Certification Report
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
BSI-DSZ-CC-0267-2004
for
Tachograph Card Version 1.1 128/64 R1.1
from
ORGA Kartensysteme GmbH
- Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Telefon +49 228 9582-0, Infoline +49 228 9582-111, Telefax +49 228 9582-455
BSI-DSZ-CC-0267-2004
Smart Card with Tachograph Application
Tachograph Card Version 1.1 128/64 R1.1
from
ORGA Kartensysteme GmbH SOGIS-MRA
The IT product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an accredited and licensed/
approved evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Part 1
Version 0.6, Part 2 Version 1.0 extended by advice of the Certification Body for components
beyond EAL4 and smart card specific guidance for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT
Security Evaluation, Version 2.1 (ISO/IEC 15408:1999) and including final interpretations for
compliance with Common Criteria Version 2.2 and Common Methodology Part 2, Version 2.2.
Evaluation Results:
Functionality: Product specific Security Target according to Appendix 10 of
Annex 1B of Regulation (EC) no. 1360/2002, amending Regulation
(EEC) no. 3821/85 on recording equipment in road transport;
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance Package: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant, EAL4 augmented by
ADO_IGS.2, ADV_IMP.2, ATE_DPT.2 and AVA_VLA.4;
Equivalent to ITSEC E3 high as required by Appendix 10 of
Annex 1B of Regulation (EC) no. 1360/2002
This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated
configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification scheme
of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions of the evaluation
facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence adduced.
The notes mentioned on the reverse side are part of this certificate.
Bonn, 18 May 2004
The President of the Federal Office
for Information Security
Dr. Helmbrecht L.S
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Telefon (0228) 9582-0 - Telefax (0228) 9582-455 - Infoline (0228) 9582-111
The rating of the strength of functions does not include the cryptoalgorithms suitable for encryption
and decryption (see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2)
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information
Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty
of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
BSI-DSZ-CC-0267-2004 Certification Report
Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the
task of issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a
distributor, hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product
according to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised
security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the
BSI or by BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This
report contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the
detailed Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security
functionality of the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and
weaknesses) and instructions for the user.
1
Act setting up the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Errichtungsgesetz, BSIG) of
17 December 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2834
V
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0267-2004
Contents
Part A: Certification
Part B: Certification Results
Part C: Excerpts from the Criteria
Part D: Annexes
VI
BSI-DSZ-CC-0267-2004 Certification Report
A Certification
1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down
in the following:
· BSIG2
· BSI Certification Ordinance3
· BSI Schedule of Costs4
· Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal
Ministry of the Interior)
· DIN EN 45011 standard
· BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
· Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 2.15
· Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM)
o Part 1, Version 0.6
o Part 2, Version 1.0
· BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme
(AIS)
· Advice from the Certification Body on methodology for assurance
components above EAL4
The use of Common Criteria Version 2.1, Common Methodology, part 2,
Version 1.0 and final interpretations as part of AIS 32 results in compliance of
the certification results with Common Criteria Version 2.2 and Common
Methodology Part 2, Version 2.2 as endorsed by the Common Criteria
recognition arrangement committees.
2
Act setting up the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Errichtungsgesetz, BSIG) of
17 December 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2834
3
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of a Certificate by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungsverordnung, BSIZertV) of 7 July 1992,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1230
4
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-
Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 29th October 1992, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1838
5
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 22nd September 2000 in the
Bundesanzeiger p. 19445
A-1
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0267-2004
2 Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries
a mutual recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are
based on ITSEC or CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
2.1 ITSEC/CC - Certificates
The SOGIS-Agreement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on
ITSEC became effective on 3 March 1998. This agreement was signed by the
national bodies of Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, The Netherlands,
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom This
agreement on the mutual recognition of IT security certificates was extended to
include certificates based on the CC for all evaluation levels (EAL 1 – EAL 7).
2.2 CC - Certificates
An arrangement (Common Criteria Arrangement) on the mutual recognition of
certificates based on the CC evaluation assurance levels up to and including
EAL 4 was signed in May 2000. It includes also the recognition of Protection
Profiles based on the CC. The arrangement was signed by the national bodies
of Australia, Canada, Finland France, Germany, Greece, Italy, The Netherlands,
New Zealand, Norway, Spain, United Kingdom and the United States. Israel
joined the arrangement in November 2000, Sweden in February 2002, Austria
in November 2002, Hungary and Turkey in September 2003, Japan in
November 2003.
A-2
BSI-DSZ-CC-0267-2004 Certification Report
3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform
procedure, a uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product Tachograph Card Version 1.1 128/64 R1.1 has undergone the
certification procedure at BSI. This is a re-certification based on BSI-DSZ-CC-
0205-2003. It replaces also the certificate BSI-DSZ-CC-0243-2004.
The evaluation of the product Tachograph Card Version 1.1 128/64 R1.1 was
conducted by SRC Security Research & Consulting GmbH (ITSEF)6
. SRC
Security Research & Consulting GmbH is an evaluation facility recognised by
BSI.
The sponsor and vendor and distributor is ORGA Kartensysteme GmbH.
The certification is concluded with
· the comparability check and
· the production of this Certification Report.
This work was completed by the BSI on 18 May 2004.
The confirmed assurance package is only valid on the condition that
· all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as
given in the following report, are observed,
· the product is operated in the environment described, where specified in
the following report.
This Certification Report only applies to the version of the product indicated
here. The validity can be extended to new versions and releases of the product,
provided the sponsor applies for re-certification of the modified product, in
accordance with the procedural requirements, and the evaluation does not
reveal any security deficiencies.
For the meaning of the assurance levels and the confirmed strength of
functions, please refer to the excerpts from the criteria at the end of the
Certification Report.
6
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
A-3
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0267-2004
4 Publication
The following Certification Results contain pages B-1 to B-28.
The product Tachograph Card Version 1.1 128/64 R1.1 has been included in
the BSI list of the certified products, which is published regularly (see also
Internet: http:// www.bsi.bund.de). Further information can be obtained from
BSI-Infoline 0228/9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the vendor7
of
the product. The Certification Report can also be downloaded from the above-
mentioned website.
7
ORGA Kartensysteme GmbH, Am Hoppenhof 33, 33104 Paderborn
A-4
BSI-DSZ-CC-0267-2004 Certification Report
B Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
· the security target of the sponsor for the target of evaluation,
· the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
· complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
B-1
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0267-2004
Contents of the certification results
1 Executive Summary 3
2 Identification of the TOE 15
3 Security Policy 16
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope 17
5 Architectural Information 17
6 Documentation 18
7 IT Product Testing 18
8 Evaluated Configuration 20
9 Results of the Re-Evaluation 20
10 Comments/Recommendations 23
11 Annexes 23
12 Security Target 23
13 Definitions 23
14 Bibliography 26
B-2
BSI-DSZ-CC-0267-2004 Certification Report
1 Executive Summary
Target of Evaluation (TOE) and subject of the Security Target (ST) [6] and [7] is
the smart card product “Tachograph Card Version 1.1 128/64 R1.1”.
The TOE will be used within the Tachograph System as a security medium
which carries a specific Tachograph Application intended for its use with the
recording equipment.
The basic functions of the Tachograph Card are:
· to store card identification and card holder identification data. These data
are used by the vehicle unit to identify the cardholder, provide
accordingly functions and data access rights, and ensure cardholder
accountability for his activities,
· to store cardholder activities data, events and faults data and control
activities data, related to the cardholder.
A Tachograph Card is therefore intended to be used by a card interface device
of a vehicle unit. It may also be used by any card reader (e.g. of a personal
computer) which shall have full read access right on any user data. During the
end-usage phase of a Tachograph Card life cycle (phase 7 of life-cycle as
described), vehicle units only may write user data to the card. A Tachograph
Card is either of the type Driver Card or Control Card or Workshop Card or
Company Card as outlined in the ST [7], chapter 2.4.
The TOE comprises the following components:
· Integrated Circuit (IC) "Philips P16WX064V0C Secure 16-bit Smart Card
Controller " provided by Philips Semiconductors GmbH
· Caernarvon Cryptographic Library on Philips Smart XA2 as IC Dedicated
Support Software provided by Philips Semiconductors GmbH
· Smart Card Embedded Software based on a Java Card Platform Version
2.1.1 with a specific Java Card Applet for the Tachograph Application
provided by ORGA Kartensysteme GmbH.
The Java Card Applet for the Tachograph Application consists of a fix part con-
taining the executable code and another configurable part for the Tachograph
Card’s file system. The configuration of the Tachograph Card concerns the
following points:
· Choice of the card type: A complete Driver Card, Control Card,
Workshop Card or Company Card with complete file system. Additionally,
a General Tachograph Card is available that can be irreversibly
converted into one of the different types Driver Card, Control Card,
Workshop Card and Company Card by using a specific card command
after initialisation resp. prior to the personalisation of the card.
