C030 Certification Report
Web Bytes Xilnex Framework version 3.0
File name: ISCB-5-RPT-C030-CR-v1a
Version: v1a
Date of document: 16 February 2012
Document classification: PUBLIC
For general inquiry about us or our services,
please email: mycc@cybersecurity.my
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C030 Certification Report
Web Bytes Xilnex Framework version 3.0
16 February 2012
ISCB Department
CyberSecurity Malaysia
Level 8, Block A, Mines Waterfront Business Park,
No 3 Jalan Tasik, The Mines Resort City
43300 Seri Kembangan, Selangor, Malaysia


Tel: +603 8946 0999 Fax: +603 8946 0888
http://www.cybersecurity.my
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Document Authorisation
DOCUMENT TITLE: C030 Certification Report - Web Bytes Xilnex Framework
version 3.0
DOCUMENT REFERENCE: ISCB-5-RPT-C030-CR-v1a
ISSUE: v1a
DATE: 16 February 2012
DISTRIBUTION: UNCONTROLLED COPY - FOR UNLIMITED USE AND
DISTRIBUTION
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Copyright Statement
The copyright of this document, which may contain proprietary information, is the
property of CyberSecurity Malaysia.
The document shall be held in safe custody.
©CYBERSECURITY MALAYSIA, 2012
Registered office:
Level 8, Block A,
Mines Waterfront Business Park,
No 3 JalanTasik, The Mines Resort City,
43300 Seri Kembangan
Selangor Malaysia
Registered in Malaysia – Company Limited by Guarantee
Company No. 726630-U
Printed in Malaysia
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Foreward
The Malaysian Common Criteria Evaluation and Certification (MyCC) Scheme has been
established under the 9th
Malaysian Plan to increase Malaysia’s competitiveness in quality
assurance of information security based on the Common Criteria (CC) standard and to
build consumers’ confidence towards Malaysian information security products.
The MyCC Scheme is operated by CyberSecurity Malaysia and provides a model for
licensed Malaysian Security Evaluation Facilities (MySEFs) to conduct security evaluations
of ICT products, systems and protection profiles against internationally recognised
standards. The results of these evaluations are certified by the Malaysian Common
Criteria Certification Body (MyCB) Unit, a unit established within Information Security
Certification Body (ISCB), CyberSecurity Malaysia.
By awarding a Common Criteria certificate, the ISCB asserts that the product complies
with the security requirements specified in the associated Security Target. A Security
Target is a requirements specification document that defines the scope of the evaluation
activities. The consumer of certified IT products should review the Security Target, in
addition to this certification report, in order to gain an understanding of any
assumptions made during the evaluation, the IT product's intended environment, its
security requirements, and the level of confidence (i.e., the evaluation assurance level)
that the product satisfies the security requirements.
This certification report is associated with the certificate of product evaluation dated 16
February 2012, and the Security Target (Ref [6]). The certification report, Certificate of
product evaluation and security target are posted on the MyCC Scheme Certified Product
Register (MyCPR) at www.cybersecurity.my/mycc and the Common Criteria Portal (the
official website of the Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement at
www.commoncriteriaportal.org).
Reproduction of this report is authorized provided the report is reproduced in its
entirety.
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Disclaimer
The Information Technology (IT) product identified in this certification report and its
associate certificate has been evaluated at an accredited and licensed evaluation facility
established under the Malaysian Common Criteria Evaluation and Certification (MyCC)
Scheme (Ref [4]) using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, version 3.1
revision 3 (Ref [3]), for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation,
version 3.1 revision 3 (Ref [2]). This certification report and its associated certificate
apply only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated
configuration. The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of
the MyCC Scheme and the conclusions of the evaluation facility in the evaluation
technical report are consistent with the evidence adduced. This certification report and
its associated certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by CyberSecurity
Malaysia or by any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certification
report and its associated certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by CyberSecurity
Malaysia or by any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is
either expressed or implied.
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Document Change Log
RELEASE DATE PAGES
AFFECTED
REMARKS/CHANGE REFERENCE
v1 3 February 2012 All Final Released.
v1a 16 February 2012 Page iv Add the date of the certificate.
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Executive Summary
Web Bytes Xilnex Framework Version 3.0 (hereafter referred as Xilnex Framework) from
Web Bytes Sdn Bhd is the Target of Evaluation (TOE) for this Evaluation Assurance Level
(EAL) 1 evaluation.
