Ärendetyp: 6 Diarienummer: 19FMV6201-19:1
Dokument ID
Enligt säkerhetsskyddslagen (2018:585)
SEKRETESS
Enligt offentlighets- och
Sekretesslagen (2009:400)
2020-11-04
Försvarets materielverk
Swedish Defence Material Administration
Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
Certification Report - F5 BIG-IP® 14.1.2 VE for
LTM+APM
Issue: 1.0, 2020-Nov-04
Authorisation: Helén Svensson, Lead Certifier , CSEC
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Table of Contents
1 Executive Summary 3
2 Identification 4
3 Security Policy 5
3.1 Security Audit 5
3.2 Cryptographic Support 5
3.3 User Data Protection 5
3.4 Identification and Authentication 5
3.5 Security Function Management 5
3.6 Protection of the TSF 6
3.7 TOE Access 6
3.8 Trusted Path / Channels 6
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope 7
4.1 Assumptions 7
4.2 Organisational Security Policies 8
4.3 Clarification of Scope 8
5 Architectural Information 10
6 Documentation 12
7 IT Product Testing 14
7.1 Evaluator Testing 14
7.2 Penetration Testing 14
8 Evaluated Configuration 15
9 Results of the Evaluation 16
10 Evaluator Comments and Recommendations 17
11 Glossary 18
12 Bibliography 19
Appendix A Scheme Versions 20
A.1 Scheme/Quality Management System 20
A.2 Scheme Notes 20
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1 Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is a network device. The TOE consists of the BIG-IP
LTM+APM Version 14.1.2 (build BIGIP-14.1.2-0.89.37, also referred to as 14.1.2 +
EHF) with Appliance Mode licensed, and running on any of the following hypervi-
sors:
 VMWare ESXi 6.5.0 - Intel Xeon E5-2697v4 processor
 Hyper-V version 10.0 on Windows Server 2019 - Intel Xeon E5-2660v3 processor
 KVM on Centos 7 - Intel Xeon E5-2660v3 processor
The hypervisors are installed on the Dell PowerEdge R630.
The hardware, hypervisors, and BIG-IP software are included in the TOE boundary.
The customer is responsible for acquiring and installing the hardware and hypervisor
and ensuring that the hardware and hypervisor on which the TOE software will run are
free of tampering. Refer to the manufacturers of those components for details.
The TOE software is delivered via download in the form of a virtual edition (VE) im-
age fileset that is protected via a digital signature. The TOE guidance is delivered via
download in the form of an ISO image along with a SHA-256 checksum for verifica-
tion by the customer.
The ST claims exact conformance to Collaborative Protection Profile for Network De-
vices (NDcPP), Version 2.1, 24-September-2018.
The NIT technical decisions that have been applied to the Network Device Collabora-
tive Protection Profile can be found in the ST.
There are seven assumptions being made in the ST regarding the secure usage and en-
vironment of the TOE. The TOE relies on these to counter the nine threats and comply
with the one organisational security policy (OSP) in the ST. The assumptions, the
threat and the OSP are described in chapter 4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope.
The evaluation has been performed by atsec information security AB and was com-
pleted 2020-10-22. The evaluation was conducted in accordance with the requirements
of Common Criteria, version 3.1, release 5, and the Common Methodology for IT Se-
curity Evaluation, version 3.1, release 5.
atsec information security AB is a licensed evaluation facility for Common Criteria
under the Swedish Common Criteria Evaluation and Certification Scheme. atsec infor-
mation security AB is also accredited by the Swedish accreditation body SWEDAC
according to ISO/IEC 17025 for Common Criteria evaluation.
The certifier monitored the activities of the evaluator by reviewing all successive ver-
sions of the evaluation reports. The certifier determined that the evaluation results
confirm the security claims in the Security Target [ST], and have been reached in
agreement with the requirements of the Common Criteria and the Common Methodol-
ogy for evaluation assurance level:
EAL 1 + ASE_SPD.1 and in accordance with the NDcPP Evaluation Activities.
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the
certificate, and on the condition that all the stipulations in the Security Target are
met.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by CSEC or any other or-
ganisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the
IT product by CSEC or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate is either expressed or implied.
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2 Identification
Certification Identification
Certification ID CSEC2019022
Name and version of the cer-
tified IT product
BIG-IP LTM+APM Version 14.1.2 (build BIGIP-
14.1.2-0.89.37, also referred to as 14.1.2 + EHF)
with Appliance Mode licensed.
