Security Target for Data ONTAP® 8.0.0 7-Mode and Data ONTAP® 8.0.1 7-Mode i
Prepared for: Prepared by:
NetApp, Inc. Corsec Security, Inc.
495 East Java Drive
Sunnyvale, CA 94089
United States of America
10340 Democracy Lane, Suite 201
Fairfax, VA 22030
United States of America
Phone: +1 408 822 6000 Phone: +1 703 267 6050
http://www.netapp.com http://www.corsec.com
Security Target
Data ONTAP® 8.0.0 7-Mode and
Data ONTAP® 8.0.1 7-Mode
EVALUATION ASSURANCE LEVEL: EAL2+
JUNE 20, 2011 | VERSION 0.9
This document provides the basis for an evaluation of a specific Target of Evaluation (TOE), Data
ONTAP® 8.0.0 7-Mode and Data ONTAP® 8.0.1 7-Mode. This Security Target (ST) defines a set
of assumptions about the aspects of the environment, a list of threats that the product intends to
counter, a set of security objectives, a set of security requirements, and the Information
Technology (IT) Security Functions provided by the TOE which meet the set of requirements.
Security Target for Data ONTAP® 8.0.0 7-Mode and Data ONTAP® 8.0.1 7-Mode iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1 INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................1
1.1 PURPOSE.......................................................................................................................................1
1.2 SECURITY TARGET AND TOE REFERENCES......................................................................................1
1.3 PRODUCT OVERVIEW ......................................................................................................................2
1.4 TOE OVERVIEW .............................................................................................................................2
1.4.1 Brief Description of the Components of the TOE .............................................................3
1.4.2 TOE Environment Hardware ...........................................................................................7
1.4.3 TOE Environment Software.............................................................................................7
1.5 TOE DESCRIPTION .........................................................................................................................7
1.5.1 Physical Scope................................................................................................................8
1.5.2 Logical Scope .................................................................................................................9
1.5.3 Product Physical and Logical Features and Functionality not included in the TOE.........11
2 CONFORMANCE CLAIMS ......................................................................................12
3 SECURITY PROBLEM.............................................................................................13
3.1 THREATS TO SECURITY .................................................................................................................13
3.2 ORGANIZATIONAL SECURITY POLICIES................................................................................14
3.3 ASSUMPTIONS ..............................................................................................................................14
4 SECURITY OBJECTIVES........................................................................................15
4.1 SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE TOE............................................................................................15
4.2 SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT .......................................................16
4.2.1 IT Security Objectives ...................................................................................................16
4.2.2 Non-IT Security Objectives............................................................................................16
5 EXTENDED COMPONENTS ...................................................................................18
5.1 EXTENDED TOE SECURITY FUNCTIONAL COMPONENTS ..................................................................18
5.1.1 Class EXT_FPT: Extended Protection of the TSF ........................................................19
6 SECURITY REQUIREMENTS .................................................................................21
6.1 CONVENTIONS ..............................................................................................................................21
6.2 SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS ........................................................................................21
6.2.1 Class FAU: Security Audit .............................................................................................23
6.2.2 Class FDP: User Data Protection ..................................................................................26
6.2.3 Class FIA: Identification and Authentication...................................................................31
6.2.4 Class FMT: Security Management ................................................................................33
6.2.5 Class FPT: Protection of the TSF..................................................................................36
6.2.6 Class FTA: TOE Access................................................................................................37
6.3 SECURITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS.........................................................................................38
7 TOE SPECIFICATION..............................................................................................39
7.1 TOE SECURITY FUNCTIONS...........................................................................................................39
7.1.1 Security Audit................................................................................................................40
7.1.2 User Data Protection.....................................................................................................41
7.1.3 Identification and Authentication....................................................................................47
7.1.4 Security Management ...................................................................................................47
7.1.5 Protection of the TSF ....................................................................................................49
7.1.6 TOE Access..................................................................................................................51
8 RATIONALE.............................................................................................................52
8.1 CONFORMANCE CLAIMS RATIONALE..............................................................................................52
8.2 SECURITY OBJECTIVES RATIONALE ...............................................................................................52
8.2.1 Security Objectives Rationale Relating to Threats .........................................................52
8.2.2 Security Objectives Rationale Relating to Assumptions.................................................56
8.3 RATIONALE FOR EXTENDED SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS ...............................................58
8.4 SECURITY REQUIREMENTS RATIONALE ..........................................................................................58
8.4.1 Rationale for Security Functional Requirements of the TOE Objectives.........................58
8.4.2 Security Assurance Requirements Rationale.................................................................60
8.4.3 Dependency Rationale..................................................................................................60
9 ACRONYMS.............................................................................................................63
TABLE OF FIGURES
FIGURE 1 – DEPLOYMENT CONFIGURATION OF THE TOE....................................................... 3
FIGURE 2 – WAFL FUNCTIONALITY DETAIL........................................................................... 5
FIGURE 3 – PHYSICAL TOE BOUNDARY................................................................................ 8
FIGURE 4 – EXT_FPT: EXTENDED PROTECTION OF THE TSF CLASS DECOMPOSITION ....... 19
FIGURE 5 – EXT_FPT_SEP FAMILY DECOMPOSITION ........................................................ 20
FIGURE 6 – MULTISTORE ENABLES SECURE MULTI-TENANCY FOR SHARED STORAGE
IMPLEMENTATIONS. .................................................................................................... 50
TABLE OF TABLES
TABLE 1 – ST AND TOE REFERENCES ................................................................................. 1
TABLE 2 – TSF USER DATA SECURITY ATTRIBUTE DESCRIPTIONS ....................................... 6
TABLE 3 – TOE CLIENT SECURITY ATTRIBUTE DESCRIPTIONS............................................... 7
TABLE 4 – CC AND PP CONFORMANCE .............................................................................. 12
TABLE 5 – THREATS .......................................................................................................... 13
TABLE 6 – ASSUMPTIONS................................................................................................... 14
TABLE 7 – SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE TOE................................................................ 15
TABLE 8 – IT SECURITY OBJECTIVES.................................................................................. 16
TABLE 9 – NON-IT SECURITY OBJECTIVES ......................................................................... 16
Security Target for Data ONTAP® 8.0.0 7-Mode and Data ONTAP® 8.0.1 7-Mode v
TABLE 10 – EXTENDED TOE SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS ................................. 18
TABLE 11 – TOE SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS .................................................. 21
TABLE 12 – FAU_GEN.1.2 AUDIT GENERATION DETAILS ................................................... 23
TABLE 13 – FDP_ACC.1.1 DETAIL.................................................................................... 26
TABLE 14 – FDP_ACF.1.1 DETAIL .................................................................................... 26
TABLE 15 – FDP_ACF.1.2 DETAIL .................................................................................... 28
TABLE 16 – ROLES MAINTAINED BY THE TOE...................................................................... 33
TABLE 17 – ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS........................................................................... 38
TABLE 18 – MAPPING OF TOE SECURITY FUNCTIONS TO SECURITY FUNCTIONAL
REQUIREMENTS ......................................................................................................... 39
TABLE 19 – AUDIT TRAIL STORAGE ACCESS BY ROLE......................................................... 40
TABLE 20 – UNIX-STYLE FILE ACCESS REQUESTS............................................................. 43
TABLE 21 – NTFS-STYLE FILE ACCESS REQUESTS............................................................ 43
TABLE 22 – SECURITY FUNCTION CAPABILITIES.................................................................. 47
TABLE 23 – THREATS:OBJECTIVES MAPPING...................................................................... 52
TABLE 24 – ASSUMPTIONS:OBJECTIVES MAPPING .............................................................. 56
TABLE 25 – OBJECTIVES:SFRS MAPPING........................................................................... 58
TABLE 26 – FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS DEPENDENCIES .................................................. 61
TABLE 27 – ACRONYMS..................................................................................................... 63
Security Target for Data ONTAP® 8.0.0 7-Mode and Data ONTAP® 8.0.1 7-Mode 1
1 INTRODUCTION
This section identifies the ST, TOE, and the ST organization. The TOE includes two versions of the NetApp
Data ONTAP operating system, Data ONTAP® 8.0.0 7-Mode and Data ONTAP® 8.0.1 7-Mode. The TOE is
a microkernel operating system that supports multi-protocol services and advanced data management
capabilities for consolidating and protecting data for enterprise applications and users. NetApp‟s storage
appliances are based on the Data ONTAP® 8.0.0 7-Mode and Data ONTAP® 8.0.1 7-Mode microkernel
operating systems, where a single storage appliance is capable of running one version of the TOE. The
differences between these two versions are limited to minor revisions and do not include any modifications
that would affect the security posture of the TOE.
1.1 PURPOSE
This ST is divided into nine sections, as follows:
Introduction (Section 1) – Provides a brief summary of the ST contents and describes the organization of
other sections within this document. It also provides an overview of the TOE security functions and
describes the physical and logical scope for the TOE, as well as the ST and TOE references.
Conformance Claims (Section 2) – Provides the identification of any Common Criteria (CC), ST Protection
Profile, and Evaluation Assurance Level (EAL) package claims. It also identifies whether the ST contains
extended security requirements.
Security Problem (Section 3) – Describes the threats, organizational security policies, and assumptions that
pertain to the TOE and its environment.
Security Objectives (Section 4) – Identifies the security objectives that are satisfied by the TOE and its
environment.
Extended Components (Section 5) – Identifies new components (extended Security Functional
Requirements (SFRs) and extended Security Assurance Requirements (SARs)) that are not included in CC
Part 2 or CC Part 3.
Security Requirements (Section 6) – Presents the SFRs and SARs met by the TOE.
TOE Specification (Section 7) – Describes the security functions provided by the TOE that satisfy the
security functional requirements and objectives.
Rationale (Section 8) - Presents the rationale for the security objectives, requirements, and SFR
dependencies as to their consistency, completeness, and suitability.
Acronyms (Section 9) – Defines the acronyms and terminology used within this ST.
1.2 SECURITY TARGET AND TOE REFERENCES
Table 1 – ST and TOE References
ST Title NetApp, Inc. Data ONTAP® 8.0.0 7-Mode and Data ONTAP® 8.0.1 7-Mode Security Target
ST Version Version 0.9
ST Author Corsec Security, Inc.
Publication Date 6/20/2011
TOE Reference NetApp Data ONTAP® 8.0.0 7-Mode and Data ONTAP® 8.0.1 7-Mode
Keywords Operating System, Access Control, Discretionary Access Control (DAC), Storage Area
Network (SAN), Common Internet File System (CIFS), Network File System (NFS), Small
Computer System Interface (SCSI), Internet Small Computer System Interface (iSCSI), Fibre
Channel (FC), Fibre Channel Protocol (FCP), Serial Attached SCSI (SAS), Serial Advanced
Technology Attachment (SATA)
1.3 PRODUCT OVERVIEW
The Product Overview provides a high level description of the product that is the subject of the evaluation.
Data ONTAP® 8.0.0 7-Mode and Data ONTAP® 8.0.1 7-Mode are proprietary microkernel operating
systems developed by NetApp. The microkernel is included in the distribution of several of NetApp‟s
storage solution products including the Fabric Attached Storage (FAS) and V-Series appliances. Data
ONTAP® 8.0.0 7-Mode and Data ONTAP® 8.0.1 7-Mode provide data management functions that include
providing secure data storage and multi-protocol access.
Data ONTAP® 8.0.0 7-Mode and Data ONTAP® 8.0.1 7-Mode are software products that is distributed with
the following NetApp storage solution products:
FAS: NetApp‟s FAS systems offer seamless access to a full range of enterprise data for users
on a variety of platforms. FAS systems support NFS and CIFS for file access, as well as
FCP and iSCSI for block-storage access.
V-Series: The V-Series product family provides unified NAS and SAN access to data stored in FC
SAN storage arrays enabling data center storage deployment.
V-Series and FAS products use the same hardware controller and run the same Data ONTAP® 8.0.0 7-
Mode and Data ONTAP® 8.0.1 7-Mode operating systems. The key difference between a V-Series system
front ending a storage array and a FAS system with NetApp disks is that the V-Series controller no longer
runs Redundant Array of Independent Disks (RAID) 4 or RAID-DP™
1
. Instead, the V-Series system offloads
the RAID protection to the storage array. V-Series storage pools are large RAID 0 stripe sets of iSCSI or FC
Logical Unit Numbers (LUNs).
For a complete list of NetApp Storage Controllers on which the product operates, see section 1.4.2. The
products support both single controller and High Availability controller pairs as Storage Controller options on
some models.
The TOE supports multiple authentication mechanisms:
For CIFS shares, the TOE can authenticate end users with Kerberos
†
or NTLM
2†
against an Active Directory
(AD) domain, with NTLM
†
against an Windows NT-style domain, or locally using NT-style NTLM
authentication against a local user database.
For NFS shares, the TOE can authenticate end users with Kerberos
†
against both an Active Directory
domain and a Network Information Service (NIS) domain, or locally against User Identifiers (UID) and
passwords in local UNIX identity stores and /etc/passwd/.
For administration, the TOE authenticates administrators against a local user repository.
The following section, TOE Overview, will provide the introduction to the parts of the overall product offering
that are specifically being evaluated.
1.4 TOE OVERVIEW
The TOE Overview summarizes the usage and major security features of the TOE. The TOE Overview
provides a context for the TOE evaluation by identifying the TOE type, describing the product, and defining
the specific evaluated configuration. Functionality included in the logical software-only TOE boundary
includes:
Secure Multi-protocol Data Storage Access
Secure storage is provided by the TOE by implementing strict access control rules to data
managed by the TOE. Multi-protocol access support is provided by the TOE by supporting both
NFS and CIFS clients and providing transparent access to data.
1
RAID-DP – a NetApp proprietary Double Parity RAID 6 implementation that prevents data loss when two
drives fail
2
NTLM – New Technology Local Area Network Manager
†
Off-box Identification and Authentication to a NIS or AD domain via either NTLM or Kerberos is a
functionality provided by the IT Environment. Identification and Authentication of end-users is not a claimed
security functionality of the TOE whether local or remote.
Security Target for Data ONTAP® 8.0.0 7-Mode and Data ONTAP® 8.0.1 7-Mode 3
Identification and Authentication
The TOE supports on-box Identification and Authentication of administrators against a local user
repository.
Domain Separation
The TOE can function as a storage server for multiple groups of users within the TOE‟s scope of
control which must remain isolated from one another through the implementation of NetApp‟s
MultiStore virtualization technology.
Management
The Management functionality included in the TOE‟s logical boundary supports functionality that
enables users to modify TOE Data and TSF security functional behavior.
Audit
The Audit functionality provided by the TOE generates audit records for administrator logins and
configuration changes.
Figure 1 shows the details of the deployment configuration of the TOE:
Network
End User Workstation
File/Web/Mail/Application Server
9 U
NetApp FAS or
V-Series Appliance
FC, SAS, or SATA Disk Drives
Management Workstation
Figure 1 – Deployment Configuration of the TOE
1.4.1 Brief Description of the Components of the TOE
Data ONTAP® 8.0.0 7-Mode and Data ONTAP® 8.0.1 7-Mode are divided into three components: Write
Anywhere File Layout® (WAFL), System Administration, and the Operating System Kernel. The three
components are described below. Their relationship to the IT Environment-supplied components is depicted
in Table 1.
WAFL The TOE‟s WAFL component is responsible for implementing the TOE‟s DAC Security Functional
Policy (SFP). The DAC SFP includes enforcing access rules to user data based on client type, client
security attributes, file types, file security attributes and access request (create, read, write, execute, delete,
change permission, and change owner).