The TOE is a distribution and synchronization platform which distributes subscribed
applications to multiple clients as well performs data synchronisation between all the
clients in the same group. The TOE comprises of two primary components as follows:
• Client Software. The client software that installs directly on each user’s PC which
operates the daily process and update based on the user activities.
• Server Software. The server software that extends client software with secure
communication, identification and authentication, and data synchronization.
The security functions that the TOE provides include the following:
• Secure Transmission – All communications between the server and the client is
through an SSL channel. It protects the user data from disclosure and
modification. Note: In offline mode where the users have no connection to the
server, users will still need to present their credentials (user ID, password and
organization ID) to get the key for decrypting the local cache. The TOE will use
the credentials to get the key back through a complementary function.
• Access control – The TOE allows users to launch only the applications they
subscribed to as well as accessing the database. The TOE will check the user ID
and their organization ID to ensure the applications that the user is allowed to
run.
• Identification and Authentication – Users will have to present their credentials
to the server for identification and authentication. Only after a successful
identification and authentication will the user is allowed to launch the
applications and access the user data at the backend and at the local cache. For
this online identification and authentication, the user will need to be connected to
the server.
• Encryption – Username and passwords are always hashed when they are being
stored into the database and during authentication. The local cache is also
encrypted and can only be accessed when users are successfully identified and
authenticated.
• Management – The TOE contains various management functions to ensure
efficient and secure management of the TOE:
o User management;
o Changing passwords; and
o Configuration of Access Control list.
The TOE maintains two roles to ensure that the functions are restricted to only
the TOE administrator. The roles maintained by the TOE are users and
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administrator. The functions above, and indeed, aspects of these functions, are
restricted based on these roles.
The scope of the evaluation is defined by the Security Target (Ref [6]), which identifies
assumptions made during the evaluation, the intended environment for Xilnex
Framework, the security requirements, and the evaluation assurance level at which the
product is intended to satisfy the security requirements. Consumers are advised to verify
that their operating environment is consistent with that specified in the security target,
and to give due consideration to the comments, observations and recommendations in
this certification report.
This report describes the findings of the security evaluation of Xilnex Framework, to the
Common Criteria (CC) evaluation assurance level EAL1 and the evaluation was conducted
in accordance with the relevant criteria and the requirements of the Malaysian Common
Criteria Evaluation and Certification (MyCC) Scheme (Ref [4]). The evaluation was
performed by the STRATSEC.NET SDN BHD (stratsec) Security Evaluation Facility
(STRATSEF) and was completed on 18 January 2012.
Malaysian Common Criteria Certification Body (MyCB), as the MyCC Scheme Certification
Body, declares that the Xilnex Framework evaluation meets all the conditions of the
Arrangement on the Recognition of Common Criteria Certificate. The product will be
listed on the MyCC Scheme Certified Products Register (MyCPR) at
www.cybersecurity.my/mycc and the Common Criteria Portal (the official website of the
Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement at www.commoncriteriaportal.org).
It is the responsibility of the user to ensure that the Xilnex Framework meets their
requirement and security needs. It is recommended that prospective users of the Xilnex
Framework refer to the ST (Ref [6]), and read this Certification Report prior to deciding
whether to purchase and deploy the product.
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Table of Contents
1 Target of Evaluation ....................................................................... 1
1.1 TOE Description............................................................................................... 1
1.2 TOE Identification............................................................................................ 2
1.3 Security Policy.................................................................................................. 3
1.5 Clarification of Scope...................................................................................... 4
1.6 Assumptions .................................................................................................... 6
1.7 Evaluated Configuration................................................................................. 6
1.8 Delivery Procedures ........................................................................................ 6
1.9 Documentation ................................................................................................ 7
2 Evaluation.......................................................................................... 8
2.1 Evaluation Analysis Activities ........................................................................ 8
2.1.1 Life-cycle support ........................................................................................... 8
2.1.2 Development.................................................................................................... 8
2.1.3 Guidance documents ...................................................................................... 8
2.1.4 IT Product Testing........................................................................................... 8
3 Result of the Evaluation................................................................13
3.1 Assurance Level Information ....................................................................... 13
3.2 Recommendation........................................................................................... 13
Annex A References........................................................................................15
A.1 References...................................................................................................... 15
A.2 Terminology................................................................................................... 15
A.2.1 Acronyms........................................................................................................ 15
A.2.2 Glossary of Terms ......................................................................................... 16
Index of Tables
Table 1: TOE identification ........................................................................................................... 2
Table 2: Independent Functional Testing................................................................................... 9
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Table 3: List of Acronyms ........................................................................................................... 15
Table 4: Glossary of Terms......................................................................................................... 16
Index of Figures
Figure 1: Xilnex Framework Architecture ................................................................................... 3
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1 Target of Evaluation
1.1 TOE Description
1 The Target of Evaluation (TOE), Web Bytes Xilnex Framework version 3.0 (hereafter
referred as Xilnex Framework), is a distribution and synchronization platform which
distributes subscribed applications to multiple clients as well performs data
synchronisation between all the clients in the same group.
