related to authorization data by using *nonces* for each message and response of all authorization protocols. The *nonce* values from the TOE use the internal RNG. A re-authentication of users is done by using the authorization protocol with a new *nonce* for each message and response.

Any operational role can access all protected commands and shielded locations only through the authentication mechanism. The access-right of commands, user data, keys and operations are defined by different security attributes as defined in chapter 7.1.3. The TPM allows access to data and keys with the “world” access and access to different commands on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is authenticated/identified. In contrast to this each user has to be successfully authenticated/identified before allowing any other TSF-mediated action on behalf of that user.

Furthermore the SF7 supplies the generation and verification of evidence of origin for transmitted data signed using identity keys, by using RSA algorithm for the signature operation at all times.

### **7.1.8 SF8 – Firmware Field Upgrade**

The field upgrading of TPM firmware is securely managed in the following way:

The Field Upgrade process does not expose the FW as a plain text. This is achieved by using AES algorithm (CTR mode) and Nuvoton’s Field Upgrade Symmetric AES 128 bits Key.

The Field Upgrade process uses authentication to verify the integrity and source of the FW. This is achieved by using RSA signature scheme TPM\_SS\_RSASSAPKCS1v15\_SHA and SHA-256 algorithms and Nuvoton's Field Upgrade RSA 2048 bits Key.

If the field upgrade process succeeds, then the resulting product is the Final TOE; otherwise (in case of interruption or incident which prevents the forming of the Final TOE), the Initial TOE remains in its initial state or fail.

The TOE has a dedicated TPM command which reports the version of the TOE firmware.

### 7.1.9 Assignment of SFs to Security Functional Requirements

The justification of the mapping between security functional requirements and security functionalities is given in Table 7.1.

**Table 7.1 – Assignment of Security Functional Requirements to Security Functions**

#	SFR	SF1	SF2	SF3	SF4	SF5	SF6	SF7	SF8
1	FMT_SMR.1							X	X
2	FMT_SMF.1			X		X		X	
3	FMT_MSA.2			X				X	X
4	FPT_TDC.1			X					
5	FCS_CKM.1					X			
6	FCS_RNG.1						X		
7	FCS_CKM.4					X			
8	FCS_COP.1/RSA	X							X
9	FCS_COP.1/AES	X							X
10	FDP_ACC.1/Modes			X					X
11	FDP_ACF.1/Modes			X					X
12	FDP_UIT.1								X
13	FDP_UCT.1								X
14	FMT_MSA.1/Modes			X					
15	FMT_MSA.1/PhysP			X					
16	FMT_MTD.1/AuthData							X	
17	FMT_MTD.1/Deleg							X	
18	FIA_UID.1							X	
19	FIA_UAU.1							X	
20	FIA_UAU.4							X	
21	FIA_UAU.5							X	
22	FIA_UAU.6							X	
23	FIA_AFL.1							X	
24	FMT_MTD.1/Lock							X	
25	FIA_USB.1							X	
26	FDP_RIP.1			X					
27	FDP_ACC.1/Deleg			X					
28	FDP_ACF.1/Deleg			X					
29	FMT_MSA.1/DFT			X					
30	FMT_MSA.1/DT			X					