System Administration The System Administration component provides an administrator with an
interface supporting operator functions including enforcing identification and authentication, user roles, and
providing the necessary user interface commands that enable an operator to support the TOE‟s security
functionality. The System Administration function is performed by a user with the root, or admin role, and
this functionality is available locally and remotely via a Command Line Interface (CLI), or remotely via one of
several management interfaces detailed in section 7.1.4. System Administration functions are audited by
default.
Operating System Kernel The Kernel facilitates communication between the components of the Operating
System.
1.4.1.1 WAFL Functionality Detail
The TOE‟s WAFL Component protects User data. The TOE uses the subject, subject‟s security attributes,
the object, the object‟s security attributes and the requested operation to determine if access is granted.
The subjects are end users on remote systems that access the TOE via NFS or CIFS. Figure 2 depicts the
WAFL functionality.
The following acronyms not yet defined are used in Figure 2 below:
 ACL – Access Control List
 ACE – Access Control Entry
 UID – User Identifier
 GID – Group Identifier
 NTFS – New Technology File System
 SD – Security Descriptor
 SID – Security Identifier
Security Target for Data ONTAP® 8.0.0 7-Mode and Data ONTAP® 8.0.1 7-Mode 5
Figure 2 – WAFL Functionality Detail
1.4.1.1.1TSF User Data
The TSF User Data that is covered by the DAC SFP are the files that reside within the TOE‟s scope of
control (i.e. user files on NetApp disks attached to an FAS series appliance, or SANs attached to a V-Series
appliance). Each file maintained by the TOE has a file style associated with it. The TOE maintains three
styles of files: NFSv3 UNIX-Style files, NFSv4 UNIX-Style files, and NTFS-Style files. NFSv3 UNIX-Style
files have UNIX-Style security attributes, NFSv4 UNIX-Style files have NFSv4 security attributes, and NTFS-
Style files have NTFS-Style security attributes.
In addition to a file style, each file has a file type. The file types may be directories, symbolic links or regular
files. UNIX-Style files may be a directory, a symbolic link or a regular file. NTFS-Style files do not have
symbolic links; therefore the file type will be either a directory or a regular file.
In addition to the file type, the TOE maintains three different storage types: UNIX Qtrees, NTFS Qtrees and
Mixed Qtrees. A Qtree is a disk space partition. UNIX Qtrees store UNIX-Style files with UNIX-Style
security attributes. NTFS Qtrees store NTFS-Style files with NTFS Style security attributes. Mixed Qtrees
store both styles of files. Files stored in Mixed Qtrees always have the security attributes associated with
the client that was last used to change their access permissions or ownership. Mixed Qtrees are not part of
the evaluated configuration.
A file‟s security attributes are determined when the file is created. The TOE will create UNIX-Style security
attributes for a file stored in a UNIX Qtree. The TOE will create NTFS-Style security attributes for a file
stored in an NTFS Qtree. These security attributes are outlined in Table 2 below:
Table 2 – TSF User Data Security Attribute Descriptions
Security Attribute Description
Access Control Entry
(ACE)
A data structure associated with New Technology File System (NTFS)-Style files. Each
ACE explicitly allows or denies access to a user or group for a specific NTSF-Style
supported operation.
Access Control List
(ACL)
A data structure associated with NTFS-Style files. Each ACL includes one or more
ACEs.
Access Mode
A data structure associated with a UNIX-Style Files. An access mode string is the last
nine characters of a UNIX-Style File Permission string (drwxrwxrwx). The nine
characters represent the access mode for the file in three sets of rwx triplets. The first
triplet specifies the permission for the file‟s owner (UID). The next triplet specifies the
permissions for the group associated with the file (UNIX file GID). The last three
characters specify the permission for the users who are neither the owner nor members
of the file‟s group (other). The rwx triplet identifies the permission for that set (owner,
group, other). The three characters represent read, write or execute privileges. If the
character is a dash, the set does not have permissions to perform the specific action.
File Permission String
A data structure associated with a UNIX-Style file. The file permission string is
represented in ten characters common to all UNIX files (e.g. drwxrwxrwx). The first
character contains one of three characters that identify the file type: d for directory, l for
a symbolic link, or a dash (-) indicates the file is a regular file. The following 9
characters represent the access mode for the file in three sets of rwx triplets.
Security Descriptor (SD) A data structure associated with NTFS-Style files. A SD contains a SID and an ACL.
Security Identifier (SID) The CIFS User SID of the file‟s owner.
Group Identifier (GID) A UNIX File GID identifies the groups associated with the UNIX-Style file.
User Identifier (UID) The UNIX User UID of the file‟s owner.
1.4.1.1.2TOE Clients
End user access to TSF data is possible through the use of at either the NFS or CIFS client protocol. In a
typical deployment as depicted in Figure 1 above, end user workstations or the file, web, mail, or application
servers of the IT Environment connect to the TOE that hosts the TSF data residing on the storage arrays.
The TOE is positioned between these workstations and servers, and the storage arrays, facilitating
seamless NFS or CIFS connectivity between them while adding increased performance, efficiency,
manageability, scalability, security, redundancy, and fault tolerance.
End system workstations and the file, web, mail, or application servers authenticate with the TOE according
to the operating procedures of the organization and IT Environment. Typical scenarios include the file, web,
mail, or application servers prompting end users for credentials as they attempt to access a web page, e-
mail system, or stand alone application, or the TOE prompting end users for credentials as they attempt to
access shared network directories (NFS or CIFS). The TOE facilitates server and end-user authentication of
the end users attempting to access the TSF data residing within the TOE‟s scope of control via NFS or
CIFS.
To determine if file access is allowed, the TOE compares a client‟s security attributes with the file‟s security
attributes, listed in Table 3 below. The type of client security attributes (UNIX-Style or NTFS-Style) required
by the TOE depends on the type of security attributes maintained by the file and the operation requested.
The file or operation will require UNIX-Style subject security attributes (NFSv3 or NFSv4), NTFS-Style
subject security attributes or both. If the file or operation requires UNIX-Style security attributes for a client,
the TOE will attempt to obtain the client‟s UNIX User UID and UNIX User GID. If the file or operation
requires NTFS-Style subject security attributes, the TOE will attempt to acquire the client‟s Windows User
SID and a Windows User GID. Because of the native operating systems of the two clients, NFS clients are
associated with UNIX-Style security attributes and CIFS Clients are associated with NTFS-Style security
attributes.
Security Target for Data ONTAP® 8.0.0 7-Mode and Data ONTAP® 8.0.1 7-Mode 7
The resolution of client security attributes is processed differently by the TOE for each type of client because
the two protocols are different. NTFS-Style security attributes for a CIFS client are resolved when the CIFS
client logs into the remote system and joins the Windows domain (of which the TOE is a member).
Therefore, NTFS-Style security attributes for a CIFS client is completed before the TOE receives a CIFS
request. Alternatively, NFS client security attributes are resolved per NFS request. The UNIX User UID is
passed in each NFS request and this UID is used to resolve the required client security attributes.
Table 3 – TOE Client Security Attribute Descriptions
Security Attribute Description
Windows User SID
The Windows user ID number. Each user in a Windows system
is assigned a unique Windows User SID.
Windows User GID
The Windows group ID number. Each user in a Windows system
is assigned to a group and that group is assigned a unique GID.
UNIX User UID
The UNIX user ID number. Each user in a UNIX system is
assigned a unique UNIX User UID.
UNIX User GID
The UNIX group ID number. Each user in an UNIX system is
assigned to a group and that group is assigned a unique GID.
1.4.2 TOE Environment Hardware
The IT Environment Hardware includes the appliance hardware of the FAS or V-Series systems. The
product functionality provided by the FAS and V-Series products is supplied by the IT Environment. For a
complete list of NetApp Storage Controllers on which TOE operates, refer to the release notes for Data
ONTAP® 8.0.0 7-Mode and Data ONTAP® 8.0.1 7-Mode respectively.
1.4.3 TOE Environment Software
The IT Environment Software includes several components of the NetApp storage solutions that are outside
the TOE boundary. The following functionality is used by the TOE, however is not evaluated:
CIFS Client software, CIFS Server software, NFS Client software, and NFS Server software
The TOE provides secure access to files under control of the TOE. The TOE provides a protective
layer between NFS Clients and CIFS Clients and NFS Servers and CIFS Servers ensuring that
only authorized users (clients) can access TOE protected files. The CIFS Client, NFS Client, CIFS
Server and NFS Server software is supplied by the IT Environment.
iSCSI Protocol, FCP Protocol
Storage systems can be fabric-attached, network-attached, or direct-attached to support iSCSI over
TCP
3
/IP
4
as well as SCSI over FCP for block-storage access.
RAID Manager
The RAID Manager supports multiple disk drives which provide fault tolerance and performance.
The RAID Manager is supplied by the IT Environment.
TCP/IP Protocol
The UDP
5
/TCP/IP protocol stack is supplied by the IT Environment.
1.5 TOE DESCRIPTION
This section primarily addresses the physical and logical components of the TOE included in the evaluation.
3
TCP – Transport Control Protocol
4
IP – Internet Protocol
5
UDP – User Datagram Protocol
1.5.1 Physical Scope
Figure 3 illustrates the physical scope and the physical boundary of the overall solution, its deployment in a
networked environment, and ties together all of the components of the TOE and the constituents of the TOE
Environment. The essential physical component for the proper operation of the TOE in the evaluated
configuration are the Data ONTAP® 8.0.0 7-Mode and Data ONTAP® 8.0.1 7-Mode operating systems
which consists of the WAFL, the System Administration module, and the Operating System Kernel as
depicted in Figure 3 below:
System Administration
Module
Integrated
RAID
Manager
WAFL
NFS
CIFS
iSCSI
FCP
Operating System Kernel
NetApp FAS or V-Series
Appliance Hardware
Management Workstation
9 U
FC, SAS, or SATA Disk Drives
File/Web/Mail/Application Server
End User Workstation
TOE Boundary
TOE
Environment
Figure 3 – Physical TOE Boundary
1.5.1.1 TOE Software
The TOE software is a microkernel operating system which runs on a subset of NetApp‟s proprietary 64-bit
x86-based storage controller platforms listed above in section 1.4.2.
The follow statements describe the TOE‟s evaluated configuration:
The wafl.root_only_chown option for the evaluated configuration is disabled. When enabled, only a
root user has permission to change the owner of a file. When disabled, the wafl.root_only_chown
option enables the owner of a file to change ownership of a file.
All authorized NetApp Administrators have the TSF admin role.
The security.admin.authentication parameter is set to “internal”. When set to “internal”,
administrators are authenticated locally, and LDAP, NIS, etc. authentication is disabled.
The security.passwd.rules.everyone parameter is set to “on”. When set to “on”, all administrative
users, including the „root‟ and „administrator‟ accounts are subject to password rules such as account lock-
out.
The options auditlog.enable parameter is set to “on”. When set to “on”, the auditing functionality of
the TOE is enabled.
The evaluated configuration does not support changing a Qtree‟s style once the Qtree is configured.
Security Target for Data ONTAP® 8.0.0 7-Mode and Data ONTAP® 8.0.1 7-Mode 9
1.5.1.2 Guidance Documentation
The following guides are required reading and part of the TOE:
 Administrator and User guidance for Data ONTAP Common Criteria deployments for Data ONTAP®
8.0.0 7-Mode and Data ONTAP® 8.0.1 7-Mode
 NetApp Manual (Man) Pages
 Data ONTAP® 8.0.0 7-Mode and Data ONTAP® 8.0.1 7-Mode System Administration Guides
 Data ONTAP® 8.0.0 7-Mode and Data ONTAP® 8.0.1 7-Mode MultiStore Management Guides
 Data ONTAP® 8.0.0 7-Mode and Data ONTAP® 8.0.1 7-Mode File Access and Protocols Management
Guides
 Data ONTAP® 8.0.0 7-Mode and Data ONTAP® 8.0.1 7-Mode Release notes
1.5.2 Logical Scope
The security functional requirements implemented by the TOE are usefully grouped under the following
Security Function Classes:
 Security Audit
 User Data Protection
 Identification and Authentication
 Security Management
 Protection of TOE Security Functions
 TOE Access
 Each of these security functions is discussed below:
1.5.2.1 Security Audit
The TOE keeps track of auditable events through the Audit Log, stored in /etc/log/auditlog.
An audit log is a record of commands executed at the console or a secure shell (SSH). All the commands
executed in a source file script are also recorded in the audit log. Administrative Hypertext Transfer Protocol
(HTTP) operations, such as those resulting from the use of FilerView, are logged. All login attempts to
access the storage system, with success or failure, are also logged.
In addition, changes made to configuration and registry files are logged. Read-only Application
Programming Interfaces (APIs) by default are not logged but an administrator can enable auditing with the
auditlog.readonly_api.enable option.
For configuration changes, the audit log shows the following information:
What configuration files were accessed
When the configuration files were accessed
What has been changed in the configuration files
For commands executed through the console or an SSH shell, the audit log shows the following information:
What commands were executed
Who executed the commands
When the commands were executed.
The TOE ensures that the audit trail storage is protected by rotating log files as they reach an administrator-
configurable maximum size, and overwriting the oldest log file when the audit trail reaches an administrator-
configurable maximum size. In addition, the log files are accessible for viewing by an authorized
administrator via NFS, CIFS, or HTTPS. For more information on how the TOE protects audit trail storage
and allows administrators to view log files, see section 0.
1.5.2.2 User Data Protection
User data protection defines how users connecting to the TOE are allowed to perform operations on objects.
User access to objects controlled by the TOE is governed by the enforcement of the DAC SFP. Access to
NTFS style files via a CIFS share is authorized locally by file ACEs. Access to NFSv3 UNIX style files via an
NFSv3 export is authorized locally by file/directory ownership and UNIX-Style security attributes. Access to
NFSv4 UNIX style files via an NFSv4 export is authorized locally by file ACEs.
The TOE provides authorized administrators with several management interfaces outlined in section 1.5.2.4
to configure end-user network access. The management interfaces provide for the creation of rules that
define actions the TOE is to take based on a set of conditions. The conditions and actions affect either the
allowed access to user data by end-users (DAC SFP), or the way administrators interact with the TOE.
For more information on the User Data Protection functionality of the TOE, see section 7.1.2.
1.5.2.3 Identification and Authentication
The Identification and Authentication (I&A) functionality of the TOE enforces human administrators to identify
and authenticate themselves to the TOE before allowing any modifications to TOE managed TSF Data.
Authentication credentials are maintained by the TOE in a local registry.
The TOE enforces minimum password strength requirements. Passwords must have a length of at least 8
characters and contain at least one numeric character and at least two alphabetic characters.
The TOE will lock out an administrator account if the user fails to enter the proper credentials after 6 failed
login attempts.
For more information on the I&A functionality of the TOE, see section 7.1.3.
1.5.2.4 Security Management
The TSF management functionality provides the necessary functions to allow a NetApp administrator to
manage and support the TSF. Included in this functionality are the rules enforced by the TOE that define
access to TOE-maintained TSF Data and its corresponding security attributes, and TSF Functions.
The security attributes include authentication data (used to authenticate end users), roles, security attribute
data (used for DAC SFP enforcement) and other TSF data (used for DAC SFP subject security attribute
resolution).
The TOE maintains the following roles for users: root, admin, power, backup, compliance, audit, none. A
“NetApp Administrator” is defined to be any human user who is assigned any of the administrative roles
(except for none) listed above.
The TSF Functions include the following groups of capabilities (which are defined in detail in Table 22):
login, CLI, security, API, compliance, and filerview. For more information on the TSF management
functionality, see section 7.1.4.
1.5.2.5 Protection of TOE Security Functions
The TOE protects the TOE Security Function (TSF) via the implementation of domain separation made
possible by MultiStore virtualization functionality.
For more information on domain separation and Protection of the TSF, see section 7.1.5.