2 The TOE comprises of two major components that need to be installed at client and
server side respectively as follows:
• Client Software. (Deployer and Cybernate API) The client software that installs
directly on each user’s PC which operates the daily process and update based on
the user activities.
• Server Software. (Deployer and Cybernate API) The server software that extends
client software with secure communication, identification and authentication, and
data synchronization.
3 The security functions that the TOE provides include the following:
a) Secure Transmission – All communications between the server and the client is
through an SSL channel. It protects the user data from disclosure and
modification. Note: In offline mode where the users have no connection to the
server, users will still need to present their credentials (user ID, password and
organization ID) to get the key for decrypting the local cache. The TOE will use
the credentials to get the key back through a complementary function.
b) Access control – The TOE allows users to launch only the applications they
subscribed to as well as accessing the database. The TOE will check the user ID
and their organization ID to ensure the applications that the user is allowed to
run.
c) Identification and Authentication – Users will have to present their credentials
to the server for identification and authentication. Only after a successful
identification and authentication will the user is allowed to launch the
applications and access the user data at the backend and at the local cache. For
this online identification and authentication, the user will need to be connected
to the server.
d) Encryption – Username and passwords are always hashed when they are being
stored into the database and during authentication. The local cache is also
encrypted and can only be accessed when users are successfully identified and
authenticated.
e) Management – The TOE contains various management functions to ensure
efficient and secure management of the TOE:
o User management;
o Changing passwords; and
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o Configuration of Access Control list.
The TOE maintains two roles to ensure that the functions are restricted to only
the TOE administrator. The roles maintained by the TOE are users and
administrator. The functions above, and indeed, aspects of these functions, are
restricted based on these roles.
1.2 TOE Identification
4 The details of the TOE are identified in Table 1 below.
Table 1: TOE identification
Evaluation Scheme
Malaysian Common Criteria Evaluation and Certification
(MyCC) Scheme
Project Identifier C030
TOE Name Web Bytes Xilnex Framework
TOE Version 3.0
Security Target Title Web Bytes Xilnex Framework Security Target
Security Target Version 1.1
Security Target Date 21 November 2011
Assurance Level Evaluation Assurance Level 1 (EAL 1)
Criteria
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, July 2009, Version 3.1, Revision 3 (Ref [2])
Methodology
Common Methodology for Information Technology
Security Evaluation, July 2009, version 3.1 revision 3 (Ref
[3])
Protection Profile
Conformance
None.
Common Criteria
Conformance
CC Part 2 Conformant.
CC Part 3 Conformant.
Package conformant to EAL1.
Sponsor and Developer
Web Bytes Sdn Bhd,
Unit 1-2-33,
Kompleks Mayang Mall,
Jalan Mayang Pasir 1,
11950 Bayan Baru,
Pulau Pinang
MALAYSIA
Evaluation Facility STRATSEC.NET SDN BHD also known as STRATSEF
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1.3 Security Policy
5 In order to provide user data protection, the TOE enforces an access control policy
on applications and user database. After a user identifies and authenticates to the
TOE, the TOE will check the user ID and organization ID for the applications and
database the user is allowed to access. The TOE maintains access control lists (ACLs)
for each object within an organization. Each ACL maps users and roles to the
operations that they are permitted to perform on the object.
6 The detail of the security policy of the TOE is expressed by the set of security
functional requirements which includes cryptographic support, user data protection,
identification and authentication, security management, and trusted path/channels.
