VMware, Inc.
VMware®
vSphere 5.0
Security Target
Evaluation Assurance Level: EAL4+
Document Version: 0.7
Prepared for: Prepared by:
VMware, Inc. Corsec Security, Inc.
3401 Hillview Ave
Palo Alto, CA 94304
United States of America
13135 Lee Jackson Memorial Highway, Suite 220
Fairfax, VA 22033
United States of America
Phone: +1 650 475 5000 Phone: +1 703 267 6050
http://www.vmware.com http://www.corsec.com
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Table of Contents
1 INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................................4
1.1 PURPOSE................................................................................................................................................................4
1.2 SECURITY TARGET AND TOE REFERENCES......................................................................................................4
1.3 PRODUCT OVERVIEW..........................................................................................................................................4
1.4 TOE OVERVIEW...................................................................................................................................................8
1.4.1 Brief Description of the Components of the TOE........................................................................................9
1.4.2 TOE Environment................................................................................................................................................11
1.5 TOE DESCRIPTION............................................................................................................................................11
1.5.1 Physical Scope.......................................................................................................................................................12
1.5.2 Logical Scope ........................................................................................................................................................13
1.5.3 Product Physical/Logical Features and Functionality not included in the TOE.................................17
2 CONFORMANCE CLAIMS ..................................................................................................18
3 SECURITY PROBLEM ..........................................................................................................19
3.1 THREATS TO SECURITY......................................................................................................................................19
3.2 ORGANIZATIONAL SECURITY POLICIES ..........................................................................................................20
3.3 ASSUMPTIONS.....................................................................................................................................................20
4 SECURITY OBJECTIVES......................................................................................................21
4.1 SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE TOE..............................................................................................................21
4.2 SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT..................................................................22
4.2.1 IT Security Objectives.........................................................................................................................................22
4.2.2 Non-IT Security Objectives ...............................................................................................................................22
5 EXTENDED COMPONENTS ..............................................................................................23
5.1 EXTENDED TOE SECURITY FUNCTIONAL COMPONENTS...........................................................................23
5.1.1 Class FAU: Security Audit..................................................................................................................................24
5.1.2 Class FIA: Identification and authentication................................................................................................26
5.1.3 Class EXT_VDS: Virtual machine domain separation.............................................................................27
5.2 EXTENDED TOE SECURITY ASSURANCE COMPONENTS..............................................................................28
6 SECURITY REQUIREMENTS ..............................................................................................29
6.1 CONVENTIONS...................................................................................................................................................29
6.2 SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS ........................................................................................................29
6.2.1 Class FAU: Security Audit..................................................................................................................................31
6.2.2 Class FCS: Cryptographic Support .................................................................................................................33
6.2.3 Class FDP: User Data Protection....................................................................................................................34
6.2.4 Class FIA: Identification and Authentication................................................................................................35
6.2.5 Class FMT: Security Management.................................................................................................................36
6.2.6 Class FPT: Protection of the TSF.....................................................................................................................39
6.2.7 Class FTA: TOE Access ......................................................................................................................................39
6.2.8 Class EXT_VDS: Virtual Machine Domain Separation...........................................................................39
6.3 SECURITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS...........................................................................................................40
7 TOE SUMMARY SPECIFICATION .....................................................................................41
7.1 TOE SECURITY FUNCTIONS.............................................................................................................................41
7.1.1 Security Audit........................................................................................................................................................42
7.1.2 Alarm generation.................................................................................................................................................42
7.1.3 Cryptographic Support.......................................................................................................................................43
7.1.4 User Data Protection..........................................................................................................................................43
7.1.5 Identification and Authentication....................................................................................................................44
7.1.6 Security Management........................................................................................................................................45
7.1.7 Protection of the TOE Security Functions....................................................................................................46
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7.1.8 Virtual Machine Domain Separation ............................................................................................................46
7.1.9 TOE Access............................................................................................................................................................47
8 RATIONALE..........................................................................................................................48
8.1 CONFORMANCE CLAIMS RATIONALE.............................................................................................................48
8.2 SECURITY OBJECTIVES RATIONALE..................................................................................................................48
8.2.1 Security Objectives Rationale Relating to Threats ....................................................................................48
8.2.2 Security Objectives Rationale Relating to Policies .....................................................................................51
8.2.3 Security Objectives Rationale Relating to Assumptions...........................................................................51
8.3 RATIONALE FOR EXTENDED SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS ......................................................51
8.4 RATIONALE FOR EXTENDED TOE SECURITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS...............................................52
8.5 SECURITY REQUIREMENTS RATIONALE ...........................................................................................................53
8.5.1 Rationale for Security Functional Requirements of the TOE Objectives............................................53
8.5.2 Security Assurance Requirements Rationale...............................................................................................55
8.5.3 Dependency Rationale.......................................................................................................................................56
9 ACRONYMS AND TERMS...................................................................................................58
Table of Figures
FIGURE 1 – SAMPLE DEPLOYMENT CONFIGURATION OF THE TOE...................................................................................8
FIGURE 2 – PHYSICAL TOE BOUNDARY............................................................................................................................. 12
FIGURE 3 – EXT_FAU_ARP SYSTEM EVENT AUTOMATIC RESPONSE FAMILY DECOMPOSITION ................................ 24
FIGURE 4 – EXT_FAU_STG EXTERNAL AUDIT TRAIL STORAGE.................................................................................... 25
FIGURE 5 – EXT_FIA_VC_LOGIN VCENTER SERVER USER LOGIN REQUEST FAMILY DECOMPOSITION................. 26
FIGURE 6 – EXT_VDS_VMM: ESXI VIRTUAL MACHINE DOMAIN SEPARATION FAMILY DECOMPOSITION............... 27
List of Tables
TABLE 1 – ST AND TOE REFERENCES....................................................................................................................................4
TABLE 2 – COMPONENTS OF THE TOE.............................................................................................................................. 13
TABLE 3 – CC AND PP CONFORMANCE............................................................................................................................ 18
TABLE 4 – THREATS ............................................................................................................................................................... 19
TABLE 5 – ASSUMPTIONS ...................................................................................................................................................... 20
TABLE 6 – SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE TOE............................................................................................................... 21
TABLE 7 – IT SECURITY OBJECTIVES.................................................................................................................................... 22
TABLE 8 – NON-IT SECURITY OBJECTIVES......................................................................................................................... 22
TABLE 9 – EXTENDED TOE SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS ........................................................................... 23
TABLE 10 – TOE SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS ............................................................................................. 29
TABLE 11 – AUDITABLE EVENTS ON THE ESXI .................................................................................................................. 31
TABLE 12 – CRYPTOGRAPHIC OPERATIONS ...................................................................................................................... 33
TABLE 13 – MANAGEMENT OF TSF DATA ......................................................................................................................... 36
TABLE 14 – ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS............................................................................................................................ 40
TABLE 15 – MAPPING OF TOE SECURITY FUNCTIONS TO SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS........................ 41
TABLE 16 – AUDIT RECORD CONTENTS............................................................................................................................ 42
TABLE 17 – THREATS:OBJECTIVES MAPPING...................................................................................................................... 48
TABLE 18 – ASSUMPTIONS:OBJECTIVES MAPPING ............................................................................................................. 51
TABLE 19 – OBJECTIVES:SFRS MAPPING ............................................................................................................................. 53
TABLE 20 – FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS DEPENDENCIES.............................................................................................. 56
TABLE 21 – ACRONYMS ........................................................................................................................................................ 58
TABLE 22 – VMWARE VSPHERE 5.0 TERMS......................................................................................................................... 60
TABLE 23 – DOCUMENTATION REFERENCES ..................................................................................................................... 60
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1 Introduction
This section identifies the Security Target (ST), Target of Evaluation (TOE), and the ST organization. The
Target of Evaluation is the VMware®
vSphere 5.0, and will hereafter be referred to as the TOE throughout
this document. The TOE is a software-only system which provides multiple virtual machines (VMs) on
industry standard x86-compatible hardware platforms and performs the management of these virtual
machines.
1.1 Purpose
This ST is divided into nine sections, as follows:
 Introduction (Section 1) – Provides a brief summary of the ST contents and describes the
organization of other sections within this document. It also provides an overview of the TOE
security functions and describes the physical and logical scope for the TOE, as well as the ST and
TOE references.
 Conformance Claims (Section 2) – Provides the identification of any Common Criteria (CC), ST
Protection Profile, and Evaluation Assurance Level (EAL) package claims. It also identifies
whether the ST contains extended security requirements.
 Security Problem (Section 3) – Describes the threats, organizational security policies, and
assumptions that pertain to the TOE and its environment.
 Security Objectives (Section 4) – Identifies the security objectives that are satisfied by the TOE
and its environment.
 Extended Components (Section 5) – Identifies new components (extended Security Functional
Requirements (SFRs) and extended Security Assurance Requirements (SARs)) that are not
included in CC Part 2 or CC Part 3.
 Security Requirements (Section 6) – Presents the SFRs and SARs met by the TOE.
 TOE Summary Specification (Section 7) – Describes the security functions provided by the TOE
that satisfy the security functional requirements and objectives.
 Rationale (Section 8) - Presents the rationale for the security objectives, requirements, and SFR
dependencies as to their consistency, completeness, and suitability.
 Acronyms and Terms (Section 9) – Defines the acronyms and terminology used within this ST.
1.2 Security Target and TOE References
Table 1 – ST and TOE References
ST Title VMware, Inc. VMware®
vSphere 5.0 Security Target
ST Version Version 0.7
ST Author Corsec Security Inc.VMWare
ST Publication Date 2012/04/19
TOE Reference VMware®
vSphere 5.0
1.3 Product Overview
The Product Overview provides a high-level description of the product that is the subject of the evaluation.
The following section, TOE Overview, will provide the introduction to the parts of the overall product
offering that are specifically being evaluated.
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VMware, Inc. specializes in virtualization software. Specifically, VMware offers its virtualization solution
which runs on industry standard x86-compatible hardware platforms. The basic concept of virtualization
technology is that a single physical hardware system is used to host multiple logical or “virtual” machines
(VMs). A host computer runs a layer of software called “hypervisor” that enables the system
administrators to create virtual machines on which the guest operating system can be installed. In
VMware’s virtualization solution, the following components are the essential building blocks that make up
the virtualized computing environment:
 A host machine – an x86 compatible hardware.
 Hypervisor (ESXi) – Enterprise class virtualization software from VMware that is installed on the
host. The ESXi software provides and manages the virtual machines on the host.
 The virtual machines themselves, on the host machine.
 The guest operating system that is installed on the virtual machine.
The four components described above make a very basic virtualized computing environment. That is, a
single ESXi provides the environment for one or more virtual machines. In a typical enterprise-level
deployment, the virtualized computing environment has multiple physical hypervisor (ESXi) hosts running
many virtual machines. To effectively manage this type of environment, VMware offers the following
software products:
 vCenter Server – A software service that provides centralized administration for connected ESXi
hosts. The vCenter Server directs actions on the virtual machines and the virtual machine hosts
(the ESXi hosts).
 VMware Update Manager (VUM) – A software service that is used to apply patches and updates
across ESXi hosts and all managed virtual machines.
 vSphere Client – This is the primary interface for creating, managing, and monitoring virtual
machines, their resources, and their host (ESXi). It is also the primary interface to monitor,
manage, and control the vCenter Server. The vSphere Client is installed on a Windows machine
and is used to connect to an ESXi host or vCenter Server.
 vSphere Web Client – The vSphere Web Client is a web based client through which the end-user
can perform virtual machine configuration and obtain console access to virtual machines. Similar
to the vSphere Client, vSphere Web Client works directly with a vCenter Server to manage ESXi
under vCenter Server Management. The vSphere Web Client is a new web based interface that
provides a subset of the management functionality as the vSphere Client.
 vCenter Syslog Collector - The vCenter Syslog Collector is a vCenter Support Tool that provides
for centralized logging management of the ESXi hosts. The vCenter Syslog Collector provides a
unified architecture for system logging and enables network logging and combining of logs from
multiple hosts.