1.5.2.6 TOE Access
The TOE mitigates unauthorized administrator access by automatically terminating administrator sessions
after 10 minutes of inactivity at the CLI and 5 minutes of inactivity at the NetApp FilerView.
Security Target for Data ONTAP® 8.0.0 7-Mode and Data ONTAP® 8.0.1 7-Mode 11
1.5.3 Product Physical and Logical Features and Functionality not included in the TOE
Features and Functionality that are not part of the evaluated configuration of the TOE are:
 Appliance hardware and firmware
 High Availability appliance pairs
 Cluster Mode
 Remote resolution of authentication data via the nsswitch.conf passwd file (i.e. UNIX LDAP
6
)
 Cross-protocol support (NFS access to NTFS-style files, CIFS access to UNIX-style files)
 Shared level ACLs
 Bypass traverse checking option
 Windows Group Policy Objects
 wafl.root_only_chown is disabled in the evaluated version (when disabled, file owners, in
addition to the root account, can change ownership of files)
 Native File Blocking (File Screening)
 Mixed Qtrees
 Changing a Qtree‟s style once the Qtree has been configured
 Remote CLIs accessible via:
 Ethernet connections to an RLM
7
or a BMC
8
installed in the appliance
 A Telnet session to the appliance
 A remote shell program, such as RSH
9
 FTP
 Trivial File Transfer Protocol (TFTP)
 HTTP
6
LDAP – Lightweight Directory Access Protocol
7
RLM – Remote Local Area Network (LAN) Management
8
BMC – Baseboard Management Controller
9
RSH – Remote Shell
2 CONFORMANCE CLAIMS
This section provides the identification for any CC, Protection Profile (PP), and EAL package conformance
claims. Rationale is provided for any extensions or augmentations to the conformance claims. Rationale for
CC and PP conformance claims can be found in Section 8.1.
Table 4 – CC and PP Conformance
Common Criteria (CC)
Identification and
Conformance
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Revision 3, July 2009; CC Part 2 extended; CC Part 3 conformant; PP claim (none);
Parts 2 and 3 Interpretations from the CEM as of 2010/08/31 were reviewed, and no
interpretations apply to the claims made in this ST.
PP Identification None
Evaluation Assurance
Level
EAL2+ (Augmented with Flaw Remediation (ALC_FLR.3))
Security Target for Data ONTAP® 8.0.0 7-Mode and Data ONTAP® 8.0.1 7-Mode 13
3 SECURITY PROBLEM
This section describes the security aspects of the environment in which the TOE will be used and the
manner in which the TOE is expected to be employed. It provides the statement of the TOE security
environment, which identifies and explains all:
 Known and presumed threats countered by either the TOE or by the security environment
 Organizational security policies with which the TOE must comply
 Assumptions about the secure usage of the TOE, including physical, personnel and connectivity
aspects.
3.1 THREATS TO SECURITY
This section identifies the threats to the IT assets against which protection is required by the TOE or by the
security environment. The threat agents are divided into three categories:
 Attackers who are not TOE users: They have public knowledge of how the TOE operates and are
assumed to possess a low skill level, limited resources to alter TOE configuration settings or
parameters and no physical access to the TOE.
 TOE users: They have extensive knowledge of how the TOE operates and are assumed to possess a
high skill level, moderate resources to alter TOE configuration settings or parameters and physical
access to the TOE. (TOE users are, however, assumed not to be willfully hostile to the TOE.)
 Agents or processes working either on behalf of attackers or autonomously: They may or may not have
knowledge of the public or proprietary TOE configuration settings/parameters. These agents and
processes can take many forms, such as bots or botnets designed to exploit common vulnerabilities or
deny others access to IT products and services.
All three are assumed to have a low level of motivation. The IT assets requiring protection are the TSF and
user data saved on or transitioning through the TOE and the hosts on the protected network. Removal,
diminution and mitigation of the threats are through the objectives identified in Section 4 Security Objectives.
The following threats are applicable:
Table 5 – Threats
Name Description
T.MASQUERADE
A TOE user or process may masquerade as another entity in order to gain
unauthorized access to data or TOE resources.
T.TAMPER
A TOE user or process may be able to bypass the TOE‟s security
mechanisms by tampering with the TOE or TOE environment.
T.UNAUTH
A TOE user may gain access to security data on the TOE, even though the
user is not authorized in accordance with the TOE security policy.
T.DATALOSS
Threat agents may attempt to remove or destroy data collected and
produced by the TOE.
T.NO_AUDIT
Threat agents may perform security-relevant operations on the TOE without
being held accountable for it.
T.IA
Threat agents may attempt to compromise the TOE or network resources
controlled by the TOE by attempting actions that it is not authorized to
perform on the TOE or network resources.
3.2 ORGANIZATIONAL SECURITY POLICIES
An Organizational Security Policy (OSP) is a set of security rules, procedures, or guidelines imposed by an
organization on the operational environment of the TOE. No OSPs are presumed to be imposed upon the
TOE or its operational environment by any organization implementing the TOE in the CC evaluated
configuration.
3.3 ASSUMPTIONS
This section describes the security aspects of the intended environment for the evaluated TOE. The
operational environment must be managed in accordance with assurance requirement documentation for
delivery, operation, and user guidance. The following specific conditions are required to ensure the security
of the TOE and are assumed to exist in an environment where this TOE is employed.
Table 6 – Assumptions
Name Description
A.PEER
Any other systems with which the TOE communicates are assumed to be
under the same management control and use a consistent representation
for specific user and group identifiers.
A.NETWORK
Security Management shall be provided to protect the Confidentiality and
Integrity of transactions on the network.
A.MANAGE
There will be one or more competent individuals assigned to manage the
TOE and the security of the information it contains.
A.NO_EVIL_ADM
The system administrative personnel are not hostile and will follow and
abide by the instructions provided by the administrator documentation.
A.COOP
Authorized users possess the necessary authorization to access at least
some of the information managed by the TOE and are expected to act in a
cooperating manner in a benign environment.
A.STRONG_PWD Authorized users will maintain strong passwords.
A.PROTECT
The processing resources of the TOE critical to the security policy
enforcement will be protected from unauthorized physical modification by
potentially hostile outsiders.
A.ADMIN_ACCESS Administrative functionality shall be restricted to authorized administrators.
Security Target for Data ONTAP® 8.0.0 7-Mode and Data ONTAP® 8.0.1 7-Mode 15
4 SECURITY OBJECTIVES
Security objectives are concise, abstract statements of the intended solution to the problem defined by the
security problem definition (see Section 3). The set of security objectives for a TOE form a high-level
solution to the security problem. This high-level solution is divided into two part-wise solutions: the security
objectives for the TOE, and the security objectives for the TOE‟s operational environment. This section
identifies the security objectives for the TOE and its supporting environment.
4.1 SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE TOE
The specific security objectives for the TOE are as follows:
Table 7 – Security Objectives for the TOE
Name Description
O.ADMIN_ROLES The TOE will provide administrative roles to isolate administrative actions.
O.AUDIT
The TOE will audit all administrator authentication attempts, whether
successful or unsuccessful, as well as TOE user account configuration
changes.
O.DAC_ACC
TOE users will be granted access only to user data for which they have
been authorized based on their user identity and group membership.
O.ENFORCE
The TOE is designed and implemented in a manner that ensures the
security policies can‟t be bypassed or interfered with via mechanisms within
the TOE's scope of control.
O.IA The TOE will require users to identify and authenticate themselves.
O.MANAGE
The TSF will provide functions and facilities necessary to support the
authorized administrators that are responsible for the management of TOE
security.
O.STRONG_PWD
The TOE must ensure that all passwords will be at least 8 characters in
length and will consist of at least one number and at least two alphabetic
characters. Password construction will be complex enough to avoid use of
passwords that are easily guessed or otherwise left vulnerable, e.g. names,
dictionary words, phone numbers, birthdays, etc. should not be used.
O.INACTIVE
The TOE will terminate an inactive management session after a
configurable interval of time.
O.TIMESTAMP The TOE will provide a reliable timestamp for use by the TOE.
4.2 SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT
4.2.1 IT Security Objectives
The following IT security objectives are to be satisfied by the environment:
Table 8 – IT Security Objectives
Name Description
OE.ACCESS
The IT Environment will ensure that users gain only authorized access to
the data the IT Environment manages.
OE.ADMIN_ROLES
The IT Environment will provide administrative roles to isolate administrative
actions.
OE.ENFORCE
The IT Environment will support the TOE by providing mechanisms to
ensure the TOE is neither bypassed nor interfered with via mechanisms
outside the TSC.
OE.IA
The IT Environment must require authorized CIFS and NFS Clients to
successfully I&A before allowing access to the TOE.
OE.NETWORK
The network path between the TOEs is a trusted channel. The network path
between the CLI client and the TOE is a trusted channel.
OE.NTP
The IT Environment will enable the TOE to provide reliable time stamps by
implementing the Network Time Protocol (NTP).
OE.SUBJECTDATA
The IT Environment will provide the TOE with the appropriate subject
security attributes.
4.2.2 Non-IT Security Objectives
The following non-IT environment security objectives are to be satisfied without imposing technical
requirements on the TOE. That is, they will not require the implementation of functions in the TOE hardware
and/or software. Thus, they will be satisfied largely through application of procedural or administrative
measures.
Table 9 – Non-IT Security Objectives
Name Description
ON.CREDEN
Those responsible for the TOE must ensure that all access credentials,
such as passwords, are protected by the users in a manner that maintains
IT security objectives.
ON.INSTALL
Those responsible for the TOE and hardware required by the TOE must
ensure that the TOE is delivered, installed, configured, managed, and
operated in a manner which maintains IT security objectives.
ON.PHYSICAL
Those responsible for the TOE must ensure that those parts of the TOE and
the IT Environment critical to security policy are protected from any physical
attack that might compromise the IT security objectives.
ON.TRAINED
Those responsible for the TOE will be properly trained and provided the
necessary information that ensures secure management of the TOE and the
IT Environment.
ON.STRONG_PWD Those responsible for the TOE must ensure that all passwords will be at
Security Target for Data ONTAP® 8.0.0 7-Mode and Data ONTAP® 8.0.1 7-Mode 17
Name Description
least 8 characters in length and will consist of at least one number and at
least two alphabetic characters. Password construction will be complex
enough to avoid use of passwords that are easily guessed or otherwise left
vulnerable, e.g. names, dictionary words, phone numbers, birthdays, etc.
should not be used.
5 EXTENDED COMPONENTS
This section defines the extended SFRs and extended SARs met by the TOE. These requirements are
presented following the conventions identified in Section 6.1.
5.1 EXTENDED TOE SECURITY FUNCTIONAL COMPONENTS
This section specifies the extended SFRs for the TOE. The extended SFRs are organized by class. Table
10 identifies all extended SFRs implemented by the TOE
Table 10 – Extended TOE Security Functional Requirements
Name Description
EXT_FPT_SEP.1 TSF domain separation for software TOEs
Security Target for Data ONTAP® 8.0.0 7-Mode and Data ONTAP® 8.0.1 7-Mode 19
5.1.1 Class EXT_FPT: Extended Protection of the TSF
Domain separation functions involve maintaining the integrity and management of the mechanisms that
constitute the TSF and to the integrity of TSF data. The EXT_FTP: Extended Protection of the TSF class
was modeled after the CC FPT: Protection of the TSF class. See section 8.3 for information regarding the
rationale for extending this class.
Figure 4 – EXT_FPT: Extended Protection of the TSF Class Decomposition
5.1.1.1 TSF Domain Separation for Software TOEs (EXT_FPT_SEP)
Family Behaviour:
This family defines the requirements for domain separation of TSF data.
Component Leveling:
Figure 5 – EXT_FPT_SEP family decomposition
EXP_FPT_SEP: TSF Domain Separation for Software TOEs provides the capability of the TOE to maintain
a separate security domain to protect it from untrusted objects in the TOE‟s scope of control.
Management: EXT_FPT_SEP.1
The following actions could be considered for the management functions in EXT_FPT_SEP.1:
 Physical storage system administrators performing maintenance (deletion, modification, addition) of
vFiler units, volumes, users, and groups of users, and their assignment to various vFilers within the
TOE‟s scope of control.
 vFiler (security domain) administrators performing maintenance (deletion, modification, addition) of
volumes, users, and groups of users within the security domain‟s scope of control.
Audit: EXT_FPT_SEP.1
The following actions should be auditable if FAU_GEN Security audit data generation is included in the
PP/ST:
 Maintenance (deletion, modification, addition) of vFiler units, users, and groups of users, and their
assignment to various security domains within the TOE‟s scope of control.
EXT_FPT_SEP.1 TSF Domain Separation for Software TOEs
Hierarchical to: [No other components]
EXT_FPT_SEP.1.1
The TSF shall maintain a security domain that protects it from interference and tampering by
untrusted subjects in the TOE’s scope of control.
EXT_FPT_SEP.1.2
The TSF shall enforce separation between the security domains of subjects in the TOE’s scope of
control.
Dependencies: [No dependencies.]
Security Target for Data ONTAP® 8.0.0 7-Mode and Data ONTAP® 8.0.1 7-Mode 21
6 SECURITY REQUIREMENTS
This section defines the SFRs and SARs met by the TOE. These requirements are presented following the
conventions identified in Section 6.1.
6.1 CONVENTIONS
There are several font variations used within this ST. Selected presentation choices are discussed here to
aid the Security Target reader.
The CC allows for assignment, refinement, selection and iteration operations to be performed on security
functional requirements. All of these operations are used within this ST. These operations are performed as
described in Part 2 of the CC, and are shown as follows:
 Completed assignment statements are identified using [italicized text within brackets].
 Completed selection statements are identified using [underlined text within brackets].
 Refinements are identified using bold text. Any text removed is stricken (Example: TSF Data) and
should be considered as a refinement.
 Extended Functional and Assurance Requirements are identified using “EXT_” at the beginning of the
short name.
 Iterations are identified by appending a letter in parentheses following the component title. For
example, FAU_GEN.1(a) Audit Data Generation would be the first iteration and FAU_GEN.1(b) Audit
Data Generation would be the second iteration.
6.2 SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS
This section specifies the SFRs for the TOE. This section organizes the SFRs by CC class. Table 11
identifies all SFRs implemented by the TOE and indicates the ST operations performed on each
requirement.
Table 11 – TOE Security Functional Requirements
Name Description S A R I
FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation 
FAU_GEN.2 User Identity Association  
FAU_SAR.1 Audit review  
FAU_SAR.2 Restricted audit review  
FAU_STG.1 Protected audit trail storage 
FAU_STG.4 Prevention of audit data loss 
FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control  
FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control  
FIA_AFL.1 Authentication failure handling 
FIA_ATD.1 User attribute definition  
Name Description S A R I
FIA_SOS.1 Verification of secrets  
FIA_UAU.2 User authentication before any action   
FIA_UID.2 User identification before any action   
FMT_MOF.1 Management of security function behaviour 
FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes 
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation 
FMT_MTD.1(a) Management of TSF data  
FMT_MTD.1(b) Management of TSF data  
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions   
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles   
EXT_FPT_SEP.1 TSF domain separation for software TOEs    
FPT_STM.1 Reliable Time Stamps    
FTA_SSL.3 TSF-initiated termination  
Note: S=Selection; A=Assignment; R=Refinement; I=Iteration
Security Target for Data ONTAP® 8.0.0 7-Mode and Data ONTAP® 8.0.1 7-Mode 23
6.2.1 Class FAU: Security Audit
FAU_GEN.1 Audit Data Generation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FAU_GEN.1.1
The TSF shall be able to generate an audit record of the following auditable events:
Start-up and shutdown of the audit functions;
All auditable events, for the [not specified] level of audit; and
[The events specified in Table 12 below].