· Choice of the personalisation scheme: Securing the transfer of
personalisation data can be done on base of a dynamic scheme (Secure
B-3
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0267-2004
Messaging with a session key) or alternatively on base of a static
scheme (Secure Messaging with a static key).
The TOE is developed and constructed in full accordance with the Tachograph
Card Specification [8], Annex 1B main body, Appendix 2, Appendix 10 (Tacho-
graph Card Generic Security Target) and Appendix 11. In particular, this implies
the conformance of the Tachograph Card with the following standards: ISO/IEC
7810 Identification cards – Physical characteristics, ISO/IEC 7816 Identification
cards - Integrated circuits with contacts: part 1, part 2, part 3, part 4 and part 8;
ISO/IEC 10373 Identification cards – Test methods.
In order to achieve the required system security, the Tachograph Card and the
corresponding ST [6] and [7] meet all the security requirements and evaluation
conditions defined in the Tachograph Card’s “Generic Security Target” in [8],
Appendix 10 under consideration of the interpretations in [9].
The life-cycle of the TOE conforms to the smart card life cycle described in
Appendix 10 of [8] referring to PP/9911 [13]. The following table outlines this
life-cycle for the TOE:
Phase Description
Phase 1 Smart Card Embedded
Software Development
The Smart Card Embedded Software Developer (ORGA
Kartensysteme GmbH, Paderborn) is in charge of the
Smart Card Embedded Software (Basic Software, Applica-
tion Software) development and the specification of IC
initialisation and pre-personalisation requirements.
Phase 2 IC Development The IC Designer (Philips Semiconductors GmbH) designs
the IC, develops IC Dedicated Software, provides informa-
tion, software or tools to the Smart Card Embedded Soft-
ware Developer, and receives the Smart Card Embedded
Software (only Basic Software) from the developer through
trusted delivery and verification procedures.
The IC Designer constructs the smart card IC database,
necessary for the IC photo mask fabrication.
Phase 3 IC Manufacturing and
Testing
The IC Manufacturer (Philips Semiconductors GmbH)
generates the masks for the IC manufacturing based upon
an output from the smart card IC database.
He is responsible for producing the IC through three main
steps: IC manufacturing, IC testing, and IC pre-
personalisation.
Phase 4 IC Packaging and
Testing
The IC Packaging Manufacturer (ORGA Kartensysteme
GmbH, Flintbek) is responsible for the IC packaging (pro-
duction of modules) and testing.
Phase 5 Smart Card Product
Finishing Process
The Smart Card Product Manufacturer (ORGA Kartensys-
teme GmbH, Flintbek) is responsible for the initialisation of
the TOE (in form of initialisation of the modules of phase 4)
and its testing. In this phase the TOE becomes either the
type Driver Card or Control Card or Workshop Card or
B-4
BSI-DSZ-CC-0267-2004 Certification Report
Phase Description
Company Card.
The smart card product finishing process comprises the
embedding of the initialised modules for the TOE and the
card production what is done alternatively by ORGA
Kartensysteme GmbH or by the customer.
Delivery of the TOE Two different ways for delivery are established:
(i) The TOE is delivered to the customer in form of a
complete (initialised) smart card.
(ii) Alternatively, the TOE is delivered to the customer
in form of an initialised module. In this case, the
smart card finishing process (embedding, final
tests) is task of the customer.
Phase 6 Smart Card
Personalisation
The Personaliser is responsible for the smart card
personalisation and final tests.
Phase 7 Smart Card
End-usage
The Smart Card Issuer is responsible for the smart card
product delivery to the smart card end-user, and the end of
life process.
Table 1: Life cycle of the TOE
The evaluation of the TOE was conducted as a composition evaluation making
use of the platform evaluation results of the CC evaluations
· of the underlying semiconductor "Philips P16WX064V0C Secure 16-bit
Smart Card Controller" provided by Philips Semiconductors GmbH [18]
and
· of the underlying semiconductor "Philips P16WX064V0C Secure 16-bit
Smart Card Controller with Caernarvon Cryptographic Library on Philips
Smart XA2 as IC Dedicated Support Software" provided by Philips Semi-
conductors GmbH.
For the re-certification, a reassessment of the hardware platform (Philips
P16WX064V0C Secure 16-bit Smart Card Controller with Caernarvon
Cryptographic Library) had been successfully carried out by T-Systems GEI
GmbH.
Both, the IC itself and the IC with its IC Dedicated Software were evaluated
according to Common Criteria EAL 5 augmented with a minimum strength level
for its security functions of SOF-high based on the Protection Profile BSI-PP-
0002 [12]. These platform evaluations were performed by T-Systems GEI
GmbH.
The Embedded Software of the “Tachograph Card Version 1.1 128/64 R1.1”
and the overall composition was evaluated by SRC Security Research &
Consulting GmbH.
The concept for composition as outlined in CC Supporting Document [4, AIS 36]
was used.
B-5
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0267-2004
The evaluation was completed on 12 May 2004. Both, the SRC Security
Research & Consulting GmbH and the evaluation facility of T-Systems GEI
GmbH are evaluation facilities (ITSEF)8
recognised by BSI. The sponsor,
vendor and distributor of the Tachograph Card Version 1.1 128/64 R1.1 is
ORGA Kartensysteme GmbH.
1.1 Assurance package
The TOE security assurance requirements are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in part 3 of the Common Criteria (see Part C or [1], part 3
for details).
The TOE meets the assurance requirements of assurance level EAL4+
(Evaluation Assurance Level 4 augmented). The following table shows the
augmented assurance components.
Requirement Identifier
EAL4 TOE evaluation: Methodically designed, tested,
and reviewed
+: ADO_IGS.2 Delivery and operation - Generation log
+: ADV_IMP.2 Development - Implementation of the TSF
+: ATE_DPT.2 Tests - Testing: low-level design
+: AVA_VLA.4 Vulnerability assessment – Highly resistant
Table 2: Assurance components and EAL-augmentation
The level of assurance and the augmentations are chosen in order to allow the
confirmation of equivalence to ITSEC [10] E3 high as required by Appendix 10
of Annex 1B of Regulation (EC) no. 1360/2002 [8] and outlined in JIL Security
Evaluation and Certification of Digital Tachographs [9].
1.2 Functionality
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) and TOE Security Functions
are based on Appendix 10 of Annex 1B of Regulation (EC) no. 1360/2002 [8]
specified in the document JIL Security Evaluation and Certification of Digital
Tachographs [9].
The TOE Security Functional Requirements selected in the Security Target are
Common Criteria Part 2 extended as shown in the following tables.
8
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
B-6
BSI-DSZ-CC-0267-2004 Certification Report
Security Functional
Requirement
9
Identifier
CC Part 2
conformant/
extended
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation (Triple-DES of HW only) Conformant
FDP_ACC.1 [MEM] Subset access control (Memory) Conformant
FDP_ACC.1 [SFR]
10
Subset access control (Special Function Register) Conformant
FDP_ACF.1 [MEM] Security Attribute based access control (Memory) Conformant
FDP_ACF.1 [SFR] Security Attribute based access control (Special
Function Register)
Conformant
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control Conformant
FDP_ITT.1 Basic internal transfer protection Conformant
FPT_FLS.1 Failure with preservation of secure state Conformant
FPT_ITT.1 Basic internal TSF data transfer protection Conformant
FPT_PHP.3 Resistance to physical attack Conformant
FPT_SEP.1 TSF domain separation Conformant
FRU_FLT.2 Limited fault tolerance Conformant
FMT_MSA.3 [MEM] Static attribute initialisation (Memory) Conformant
FMT_MSA.3 [SFR] Static attribute initialisation (Special Function Register) Conformant
FMT_MSA.1 [MEM] Management of security attributes (Memory) Conformant
FMT_MSA.1 [SFR] Management of security attributes (Special Function
Register)
Conformant
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions Conformant
FAU_SAS.1 Audit storage Extended see
PP [12]
FCS_RND.1 Quality metric for random numbers Extended see
PP [12]
FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities Extended see
PP [12]
FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability Extended see
PP [12]
FRU_VRC.1 Simple value range check Extended see
ST of IC [19]
Table 3: Security Functional Requirements for the IC part of the TOE (see [18] and [19] for BSI-
DSZ-CC-0203-2003).