Running on any of the following hypervisors:
 VMWare ESXi 6.5.0 - Intel Xeon E5-2697v4
processor
 Hyper-V version 10.0 on Windows Server 2019
- Intel Xeon E5-2660v3 processor
 KVM on Centos 7 - Intel Xeon E5-2660v3 pro-
cessor
Security Target Identification F5 BIG-IP® 14.1.2 VE for LTM+APM Security
Target, F5 Networks, Inc., 2020-03-31, Version 4.7
EAL EAL 1 + ASE_SPD.1 and
NDcPP V2.1
Sponsor F5 Networks, Inc.
Developer F5 Networks, Inc.
ITSEF atsec information security AB
Common Criteria version 3.1 release 5
CEM version 3.1 release 5
QMS version 1.23.2
Scheme Notes Release 16.0
Recognition Scope CCRA
Certification date 2020-11-04
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3 Security Policy
The TOE provides the following security services:
 Security Audit
 Cryptographic Support
 User Data Protection
 Identification and Authentication
 Security Function Management
 Protection of the TSF
 TOE Access
 Trusted Path / Channels
3.1 Security Audit
The TOE implements implements syslog capabilities to generate audit records for se-
curity relevant events. In addition, the TOE protects the audit trail from unauthorized
modifications and loss of audit data due to insufficient space..
3.2 Cryptographic Support
The TOE provides cryptographic functionality is provided by the OpenSSL crypto-
graphic module. The TOE provides a secure shell (SSH) to allow administrators to
connect over a dedicated network interface. The TOE also implements the TLS proto-
col to allow administrators to remotely manage the TOE. The TOE implements a TLS
client for interactions with other TLS servers. These cryptographic implementations
utilize the cryptographic module which provides random number generation, key gen-
eration, key establishment, key storage, key destruction, hash operations, encryp-
tion/decryption operations, and digital signature operations.
3.3 User Data Protection
The TOE implements residual information protection on network packets traversing
through it. In other words, network packets traversing through the BIG-IP do not con-
tain any residual data.
3.4 Identification and Authentication
The TOE provides an internal password-based repository that is implemented for au-
thentication of management users. The TOE enforces a strong password policy and
disabling user accounts after a configured number of failed authentication attempts.
3.5 Security Function Management
A command line interface (available via the traffic management shell "tmsh"), web-
based GUI ("Configuration utility"), a SOAP-based API ("iControl API"), and a
REST-based API (“iControl REST API”) are offered to administrators for all relevant
configuration of security functionality.
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The TOE manages configuration objects in a partition which includes users, server
pools, etc. This includes the authentication of administrators by user name and pass-
word, as well as access control based on pre-defined roles and, optionally, groups of
objects ("Profiles"). "Profiles" can be defined for individual servers and classes of
servers that the TOE forwards traffic from clients to, and for traffic that matches cer-
tain characteristics, determining the kind of treatment applicable to that traffic. Man-
agement capabilities offered by the TOE include the definition of templates for certain
configuration options. The management functionality also implements roles for sepa-
ration of duties.
3.6 Protection of the TSF
The TOE implements many capabilities to protect the integrity and management of its
own security functionality. These capabilities include the protection of sensitive data,
such as passwords and keys, self-tests, product update verification, and reliable time
stamping.
3.7 TOE Access
Prior to interactive user authentication, the TOE can display an administrative defined
banner. The TOE terminates interactive sessions after an administrator-defined period
of inactivity and allows users to terminate their own authenticated session.
3.8 Trusted Path / Channels
The TOE protects remote connections to its management interfaces with TLS and
SSH. The TOE also protects communication channels with audit servers using TLS.
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4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
4.1 Assumptions
The Security Target [ST] makes seven assumptions on the usage and the operational
environment of the TOE.
A.PHYSICAL_PROTECTION
The network device is assumed to be physically protected in its operational environ-
ment and not subject to physical attacks that compromise the security and/or interfere
with the device’s physical interconnections and correct operation. This protection is
assumed to be sufficient to protect the device and the data it contains. As a result, the
cPP will not include any requirements on physical tamper protection or other physical
attack mitigations. The cPP will not expect the product to defend against physical ac-
cess to the device that allows unauthorized entities to extract data, bypass other con-
trols, or otherwise manipulate the device.