The relationship between the vCenter Server and the hypervisor (ESXi) hosts is a one to many relationship:
A single vCenter Server managing a multiple number of ESXi hosts, and all the virtual machines that reside
on those hosts. Also, it should be noted that while it is possible to install and run the vCenter Server and
VUM on the same physical machine, they are installed and run on different machines, in most cases.
The use of the vCenter Server in managing the hypervisor (ESXi) also allows the following system
management services:
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 VMware Data Recovery – provides simple, cost effective, agentless backup and recovery for
virtual machines.
 VMware Distributed Resource Scheduler (DRS) – monitors available resources and intelligently
allocates resources among VMs based on a pre-defined set of rules..
 VMware Fault Tolerance – configures two VMs in parallel to provide continuous availability,
without any data loss or downtime, to any application, in the event of hardware failures.
 VMware HA1
– enables automatic restart of virtual machines on a different physical server within a
cluster with spare capacity, if the hosting server fails.
 VMware Hot Add – enables CPU and memory to be added to virtual machines when needed
without disruption or downtime.
 VMware Host Profiles – standardizes and automates configuration of the hypervisor (ESXi) hosts
by capturing a reference host configuration and ensuring compliance for resource, networking,
storage and security settings.
 VMware vCenter Linked Mode – enables joining multiple vCenter Server systems with replicated
roles, permissions, and licenses along with search capabilities across all linked vCenter Server
inventories. When a vCenter Server is connected to other vCenter Server systems using Linked
Mode, the user can connect to that vCenter Server system and view and manage the inventories of
all the vCenter Server systems that are linked. Linked Mode uses Microsoft Active Directory
Lightweight Directory Services (AD LDS)2
to store and synchronize data across multiple vCenter
Server systems. ADAM is installed automatically as part of vCenter Server installation. Each AD
LDS instance stores a portion of the data from all of the vCenter Server systems in the group,
including information about user accounts, roles, and licenses. This information is regularly
replicated across all of the AD LDS instances in the connected group to keep them in sync. The
remainder of the information is accessed directly from each vCenter Server instance without having
to connect to each individual vCenter Server in a Linked Mode configuration. This is mostly VM
and Host information data.
 VMware VMotion – enables the migration of a running VM from one host to the other with zero
down time. VMotion is capable of migrating virtual machines between:
o One ESX host and another ESX host
o An ESX host and an ESXi host (and vice versa)
 VMware vStorage Thin Provisioning – provides dynamic allocation of storage capacity and thereby
reduces storage consumption.
 VMware vNetwork Distributed Switch – provides a network switch which spans many host
enabling simplified on-going administration and control of virtual machine networking across
hosts. It also enables third party distributed virtual switches such as the Cisco Nexus 1000v to be
used in VMware's virtual networking environment.
 Stateless ESXi – provides central storage and management of ESXi images and host profiles for
rapid deployment to hosts without local storage. Upon host startup, a pre-determined ESXi
software image and configuration profile is network loaded and configured.
1
HA – High Availability
2
In previous versions of Windows, AD LDS was Microsoft Active Directory Application Mode (ADAM).
In Windows Server 2008, ADAM has been renamed AD LDS.
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 Client USB3
– simplifies connecting the VMs to USB devices on the ESXi host machine. This also
allows USB smartcards to connect to VMs.
 vSphere Management Assistant (vMA) – A preconfigured software virtual appliance that is used
to run scripts and agents to assist with managing ESXi and vCenter Server systems. In addition it
provides a vSphere CLI (vCLI) for management.
The vCenter Server 5.0, vSphere Client 5.0, VUM 5.0, together with ESXi 5.0 are the major components of
a virtualization suite offered by VMware, Inc. called VMware vSphere 5.0.
Components of the VMware vSphere 5.0 virtualization suite are backwards compatible with properly
licensed components of previous VMware virtualization suites; VMware vSphere 4.x and VMware Virtual
Infrastructure 3.x (VI3). Prior virtualization suite management components are not forward compatible
with vSphere 5.0 suite components; however, vSphere 5.0 can directly manage 4.x and 3.x suite
components. Backwards compatibility includes VMware vSphere 5.0 management of ESX and ESXi hosts
from VMware vSphere 4.x and VMware VI3 virtualization suites.
The minimum hardware and software requirements for the major components of the VMware vSphere 5.0
are located at the following web page:
 http://www.vmware.com/resources/compatibility/search.php?action=base&deviceCategory=server
It should be noted, as indicated in Figure 1 below, the hardware and software requirements for VMware
vSphere 5.0 are outside the scope of evaluation, and are considered to be part of the IT environment.
Supported AMD and Intel 64 bit processors for the ESXi 5.0 host are described on VMware's Hardware
Compatibility List (HCL). For the most recent listing of certified systems, storage and Input/Output (I/O)
devices for the VMware ESXi, see the following web page:.
 http://www.vmware.com/resources/compatibility/search.php
3
USB – Universal Serial Bus
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1.4 TOE Overview
The TOE Overview summarizes the usage and major security features of the TOE. The TOE Overview
provides a context for the TOE evaluation by identifying the TOE type, describing the product, and
defining the specific evaluated configuration.
The TOE is a system that can provides an environment for multiple virtual machines on industry standard
x86-compatible hardware platforms (64-bit) and allows the management of these virtual machines. Figure
1 shows a sample deployment configuration of the TOE:
Figure 1 – Sample Deployment Configuration of the TOE
The acronym(s) appearing in Figure 1 and not previously defined are:
 OS – Operating System
The sample deployment of the TOE shown in Figure 1 is composed of a single instance of each major TOE
component. These are ESXi, vCenter Server for Windows, vCenter Server Virtual Appliance, VUM,
vSphere Client and vSphere Web Client. In the sample deployment of the TOE, the vCenter Server and the
VUM are installed and run on the same Windows machine.
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1.4.1 Brief Description of the Components of the TOE
The following paragraphs provide a brief description of the components of the TOE.
1.4.1.1 vCenter Server
The vCenter Server provides centralized management of ESXi and is distributed as s service for Windows-
and as a pre-package Virtual Appliance (VA). Through the vCenter Server, an administrator can configure
an ESXi, which includes viewing and managing the networking, data storage, security settings, user
privileges and various object permissions. The vCenter Server also allows the provisioning of virtual
machines on the ESXi. For example, virtual machines can be created, configured, cloned, and relocated.
The vCenter Server communicates with ESXi via the vCenter Server Agent (VPXA) located on the ESXi
host. The confidentiality and integrity of this communication is protected using the Secure Sockets Layer
(SSL) protocol and certificates which are system-generated or provided by the end-user. The vCenter
Server’s SSL implementation uses algorithms that are Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program
(CAVP) validated against FIPS4
requirements.
1.4.1.1.1 vCenter Server Access Methods
The vCenter Server can be accessed by users via two different methods: by using the standalone vSphere
Client software or, by using the vSphere Web Client via a web browser.
1.4.1.1.1.1 vSphere Client
Users connect to the vCenter Server via the vSphere Client either locally (on the same machine as the
vCenter Server) or remotely, from a workstation running the vSphere Client software. In addition, the
vSphere Client is used to manage ESXi hosts well as VMs. Communication with the vSphere Client is
protected using SSL.
1.4.1.1.1.2 vSphere Web Client
Users connect to the vCenter Server via the vSphere Web Client through a web browser. The vSphere Web
Client interface is a Java-based web application plugin using standard OSGI5
format. The vSphere Web
Client provides a subset of the functionality provided by the vSphere Client. In addition, the vSphere Web
Client is used to manage ESXi hosts well as VMs. Communication between the vSphere Web Client and
another VMware component is protected using Secure HyperText Transfer Protocol (HTTPS), as shown in
Figure 2.
1.4.1.1.2 vCenter Server Database
The vCenter Server Database contains information about the configuration and status of all ESXi hosts
under management and each of the host’s virtual machines. It also stores management information for the
ESXi host, including the following:
 Scheduled tasks: a list of activities and a means to schedule them.
 Alarms: a means to create and modify a set of alarms that apply to an organizational structure and
contain a triggering event and notification information.
 Events: a list of all the events that occur in the vCenter Server environment. Audit data are stored
as events.
 Permissions: a set of user and vCenter Server object permissions.
4
FIPS – Federal Information Processing Standard
5
OSGI - Open Services Gateway Initiative Alliance is an open standards organization founded in March
1999 that originally specified and continues to maintain the OSGI standard.
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1.4.1.2 VMware Update Manager
The VMware Update Manager (VUM) provides automated patch management for the ESXi hosts and its
Virtual Machines. VUM scans the state of the ESXi host, and compares it against a default baseline, or
against a custom dynamic or defined static baseline set by the administrator. It then invokes the update and
patching mechanism of ESXi to enforce compliance to mandated patch standards. VUM is also able to
automatically patch and update the select Guest Operating Systems being run as Virtual Machines.
However, guest operating systems are not part of this TOE and as such the patching of those operating
systems is outside the scope of this evaluation.
After performing a scan against the ESXi host, VUM accesses VMware’s website and downloads a key and
other metadata about the patches via HTTPS. It then sends the key to an ISP6
server, which accesses the
appropriate server to retrieve updates. VUM then downloads the patches to be installed on the TOE via
HTTP7
, and uses a certificate to verify the signature on the downloaded binary, thereby validating the
binaries authenticity and integrity. VUM stores the binary locally on the vCenter Server machine. Once
instructed by VUM, ESXi then pulls the appropriate updates and patches from VUM’s database via HTTP,
using a key and signature to verify the downloaded binaries.
1.4.1.3 ESXi
ESXi is a user-installable or OEM-embedded virtualization layer that runs directly on industry standard
x86-compatible hardware, providing an environment where multiple virtual machines can be hosted on one
physical server. Virtual machines are the containers in which guest operating systems run. By design, all
VMware virtual machines are isolated from one another. Virtual machine isolation is imperceptible to the
guest operating system. Even a user with System Administrator privileges on a virtual machine’s guest
operating system cannot breach this layer of isolation to access another virtual machine. This isolation
enables multiple virtual machines to run securely while sharing hardware and ensures both their ability to
access hardware and their uninterrupted performance.
The virtual Symmetric Multi-Processing (vSMP) feature enables a single virtual machine to use multiple
physical processor cores simultaneously. The number of virtual processors is configurable for each virtual
machine.
ESXi also provides a robust virtualized networking mechanism known as "VMware virtual networking".
In the VMware virtual networking scheme, ESXi virtualizes the physical network to which it is connected
and thus provides virtual switches called "vSwitches" to VMs. This allows properly configured virtual
machines to connect to and communicate via the physical network as if they were directly connected to it.
A vSwitch works like a physical Ethernet switch. It detects which virtual machines and physical network
interfaces are logically connected to each of its virtual ports and uses that information to forward traffic to
the correct destination. The vSwitch is implemented entirely in software as part of ESXi. ESXi vSwitches
also implement VLANs8
, which are an IEEE9
standard networking scheme with specific tagging methods
that allow routing of packets to only those ports that are part of the VLAN. The VLAN implementation in
ESXi allows the protection of a set of virtual machines from accidental or malicious intrusions.
In addition to offering the vSwitch capability, ESXi 5.0 also provides an additional choice for VMware
virtual networking with the vNetwork Distributed Switch (vDS). Whereas the vSwitch, also known as the
Standard Switch in VMware virtual networking, is implemented on a single ESXi host, the vDS spans
multiple ESXi hosts. In other words, the vSwitch is used to build virtual networks of virtual machines
residing on a single ESXi host, whereas the vDS is used to build virtual networks of virtual machines that
6
ISP – Internet Service Provider; this ISP provides access to patch and update download servers.
7
HTTP – HyperText Transport Protocol
8
VLAN – Virtual Local Area Network
9
IEEE – Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers
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can exist across multiple ESXi hosts. Therefore, the vDS greatly simplifies the task of network
configuration when migrating virtual machines from one ESXi host to another ESXi host, using VMotion.
It should be noted that the implementation of VLAN, Private VLAN (PVLAN), attaching virtual machines
on a vSwitch on a single ESXi host, attaching virtual machines on a vDS across multiple ESXi hosts, and
interfacing with third party switch products is possible because the ESXi ensures that network traffic
traversing a vSwitch or vDS is only delivered to the intended virtual machines and physical interfaces.