Security Functional
Requirement
11
Identifier
CC Part 2
conformant/
extended
9
The brackets [xxx] after a component name indicates a specific iteration of the component
10
In this case SFR stands for Special Function Register
11
The indicator +n after a component name indicates a specific iteration of the component
B-7
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0267-2004
Security Functional
Requirement
11
Identifier
CC Part 2
conformant/
extended
FCS_COP.1+1 Cryptographic operation (Triple-DES of SW using HW) Conformant
FCS_COP.1+2 Cryptographic operation (RSA) Conformant
FCS_COP.1+4 Cryptographic operation (SHA-1) Conformant
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control Conformant
FDP_ITT.1 Basic internal transfer protection Conformant
FDP_RIP.1 Subset residual information protection Conformant
FPT_FLS.1 Failure with preservation of secure state Conformant
FPT_ITT.1 Basic internal TSF data transfer protection Conformant
FCS_RND.2 Random number generation Extended see
ST [7]
FPT_TST.2 Subset TOE security testing Extended see
ST [7]
Table 4: Security Functional Requirements for the IC dedicated SW part of the TOE
Security Functional
Requirement
12
Identifier
CC Part 2
conformant/
extended
FAU_SAA.1 Potential violation analysis Conformant
FCO_NRO.1 Selective Proof of origin Conformant
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic Key Generation (for Triple-DES Keys) Conformant
FCS_CKM.2-1 Cryptographic Key Distribution (for Triple-DES Keys) Conformant
FCS_CKM.2-2 Cryptographic Key Distribution (for public RSA Keys) Conformant
FCS_CKM.2-3 Cryptographic Key Distribution (for static Triple-DES
Keys)
Conformant
FCS_CKM.3-1 Cryptographic Key Access (to private RSA Key) Conformant
FCS_CKM.3-2 Cryptographic Key Access (to public RSA Key) Conformant
FCS_CKM.3-3 Cryptographic Key Access (to private RSA Key) Conformant
FCS_CKM.3-4 Cryptographic Key Access (to public RSA Key) Conformant
FCS_CKM.3-5 Cryptographic Key Access (to Triple-DES Key) Conformant
FCS_CKM.4-1 Cryptographic Key Destruction (of Triple-DES Key) Conformant
FCS_CKM.4-2 Cryptographic Key Destruction (of public RSA Key) Conformant
FCS_COP.1-1 Cryptographic operation (explicit signature generation
and verification)
Conformant
FCS_COP.1-2 Cryptographic operation (implicit signature generation
and verification)
Conformant
12
The brackets -n after a component name indicates a specific iteration of the component
B-8
BSI-DSZ-CC-0267-2004 Certification Report
Security Functional
Requirement
12
Identifier
CC Part 2
conformant/
extended
FCS_COP.1-3 Cryptographic operation (implicit encryption and
decryption operation)
Conformant
FCS_COP.1-4 Cryptographic operation (encryption and decryption
operation concerning symmetric cryptography)
Conformant
FCS_COP.1-5 Cryptographic operation (MAC generation and
verification)
Conformant
FDP_ACC.2-1 Complete access control (for AC_SFP) Conformant
FDP_ACC.2-2 Complete access control (for PERS-AC_SFP) Conformant
FDP_ACF.1-1 Security attribute based access control (for AC_SFP) Conformant
FDP_ACF.1-2 Security attribute based access control (for PERS-
AC_SFP)
Conformant
FDP_DAU.1 Basic data authentication Conformant
FDP_ETC.1 Export of user data without security attributes Conformant
FDP_ETC.2 Export of user data with security attributes Conformant
FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes Conformant
FDP_RIP.1 Subset residual information protection Conformant
FDP_SDI.2 Stored data integrity monitoring and action Conformant
FIA_AFL.1-1 Authentication failure handling (of interface device) Conformant
FIA_AFL.1-2 Authentication failure handling (of PIN check workshop
card)
Conformant
FIA_ATD.1 User attribute definition Conformant
FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication Conformant
FIA_UAU.3 Unforgeable authentication Conformant
FIA_UAU.4 Single-use authentication mechanisms Conformant
FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification Conformant
FIA_USB.1 User-subject binding Conformant
FPR_UNO.1-1 Unobservability (of mutual authentication operation) Conformant
FPR_UNO.1-2 Unobservability (of import and export of user data) Conformant
FPR_UNO.1-3 Unobservability (of import of static personalisation key) Conformant
FPT_FLS.1 Failure with preservation of secure state Conformant
FPT_PHP.3 Resistance to physical attack Conformant
FPT_SEP.1 TSF domain separation Conformant
FPT_TDC.1 Inter-TSF basic TSF data consistency Conformant
FPT_TST.1 TSF testing Conformant
FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel Conformant
Table 5: Security Functional Requirements for the Embedded SW part of the TOE
B-9
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0267-2004
These Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functions:
Identifier Security Function
F.RNG Random Number Generator
F.HW_DEA Triple-DES Co-processor
F.OPC Control of Operating Conditions
F.PHY Protection against Physical Manipulation
F.LOG Logical Protection
F.COMP Protection of Mode Control
F.MEM_ACC Memory Access Control
F.SFR_ACC Special Function Register Access Control
F.RANGE_CHK Value Range Check
F.DES DES Operation
F.RSA RSA Operation
F.SHA-1 SHA-1 Computation
F.RNG_Access Generation of Random Numbers
F.Object_Reuse Reuse of Objects
Table 6: TOE Security Functions of IC and IC dedicated SW parts of the TOE
Identifier Security Function
F.ACS Security Attribute Based Access Control
F.IA_KEY Key Based User / TOE Authentication
F.IA_PWD Password Based User Authentication (only relevant for the Tachograph
Card type Workshop Card)
F.DATA_INT Stored Data Integrity Monitoring and Action
F.EX_CONF Confidentiality of Data Exchange
F.EX_INT Integrity and Authenticity of Data Exchange
F.RIP Residual Information Protection
F.FAIL_PROT Hardware and Software Failure Protection
F.SIDE_CHAN Side Channel Analysis Control
F.SELFTEST Self Test
F.GEN_SES Generation of Session Keys
F.GEN_DIGSIG Generation of Digital Signatures
F.VER_DIGSIG Verification of Digital Signatures
F.ENC Encryption
F.DEC Decryption
Table 7: TOE Security Functions of the Embedded SW part of the TOE
B-10
BSI-DSZ-CC-0267-2004 Certification Report
Note: Only the titles of the Security Functional Requirements and of the TOE
Security Functions are provided. For more details please refer to the Security
Target [7], chapter 5.1.1 and 6.1.
All TOE Security Functions are applicable from TOE delivery to phase 7 of the
smart card life cycle model.
1.3 Strength of Function
The TOE‘s strength of functions is rated ‘high’ (SOF-high) for the following
functions:
- F.RNG (Random Number Generator);
- F.RNG_Access (Generation of Random Numbers);
- F.LOG (Logical Protection) especially for the F.HW_DEA (Triple-DES Co-processor);
- F.LOG (Logical Protection) and F.SIDE_CHAN (Side Channel Analysis Control) for F.DES
(DES Operation), F.RSA (RSA Operation, only decryption part, F.GEN_DIGSIG (Generation
of Digital Signatures), F.DEC (Decryption) and F.IA_KEY (Key Based User / TOE Authenti-
cation);
- F.IA_PWD (Password Based User Authentication).
The rating of the strength of functions does not include the cryptoalgorithms
suitable for encryption and decryption (see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2).
1.4 Summary of threats and Organisational Security Policies (OSPs)
addressed by the evaluated IT product
The threats are subdivided into three groups affecting the IC, the general, or the
Tachograph Card specific Embedded Software:
Name Definition
T.Leak-Inherent Inherent Information Leakage
T.Phys-Probing Physical Probing
T.Malfunction Malfunction due to Environmental Stress
T.Phys-Manipulation Physical Manipulation
T.Leak-Forced Forced Information Leakage
T.Abuse-Func Abuse of Functionality
T.RND Deficiency of Random Numbers
Table 8: Threats of IC and IC dedicated SW parts of the TOE
Name Definition
Threats on all Phases
T.CLON Cloning of the TOE
Threats on Phase 1
T.DIS_INFO Disclosure of IC Assets
B-11
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0267-2004
Name Definition
T.DIS_DEL Disclosure of the Smart Card Embedded Software / Application
Data during Delivery
T.DIS_ES1 Disclosure of the Smart Card Embedded Software / Application
Data within the Development Environment
T.DIS_TEST_ES Disclosure of Smart Card Embedded Software Test Programs /
Information
T.T_DEL Theft of the Smart Card Embedded Software / Application Data
during Delivery
T.T_TOOLS Theft or Unauthorised Use of the Smart Card Embedded
Software Development Tools
T.T_SAMPLE2 Theft or Unauthorised Use of TOE Samples
T_MOD_DEL Modification of the Smart Card Embedded Software / Application
Data during Delivery
T.MOD Modification of the Smart Card Embedded Software / Application
Data within the Development Environment
Threats on Delivery from
Phase 1 to Phases 4 / 5 / 6
T.DIS_DEL1 Disclosure of Application Data during Delivery
T.DIS_DEL2 Disclosure of Delivered Application Data
T.MOD_DEL1 Modification of Application Data during Delivery
T.MOD_DEL2 Modification of Delivered Application Data
Threats on Phases 4 to 7
T.DIS_ES2 Disclosure of the Smart Card Embedded Software / Application
Data
T.T_ES Theft or Unauthorised Use of TOE
T.T_CMD Use of TOE Command-Set
T.MOD_LOAD Program Loading
T.MOD_EXE Program Execution
T.MOD_SHARE Modification of Program Behaviour
T.MOD_SOFT Modification of Smart Card Embedded Software / Application
Data
Table 9: Threats of the TOE-ES (Basic Software) parts of the TOE
Name Definition
T.Ident_Data Modification of Identification Data
T.Activity_Data Modification of Activity Data
T.Data_exchange Modification of Activity Data during Data Transfer
T.Pers_Data Authentication for Personalisation
B-12
BSI-DSZ-CC-0267-2004 Certification Report
Name Definition
T.Pers_exchange Modification or Disclosure of Personalisation Data during Data
Transfer
Table 10: Threats of the TOE-ES (Tachograph Card Specific Threats)
The Organisational Security Policies for the TOE are defined as:
Name Definition
P.Process-Card Protection during Packaging, Finishing and Personalisation
P.Design-Software Design of the Smart Card Embedded Software
Table 11: OSPs for the TOE
Note: Only the titles of the threats and OSPs are provided. For more details
please refer to the Security Target [7], chapter 3.