Further details on these security policies may be found in Section 4 of the ST (Ref
[6]).
1.4 TOE Architecture
7 The Security Target (Ref [6]) defines clearly both logical and physical boundaries of
the TOE.
8 Physically, the TOE consists of the client software, and the server software.
9 A typical installation of the TOE can be found in Figure 1 below and identifies the
various supporting components that combine to deliver the system. The TOE is an
application that requires a server machine, operating system, database, and other
supporting software as described in Section 1.4.1 of the ST (Ref [6]).
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Figure 1: Xilnex Framework Architecture
10 The TOE consist of 2 m
e setup of the required folders, fonts and
required libraries at the client side. The module detects the machine
odules as follows:
a) The Deployer module that handles th
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ient side.
1.5
suitable for use in well-protected environments that have
effective countermeasures, particularly in the areas of physical access, personnel and
r the transfer of user data from the TOE to a remote instance of the
a local instance of the database from the
b)
sers to launch only the applications they subscribed
to identify and authenticate themselves before performing any
configuration and performs the necessary setup to enable applications to run.
The Deployer module will download the Cybernate API from the server.
b) The Cybernate API provides the identification and authentication feature of the
TOE. It also controls what applications can the user runs at the cl
Administrator can also creates, and delete users through this interface.
Cybernate API will create a complete instance of the organization database at the
client side (local cache). This local cache will be encrypted by Cybernate API using
a random generated key. It also establishes the secure communication between
the server and the client.
Clarification of Scope
11 The TOE is designed to be
communication security in accordance with administrator guidance that is supplied
with the product. The scope of the evaluation was limited to those claims made in
the Security Target (Ref [6]) and includes only the following evaluated security
functionality:
a) Secure Transmission - the TOE established a trusted channel using the SSL
protocol fo
TOE to ensure it protects the user data from disclosure and modification. The SSL
session is based on mutual authentication of the TOE, and the remote instance,
using installed digital certificates.
The TOE will synchronize the user databases between all users within an
organization. All clients will have
server. This enables users to work in offline mode when they do not have a
connection to the server. Once connected to the server, the client will update the
server with the latest data.
Access Control - The TOE enforces an access control policy on applications and
user data. The TOE allows u
as well as accessing the database at server side. The TOE will check the user ID
and their organization ID for the applications and database the user is allowed to
access. The TOE maintains access control lists (ACLs) for each object within an
organization. Each ACL maps users and roles to the operations that they are
permitted to perform on the object. The ACLs are stored at the server as well as
in the client local cache to enable users to work offline without being connected
to the server.
c) Identification & Authentication - The TOE requires the users (User or
Administrator)
TOE security function mediated actions on behalf of the user. Users and
administrator will login through an interface at the client side of the TOE. Only
after a successful identification and authentication will the user is allowed to
launch the applications and access the user data at the server and at the client
local cache.
Users will be locked out for 10 seconds if they failed their authentication 3 times.
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d)
, a
e) s management functions to ensure
r can query, create, delete, and
the
ministrator can modify the
ains 2 roles within the TOE to ensure that the functions are
12 s and services may
re not included in the scope of the evaluation, but
icrosoft Windows XP, Windows Vista and Windows 7);
Server 2003 with Microsoft IIS.
14 vironment is an important element in
t the TOE is initialised correctly and protection from tampering.
Encryption – Username and password are always hashed when they are being
stored into the database and during authentication. The local cache (local
instance of the database), which is generated at the client side, is encrypted and
can only be accessed when users successfully identify and authenticate
themselves. The key for encryption is generated using random number
functionality of .NET framework and will be stored at the server side. The key is
zeroized at the client side when it has been used for encryption or decryption.
For users who are not connected to the server, upon the first logon by the user
code is generated by the TOE. This code is generated from the local cache
encryption key and the user credential (user ID, password and Organization ID).
The code is stored at the client side in the Windows registry. Only with the
correct credentials can the encryption key be generated back for decrypting the
local cache. 1 code is generated for 1 user.
Management - The TOE contains variou
efficient and secure management of the TOE:
o User management – only Administrato
modify users into the respective organization. Default password will be
given to the users via email and need to be changed upon first logon.
o Changing password – all users can change their password through
client interface. All changing of password is allowed only in online mode
where the client and the server are connected.
o Configuration of Access Control List (ACL) – Ad
ACL, mapping users to applications and database that they are allowed to
access.