With the vDS feature of VMware virtual networking, ESXi 5.0 can implement a PVLAN. PVLANs enable
users to restrict communication between virtual machines on the same VLAN or network segment,
significantly reducing the number of subnets needed for certain network configurations. It should also be
noted that VMware's vNetwork Distributed Switch is able to interface with third party switch products such
as a Cisco Nexus 1000V Series Switch.
ESXi uses a custom mini-HTTP server to support the ESXi landing page which provides a network
location to download the vSphere Client, browse the ESXi host’s VM inventory and objects managed by
the ESXi host, and links to download remote management tools and user documentation. The
confidentiality and integrity of this communication, and communication with a client web browser and the
ESXi mini-HTTP server is protected using SSL. ESXi has a standard SSH interface which SSH clients can
connect to execute command line functions. In addition to the vSphere Client there is another remote
management interface to the ESXi host, called vSphere Command Line Interface (vCLI) client. The
confidentiality and integrity of the communication between the ESXi host and the vCLI client is also
protected using SSL.
ESXi can also be accessed using a local console that is directly attached to the ESXi host. Only root users
or the users with system administrator role can access the ESXi host this way. The ESXi host provides the
Direct Console User Interface (DCUI), which is a BIOS10
-like, menu-driven user interface that is displayed
only on the local console of an ESXi host. The DCUI is used for the initial configuration, viewing logs,
restarting services and agents, lockdown mode11
configuration, restarting server and resetting system
defaults.
1.4.1.3.1 vCenter Server Agent
The vCenter Server Agent forwards requests for services from vCenter Server users, when ESXi is under
the management of a vCenter Server. The ESXi hosts can only be managed by a single vCenter Server.
The requests from the vCenter Server Agents are handled by the ESXi daemon in a manner similar to
requests from users at the vSphere Client or WebClient interfaces.
.
1.4.2 TOE Environment
For information on the TOE Environment see Section 1.3 above.
1.5 TOE Description
This section primarily addresses the physical and logical components of the TOE included in the
evaluation.
10
BIOS – Basic Input Output Signal
11
Lockdown mode – Enabling the lockdown mode disables remote access to the administrator account
after the vCenter Server takes control of the ESXi host. Lockdown mode is only available on ESXi
host.
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1.5.1 Physical Scope
ESXi is a virtualization layer that runs directly on industry standard x86-compatible hardware, providing an
environment where multiple virtual machines can be hosted on one physical server. ESXi abstracts
processor, memory, storage, and networking resources to create virtual machines which can run a wide
variety of different operating systems. Each virtual machine acts as a physically separated guest and only
communicates with other virtual machines using standard networking protocols.
The vCenter Server acts as a management console, deploying, monitoring, and managing virtual machines
that are distributed across multiple hosts running the ESXi software. VMware Update Manager handles
updates and patches for the TOE.
Figure 2 illustrates the physical scope and the physical boundary of the overall solution and ties together all
of the components of the TOE and the constituents of the TOE Environment. The TOE is software only
and the TOE Components are specified in Figure 2 below.
Figure 2 – Physical TOE Boundary
The acronym(s) appearing in Figure 2 and not previously defined are:
 DB – Database
 vCLI – vSphere Command Line Interface
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Table 2 below indicates which elements of the product are included in the TOE boundary.
Table 2 – Components of the TOE
Component TOE
TOE
Environment
vCenter Server 5.0 Software 
VMware Update Manager 5.0 Software (on the vCenter Server machine) 
ESXi 5.0 Software 
vSphere Client 5.0 
vSphere Web Client 5.0 
NTP12
Client on vSphere Client 
NTP Client on ESXi host 
NTP Server available to ESXi host and vCenter Server 
ESXi host hardware (processor and adapters) 
Storage Area Network hardware and software to be used with ESXi host 
vCenter Server Hardware, operating system, and database. 
vSphere Client hardware and operating system 
vSphere Web Client hardware and operating system 
Operating systems and applications running in VMs 
Hardware, OS, and software (as identified in the previous sections) for remote
workstations 
1.5.1.1 Guidance Documentation
The following guides are required reading and part of the TOE:
 vSphere Availability Guide ESXi 5.0, ESXi 5.0, vCenter Server 5.0
 vSphere Datacenter Administration Guide ESXi 5.0, ESXi 5.0, vCenter Server 5.0
 ESXi Configuration Guide ESXi 5.0, vCenter Server 5.0
 Fibre Channel SAN Configuration Guide ESXi 5.0, ESXi 5.0, vCenter Server 5.0
 Getting Started with ESXi Installable ESXi 5.0 Installable, vCenter Server 5.0
 Getting Started with ESXi Embedded ESXi 5.0 Embedded and vCenter Server 5.0
 Introduction to VMware vSphere ESXi 5.0, ESXi 5.0, vCenter Server 5.0
 iSCSI13
SAN Configuration Guide ESXi 5.0, ESXi 5.0, vCenter 5.0
 vSphere Resource Management Guide ESXi 5.0, ESXi 5.0, vCenter Server 5.0
 Setup for Failover Clustering and Microsoft Cluster Service ESXi 5.0, ESXi 5.0, vCenter Server
5.0
 vSphere Upgrade Guide ESXi 5.0, ESXi 5.0, vCenter Server 5.0, vSphere Client 5.0
 VMware, Inc. vSphere 5.0 Guidance Documentation Supplement
1.5.2 Logical Scope
The security functional requirements implemented by the TOE are usefully grouped under the following
Security Function Classes:
12
NTP – Network Time Protocol
13
iSCSI – Internet Small Computer System Configuration
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 Security Audit
 Alarm Generation
 Cryptographic Support
 User Data Protection
 Identification and Authentication
 Security Management
 Protection of the TOE Security Functions (TSF)
 Virtual Machine Domain Separation
 TOE Access
1.5.2.1 Security Audit
The auditing security function of the TOE is provided by both the ESXi and the vCenter Server. Audit data
collected by ESXi is stored in a flat file on the ESXi host. Audit data collected by the vCenter Server is
stored as events in the vCenter Server Database. Each audit record generated includes the date and time of
the event, the type of event, the subject identity (if applicable), and the outcome (success or failure) of the
event. The identity of the virtual machine, the scheduled task, or alarm identity is also recorded, if
applicable.
The vCenter Server provides the capability to review vCenter Server generated audit records by reviewing
the event logs stored on the vCenter Server Database. Only a vCenter Server Administrator can view all of
the event logs. Audit events are viewed through the vSphere Client under the event tab for each
organizational object. Audit events are viewed through the vSphere Web Client. ESXi provides the same
capability, using the syslog command to review its audit records which are stored in /var/log/messages.
Reviewing the audit records on ESXi is restricted to the ESXi System Administrator.
The vCenter Syslog Collector provides for centralized logging management of the ESXi hosts. The
vCenter Syslog Collector provides a unified architecture for system logging and enables network logging
and combining of logs from multiple hosts. The vCenter Syslog Collector is deployed on a protected
network so that the data-in-transit when ESXi logs are sent to the vCenter Syslog Collector host are
protected by the IT Environment.
1.5.2.2 Alarm Generation
Alarms are notifications that occur in response to selected events, conditions, and states that occur with
objects managed by the vCenter Server. The vCenter Server is configured with a set of predefined alarms
that monitor clusters, hosts, datacenters, datastores, networks, and virtual machines14
. Each predefined
alarm monitors a specific object and applies it to all objects of that type. For example, by default, the Host
CPU Usage alarm is set automatically on each ESXi host in the inventory and triggers automatically when
any host’s CPU usage reaches the defined CPU value.
If the predefined vCenter Server alarms do not account for the condition, state or the event that needs to be
monitored, the TOE users can define custom alarms. The TOE users use the vSphere Client to create,
modify, and remove alarms or the vSphere Web Client to view and monitor alarms.
1.5.2.3 Cryptographic Support
The TOE protects the confidentiality and integrity of all data as it passes between the remote components
of the TOE, or from the TOE to another trusted IT product. The TOE achieves this by using OpenSSL and
OpenSSH which performs the encryption and the decryption of data that is being passed.
14
Refer to Table 22 for the description of these terms: Clusters, Datacenters, Datastores, Networks, and
Virtual Machines.
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The TOE implements CAVP-validated cryptographic algorithms to handle all cryptographic functions for
the encryption and the decryption of data.
1.5.2.4 User Data Protection
ESXi has the ability for authorized administrators to specify the information flow control security
functional policy used to control the flow of user data across the ports of the device. The Virtual and
Distributed Switch Information Flow Control SFP15
includes the information flow control SFP for both the
virtual switch and distributed switch functionality. A virtual switch, vSwitch,works much like a physical
Ethernet switch. It detects which virtual machines are logically connected to any of its virtual ports and
uses that information to forward traffic to the correct virtual machines on the same host machine. A
vNetwork Distributed Switch functions as a single virtual switch across multiple associated hosts. This
allows virtual machines to maintain consistent network configuration as they migrate between multiple
hosts. The vSwitches and VNetwork Distributed Switches include functionality identical to that of a
hardware Ethernet switch, although the implementation is solely in software: the source and destination
identifiers of network data packets entering the vSwitch/VNetwork Distributed Switch via any of its virtual
interfaces (which can be connected either to physical network interfaces, virtual machine virtual network
interfaces, or other vSwitches/VNetwork Distributed Switches) are analyzed and the packet is delivered
only to the appropriate virtual interface – the vSwitch/VNetwork Distributed Switch will not deliver
packets to unintended virtual interfaces.
1.5.2.5 Identification and Authentication
When a user attempts to log into ESXi, a user name and password are requested before access is given.
These authentication credentials are compared with the authentication credentials stored on the ESXi host
in a shadow file, where the password is hashed using Secure Hash Algorithm-1 (SHA-1). In addition,
ESXi can participate in an Active Directory (AD) infrastructure and can use the credentials provided by
AD for authorization. If the authentication credentials are valid, access to the system is provided, with the
privileges appropriate to the role assigned to that user. If the credentials are not valid, the user is presented
with another chance to provide valid credentials. Failed and successful user login events are captured in
the system logs.
When a user attempts to log into the vCenter Server, the user is presented with a login screen which
requests the vCenter Server’s network name or IP16
address, the user name, and the user password. The
user information is passed to the underlying Windows operating system of the vCenter Server which
verifies the user identity and password. vCenter Server can also participate in an Active Directory
infrastructure and can use the credentials provided by AD for authorization. If the login is valid, the user at
the vSphere Client is presented with the vSphere Client interface denoting a successful login. If the login is
invalid, a message is displayed, and the login window remains available for the user to retry. If the login is
valid, the user at the vSphere Web Client is presented with the vSphere Web Client user interface denoting
a successful login. If the login is invalid, a message is displayed, and the login window remains available
for the user to retry. Failed and successful user login events are captured in the system logs for both the
vSphere Client and the vSphere Web Client.
When VMware Update Manager starts up, it authenticates with vCenter Server. VUM instructs ESXi to
scan for compliance against a pre-defined or custom created baseline and then installs a single image with a
selected group of patches to be applied. ESXi will only call the instructed VUM instance, thereby ensuring
that only the VUM instance that is installed with the TOE will be used to download updates and patches to
the ESXi host. Security Management
The TOE provides a set of commands for administrators to manage the security functions, configuration,
and other features of ESXi. The Security Management function specifies user roles with defined access for
the management of ESXi. The TOE ensures that the ability to modify user privileges on the vCenter Server
15
SFP = Security Function Policy
16
IP: Internet Protocol
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objects is restricted to a vCenter Server Administrator, or to an administrator-defined role explicitly given
the required permissions. The TOE also ensures that the ability to modify permissions of users on ESXi
objects is restricted to system administrators.
Note that for purposes of this ST, Administrative users are considered to be the users of the TOE. VM
users (individuals who access the guest operating system and applications within a virtual machine) are
outside the scope of the TOE and are not discussed any further here.)
1.5.2.6 Security Management
Security management specifies how the ESXi manages several aspects of the TSF including TSF data and
security functions. TSF data includes configuration data of the TOE, audit data, and system data. For a
detailed listing of TSF data managed by the TOE see Table 13 of this ST. The TOE provides authorized
administrators with management consoles as described in section 1.4.1 to easily manage the security
functions and TSF data of the TOE.