1.5 Special configuration requirements
The TOE is delivered at the end of phase 5 in form of complete cards, i.e. after
the initialisation process of the TOE has been successfully finished, final tests
have been successfully conducted and the card production has been fulfilled.
Alternatively, the TOE is delivered in form of initialised and tested modules. In
this case, the smart card finishing process (embedding of the delivered
modules, final tests) is task of the customer.
A Tachograph Card may be of the following types: Driver Card, Control Card,
Workshop Card or Company Card as defined in [8] depending on the specific
applet and data loaded into the card. Alternatively, in case of the card type
General Tachograph Card, the applet may contain code with a prepared file
system for the four card types. In that case, after initialisation resp. prior to the
personalisation of the card, one of the four prepared card types has to be
created by usage of a specific card command.
Two personalisation schemes are provided by the Tachograph Card:
· Dynamic scheme with Secure Messaging using a session key:
The Tachograph Card allows a personalisation only after a successful
preceding mutual authentication between the TOE and the external world
with agreement of a session key and send sequence counter and makes
use of asymmetric keys. The keys necessary on the card for the
authentication procedure are part of the Application Software resp. the
Tachograph Applet and are loaded onto the card in the framework of the
initialisation. The following data transfer of the personalisation data has
to be conducted with Secure Messaging.
B-13
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0267-2004
· Static scheme with Secure Messaging using a static key:
The TOE allows a personalisation only under usage of a static symmetric
personalisation key which is stored on the card during the initialisation of
the card or later within an additional pre-personalisation phase. In the
latter case, the symmetric key has to be loaded with a specific card
command in encrypted form.
In each case, the personalisation of the Tachograph Card requires a preceding
authentication of the external world (personalisation unit). At the end of the
personalisation process, the card is switched to the end-user operational phase.
There are no special security measures for the start-up of the TOE besides the
requirement that the TOE has to be used under the well-defined operating con-
ditions and that the requirements on the personalisation and usage have to be
applied as described in the user documentation [15], [16] and [17].
1.6 Assumptions about the operating environment
The TOE is intended to be used within the Tachograph System as a security
medium which carries a specific Tachograph Application intended for its use
with the recording equipment as specified in [8].
There do not exist any Tachograph Card specific assumptions for the environ-
ment of the TOE. The following general assumptions are made based on the
PP/9911 [13] and PP/9806 [14] referenced in Appendix 10 of Annex 1B of
Regulation (EC) no. 1360/2002 [8] (Generic Security Target).
Name Definition
Assumptions on Phase 1 to 5:
A.DEV_ORG Protection of the TOE under Development and Production
Assumptions on the TOE Delivery
Process (Phases 4 to 7)
A.DLV_PROTECT Protection of the TOE under Delivery and Storage
A.DLV_AUDIT Audit of Delivery and Storage
A.DLV_RESP Responsibility within Delivery
Assumptions on Phases 4 to 6
A.USE_TEST Testing of the TOE
A.USE_PROD Protection of the TOE under Testing and Manufacturing
Assumptions on Phase 7
A.USE_DIAG Secure Communication
Table 12: General assumptions for the TOE
Additionally, an assumption (A.PERS) on secure generation and handling of
personalisation data is made because the establishment of a secure environ-
B-14
BSI-DSZ-CC-0267-2004 Certification Report
ment for the personalisation process with adequate personnel, organisational
and technical security measures is in the responsibility of the personalisation
centre itself. The security of the personalisation process of the TOE is
supported by the TOE itself.
1.7 Disclaimers
The Certification Results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the
Certificate and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in
this Certification Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product
by the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation
that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT
product by BSI or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2 Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
Tachograph Card Version 1.1 128/64 R1.1
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
No Type Identifier Release Date Form of Delivery
1 HW /
SW
Tachograph Smart Card
Consisting of:
1.1 128/64
R1.1
Initialised and
tested smart cards
- Philips P16WX064V0C
Secure 16-bit Smart Card
Controller, C013C including
IC Dedicated Test ROM
Software version 2.1 dated
03 Sept.2001
or
initialised and
tested modules
- IC Dedicated Support
Software Caervarnon
Cryptographic Library
version 4.2.2 dated 13 June
2003
- Embedded Software,
Version 1.1 128/64 R1.1
including Basic Software and
Tachograph Application with
Application Data (Depending
on card type)
2 DOC User documentation for
personalisation, Tachograph
Card Version 1.1 128/64
R1.1
V1.00 7 May 2004 Document in
paper / electronic
form [15]
B-15
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0267-2004
No Type Identifier Release Date Form of Delivery
3 DOC User documentation for
Tachograph Card issuer,
Tachograph Card Version
1.1 128/64 R1.1
V1.00 7 May 2004 Document in
paper / electronic
form [17]
4 DOC User documentation for
developers of card interface
devices, Tachograph Card
Version 1.1 128/64 R1.1
V1.00 7 May 2004 Document in
paper / electronic
form [16]
5 DOC Tachograph Card Version
1.1 128/64 R1.1
Data Sheet
13
V1.00 7 May 2004 Document in
paper / electronic
form [20]
6 Keys Keys for verification of the
TOE and for personalisation
(ORGA Key, Card Key,
Personalisation Unit Key [if
applicable], Static Pers-Key
[if applicable])
Customer
specific
Either on paper or
in electronic
format
Table 13: Deliverables of the TOE
To ensure that the customer receives this evaluated version, the delivery pro-
cedures described in the User documentation for personalisation [15] have to
be followed. The Tachograph Card Version 1.1 128/64 R1.1 Data Sheet
includes File Control Information (FCI) which can be used for identification of
the five different card types.
3 Security Policy
The TOE will be employed within the Tachograph System as a security medium
which carries a specific Tachograph Application intended for its use with the
recording equipment.
The TOE is the composition of the IC, IC Dedicated Software and Smart Card
Embedded Software. The security policy is to provide:
· protection against leakage of information (e.g. to ensure the confidential-
ity of cryptographic keys during cryptographic functions performed by the
TOE), against physical probing, against malfunctions, against physical
manipulations, against access for code and data memory and against
abuse of functionality
· secure storage of user data and TSF data
· access control to user data and TSF data according to the specified rules
· secure communication to the vehicle unit of the Tachograph System
as specified in Appendix 10 of Annex 1B of Regulation (EC) no. 1360/2002 [8].
13
see chapter 6
B-16
BSI-DSZ-CC-0267-2004 Certification Report
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The TOE is intended to be used within the Tachograph System as a security
medium which carries a specific Tachograph Application intended for its use
with the recording equipment as specified in [8].
There do not exist any Tachograph Card specific assumptions for the environ-
ment of the TOE as the definition of the card type is done before the TOE
personalisation in phase 6 before delivery.
General assumptions are made based on the PP/9911 [13] and PP/9806 [14]
referenced in Appendix 10 of Annex 1B of Regulation (EC) no. 1360/2002 [8]
(Generic Security Target). These general assumptions are structured according
to the phases of the life cycle. Some of these assumptions are related to proce-
dures in phases 1 to 5. These phases were part of the TOE evaluation. As
delivery of the TOE is defined within or at the end of phase 5 of the life cycle.
(see table 1), the phases 6 and 7 are the usage phases of the TOE. Procedures
related to assumptions on these phases and the additional assumption A.PERS
on secure generation and handling of personalisation data are outlined in the
user documentation.