The TOE maint
restricted to only those users that need to have access to privileged functions.
The roles maintained by the TOE are: User and Administrator. The functions
above, and indeed, aspects of these functions, are restricted based on these
roles. There is only one administrator for each organization.
Potential consumers of the TOE are advised that some function
not have been evaluated as part of the evaluation. Potential consumers of the TOE
should carefully consider their requirements for using functions and services outside
of the evaluated configuration.
13 Functions and services which a
these IT environment are required to ensure that the TOE perform in its intended
operations, are as follows:
a) An Operating System (M
b) Microsoft .NET Framework Version 4.0;
c) Xilnex Framework Backend consist of:
o Web Server running on Windows
o Database – MySQL version 5.1.
Secure installation of the operational en
ensuring tha
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15 This evaluation was performed at EAL1. Therefore, no assumptions for the TOE were
(Ref [6]).
16 This section describes the configuration of the TOE that is included within the scope
ce gained via evaluation applies specifically to the TOE
in the defined evaluated configuration according to the documented delivery and
odule at the server.
the needs to understand or reprogram any related
1.8
18 There are 2 parts to the TOE. The first part is Cybernate API Version 3.0
lopers to use to build custom application
on top of it.
yer module at Web Bytes (server). It can be
1.6 Assumptions
defined in the ST
1.7 Evaluated Configuration
of the evaluation. The assuran
installation procedures and only by trustworthy staff.
17 The secure setup, installation and configuration of the TOE are based on Section 4 of
the Web Bytes Xilnex Framework Guidance Documentation (Ref [8]). Basically it
covers:
a) Installing and configuring the Deployer module – an executable at the client side
for user to access the subscribed applications and communicating with the
Deployer m
b) Installing and configuring the Cybernate API – a DLL file that provides a set of
functions that enables developers to take advantage of the Cybernate Platform’s
synchronization ability without
synchronization mechanism. It provides necessary data manipulation functions
that can be use by developers as if they are writing a simple database program.
Cybernate API also provides necessary authentication functions in accessing the
local database cache and also authentication for server synchronization.
c) Installing and configuring Xilnex Framework Backend – a system running by Web
Bytes super administrator to configure the TOE and running on IIS as web
services.
Delivery Procedures
(cybernate.dll) which is a DLL file for deve
19 The second part is the Deployer module (xilnex.exe (version 1.0.18.0)) which is an
executable at the client side for users to access the subscribed applications and
communicating with the Deplo
downloaded from http://xilnex.com/Download.aspx.
20 For the Cybernate API, the DLL file and the user guide for developer (Xilnex
Framework SDK - CybernateAPI version 3.0) will be sent to the developers of custom
applications on a CD. The CD is sent via a trusted courier (DHL, Fedex, etc) or in
21
delivery process.
person by the administrators of Web Bytes.
However, for this EAL1 evaluation, TOE Delivery (ALC_DEL) is not included in the
scope of the evaluation. Thus, developer did not provide any documentation on TOE
delivery and the evaluators did not verify any TOE
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22 TOE is used in
accordance with guidance documentation.
mentation is provided by the developer to the end user as
ocumentation (Ref [8])
1.9 Documentation
To ensure secure usage of the product, it is important that the
23 The following docu
guidance to ensure secure installation and operation of the product:
a) Web Bytes Xilnex Framework Guidance D
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2 Evaluation
24 The evaluation was conducted in accordance with the requirements of the Common
Criteria, Version 3.1 Revision 3 (Ref [2]) and the Common Methodology for IT
Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 Revision 3 (Ref [3]). The evaluation was
conducted at Evaluation Assurance Level 1 (EAL1). The evaluation was performed
conformant to the MyCC Scheme Policy (MyCC_P1) (Ref [4]) and MyCC Scheme
Evaluation Facility Manual (MyCC_P3) (Ref [5]).
2.1 Evaluation Analysis Activities
25 The evaluation activities involved a structured evaluation of Xilnex Framework
Version 3.0, including the following components:
2.1.1 Life-cycle support
26 An analysis of the TOE configuration management system and associated
documentation was performed. The evaluators confirmed that the configuration list
which includes the TOE and the evaluation evidence were clearly and uniquely
labelled.