VM administrators are administrators of one or more VMs on the ESXi host. VM administrators can access
the VMs by directly logging into the ESXi host or through the vCenter Server via the vpxuser account and
password. When logging in through the vCenter Server, the vCenter Server uses the vpxuser account and
password to gain access to the ESXi host and process the requests on behalf of the VM administrators.
The TOE supports a combination of access control as detailed in Table 13. Users, groups, roles, and
permissions are used to control who is allowed access to the vSphere managed objects and the specific
actions that are allowed. vCenter Server and ESXi hosts determine the level of access for the user based on
the permissions that are assigned to said user. The combination of user name, password, and permissions is
the mechanism by which vCenter Server and ESXi hosts authenticate a user for access and authorize the
user to perform activities.
The servers and hosts maintain lists of authorized users and the permissions assigned to each user.
Privileges define basic individual rights that are required to perform actions and read properties. ESXi
and vCenter Server use sets of privileges or roles to control which users or groups can access particular
vSphere objects.
ESXi and vCenter Server provide a set of pre-established roles and allow for roles to be defined by
administrators. The privileges and roles assigned on an ESXi host are separate from the privileges and
roles assigned on vCenter Server. Only the privileges and roles assigned through the vCenter Server
system are available to administrators managing a host through vCenter Server. Refer to Table 13 for a
detailed listing of operations that are performed per specific data and role.
The vCenter Server supports two categories of roles: vCenter Server Administrator and Administrator
defined roles. The vCenter Server Administrator is implemented by membership in the “administrators”
group of the underlying Windows OS for vCenter Server. Users log in using their username and password,
and are automatically assigned in this role by virtue of their membership in the administrators group. The
vCenter Server Virtual Appliance Administrator is implemented by the root account on POSIX.17
1.5.2.7 Protection of the TSF
The Protection of the TSF function provides the integrity and management of the mechanisms that provide
the TSF. Protection of the TOE from physical tampering is ensured by its environment. It is the
responsibility of the administrator to assure that physical connections made to the TOE remain intact and
unmodified. The TOE protects the confidentiality and integrity of all data as it is transmitted between the
17
vSphere Install Guide, section “Download and Deploy the VMware vCenter Server Appliance”
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remote components of the TOE, or from the TOE to another trusted IT product by using OpenSSL or
OpenSSH as follows:
 HTTP communications between VUM and the ISP Server, and between VUM and the ESXi, are
protected by signature verification.
 Client USB redirect from the USB ports on the host machine to the VMs is secured by OpenSSL.
 HTTPS is used between the vSphere Web Client and the vCenter Server.
 SSH is used to secure the communications between the ESXi host and a SSH Client on the remote
client
 OpenSSL is used to secure communications between the ESXi host and vCLI on the remote client.
 ESXi logs sent to the Syslog Collector host are secured while in transit.
1.5.2.7.1 Virtual Machine Domain Separation
The virtual machine separation security function of the TOE is provided by the ESXi component. The
TOE ensures that each virtual machine is isolated from any other virtual machines co-existing on the ESXi.
This isolation is provided at the virtualization layer of the ESXi. The virtualization layer of the ESXi
ensures that virtual machines are unable to directly interact with other virtual machines yet still allow for
physical resources to be shared among the existing virtual machines.
The ESXi provides an idealized hardware environment and virtualization of underlying physical resources.
Each virtual machine runs its own operating system and applications: they cannot communicate to each
other in unauthorized ways.
1.5.2.8 TOE Access
The TOE Access function enables termination of a user's session after a period of inactivity. The TOE will
lock an interactive session after an authorized administrator-specified time period of user inactivity.
1.5.3 Product Physical/Logical Features and Functionality not
included in the TOE
Each virtual machine can have users who are individuals using a virtual machine’s guest operating system
and applications that reside on the virtualized hardware of the virtual machine that is instantiated on an
ESXi host. These users access the VM via a remote workstation called a Remote Console, using an
Internet Protocol (IP) address associated with the specific virtual machine. The VMs themselves, their
operating systems, applications, and users are outside the scope of the TOE. The claims of the TOE are
relevant to the management, separation, isolation, and protection of the virtual machine structures, and not
of the functionality and actions that take place within a VM, and as such do not address the security issues
within each VM.
The following features of the system were not included in the evaluation.
 Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP), File Transfer Protocol (FTP), Telnet
 The use of any authentication method on ESXi other than the local password database
 VMware Software Development Kit (SDK) tools
 The procfs interface on the ESXi host Service Console
 VMware Scripting Application Programming Interface (API) on the ESXi host
 VMware Consolidated Backup
 Guest OS patch updates via Update Manager
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2 Conformance Claims
This section provides the identification for any CC, Protection Profile (PP), and EAL package conformance
claims. Rationale is provided for any extensions or augmentations to the conformance claims. Rationale for
CC and PP conformance claims can be found in Section 8.1.
Table 3 – CC and PP Conformance
Common Criteria
(CC) Identification
and Conformance
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Revision 3, July 2009; CC Part 2 extended; CC Part 3 conformant; PP claim
(none); Parts 2 and 3 Interpretations from the Interpreted CEM as of
2011/08/23 were reviewed, and no interpretations apply to the claims made in
this ST.
PP Identification None
Evaluation
Assurance Level
EAL4+ augmented with Flaw Remediation (ALC_FLR.2)
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3 Security Problem
This section describes the security aspects of the environment in which the TOE will be used and the
manner in which the TOE is expected to be employed. It provides the statement of the TOE security
environment, which identifies and explains all:
 Known and presumed threats countered by either the TOE or by the security environment
 Organizational security policies with which the TOE must comply
 Assumptions about the secure usage of the TOE, including physical, personnel and connectivity
aspects
3.1 Threats to Security
This section identifies the threats to the IT18
assets against which protection is required by the TOE or by
the security environment. One type of threat agent is individuals who are not authorized to use the TOE.
The threat agents are assumed to:
 have public knowledge of how the TOE operates
 possess a low skill level
 have limited resources to alter TOE configuration settings
 have no physical access to the TOE
 possess a low level of motivation.
Other types of threat agents are:
 a process running on a Virtual Machine that may cause tampering or interference in another VM’s
domain of execution, and
 a process running on a Virtual Machine that may attempt to circumvent the operating mechanism of
the Virtual Networking scheme.
 a process running on a Virtual Machine or an ESXi host that may cause a system malfunction or a
system performance degradation.
The IT assets requiring protection are the virtual machines running on the TOE. Removal, diminution and
mitigation of the threats are through the objectives identified in Section 4 – Security Objectives.
The following threats are applicable:
Table 4 – Threats
Name Description
T.COMINT An unauthorized individual may attempt to compromise the security
of the data collected and produced by the TOE by bypassing a security
mechanism.
T.PRIVIL An unauthorized individual may gain access to the TOE and exploit
system privileges to gain access to TOE security functions and data.
T.VIRTUAL_NETWORK A process running on a virtual machine attempts to deliver traffic to
wrong VM or external entity.
T.VM A process running on one virtual machine might compromise the
security of processes running on other virtual machines.
18
IT – Information Technology
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3.2 Organizational Security Policies
There are no Organization Security Policies.
3.3 Assumptions
This section describes the security aspects of the intended environment for the evaluated TOE. The
operational environment must be managed in accordance with assurance requirement documentation for
delivery, operation, and user guidance. The following specific conditions are required to ensure the security
of the TOE and are assumed to exist in an environment where this TOE is employed.
Table 5 – Assumptions
Name Description
A.NOEVIL Users are non-hostile, appropriately trained, and follow all user
guidance.
A.PHYSCL The ESXi host and the vCenter Server components will be located
within controlled access facilities which will prevent unauthorized
physical access.
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4 Security Objectives
Security objectives are concise, abstract statements of the intended solution to the problem defined by the
security problem definition (see Section 3). The set of security objectives for a TOE form a high-level
solution to the security problem. This high-level solution is divided into two part-wise solutions: the
security objectives for the TOE, and the security objectives for the TOE’s operational environment. This
section identifies the security objectives for the TOE and its supporting environment.
4.1 Security Objectives for the TOE
The specific security objectives for the TOE are as follows:
Table 6 – Security Objectives for the TOE
Name Description
O.ACCESS The TOE must allow authorized users to access only appropriate TOE
functions and data.
O.ADMIN The TOE must include a set of functions that allow efficient
management of its functions and data, ensuring that TOE users with
the appropriate privileges and only those TOE users, may exercise
such control.
O.AUDIT The TOE must gather audit records of actions on the TOE which may
be indicative of misuse.
O.IDAUTH The TOE must be able to identify and authenticate users prior to
allowing access to TOE administrative functions and data.
O.SECURE The TOE must ensure the confidentiality and integrity of all data as it
passes between the remote components of the TOE or from the TOE
to another trusted IT product.
O.VLAN The TOE must ensure that network traffic traversing a vSwitch is only
delivered to virtual machines and physical interfaces that are part of
the intended VLAN.
O.VM The TOE must provide virtual machines with a domain of execution
which is protected from interference and tampering by virtual
machines.
O.VSWITCH The TOE must ensure that network traffic traversing a vSwitch is only
delivered to the intended virtual machines and physical interfaces.
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4.2 Security Objectives for the Operational
Environment
4.2.1 IT Security Objectives
The following IT security objectives are to be satisfied by the environment:
Table 7 – IT Security Objectives
Name Description
OE.IDAUTH The IT Environment will provide reliable verification of the vSphere
Client user credentials.
OE.SEP The TOE environment will protect the TOE from external
interference or tampering.
OE.TIME The TOE environment must provide reliable timestamps to the TOE.
4.2.2 Non-IT Security Objectives
The following non-IT environment security objectives are to be satisfied without imposing technical
requirements on the TOE. That is, they will not require the implementation of functions in the TOE
hardware and/or software. Thus, they will be satisfied largely through application of procedural or
administrative measures.
Table 8 – Non-IT Security Objectives
Name Description
NOE.NOEVIL Users are non-hostile, appropriately trained, and follow all user
guidance.
NOE.PHYSCL The ESXi host and the vCenter Server components will be located
within controlled access facilities which will prevent unauthorized
physical access.
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5 Extended Components
This section defines the extended SFRs and extended SARs met by the TOE. These requirements are
presented following the conventions identified in Section 6.1.
5.1 Extended TOE Security Functional
Components
This section specifies the extended SFRs for the TOE. The extended SFRs are organized by class. Table 9
identifies all extended SFRs implemented by the TOE.
Table 9 – Extended TOE Security Functional Requirements
Name Description
EXT_FAU_ARP.1 System event automatic response
EXT_FAU_STG.1 External audit trail storage
EXT_FIA_VC_LOGIN.1 vCenter Server user login request
EXT_VDS_VMM.1 ESXi virtual machine domain separation
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5.1.1 Class FAU: Security Audit
Families in this class address the requirements for functions to recognize, record, store, and analyze
information related to security relevant activities. The extended family “EXT_FAU_ARP: System event
automatic response” and family “EXT_FAU_STG: External Audit Trail Storage” were modeled after the
CC Part 2 SFRs, FAU_ARP.1 and FAU_STG.1 respectively.
5.1.1.1 Security event automatic response (EXT_FAU_ARP)
Family Behavior
This family defines the response to be taken in case of detected events indicative of a potential system
malfunction or a potential system performance degradation on the ESXi host and its virtual machines.
Component Leveling
EXT_FAU_ARP: System event automatic response 1
Figure 3 – EXT_FAU_ARP System event automatic response family decomposition
EXT_FAU_ARP.1 System event automatic response, defines the behavior of the vCenter Server when it
detects the events indicative of a potential system malfunction or a potential system performance
degradation on the ESXi host and its virtual machines. It was modeled after FAU_ARP.1
Management: EXT_FAU_ARP.1
a) There are no management activities forseen.
Audit: EXT_FAU_ARP.1
a) There are no auditable events foreseen.
EXT_FAU_ARP.1 System event automatic response
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: None
This component will ensure that the TOE users are notified of the events on the ESXi host that may cause a
system malfunction or a system performance degradation on the ESXi host and its virtual machines.