The TOE is the Tachograph Card Version 1.1 128/64 R1.1 providing security
functions as required in Appendix 10 of Annex 1B of Regulation (EC) no.
1360/2002 [8] (Generic Security Target). Threats on the overall Tachograph
System which are not related to the Tachograph Smart Cards were not
addressed by this product evaluation.
5 Architectural Information
The TOE is a product. It is composed from an Integrated Circuit (IC) with its
proprietary IC Dedicated Software and a Smart Card Embedded Software (ES),
consisting of Basic Software (BS) and Application Software (AS). The Design of
the Embedded Software is based on the Java Card Platform Version 2.1.1 with
a dedicated Java Card Applet for the Tachograph Card application. The four
different card types are distinguished as they contain a specific applet each,
and specific data structures and data.
As all parts of TOE software are running inside the IC, the external interface of
the TOE to its environment can be defined as the external interface of this IC,
the Philips P16WX064V0C Secure 16-bit Smart Card Controller. The external
interface is divided into a physical / electrical interface and a logical interface.
The physical / electrical interface of the P16WX064V0C are the pads to connect
the lines supply voltage, reset input, clock input, ground and I/O. An external
voltage and timing supply as well as a data interface are necessary for the
operation of the IC. Beyond the physical behaviour, the data interface is defined
by the Smart Card Embedded Software (ES). A user would use the physical
interface via the Chip card contacts. The electrical and physical characteristics
fulfilled are given in the Tachograph Cards Specification [8]. The location and
B-17
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0267-2004
dimensions of the Chip card contacts comply with the ISO/IEC 7816-2. The
electronic signals, the working of the card as well as the power consumption are
in accordance with ISO/IEC 7816.
The logical interface consists of two parts: (i) everything below the command
level and (ii) the accessing of the Tachograph Cards by commands via the
command interface. Commands and protocols of the Tachograph Application
for phase 7 are fully described in the Tachograph Cards Specification [8] with
the exception of one newly introduced command, “GET DATA” which does not
read any security relevant data. Specific commands for the personalisation
phase (phase 6) are described in the User Guidance for the Personaliser [15].
The subsystems of the TOE are described in the ST [7], chapter 2.1. The TOE
Summary Specification (chapter 6 of the ST [7]) describes the TOE Security
Functions with relation to the IC and Cryptographic Library and to the
Embedded Software.
6 Documentation
The user of the TOE is
(i) the developer of a vehicle unit who needs information how the TOE
interacts with the vehicle unit
(ii) the personaliser of the Tachograph Cards who needs information about
security procedures and how the TOE supports the personalisation
process
(iii) the issuer of the Tachograph Cards who needs information how to use
the 4 different card types after personalisation, information on specific
aspects of the issuance of the Tachograph Cards and information to be
passed to the end-user of the Tachograph Cards (card-holder, e.g. the
driver).
For these three types of users separate user documentation is provided (see
[15], [16] and [17]). Additionally, the Tachograph Card Version 1.1 128/64 R1.1,
Data Sheet [20] is provided by ORGA. It contains Answer To Reset (ATR)
information and File Control Information (FCI) as identification information for
the Tachograph Cards. As some data contained in the Data Sheet can be
customer specific, it will be provided individually for specific customers.
7 IT Product Testing
Tests of the TOE were done (i) with real cards using a card reader and a PC
and (ii) in an emulator test environment.
For those tests, where real cards are used, the specified method was used to
identify the Tachograph Card version and the correct card configuration for
every test. The real cards used for testing were either in initialised state (i. e.
B-18
BSI-DSZ-CC-0267-2004 Certification Report
ready for personalisation) or in operational state (i. e. personalisation com-
pleted). Using specific commands for reading FCI-data, the life cycle state of
the applet and the type of the card could be determined.
For identification of the correct versions of the electronic data used for tests in
the emulator test environment, and to determine whether the initial condition of
each test is satisfied, the methods of the evaluated Configuration Management
System were used. The version control mechanism can guarantee that the
design files and the initial data used for testing are those provided by the
developers for the specific version of the TOE under evaluation.
As specific subsystems are the same in all card types and others are different,
some tests had to be performed on all four card types, others could be re-used.
Tests after modifications of the TOE during the evaluation process were re-
done as necessary depending on the specific change.
For re-evaluation, a subset of the developer and independent evaluator tests of
BSI-DSZ-CC-0205-2003 had to be repeated. Especially tests covering product
changes were performed again.
Developer tests:
For developer tests, the test cases were mapped to Security Functions. All
Security Functions with their security properties and their interfaces were
covered. In addition, the test cases were mapped to subsystems of the High-
Level Design and to modules of the Low-Level Design. All subsystems and
modules with their security properties and their interfaces were covered. The
developer tested each property of the design specification. All command APDU
with valid and invalid inputs are tested and all functions are tested with valid and
invalid inputs. All test results were documented in log-files. All security functions
were tested with overall positive results.
Independent evaluator tests:
Most tests of the evaluator were done by ISO-7816 APDU command sequences
using a real card. Tests with emulators were chosen by the evaluators only for
those security functions, where internal resources of the card needed to be
modified or observed during the test (e.g. Anti-DPA-Measures and Residual
Information protection).
Several issues have been checked extensively by functional tests and by
source code analysis (e.g. I/O-testing, making sure that the protocol levels of
the TOE interface below ISO command level have stable behaviour; functional
Tachograph command testing including all possible error cases showing that no
undesired behaviour exits on command level which might be exploitable by an
attacker).
Side channel attacks on DES and RSA were tested and analysed during the
evaluation of BSI-DSZ-CC-0205-2003. The result of these analysis is still valid.
It showed that secret keys could not be extracted.
In addition, tests according to Appendix 9 of the EU Tachograph Card Commis-
sion Regulation [8] have been performed. Preliminary, the personalisation
B-19
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0267-2004
process of the cards has been carried out and thereby tested. The tests have
been performed for all four different types of ORGA Tachograph Cards. For the
Appendix 9 tests, cards with the final ROM mask and the actual Tachograph
Applet have been used. The achieved test results correspond to the expected
test results (see Annex A of this report).
8 Evaluated Configuration
The TOE is delivered within or at the end of phase 5 in form of initialised and
tested complete cards or in form of initialised and tested modules (see table 1).
A Tachograph Card may be of the following types: Driver Card, Control Card,
Workshop Card or Company Card depending on the specific applet and data
loaded into the card. Additionally, a General Tachograph Card is available that
can be irreversibly converted into one of the different card types by using a
specific card command after initialisation resp. prior to the personalisation of the
card. These five different card types are considered as different configurations
of the TOE.
All procedures for personalisation and configuration for the end-user necessary
after delivery are described in the user documentation [15].
9 Results of the Re-Evaluation
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [11] was provided by the ITSEF SRC
Security Research & Consulting GmbH according to the Common Criteria [1],
the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all interpretations
and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
As the evaluation of the TOE was conducted as a composition evaluation, the
ETR [11] includes also the evaluation results of the composite evaluation activi-
ties in accordance with CC Supporting Document, ETR-lite for Composition:
Annex A Composite smart card evaluation [4, AIS 36].
The ETR [11] builds up on the ETR-lite for Composition documents of the
evaluations of the underlying „Philips P16WX064V0C Secure 16-bit Smart Card
Controller“ and of the underlying „Philips P16WX064V0C Secure 16-bit Smart
Card Controller with Caernarvon Cryptographic Library on Philips Smart XA2 as
IC Dedicated Support Software". These ETR-lite for Composition documents
were provided by the ITSEF T-Systems GEI GmbH according to CC Supporting
Document, ETR-lite for Composition ([4, AIS 36]).
The evaluation methodology CEM [2] was used for those components identical
with EAL4. For components beyond EAL4 the methodology was defined in co-
ordination with the Certification Body. For smart card specific methodology the
scheme interpretations AIS 25, AIS 26 and AIS 36 (see [4]) were used. For
specific methodology on random number generator evaluation the scheme
interpretations AIS 20 and AIS 31 (see [4]) were used.
B-20
BSI-DSZ-CC-0267-2004 Certification Report
The assurance refinements outlined in the Security Target were followed in the
course of the evaluation of the TOE.
The verdicts for the CC, Part 3 assurance components (according to EAL4
augmented and the class ASE for the Security Target evaluation) are summa-
rised in the following table.