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#	SFR	SF1	SF2	SF3	SF4	SF5	SF6	SF7	SF8
31	FMT_MSA.3/Deleg			X					
32	FDP_ACC.1/KeyMan			X					
33	FDP_ACF.1/KeyMan			X					
34	FMT_MSA.1/KeyMan			X					
35	FMT_MSA.1/Kevi			X					
36	FMT_MSA.3/KeyMan			X					
37	FDP_ACC.1/MigK			X					
38	FDP_ACF.1/MigK			X					
39	FMT_MSA.1/MigK			X					
40	FMT_MTD.1/MigK			X					
41	FDP_ACC.1/M&R			X					
42	FDP_ACF.1/M&R			X					
43	FMT_MSA.3/M&R			X					
44	FCO_NRO.1/M&R			X					
45	FDP_ACC.1/NVS			X					
46	FDP_ACF.1/NVS			X					
47	FMT_MSA.3/NVS			X					
48	FDP_ACC.1/MC			X					
49	FDP_ACF.1/MC			X					
50	FMT_MSA.1/MC			X					
51	FMT_MSA.3/MC			X					
52	FPT_STM.1							X	
53	FCO_NRO.1/STS							X	
54	FDP_ACC.1/EID			X					
55	FDP_ACF.1/EID			X					
56	FMT_MSA.3/EID			X					
57	FDP_ETC.2			X					
58	FDP_ITC.2			X					
59	FDP_UCT.1/Exp			X					
60	FDP_UCT.1/Imp			X					
61	FDP_UIT.1/Data			X					
62	FDP_UIT.1/Session			X					
63	FAU_GEN.1			X				X	
64	FDP_ACC.1/DAA			X					
65	FDP_ACF.1/DAA			X					
66	FMT_MSA.1/DAA			X					
67	FMT_MSA.3/DAA			X					
68	FPR_UNL.1			X					
69	FPT_FLS.1	X	X	X					X
70	FPT_TST.1		X						
71	FPT_PHP.3				X				

## 8 Rationale

This section provides the evidence which supports the claims that the ST is a complete and cohesive set of objectives and requirements, and that the TOE summary specification addresses the requirements.

### 8.1 Rationale for Security Problem Definition

Strict conformance to the PP is claimed. It is a relevant claim as:

- The threats in the ST are exactly those of the claimed PP (no additional threat added by the presence of the Firmware Field Upgrade functionality);
- The assumptions in the ST are identical to those of the claimed PP (no additional assumption added by the presence of the Firmware Field Upgrade functionality).

The OSPs in the ST are however a superset of the OSPs in the claimed PP: “OSP.FieldUpgrade” is added. This additional OSP induces additional security objectives: “O.FieldUpgradeControl” and “OE.FieldUpgradeInfo”.

The rationale given in the PP ([PP], §5.3) remains fully valid for the Security Target as the “field upgrade” additions do not affect other PP elements. This PP rationale is reproduced in Table 8.1, with the addition for Field Upgrade. This table provides an overview of the mapping between the security objective for the TOE and the Threats, Organisational Security Policies and Assumptions.

**Table 8.1 – Security Objective Rationale**

TOE	O.Anonymity	O.Context_Management	O.Crypto_Key_Man	O.DAC	O.Export	O.Fail_Secure	O.General_Integ_Checks	O.I&A	O.Import	O.Limit_Actions_Auth	O.Locality	O.Record_Measurement	O.MessageNR	O.No_Residual_Info	O.Reporting	O.Security_Attr_Mgt	O.Security_Roles	O.Self_Test	O.Single_Auth	O.Transport_Protection	O.DAA	O.Tamper_Resistance	O.FieldUpgradeControl	OE.Configuration	OE.Locality	OE.Physical_Presence	OE.Int_Prot_Sealed_Blob	OE.Credential	OE.Measurement	OE.DAA	OE.FieldUpgradeInfo
T.Compromise			X					X								X															
T.Bypass															X																
T.Export					X										X									X							
T.Hack_Crypto		X																													
T.Hack_Physical			X																			X									
T.Imperson							X	X	X	X						X								X	X						
T.Import								X																			X				
T.Insecure_State					X	X									X								X								
T.Intercept																				X											
T.Malfunction					X												X														
T.Modify			X				X	X								X															
T.Object_Attr_Change															X																
T.Replay																			X												
T.Repudiate_Transact												X																			
T.Residual_Info													X																		
OSP.Anonymity	X																														
OSP.Context_Management		X																													
OSP.Delegation			X												X																
OSP.Locality										X															X						
OSP.RT_Measurement									X																					X	
OSP.RT_Reporting														X													X				
OSP.RT_Storage		X	X	X			X	X																							
OSP.Anonymous_Attestation																				X											X
A.Configuration																								X							
A.Phys_Presence																									X						
OSP.FieldUpgrade																							X								X

A detailed justification of the mapping is provided in the PP and is not reproduced here. The Field Upgrade justification, which is not provided in the PP, is given below.