FAU_GEN.1.2
The TSF shall record within each audit record at least the following information:
Date and time of the event, type of event, subject identity (if applicable), and the outcome (success
or failure) of the event; and
For each audit event type, based on the auditable event definitions of the functional components
included in the PP/ST, [the additional event information specified in Table 12 below].
Table 12 – FAU_GEN.1.2 Audit Generation Details
SFR Addressed Auditable Events Additional Event Information
FIA_UAU.2, FIA_UID.2 Successful local logon User identity, security domain
FIA_UAU.2, FIA_UID.2 Unsuccessful local logon User identity supplied, security domain
FMT_SMF.1 User created
User ID10
created, User ID of the administrator performing
the action, security domain
FMT_SMF.1 User deleted
User ID deleted, User ID of the administrator performing
the action, security domain
FMT_SMF.1 Group created
Group created, User ID of the administrator performing the
action, security domain
FMT_SMF.1 Group deleted
Group deleted, User ID of the administrator performing the
action, security domain
FMT_SMF.1 Group member added
User ID and group associated, User ID of the administrator
performing the action, security domain
FMT_SMF.1 Group member deleted
User ID and group disassociated, user ID of the
administrator performing the action, security domain
Dependencies: FPT_STM.1 Reliable time stamps
10
ID - Identifier
FAU_GEN.2 User identity association
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FAU_GEN.2.1
For audit events resulting from actions of identified users, the TSF shall be able to associate each
auditable event with the identity of the user that caused the event.
Dependencies: FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation
FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
FAU_SAR.1 Audit review
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FAU_SAR.1.1
The TSF shall provide [authorised administrators] with the capability to read [all audit information]
from the audit records.
FAU_SAR.1.2
The TSF shall provide the audit records in a manner suitable for the user to interpret the
information.
Dependencies: FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation
FAU_SAR.2 Restricted audit review
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FAU_SAR.2.1
The TSF shall prohibit all users read access to the audit records, except those users that have
been granted explicit read-access.
Dependencies: FAU_SAR.1 Audit review
FAU_STG.1 Protected audit trail storage
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FAU_STG.1.1
The TSF shall protect the stored audit records in the audit trail from unauthorised deletion.
FAU_STG.1.2
The TSF shall be able to [prevent] unauthorised modifications to the stored audit records in the
audit trail.
Dependencies: FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation
Security Target for Data ONTAP® 8.0.0 7-Mode and Data ONTAP® 8.0.1 7-Mode 25
FAU_STG.4 Prevention of audit data loss
Hierarchical to: FAU_STG.3 Action in case of possible audit data loss
FAU_STG.4.1
The TSF shall [overwrite the oldest stored audit records] and [no other actions] if the audit trail is
full.
Dependencies: FAU_STG.1 Protected audit trail storage
6.2.2 Class FDP: User Data Protection
FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FDP_ACC.1.1
The TSF shall enforce the [DAC SFP] on [the subjects, objects, and operations among subjects
and objects listed in Table 13 below].
Table 13 – FDP_ACC.1.1 Detail
Subject
Object (Files on the Storage Appliance) Operation among Subject
and Object covered by the
DAC SFP
File Style File Type Qtree Type
NFSv3 Client
NFSv3 UNIX-
Style File
Directory, Symbolic Link,
Regular File
UNIX Qtree
Create, read, write, execute,
delete, change permissions,
change ownership
NFSv4 Client
NFSv4 Unix-
Style File
Directory, Symbolic Link,
Regular File
UNIX Qtree
Create, read, write, execute,
delete, change permissions,
change ownership
CIFS Client NTFS-Style File Directory, Regular File NTFS Qtree
Create, read, write, execute,
delete, change permissions,
change ownership
Dependencies: FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control
FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FDP_ACF.1.1
The TSF shall enforce the [DAC SFP] to objects based on the following [the subjects, objects,
operations, and associated security attributes listed in Table 14 below:]
Table 14 – FDP_ACF.1.1 Detail
Operation Subject Object (File)
Subject Object (file)
Security
Attribute
Other Objects
and Security
Attributes used
for DAC SFP
Security
Attribute
Other TSF Data
Create
NFSv3
Client
NFSv3
UNIX-Style
file
UNIX User UID,
UNIX User GID
UNIX Username N/A
UNIX Parent
Directory UID,
UNIX Parent
Directory GID
and access mode
NFSv4
Client
NFSv4
UNIX-Style
file
UNIX User UID,
UNIX User GID
UNIX Username N/A
UNIX Parent
Directory UID,
UNIX Parent
Directory ACEs
Security Target for Data ONTAP® 8.0.0 7-Mode and Data ONTAP® 8.0.1 7-Mode 27
Operation Subject Object (File)
Subject Object (file)
Security
Attribute
Other Objects
and Security
Attributes used
for DAC SFP
Security
Attribute
Other TSF Data
CIFS Client
NTFS-Style
file
Windows User
SID, Windows
User GID
Windows
Username
N/A
Qtree type,
Parent directory’s
SID and ACEs
Read,
Write,
Execute
NFSv3
Client
NFSv3
UNIX-Style
file
UNIX User UID,
UNIX User GID
None
UNIX file UID,
UNIX file GID,
access mode
None
NFSv4
Client
NFSv4
UNIX-Style
file
UNIX User UID,
UNIX User GID
None
UNIX User UID,
ACEs
None
CIFS Client
NTFS-Style
file
Windows User
SID, Windows
User GID
Windows
Username
SID and ACEs None
Delete
NFSv3
Client
NFSv3
UNIX-Style
file
UNIX User UID,
UNIX User GID
UNIX Username None
UNIX Parent
Directory UID,
UNIX Parent
Directory GID
and access mode
NFSv4
Client
NFSv4
UNIX-Style
file
UNIX User UID
UNIX User GID
None
UNIX User UID,
ACEs
UNIX Parent
Directory UID,
UNIX Parent
Directory ACEs
CIFS Client
NTFS-Style
file
Windows User
SID, Windows
User GID
Windows
Username
SID and ACEs
Parent directory’s
SID and ACEs
Change
Permission
NFSv3
Client
NFSv3
UNIX-Style
file
UNIX User UID,
UNIX User GID
UNIX Username None
UNIX Parent
Directory UID,
UNIX Parent
Directory GID
and access mode
NFSv4
Client
NFSv4
UNIX-Style
file
UNIX User UID
UNIX User GID
None
UNIX User UID,
ACEs
UNIX Parent
Directory UID,
UNIX Parent
Directory ACEs
CIFS Client
NTFS-Style
file
Windows User
SID, Windows
User GID
Windows
Username
SID and ACEs
Parent directory’s
SID and ACEs
Change
Owner
NFSv3
Client
NFSv3
UNIX-Style
file
UNIX User UID None UNIX User UID None
NFSv4
Client
NFSv4
UNIX-Style
file
UNIX User UID None UNIX User UID None
CIFS Client
NTFS-Style
file
Windows User
SID, Windows
User GID
None SID and ACEs None
FDP_ACF.1.2
The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among controlled subjects
and controlled objects is allowed: [access is granted if one of the following conditions listed in Table
15 below is true:]
Table 15 – FDP_ACF.1.2 Detail
Operation Subject Object (File) =DAC Rule
Create
NFSv3 Client
NFSv3 UNIX-
Style file
1. The subject is the owner of the parent directory
and the owner has been granted Write and Execute
access (UNIX-Style security attributes).
2. The subject is not the owner of the parent directory
but is a member of the parent directory’s group and
the group has Write and Execute access (UNIX-Style
security attributes).
3. The subject is neither the owner of the parent
directory nor a member of the parent directory’s
group but Write and Execute access has been
granted to all subjects (UNIX-Style security
attributes).
NFSv4 Client
NFSv4 UNIX-
Style file
4. The subject is the owner of the parent directory
and the owner has been granted Write and Execute
access (UNIX-Style security attributes).
5. There is no parent directory ACE that denies Write
or Execute access to the subject and parent directory
ACEs exist that grant Write and Execute permission
to the subject (NFSv4-Style security attributes).
6. There is no parent directory ACE that denies Write
or Execute access to any group that the subject is a
member of and parent directory ACEs exist that grant
Write and Execute permission to any group the
subject is a member of (NFSv4-Style security
attributes).
CIFS Client NTFS-Style file
7. There is no parent directory ACE that denies Write
or Execute access to the subject and parent directory
ACEs exist that grant Write and Execute permission
to the subject (NTFS-Style security attributes).
8. There is no parent directory ACE that denies Write
or Execute access to any group that the subject is a
member of and parent directory ACEs exist that grant
Write and Execute permission to any group the
subject is a member of (NTFS-Style security
attributes).
Read, Write
Execute
NFSv3 Client
NFSv3 UNIX-
Style file
9. The subject is the owner of the file and the owner
has been granted access for the specific operation
(UNIX-Style security attributes).
10. The subject is not the owner of the file but is a
member of the object’s group and the object’s group
has access for the specific operation (UNIX-Style
security attributes).
Security Target for Data ONTAP® 8.0.0 7-Mode and Data ONTAP® 8.0.1 7-Mode 29
Operation Subject Object (File) =DAC Rule
11. The subject is neither the owner of the file nor a
member of the object’s group but the specific access
request has been granted to all subjects (UNIX-Style
security attributes)
NFSv4 Client
NFSv4 UNIX-
Style file
12. The subject is the owner of the file and the owner
has been granted access for the specific operation
(UNIX-Style security attributes).
13. There is no ACE that denies access to the
subject for the specific operation and an ACE exists
that grants permission to the subject for the specific
operation (NFSv4-Style security attributes).
14. There is no ACE that denies access for the
specific operation to any group that the subject is a
member of and an ACE exists that grants permission
to any group the subject is a member of for the
specific operation (NFSv4-Style security attributes).
CIFS Client NTFS-Style file
15. There is no ACE that denies access to the
subject for the specific operation and an ACE exists
that grants permission to the subject for the specific
operation (NTFS-Style security attributes).
16. There is no ACE that denies access for the
specific operation to any group that the subject is a
member of and an ACE exists that grants permission
to any group the subject is a member of for the
specific operation (NTFS-Style security attributes).
Delete
NFSv3 Client
NFSv3 UNIX-
Style file
17. Rule 1, 2 or 3 above is true (subject has Write
and Execute UNIX-Style permission for parent
directory).
NFSv4 Client
NFSv4 UNIX-
Style file
18. Rule 12, 13, or 14 above is true (subject has
Delete NFSv4-style permission or is UNIX owner for
parent directory)
CIFS Client NTFS-Style file
19. Rule 15 or 16 above is true for Delete operation
(subject has Delete NTFS-Style permission for
object).
20. Rule 12 above fails and Rule 14 or 15 below are
true (subject has Delete Child NTFS-Style permission
for parent directory)
21. There is no parent directory ACE that denies
Delete Child access to the subject and a parent
directory ACE exists that grants Delete Child
permission to the subject (NTFS-Style security
attribute).
22. There is no parent directory ACE that denies
Delete Child access to any group that the subject is a
member of and an object ACE exists that grants
Delete Child permission to a group the subject is a
member of (NTFS-Style security attribute).
Change
Permission
NFSv3 Client
NFSv3 UNIX-
Style file
23. Rule 1, 2 or 3 above is true (subject has Write
and Execute UNIX-Style permission for parent
Operation Subject Object (File) =DAC Rule
directory) and rule 6, 7 or 8 above is true for Write
operation (UNIX-Style permission for object).
NFSv4 Client
NFSv4 UNIX-
Style file
24. Rule 4, 5, or 6 above is true (subject has Write
and Execute NFSv4-Style permission for parent
directory) and rule 12, 13, or 14 above is true for
Change Permission operation (UNIX and NFSv4
Style permission for object)
CIFS Client NTFS-Style file
25. Rule 7 or 8 above is true (subject has Write and
Execute NTFS-Style permission for parent directory)
and rule 15 or 16 above is true for Change
Permission operation (NTFS-Style permission for
object).
Change Ownership
NFSv3 Client
NFSv3 UNIX-
Style file
26. If the UNIX UID is root, or the owner of the file,
the operation is allowed.
NFSv4 Client
NFSv4 UNIX-
Style file
27. Rule 12, 13, or 14 above is true for Change
Ownership operation (subject has Change Owner
NFSv4-Style permission or is UNIX-Style owner for
object)
CIFS Client NTFS-Style file
28. Rule 15 or 16 above is true for Change
Ownership operation (subject has Change Owner
NTFS-Style permission for object).
FDP_ACF.1.3
The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on the following additional
rules: [access is granted if the object is a UNIX-style file and the subject is root].
FDP_ACF.1.4
The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the [following additional rule:
access is denied if the subject does not have an Administrative Role].
Dependencies: FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialization
Security Target for Data ONTAP® 8.0.0 7-Mode and Data ONTAP® 8.0.1 7-Mode 31
6.2.3 Class FIA: Identification and Authentication
FIA_AFL.1 Authentication failure handling
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FIA_AFL.1.1
The TSF shall detect when [6] unsuccessful authentication attempts occur related to [login
attempts].
FIA_AFL.1.2
When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has been [surpassed], the TSF
shall [lock the user, except for the root account, out of the system].
Dependencies: FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication
FIA_ATD.1 User attribute definition
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FIA_ATD.1.1
The TSF shall maintain the following list of security attributes belonging to individual users: [TOE
user name, password, group membership; UNIX User UID and GID; Windows User SID and GID].
Dependencies: No dependencies
FIA_SOS.1 Verification of secrets
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FIA_SOS.1.1
The TSF shall provide a mechanism to verify that secrets meet [the following criteria: at least 8
characters in length and consist of at least one number and at least two alphabetic characters].
Dependencies: No dependencies
FIA_UAU.2 User authentication before any action
Hierarchical to: FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication
FIA_UAU.2.1
The TSF shall require each user administrator to be successfully authenticated before allowing
any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
Dependencies: FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
FIA_UID.2 User identification before any action
Hierarchical to: FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
FIA_UID.2.1
The TSF shall require each user administrator to be successfully identified before allowing any
other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
Dependencies: No dependencies
Security Target for Data ONTAP® 8.0.0 7-Mode and Data ONTAP® 8.0.1 7-Mode 33
6.2.4 Class FMT: Security Management
FMT_MOF.1 Management of security functions behaviour
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FMT_MOF.1.1
The TSF shall restrict the ability to [determine the behaviour of, disable, enable, modify the
behaviour of perform] the functions [Default capability assignments in Table 16 below] to [the
roles listed in Table 16 below].
Dependencies: FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
Table 16 – Roles maintained by the TOE
Role Default capability assignments Summary of default granted capabilities
root * Grants all possible capabilities.
Admin cli-*, api-*, login-*, security-*
Grants all CLI, API, login, and security
capabilities.
Power
cli-cifs*, cli-exportfs*, cli-nfs*, cli-
useradmin*, api-cifs-*, api-nfs-*, login-
telnet, login-http-admin, login-rsh, login-
ssh,api-system-api-*
Grants the ability to :
Invoke all cifs, exportfs,nfs, and useradmin CLI
commands
Make all cifs and nfs APIcalls
Log in using Telnet, HTTP,RSH, and SSH
sessions
Backup login-ndmp Grants the ability to make NDMP requests.
Compliance
cli-cifs*, cli-exportfs*, cli-nfs*, cli-
useradmin*, api-cifs-*, api-nfs-*, login-
telnet, login-http-admin, login-rsh, login-
ssh, api-system-api-*, cli-snaplock*, api-
snaplock-*, api-file-*, compliance-*
Grants compliance-related capabilities in addition
to all the capabilities granted by the power role.