Assurance classes and components Verdict
Security Target evaluation CC Class ASE PASS
TOE description ASE_DES.1 PASS
Security environment ASE_ENV.1 PASS
ST introduction ASE_INT.1 PASS
Security objectives ASE_OBJ.1 PASS
PP claims ASE_PPC.1 PASS
IT security requirements ASE_REQ.1 PASS
Explicitly stated IT security requirements ASE_SRE.1 PASS
TOE summary specification ASE_TSS.1 PASS
Configuration management CC Class ACM PASS
Partial CM automation ACM_AUT.1 PASS
Generation support and acceptance procedures ACM_CAP.4 PASS
Problem tracking CM coverage ACM_SCP.2 PASS
Delivery and operation CC Class ADO PASS
Detection of modification ADO_DEL.2 PASS
Generation log ADO_IGS.2 PASS
Development CC Class ADV PASS
Fully defined external interfaces ADV_FSP.2 PASS
Security enforcing high-level design ADV_HLD.2 PASS
Implementation of the TSF ADV_IMP.2 PASS
Descriptive low-level design ADV_LLD.1 PASS
Informal correspondence demonstration ADV_RCR.1 PASS
Informal TOE security policy model ADV_SPM.1 PASS
Guidance documents CC Class AGD PASS
Administrator guidance AGD_ADM.1 PASS
User guidance AGD_USR.1 PASS
Life cycle support CC Class ALC PASS
Identification of security measures ALC_DVS.1 PASS
Developer defined life-cycle model ALC_LCD.1 PASS
Well-defined development tools ALC_TAT.1 PASS
B-21
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0267-2004
Assurance classes and components Verdict
Tests CC Class ATE PASS
Analysis of coverage ATE_COV.2 PASS
Testing: low-level design ATE_DPT.2 PASS
Functional testing ATE_FUN.1 PASS
Independent testing - sample ATE_IND.2 PASS
Vulnerability assessment CC Class AVA PASS
Validation of analysis AVA_MSU.2 PASS
Strength of TOE security function evaluation AVA_SOF.1 PASS
Highly resistant AVA_VLA.4 PASS
Table 14: Verdicts for the assurance components
The evaluation has shown that:
· the Security Functional Requirements specified for the TOE are Common
Criteria Part 2 extended
· the TOE provides the functionality according to Appendix 10 of Annex 1B
of Regulation (EC) no. 1360/2002 [8] and stated more precisely in the
document JIL Security Evaluation and Certification of Digital
Tachographs [9]
· the assurance of the TOE is Common Criteria Part 3 conformant, EAL4
augmented by ADO_IGS.2, ADV_IMP.2, ATE_DPT.2 and AVA_VLA.4
· the assurance of the TOE is equivalent to ITSEC [10] E3 high as required
by Appendix 10 of Annex 1B of Regulation (EC) no. 1360/2002 [8]
· the TOE fulfils the claimed strength of function SOF-high for the functions
as outlined in chapter 1.6. Therefore the scheme interpretations AIS 20,
AIS 26 and AIS 31 (see [4]) were used. The rating of the strength of
functions does not include the cryptoalgorithms suitable for encryption
and decryption (see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2).
· specific tests required by Appendix 9 of the EU Tachograph Card
Commission Regulation [8] are fulfilled (see Annex A of this report).
The underlying hardware had been successfully reassessed by T-Systems GEI
GmbH.
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the Tachograph Card
Version 1.1 128/64 R1.1. The validity can be extended to new versions and
releases of the product, provided the sponsor applies for re-certification of the
modified product, in accordance with the procedural requirements, and the
evaluation of the modified product does not reveal any security deficiencies.
B-22
BSI-DSZ-CC-0267-2004 Certification Report
10 Comments/Recommendations
The User Guidance documentation (refer to chapter 6) contains necessary
information about the secure usage of the TOE. Additionally, for secure usage
of the TOE the fulfilment of the assumptions about the environment in the
Security Target [7] and the Security Target as a whole has to be taken into
account. Therefore a user/administrator has to follow the guidance in these
documents.
11 Annexes
none
12 Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [7] of the Target of Evaluation
(TOE) is provided within a separate document. It is a sanitised version of the
complete Security Target [6] used for the evaluation performed.
13 Definitions
13.1 Acronyms
AC_SFP SFP Access Control
APDU Application Protocol Data Unit
BS Basic Software
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik /
Federal Office for Information Security
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CEM Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation
CM Card Manager
DES Data Encryption Standard; symmetric block cipher algorithm
DFA Differential Fault Analysis
DOC Document
DPA Differential Power Analysis
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
EEPROM Electronically Erasable Programmable Read Only Memory
ES Embedded Software
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
FCI File Control Information
IC Integrated Circuit
B-23
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0267-2004
IFD Interface Device
INI Initialisation Module
IT Information Technology
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
JC Java Card Platform
JCAPI Java Card Application Programming Interface
JCRE Java Card Runtime Environment
JCVM Java Card Virtual Machine
JIL Joint Interpretation Library
MAC Message Authentication Code
MMU Memory Management Unit
OS Operating System
OTP One Time Programmable (a certain part of the EEPROM)
PERS-AC_SFP SFP Personalisation Access Control
PIN Personal Identification Number
PP Protection Profile
PW Password
RAM Random Access Memory
RNG Random Number Generator
ROM Read Only Memory
RSA Rivest-Shamir-Adleman Algorithm
SF Security Function
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
SM Secure Messaging
SOF Strength of Function
SPA Simple Power Analysis
ST Security Target
TA Tachograph Applet
TOE Target of Evaluation
Triple-DES Symmetric block cipher algorithm based on the DES
TSC TSF Scope of Control
TSF TOE Security Functions
TSP TOE Security Policy
TSS TOE Summary Specification
VU Vehicle Unit
B-24
BSI-DSZ-CC-0267-2004 Certification Report
13.2 Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more assurance component(s) from CC
Part 3 to an EAL or assurance package.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not
contained in part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in part 3 of the
CC.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics
based on well-established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - An entity within the TSC that contains or receives information and
upon which subjects perform operations.
Protection Profile - An implementation-independent set of security require-
ments for a category of TOEs that meet specific consumer needs.
Security Function - A part or parts of the TOE that have to be relied upon for
enforcing a closely related subset of the rules from the TSP.
Security Target - A set of security requirements and specifications to be used
as the basis for evaluation of an identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined
semantics.
Strength of Function - A qualification of a TOE security function expressing
the minimum efforts assumed necessary to defeat its expected security
behaviour by directly attacking its underlying security mechanisms.
SOF-basic - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that
the function provides adequate protection against casual breach of TOE
security by attackers possessing a low attack potential.
SOF-medium - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows
that the function provides adequate protection against straightforward or
intentional breach of TOE security by attackers possessing a moderate attack
potential.
SOF-high - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that
the function provides adequate protection against deliberately planned or
organised breach of TOE security by attackers possessing a high attack
potential.
Subject - An entity within the TSC that causes operations to be performed.
Target of Evaluation - An IT product or system and its associated
administrator and user guidance documentation that is the subject of an
evaluation.
B-25
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0267-2004
TOE Security Functions - A set consisting of all hardware, software, and
firmware of the TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the
TSP.
TOE Security Policy - A set of rules that regulate how assets are managed,
protected and distributed within a TOE.
TSF Scope of Control - The set of interactions that can occur with or within a
TOE and are subject to the rules of the TSP.
14 Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 2.1, August 1999
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
(CEM), Part 1, Version 0.6; Part 2: Evaluation Methodology, Version 1.0,
August 1999
[3] BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125, Version 5.1, January
1998)
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS), e.g.
AIS 20: Functionality classes and evaluation methodology for
deterministic random number generators AIS 20, Version 1, 2
December,1999
AIS 25 for: CC-Supporting Document: The application of CC to
Integrated Circuits, Version 2, July 2002
AIS 26 for: CC-Supporting Document: Application of Attack Potential to
Smartcards, Version 2, August 2002
AIS 31: Functionality classes and evaluation methodology of physical
random number generators, Version 1, 25 September 2001
AIS 32: Use of the international approved CC Final Interpretations into
the German Certification Scheme
AIS 35 for: CC-Supporting Document: ST-lite, Version 1.1, July 2002
AIS 36 for: CC-Supporting Documents: ETR-lite for Composition, Version
1.1, July 2002 and
ETR-lite for composition: Annex A Composite smart card evaluation:
Recommended best practice, Version 1.2, March 2002
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148, BSI 7149), periodically
updated list published also on the BSI Web-site
B-26
BSI-DSZ-CC-0267-2004 Certification Report
[6] Security Target, BSI-DSZ-0267-2004, Version 1.00, 7 May 2004, ORGA
Kartensysteme GmbH (confidential document)
[7] Security Target Lite, BSI-DSZ-0267-2004, Version 1.00, 12 May 2004,
ORGA Kartensysteme GmbH (sanitised public document)
[8] Annex 1B of Commission Regulation (EC) No.1360/2002 on recording
equipment in road transport: Requirements for Construction, Testing,
Installation and Inspection (in: Official Journal of the European
Communities, L 207 / 1 ff.), 05.08.2002, Commission of the European
Communities
Appendix 2 of Annex I (B) of Council Regulation (EEC) No. 1360/2002 –
Tachograph Cards Specification
Appendix 7 of Annex I (B) of Council Regulation (EEC) No. 1360/2002 -
Data downloading protocols
Appendix 9 of Annex I (B) of Council Regulation (EEC) No. 1360/2002 –
Type Approval – List of Minimum Required Tests
Appendix 10 of Annex I (B) of Council Regulation (EEC) No. 1360/2002 -
Generic Security Targets
Appendix 11 of Annex I (B) of Council Regulation (EEC) No. 1360/2002 -
Common Security Mechanisms
[9] Joint Interpretation Library (JIL) - Security Evaluation and Certification of
Digital Tachographs, Version 1.12, June 2003, JIL Working Group (BSI,
CESG, DCSSI, NLNCSA)
[10] Information Technology Security Evaluation Criteria (ITSEC), CEC,
Version 1.2, June 1991.