2.1.2 Development
27 The evaluators analysed the TOE functional specification; they determined that the
design completely and accurately describes the TOE security functionality (TSF)
interfaces (TSFIs), and how the TSF implements the security functional requirements
(SFRs).
2.1.3 Guidance documents
28 The evaluators examined the TOE preparative user guidance and operational user
guidance, and determined that it sufficiently and unambiguously described how to
securely transform the TOE into its evaluated configuration, and how to use and
administer the product in order to fulfil the security objectives for the operational
environment. The evaluators examined and tested the preparative and operational
guidance, and determined that they were complete and sufficiently detailed to result
in a secure configuration.
2.1.4 IT Product Testing
29 Testing at EAL1 consists of performing independent function test, and performing
penetration tests. The formal testing was conducted by evaluators from stratsec at
Web Bytes office in Bayan Baru, Pulau Pinang since due to time constraint, stratsec
lab was not able to replicate the TOE development server to stratsec environment.
This approach was taken due to the need to gain access to the development server
of the TOE which is required to conduct the testing. In addition, initial stage for
remote penetration testing was performed from the stratsec test environment in
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Plaza Sentral, Kuala Lumpur. The detailed testing activities, including configurations,
procedures, test cases, expected results and actual results are documented in a
separate Test Plan Reports.
2.1.4.1 Independent Functional Testing
30 At EAL1, independent functional testing is the evaluation conducted by evaluator
based on the information gathered by examining functional and guidance
documentation, and creating test cases to verify the behaviour of the TOE.
31 All testing was planned and documented to a sufficient level of detail to allow
repeatability of the testing procedures and results. The result of the independent
tests developed and performed by the evaluators to verify the TOE functionality are
as follows:
Table 2: Independent Functional Testing
DESCRIPTION SECURITY FUNCTION TSFI RESULT
To test that TOE
performing hashing for
user password using
SHA512 algorithm and
performing encryption and
decryption for user local
cache using RC4 algorithm
with 128 key size.
FCS_COP.1
Cryptographic
Operation (SHA512
and RC4)
User Interface
Database
Interface
PASS. Result as
expected.
To test that TOE generate
cryptographic key for user
local cache using RC4
algorithm with 128 key
size.
FCS_CKM.1
Cryptographic Key
Generation (RC4)
User Interface PASS. Result as
expected.
To test that TOE
performing appropriate
action in destroying the
cryptographic key using
zeroization of keys
method.
FCS_CKM.4
Cryptographic Key
Destruction
User Interface PASS. Result as
expected.
To test that the TSF shall
enforce the Access Control
Policy.
FDP_ACC.1 Subset
access control
User Interface
Database
Interface
Device Interface
PASS. Result as
expected.
To test that the TSF shall FDP_ACF.1 Security User Interface PASS. Result as
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enforce the Access Control
Policy to objects based on
the following:
a) ID of the user
b) Company Unique ID
c) Access Control List
attribute based access
control
Database
Interface
expected.
To test that the TSF shall
detect when 3
unsuccessful
authentication attempts
occur and block the user
usage of the TOE for a
pre-defined time of 10
seconds.
FIA_AFL.1
Authentication failure
handling
User Interface
Database
Interface
PASS. Result as
expected.
To test that the TSF shall
maintain the following list
of security attributes
belonging to individual
users: [user password and
user organization ID].
FIA_ATD.1 User
attribute definition
User Interface
Database
Interface
PASS. Result as
expected.
To test that the TSF shall
require each user to be
successfully authenticated
before allowing any other
TSF-mediated actions on
behalf of that user.
FIA_UAU.2 User
authentication before
any action
User Interface
Database
Interface
PASS. Result as
expected.
The TSF shall require each
user to be successfully
identified before allowing
any other TSF-mediated
actions on behalf of that
user.
FIA_UID.2 User
identification before
any action
User Interface
Database
Interface
PASS. Result as
expected.
To test that the TSF shall
enforce the [Access
Control SFP] to restrict the
FMT_MSA.1
Management of
security attributes
User Interface PASS. Result as
expected.
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ability to [write or delete]
the security attributes [that
map user IDs to user
organization ID and
applications to only the
users that are mapped] to
[the Administrator role].