Note: The compliance role is the default role for
the Compliance Administrators group. The
compliance role cannot be removed from the
Compliance Administrators group or added to
other groups.
Audit api-snmp-get, api-snmp-get-next
Grants the ability to make snmp-get and snmp-
get-next API calls.
None none Grants no administrative capabilities.
FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FMT_MSA.1.1
The TSF shall enforce the [DAC SFP] to restrict the ability to [modify, delete, add] the security
attributes [TOE User UID and Primary TOE User GID maintained locally by the TOE] to [an
authorised administrator].
Dependencies: FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
[FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FMT_MSA.3.1
The TSF shall enforce the [DAC SFP] to provide [restrictive] default values for security
attributes that are used to enforce the SFP
FMT_MSA.3.2
The TSF shall allow the [no authorized identified roles] to specify alternative initial values
to override the default values when an object or information is created.
Dependencies: FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MTD.1(a) Management of TSF data
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FMT_MTD.1.1
The TSF shall restrict the ability to [query, modify, delete] the [local user account repository] to [authorised
administrators with the root or Admin role]
Dependencies: FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MTD.1(b) Management of TSF data
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FMT_MTD.1.1
The TSF shall restrict the ability to [modify] the [state of the TOE] to [authorised administrators with the root
or Admin role].
Dependencies: FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
Security Target for Data ONTAP® 8.0.0 7-Mode and Data ONTAP® 8.0.1 7-Mode 35
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FMT_SMF.1.1
The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions: [management of
security functions behaviour, management of security attributes, and management of TSF data].
Dependencies: No Dependencies
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FMT_SMR.1.1
The TSF shall maintain the roles: [root, Admin, Power, Backup, Compliance, Audit, None].
FMT_SMR.1.2
The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.
Dependencies: FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
6.2.5 Class FPT: Protection of the TSF
FPT_STM.1 Reliable time stamps
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FMT_STM.1.1
The TSF shall be able to provide reliable time stamps.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
EXT_FPT_SEP.1 TSF Domain Separation for Software TOEs
Hierarchical to: No other components
EXT_FPT_SEP.1.1
The TSF shall maintain a security domain that protects it from interference and tampering by
untrusted subjects in the TOE‟S scope of control.
EXT_FPT_SEP.1.2
The TSF shall enforce separation between the security domains of subjects in the TOE‟S scope of
control.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
Security Target for Data ONTAP® 8.0.0 7-Mode and Data ONTAP® 8.0.1 7-Mode 37
6.2.6 Class FTA: TOE Access
FTA_SSL.3 TSF-initiated termination
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FTA_SSL.3.1
The TSF shall terminate an interactive session after [10 minutes of user inactivity at the CLI and 5
minutes of user inactivity at the NetApp FilerView ].
Dependencies: No dependencies
6.3 SECURITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS
This section defines the assurance requirements for the TOE. Assurance requirements are taken from the
CC Part 3 and are EAL2 augmented with ALC_FLR.3. Table 17 – Assurance Requirements summarizes
the requirements.
Table 17 – Assurance Requirements
Assurance Requirements
Class ASE: Security Target evaluation
ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
ASE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
ASE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
ASE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification
Class ALC : Life Cycle Support
ALC_CMC.2 Use of a CM system
ALC_CMS.2 Parts of the TOE CM coverage
ALC_DEL.1 Delivery Procedures
ALC_FLR.3 Systematic Flaw Remediation
Class ADV: Development
ADV_ARC.1 Security Architecture Description
ADV_FSP.2 Security-enforcing functional specification
ADV_TDS.1 Basic design
Class AGD: Guidance documents
AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
Class ATE: Tests
ATE_COV.1 Evidence of coverage
ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing
ATE_IND.2 Independent testing – sample
Class AVA: Vulnerability assessment AVA_VAN.2 Vulnerability analysis
Security Target for Data ONTAP® 8.0.0 7-Mode and Data ONTAP® 8.0.1 7-Mode 39
7 TOE SPECIFICATION
This section presents information to detail how the TOE meets the functional requirements described in
previous sections of this ST.
7.1 TOE SECURITY FUNCTIONS
Each of the security requirements and the associated descriptions correspond to the security functions.
Hence, each function is described by how it specifically satisfies each of its related requirements. This
serves to both describe the security functions and rationalize that the security functions satisfy the
necessary requirements.
Table 18 – Mapping of TOE Security Functions to Security Functional Requirements
TOE Security Function SFR ID Description
Security Audit
FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation
FAU_GEN.2 User Identity Association
FAU_SAR.1 Audit review
FAU_SAR.2 Restricted audit review
FAU_STG.1 Protected audit trail storage
FAU_STG.4 Prevention of audit data loss
User Data Protection
FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
FDP_ACF.1
Security attribute based access
control
Identification and Authentication
FIA_AFL.1 Authentication failure handling
FIA_ATD.1 User attribute definition
FIA_SOS.1 Verification of secrets
FIA_UAU.2
User authentication before any
action
FIA_UID.2 User identification before any action
Security Management
FMT_MOF.1
Management of security function
behaviour
FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation
FMT_MTD.1(a) Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1(b) Management of TSF data
FMT_SMF.1
Specification of management
functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
TOE Security Function SFR ID Description
Protection of TOE Security Functions
EXT_FPT_SEP.1
TSF domain separation for software
TOEs
FPT_STM.1 Reliable Time Stamps
TOE Access FTA_SSL.3 TSF-initiated termination
7.1.1 Security Audit
The TOE generates audit event records for events involving administrator logons as well as configuration
changes, specifically for locally-defined users and groups. The audit function is normally executing any time
the TOE is operational and the options auditlog.enable parameter is set to “on”. If the audit function
is started or stopped, an audit event record is generated. All audit event records include a reliable
timestamp.
The TOE ensures that the audit trail storage is protected by rotating log files as they reach an administrator-
configurable maximum size, and overwriting the oldest log file when the audit trail reaches an administrator-
configurable maximum size.
The maximum size of the audit-log file is specified by the auditlog.max_file_size option. The
maximum size of an audit entry in the audit-log file is 200 characters. An audit entry is truncated to 200
characters if it exceeds the size limit.
Every Saturday at midnight, the /etc/log/auditlog file is copied to /etc/log/auditlog.0,
/etc/log/auditlog.0 is copied to /etc/log/auditlog.1, and so on. This also occurs if the audit-log
file reaches the maximum size specified by auditlog.max_file_size.
The system saves audit-log files for six weeks, unless any audit-log file reaches the maximum size, in which
case the oldest audit-log file is discarded.
Administrators can access the audit-log files using the NFS or CIFS clients, or using HTTPS. The TOE
ensures that the audit trail storage is protected from unauthorized deletion or modification by enforcing role-
based permissions to the audit trail as described in Table 19 below:
Table 19 – Audit Trail Storage Access by Role
Role Permission
root
create, read, write,
execute, delete,
change permission,
change owner
Admin
create, read, write,
execute, delete,
change permission
Power read
Backup read
Compliance read
Audit none
None none
To access the log files via NFS, the administrator must mount the root directory
<system_name>:/vol/vol0) to a desired mount point on the management workstation (where
Security Target for Data ONTAP® 8.0.0 7-Mode and Data ONTAP® 8.0.1 7-Mode 41
<system_name> is the short name, Fully Qualified Domain Name (FQDN), or IP address of the storage
system). The administrator can then change directories to <mount point>/etc/log/ to view log files in
a text editor program (where <mount point> is the desired mount point on the management workstation).
To access the log files via CIFS, the administrator must mount the \\<system_name>\C$ share to a
desired drive letter on the management workstation (where <system_name> is the short name, FQDN, or
IP address of the storage system). The administrator can then change directories to <drive
letter>\etc\log\ to view log files in a text editor program (where <drive letter> is the desired drive
letter on the management workstation).
To access the log files via HTTPS, the administrator must ensure that the httpd.autoindex.enable
option is set to on and that the httpd.admin.access option is set to allow administrative access. The
administrator can then point the web browser on the management workstation to
https://<system_name>/na_admin/logs/ to download log files to the management workstation
(where <system_name> is the short name, FQDN, or IP address of the storage system). Log files are in
Microsoft Windows Event Viewer format (EVT) and can be opened by Windows Event Viewer.
Administrators can also configure auditing for specific file access protocols, and forward audit logs to a
remote Syslog log host.
TOE Security Functional Requirements Satisfied: FAU_GEN.1, FAU_GEN.2, FAU_SAR.1, FAU_SAR.2,
FAU_STG.1, FAU_STG.4
7.1.2 User Data Protection
The TSF mediates access of subjects and objects.
The subjects covered by the DAC SFP are NFS Clients and CIFS Clients.
The objects covered by the DAC SFP are files (TSF user data). The TOE maintains files with either NTFS-
Style security attributes or UNIX-Style security attributes.
The access modes covered by the DAC SFP are: create, read, write, execute, delete, change permission
and change owner.
The DAC SFP is detailed below:
7.1.2.1 Discretionary Access Control (DAC) Security Function
The DAC SFP protects user data (FDP_ACC.1). The DAC SFP uses the subject type, subject‟s security
attributes, the object, the object‟s security attributes and the access mode (operation) to determine if access
is granted. For some operations, the security attributes of the object‟s parent directory are also used. The
following sections describe the DAC SFP and provide the Security Functional Requirements that meet the
Security Function.
7.1.2.1.1DAC SFP Object Security Attributes
The TSF User Data that is covered by the DAC SFP are files (objects). Each file maintained by the TOE
has a file style associated with it. The type of security attributes associated with the file defines a file style.
The TOE maintains two styles of files: UNIX-Style files and NTFS-Style files. UNIX-Style files have UNIX-
Style security attributes and NTFS-Style files have NTFS-Style security. Each file style is assigned different
security attributes that are used by the DAC SFP to determine if access is granted for a subject.
In addition to a file style, each file has a file type. The file types may be directories, symbolic links or regular
files. UNIX-Style files may be a directory, a symbolic link or a regular file (FDP_ACC.1). NTFS-Style files
do not have symbolic links; therefore, the file type will be either directory or regular file (FDP_ACC.1).
In addition to the file type, the TOE maintains three different storage types: UNIX Qtrees, NTFS Qtrees or
mixed Qtrees. A Qtree is a disk space partition. UNIX Qtrees store UNIX-Style files with UNIX-Style
security attributes. NTFS Qtrees store NTFS-Style files with NTFS-Style security attributes. Mixed Qtrees
store both styles of files. Any file may have either UNIX-Style security attributes or NTFS-Style security
attributes associated with them. Mixed Qtrees will not be part of the evaluated configuration. The following
sections describe the security attributes associated with the objects.
7.1.2.1.1.1 NFSv3 UNIX-Style File Security Attribute Description
A UNIX-Style file managed by the TOE has eleven security attributes that are used to determine file access.
The security attributes include a UNIX File UID, a UNIX file GID and a nine character access mode string.
The UNIX File UID is the UID of the file‟s owner. The UNIX file GID is the GID associated with the file. The
access mode is a subset of characters within the file‟s file permission string. The file permission string is
represented in ten characters common to all UNIX files (e.g. drwxrwxrwx). The first character contains one
of three characters that identify the file type: d for directory, l for a symbolic link, or a dash (-) indicates the
file is a regular file. The following 9 characters represent the access mode for the file in three sets of rwx
triplets. The first triplet specifies the permission for the file‟s owner (UID). The next triplet specifies the
permissions for the group associated with the file (UNIX file GID). The last three characters specify the
permission for the users who are neither the owner nor members of the file‟s group (other). The rwx triplet
identifies the permission for that set (owner, group, other). The three characters represent Read, write or
execute privileges. If the character is a dash, the set does not have permissions to perform the specific
action (FDP_ACF.1). A directory‟s permission string may also contain a “sticky bit” represented at the end
of the nine character access mode string by a “T” (e.g. drwxrwxrwxT). A sticky bit-enabled directory signifies
that files or folders created within this directory can only be deleted by the file owner.
To determine if a client has read, write or execute permission for a UNIX-Style file, the TOE first compares
the client‟s UNIX User UID with the file‟s UID. If a match occurs (the client is the owner) and the file‟s
access mode specifies permission for the specific access request (rwx), the request is allowed. If the owner
does not have permission to perform the request, the request is denied. If the client is not the file‟s owner,
the TOE determines if the client is a member of the file‟s group by comparing the client‟s Primary UNIX User
GID to the file‟s GID. If the client is a member of the file‟s group and the access mode specifies permission
for the specific access request, the request is allowed. If the group does not have permission to perform the
request, the request is denied. If the client is not the file‟s owner or a member of the file‟s group, the TOE
then determines if all others (the last triplet) have permission to perform the request. If all others have
permission, the request is honored. Otherwise the request is denied (FDP_ACF.1).
For the remainder of this document, when the DAC SFP rules state that the TOE determines if a client,
using UNIX-Style security attributes, has access, the above steps are what the TOE performs: the TOE
walks through the owner, group and other attributes to determine access.
7.1.2.1.1.2 NFSv4 UNIX-Style File
The TOE‟s NFSv4 UNIX-Style file security attributes are NFSv4 ACLs. Each file has a data structure
associated with it containing the file owner‟s UID and an ACL. Each ACL consists of one or more ACE.
Each ACE explicitly allows or denies access to a single user or group. Access is allowed if there is no ACE
that denies access to the user or any group that the user is a member of and if an ACE exists that grants
permission to the user or any group the user is a member of.
This determination is made by consulting the ownership, permissions, and ACEs on the file or directory and
comparing against the UID and GID of the requesting user. The group memberships (and possibly
username to UID number mapping) are obtained from local files or a directory service, while the file
permissions and ACLs are stored in the file system.
For the remainder of this document, when the DAC SFP rules state that the TOE determines if a client,
using NFSv4 UNIX-Style security attributes, has access, the above steps are what the TOE performs to
determine access.
7.1.2.1.1.3 NTFS-Style File Security Attributes Description
The TOE‟s NTFS-Style file security attributes are standard Windows file security attributes. Each file has a
data structure associated with an SD. This SD contains the file owner‟s SID, group‟s SID, DACL
11
, and
SACL
12
. Each ACL consists of one or more Access Control Entries (ACEs). Each ACE explicitly allows or
denies access to a single user or group. Access is allowed if there is no ACE that denies access to the user
or any group that the user is a member of and if an ACE exists that grants permission to the user or any
group the user is a member of.
11
DACL – Discretionary ACL: Used to determine permissions.
12
SACL – System ACL: Used for auditing purposes.
Security Target for Data ONTAP® 8.0.0 7-Mode and Data ONTAP® 8.0.1 7-Mode 43
For the remainder of this document, when the DAC SFP rules state that the TOE determines if a client,
using NTFS-Style security attributes, has access, the above steps are what the TOE performs to determine
access.
7.1.2.1.2DAC SFP Access Requests
Access requests define what operation a subject requests to perform on an object. The TOE‟s DAC SFP
addresses seven access requests: create, read, write, execute, delete, change permissions, and change
owner (FDP_ACC.1). The following sections define the operations.
7.1.2.1.2.1 UNIX-Style Access Requests
The following table identifies the operations of subjects on UNIX-Style files (objects) covered by the DAC
SFP and explains what each of the file access request means.
Table 20 – UNIX-Style File Access Requests
DAC SFP Operation
UNIX-Style File Types
Directory Symbolic Link Normal File
Create Create a directory. Create a symbolic link. Create a file.
Read Get info about the directory
or its contents.
Read the file the symbolic
link contains the name of.
Read the file.
Write Add a file in the directory. Write to the file the
symbolic link contains the
name of.
Append/write/truncate the
file.
Execute Traverse the directory;
change the working
directory or access a file or
subdirectory in the
directory.
Execute the file the
symbolic link contains the
name of.
