National Information Assurance Partnership
Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
Validation Report
Brocade Communications Systems, Inc.
Brocade MLXe® and NetIron® Family
Devices with Multi-Service IronWare
R05.6.00
Report Number: CCEVS-VR-10564-2014
Dated: May 29, 2014
Version: 1.0
National Institute of Standards and Technology National Security Agency
Information Technology Laboratory Information Assurance Directorate
100 Bureau Drive 9800 Savage Road STE 6940
Gaithersburg, MD 20899 Fort George G. Meade, MD 20755-6940
®
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Table of Contents
1 Executive Summary.................................................................................................... 1
2 Identification............................................................................................................... 2
3 Architectural Information ........................................................................................... 3
3.1 TOE Evaluated Platforms ................................................................................... 4
3.2 TOE Architecture................................................................................................ 4
3.3 Physical Boundaries............................................................................................ 5
4 Security Policy............................................................................................................ 5
4.1 Security audit ...................................................................................................... 5
4.2 Cryptographic support ........................................................................................ 6
4.3 User data protection............................................................................................ 6
4.4 Identification and authentication......................................................................... 6
4.5 Security management.......................................................................................... 6
4.6 Protection of the TSF.......................................................................................... 6
4.7 TOE access.......................................................................................................... 7
4.8 Trusted path/channels ......................................................................................... 7
5 Assumptions................................................................................................................ 7
6 Documentation............................................................................................................ 7
7 IT Product Testing ...................................................................................................... 8
7.1 Developer Testing............................................................................................... 8
7.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing ............................................................... 8
8 Evaluated Configuration............................................................................................. 8
9 Results of the Evaluation ............................................................................................ 9
10 Validator Comments/Recommendations .................................................................... 9
11 Security Target............................................................................................................ 9
12 Glossary .................................................................................................................... 10
13 Bibliography ............................................................................................................. 10
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1 Executive Summary
This report documents the assessment of the National Information Assurance Partnership
(NIAP) validation team of the evaluation of Brocade MLXe® and NetIron® Family
Devices with Multi-Service IronWare R05.6.00 solution provided by Brocade
Communications Systems, Inc. It presents the evaluation results, their justifications, and
the conformance results. This Validation Report is not an endorsement of the Target of
Evaluation by any agency of the U.S. government, and no warranty is either expressed or
implied.
The evaluation was performed by the Gossamer Security Solutions (Gossamer) Common
Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL) in Catonsville, MD, United States of America, and
was completed in Month Year. The information in this report is largely derived from the
Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) and associated test reports, all written by Gossamer
Security Solutions. The evaluation determined that the product is both Common Criteria
Part 2 Extended and Part 3 Conformant, and meets the assurance requirements of EAL 1.
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the Brocade MLXe® and NetIron® Family Devices
with Multi-Service IronWare R05.6.00 family of products. The TOE is composed of a
hardware appliance with embedded software installed on a management processor. The
embedded software is a version of Brocades' proprietary Multi-Service IronWare software.
The software controls the switching and routing network frames and packets among the
connections available on the hardware appliances.
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) identified in this Validation Report has been evaluated at a
NIAP approved Common Criteria Testing Laboratory using the Common Methodology for
IT Security Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev 4) for conformance to the Common Criteria for
IT Security Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev 4). This Validation Report applies only to the
specific version of the TOE as evaluated. The evaluation has been conducted in
accordance with the provisions of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation
Scheme policies and practices as described on their web site www.niap-ccevs.org.
The validation team provided guidance on technical issues and evaluation processes, and
reviewed the individual work units of the ETR and the reports for the ND PP assurance
activities. The validation team found that the evaluation showed that the product satisfies
all of the functional requirements and assurance requirements stated in the Security Target
(ST). Therefore the validation team concludes that the testing laboratory’s findings are
accurate, the conclusions justified, and the conformance results are correct. The
conclusions of the testing laboratory in the evaluation technical report are consistent with
the evidence produced.
The Gossamer Security Solutions evaluation team concluded that the Common Criteria
requirements for Evaluation Assurance Level (EAL) 1.
The technical information included in this report was obtained from the Brocade
Communications Systems, Inc. Brocade MLXe® and NetIron® Family Devices with
Multi-Service IronWare R05.6.00 Security Target and analysis performed by the
Validation Team.
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2 Identification
The CCEVS is a joint National Security Agency (NSA) and National Institute of Standards
effort to establish commercial facilities to perform trusted product evaluations. Under this
program, security evaluations are conducted by commercial testing laboratories called
Common Criteria Testing Laboratories (CCTLs) using the Common Evaluation
Methodology (CEM) for Evaluation Assurance Level (EAL) 1 through 4 in accordance
with National Voluntary Laboratory Assessment Program (NVLAP) accreditation.