[11] Evaluation Technical Report, Version 3.0, 10 May 2004 for Tachograph
Card Version 1.1 128/64 R1.1 (confidential document)
[12] Smart Card IC Platform Protection Profile, Version 1.0, July 2001,
registered at the German Certification Body under number BSI-PP-0002-
2001
[13] Smart Card Integrated Circuit With Embedded Software Protection
Profile - version 2.0 - issue June 99. Registered at French certification
body under the number PP/9911.
[14] Smartcard Integrated Circuit Protection Profile - version 2.0 - issue
September 1998. Registered at French certification body under the
number PP/9806.
[15] User Guidance for the Personaliser of the Tachograph Card -
Tachograph Card Version 1.1 128/64 R1.1, Version V1.00, ORGA
Kartensysteme GmbH, 7 May 2004
B-27
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0267-2004
[16] User Guidance for the Vehicle Unit Developer - Tachograph Card
Version 1.1 128/64 R1.1, Version V1.00, ORGA Kartensysteme GmbH,
7 May 2004
[17] User Guidance for the Issuer of the Tachograph Card - Tachograph Card
Version 1.1 128/64 R1.1, Version V1.00, ORGA Kartensysteme GmbH,
7 May 2004
[18] Certification Report, BSI-DSZ-CC-0203-2003 for Philips Smart Card
Controller P16WX064V0C from Philips Semiconductors GmbH
Business Line Identification, 18 June 2003, Bundesamt für
Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
[19] Security Target Lite BSI-DSZ-CC-0203, Version 1.2, May 8th
, 2003,
Evaluation of Philips P16WX064V0C Secure 16-bit Smart Card
Controller, Philips Semiconductors (sanitised public document)
[20] Data Sheet V1.00 - Tachograph Card Version 1.1 128/64 R1.1, Version
V1.00, ORGA Kartensysteme GmbH, 07.05.2004
B-28
BSI-DSZ-CC-0267-2004 Certification Report
C Excerpts from the Criteria
CC Part 1:
Caveats on evaluation results (chapter 5.4) / Final Interpretation 008
The conformance result indicates the source of the collection of requirements that is
met by a TOE or PP that passes its evaluation. This conformance result is presented
with respect to Part 2 (functional requirements), Part 3 (assurance requirements) and, if
applicable, to a pre-defined set of requirements (e.g., EAL, Protection Profile).
The conformance result consists of one of the following:
Part 2 conformant - A PP or TOE is Part 2 conformant if the functional requirements
are based only upon functional components in Part 2
Part 2 extended - A PP or TOE is Part 2 extended if the functional requirements
include functional components not in Part 2
plus one of the following:
Part 3 conformant - A PP or TOE is Part 3 conformant if the assurance requirements
are based only upon assurance components in Part 3
Part 3 extended - A PP or TOE is Part 3 extended if the assurance requirements
include assurance requirements not in Part 3.
Additionally, the conformance result may include a statement made with respect to sets
of defined requirements, in which case it consists of one of the following:
Package name Conformant - A PP or TOE is conformant to a pre-defined named
functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the requirements (functions or
assurance) include all components in the packages listed as part of the conformance
result.
Package name Augmented - A PP or TOE is an augmentation of a pre-defined
named functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the requirements (functions
or assurance) are a proper superset of all components in the packages listed as part of
the conformance result.
Finally, the conformance result may also include a statement made with respect to
Protection Profiles, in which case it includes the following:
PP Conformant - A TOE meets specific PP(s), which are listed as part of the
conformance result.
C-1
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0267-2004
CC Part 3:
Assurance categorisation (chapter 2.5)
„The assurance classes, families, and the abbreviation for each family are shown in
Table 2.1.
Assurance Class Assurance Family Abbreviated Name
Class ACM:
Configuration
management
CM automation ACM_AUT
CM capabilities ACM_CAP
CM scope ACM_SCP
Class ADO: Delivery
and operation
Delivery ADO_DEL
Installation, generation and start-up ADO_IGS
Class ADV:
Development
Functional specification ADV_FSP
High-level design ADV_HLD
Implementation representation ADV_IMP
TSF internals ADV_INT
Low-level design ADV_LLD
Representation correspondence ADV_RCR
Security policy modeling ADV_SPM
Class AGD: Guidance
documents
Administrator guidance AGD_ADM
User guidance AGD_USR
Class ALC: Life cycle
support
Development security ALC_DVS
Flaw remediation ALC_FLR
Life cycle definition ALC_LCD
Tools and techniques ALC_TAT
Class ATE: Tests Coverage ATE_COV
Depth ATE_DPT
Functional tests ATE_FUN
Independent testing ATE_IND
Class AVA:
Vulnerability
assessment
Covert channel analysis AVA_CCA
Misuse AVA_MSU
Strength of TOE security functions AVA_SOF
Vulnerability analysis AVA_VLA
Table 2.1 -Assurance family breakdown and mapping“
C-2
BSI-DSZ-CC-0267-2004 Certification Report
Evaluation assurance levels (chapter 6)
„The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that balances
the level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of acquiring that degree of
assurance. The CC approach identifies the separate concepts of assurance in a TOE
at the end of the evaluation, and of maintenance of that assurance during the
operational use of the TOE.
It is important to note that not all families and components from Part 3 are included in
the EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful and desirable
assurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and components will be
considered for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and STs for which they provide
utility.
Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview (chapter 6.1)
Table 6.1 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a hierarchically
ordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families. Each number in the
resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component where applicable.
As outlined in the next section, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation assurance
levels are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE's assurance. They are hierarchically
ordered inasmuch as each EAL represents more assurance than all lower EALs. The
increase in assurance from EAL to EAL is accomplished by substitution of a
hierarchically higher assurance component from the same assurance family (i.e.
increasing rigour, scope, and/or depth) and from the addition of assurance components
from other assurance families (i.e. adding new requirements).
These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as
described in chapter 2 of this Part 3. More precisely, each EAL includes no more than
one component of each assurance family and all assurance dependencies of every
component are addressed.
While the EALs are defined in the CC, it is possible to represent other combinations of
assurance. Specifically, the notion of “augmentation“ allows the addition of assurance
components (from assurance families not already included in the EAL) or the
substitution of assurance components (with another hierarchically higher assurance
component in the same assurance family) to an EAL. Of the assurance constructs
defined in the CC, only EALs may be augmented. The notion of an “EAL minus a
constituent assurance component“ is not recognised by the CC as a valid claim.
Augmentation carries with it the obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility
and added value of the added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also be
extended with explicitly stated assurance requirements.
C-3
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0267-2004
Assurance
Class
Assurance
Family
Assurance Components by
Evaluation Assurance Level
EAL1 EAL2 EAL3 EAL4 EAL5 EAL6 EAL7
Configuration
management
ACM_AUT 1 1 2 2
ACM_CAP 1 2 3 4 4 5 5
ACM_SCP 1 2 3 3 3
Delivery and
operation
ADO_DEL 1 1 2 2 2 3
ADO_IGS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Development ADV_FSP 1 1 1 2 3 3 4
ADV_HLD 1 2 2 3 4 5
ADV_IMP 1 2 3 3
ADV_INT 1 2 3
ADV_LLD 1 1 2 2
ADV_RCR 1 1 1 1 2 2 3
ADV_SPM 1 3 3 3
Guidance
documents
AGD_ADM 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
AGD_USR 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Life cycle
support
ALC_DVS 1 1 1 2 2
ALC_FLR
ALC_LCD 1 2 2 3
ALC_TAT 1 2 3 3
Tests ATE_COV 1 2 2 2 3 3
ATE_DPT 1 1 2 2 3
ATE_FUN 1 1 1 1 2 2
ATE_IND 1 2 2 2 2 2 3
Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_CCA 1 2 2
AVA_MSU 1 2 2 3 3
AVA_SOF 1 1 1 1 1 1
AVA_VLA 1 1 2 3 4 4
Table 6.1 - Evaluation assurance level summary“
C-4
BSI-DSZ-CC-0267-2004 Certification Report
Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL1) - functionally tested (chapter 6.2.1)
„Objectives
EAL1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but the
threats to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where independent
assurance is required to support the contention that due care has been exercised with
respect to the protection of personal or similar information.