A.LIMITED_FUNCTIONALITY
The device is assumed to provide networking functionality as its core function and not
provide functionality/services that could be deemed as general purpose computing.
For example the device should not provide a computing platform for general purpose
applications (unrelated to networking functionality).
A.NO_THRU_TRAFFIC_PROTECTION
The standard/generic network device does not provide any assurance regarding the
protection of traffic that traverses it. The intent is for the network device to protect
data that originates on or is destined to the device itself, to include administrative data
and audit data. Traffic that is traversing the network device, destined for another net-
work entity, is not covered by the NDcPP.
It is assumed that this protection will be covered by cPPs and PP-Modules for particu-
lar types of network devices (e.g., firewall).
A.TRUSTED_ADMINISTRATOR
The Security Administrator(s) for the network device are assumed to be trusted and to
act in the best interest of security for the organization. This includes being appropri-
ately trained, following policy, and adhering to guidance documentation. Administra-
tors are trusted to ensure passwords/credentials have sufficient strength and entropy
and to lack malicious intent when administering the device. The network device is not
expected to be capable of defending against a malicious Administrator that actively
works to bypass or compromise the security of the device.
For TOEs supporting X.509v3 certificate-based authentication, the Security Adminis-
trator(s) are expected to fully validate (e.g. offline verification) any CA certificate
(root CA certificate or intermediate CA certificate) loaded into the TOE’s trust store
(aka 'root store', ' trusted CA Key Store', or similar) as a trust anchor prior to use (e.g.
offline verification).
A.REGULAR_UPDATES
The network device firmware and software is assumed to be updated by an Adminis-
trator on a regular basis in response to the release of product updates due to known
vulnerabilities..
A.ADMIN_CREDENTIALS_SECURE
The Administrator’s credentials (private key) used to access the network device are
protected by the platform on which they reside..
A.RESIDUAL_INFORMATION
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The Administrator must ensure that there is no unauthorized access possible for sensi-
tive residual information (e.g., cryptographic keys, keying material, PINs, passwords,
etc.) on networking equipment when the equipment is discarded or removed from its
operational environment.
4.2 Organisational Security Policies
The Security Target contains one Organisational Security Policies (OSPs), which have
been considered during the evaluation.
P.ACCESS_BANNER
The TOE shall display an initial banner describing restrictions of use, legal agree-
ments, or any other appropriate information to which users consent by accessing the
TOE.
4.3 Clarification of Scope
The Security Target contains nine threats, which have been considered during the
evaluation.
T.UNAUTHORIZED_ADMINISTRATOR_ACCESS
Threat agents may attempt to gain Administrator access to the firewall by nefarious
means such as masquerading as an Administrator to the firewall, masquerading as the
firewall to an Administrator, replaying an administrative session (in its entirety, or se-
lected portions), or performing man-in-the-middle attacks, which would provide ac-
cess to the administrative session, or sessions between the firewall and a network de-
vice. Successfully gaining Administrator access allows malicious actions that compro-
mise the security functionality of the firewall and the network on which it resides.
T.WEAK_CRYPTOGRAPHY
Threat agents may exploit weak cryptographic algorithms or perform a cryptographic
exhaust against the key space. Poorly chosen encryption algorithms, modes, and key
sizes will allow attackers to compromise the algorithms, or brute force exhaust the key
space and give them unauthorized access allowing them to read, manipulate and/or
control the traffic with minimal effort.
T.UNTRUSTED_COMMUNICATION_CHANNELS
Threat agents may attempt to target firewalls that do not use standardized secure tun-
neling protocols to protect the critical network traffic. Attackers may take advantage
of poorly designed protocols or poor key management to successfully perform man-in-
the-middle attacks, replay attacks, etc. Successful attacks will result in loss of confi-
dentiality and integrity of the critical network traffic, and potentially could lead to a
compromise of the firewall itself.
T.WEAK_AUTHENTICATION_ENDPOINTS
Threat agents may take advantage of secure protocols that use weak methods to au-
thenticate the endpoints – e.g., shared password that is guessable or transported as
plaintext. The consequences are the same as a poorly designed protocol, the attacker
could masquerade as the Administrator or another device, and the attacker could insert
themselves into the network stream and perform a man-in-the-middle attack. The re-
sult is the critical network traffic is exposed and there could be a loss of confidential-
ity and integrity, and potentially the firewall itself could be compromised.