To test that the TSF shall
enforce the [Access
Control SFP] to provide
[restrictive] default values
for security attributes that
are used to enforce the SFP
and shall allow the [none]
to specify alternative initial
values to override the
default values when an
object or information is
created.
FMT_MSA.3 Static
attribute initialisation
User Interface PASS. Result as
expected.
To test that the TSF shall
be capable of performing
the following management
functions: [
a) mapping user to user
organization ID.
b) creation of users with
default passwords
c) deletion of users
d) changing of passwords
e) management of Access
Control list]
FMT_SMF.1
Specification of
Management Function
User Interface PASS. Result as
expected.
The TSF shall maintain the
roles [User and
Administrator] and shall be
able to associate users
with roles.
FMT_SMR.1 Security
Roles
User Interface PASS. Result as
expected.
To test that the TSF shall
protect TSF data from
FMT_ITT.1 Basic
Internal TSF Data
User Interface
OS Interface
PASS. Result as
expected.
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[disclosure and
modification] when it is
transmitted between
separate parts of the TOE.
Transfer Protection
32 All tests performed by the evaluators produced the expected results and as such the
TOE behaved as expected.
2.1.4.2 Penetration Testing
33 The evaluators performed a vulnerability analysis of the TOE in order to identify
potential vulnerabilities in the TOE. This vulnerability analysis considered public
domain sources and an analysis of guidance documentation, and functional
specification.
34 From the vulnerability analysis, the evaluators conducted penetration testing to
determine that the TOE is resistant to attacks performed by an attacker possessing
Basic attack potential. The following factors have been taken into consideration
during the penetration tests:
a) Time taken to identify and exploit (elapsed time);
b) Specialist technical expertise required (specialist expertise);
c) Knowledge of the TOE design and operation (knowledge of the TOE);
d) Window of opportunity; and
e) IT hardware/software or other equipment required for exploitation.
35 The penetration tests focused on :
a) SQL Injection Attack.
b) Information Disclosure.
36 The results of the penetration testing note that there is no exploitable vulnerability
and/or residual vulnerability found. However, it is important to ensure that the TOE
environment has been correctly configured, patched and hardened.
2.1.4.3 Testing Results
37 Tests conducted for the TOE produced the expected results and demonstrated that
the product behaved as specified in its Security Target and functional specification.
38 Based on the results of penetration testing, the evaluators determined that the TOE
is resistant to an attacker possessing a basic attack potential.
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3 Result of the Evaluation
39 After due consideration during the oversight of the execution of the evaluation by
the certifiers and of the Evaluation Technical Report (Ref [7]), the Malaysian Common
Criteria Certification Body certifies the evaluation of Xilnex Framework performed by
the stratsec Security Evaluation Facility which known as STRATSEF.
40 The STRATSEF found that Xilnex Framework upholds the claims made in the Security
Target (Ref [6]) and supporting documentation, and has met the requirements of the
Common Criteria (CC) assurance level EAL1.
41 Certification is not a guarantee that a TOE is completely free of exploitable
vulnerabilities. There will remain a small level of risk that exploitable vulnerabilities
undiscovered in its claimed security functionality. This risk is reduced as the certified
level of assurance increases for the TOE.
3.1 Assurance Level Information
42 EAL1 provides a basic level of assurance by a limited Security Target and an analysis
of the security functions in that Security Target, using a functional and interface
specification and guidance documentation, to understand the security behaviour.
43 The analysis is supported by a search for potential vulnerabilities in the public
domain and independent testing (functional and penetration) of the TOE security
functions.
44 EAL1 also provides assurance through unique identification of the TOE and of the
relevant evaluation documents.
3.2 Recommendation
45 In addition to ensure secure usage of the product, below are additional
recommendations for Xilnex Framework users:
a) Users and administrators of the TOE should make themselves familiar with the
developer guidance provided with the TOE and pay attention to all security
warnings.
b) Those responsible for administrating the Xilnex Framework Backend must ensure
that the following is maintained for the TOE:
o There is appropriate network layer protection, such as a firewall, that only
permits access through essential ports for external users to access the
web-server.
o The underlying operating system for the database and web-servers are
patched and hardened to protect against known vulnerabilities and
security configuration issues.
o SSL certificates are valid (not revoked or expired), are sourced from a
trusted entity.