**OSP.FieldUpgrade:** The Platform software is allowed to perform Field Upgrade within the certified TPM or installing a new certified TPM before and after delivery to the end user. The end user shall be aware of the certification and the version of the TPM.

The OSP.FieldUpgrade is implemented by O.FieldUpgradeControl and OE.FieldUpgradeInfo: O.FieldUpgradeControl ensures that the field upgrade can only be performed by an entity providing either ownership or physical presence proof and only authentic update data provided by the vendor are accepted. Further, according to OE.FieldUpgradeInfo the operational environment is required to ensure that the end user shall be aware of the field upgrade process and its result, whether the installed firmware is certified or not and the version of the certified TPM.

## 8.2 Rationale for Security Requirements

Strict conformance to the PP is claimed. It is a relevant claim as the statement of security requirements in the ST is a superset of the security requirements in the claimed PP.

The objectives in the ST are a superset of the OSPs in the claimed PP due to addition of O.FieldUpgradeControl. This additional Objective induces additional SFRs: “FDP\_UIT.1” and “FDP\_UCT.1”.

In spite of these two additional SFRs, the rationale given in the PP ([PP], §6.3) remains fully valid for the Security Target. This rationale demonstrates that each security objective for the TOE is covered by at least one security functional requirements, and each dependency of the security requirements is satisfied (or justified when the dependency is not justified). It also contains a short rationale for the EAL package. As the Security Target takes all the security requirements from the claimed PP (plus FDP\_UIT.1 and FDP\_UCT.1), the statement of the security requirements remains internally consistent.

This PP rationale is reproduced in Table 8.2, with the additions for Field Upgrade. This table demonstrates that each security objective for the TOE is covered by at least one SFR and each SFR is traced back to at least one security objective for the TOE.

**Table 8.2 – Security Requirement Rationale**

	O.Anonymity	O.Context_Management	O.Crypto_Key_Man	O.DAC	O.Export	O.Fail_Secure	O.General_Integ_Checks	O.I&A	O.Import	O.Limit_Actions_Auth	O.Locality	O.Record_Measurement	O.MessageNR	O.No_Residual_Info	O.Reporting	O.Security_Attr_Mgt	O.Security_Roles	O.Self_Test	O.Single_Auth	O.Transport_Protection	O.DAA	O.Tamper_Resistance	O.FieldUpgradeControl	
FMT_SMR.1																X							X	
FMT_SMF.1																X								
FMT_MSA.2																X								X
FPT_TDC.1								X																
FCS_CKM.1			X												X									
FCS_RNG.1			X																					
FCS_CKM.4			X										X											
FCS_COP.1/SHA											X	X								X			X	
FCS_COP.1/HMAC		X	X		X		X	X	X											X			X	
FCS_COP.1/RSA_Sig												X		X									X	
FCS_COP.1/RSA_Enc			X		X			X												X			X	
FCS_COP.1/SymEnc		X	X		X			X												X			X	
FDP_ACC.1/Modes	X			X						X														
FDP_ACF.1/Modes	X			X						X														X
FMT_MSA.1/Modes	X			X						X						X								
FMT_MSA.1/PhysP			X	X						X						X								
FMT_MTD.1/AuthData								X																
FMT_MTD.1/Deleg				X				X																
FIA_UID.1								X	X															
FIA_UAU.1								X																
FIA_UAU.4																			X	X				
FIA_UAU.5								X												X				X
FIA_UAU.6								X																
FIA_AFL.1								X																
FMT_MTD.1/Lock								X																
FIA_USB.1				X				X		X							X							
FDP_RIP.1													X											
FDP_ACC.1/Deleg				X																				
FDP_ACF.1/Deleg				X						X														