T.UPDATE_COMPROMISE
Threat agents may attempt to provide a compromised update of the software or firm-
ware which undermines the security functionality of the device. Non-validated updates
or updates validated using non-secure or weak cryptography leave the update firm-
ware vulnerable to surreptitious alteration.
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T.UNDETECTED_ACTIVITY
Threat agents may attempt to access, change, and/or modify the security functionality
of the firewall without Administrator awareness. This could result in the attacker find-
ing an avenue (e.g., misconfiguration, flaw in the product) to compromise the device
and the Administrator would have no knowledge that the device has been compro-
mised.
T.SECURITY_FUNCTIONALITY_COMPROMISE
Threat agents may compromise credentials and firewall data enabling continued ac-
cess to the firewall and its critical data. The compromise of credentials include replac-
ing existing credentials with an attacker’s credentials, modifying existing credentials,
or obtaining the Administrator or firewall credentials for use by the attacker.
T.PASSWORD_CRACKING
Threat agents may be able to take advantage of weak administrative passwords to gain
privileged access to the firewall. Having privileged access to the firewall provides the
attacker unfettered access to the network traffic, and may allow them to take ad-
vantage of any trust relationships with other network devices.
T.SECURITY_FUNCTIONALITY_FAILURE
An external, unauthorized entity could make use of failed or compromised security
functionality and might therefore subsequently use or abuse security functions without
prior authentication to access, change or modify device data, critical network traffic or
security functionality of the device.
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5 Architectural Information
The following diagram shows the basic components that comprise the TOE.
The TOE is separated into two (2) distinct planes, the control plane and the data plane.
The control plane validates, stores, and passes configuration data to all necessary sys-
tems. It also provides all administrative access to the TOE. The data plane passes user
traffic through the TOE.
The TOE implements and supports the following network protocols: TLS (client and
server), SSH, HTTPS, FTP. The TOE protects remote connections to its management
interfaces with TLS and SSH. The TOE also protects communication channels with
audit servers using TLS (TLSv1.1 and TLSv1.2). The cryptographic functionality im-
plemented in the TOE is provided by OpenSSL.
The TOE is divided into six (6) subsystems: Hardware, Hypervisor, Traffic Manage-
ment Operating System (TMOS), Traffic Management Micro-kernel (TMM), Local
Traffic Manager (LTM), and Access Policy Manager (APM). F5’s TMOS is a Linux-
based operating system customized for performance. The TMM is the data plane of
the product and all data plane traffic passes through the TMM. The LTM controls net-
work traffic coming into or exiting the local area network (LAN) and provides the
ability to intercept and redirect incoming network traffic. The APM module terminates
TLS-based VPN connections from remote clients although these features are not in-
cluded in the evaluated configuration.
At the core of BIG-IP is a concept referred to as Traffic Management Microkernel
(TMM), representing the data plane of the product when compared to traditional net-
work device architectures. It is implemented by a daemon running with root privi-
leges, performing its own memory management, and having direct access to the hyper-
visor. TMM implements a number of sequential filters both for the “client-side” and
“server-side” network interfaces served by BIG-IP. The filters implemented in TMM
include a TCP, TLS, compression, and HTTP filter, amongst others. If the hypervisor
provides more than one CPU, TMM runs multi-threaded (one thread per CPU). In this
case, disaggregators in the kernel are responsible for de-multiplexing and multiplexing
network traffic for handling by an individual TMM thread.
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Additional plug-in filters can be added to this queue by individual product packages.
These plug-ins typically have a filter component in TMM, with additional and more
complex logic in a counter-part implemented in a Linux-based daemon (module). The
plug-in modules relevant to this evaluation include:
 Local Traffic Manager (LTM): authentication of HTTP (based on Apache) traffic
and advanced traffic forwarding directives
 Access Policy Manager (APM): TLS-based client connectivity.