EXT_FAU_ARP.1.1 The vCenter Server shall notify the appropriate TOE users upon detection of a
potential system malfunction or a potential system performance degradation on the ESXi host and its
virtual machines.
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5.1.1.2 External audit trail storage (EXT_FAU_STG)
Family Behavior
This family defines the log storage capabilities of remote backup.
Component Leveling
EXT_FAU_STG: External audit trail storage 1
Figure 4 – EXT_FAU_STG External audit trail storage
EXT_FAU_STG.1 External audit trail storage, defines the behavior of the remote backup when ESXi hosts
send their logs to the vCenter Syslog Collector. It was modeled after FAU_STG.1.
Management: EXT_FAU_STG.1
a) There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit: EXT_FAU_STG.1
a) There are no auditable events forseen.
EXT_FAU_STG.1 External audit trail storage
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: FAU_GEN.1
This component will ensure that the ESXi log files are successfully backed up and stored by the Syslog
Collector.
EXT_FAU_STG.1.1 The TSF shall be able to backup and restore the ESXi log files to a separate
part of the TOE.
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5.1.2 Class FIA: Identification and authentication
Families in this class address the requirements for functions to establish and verify a claimed user identity.
The extended family “EXT_FIA_VC_LOGIN: vCenter Server user login request” was modeled after the
other FIA SFRs.
5.1.2.1 vCenter Server user login request (EXT_FIA_VC_LOGIN)
Family Behavior
This family defines the identification and authentication behavior of the vCenter Server component of the
TOE.
Component Leveling
Figure 5 – EXT_FIA_VC_LOGIN vCenter Server user login request family decomposition
EXT_FIA_VC_LOGIN.1 vCenter Server user login request, defines the behavior of the vCenter Server
component when identifying and authenticating an administrative user. It was modeled after FIA_UAU.1
and FIA_UID.1.
Management: EXT_FIA_VC_LOGIN.1
a) There are no management activities forseen
Audit: EXT_FIA_VC_LOGIN.1
b) There are no auditable events forseen.
EXT_FIA_VC_LOGIN.1 vCenter Server user login request
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: None
This component will provide users the capability to identify and authenticate themselves to the vCenter
Server, via a credential authority stored in the Environment.
EXT_FIA_VC_LOGIN.1.1 The vCenter Server shall request identification and authentication from
the vCenter Server environment for a vCenter Server user, and receive notification of success, prior
to granting any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of the user.
EXT
_FIA_VC_LOGIN: vCenter Server user login request 1
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5.1.3 Class EXT_VDS: Virtual machine domain separation
Virtual machine domain separation functions ensure that virtual machines cannot inappropriately or
unintentionally interact with or tamper with each other. The extended class "EXT_VDS: Virtual machine
domain separation" was modeled after the class FDP.
5.1.3.1 ESXi virtual machine domain separation (EXT_VDS_VMM)
Family Behavior
This family defines the non-interference requirements for VMs that are running simultaneously on an ESXi
host.
Component Leveling
Figure 6 – EXT_VDS_VMM: ESXi Virtual machine domain separation family decomposition
EXT_VDS_VMM.1 ESXi virtual machine domain separation ensures that VMs cannot interfere or tamper
with each other. The extended family “EXT_VDS_VMM: ESXi virtual machine domain separation” was
modeled after the other FDP SFRs.
Management: EXT_VDS_VMM.1
a) There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit: EXT_VDS_VMM.1
a) There are no auditable events forseen.
EXT_VDS_VMM.1 ESXi virtual machine domain separation
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: None
This component will ensure that network traffic is only delivered to the intended recipients(s).
EXT_VDS_VMM.1.1 The TSF shall maintain a security domain for the execution of each virtual
machine that protects the virtual machine from interference and tampering by untrusted subjects or
subjects from outside the scope of the VM.
EXT_VDS_VMM.1.2 The TSF shall enforce separation between the security domains of VMs in the
TSC19
.
19
TSC: TOE Scope of Control
EXT _VDS_VMM: ESXi virtual machine domain separation 1
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5.2 Extended TOE Security Assurance
Components
There are no extended TOE security assurance components.
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6 Security Requirements
This section defines the SFRs and SARs met by the TOE. These requirements are presented following the
conventions identified in Section 6.1.
6.1 Conventions
There are several font variations used within this ST. Selected presentation choices are discussed here to
aid the Security Target reader.
The CC allows for assignment, refinement, selection and iteration operations to be performed on security
functional requirements. All of these operations are used within this ST. These operations are performed as
described in Part 2 of the CC, and are shown as follows:
 Completed assignment statements are identified using [italicized text within brackets].
 Completed selection statements are identified using [underlined italicized text within brackets].
 Refinements are identified using bold text. Any text removed is stricken (Example: TSF Data)
and should be considered as a refinement.
 Extended Functional and Assurance Requirements are identified using “EXT_” at the beginning of
the short name.
 Iterations are identified by appending a letter in parentheses following the component title. For
example, FAU_GEN.1(a) Audit Data Generation would be the first iteration and FAU_GEN.1(b)
Audit Data Generation would be the second iteration.
6.2 Security Functional Requirements
This section specifies the SFRs for the TOE. This section organizes the SFRs by CC class. Table 10
identifies all SFRs implemented by the TOE and indicates the ST operations performed on each
requirement.
Table 10 – TOE Security Functional Requirements
Name Description S A R I
FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation 

FAU_SAR.1 Audit review  
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic Operation  
FDP_IFC.2 Complete information flow control  
FDP_IFF.1 Simple security attributes  
FIA_UAU.2 User authentication before any action   
FIA_UID.2 User identification before any action   
FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes (Virtual and
Distributed Switch Information Flow Control)



FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation 


FMT_MTD.1 Management of TSF data 


FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management function  

FMT_SMR.1(a) Security roles (vCenter Server)  


FMT_SMR.1(b) Security roles (ESXi)  


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Name Description S A R I
FPT_ITC.1 Inter-TSF confidentiality during transmission    
FPT_ITT.1 Basic internal TSF data transfer protection 
  
FTA_SSL.3 TSF-initiated termination  
 
EXT_FAU_ARP.1 System event automatic response    
EXT_FAU_STG.1 External audit trail storage    
EXT_FIA_VC_LOGIN.1 vCenter Server user login request    
EXT_VDS_VMM.1 ESXi virtual machine domain separation    
Note: S=Selection; A=Assignment; R=Refinement; I=Iteration
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6.2.1 Class FAU: Security Audit
EXT_FAU_ARP.1 System event automatic response.
Hierarchical to: No other components.
EXT_FAU_ARP.1.1
The vCenter Server shall notify the appropriate TOE users upon detection of a potential system
malfunction or a potential system performance degradation on the ESXi host and its virtual
machines.
Dependencies: None
FAU_GEN.1 Audit Data Generation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FAU_GEN.1.1
The TSF shall be able to generate an audit record of the following auditable events:
a) Start-up and shutdown of the audit functions;
b) All auditable events, for the [not specified] level of audit; and
c) [The events specified in the “Audit Event” column of Table 11].
FAU_GEN.1.2
The TSF shall record within each audit record at least the following information:
a) Date and time of the event, type of event, subject identity (if applicable), and the outcome
(success or failure) of the event; and
b) For each audit event type, based on the auditable event definitions of the functional
components included in the PP/ST, [the information specified in the “Additional Collected
Information” column of Table 11].
Dependencies: FPT_STM.1 Reliable time stamps
Table 11 – Auditable Events on the ESXi
Audit Event Additional Collected
Information
Startup and shutdown of the Auditing functions <none>
All management operations performed on virtual
machines20
virtual machine
All changes to the configuration of alarms or scheduled
task
The alarm or scheduled task
All use of the identification and authentication mechanisms The user identity if provided
20
This audit event refers to management actions taken by an ESXi or a vCenter Server administrator via the
ESXi or the vCenter Server management interfaces; it does not refer to the VM guest-OS administrator
events which occur within the guest-OS.
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FAU_SAR.1 Audit review
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FAU_SAR.1.1
The TSF shall provide [authorized vCenter Server administrators, system administrators, and VM
administrators] with the capability to read [all audit events in which the authorized administrator
has permission to read] from the audit records.
FAU_SAR.1.2
The TSF shall provide the audit records in a manner suitable for the user to interpret the
information.
Dependencies: FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation
EXT_FAU_STG.1 External audit trail storage.
Hierarchical to: No other components.
EXT_FAU_STG.1.1 The TSF shall be able to backup and restore the ESXi log files to a separate
part of the TOE.
Dependencies: FAU_GEN.1
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6.2.2 Class FCS: Cryptographic Support
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic Operation.
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FCS_COP.1.1
The TSF shall perform [the cryptographic operations listed in the Cryptographic Operations
column of Table 12] in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [the cryptographic
algorithms listed in the Cryptographic Algorithm column of Table 12 ] and cryptographic key
sizes [the cryptographic key sizes listed in the Key Sizes (bits) column of Table 12] that meet the
following: [the list of standards in the Standards (Certificate #) column of Table 12].
Dependencies: None
Table 12 – Cryptographic Operations
Cryptographic
Operations
Cryptographic
Algorithm
Key Sizes (bits) Standards (Certificate #)
Symmetric encryption and
decryption
Triple-DES21
(2-Key)
CBC
128 CAVP (cert #970, 971, 972,
973)
AES22
(128, 256) CBC 128, 256 CAVP (cert #1421, 1422,
1423)
Message Digest SHA-1 N/A23
CAVP (cert #1289, 1290,
1291)
Message Authentication HMAC-SHA-1 128, 160 CAVP (cert #840, 841, 842,
843)
Digital signature verification
of VPXA bundle
RSA digital signature 1024 bit CAVP (cert #696, 697, 698,
699)
Digital signatures for patch
bundles (used by VUM)
RSA digital signature 1024 bit CAVP (cert #696, 697, 698,
699)
21
DES – Data Encryption Standard
22
AES – Advanced Encryption Standard
23
N/A – Not Applicable
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6.2.3 Class FDP: User Data Protection
FDP_IFC.2 Complete information flow control
Hierarchical to: FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control
FDP_IFC.2.1
The TSF shall enforce the [Virtual and Distributed Switch Information Flow Control SFP] on [
a) Subjects: physical network interfaces and VM virtual network interfaces
b) Information: network data packets]
and all operations that cause that information to flow to and from subjects covered by the
SFP.
FDP_IFC.2.2
The TSF shall ensure that all operations that cause any information in the TOE to flow to and from
any subject in the TOE are covered by an information flow control SFP.
Dependencies: FDP_IFF.1 Simple security attributes
FDP_IFF.1 Simple security attributes
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FDP_IFF.1.1
The TSF shall enforce the [Virtual and Distributed Switch Information Flow Control SFP] based
on the following types of subject and information security attributes: [
a) Subjects: physical network interfaces and VM virtual network interfaces
b) Subject security attributes: interface identifier, VLAN identifier (if applicable)
c) Information: network data packets
d) Information security attributes: source identifier, destination identifier].
FDP_IFF.1.2
The TSF shall permit an information flow between a controlled subject and controlled information
via a controlled operation if the following rules hold: [if the data packet originates from a
recognized and authorized physical network interface or VM virtual network interface as
identified by the interface identifier or VLAN identifier (if applicable) which are indicated by the
source identifier as defined in this SFP, and is addressed to a recognized and authorized
destination which is indicated by the destination identifier as defined in this SFP, then allow the
information flow, otherwise deny the information flow].
FDP_IFF.1.3
The TSF shall enforce [no additional information flow control SFP rules].
FDP_IFF.1.4
The TSF shall explicitly authorise an information flow based on [no additional information flow
control SFP rules.]
FDP_IFF.1.5
The TSF shall explicitly deny an information flow based on [no additional information flow
control SFP rules.]
Dependencies: FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation
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6.2.4 Class FIA: Identification and Authentication
FIA_UAU.2 User authentication before any action
Hierarchical to: FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication
FIA_UAU.2.1
The TSF shall require each ESXi and vCenter user to be successfully authenticated before
allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
Dependencies: FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
FIA_UID.2 User identification before any action
Hierarchical to: FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
FIA_UID.2.1
The TSF shall require each ESXi and vCenter user to be successfully identified before allowing
any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
Dependencies: No dependencies
EXT_FIA_VC_LOGIN.1 vCenter user login request
Hierarchical to: No other components.