	O.Anonymity	O.Context_Management	O.Crypto_Key_Man	O.DAC	O.Export	O.Fail_Secure	O.General_Integ_Checks	O.I&A	O.Import	O.Limit_Actions_Auth	O.Locality	O.Record_Measurement	O.MessageNR	O.No_Residual_Info	O.Reporting	O.Security_Attr_Mgt	O.Security_Roles	O.Self_Test	O.Single_Auth	O.Transport_Protection	O.DAA	O.Tamper_Resistance	O.FieldUpgradeControl
FMT_MSA.1/DFT				X												X							
FMT_MSA.1/DT				X												X							
FMT_MSA.3/Deleg				X												X							
FDP_ACC.1/KeyMan			X												X								
FDP_ACF.1/KeyMan			X							X					X								
FMT_MSA.1/KeyMan			X												X	X							
FMT_MSA.1/KEvi			X													X							
FMT_MSA.3/KeyMan			X												X	X							
FDP_ACC.1/MigK			X																				
FDP_ACF.1/MigK			X																				
FMT_MSA.1/MigK			X													X							
FMT_MTD.1/MigK			X																				
FDP_ACC.1/M&R											X				X								
FDP_ACF.1/M&R										X	X				X								
FMT_MSA.3/M&R											X				X	X							
FCO_NRO.1/M&R										X		X			X								
FDP_ACC.1/NVS				X																			
FDP_ACF.1/NVS				X						X													
FMT_MSA.3/NVS				X												X							
FDP_ACC.1/MC				X																			
FDP_ACF.1/MC				X																			
FMT_MSA.1/MC				X												X							
FMT_MSA.3/MC				X												X							
FPT_STM.1													X							X			
FCO_NRO.1/STS													X										
FDP_ACC.1/EID		X			X				X														
FDP_ACF.1/EID		X			X				X	X													
FMT_MSA.3/EID		X			X				X							X							
FDP_ETC.2		X	X		X					X													
FDP_ITC.2			X						X	X													
FDP_UCT.1/Exp		X	X		X																		



	O.Anonymity	O.Context_Management	O.Crypto_Key_Man	O.DAC	O.Export	O.Fail_Secure	O.General_Integ_Checks	O.I&A	O.Import	O.Limit_Actions_Auth	O.Locality	O.Record_Measurement	O.MessageNR	O.No_Residual_Info	O.Reporting	O.Security_Attr_Mgt	O.Security_Roles	O.Self_Test	O.Single_Auth	O.Transport_Protection	O.DAA	O.Tamper_Resistance	O.FieldUpgradeControl
FDP_UCT.1/Imp		X	X						X											X			
FDP_UIT.1/Data		X	X		X				X														
FDP_UIT.1/Session																			X	X			
FAU_GEN.1																				X			
FDP_ACC.1/DAA																					X		
FDP_ACF.1/DAA																					X		
FMT_MSA.1/DAA																					X		
FMT_MSA.3/DAA																					X		
FPR_UNL.1																					X		
FPT_FLS.1						X												X					X
FPT_TST.1							X											X					
FPT_PHP.3																						X	
FDP_UIT.1																							X
FDP_UCT.																							X

A detailed justification required for suitability of the security functional requirements to achieve the security objectives is provided in the PP and is not reproduced here. The Field Upgrade justification, which is not provided in the PP, is given below.

**O.FieldUpgradeControl** requires that the TOE restricts access to the Field Upgrade capability and accepts only authentic update data provided by the TOE vendor. This objective is addressed by the following SFRs:

- FMT\_SMR.1/Security roles defines a set of roles that the TSF shall maintain. Also, the association of users with these roles is required by this SFR, the TPM owner.
- FDP\_ACF.1/Modes Security attribute based access control defines rules to enforce a policy regarding the TOE states, including the state transition regarding the Field Upgrade mode state.
- FDP\_UIT.1/Firmware requires that the TSF shall enforce a SFP to provide and use integrity protection capabilities for firmware update data on reception of that data.
- FDP\_UCT.1/Firmware requires that the TSF shall enforce a SFP to use confidentiality protection capabilities for firmware update data on reception of that data.
- FPT\_FLS.1 requires that the TSF shall preserve a secure state during a failure of the field upgrade process
- FMT\_MSA.2 requires that the TSF shall ensure that only secure values are accepted for the TPM\_FieldUpgrade command.
- FCS\_COP.1 This SFR identifies the cryptographic algorithms available on the TOE. As regards the Field Upgrade capabilities data decryption is performed by an AES 128 CTR mode, and integrity control is performed by using RSA signature scheme PKCS#1 v2.0.