Execute the file.
Delete Delete the directory. Delete the symbolic link. Delete the file.
Change Permission Change the permission of
the directory.
Change the permission of
the symbolic link.
Change the permission of
the file.
Change Owner No effect. Become the symbolic link‟s
owner.
Become the file‟s owner.
7.1.2.1.2.2 NTFS-Style File Access Requests
The NTFS-Style file security attributes define more access modes than UNIX does. There are, however, no
symbolic links in NTFS-Style files. The following table identifies the operations of subjects on NTFS-Style
files (objects) covered by the DAC SFP and explains what each of the basic file access request means.
Table 21 – NTFS-Style File Access Requests
DAC SFP Operation
NTFS-Style File Types
Directory Normal File
Create Create a directory Create a file.
DAC SFP Operation
NTFS-Style File Types
Directory Normal File
Read Get info about the directory or its
contents
Read the file.
Write Add a file in the directory Truncate, append, or overwrite the
file.
Execute No effect If the file has an extension of .exe or
.com, attempt to execute it as a
native binary. If it has an extension
of .bat or .cmd, attempt to execute it
as a batch or command file using the
command interpreter.
Delete Delete the directory. Delete
privilege must be explicitly granted
on the contained files and
subdirectories before they can be
deleted. A directory may not be
deleted unless it is empty.
Delete the file.
Change Permission Change the permissions on the
directory (change the directory‟s
ACL)
Change the file‟s ACL.
Change Owner Become the directory‟s owner Become the file‟s owner.
7.1.2.1.3DAC Operations and Rules
In general the TOE supports access to all objects from all subjects. However, the following exceptions
apply:
Client The DAC SFP supports client protocol-specific support for create, read, write, execute,
delete, change permission and change owner operations.
File Style The file style (UNIX-Style or NTFS-Style) is considered in the TOE‟s DAC SFP Rules
because the type of security attributes maintained by the object aids in determining the type of security
attributes required by the client.
File Type The file type (directory, symbolic link or regular file) is considered when determining if
object access is allowed for a subject. The CIFS protocol does not know about symbolic links. Therefore,
CIFS Clients will not request an operation for a symbolic link; the only operations for objects with file type of
symbolic link applicable to the DAC SFP are NFS Client operations for UNIX-Style files.
Additional Data As well as client security attributes and object security attributes, certain operations
require the TOE to examine the security attributes of other objects to determine if access is allowed,
specifically, the object‟s parent directory. The TOE examines the security attributes of an object‟s parent
directory for create, delete and change permission operations.
Operation The operations supported by the DAC are: Create, Read, Write, Execute, Delete, Change
Permissions, and Change Owner. The execute command is treated differently for the different file styles
and file types. Executing an NTFS directory has no effect. Executing a UNIX-Style directory means to
traverse the directory; change the working directory, or access a file or subdirectory in the directory.
7.1.2.1.4DAC SFP Subject Security Attributes
The subjects that apply to the DAC SFP are subjects with or without administrative roles; they access the
TOE as NFS Clients and CIFS Clients (FDP_ACC.1). To determine if access is permitted for an object, the
Security Target for Data ONTAP® 8.0.0 7-Mode and Data ONTAP® 8.0.1 7-Mode 45
TOE requires the security attributes associated with the client. These security attributes may be resolved by
the TOE or the IT Environment.
The subject security attributes required by the DAC SFP depend on the type of security attributes
maintained by the object; the object will require either UNIX-Style subject security attributes or NTFS-Style
subject security attributes to determine if access is permitted. Based on the native systems, NFS clients are
typically associated with UNIX-Style security attributes and CIFS Clients are associated with NTFS-Style
security attributes. The following sections describe the TOE‟s subject security attribute resolution used to
enforce the DAC SFP.
7.1.2.1.5Derivation of UNIX-Style Client Subject Security Attributes
If the TOE determines that NFSv3 UNIX-Style security attributes should be used to determine access for an
object, the TOE requires a client‟s (subject‟s) UNIX User UID and UNIX User GID (FDP_ACF.1).
If the TOE determines that the NFSv4 UNIX-Style security attributes should be used to determine access for
an object, the TOE requires a client‟s (subject‟s) UNIX User UID and GID with permission matching the file‟s
ACL (FDP_ACF.1).
If the access request is initiated by an NFS Client, the TOE received the NFS Client‟s UNIX User UID in the
NFS request (IT Environment). The TOE then searches the IT Environment to get the UNIX User GID and
UNIX username (FDP_ACF.1).
7.1.2.1.5.1 Derivation of NTFS-Style Client Subject Security Attributes
If the TOE determines that NTFS-Style security attributes should be used to determine access for an object,
the TOE requires two subject security attributes: a Windows User SID and a Windows User GID.
If the access request is initiated by a CIFS Client, the TOE obtained the CIFS Client‟s username (Windows
username) when the client logged onto the remote system and joined the Windows Domain. In addition to
this, the IT Environment queried the domain controller to obtain the Windows User SID and the Windows
User GID.
7.1.2.1.6DAC SFP Rules
The DAC SFP rules that apply depend on the subject, the operation, and the object. In addition, the objects
file type (directory, symbolic link and regular) is used to determine access and the type of Qtree the file is
stored in. The six access modes under the control of the TOE DAC SFP are described below.
CREATE ACCESS REQUEST
To determine if a client has permissions to create a file, the TOE first looks at the parent directory‟s security
attributes.
If the parent directory is NTFS-Style, the TOE uses NTFS-Style security attributes for both subject and
object to determine if access is permitted. If the client does not have write and execute privileges to the
parent directory, the request is denied. If the client has write and execute privileges for the parent directory,
the file is created (FDP_ACF.1). In an NTFS Qtree, the new file inherits the NTFS-Style security attributes
from the parent directory (FMT_MSA.3).
If the parent directory is NFSv3 UNIX-Style, the TOE uses NFSv3 UNIX-Style security attributes for both
subject and object to determine access. If the client does not have write and execute privileges to the
parent directory, the request is denied. If the client has write and execute privileges for the parent directory,
the file is created (FDP_ACF.1). In a UNIX Qtree, the new file‟s NFSv3 UNIX-Style security attributes are
determined by the file mode creation mask, also known as the User Mask (umask) of the user-owned
process creating the file (FMT_MSA.3).
If the parent directory is NFSv4 UNIX-Style, the TOE uses NFSv4-Style ACL security attributes for the
object, and UNIX user UID and GID for the subject. If the client has write and execute privileges for the
parent directory, the file is created (FDP_ACF.1). In an NFSv4 UNIX-Style Qtree, the new file inherits the
NFSv4 UNIX-Style security attributes from the parent directory (FMT_MSA.3).
READ, WRITE, EXECUTE ACCESS REQUESTS
To determine if a client has permission to read, write or execute a file, the TOE first examines the client type.
If a client requests access to a file with NFSv3 UNIX-style security attributes, the TOE uses NFSv3 UNIX-
Style security attributes for both subject and object to determine if read, write or execute access request is
permitted. If the client has read, write or execute permission for the file, access is permitted (FDP_ACF.1).
If the client does not have access, the request is denied.
Otherwise, the TOE uses the file‟s ACL to determine if read, write or execute permission is allowed. The
TOE uses NFSv4 or NTFS-Style security attributes for both subject and object to determine access. The
TOE determines if the file‟s ACEs allow permission for the specific request. If they do, access is granted
(FDP_ACF.1). If the ACEs do not grant permission, access is denied.
CLIENT DELETE ACCESS REQUEST
To determine if a client has permission to delete a file, the TOE looks at the styles of the file and parent
directory.
NFSv3 UNIX-Style File stored in a UNIX-Style Parent Directory
The TOE, using NFSv3 UNIX-Style security attributes for both subject and object, determines if the client
has write and execute access for the file‟s parent directory. If the client does, the delete access is permitted
(FDP_ACF.1). Otherwise, access is denied.
NFSv4 and NTFS-Style File stored in an NTFS-Style Parent Directory
The TOE, using NFSv4 and NTFS-Style security attributes for both subject and object, first determines if the
file‟s ACL grants the client delete access to the file. If so, access is granted (FDP_ACF.1). If the file‟s ACEs
do not grant delete permission for the client, the TOE determines if the parent directory has a DC (Delete
Child) ACE that grants access for the subject. If the parent does, delete access is permitted (FDP_ACF.1).
Otherwise, access is denied.
CHANGE PERMISSION ACCESS REQUESTS
To determine if a client has permission to change the permissions of a file, the TOE looks at the styles of the
file and parent directory.
NFSv3 UNIX-Style File stored in a UNIX-Style Parent Directory
The TOE, using NFSv3 UNIX-Style security attributes for both subject and object, determines if the client
has write and execute access for the file‟s parent directory. If the client does, and the client also has write
access for the file, the change permission access is permitted (FDP_ACF.1). Otherwise, access is denied.
NFSv4 and NTFS-Style File stored in an NTFS-Style Parent Directory
The TOE, using NFSv4 and NTFS-Style security attributes for both subject and object, determines if the
file‟s ACL grants the client change permission access to the file. If so, the TOE determines if the parent
directory‟s ACL grants write and execute access for the subject. If so, change permission access is
permitted (FDP_ACF.1). Otherwise, access is denied.
CHANGE OWNER ACCESS REQUESTS
The DAC SFP distinguishes between the NFS Client Change Owner (chown) UNIX command and the CIFS
Client Change Owner (Change Ownership) command.
NFSv3 Clients
If an NFSv3 Client requests a Change Owner request (chown) for an NTFS-Style file, the request is denied
(FDP_ACF.1). If an NFS Client sends a Change Owner request (chown) for an NFSv3 UNIX-Style directory,
the request is denied. For other UNIX-Style file types, the TOE determines if the client is root (UNIX User
UID is root UID) or the file owner. If the client is root or the file owner, access is allowed (FDP_ACF.1) and
the TOE changes the object‟s owner to the owner specified in the chown request. If the object had an ACL,
the TOE removes the ACL.
NFSv4 Clients
If an NFSv4 Client requests a Change Owner request for an NTFS-Style file, the request is denied
(FDP_ACF.1). If the file is an NFSv4 UNIX-Style file, the TOE determines if the client has Change Owner
ACE privileges for the file. If the client does, access is allowed (FDP_ACF.1). The TOE will replace the
Security Target for Data ONTAP® 8.0.0 7-Mode and Data ONTAP® 8.0.1 7-Mode 47
existing owner ACE with the new ACE sent in the command. If the NFSv4 Client does not have Change
Owner privileges, the request is denied.
CIFS Client
If a CIFS Client requests a Change Owner request for a UNIX-Style file, the request is denied (FDP_ACF.1).
If the file is an NTFS-Style file, the TOE determines if the client has Change Owner privileges for the file. If
the client does, access is allowed (FDP_ACF.1). The TOE will replace the existing owner ACE with the new
ACE sent in the command. If the CIFS Client does not have Change Owner privileges, the request is
denied.
TOE Security Functional Requirements Satisfied: FDP_ACC.1, FDP_ACF.1
7.1.3 Identification and Authentication
The TOE‟s I&A functionality enforces human administrators to identify and authenticate themselves to the
TOE before allowing any modifications to TOE managed TSF Data (FIA_UID.2, FIA_UAU.2).
Administrators‟ authentication credentials are maintained by the TOE in a local registry. The file contains
the username, password, full name, password aging, role, and other similar characteristics for each
administrator. Authentication credentials are maintained by the TOE in a local registry. Several roles exist
for administrator authentication: root, admin, power, backup, compliance, and audit.
The TOE enforces minimum password strength requirements. Passwords must have a length of at least 8
characters and contain at least one numeric character and at least two alphabetic characters (FIA_SOS.1).
The TOE also maintains the following attributes for administrative accounts: TOE user name, password,
group membership, UNIX User UID and GID, and Windows User SID and GID (FIA_ATD.1).
Administrators are authenticated locally using role based access control.
The TOE will lock out an administrator account if the user fails to enter the proper credentials after 6 failed
login attempts (FIA_AFL.1).
TOE Security Functional Requirements Satisfied: FIA_AFL.1, FIA_ATD.1, FIA_SOS.1, FIA_UAU.2,
FIA_UID.2
7.1.4 Security Management
The Security Management functionality of the TOE allows TOE administrators to manage the behavior of
security functions, manage security attributes, manage TSF data, and manage roles. The TOE allows
administrators to manage security functions associations with roles, and assign those roles to TOE users. In
addition, the TOE allows administrators to associate security attributes with TSF data.
7.1.4.1 Management of Security Functions Behavior
The Administrative Security Function provides the necessary functions, or capabilities, to allow a NetApp
administrator to manage and support the TSF. Included in this functionality are the rules enforced by the
TOE that define access to TOE-maintained TSF Data and TSF Functions. The TSF Functions are
categorized into the groups of capabilities listed in Table 22 below:
Table 22 – Security Function Capabilities
Capability
Type
Capabilities
Login
login-* grants the specified role the capability to log in through all supported protocols.
Login-protocol grants the specified role the capability to log in through a specified protocol.
Supported protocols include the following:
login-console grants the specified role the capability to log in to the storage system using the
console.
login-ndmp grants the specified role the capability to make NDMP requests.
login-snmp grants the specified role the capability to log in to the storage system using SNMPv3.
Capability
Type
Capabilities
login-ssh grants the specified role the capability to log in to the storage system using SSH.
CLI
Grants the specified role the capability to execute one or more Data ONTAP command line interface
(CLI) commands.
cli-* grants the specified role the capability to execute all supported CLI commands.
cli-cmd* grants the specified role the capability to execute all commands associated with the CLI
command cmd.
Note: Users with cli capability also require at least one login capability to execute CLI commands.
Security
Grants the specified role security-related capabilities, such as the capability to change other users‟
passwords or to invoke the CLI priv set advanced command.
Security-* grants the specified role all security capabilities
security-capability grants the specified role one of the following specific security capabilities:
security-passwd-change-others grants the specified role the capability to change the
passwords of all users with equal or fewer capabilities.
security-priv-advanced grants the specified role the capability to access the advanced CLI
commands.
security-load-lclgroups grants the specified role the capability to reload the lclgroups.cfg file.
security-complete-user-control grants the specified role the capability to create, modify,
and delete users, groups, and roles with greater capabilities.
API
Grants the specified role the capability to execute Data ONTAP API calls.
Api-* grants the specified role all API capabilities.
Api-api_call_family-* grants the specified role the capability to call all API routines in the
family api_call_family.
Api-api_call grants the specified role the capability to call the API routine api_call.
Compliance
Grants the specified role the capability to execute compliance-related operations.
Compliance-* grants the specified role the capability to execute all compliance-related operations.
Compliance-privileged-delete grants the specified role the capability to execute privileged
deletion of compliance data.
Note: The compliance capabilities (compliance-*) are included in the default capabilities of the
compliance role. The compliance capabilities cannot be removed from the compliance role or added
to other roles.
Filerview
Grants the specified role read-only access to FilerView.
This capability type includes only the filerview-readonly capability, which grants the specified role the
capability to view but not change manageable objects on systems managed by FilerView.
Only end users associated with the specific roles as outlined in Table 16 may modify the association
between users, groups, and any of the above capabilities.
The TOE provides several interfaces for administrators to use to manage the behavior of the TSFs. The
various management interfaces available to administrators are outlined below:
CLI
Local CLI available via a serial terminal connected to the console port of the appliance
Remote CLI available via a secure shell program, such as SSH, OpenSSH, PuTTY, etc.