The NIAP Validation Body assigns Validators to monitor the CCTLs to ensure quality and
consistency across evaluations. Developers of information technology products desiring a
security evaluation contract with a CCTL and pay a fee for their product’s evaluation.
Upon successful completion of the evaluation, the product is added to NIAP’s Validated
Products List.
Table 1 provides information needed to completely identify the product, including:
• The Target of Evaluation (TOE): the fully qualified identifier of the product as
evaluated.
• The Security Target (ST), describing the security features, claims, and assurances of the
product.
• The conformance result of the evaluation.
• The Protection Profile to which the product is conformant.
• The organizations and individuals participating in the evaluation.
Table 1: Evaluation Identifiers
Item Identifier
Evaluation Scheme United States NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
TOE: Brocade MLXe® and NetIron® Family Devices with Multi-Service IronWare
R05.6.00
Protection Profile
(Specific models identified in Section 3.1, below)
Protection Profile for Network Devices, version 1.1, 8 June 2012 (NDPP)
(including the optional SSH and TLS requirements) with Errata #2
ST: Brocade Communications Systems, Inc. Brocade MLXe® and NetIron® Family
Devices with Multi-Service IronWare R05.6.00 Security Target, Version 1.0, May
19, 2014
Evaluation Technical
Report
Evaluation Technical Report for Brocade MLXe® and NetIron® Family Devices
with Multi-Service IronWare R05.6.00, Version 1.1, May 19, 2014
CC Version Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
rev 4
Conformance Result CC Part 2 extended, CC Part 3 conformant
Sponsor Brocade Communications Systems, Inc.
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Item Identifier
Developer Brocade Communications Systems, Inc.
Common Criteria
Testing Lab (CCTL)
Gossamer Security Solutions, Inc.
CCEVS Validators Patrick Mallett, The MITRE Corporation
Brad O’Neill, The MITRE Corporation
3 Architectural Information
Note: The following architectural description is based on the description presented in the
Security Target.
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the Brocade MLXe® and NetIron® Family Devices
with Multi-Service IronWare R05.6.00 family of products.
The TOE is composed of a hardware appliance with embedded software installed on a
management processor. The embedded software is a version of Brocades' proprietary
Multi-Service IronWare software. The software controls the switching and routing network
frames and packets among the connections available on the hardware appliances.
All TOE appliances are configured at the factory with default parameters to allow
immediate use of the system’s basic features through its Command Line Interface (CLI).
However, the product should be configured in accordance with the evaluated configuration
(using the Multi-Service IronWare Federal Information Processing Standards and Common
Criteria Guide) prior to being placed into operation. The CLI is a text based interface which
is accessible from a directly connected terminal or via a remote terminal using SSH. Once
configured, the MLX TOE series also offers an encrypted Web Management Interface
using TLS.
The hardware platforms that support the TOE have a number of common hardware
characteristics:
• Central processor that supports all system operations, i.e. PowerPC etc.
• Dynamic memory, used by the central processor for all system operations
• Non-volatile flash memory, used to store the operating system image, startup
configuration and other relevant files.
• Multiple physical network interfaces either fixed in configuration or removable as
in a chassis based product.
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3.1 TOE Evaluated Platforms
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is Brocade Communications Systems, Inc. Brocade
MLXe® and NetIron® Family Devices with Multi-Service IronWare R05.6.00, including
the following series and models:
• Brocade NetIron MLXe Series Hardware Platforms (BR-MLXE-16-MR-M-AC,
BR-MLXE-16-MR-M-DC, BR-MLXE-16-MR2-M-AC, BR-MLXE-16-MR2-M-
DC, BR-MLXE-8-MR-M-AC, BR-MLXE-8-MR-M-DC, BR-MLXE-8-MR2-M-
AC, BR-MLXE-8-MR2-M-DC, BR-MLXE-4-MR-M-AC, BR-MLXE-4-MR-M-
DC, BR-MLXE-4-MR2-M-AC, and BR-MLXE-4-MR2-M-DC);
• Brocade NetIron CER 2000 Series Hardware Platforms (NI-CER-2024C-
ADVPREM-AC, NI-CER-2024C-ADVPREM-DC, NI-CER-2024F-ADVPREM-
AC, NI-CER-2024F-ADVPREM-DC, NI-CER-2048C-ADVPREM-AC, NI-CER-
2048C-ADVPREM-DC, NI-CER-2048CX-ADVPREM-AC, NI-CER-2048CX-
ADVPREM-DC, NI-CER-2048F-ADVPREM-AC, NI-CER-2048F-ADVPREM-
DC, NI-CER-2048FX-ADVPREM-AC, NI-CER-2048FX-ADVPREM-DC, BR-
CER-2024C-4X-RT-AC, BR-CER-2024C-4X-RT-DC, BR-CER-2024F-4X-RT-
AC, and BR-CER-2024F-4X-RT-DC); and
• Brocade NetIron CES 2000 Series Hardware Platforms (BR-CES-2024C-4X-AC,
BR-CES-2024C-4X-DC, BR-CES-2024F-4X-AC, and BR-CES-2024F-4X-DC).