Overall, two SFRs “FDP\_UIT.1” and “FDP\_UCT.1” have been added to those of the PP; these SFRs are only relevant to **O.FieldUpgradeControl**.

Their dependency is on [FDP\_ACC.1 Subset access control, or FDP\_IFC.1 Subset information flow control] and [FTP\_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel, or FTP\_TRP.1 Trusted path]. Dependency on FDP\_ACC.1 is achieved. As regards the other expected dependency, the firmware update procedure as kind of user data import is realized based on commands that transfer single data packets into the TOE. No secure channel will be established and used for that process, the protection of the user data is done based on checks of each single packet. Hence the SFRs regarding trusted channel and trusted path are not applicable.

## 9 Appendix 1

The following table lists all commands available on the TOE. Its intent is to identify which of the commands labelled as “optional” in the TCG specification are implemented on the TOE, and which are Nuvoton-specific commands.

### 9.1 Commands from TCG Specification Implemented in the TOE

**Table 9.1 – Commands Implemented in the TOE**

			Optional	RQU	No Owner	Avail	
						Deactivated	Disabled
TPM_ORD_ActivateIdentity	122	0x0000007A					
TPM_ORD_AuthorizeMigrationKey	43	0x0000002B					
TPM_ORD_CertifyKey	50	0x00000032		X			
TPM_ORD_CertifyKey2	51	0x00000033		X			
TPM_ORD_ChangeAuth	12	0x0000000C					
TPM_ORD_ChangeAuthAsymFinish	15	0x0000000F		X			
TPM_ORD_ChangeAuthAsymStart	14	0x0000000E		X			
TPM_ORD_ChangeAuthOwner	16	0x00000010					
TPM_ORD_CMK_ApproveMA	29	0x0000001D	X				
TPM_ORD_CMK_ConvertMigration	36	0x00000024	X				
TPM_ORD_CMK_CreateBlob	27	0x0000001B	X				
TPM_ORD_CMK_CreateKey	19	0x00000013	X				
TPM_ORD_CMK_CreateTicket	18	0x00000012	X				
TPM_ORD_CMK_SetRestrictions	28	0x0000001C	X				
TPM_ORD_ContinueSelfTest	83	0x00000053		X	X	X	X
TPM_ORD_ConvertMigrationBlob	42	0x0000002A		X			
TPM_ORD_CreateCounter	220	0x000000DC					
TPM_ORD_CreateEndorsementKeyPair	120	0x00000078		X	X		
TPM_ORD_CreateMigrationBlob	40	0x00000028					
TPM_ORD_CreateWrapKey	31	0x0000001F					
TPM_ORD_DAA_Join	41	0x00000029	X				
TPM_ORD_DAA_Sign	49	0x00000031	X				
TPM_ORD_Delegate_CreateKeyDelegation	212	0x000000D4					
TPM_ORD_Delegate_CreateOwnerDelegation	213	0x000000D5					
TPM_ORD_Delegate_LoadOwnerDelegation	216	0x000000D8		X	X		
TPM_ORD_Delegate_Manage	210	0x000000D2		X	X		
TPM_ORD_Delegate_ReadTable	219	0x000000DB		X	X		
TPM_ORD_Delegate_UpdateVerification	209	0x000000D1					
TPM_ORD_Delegate_VerifyDelegation	214	0x000000D6		X			
TPM_ORD_DirRead	26	0x0000001A		X			
TPM_ORD_DirWriteAuth	25	0x00000019					
TPM_ORD_DisableForceClear	94	0x0000005E		X	X		
TPM_ORD_DisableOwnerClear	92	0x0000005C					