(See section 1.5.3 for a list of other methods of accessing the CLI which are not included in the evaluated
configuration of the TOE)
Security Target for Data ONTAP® 8.0.0 7-Mode and Data ONTAP® 8.0.1 7-Mode 49
NetApp FilerView
A Web-based graphical management interface hosted by the TOE accessible at
https://[system_name]/na_admin (where [system_name] is the short name, FQDN, or IP address
of the storage system)
Editing of Configuration Files
By mounting the root directory of the storage system on a UNIX workstation
By mounting the C$ share of the storage system on a Windows workstation
7.1.4.2 Management of Security Attributes
The TOE protects TSF data via the implementation of the DAC SFP as described in section 7.1.2.1 above.
The security attributes upon which the DAC SFP relies for access control are configurable only by users who
are owners of the object or users who are assigned the root, admin, or power role.
The management of security attributes is performed by editing the attributes of individual objects such as the
SD of NTFS-style files, the ACL of NFSv4 UNIX-style files, or the nine character access mode string of
NFSv3 UNIX-style files, by editing the file‟s group membership, or by editing a user‟s membership in a
group. For more information on the security attributes of TSF data, see section 7.1.2.1.1 and its subsections
above.
7.1.4.3 Management of TSF Data
The TOE‟s Administration Security Function includes TSF Data Management. The TSF Data Management
includes management of both authentication data and security attributes. The following data is managed by
the TOE:
TOE Username Management.
Deny unauthorized administrative login attempts via Data ONTAP.
Implement a “Sleep Mode” function call to Data ONTAP to deny access and initiate a time out period for
further login attempts, for brute force password guessing.
TOE USERNAME MANAGEMENT
The TOE maintains authentication data locally that is used authenticate the NetApp Administrators. This
authentication database can only be accessed through the useradmin command.
7.1.4.4 Management of Roles
The TOE maintains the following roles for users: root, admin, power, backup, compliance, audit, none. The
root and admin roles have the default capability to administratively access the TOE and modify security
attributes. The other administrative roles have varying functionality as defined in Table 16.
NetApp Administrators are required to identify and authenticate themselves to the TOE. The authentication
data used for I&A, username and password, is maintained locally by the TOE; administration of user
authentication data by the IT Environment is not supported. NetApp Administrators are allowed to modify
TOE-managed TSF data including authentication data, security attributes and other TSF Data.
Non-administrators are users who access the TOE via a remote system using NFS or CIFS client software
(process acting on behalf of a user). Non-administrators have access to TOE managed user data, but do
not have authority to modify TOE managed TSF data. Access to TOE managed user data by non-
administrators is covered by the TOE‟s DAC SFP.
TOE Security Functional Requirements Satisfied: FMT_MOF.1, FMT_MSA.1, FMT_MSA.3,
FMT_MTD.1(a), FMT_MTD.1(b), FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1
7.1.5 Protection of the TSF
The TOE protects the TOE Security Function (TSF) via the implementation of domain separation made
possible by MultiStore virtualization functionality.
MultiStore enables administrators to partition the storage and network resources of a single storage system
so that it appears as multiple storage systems on the network. MultiStore is an individually licensed
software feature of Data ONTAP® 8.0.0 7-Mode and Data ONTAP® 8.0.1 7-Mode. Each virtual storage
controller created as a result of partitioning is called a vFiler™ unit, while the physical storage controller is
known as the host storage system.
A virtual storage controller is a lightweight instance of a multiprotocol server. Physical resources of the
storage system such as system memory and processor are shared between virtual storage controllers. A
virtual storage controller consists of data stored in a volume or a qtree, the IP address(es) necessary to
reach the virtual storage controller, and the security and other attributes associated with the data. From the
client systems and management software perspective the data is completely secured and isolated from all
other virtual storage controllers.
As illustrated in Figure 6 below, a virtual storage controller‟s configuration allows it to store and retrieve data
in the correct context in its storage units. This information also allows the virtual storage controller to
correctly interpret the access control and security-related metainformation embedded in its storage.
Figure 6 – Multistore enables secure multi-tenancy for shared storage implementations.
Enabling a MultiStore license will create a virtual storage controller named “vFiler0”. “vFiler0” is referred to
as a default virtual storage controller and cannot be renamed. Any other virtual storage controller created
on the storage system is referred to as a nondefault virtual storage controller. The “vFiler0” unit owns all the
resources of the storage system. When administrators create vFiler units and assign resources to them, the
resources are assigned from “vFiler0”. Therefore, “vFiler0” owns all resources that are not owned by
nondefault vFiler units.
A virtual storage controller configuration includes:
Quota, exports, and log information
Configuration for hosts, DNS, and NIS
CIFS domain info, local users, groups, shares
The subset of storage system options that are specific to a virtual storage controller
Virtual storage controller registry data
Security Target for Data ONTAP® 8.0.0 7-Mode and Data ONTAP® 8.0.1 7-Mode 51
Administrators of vFiler unit can manage all vFiler units that they are authorized to access. However, vFiler
unit administrators have access rights different from those of storage system administrators. The hosting
storage system administrator can access all the data contained in a vFiler unit by using the vfiler
context or the vfiler run commands. However, after assigning a qtree or volume to a vFiler unit, the
hosting storage system administrator no longer has access to the data in that qtree or volume.
The system clock is set at boot via the Network Time Protocol and provides reliable timestamps for use by
the TOE.
TOE Security Functional Requirements Satisfied: EXT_FPT_SEP.1, FPT_STM.1
7.1.6 TOE Access
The TOE mitigates unauthorized administrator access by automatically terminating administrator sessions
after 10 minutes of inactivity at the CLI and 5 minutes of inactivity at the NetApp FilerView.
TOE Security Functional Requirements Satisfied: FTA_SSL.3
8 RATIONALE
8.1 CONFORMANCE CLAIMS RATIONALE
This Security Target extends Part 2 and conforms to Part 3 of the Common Criteria Standard for Information
Technology Security Evaluations, version 3.1, revision 3. The extended SFR contained within this ST is
EXT_FPT_SEP.1. This SFR was included to define the security functionality provided by the use of
MultiStore virtualization.
There are no protection profile claims for this Security Target.
8.2 SECURITY OBJECTIVES RATIONALE
This section provides a rationale for the existence of each threat, policy statement, and assumption that
compose the Security Target. Sections 8.2.1 and 8.2.2 demonstrate the mappings between the threats,
policies, and assumptions to the security objectives are complete. The following discussion provides detailed
evidence of coverage for each threat, policy, and assumption.
8.2.1 Security Objectives Rationale Relating to Threats
Table 23 – Threats:Objectives Mapping
Threats Objectives Rationale
T.MASQUERADE
A TOE user or process may
masquerade as another entity in
order to gain unauthorized access
to data or TOE resources.
O.ADMIN_ROLES
The TOE will provide
administrative roles to isolate
administrative actions.
Access to the TOE or network
resources controlled by the TOE
will only be granted to user
accounts associated with the root,
admin, power, backup,
compliance, or audit role. This
prevents threat agents from
gaining unauthorized access to the
TOE or network resources.
O.DAC_ACC
TOE users will be granted access
only to user data for which they
have been authorized based on
their user identity and group
membership.
The TOE will prevent access to
TSF data by users masquerading
as other entities by implementing
discretionary access control.
Users shall be granted access only
to data for which they have been
authorized based on their user
identity and group membership.
T.TAMPER
A TOE user or process may be able
to bypass the TOE‟s security
mechanisms by tampering with the
TOE or TOE environment.
O.ADMIN_ROLES
The TOE will provide
administrative roles to isolate
administrative actions.
The TOE will monitor attempts to
access configuration data or other
trusted data that could result in
system failure resulting in
unauthorized access to trusted
data. Authorized roles are
required for users to perform
administrative procedures, thus
isolating the amount of damage a
user can perform.
O.IA
The TOE will require users to
identify and authenticate
The TOE will monitor attempts to
access configuration data or other
trusted data that could result in
system failure resulting in
Security Target for Data ONTAP® 8.0.0 7-Mode and Data ONTAP® 8.0.1 7-Mode 53
Threats Objectives Rationale
themselves. unauthorized access to trusted
data. Users are required to identify
and authenticate themselves to the
TOE before attempting to modify
TSF data or administrative
functions.
O.MANAGE
The TSF will provide functions and
facilities necessary to support the
authorized administrators that are
responsible for the management of
TOE security.
The TOE will have defined
methods and permissions for
modification of configuration data.
O.STRONG_PWD
The TOE must ensure that all
passwords will be at least 8
characters in length and will
consist of at least one number and
at least two alphabetic characters.
Password construction will be
complex enough to avoid use of
passwords that are easily guessed
or otherwise left vulnerable, e.g.
names, dictionary words, phone
numbers, birthdays, etc. should not
be used.
The TOE will have defined
password rules that require strong
passwords. The default password
rules require passwords that are at
least 8 characters in length and
consist of at least one numeric and
as least two alphabetic characters.
OE.ACCESS
The IT Environment will ensure
that users gain only authorized
access to the data the IT
Environment manages.
The IT Environment will monitor
attempts to access configuration
data or other trusted data that
could result in system failure
resulting in unauthorized access to
trusted data.
OE.ADMIN_ROLES
The IT Environment will provide
administrative roles to isolate
administrative actions.
The IT Environment will monitor
attempts to access configuration
data or other trusted data that
could result in system failure
resulting in unauthorized access to
trusted data. Authorized roles are
required for users to perform
administrative procedures, thus
isolating the amount of damage a
user can perform.
T.UNAUTH
A TOE user may gain access to
security data on the TOE, even
though the user is not authorized in
accordance with the TOE security
policy.
O.ADMIN_ROLES
The TOE will provide
administrative roles to isolate
administrative actions.
The TOE will require authorized
roles for users to perform
administrative procedures
therefore, isolating the amount of
damage a user can perform.
O.ENFORCE
The TOE is designed and
implemented in a manner that
ensures the security policies can‟t
The TOE will ensure the security
policy enforcement of the TOE is
invoked and not interfered with
inside the TOE.
Threats Objectives Rationale
be bypassed or interfered with via
mechanisms within the TOE's
scope of control.
O.IA
The TOE will require users to
identify and authenticate
themselves.
The TOE will require users to
identify and authenticate
themselves before attempting to
modify TSF data or security
attributes.
O.MANAGE
The TSF will provide functions and
facilities necessary to support the
authorized administrators that are
responsible for the management of
TOE security.
The TOE will have defined
methods and permissions for
modification of configuration data.
O.INACTIVE
The TOE will terminate an inactive
management session after a
configurable interval of time.
The TOE will prevent users from
gaining access to security data on
the TOE, even though the user is
not authorized in accordance with
the TOE security policy, by
terminating an inactive
management session after a
configurable interval of time.
OE.ACCESS
The IT Environment will ensure
that users gain only authorized
access to the data the IT
Environment manages.
The IT Environment will enforce
restrictive access and modification
rules for security attributes and
TSF Data managed by the IT
Environment and used by the TOE
to enforce the DAC SFP.
OE.ADMIN_ROLES
The IT Environment will provide
administrative roles to isolate
administrative actions.
The IT Environment will require
authorized roles for users to
perform administrative procedures
thus, isolating the amount of
damage a user can perform.
OE.ENFORCE
The IT Environment will support
the TOE by providing mechanisms
to ensure the TOE is neither
bypassed nor interfered with via
mechanisms outside the TSC.
The IT Environment will ensure the
security policy enforcement of the
TOE is invoked and not interfered
with outside the TOE.
T.DATALOSS
Threat agents may attempt to
remove or destroy data collected
and produced by the TOE.
O.IA
The TOE will require users to
identify and authenticate
themselves.
The TOE will mitigate unauthorized
attempts to remove or destroy data
collected and produced by the
TOE by requiring that access to
subject data is granted only after a
user has been identified and
authenticated.
T.NO_AUDIT
Threat agents may perform
O.AUDIT
The TOE will audit all administrator
The TOE will prevent a threat
agent from performing a security-
related action without being held
Security Target for Data ONTAP® 8.0.0 7-Mode and Data ONTAP® 8.0.1 7-Mode 55
Threats Objectives Rationale
security-relevant operations on the
TOE without being held
accountable for it.
authentication attempts, whether
successful or unsuccessful, as well
as TOE user account configuration
changes.
accountable by auditing all
security-related activity on the TOE
and associating users with those
activities.
O.TIMESTAMP
The TOE will provide a reliable
timestamp for use by the TOE.
The TOE will prevent a threat
agent from performing a security-
related action without being held
accountable by auditing all
security-related activity on the TOE
and recording the time those
activities were performed.
OE.NTP
The IT Environment will enable the
TOE to provide reliable time
stamps by implementing the
Network Time Protocol (NTP).
The IT Environment will ensure
that the TOE is able to perform
reliable auditing by ensuring that
the timestamp is reliable through
the implementation of the Network
Time Protocol.
T.IA
Threat agents may attempt to
compromise the TOE or network
resources controlled by the TOE by
attempting actions that it is not
authorized to perform on the TOE
or network resources.
O.ADMIN_ROLES
The TOE will provide
administrative roles to isolate
administrative actions.
The TOE will prevent attempts to
compromise the TOE or network
resources controlled by the TOE
by threat agents attempting actions
that they are not authorized to
perform by providing an
administrator role and restricting
access to the resources to users
associated with that role.
O.DAC_ACC
TOE users will be granted access
only to user data for which they
have been authorized based on
their user identity and group
membership.
The TOE will prevent attempts to
compromise the TOE or network
resources controlled by the TOE
by threat agents attempting actions
that they are not authorized to
perform by only granting users
access to user data for which they
have been authorized based on
the identity of users and groups of
users.
O.IA
The TOE will require users to
identify and authenticate
themselves.
The TOE will prevent attempts to
compromise the TOE or network
resources controlled by the TOE
by threat agents attempting actions
that they are not authorized to
perform by requiring users to
identify and authenticate
themselves.
OE.IA
The IT Environment must require
authorized CIFS and NFS Clients
to successfully I&A before allowing
access to the TOE.
The IT Environment will prevent
attempts to compromise the TOE
or network resources controlled by
the TOE by threat agents
attempting actions that they are not
authorized to perform by requiring
users to identify and authenticate
themselves.
Every Threat is mapped to one or more Objectives in the table above. This complete mapping
demonstrates that the defined security objectives counter all defined threats.
8.2.2 Security Objectives Rationale Relating to Assumptions
Table 24 – Assumptions:Objectives Mapping
Assumptions Objectives Rationale
A.PEER
Any other systems with which the
TOE communicates are assumed to
be under the same management
control and use a consistent
representation for specific user and
group identifiers.
OE.SUBJECTDATA
The IT Environment will provide the
TOE with the appropriate subject
security attributes.
The security attributes provided by
the IT Environment will be
meaningful because the
representations between the TOE
and IT Environment systems are
consistent.
A.NETWORK
Security Management shall be
provided to protect the Confidentiality
and Integrity of transactions on the
network.
OE.NETWORK
The network path between the TOEs
is a trusted channel. The network
path between the CLI client and the
TOE is a trusted channel.
The channel between the TOEs
which are replication partners, and
the channel between the TOE and
the CLI client are trusted channels.
A.MANAGE
There will be one or more competent
individuals assigned to manage the
TOE and the security of the
information it contains.
ON.INSTALL
Those responsible for the TOE and
hardware required by the TOE must
ensure that the TOE is delivered,
installed, configured, managed, and
operated in a manner which
maintains IT security objectives.
The TOE will be managed
appropriately by one or more
competent individuals.
ON.TRAINED
Those responsible for the TOE will
be properly trained and provided the
necessary information that ensures
secure management of the TOE and
the IT Environment.
Those responsible for the TOE will
be properly trained and provided the
necessary information that ensures
secure management of the TOE and
the IT Environment.
A.NO_EVIL_ADM
The system administrative personnel
are not hostile and will follow and
abide by the instructions provided by
the administrator documentation.