The vCenter Server shall request identification and authentication from the vCenter Server
environment for a vCenter Server user, and receive notification of success, prior to granting any
other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of the user.
Dependencies: No dependencies
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6.2.5 Class FMT: Security Management
FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes (Virtual and Distributed Switch Information Flow
Control)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FMT_MSA.1.1
The TSF shall enforce the [Virtual and Distributed Switch Information Flow Control SFP] to
restrict the ability to [add, modify, delete] the security attributes [interface identifier, VLAN
identifier] to [System Administrators].
Dependencies: [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialization (Virtual and Distributed Switch Information Flow
Control)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FMT_MSA.3.1
The TSF shall enforce the [Virtual and Distributed Switch Information Flow Control Policy] to
provide [restrictive] default values for security attributes that are used to enforce the Virtual and
Distributed Switch Information Flow Control SFP.
FMT_MSA.3.2
The TSF shall allow the [System Administrators] to specify alternative initial values to override
the default values when a Virtual Switch is created on the ESXi.
Dependencies: FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MTD.1 Management of TSF data
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FMT_MTD.1.1
The TSF shall restrict the ability to [the operations as defined in column ‘Operation’ of Table
13]] the [TSF data as defined in column ‘TSF Data’ of Table 13] to [the authorized identified roles
as defined in column ‘Authorized Role’ of Table 13].
Table 13 – Management of TSF Data
Operation TSF Data Authorized Role
vSphere Client for vCenter
Add, modify, remove Users vCenter Server Administrator
Add, modify, remove Groups vCenter Server Administrator
Add, modify, remove vCenter Server user role vCenter Server Administrator
Create Virtual machine definition vCenter Server Administrator
Edit VM configuration files vCenter Server Administrator
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Operation TSF Data Authorized Role
View, Edit Settings Inventory data for virtual machines vCenter Server Administrator
Select Folders vCenter Server Administrator
View Datacenters vCenter Server Administrator
Select Hosts vCenter Server Administrator
Select Clusters vCenter Server Administrator
Select Resource pools vCenter Server Administrator
Configure Networks vCenter Server Administrator
Select Datastores vCenter Server Administrator
Adding, deleting, or
modifying
Permissions associated with a user or
group
vCenter Server Administrator
Convert Templates vCenter Server Administrator
View, Filter Audit events, audit logs vCenter Server Administrator
Set Alarms vCenter Server Administrator
Create Scheduled tasks vCenter Server Administrator
Create Templates vCenter Server Administrator
Modify Timeout value vCenter Server Administrator
vSphere Client for ESXi
Add, modify, delete User identity System Administrator
Add, modify, delete User group System Administrator
Add, modify, delete ESXi User Role System Administrator
Create, modify, delete,
Power Up
Virtual machine definition VM Administrator
Edit Virtual machine configuration files VM Administrator
Edit ESXi configuration files VM Administrator
View, Sort ESXi audit logs System Administrator or VM
Administrator
Modify Read, write, and execute permissions on
objects
System Administrator or VM
Administrator
View Virtual machine inventory System Administrator or VM
Administrator
Add, modify, delete Object group
VM Administrator: may change
the group of the file to any group
the owner is a member of
System Administrator: may change
the group arbitrarily
Add, modify, delete User identity of object owner System Administrator
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Operation TSF Data Authorized Role
Change password VM Administrator
Change Own password Users
Power Up VM VM Administrator
Modify Timeout value System administrator or VM
administrator
vSphere Command-Line Interface
Add, delete User account VM Administrator
Change password VM Administrator
Dependencies: FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FMT_SMF.1.1
The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions: [the management of
TSF data as stated in FMT_MTD.1, management of security attributes (FMT_MSA.1),
management of audit data (FAU_GEN.1), management of cryptography (FCS_COP.1), and
management of identities and authentication (FIA_UAU.1, FIA_UID.1)].
Dependencies: No Dependencies
FMT_SMR.1 (a) Security roles (vCenter Server)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FMT_SMR.1.1 (a)
The TSF shall maintain the roles for the vCenter Server users [vCenter Server Administrator
and Administrator defined roles].
FMT_SMR.1.2 (a)
The TSF shall be able to associate the vCenter Server users with the above mentioned roles.
Dependencies: FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
FMT_SMR.1(b) Security roles (ESXi)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FMT_SMR.1.1 (b)
The TSF shall maintain the roles for the ESXi users [VM Administrator, System Administrator,
and Users].
FMT_SMR.1.2 (b)
The TSF shall be able to associate the ESXi users with the above mentioned roles.
Dependencies: FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
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6.2.6 Class FPT: Protection of the TSF
FPT_ITC.1 Inter-TSF confidentiality during transmission
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FPT_ITC.1.1
The TSF shall protect all TSF data transmitted from the TSF to another trusted IT product from
unauthorised disclosure during transmission.
Dependencies: No dependencies
FPT_ITT.1 Basic internal TSF data transfer protection
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FPT_ITT.1.1
The TSF shall protect TSF data from [disclosure, modification] when it is transmitted between
separate parts of the TOE.
Dependencies: No dependencies
6.2.7 Class FTA: TOE Access
FTA_SSL.3 TSF-initiated termination
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FTA_SSL.3.1
The TSF Web Client, DCUI and SSH Interface shall terminate an interactive session after a
[authorized administrator specified time period of user inactivity].
Dependencies: No dependencies
6.2.8 Class EXT_VDS: Virtual Machine Domain Separation
EXT_VDS_VMM.1 ESXi virtual machine domain separation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
EXT_VDS_VMM.1.1
The TSF shall maintain a security domain for the execution of each virtual machine that protects
the virtual machine from interference and tampering by untrusted subjects or subjects from outside
the scope of the VM.
EXT_VDS_VMM.1.2
The TSF shall enforce separation between the security domains of VMs that the TOE controls.
Dependencies: No dependencies
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6.3 Security Assurance Requirements
This section defines the assurance requirements for the TOE. Assurance requirements are taken from the
CC Part 3 and are EAL4, augmented with ALC_FLR.2. Table 14 – Assurance Requirements summarizes
the requirements.
Table 14 – Assurance Requirements
Assurance Requirements
Class ALC : Life Cycle Support ALC_CMC.4 Production support, acceptance
procedures and automation
ALC_CMS.4 Problem tracking CM Coverage
ALC_DEL.1 Delivery Procedures
ALC_DVS.1 Identification of security measures
ALC_LCD.1 Developer defined life-cycle model
ALC_TAT.1 Well-defined development tools
ALC_FLR.2 Flaw reporting procedures
Class ADV: Development ADV_ARC.1 Security Architecture Description
ADV_FSP.4 Complete functional specification
ADV_IMP.1 Implementation representation of the TSF
ADV_TDS.3 Basic modular design
Class AGD: Guidance documents AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
Class ATE: Tests ATE_COV.2 Analysis of coverage
ATE_DPT.1 Testing: Basic Design
ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing
ATE_IND.2 Independent testing – sample
Class AVA: Vulnerability assessment AVA_VAN.3 Focused Vulnerability analysis
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7 TOE Summary Specification
This section presents information to detail how the TOE meets the functional requirements described in
previous sections of this ST.
7.1 TOE Security Functions
Each of the security requirements and the associated descriptions correspond to the security functions.
Hence, each function is described by how it specifically satisfies each of its related requirements. This
serves to both describe the security functions and rationalize that the security functions satisfy the
necessary requirements.
Table 15 – Mapping of TOE Security Functions to Security Functional Requirements
TOE Security
Function
SFR ID Description
Alarm Generation EXT_FAU_ARP.1 System event automatic response
Cryptographic Support FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic Operation
Identification and
Authentication
FIA_UAU.2 User authentication before any action
FIA_UID.2 User identification before any action
EXT_FIA_VC_LOGIN.1 vCenter Server user login request
Protection of the TSF FPT_ITC.1 Inter-TSF confidentiality during transmission
FPT_ITT.1 Basic internal TSF data transfer protection
Security Audit FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation
FAU_SAR.1 Audit review
EXT_FAU_STG.1 External audit trail storage
Security Management FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes (Virtual and
Distributed Switch Information Flow Control)
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation
FMT_MTD.1 Management of TSF data
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management function
FMT_SMR.1(a) Security roles (vCenter Server)
FMT_SMR.1(b) Security roles (ESXi)
TOE Access FTA_SSL.3 TSF-initiated termination
User Data Protection FDP_IFC.2 Complete information flow control
FDP_IFF.1 Simple security attributes
Virtual Machine Domain
Separation
EXT_VDS_VMM.1 ESXi virtual machine domain separation
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7.1.1 Security Audit
The auditing security function of the TOE is provided by both the ESXi and vCenter Server. Audit data
collected by the ESXi are stored in a flat file on the ESXi. Audit data collected by the vCenter Server are
stored as events separately on the vCenter Server Database. Centralized storage of audit data for multiple
ESXi hosts are provided by the vCenter Syslog Collector. The TOE audit records contain the following
information:
Table 16 – Audit Record Contents
Field Content
Timestamp Date and time of the event
Class Type of event
Source Subject identity
Event State Outcome
Each audit record generated includes the date and time of the event, type of event, subject identity, and the
outcome (success or failure) of the event, and virtual machine, scheduled task, or alarm identity if
applicable. For invalid identification attempts, the identity of the user name supplied is also recorded.
The vCenter Server audit records are stored as events, and are managed by the vCenter Server Security
Management Functionality. They are stored separate from ESXi audit records on the vCenter Server
Database. The vCenter Server provides the capability to review its audit records by reviewing the event
logs stored on the vCenter Server Database. Event logs are associated with objects, and access to the event
logs is determined by access to the object associated with the event log. Administrators who can access a
particular VM or VM Group can access the event logs for that organizational grouping. Audit events are
viewed through the vSphere Client under the event tab for each organizational object. Likewise, audit
events can be viewed through the vSphere Web Client.
The ESXi audit records are stored in a flat file on the Service Console of the ESXi. The ESXi provides the
capability using the syslog command to review its audit records which are stored in /var/log/messages.
Reviewing the audit records on the ESXi is restricted to the ESXi System Administrator.
vSphere Syslog Collector Assistant is a software tool that is used to backup and restore ESXi logs and
provide separate centralized log storage for one or more ESXi hosts.
TOE Security Functional Requirements Satisfied: FAU_GEN.1, FAU_SAR.1, EXT_FAU_STG.1
7.1.2 Alarm generation
Alarms are notifications that occur in response to selected events, conditions, and states that occur with
objects managed by the vCenter Server. The vCenter Server is configured with a set of predefined alarms
that monitor clusters, hosts, datacenters, datastores, networks, and virtual machines. Each predefined alarm
monitors a specific object and applies to all objects of that type. For example, by default, the Host CPU
Usage alarm is set automatically on each ESXi host in the inventory and triggers automatically when any
host’s CPU usage reaches the defined CPU value.
Alarms are composed of two parts, a trigger and an action:
1. Trigger – A set of conditions that must be met for an alarm warning and alert to occur. Most
triggers consist of a condition value and a length of time that value is true. For example, the pre-
defined virtual machine memory alarm triggers a warning when memory usage is over 75% for
one hour and 90% for five minutes. VMware uses colors to denote alarm severity:
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 Normal – Green
 Warning – Yellow
 Alert – Red
The vCenter Server System Administrator can set alarms to trigger when the state changes from
green to yellow, yellow to red, red to yellow, and yellow to green. Triggers are defined for the
default VMware alarms. The vCenter Server Administrator can change the trigger conditions
(thresholds, warning values, and alert values) for the default alarms.
2. Action – The operation that occurs in response to the trigger. For example, an email notification
can be sent to one or more administrators when an alarm is triggered. The default vCenter Server
alarms are not preconfigured with actions. The vCenter Server Administrator must manually set
what action occurs when the triggering event, condition, or state occurs.