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			Avail				
			Optional	RQU	No Owner	Deactivated	Disabled
TPM_ORD_DisablePubekRead	126	0x0000007E					
TPM_ORD_DSAP	17	0x00000011		X		X	X
TPM_ORD_EstablishTransport	230	0x000000E6		X			
TPM_ORD_EvictKey	34	0x00000022		X			
TPM_ORD_ExecuteTransport	231	0x000000E7					
TPM_ORD_Extend	20	0x00000014		X	X	X	X
TPM_ORD_FieldUpgrade	170	0x000000AA	X	X	X	X	X
TPM_ORD_FlushSpecific	186	0x000000BA		X	X	X	X
TPM_ORD_ForceClear	93	0x0000005D		X	X		
TPM_ORD_GetCapability	101	0x00000065		X	X	X	X
TPM_ORD_GetCapabilityOwner	102	0x00000066					
TPM_ORD_GetPubKey	33	0x00000021		X			
TPM_ORD_GetRandom	70	0x00000046		X	X		
TPM_ORD_GetTestResult	84	0x00000054		X	X	X	X
TPM_ORD_GetTicks	241	0x000000F1		X	X		
TPM_ORD_IncrementCounter	221	0x000000DD				X	X
TPM_ORD_Init	151	0x00000097		X	X	X	X
TPM_ORD_KeyControlOwner	35	0x00000023					
TPM_ORD_LoadContext	185	0x000000B9		X			
TPM_ORD_LoadKey	32	0x00000020		X			
TPM_ORD_LoadKey2	65	0x00000041		X			
TPM_ORD_MakeIdentity	121	0x00000079					
TPM_ORD_MigrateKey	37	0x00000025		X			
TPM_ORD_NV_DefineSpace 204	0x000000CC			X	X	A	A
TPM_ORD_NV_ReadValue	207	0x000000CF		X	X	A	A
TPM_ORD_NV_ReadValueAuth	208	0x000000D0					
TPM_ORD_NV_WriteValue	205	0x000000CD		X	X	A	A
TPM_ORD_NV_WriteValueAuth	206	0x000000CE					
TPM_ORD_OIAP	10	0x0000000A		X	X	X	X
TPM_ORD_OSAP	11	0x0000000B		X		X	X
TPM_ORD_OwnerClear	91	0x0000005B					
TPM_ORD_OwnerReadInternalPub	129	0x00000081					
TPM_ORD_OwnerReadPubek	125	0x0000007D					
TPM_ORD_OwnerSetDisable	110	0x0000006E				X	X
TPM_ORD_PCR_Reset	200	0x000000C8		X	X		
TPM_ORD_PcrRead	21	0x00000015		X	X		
TPM_ORD_PhysicalDisable	112	0x00000070		X	X	X	
TPM_ORD_PhysicalEnable	111	0x0000006F		X	X	X	X
TPM_ORD_PhysicalSetDeactivated	114	0x00000072		X	X	X	
TPM_ORD_Quote	22	0x00000016		X			
TPM_ORD_Quote2	62	0x0000003E	X	X			
TPM_ORD_ReadCounter	222	0x000000DE		X	X		