ON.INSTALL
Those responsible for the TOE and
hardware required by the TOE must
ensure that the TOE is delivered,
installed, configured, managed, and
operated in a manner which
maintains IT security objectives.
The TOE will be delivered, installed,
managed, and operated by a non-
hostile administrator in a manner
which maintains IT security
objectives.
A.COOP
Authorized users possess the
necessary authorization to access at
least some of the information
managed by the TOE and are
expected to act in a cooperating
manner in a benign environment.
ON.CREDEN
Those responsible for the TOE must
ensure that all access credentials,
such as passwords, are protected by
the users in a manner that maintains
IT security objectives.
Authorized user will provide for the
physical protection of the TOE‟s
access credentials.
Security Target for Data ONTAP® 8.0.0 7-Mode and Data ONTAP® 8.0.1 7-Mode 57
Assumptions Objectives Rationale
A.STRONG_PWD
Authorized users will maintain strong
passwords.
O.STRONG_PWD
The TOE must ensure that all
passwords will be at least 8
characters in length and will consist
of at least one number and at least
two alphabetic characters. Password
construction will be complex enough
to avoid use of passwords that are
easily guessed or otherwise left
vulnerable, e.g. names, dictionary
words, phone numbers, birthdays,
etc. should not be used.
Strong passwords will be used by the
NetApp Administrators by ensuring
that all passwords will be at least 8
characters in length and will consist
of at least 1 numeric character and 2
alphabetic characters. Password
construction will be complex enough
to avoid use of passwords that are
easily guessed or otherwise left
vulnerable, e.g. names, dictionary
words, phone numbers, birthdays,
etc. should not be used.
ON.STRONG_PWD
Those responsible for the TOE must
ensure that all passwords will be at
least 8 characters in length and will
consist of at least one number and at
least two alphabetic characters.
Password construction will be
complex enough to avoid use of
passwords that are easily guessed or
otherwise left vulnerable, e.g.
names, dictionary words, phone
numbers, birthdays, etc. should not
be used.
Strong passwords will be used by the
NetApp Administrators by ensuring
that all passwords will be at least 8
characters in length and will consist
of lower-case alphabetic characters
and at least 2 of the following 3
attributes: upper-case alphabetic,
numeric, special characters (such as
!, $, or <). Password construction will
be complex enough to avoid use of
passwords that are easily guessed or
otherwise left vulnerable, e.g.
names, dictionary words, phone
numbers, birthdays, etc. should not
be used.
A.PROTECT
The processing resources of the TOE
critical to the security policy
enforcement will be protected from
unauthorized physical modification by
potentially hostile outsiders.
ON.PHYSICAL
Those responsible for the TOE must
ensure that those parts of the TOE
and the IT Environment critical to
security policy are protected from
any physical attack that might
compromise the IT security
objectives.
The security critical components of
the TOE are protected from physical
attacks by ensuring that that the TOE
is protected from unauthorized
physical modification by hostile
outsiders.
A.ADMIN_ACCESS
Administrative functionality shall be
restricted to authorized
administrators.
O.ADMIN_ROLES
The TOE will provide administrative
roles to isolate administrative
actions.
The TOE will provide a distinct role
for administrators, thereby enabling
administrative functions to be
associated with just that role.
O.IA
The TOE will require users to identify
and authenticate themselves.
The TOE will provide a mechanism
to I&A specific users, which is a
prerequisite for associating a role
with a user.
O.MANAGE
The TSF will provide functions and
facilities necessary to support the
authorized administrators that are
responsible for the management of
TOE security.
The TOE will provide administrative
functions that can be restricted to
administrative roles.
Every assumption is mapped to one or more Objectives in the table above. This complete mapping
demonstrates that the defined security objectives uphold all defined assumptions.
8.3 RATIONALE FOR EXTENDED SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS
A class of EXT_FPT (Extended Protection of the TSF) and a family of EXT_FPT_SEP requirements was
created to specifically address domain separation within the TOE‟s scope of control. The FPT_SEP family
from CC v2.3 was used as a model for creating this requirement. The purpose of this family of requirements
is to define multiple security domains created by the implementation of MultiStore technology. These
requirements have no dependencies since the stated requirements embody all the necessary security
functions. These requirements exhibit functionality that can be easily documented in the ADV assurance
evidence and thus do not require any additional Assurance Documentation.
8.4 SECURITY REQUIREMENTS RATIONALE
The following discussion provides detailed evidence of coverage for each security objective.
8.4.1 Rationale for Security Functional Requirements of the TOE Objectives
Table 25 – Objectives:SFRs Mapping
Objective
Requirements Addressing the
Objective
Rationale
O.ADMIN_ROLES
The TOE will provide administrative
roles to isolate administrative actions.
FMT_SMR.1
Security roles
Defines the user roles implemented
by the DAC SFP requiring authorized
roles for NetApp Administrators to
perform administrative procedures.
O.AUDIT
The TOE will audit all administrator
authentication attempts, whether
successful or unsuccessful, as well as
TOE user account configuration
changes.
FAU_GEN.1
Audit data generation
Requires the TOE to generate audit
event records for administrator
logons and configuration changes,
and defines the information saved in
these records.
FAU_GEN.2
User Identity Association
Requires the TOE to associate a
specific user with the audit event
records.
FAU_SAR.1
Audit review
Requires the TOE to allow users to
review audit event records.
FAU_SAR.2
Restricted audit review
Requires the TOE to only allow
administrators to review audit event
records.
FAU_STG.1
Protected audit trail storage
Requires the TOE to restrict the
ability to modify or delete the audit
trail to administrators, and to detect
any such behavior by auditing all
management operations.
FAU_STG.4
Prevention of audit data loss
The TOE will continue to audit
management activity if the audit trail
is full by backing up the current audit
trail, deleting the oldest audit trail file,
and creating a new audit trail file.
Security Target for Data ONTAP® 8.0.0 7-Mode and Data ONTAP® 8.0.1 7-Mode 59
Objective
Requirements Addressing the
Objective
Rationale
O.DAC_ACC
TOE users will be granted access
only to user data for which they have
been authorized based on their user
identity and group membership.
FDP_ACC.1
Subset access control
Identifies the subjects, objects, and
operation of subjects on objects
covered by the DAC SFP.
FDP_ACF.1
Security attribute based access
control
Identifies the subject and object
security attributes used to enforce
the DAC SFP, and defines the DAC
rules enforced by the TOE that
define access rules for TOE
managed user data.
FMT_MSA.3
Static attribute initialisation
Ensures restrictive default values are
defined for the TOE‟s object security
attributes used to enforce the DAC
SFP.
O.ENFORCE
The TOE is designed and
implemented in a manner that
ensures the security policies can‟t be
bypassed or interfered with via
mechanisms within the TOE's scope
of control.
EXT_FPT_SEP.1
TSF domain separation for software
TOEs
The TOE tracks user sessions
individually and enforces the TSP
appropriately for each session. User
sessions cannot interfere with one
another within the TOE. Without this
assurance, there would not be
assurance that the TOE could not be
interfered with.
O.IA
The TOE will require users to identify
and authenticate themselves.
FIA_AFL.1
Authentication failure handling
Protects the TOE from malicious
brute-force and dictionary password
attacks by locking out accounts after
6 failed login attempts.
FIA_UAU.2
User authentication before any
action
Ensures that users must authenticate
themselves before any TSF
mediated access to the TOE
functions or TSF data is allowed.
FIA_UID.2
User identification before any action
Ensures that users must identify
themselves before any TSF
mediated access to the TOE
functions or TSF data is allowed.
O.MANAGE
The TSF will provide functions and
facilities necessary to support the
authorized administrators that are
responsible for the management of
TOE security.
FIA_ATD.1
User attribute definition
Identifies the TOE maintained
subject security attributes of TOE
maintained objects.
FMT_MOF.1
Management of security function
behaviour
Defines the restrictions enforced by
the DAC SFP to modify roles
associated with adminstrators
managed by the TOE and used to
enforce the DAC SFP.
O.MANAGE
The TSF will provide functions and
facilities necessary to support the
authorized administrators that are
responsible for the management of
TOE security.
FMT_MSA.1
Management of security attributes
Only authorized NetApp
Administrators responsible for the
management of TOE security may
modify, delete or add the security
attributes (TOE User UID and
Primary TOE User GID) maintained
locally by the TOE and used to
enforce the DAC SFP.
Objective
Requirements Addressing the
Objective
Rationale
O.MANAGE
The TSF will provide functions and
facilities necessary to support the
authorized administrators that are
responsible for the management of
TOE security.
FMT_MTD.1(a)
Management of TSF data
Defines the restrictions enforced by
the DAC SFP to modify user
accounts and roles managed by the
TOE and used to enforce the DAC
SFP.
FMT_MTD.1(b)
Management of TSF data
Defines the restrictions enforced by
the DAC SFP to modify the listening
state of the TOE.
FMT_SMF.1
Specification of management
functions
Defines the TSF management
functions provided by the TOE that
ensures the TOE‟s SFPs can be
enforced.
O.STRONG_PWD
The TOE must ensure that all
passwords will be at least 8
characters in length and will consist of
at least one number and at least two
alphabetic characters. Password
construction will be complex enough
to avoid use of passwords that are
easily guessed or otherwise left
vulnerable, e.g. names, dictionary
words, phone numbers, birthdays, etc.
should not be used.
FIA_SOS.1
Verification of secrets
The TOE ensures that all passwords
will be at least 8 characters in length
and will consist of at least one
number and at least two alphabetic
characters.
O.INACTIVE
The TOE will terminate an inactive
management session after a
configurable interval of time.
FTA_SSL.3
TSF-initiated termination
The TOE will terminate an
administrator's session after 10
minutes of inactivity at the CLI and 5
minutes of inactivity at the NetApp
FilerView.
O.TIMESTAMP
The TOE will provide a reliable
timestamp for use by the TOE.
FPT_STM.1
Reliable Time Stamps
The Operating System Kernel will
provide a reliable timestamp for use
by the TOE.
8.4.2 Security Assurance Requirements Rationale
EAL2 was chosen to provide a low to moderate level of assurance that is consistent with good commercial
practices. As such, minimal additional tasks are placed upon the vendor assuming the vendor follows
reasonable software engineering practices and can provide support to the evaluation for design and testing
efforts. The chosen assurance level is appropriate with the threats defined for the environment. While the
System may monitor a hostile environment, it is expected to be in a non-hostile position and embedded in or
protected by other products designed to address threats that correspond with the intended environment. At
EAL2, the System will have incurred a search for obvious flaws to support its introduction into the non-
hostile environment.
The augmentation of ALC_FLR.3 was chosen to give greater assurance of the developer‟s on-going flaw
remediation processes.
8.4.3 Dependency Rationale
This ST does satisfy all the requirement dependencies of the Common Criteria. Table 26 lists each
requirement to which the TOE claims conformance with a dependency and indicates whether the dependent
requirement was included. As the table indicates, all dependencies have been met.
Security Target for Data ONTAP® 8.0.0 7-Mode and Data ONTAP® 8.0.1 7-Mode 61
Table 26 – Functional Requirements Dependencies
SFR ID Dependencies Dependency Met Rationale
FAU_GEN.1 FPT_STM.1 
FAU_GEN.2
FIA_UID.2 
Although FAU_GEN.2 is
dependent on FIA_UID.1
which is not claimed, the
dependency SFR is
substituted by FIA_UID.2
which is hierarchical to
FIA_UID.1 and claimed
because the TOE does not
permit any TSF-mediated
actions before users are
identified.
FAU_GEN.1 
FAU_SAR.1 FAU_GEN.1 
FAU_SAR.2 FAU_SAR.1 
FAU_STG.1 FAU_GEN.1 
FAU_STG.4 FAU_STG.1 
FDP_ACC.1 FDP_ACF.1 
FDP_ACF.1
FDP_ACC.1 
FMT_MSA.3 
FIA_AFL.1 FIA_UAU.2
 Although FIA_AFL.1 is
dependent on FIA_UID.1
which is not claimed, the
dependency SFR is
substituted by FIA_UID.2
which is hierarchical to
FIA_UID.1 and claimed
because the TOE does not
permit any TSF-mediated
actions before users are
identified.
FIA_ATD.1 No dependencies
FIA_SOS.1 No dependencies
FIA_UAU.2 FIA_UID.2 
Although FIA_UAU.2 is
dependent on FIA_UID.1
which is not claimed, the
dependency SFR is
substituted by FIA_UID.2
which is hierarchical to
FIA_UID.1 and claimed
because the TOE does not
permit any TSF-mediated
actions before users are
identified.
SFR ID Dependencies Dependency Met Rationale
FIA_UID.2 No dependencies
FMT_MOF.1
FMT_SMF.1 
FMT_SMR.1 
FMT_MSA.1
FMT_SMR.1 
FMT_SMF.1 
FDP_ACC.1 
FMT_MSA.3
FMT_MSA.1(a) 
FMT_MSA.1(b) 
FMT_SMR.1 
FMT_MTD.1(a)
FMT_SMR.1 
FMT_SMF.1 
FMT_MTD.1(b)
FMT_SMR.1 
FMT_SMF.1 
FMT_SMF.1 No dependencies
FMT_SMR.1 FIA_UID.2 
Although FMT_SMR.1 is
dependent on FIA_UID.1
which is not claimed, the
dependency SFR is
substituted by FIA_UID.2
which is hierarchical to
FIA_UID.1 and claimed
because the TOE does not
permit any TSF-mediated
actions before users are
identified.
EXT_FPT_SEP.1 No dependencies
FPT_STM.1 No dependencies
FTA_SSL.3 No dependencies
Security Target for Data ONTAP® 8.0.0 7-Mode and Data ONTAP® 8.0.1 7-Mode 63
9 ACRONYMS
This section describes the acronyms.
Table 27 – Acronyms
Acronym Definition
ACE Access Control Entry
ACL Access Control List
API Application Programming Interface
BMC Baseboard Management Controller
CC Common Criteria
CIFS Common Internet File System
CLI Command Line Interface
CM Configuration Management
DAC Discretionary Access Control
DACL Discretionary Access Control List
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
EVT Microsoft Windows Event Viewer format
FAS Fabric Attached Storage
FC Fibre Channel
FCP Fibre Channel Protocol
FQDN Fully Qualified Domain Name
GID Group Identifier
HTTP Hypertext Transfer Protocol
I&A Identification and Authentication
ID Identifier
IP Internet Protocol
iSCSI Internet Small Computer System Interface
IT Information Technology
KDC Key Distribution Center
LAN Local Area Network
LDAP Lightweight Directory Access Protocol
LUN Logical Unit Number
MAN Manual
NFS Network File System
NIS Network Information Service
Acronym Definition
NTFS New Technology File System
NTLM New Technology Local Area Network Manager
NTP Network Time Protocol
OS Operating System
PAM Pluggable Authentication Module
RAID Redundant Array of Independent Disks
RLM Remote LAN Management
RSH Remote Shell
SACL System Access Control List
SAN Storage Area Network
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SAS Serial Attached Small Computer System Interface
SATA Serial Advanced Technology Attachment
SD Security Descriptor
SFP Security Functional Profile
SFR Security Functional Requirement
SID Security Identifier
SSH Secure Shell
ST Security Target
TCP Transport Control Protocol
TFTP Trivial File Transfer Protocol
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Function
TSP TOE Security Policy
UDP User Datagram Protocol
UID User Identifier
UMASK User Mask
WAFL Write Anywhere File Layout®
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Specifications are subject to change without notice. NetApp, the NetApp logo, Go further, faster, Data ONTAP, NearStore, SnapMirror,
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Security Target for Data ONTAP® 8.0.0 7-Mode and Data ONTAP® 8.0.1 7-Mode 65
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