3.2 TOE Architecture
The basic architecture of each TOE appliance begins with a hardware appliance with
physical network connections. Within the hardware appliance, the Brocade IOS is designed
to control and enable access to the available hardware functions (e.g., program execution,
device access, facilitate basic routing functions). IOS enforces applicable security policies
on network information flowing through the hardware appliance.
The basic start-up operation of the TOE is as follows:
1. At system startup the operating system is transferred from flash memory to dynamic
memory using a built-in hardware bootstrap.
2. The operating system reads the configuration parameters from the configuration file
in non-volatile memory and then builds the necessary data structures in dynamic
memory and begins operation.
During normal operation, IP packets are sent to the management IP address or through the
appliance over one or more of its physical network interfaces, which processes them
according to the system’s configuration and state information dynamically maintained by
the appliance. This processing typically results in the frames or packets being forwarded
out of the device over another interface, or dropped in accordance with a configured policy.
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The TOE will process other packets destined for itself (control path packets) based on the
requirements of the given protocol (HTTPS or SSH).
3.3 Physical Boundaries
Each TOE appliance runs a version of the Brocades software and has physical network
connections to its environment to facilitate routing and switching of network traffic. The
TOE appliance can also be the destination of network traffic, where it provides interfaces
for its own management.
The TOE may be accessed and managed through a PC or terminal in the environment
which can be remote from or directly connected to the TOE.
The TOE can be configured to forward its audit records to an external syslog server in the
network environment. This is generally advisable given the limited audit log storage space
on the evaluated appliances.
The TOE can be configured to synchronize its internal clock using an external NTP server
in the operational environment.
NetIron provides SSL encrypted TACACS+ authentication but does not provide SSL
encrypted RADIUS. Thus, the use of RADIUS external authentication services are
excluded from the evaluated configuration of the TOE. NetIron’s TACACS+ supports
password authentication only and does not support SSH public-key authentication.
4 Security Policy
This section summaries the security functionality of the TOE:
1. Security audit
2. Cryptographic support
3. User data protection
4. Identification and authentication
5. Security Management
6. Protection of the TSF
7. TOE access
8. Trusted path/channels
4.1 Security audit
The TOE is designed to be able to generate logs for a wide range of security relevant
events. The TOE can be configured to store the logs locally so they can be accessed by an
administrator and also to send the logs to a designated log server using TLS to protect the
logs while in transit on the network.
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4.2 Cryptographic support
The TOE is a FIPS-validated cryptographic module that provides key management, random
bit generation, encryption/decryption, digital signature, secure hashing, and key-hashing
features in support of higher level cryptographic protocols including SSH and TLS/HTTPS.
4.3 User data protection
The TOE performs a wide variety of network switching and routing functions, passing
network traffic among its various network connections. While implementing applicable
network protocols associated with network traffic routing, the TOE is designed to ensure
that it doesn’t inadvertently reuse data found in network traffic. This is accomplished
primarily by controlling the size of all buffers, fully overwriting buffer contents, and zero-
padding of memory structures and buffers when necessary.
4.4 Identification and authentication
The TOE requires users to be identified and authenticated before they can use functions
mediated by the TOE, with the exception of passing network traffic in accordance with its
configured switching/routing rules. It provides the ability to both assign attributes (user
names, passwords and privilege levels) and to authenticate users against these attributes.
4.5 Security management
The TOE provides Command Line Interface (CLI) commands and the MLX series provides
an HTTPS (utilizing TLS v1.0) Graphical User Interface (Web GUI) to access the wide
range of security management functions to manage its security policies. All administrative
activity and functions including security management commands are limited to authorized
users (i.e., administrators) only after they have provided acceptable user identification and
authentication data to the TOE. The security management functions are controlled through
the use of privileges associated with roles that can be assigned to TOE users. Among the
available privileges, only the Super User can actually manage the security policies provided
by the TOE and the TOE offers a complete set of functions to facilitate effective
management since the Super User allows for complete read-and-write access to the system.