						Avail	
			Optional	RQU	No Owner	Deactivated	Disabled
TPM_ORD_ReadPubek	124	0x0000007C		X	X		
TPM_ORD_ReleaseCounter	223	0x000000DF			X		
TPM_ORD_ReleaseCounterOwner	224	0x000000E0					
TPM_ORD_ReleaseTransportsigned	232	0x000000E8					
TPM_ORD_Reset	90	0x0000005A		X	X	X	X
TPM_ORD_ResetLockValue	64	0x00000040					
TPM_ORD_SaveContext	184	0x000000B8		X			
TPM_ORD_SaveState	152	0x00000098		X	X	X	X
TPM_ORD_Seal	23	0x00000017					
TPM_ORD_Sealx	61	0x0000003D	X				
TPM_ORD_SelfTestFull	80	0x00000050		X	X	X	X
TPM_ORD_SetCapability	63	0x0000003F		X	X	X	X
TPM_ORD_SetOperatorAuth	116	0x00000074		X	X		
TPM_ORD_SetOwnerInstall	113	0x00000071		X	X		
TPM_ORD_SetOwnerPointer	117	0x00000075		X			
TPM_ORD_SetTempDeactivated	115	0x00000073		X	X		X
TPM_ORD_SHA1Complete	162	0x000000A2		X	X	X	X
TPM_ORD_SHA1CompleteExtend	163	x000000A3		X	X	X	X
TPM_ORD_SHA1Start	160	0x000000A0		X	X	X	X
TPM_ORD_SHA1Update	161	0x000000A1		X	X	X	X
TPM_ORD_Sign	60	0x0000003C		X			
TPM_ORD_Startup	153	x00000099		X	X	X	X
TPM_ORD_StirRandom	71	0x00000047		X	X		
TPM_ORD_TakeOwnership	13	0x0000000D			X	X	
TPM_ORD_Terminate_Handle	150	0x00000096		X	X	X	X
TPM_ORD_TickStampBlob	242	0x000000F2		X			
TPM_ORD_UnBind	30	0x0000001E		X			
TPM_ORD_Unseal	24	0x00000018					
TSC_ORD_PhysicalPresence	10	0x4000000A		X	X	X	X
TSC_ORD_ResetEstablishmentBit	11	0x4000000B		X	X	X	X

## 9.2 Nuvoton-Specific Commands

NTC\_GetTpmStatus

For more information, see [PRG].

## 10 Appendix 2

### 10.1 References

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- [FIPS 180] FIPS PUB 180-2 FEDERAL INFORMATION PROCESSING STANDARDS PUBLICATION, SECURE HASH STANDARD, National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2002 August 1
- [HMAC] RFC 2104: HMAC: Keyed-Hashing for Message Authentication, <http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2104.txt>
- [PKCS#1] PKCS #1 v2.0: RSA Cryptography Standard, RSA Laboratories, October 1, 1998
- [FIPS140-2] Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 140-2
- [SP800-90A] NIST Special Publication 800-90A: Recommendation for Random Number Generation Using Deterministic Random Bit Generators; January 2012
- [FIPS 197] Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 197: Specification for the ADVANCED ENCRYPTION STANDARD (AES), November 26, 2001

## 10.2 Acronyms and Glossary

**Acronyms**

- CC Common Criteria
- EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
- IT Information Technology
- NTC Nuvoton Technology Corporation
- PP Protection Profile
- SF Security Function
- SFP Security Function Policy
- SFR Security Functional Requirement
- ST Security Target
- TOE Target of Evaluation
- TSC TSF Scope of Control
- TSF TOE Security Functions
- TSFI TSF Interface
- TSP TOE Security Policy

## Glossary

AES:	Symmetric key encryption defined by NIST as FIPS 197.
Blob:	Opaque data of fixed or variable size. The meaning and interpretation of the data is outside the scope and context of the Subsystem.
Challenger:	An entity that requests and has the ability to interpret integrity metrics from a Subsystem.
Conformance Credential:	A credential that states the conformance to the TCG specification of: the TPM; the method of incorporation of the TPM into the platform; the RTM; and the method of incorporation of the RTM into the platform.
Denial-of-service attack:	An attack on a system (or subsystem) which has no effect on information except to prevent its use.
Endorsement Credential:	A credential containing a public key (the endorsement public key) that was generated by a genuine TPM.
Endorsement Key:	A term used ambiguously, depending on context, to mean a pair of keys, or the public key of that pair, or the private key of that pair; an asymmetric key pair generated by or inserted in a TPM that is used as proof that a TPM is a genuine TPM; the public endorsement key (PUBEK); the private endorsement key (PRIVEK).
Identity Credential:	A credential issued by a Privacy CA that provides an identity for the TPM.
Integrity metric(s):	Values that are the results of measurements on the integrity of the platform.
Man-in-the-middle attack:	An attack by an entity intercepting communications between two others without their knowledge and by intercepting that communication is able to obtain or modify the information between them.
Migratable:	A key which may be transported outside the specific TPM.
Nonce:	A nonce is a random value that provides protection from replay and other attacks. Many of the commands and protocols in the specification require a nonce.
Non-Migratable:	A key which cannot be transported outside a specific TPM; a key that is (statistically) unique to a particular TPM.
Owner:	The entity that owns the platform in which a TPM is installed. Since there is, by definition, a one-to-one relationship between the TPM and the platform, the Owner is also the Owner of the TPM. The Owner of the platform is not necessarily the "user" of the platform (e.g., in a corporation, the Owner of the platform might be the IT department while the user is an employee.) The Owner has administration rights over the TPM.
PKI Identity Protocol:	The protocol used to insert anonymous identities into the TPM.
Platform Credential:	A credential that states that a specific platform contains a genuine TCG Subsystem.