EAL1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer, including
independent testing against a specification, and an examination of the guidance
documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL1 evaluation could be successfully
conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE, and for minimal outlay.
An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a manner
consistent with its documentation, and that it provides useful protection against
identified threats.“
Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL2) - structurally tested (chapter 6.2.2)
„Objectives
EAL2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of design
information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the part of the
developer than is consistent with good commercial practice. As such it should not
require a substantially increased investment of cost or time.
EAL2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require
a low to moderate level of independently assured security in the absence of ready
availability of the complete development record. Such a situation may arise when
securing legacy systems, or where access to the developer may be limited.“
Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL3) - methodically tested and checked
(chapter 6.2.3)
„Objectives
EAL3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from positive
security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of existing sound
development practices.
EAL3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
moderate level of independently assured security, and require a thorough investigation
of the TOE and its development without substantial re-engineering.“
Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL4) - methodically designed, tested, and
reviewed (chapter 6.2.4)
„Objectives
EAL4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security
engineering based on good commercial development practices which, though rigorous,
C-5
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0267-2004
do not require substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other resources. EAL4 is the
highest level at which it is likely to be economically feasible to retrofit to an existing
product line.
EAL4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require
a moderate to high level of independently assured security in conventional commodity
TOEs and are prepared to incur additional security-specific engineering costs.“
Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL5) - semiformally designed and tested
(chapter 6.2.5)
„Objectives
EAL5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security engineering
based upon rigorous commercial development practices supported by moderate
application of specialist security engineering techniques. Such a TOE will probably be
designed and developed with the intent of achieving EAL5 assurance. It is likely that
the additional costs attributable to the EAL5 requirements, relative to rigorous
development without the application of specialised techniques, will not be large.
EAL5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require
a high level of independently assured security in a planned development and require a
rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable costs attributable to
specialist security engineering techniques.“
Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL6) - semiformally verified design and
tested (chapter 6.2.6)
„Objectives
EAL6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security
engineering techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to produce a
premium TOE for protecting high value assets against significant risks.
EAL6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in
high risk situations where the value of the protected assets justifies the additional
costs.“
Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL7) - formally verified design and tested
(chapter 6.2.7)
„Objectives
EAL7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in extremely
high risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies the higher costs.
Practical application of EAL7 is currently limited to TOEs with tightly focused security
functionality that is amenable to extensive formal analysis.“
C-6
BSI-DSZ-CC-0267-2004 Certification Report
Strength of TOE security functions (AVA_SOF) (chapter 14.3)
AVA_SOF Strength of TOE security functions
„Objectives
Even if a TOE security function cannot be bypassed, deactivated, or corrupted, it may
still be possible to defeat it because there is a vulnerability in the concept of its
underlying security mechanisms. For those functions a qualification of their security
behaviour can be made using the results of a quantitative or statistical analysis of the
security behaviour of these mechanisms and the effort required to overcome them. The
qualification is made in the form of a strength of TOE security function claim.“
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VLA) (chapter 14.4)
AVA_VLA Vulnerability analysis
„Objectives
Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether vulnerabilities identified,
during the evaluation of the construction and anticipated operation of the TOE or by
other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses), could allow users to violate the TSP.
Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that a user will be able to discover flaws
that will allow unauthorised access to resources (e.g. data), allow the ability to interfere
with or alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorised capabilities of other users.“
„Application notes
A vulnerability analysis is performed by the developer in order to ascertain the
presence of security vulnerabilities, and should consider at least the contents of all the
TOE deliverables including the ST for the targeted evaluation assurance level. The
developer is required to document the disposition of identified vulnerabilities to allow
the evaluator to make use of that information if it is found useful as a support for the
evaluator's independent vulnerability analysis.“
„Independent vulnerability analysis goes beyond the vulnerabilities identified by the
developer. The main intent of the evaluator analysis is to determine that the TOE is
resistant to penetration attacks performed by an attacker possessing a low (for
AVA_VLA.2), moderate (for AVA_VLA.3) or high (for AVA_VLA.4) attack potential.“
C-7
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0267-2004
This page is intentionally left blank.
C-8
BSI-DSZ-CC-0267-2004 Certification Report
D Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Functional Tests according to Appendix 9 of Annex I (B)
of Council Regulation (EEC) No. 1360/2002 D-3
Annex B: Evaluation results regarding development
and production environment D-5
D-1
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0267-2004
This page is intentionally left blank.
D-2
BSI-DSZ-CC-0267-2004 Certification Report
Annex A of Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0267-2004:
Functional Tests according to Appendix 9 of Annex I (B) of
Council Regulation (EEC) No. 1360/2002
In addition to the ordinary evaluator tasks of the Common Criteria evaluation at
level EAL4+ (equivalent to ITSEC E3 high), functional tests according to
Appendix 9 of the EU Tachograph Card Commission Regulation [8] have been
performed.
The following list shows the results of these tests:
N
o
Test Description Related
requirements
Result
1 Administrative examination
1.1 Docu-
menta-
tion
Correctness of documentation - Confirmed
4 Protocol tests The evaluators have
assured themselves in
detail of the fact that the
functional tests have
been performed
successfully.
4.1 ATR Check that the ATR is
compliant.
ISO/IEC 7816-3
TCS 304, 307, 308
Confirmed
4.2 T=0 Check that T=0 protocol is
compliant.
ISO/IEC 7816-3
TCS 302, 303, 305
Confirmed
4.3 PTS Check that the PTS command
is compliant by setting T=1
from T=0.
ISO/IEC 7816-3
TCS 309 to 311
Confirmed
4.4 T=1 Check that T=1 protocol is
compliant.
ISO/IEC 7816-3
TCS 303, / 306
Confirmed
5 Card Structure
5.1 Test that the file structure of
the card is compliant by
checking the presence of the
mandatory files in the card
and their Access Conditions.
TCS 312
TCS 400*, 401,
402, 403*, 404,
405*, 406, 407,
408*, 409, 410*,
411, 412, 413*,
414, 415*, 416,
417, 418*, 419
Confirmed
D-3
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0267-2004
N
o
Test Description Related
requirements
Result
6 Functional tests
6.1 Normal
Pro-
cessing
Test at least once each
allowed usage of each
command
(ex: test the UPDATE
BINARY command with CLA
= '00', CLA = '0C' and with
different P1,P2 and Lc
parameters).
Check that the operations
have actually been performed
in the card (ex: by reading the
file the command has been
performed on).
Confirmed
6.2 Error
Messa-
ges
Test at least once each error
message (as specified in
Appendix 2) for each
command.
Test at least once every
generic error (except ‘6400’
integrity errors checked during
security certification).
TCS 313
to
TCS 379
Confirmed
D-4
BSI-DSZ-CC-0267-2004 Certification Report
Annex B of Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0267-2004
Evaluation results regarding
development and production
environment
The IT product, Orga Tachograph Card Version 1.1 128/64 R1.1 (Target of Evaluation,
TOE) has been evaluated at an accredited and licensed/ approved evaluation facility
using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Part 1 Version 0.6, Part 2
Version 1.0, extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL4
and smart card specific guidance, for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT
Security Evaluation, Version 2.1 (ISO/IEC15408: 1999) and including final
interpretations for compliance with Common Criteria Version 2.2 and Common
Methodology Part 2, Version 2.2.
As a result of the TOE certification, dated 18 May 2004, the following results regarding
the development and production environment apply. The Common Criteria assurance
requirements
· ACM – Configuration management (i.e. ACM_AUT.1, ACM_CAP.4, ACM_SCP.2),
· ADO – Delivery and operation (i.e. ADO_DEL.2, ADO_IGS.2) and
· ALC – Life cycle support (i.e. ALC_DVS.1, ALC_LCD.1, ALC_TAT.1),
are fulfilled for the development and production sites of the TOE listed below ((a) – (b)):
ORGA Kartensysteme GmbH, Am Hoppenhof 33, 33104 Paderborn
(embedded software development)
(a)
(b) ORGA Kartensysteme GmbH, Konrad-Zuse-Ring 1, 24220 Flintbek
(card production and initialisation site)
For development and productions sites regarding the Philips P16WX064V0C Secure 16-bit
Smart Card Controller and its Crypto Library refer to the certification report BSI-DSZ-CC-
0203-2003.
For the sites listed above, the requirements have been specifically applied in
accordance with the Security Target BSI-DSZ-0267-2004, Version 1.00, 12 May 2004,
ORGA Kartensysteme GmbH [7]. The evaluators verified, that the threats, policies and
security objective for the life cycle phases 1 to 5 up to delivery within or at the end of
phase 5 as stated in the TOE Security Target [7] are fulfilled by the procedures of these
sites.
D-5