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6 Documentation
Relevant guidance documents for the secure operation of BIG-IP that are part of the
TOE are:
 BIG-IP Common Criteria Evaluation Configuration Guide BIG-IP LTM+AFM
and BIG-IP LTM+APM Release 14.1.2 VE
 K05254775: Common Criteria Certification for BIG-IP 14.1.2 VE
 BIG-IP Device Service Clustering: Administration
 BIG-IP Digital Certificates: Administration
 BIG-IP Local Traffic Manager: Implementations
 BIG-IP Local Traffic Manager: Monitors Reference
 BIG-IP Local Traffic Manager: Profiles Reference
 BIG-IP Release Note
 BIG-IP System: Essentials
 BIG-IP System: SSL Administration
 BIG-IP System: User Account Administration
 BIG-IP Systems: Getting Started Guide
 BIG-IP TMOS: Implementations
 BIG-IP TMOS: Routing Administration
 External Monitoring of BIG-IP Systems: Implementations
 GUI Help Files
 iControl SDK
 iControl REST API User Guide
 K12042624: Restricting access to the Configuration utility using client certificates
(12.x – 14.x)
 K13092: Overview of securing access to the BIG-IP system
 K13302: Configuring the BIG-IP system to use an SSL chain certificate (11.x –
14.x)
 K13454: Configuring SSH public key authentication on BIP-IP systems (11.x –
14.x)
 K14620: Managing SSL Certificates for BIG-IP systems using the Configuration
utility
 K14783: Overview of the Client SSL profile (11.x – 14.x)
 K14806: Overview of the Server SSL profile (11.x – 15.x)
 K15497: Configuring a secure password policy for the BIG-IP system (11.x –
14.x)
 K15664: Overview of BIG-IP device certificates (11.x – 14.x)
 K42531434: Replacing the Configuration utility’s self-signed SSL certificate with
a CA-signed SSL certificate
 K5532: Configuring the level of information logged for TMM-specific events
 K6068: Configuring a pre-login or post-login message banner for the BIG-IP or
Enterprise Manager system
 K7752: Licensing the BIG-IP system
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 K80425458: Modifying the list of ciphers and MAC algorithms used by the SSH
service on the BIGIP system or BIG-IQ system
 K9908: Configuring an automatic logout for idle sessions
 Traffic Management Shell (tmsh) Reference Guide (versions 14.1.0 and 12.0.01)
 BIG-IP VE in Linux KVM
 BIG-IP VE in Microsoft Hyper-V
 BIG-IP VE in VMware ESXi
 BIG-IP Virtual Edition Supported Platforms
 K14810: Overview of BIG-IP VE license and throughput limits
 K14946: Overview of BIG-IP VE image sizes
 Linux KVM – BIG-IP VE Setup
 Linux KVM – BIG-IP VE Users Guide
 Linux KVM – Configure cryptographic offload for BIG-IP VE with Intel QAT
 Microsoft Hyper-V – BIG-IP VE Setup
 Microsoft Hyper-V – BIG-IP VE Users Guide
 VMware ESXi – BIG-IP VE Setup
 VMware ESXi – BIG-IP VE Users Guide
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7 IT Product Testing
7.1 Evaluator Testing
The independent testing was performed on the TOE in the form that it is delivered to
customers. The evaluator has performed more than 50 test cases, including extensive
testing to test cryptographic protocols (SSH, TLS, HTTPS) as well as underlying cryp-
tographic operations (FCS_COP, FCS_CKM) that were also separately tested in algo-
rithm testing. All test cases passed successfully.
Algorithm testing is required to be performed by the NDcPP Supporting Document
[EA-ND 2.1]. Algorithm test vectors were generated by CAVS tool to test all crypto-
graphic algorithms of the TOE. The testing is valid for all hypervisors supported by
the TOE, which is evident from the certificates: KVM, VMware and Hyper-V.
7.2 Penetration Testing
The approach for the penetration test was to scan all TCP/IP ports on the TOE plat-
form to identify all open ports. The penetration test was performed on the TOE in the
evaluated configuration. The results of the port scan found that there were no open
ports.
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8 Evaluated Configuration
The following configuration specifics apply to the evaluated configuration of the
TOE:
 Appliance mode is licensed. This results in root access to the TOE operating sys-
tem and bash shell being disabled.
 Certificate validation is performed using CRLs.
 Disabled interfaces:
 All command shells other than tmsh are disabled. For example, bash and other
user-serviceable shells are excluded.
 Management of the TOE via SNMP is disabled.
 Management of the TOE via the appliance's LCD display is disabled.
 SSH client
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9 Results of the Evaluation
The evaluators applied each work unit of the Common Methodology [CEM] within
the scope of the evaluation, and concluded that the TOE meets the security objectives
stated in the Security Target [ST] for an attack potential of Basic.