- Privacy CA: An entity that issues an Identity Credential for a TPM based on trust in the entities that vouch for the TPM via the Endorsement Credential, the Conformance Credential, and the Platform Credential.
- Private Endorsement Key (PRIVEK): The private key of the key pair that proves that a TPM is a genuine TPM. The PRIVEK is (statistically) unique to only one TPM.
- Public Endorsement Key (PUBEK): A public key that proves that a TPM is a genuine TPM. The PUBEK is (statistically) unique to only one TPM.
- Random number generator (RNG): A pseudo-random number generator that must be initialised with unpredictable data and provides, “random” numbers on demand.
- Root of Trust for Measurement (RTM): The point from which all trust in the measurement process is predicated.
- Root of Trust for Reporting (RTR): The point from which all trust in reporting of measured information is predicated.
- Root of Trust for Storing (RTS): The point from which all trust in Protected Storage is predicated.
- RSA: An (asymmetric) encryption method using two keys: a private key and a public key. Reference: <http://www.rsa.com>.
- SHA-1: A NIST defined hashing algorithm producing a 160-bit result from an arbitrary sized source as specified in FIPS 180-1.
- Storage Root Key (SRK): The root key of a hierarchy of keys associated with a TPM; generated within a TPM; a non-migratable key.
- Subsystem: The combination of the TSS and the TPM.
- Support Services (TSS): Services to support the TPM but which do not need the protection of the TPM. The same as Trusted Platform Support Services.
- TCG-protected capability: A function which is protected within the TPM, and has access to TPM secrets.
- TPM Identity: One of the anonymous PKI identities belonging to a TPM; a TPM may have multiple identities.
- Trusted Platform Agent (TPA): Trusted Platform Agent; the component within the platform that reports integrity metrics, logs, Validation Data, etc. to a Challenger; outside the scope of this specification.
- Trusted Platform Measurement Store (TPMS): Storage locations within the Subsystem, which contain unprotected logs of measurement process.
- Trusted Platform Module (TPM): The set of functions and data that are common to all types of platform, which must be trustworthy if the Subsystem is to be trustworthy; a logical definition in terms of protected capabilities and shielded locations.
- Trusted Platform Support Services (TSS): The set of functions and data that are common to all types of platform, which are not required to be trustworthy (and therefore do not need to be part of the TPM).
- User: An entity that uses the platform in which a TPM is installed. The only rights that a User has over a TPM are the rights given to the User by the Owner. These rights are expressed in the form of authentication data, given by the Owner to the User, that permits access to entities protected by the TPM. The User of the platform is not necessarily the “owner” of the platform (e.g., in a corporation, the owner of the platform might be the IT department while the User is an employee). There can be multiple Users.

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- Validation Credential: A credential that states values of measurements that should be obtained when measuring a particular part of the platform when the part is functioning as expected.
- Validation Data: Data inside a Validation Credential; the values that the integrity measurements should produce when the part of a platform described by the Validation Credential is working correctly.
- Validation Entity: An entity that issues a Validation Certificate for a component; the manufacturer of that component; an agent of the manufacturer of that component.