4.6 Protection of the TSF
The TOE implements a number of features design to protect itself to ensure the reliability
and integrity of its security features.
It protects particularly sensitive data such as stored passwords and cryptographic keys so
that they are not accessible even by an administrator. It also provides its own timing
mechanism to ensure that reliable time information is available (e.g., for log
accountability).
Note that the TOE is a single appliance, and as such, no intra-TOE communication is
subject to any risks that may require special protection (e.g., cryptographic mechanisms).
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The TOE includes functions to perform self-tests so that it might detect when it is failing. It
also includes mechanisms (i.e., verification of the digital signature of each new image) so
that the TOE itself can be updated while ensuring that the updates will not introduce
malicious or other unexpected changes in the TOE.
4.7 TOE access
The TOE can be configured to display a message of the day banner when an administrator
establishes an interactive session and subsequently will enforce an administrator-defined
inactivity timeout value after which the inactive session (local or remote) will be
terminated.
4.8 Trusted path/channels
The TOE protects interactive communication with administrators using SSHv2 for CLI
access or, for the MLX series, TLS/HTTPS for Web graphical user interface access. In
each case, the both integrity and disclosure protection is ensured. If the negotiation of an
encrypted session fails or if the user does not have authorization for remote administration,
the attempted connection will not be established.
The TOE protects communication with network peers, such as a log server, using TLS
connections to prevent unintended disclosure or modification of logs.
5 Assumptions
The Security Problem Definition, including the assumptions, may be found in the
Protection Profile for Network Devices, version 1.1, 8 June 2012 (NDPP) with Errata#2.
That information has not been reproduced here and the NDPP should be consulted if there
is interest in that material.
6 Documentation
The following documents were available with the TOE for evaluation:
• Multi-Service IronWare Federal Information Processing Standards and Common
Criteria Guide Platform Support: Multi-Service IronWare R05.6.xx, 53-1002735-
01, May 19 2014.
• Multi-Service IronWare Administration Configuration Guide Supporting Multi-
Service IronWare R05.6.00, 53-1003028-02, 9 December 2013.
• Multi-Service IronWare Security Configuration Guide Supporting Multi-Service
IronWare R05.6.00, 53-1003035-02, 9 December 2013
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7 IT Product Testing
This section describes the testing efforts of the developer and the Evaluation Team. It is
derived from information contained in the Evaluation Team Test Report for the Brocade
MLXe® and NetIron® Family Devices with Multi-Service IronWare R05.6.00, Version
1.0, February 14, 2014.
7.1 Developer Testing
No evidence of developer testing is required in the assurance activities for this product.
7.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing
The evaluation team verified the product according to the Multi-Service IronWare Federal
Information Processing Standards and Common Criteria Guide Platform Support: Multi-
Service IronWare R05.6.xx, 53-1002735-01, 11 February 2014 document and ran the tests
specified in the NDPP including the optional SSH and HTTPS/TLS tests.
8 Evaluated Configuration
The evaluated configuration, as defined in the Security Target, is the Brocade MLXe® and
NetIron® Family Devices with Multi-Service IronWare R05.6.00 including the following
series and models
• Brocade NetIron MLXe Series Hardware Platforms (BR-MLXE-16-MR-M-AC,
BR-MLXE-16-MR-M-DC, BR-MLXE-16-MR2-M-AC, BR-MLXE-16-MR2-M-
DC, BR-MLXE-8-MR-M-AC, BR-MLXE-8-MR-M-DC, BR-MLXE-8-MR2-M-
AC, BR-MLXE-8-MR2-M-DC, BR-MLXE-4-MR-M-AC, BR-MLXE-4-MR-M-
DC, BR-MLXE-4-MR2-M-AC, and BR-MLXE-4-MR2-M-DC);
• Brocade NetIron CER 2000 Series Hardware Platforms (NI-CER-2024C-
ADVPREM-AC, NI-CER-2024C-ADVPREM-DC, NI-CER-2024F-ADVPREM-
AC, NI-CER-2024F-ADVPREM-DC, NI-CER-2048C-ADVPREM-AC, NI-CER-
2048C-ADVPREM-DC, NI-CER-2048CX-ADVPREM-AC, NI-CER-2048CX-
ADVPREM-DC, NI-CER-2048F-ADVPREM-AC, NI-CER-2048F-ADVPREM-
DC, NI-CER-2048FX-ADVPREM-AC, NI-CER-2048FX-ADVPREM-DC, BR-
CER-2024C-4X-RT-AC, BR-CER-2024C-4X-RT-DC, BR-CER-2024F-4X-RT-
AC, and BR-CER-2024F-4X-RT-DC); and
• Brocade NetIron CES 2000 Series Hardware Platforms (BR-CES-2024C-4X-AC,
BR-CES-2024C-4X-DC, BR-CES-2024F-4X-AC, and BR-CES-2024F-4X-DC).