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o That algorithm selected for SSL encryption and key lengths are
appropriate for protecting the level of information being transmitted
between the client and the server.
o The servers that host the web and database servers are hosted in a secure
operating facility with restricted physical access and are not installed in
shared hardware.
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Annex A References
A.1 References
[1] Arrangement on the recognition of Common Criteria Certificates in the field of
Information Technology Security, May 2000.
[2] The Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Revision 3, July 2009.
[3] The Common Evaluation Methodology for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, Version 3.1, Revision 3, July 2009.
[4] MyCC Scheme Policy (MyCC_P1), v1a, CyberSecurity Malaysia, December 2009.
[5] MyCC Scheme Evaluation Facility Manual (MyCC_P3), v1, December 2009.
[6] Web Bytes Xilnex Framework Security Target, Version 1.1, 21 November 2011.
[7] Evaluation Technical Report EAL1 Evaluation of Xilnex Framework, Version 1.4, 18
January 2012.
[8] Web Bytes Xilnex Framework Guidance Documentation, version 1.0, 19 January 2011.
A.2 Terminology
A.2.1 Acronyms
Table 3: List of Acronyms
Acronym Expanded Term
CB Certification Body
CC Common Criteria (ISO/IEC15408)
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CEM Common Evaluation Methodology (ISO/IEC 18045)
IEC International Electrotechnical Commission
ISO International Organisation for Standardization
ISCB Information Security Certification Body
MyCB Malaysian Common Criteria Certification Body
MyCC Malaysian Common Criteria Evaluation and Certification
Scheme
MyCPR MyCC Scheme Certified Products Register
MySEF Malaysian Security Evaluation Facility
PP Protection Profile
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Acronym Expanded Term
SFP Security Function Policy
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Function
A.2.2 Glossary of Terms
Table 4: Glossary of Terms
Term Definition and Source
Certificate The official representation from the CB of the certification of
a specific version of a product to the Common Criteria.
Certification Body An organisation responsible for carrying out certification and
for overseeing the day-today operation of an Evaluation and
Certification Scheme. Source CCRA
Certifier The certifier responsible for managing a specific certification
task.
Consumer The organisation that uses the certified product within their
infrastructure.
Developer The organisation that develops the product submitted for CC
evaluation and certification.
Evaluation The assessment of an IT product, IT system, or any other
valid target as defined by the scheme, proposed by an
applicant against the standards covered by the scope defined
in its application against the certification criteria specified in
the rules of the scheme. Source CCRA and MS ISO/IEC Guide
65.
Evaluation and Certification
Scheme
The systematic organisation of the functions of evaluation
and certification under the authority of a certification body
in order to ensure that high standards of competence and
impartiality are maintained and that consistency is achieved.
Source CCRA.
Evaluator The evaluator responsible for managing the technical aspects
of a specific evaluation task.
Interpretation Expert technical judgement, when required, regarding the
meaning or method of application of any technical aspect of
the criteria or the methodology.
Local Cache A local instance of the database at the client’s machine.
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Term Definition and Source
Maintenance Certificate The update of a Common Criteria certificate to reflect a
specific version of a product that has been maintained under
the MyCC Scheme.
MyCB Personnel Includes all members of the Certification Subcommittee, the
Scheme Manager, the Senior Certifier, Certifiers and the
Quality Manager.
National Interpretation An interpretation of the CC, CEM or MyCC Scheme rules that
is applicable within the MyCC Scheme only.
Security Evaluation Facility An organisation (or business unit of an organisation) that
conducts ICT security evaluation of products and systems
using the CC and CEM in accordance with Evaluation and
Certification Scheme policy
Sponsor The organisation that submits a product for evaluation and
certification under the MyCC Scheme. The sponsor may also
be the developer.
SSL Secure Sockets Layer (SSL), a protocol developed by Netscape
for transmitting private documents via the Internet. SSL uses
a cryptographic system that uses two keys to encrypt data – a
public key known to everyone and a private or secret key
known only to the recipient of the message.
TSF data Data created by and for the TOE, which might affect the
operation of the TOE.
TSP TOE Security Policy, a set of rules that regulate how assets are
managed, protected and distributed.
User It means any entity (human user or external IT entity) outside
the TOE that interacts with the TOE. In this case, users of the
TOE are developers who will build custom application to run
over the TOE and users of the custom applications.
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