The certifier reviewed the work of the evaluators and determined that the evaluation
was conducted in accordance with the Common Criteria [CC].
The evaluators' overall verdict is PASS.
The verdicts for the assurance classes and components are summarised in the follow-
ing table:
Assurance Class/Family Short name Verdict
Development ADV PASS
Functional Specification ADV_FSP.1 PASS
Guidance Documents AGD PASS
Operational User Guidance AGD_OPE.1 PASS
Preparative Procedures AGD_PRE.1 PASS
Life-cycle Support ALC PASS
CM Capabilities ALC_CMC.1 PASS
CM Scope ALC_CMS.1 PASS
Security Target Evaluation ASE PASS
ST Introduction ASE_INT.1 PASS
Conformance Claims ASE_CCL.1 PASS
Security Problem Definition ASE_SPD.1 PASS
Security Objectives ASE_OBJ.1 PASS
Extended Components Definition ASE_ECD.1 PASS
Security Requirements ASE_REQ.1 PASS
TOE Summary Specification ASE_TSS.1 PASS
Tests ATE PASS
Independent Testing ATE_IND.1 PASS
Vulnerability Assessment AVA PASS
Vulnerability Analysis AVA_VAN.1 PASS
Evaluation Activities for NDcPP PASS
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10 Evaluator Comments and Recommendations
None.
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11 Glossary
CC Common Criteria
CRL Certificate Revocation List
EAL2 Evaluation Assurance Level 2
GUI Graphical User Interface
ITSEF IT Security Evaluation Facility
LTM Local Traffic Manager
OSP Organisational Security Policy
PP Protection Profile
SOAP Simple Object Access Protocol
ST Security Target
TLS Transport Layer Security
TMM Traffic Management Microkernel
TMOS Traffic Management Operating System
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functions
vCMP Virtual Clustered Multi-Processing
VE Virtual Edition
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12 Bibliography
ST F5 BIG-IP 14.1.0 for LTM+AFM Security Target, F5 Networks Inc.
2019-07-10 document version 4.6
ECG BIG-IP Common Criteria Evaluation Configuration Guide BIG-IP
LTM+AFM and BIG-IP LTM+APM Release 14.1.2 VE, F5 Net-
works Inc., 2020-10-16, document version 4.75
NDcPP Collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices (NDcPP),
Version 2.1, 2018-09-24, document version 2.1
EA-ND 2.1 Evaluation Activities for Network Device cPP, september-2018,
document version 2.1
CCpart1 Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Part 1, version 3.1 revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-001
CCpart2 Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Part 2, version 3.1 revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-002
CCpart3 Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Part 3, version 3.1 revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-003
CC CCpart1 + CCpart2 + CCpart3
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evalu-
ation, version 3.1 revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-004
SP-002 SP-002 Evaluation and Certification, CSEC, 2019-09-24, document
version 31.0
Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
Certification Report - F5 BIG-IP® 14.1.2 VE for LTM+APM
19FMV6201-19:1 1.0 2020-11-04
20 (20)
Appendix A Scheme Versions
During the certification the following versions of the Swedish Common Criteria Eval-
uation and Certification scheme have been used.
A.1 Scheme/Quality Management System
During the certification project, the following versions of the quality management sys-
tem (QMS) have been applicable since the certification application was received:
QMS 1.23 valid from 2019-10-14
QMS 1.23.1 valid from 2020-03-06
QMS 1.23.2 valid from 2020-05-11
In order to ensure consistency in the outcome of the certification, the certifier has ex-
amined the changes introduced in each update of the quality management system.
The changes between consecutive versions are outlined in “Ändringslista CSEC QMS
1.23.2”. The certifier concluded that, from QMS 1.23 to the current QMS 1.23.2, there
are no changes with impact on the result of the certification.
A.2 Scheme Notes
The following Scheme interpretations have been considered during the certification.
 Scheme Note 15 - Demonstration of test Coverage
 Scheme Note 18 - Highlighted Requirements on the Security Target
 Scheme Note 21 - NIAP PP Certifications
 Scheme Note 22 - Vulnerability assessment
 Scheme Note 23 - Evaluation reports for NIAP PPs and cPPs
 Scheme Note 25 - Use of CAVP-tests in CC evaluations