If the predefined vCenter Server alarms do not account for the condition, state, or the event that needs to be
monitored, the TOE users can define custom alarms or modify the pre-defined alarms. The TOE users also
have the option of removing the predefined alarms that are not needed. The TOE users use the vSphere
Client to create, modify, and remove alarms. The vSphere Web Client is used to view and monitor alarms.
TOE Security Functional Requirements Satisfied: EXT_FAU_ARP.1
7.1.3 Cryptographic Support
The TOE protects the confidentiality and integrity of all data as it passes between the remote components
of the TOE, or from the TOE to another trusted IT product. The TOE achieves this by using SSL and SSH
which performs the encryption and the decryption of data that is being passed.
The TOE implements CAVP-validated cryptographic algorithms to handle all cryptographic functions for
the encryption and the decryption of data.
TOE Security Functional Requirements Satisfied: FCS_COP.1
7.1.4 User Data Protection
The TOE enforces the Virtual and Distributed Switch Information Flow Control policy. Within the TOE,
the ESXi implements vSwitches, VNetwork Distributed Switches, and VLANs, all of which are
configurable by authorized administrators.
7.1.4.1 Virtual Switch
A virtual switch, vSwitch, works like a physical Ethernet switch. It detects which virtual machines are
logically connected to each of its virtual ports and uses that information to forward traffic to the correct
virtual machines on the same host machine. When two or more virtual machines are connected to the same
vSwitch, network traffic between them is routed locally. If an uplink adapter is attached to the vSwitch,
then each virtual machine can access the external network that is connected to the adapter.
Each virtual machine on a single host that is configured for networking is logically connected to a vSwitch
by the ESXi. The vSwitch provides functionality identical to that of a hardware Ethernet switch, although
the implementation is solely in software: the source and destination identifiers of network data packets
entering the vSwitch via any of its virtual interfaces (which can be connected either to physical network
interfaces, virtual machine virtual network interfaces, or other vSwitches) are analyzed and the packet is
delivered only to the appropriate virtual interface – the vSwitch will not deliver packets to unintended
virtual interfaces. Administrators can also configure VLANs on a vSwitch. A vSwitch VLAN will create a
virtual network within the vSwitch that allows specified virtual interfaces to communicate only with other
specified virtual interfaces – traffic addressed to or from interfaces that are not part of the VLAN will not
be delivered by the vSwitch.
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7.1.4.2 Distributed Virtual Switch
A vNetwork Distributed Switch functions similarly to a vSwitch. It allows virtual machines across
multiple host machines to be logically connected via the same vNetwork Distributed Switch. Like a
vNetwork Standard Switch, each vNetwork Distributed Switch is a network hub that virtual machines can
use. A vNetwork Distributed Switch can forward traffic between virtual machines located across hosts or
link to an external network by connecting to physical Ethernet adapters, also known as uplink adapters. A
vNetwork Distributed Switch functions as a single virtual switch across all associated hosts. This enables
an authorized administrator to set network configurations that span across all member hosts, and allows
virtual machines to maintain consistent network configuration as they migrate across multiple hosts.
Each virtual machine that is configured for networking is logically connected to a vNetwork Distributed
Switch by the ESXi. The vNetwork Distributed Switch provides functionality identical to that of a
hardware Ethernet switch, although the implementation is solely in software: the source and destination
identifiers of network data packets entering the vNetwork Distributed Switch via any of its virtual
interfaces (which can be connected either to physical network interfaces, virtual machine virtual network
interfaces, or other vNetwork Distributed Switches are analyzed and the packet is delivered only to the
appropriate virtual interface – the vNetwork Distributed Switch will not deliver packets to unintended
virtual interfaces. Administrators can also configure VLANs on vNetwork Distributed Switch. A
vNetwork Distributed Switch VLAN will create a virtual network within the vNetwork Distributed Switch
that allows specified virtual interfaces to communicate only with other specified virtual interfaces – traffic
addressed to or from interfaces which are not part of the VLAN will not be delivered by the vNetwork
Distributed Switch.
Each ESXi host can implement one or more switches and they can be any combination of vSwitches and
vNetwork Distributed Switch.
TOE Security Functional Requirements Satisfied: FDP_IFC.2, FDP_IFF.1
7.1.5 Identification and Authentication
When a user logs into the ESXi, a user name and password are requested before access is given. These
authentication credentials are compared with the authentication credentials stored on the ESXi in a shadow
file, where the password is hashed using SHA24
-1. In addition, ESXi can participate in an Active Directory
(AD) infrastructure and can use the credentials provided by AD for authorization. If the authentication
credentials are valid, access to the system is provided, with the privileges appropriate to the role assigned to
that user. If the credentials are not valid, the user is presented with another chance to provide valid
credentials. Failed and successful user login events are captured in the system logs.
When a user logs into vCenter Server and vCenter Server Virtual Appliance using the vSphere Client, they
are presented with a login screen, requesting the vCenter Server hostname or IP address, the user name,
and the user password. vCenter Server can also participate in an Active Directory infrastructure and can
use the user provided credentials provided by AD for authorization. The user information is passed to the
underlying Windows operating of the vCenter Server system which verifies the user identity and password.
If the login is valid, the user at the vSphere Client is presented with the vSphere Client interface denoting a
successful login. If the login is invalid, a message is displayed, and the login window remains available for
the user to retry. Failed and successful user login events are captured in the system logs. If the login is
valid, the user at the vSphere Web Client is presented with the vSphere Web Client interface denoting a
successful login. If the login is invalid, a message is displayed, and the login window remains available for
the user to retry. Failed and successful user login events are captured in the system logs for both the
vSphere Client and the vSphere Web Client.
VMware Update Manager (VUM) is a software service that is used to apply patches and updates across
ESXi hosts and all supported virtual machines. When VUM starts up, it authenticates with vCenter Server.
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VUM instructs ESXi to scan for compliance against a pre-defined or custom user created baseline and then
installs an ESXi image which could consist of single or selected group of patches. ESXi will only call the
instructed VUM instance, thereby ensuring that only the VUM instance that is installed with the TOE will
be used to transfer updates and patches to the ESXi.
No users on the ESXi host or the vCenter Server, other than the vCenter Server administrator, have access
to the vpxuser (defined in Section 7.1.6) passwords stored in the vCenter Server database. These users are
fully subject to the access control rules. Below are a few important characteristics of the vpxuser password.
 The vpxuser password is machine-generated.
 The vpxuser password is stored in encrypted form. It is never exposed in plaintext.
 The vpxuser password for each ESXi host under the management of a vCenter Server is unique for
that ESXi host. Thus, it is a one to many relationships: a single vCenter Server possessing many
(and unique) vpxuser passwords for all the ESXi hosts it manages.
For each interface CLI, DCUI, and vCLI, administrators are required to identify and authenticate
themselves before any action is allowed to be performed.
TOE Security Functional Requirements Satisfied: FIA_UAU.2, FIA_UID.2, EXT_FIA_VC_LOGIN.1
7.1.6 Security Management
Security management specifies how the ESXi manages several aspects of the TSF including TSF data and
security functions. TSF data includes configuration data of the TOE, audit data, and system data. For a
detailed listing of TSF data managed by the TOE see Table 13 of this ST. The TOE provides authorized
administrators with management consoles as described in section 1.4.1 to easily manage the security
functions and TSF data of the TOE.
ESXi supports two administrator roles: system administrator and VM administrator. The system
administrator role can be assigned to three different kinds of user accounts. These are:
1. root – The system administrator role is implemented using the root account of the underlying
POSIX25
. Users log into the root account and give the root password in order to use this role.
2. individual user – It is also possible to assign a system administrator role to an individual user
account. For example, an account name of jsmith can be assigned to a role of system
administrator, thus making that particular individual user (e.g. John Smith) a System
Administrator on the ESXi host. Assigning the system administrator role to different user
accounts (rather than root account alone) helps in maintaining security through traceability.
3. vpxuser – The vpxuser account is used by the vCenter Server when it manages activities for the
connected ESXi host. The vpxuser account is initially created when the vCenter Server adds the
ESXi host as one of its managed hosts for the first time.
It should be noted that the vCenter Server administrator supplies the username and password for either the
root account or the user account with a system administrator role, when adding the ESXi host for the first
time. When this authentication with the ESXi host is successful, a special account called vpxuser is created
on the ESXi host along with a vpxuser machine generated password known only to the vCenter Server and
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the specific ESXi host. This login account (vpxuser account) and password (vpxuser password) are used for
all subsequent connections between the ESXi host and the vCenter Server.
VM administrators are administrators of one or more VMs on the ESXi host. VM administrators can access
the VMs by directly logging into the ESXi host or through the vCenter Server via the vpxuser account and
password. When logging in through the vCenter Server, the vCenter Server uses the vpxuser account and
password to gain access to the ESXi host and process the requests on behalf of the VM administrators.
The TOE supports a combination of access control as detailed in Table 13. Users, groups, roles, and
permissions are used to control who is allowed access to the vSphere managed objects and the specific
actions that are allowed. vCenter Server and ESXi hosts determine the level of access for the user based on
the permissions that are assigned to said user. The combination of user name, password, and permissions is
the mechanism by which vCenter Server and ESXi hosts authenticate a user for access and authorize the
user to perform activities.
The servers and hosts maintain lists of authorized users and the permissions assigned to each user.
Privileges define basic individual rights that are required to perform actions and read properties. ESXi
and vCenter Server use sets of privileges or roles to control which users or groups can access particular
vSphere objects.
ESXi and vCenter Server provide a set of pre-established roles and allow for roles to be defined by
administrators. The privileges and roles assigned on an ESXi host are separate from the privileges and
roles assigned on vCenter Server. Only the privileges and roles assigned through the vCenter Server
system are available to administrators managing a host through vCenter Server. Refer to Table 13 for a
detailed listing of operations that are performed per specific data and role.
The vCenter Server supports two categories of roles: vCenter Server Administrator and Administrator
defined roles. The vCenter Server Administrator is implemented by membership in the “administrators”
group of the underlying Windows OS for vCenter Server. Users log in using their username and password,
and are automatically assigned in this role by virtue of their membership in the administrators group. The
vCenter Server Virtual Appliance Administrator is implemented by the root account on POSIX.26
TOE Security Functional Requirements Satisfied: FMT_MSA.1, FMT_MSA.3, FMT_MTD.1,
FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1(a), FMT_SMR.1(b)
7.1.7 Protection of the TOE Security Functions
The Protection of the TSF function provides the integrity and management of the mechanisms that provide
the TSF. Protection of the TOE from physical tampering is ensured by its environment. It is the
responsibility of the administrator to assure that physical connections made to the TOE remain intact and
unmodified. The TOE protects information as it is transmitted between remote components of the TOE by
protecting the information using OpenSSL. HTTP communications between VUM and the ISP Server, and
between VUM and the ESXi, are protected by signature verification. The ESXi audit data that is
transmitted to the vCenter Syslog Collector for storage purposes is secured by OpenSSL. The Client USB
redirect to the VMs is secured by OpenSSL.
TOE Security Functional Requirements Satisfied: FPT_ITC.1, FPT_ITT.1, EXT_FAU_STG.1
7.1.8 Virtual Machine Domain Separation
The virtual machine separation security function of the TOE is provided by the ESXi component. The
TOE ensures that each virtual machine is isolated from any other virtual machines co-existing on the ESXi.
This isolation is provided at the virtualization layer of the ESXi. The virtualization layer of the ESXi
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ensures that virtual machines are unable to directly interact with other virtual machines yet still allow for
physical resources to be shared among the existing virtual machines.
The ESXi provides an idealized hardware environment and virtualization of underlying physical resources.
Each virtual machine runs its own operating system and applications: they cannot communicate with each
other in unacceptable or unauthorized ways. The following mechanisms ensure this:
 Shared memory: The memory allocation mechanisms prevent the sharing of writable memory.
Each VM is assigned memory that belongs exclusively to it.
 Read-only Memory: For efficiency, multiple VMs may use the same memory pages , and in these
cases, the memory locations are shared, but in a read-only mode. This effectively saves memory
without providing a communication channel between VMs.
 Communication between VMs through standard network connections can be permitted or
prevented as desired. These standard networking mechanisms are similar to those used to connect
separate physical machines.