To use the product in the evaluated configuration the image version must be “xmr05600aa”
(for the MLX series) or “ce05600aa” (for the CER or CES series). The product also must
be configured as specified in the Multi-Service IronWare Federal Information Processing
Standards and Common Criteria Guide Platform Support: Multi-Service IronWare
R05.6.xx, 53-1002735-01, 11 February 2014.
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9 Results of the Evaluation
The results of the assurance requirements are summarized in this section. The details of the
evaluation results are recorded in the Evaluation Technical Report (proprietary) and Test
Summary Report provided by the CCTL. A verdict for an assurance component is
determined by the resulting verdicts assigned to the corresponding evaluator action
elements. The evaluation was conducted based upon version 3.1 rev 4 of the CC and the
CEM. Additionally the evaluators performed the assurance activities specified in the
Network Devices Protection Profile (NDPP). The evaluation determined that the Brocade
MLXe® and NetIron® Family Devices with Multi-Service IronWare R05.6.00 TOE to be
Part 2 extended, and meets the SARs contained the PP.
The assurance requirements for an evaluation at Evaluation Assurance Level are listed
below. All assurance activities and work units received a passing verdict. The following
components are taken from CC part 3:
• ADV_FSP.1 Basic functional specification
• AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
• AGD_PRE.1 Preparative user guidance
• ALC_CMC.1 Labeling of the TOE
• ALC_CMS.1 TOE CM coverage
• ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
• ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
• ASE_INT.1 ST Introduction
• ASE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment
• ASE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
• ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification
• ATE_IND.1 Independent testing – conformance
• AVA_VAN.1 Vulnerability analysis
10 Validator Comments/Recommendations
The validators suggest that the consumer pay particular attention to the evaluated
configuration of the device(s). In order to remain CC compliant, the device(s) must first be
configured into FIPS mode, then into Common Criteria mode as specified in the IronWare
FIPS and Common Criteria Guide.
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Please note that the functionality evaluated is scoped exclusively to the security functional
requirements specified in the Security Target. Other functionality included in the product
was not assessed as part of this evaluation. Please note further that certain network related
functionality is excluded from the approved configuration and that some networking
functions relative to the devices were not tested, nor are any claims made relative to their
security.
The validators note that “Test 2” in the FCS_TLS_EXT.1 Assurance Activities was not
performed. Performance of this test, which is included in the “Security Requirements for
Network Devices Errata #2” (dated January 13, 2013), was remove by the TD0004
Technical Decision that is available on the NIAP web site. Annexes
Not applicable
11 Security Target
The Security Target is identified as Brocade Communications Systems, Inc. Brocade
MLXe® and NetIron® Family Devices with Multi-Service IronWare R05.6.00, version 1.0,
May 19, 2014.
12 Glossary
The following definitions are used throughout this document:
• Common Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL). An IT security evaluation facility
accredited by the National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP) and
approved by the CCEVS Validation Body to conduct Common Criteria-based
evaluations.
• Conformance. The ability to demonstrate in an unambiguous way that a given
implementation is correct with respect to the formal model.
• Evaluation. The assessment of an IT product against the Common Criteria using the
Common Criteria Evaluation Methodology to determine whether or not the claims
made are justified; or the assessment of a protection profile against the Common
Criteria using the Common Evaluation Methodology to determine if the Profile is
complete, consistent, technically sound and hence suitable for use as a statement of
requirements for one or more TOEs that may be evaluated.
• Evaluation Evidence. Any tangible resource (information) required from the sponsor
or developer by the evaluator to perform one or more evaluation activities.
• Feature. Part of a product that is either included with the product or can be ordered
separately.
• Target of Evaluation (TOE). A group of IT products configured as an IT system, or
an IT product, and associated documentation that is the subject of a security evaluation
under the CC.
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• Validation. The process carried out by the CCEVS Validation Body leading to the
issue of a Common Criteria certificate.
• Validation Body. A governmental organization responsible for carrying out validation
and for overseeing the day-to-day operation of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation
and Validation Scheme.
13 Bibliography
The Validation Team used the following documents to produce this Validation Report:
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation: Part 1:
Introduction and General Model, Version 3.1, Revision 4, September 2012.
[2] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2: Security
functional components, Version 3.1, Revision 4, September 2012.
[3] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 3: Security
assurance components, Version 3.1 Revision 4, September 2102.
[4] Protection Profile for Network Devices, version 1.1, 8 June 2012 (NDPP).