Each virtual machine appears to run on its own processor, fully isolated from other virtual machines with
its own registers, buffers, and other control structures. Most instructions are directly executed on the
physical processor, allowing compute-intensive workloads to run at near-native speed. Memory appears
contiguous to each virtual machine, but instead, noncontiguous physical pages are remapped efficiently and
presented transparently to each virtual machine.
TOE Security Functional Requirements Satisfied: EXT_VDS_VMM.1
7.1.9 TOE Access
The TOE Access function provides for controlling the establishment of a user's session. The TOE will lock
an interactive session after an authorized administrator specified time period of user inactivity. Only once a
user successfully identifies and authenticates to the TOE will they gain access to the TOE.
TOE Security Functional Requirements Satisfied: FTA_SSL.3
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8 Rationale
8.1 Conformance Claims Rationale
There are no protection profile conformance claims for this security target.
8.2 Security Objectives Rationale
This section provides a rationale for the existence of each threat, policy statement, and assumption that
compose the Security Target. Sections 8.2.1, 8.2.2, and 8.2.3 demonstrate the mappings between the
threats, polices, and assumptions to the security objectives is complete. The following discussion provides
detailed evidence of coverage for each threat, policy, and assumption.
8.2.1 Security Objectives Rationale Relating to Threats
Table 17 displays the mapping of threats to objectives.
Table 17 – Threats:Objectives Mapping
Threats Objectives Rationale
T.COMINT
An unauthorized individual may
attempt to compromise the
security of the data collected and
produced by the TOE by bypassing
a security mechanism.
O.ACCESS
The TOE must allow authorized
users to access only appropriate
TOE functions and data.
The O.ACCESS objective ensures
that unauthorized modifications
and access to functions and data is
prevented. The O.ACCESS
objective provides that the TOE
must allow authorized operators
to access only appropriate TOE
functions and data.
OE.IDAUTH
The IT Environment will provide
reliable verification of the vSphere
Client user credentials.
The O.IDAUTH objective,
supported by the OE.IDAUTH
objective, requires that the TOE,
with support from the
environment, must be able to
identify and authenticate
operators prior to allowing access
to TOE functions and data.
O.ADMIN
The TOE must include a set of
functions that allow efficient
management of its functions and
data, ensuring that TOE users
with the appropriate privileges
and only those TOE users, may
exercise such control.
The O.ADMIN objective requires
that only authorized users are
able to manage the security
attributes of the TOE.
OE.SEP
The TOE environment will
protect the TOE from external
interference or tampering.
The OE.SEP objective also
supports these objectives by
requiring that the IT environment
protect the TOE from
interference that would prevent it
from performing its functions.
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Threats Objectives Rationale
O.AUDIT
The TOE must gather audit
records of actions on the TOE
which may be indicative of misuse.
The O.AUDIT objective provides
defense in depth, by requiring the
recording and availability of audit
records for review by an
authorized operator of the TOE.
OE.TIME
The TOE environment must
provide reliable timestamps to the
TOE.
The OE.TIME objective supports
these objectives by providing for
reliable timestamps to be used by
the TOE.
O.IDAUTH
The TOE must be able to identify
and authenticate users prior to
allowing access to TOE
administrative functions and data.
The O.IDAUTH objective,
supported by the OE.IDAUTH
objective, requires that the TOE,
with support from the
environment, must be able to
identify and authenticate
operators prior to allowing access
to TOE functions and data.
O.SECURE
The TOE must ensure the
confidentiality and integrity of all
data as it passes between the
remote components of the TOE
or from the TOE to another
trusted IT product.
The O.SECURE objective ensures
that TOE data is protected when
transmitted between remote
components of the TOE.
T.PRIVIL
An unauthorized individual may
gain access to the TOE and exploit
system privileges to gain access to
TOE security functions and data.
O.ACCESS
The TOE must allow authorized
users to access only appropriate
TOE functions and data.
The O.ACCESS objective
provides that all access is
compliant with the TSP.
OE.IDAUTH
The IT Environment will provide
reliable verification of the vSphere
Client user credentials.
This threat is primarily diminished
by the O.IDAUTH objective,
supported by the OE.IDAUTH
objective, which requires that the
TOE, with support from the
environment, must be able to
identify and authenticate
operators prior to allowing access
to TOE functions and data.
O.ADMIN
The TOE must include a set of
functions that allow efficient
management of its functions and
data, ensuring that TOE users
with the appropriate privileges
and only those TOE users, may
exercise such control.
The O.ADMIN objective ensures
that only TOE operators with
appropriate privileges can manage
the functions and data of the TOE
OE.SEP
The TOE environment will
protect the TOE from external
interference or tampering.
The OE.SEP objective also
supports these objectives by
requiring that the IT environment
protect the TOE from
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Threats Objectives Rationale
interference that would prevent it
from performing its functions.
O.AUDIT
The TOE must gather audit
records of actions on the TOE
which may be indicative of misuse.
The O.AUDIT objective provides
defense in depth, by requiring the
recording and availability of audit
records for review by an
authorized operator of the TOE.
OE.TIME
The TOE environment must
provide reliable timestamps to the
TOE.
The OE.TIME objective supports
these objectives by providing for
reliable timestamps which includes
the date and time of any action
done on the TOE. If an intrusion
occurs, a reliable audit entry with
the date and timestamp will be
recorded.
O.IDAUTH
The TOE must be able to identify
and authenticate users prior to
allowing access to TOE
administrative functions and data.
This threat is primarily diminished
by the O.IDAUTH objective,
supported by the OE.IDAUTH
objective, which requires that the
TOE, with support from the
environment, must be able to
identify and authenticate
operators prior to allowing access
to TOE functions and data.
T.VIRTUAL_NETWORK
A process running on a virtual
machine attempts to deliver traffic
to wrong VM or external entity.
O.VLAN
The TOE must ensure that
network traffic traversing a
vSwitch is only delivered to virtual
machines and physical interfaces
that are part of the intended
VLAN.
O.VLAN requires that the
vSwitch must deliver network
traffic only to virtual machines
and/or physical interfaces that
have been grouped into the
intended VLAN.
O.VSWITCH
The TOE must ensure that
network traffic traversing a
vSwitch is only delivered to the
intended virtual machines and
physical interfaces.
O.VSWITCH requires that the
vSwitch must deliver network
traffic only to the virtual machines
and/or physical interfaces for
which it is intended.
T.VM
A process running on one virtual
machine might compromise the
security of processes running on
other virtual machines.
OE.SEP
The TOE environment will
protect the TOE from external
interference or tampering.
The OE.SEP mitigates this threat
by requiring that the IT
environment protect the TOE
from interference that would
prevent it from performing its
functions.
O.VM
The TOE must provide virtual
machines with a domain of
execution which is protected
from interference and tampering
by virtual machines.
This threat is mitigated by the
O.VM objective which requires
the ESXi host component to
provide a domain of execution in
order to protect from
interference and tampering by
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Threats Objectives Rationale
virtual machines. The
virtualization layer of the ESXi
host ensures that virtual machines
are unable to directly interact
with other virtual machines.
Every Threat is mapped to one or more Objectives in the table above. This complete mapping demonstrates
that the defined security objectives counter all defined threats.
8.2.2 Security Objectives Rationale Relating to Policies
There are no Organization Security Policies.
8.2.3 Security Objectives Rationale Relating to Assumptions
Table 18 – Assumptions:Objectives Mapping
Assumptions Objectives Rationale
A.NOEVIL
Users are non-hostile,
appropriately trained, and follow all
user guidance.
NOE.NOEVIL
Users are non-hostile,
appropriately trained, and follow
all user guidance.
The NOE.NOEVIL objective
ensures that operators are non-
hostile, appropriately trained, and
follow all operator guidance.
A.PHYSCL
The ESXi host and the vCenter
Server components will be located
within controlled access facilities
which will prevent unauthorized
physical access.
NOE.PHYSCL
The ESXi host and the vCenter
Server components will be
located within controlled access
facilities which will prevent
unauthorized physical access.
The NOE.PHYSCL objective
requires that the ESXi and the
vCenter Server components will
be located within controlled
access facilities which will prevent
unauthorized physical access.
Every assumption is mapped to one or more Objectives in the table above. This complete mapping
demonstrates that the defined security objectives uphold all defined assumptions.
8.3 Rationale for Extended Security Functional
Requirements
The TOE contains the following explicitly stated security functional requirements:
 EXT_FAU_ARP.1
 EXT_FAU_STG.1
 EXT_FIA_VC_LOGIN.1
 EXT_VDS_VMM.1
EXT_FAU_ARP.1 was explicitly stated because the vCenter Server is configured with a set of predefined
alarms that monitor the status of the TOE components. When the vCenter Server detects a potential system
malfunction or a system performance degradation, it generates an alarm for such event. This requirement is
based in part on FAU_ARP.1.
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EXT_FAU_STG.1 was explicitly stated because the backup and restore of audit data onto a remote
machine is not directly provided in the standard CC PART 2 FAU SFRs. This SFR describes the backup
and restore capabilities of the vCenter Syslog Collector. This requirement is based in part on FAU_STG.1.
EXT_FIA_VC_LOGIN.1 was explicitly stated because authentication and identification of the vCenter
Server users is performed by the TOE Environment, and not by the TOE. This explicit requirement was
written to make the link between the Identification and Authentication security function provided by the
environment, and the actions that the vCenter Server takes to ensure that only identified and authenticated
users can access the TOE via the vCenter Server, because there is no CC requirement that can quite do this.
This requirement is based in part on FIA_UAU.1 and FIA_UID.1.
EXT_VDS_VMM.1 is an explicitly-stated functional requirement. The SFR family “Virtual machine
domain separation” was created to specifically address the separation of virtual machines from each other
when running within the TOE, as opposed to separation of the TOE’s domain of execution from outside
entities. The SFR in this family has no dependencies since the stated requirement embodies all necessary
security functions. This requirement exhibits functionality that can easily be documented in the ADV
assurance evidence and thus does not require any additional Assurance Documentation.
8.4 Rationale for Extended TOE Security
Assurance Requirements
There are no extended TOE security assurance requirements.
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8.5 Security Requirements Rationale
The following discussion provides detailed evidence of coverage for each security objective.
8.5.1 Rationale for Security Functional Requirements of the TOE
Objectives
Table 19 – Objectives:SFRs Mapping
Objective Requirements Addressing the
Objective
Rationale
O.ACCESS
The TOE must allow authorized
users to access only appropriate
TOE functions and data.
FIA_UAU.2
User authentication before any
action
The TOE will not give any access
to a user until the TOE has
identified (FIA_UID.2) and
authenticated (FIA_UAU.2).
FIA_UID.2
User identification before any
action
The TOE will not give any access
to a user until the TOE has
identified (FIA_UID.2) and
authenticated (FIA_UAU.2).
FTA_SSL.3
TSF-initiated termination
The requirement meets the
objective by locking an unattended
session when it has exceeded the
time limit configured by the VM
Administrator.
EXT_FIA_VC_LOGIN.1
vCenter Server user login request
For vCenter Server, the TOE
requires support from the TOE
environment to verify the user
credentials.
O.ADMIN
The TOE must include a set of
functions that allow efficient
management of its functions and
data, ensuring that TOE users with
the appropriate privileges and only
those TOE users, may exercise
such control.
FMT_MSA.1
Management of security attributes
(Virtual and Distributed Switch
Information Flow Control)
Only the roles defined in
FMT_SMR.1 are given the right to
modify or set defaults for TOE
security attributes.
FMT_MSA.3
Static attribute initialisation
Restrictive default values for the
security attributes of the Virtual
Switch are provided and the
authorized administrator can
change them.
FMT_MTD.1
Management of TSF data
The requirement meets the
objective by ensuring that only
authorized users are allowed
access to TSF data.
FMT_SMF.1
Specification of management
function
The requirement meets the
objective by ensuring that the
TOE includes administrative
functions to facilitate the
management of the TSF.
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Objective Requirements Addressing the
Objective
Rationale
FMT_SMR.1(a)
Security roles (vCenter Server)
The requirement meets the
objective by ensuring that the
TOE provides roles with differing
privileges for the management of
the TOE.
FMT_SMR.1(b)
Security roles (ESXi)
The requirement meets the
objective by ensuring that the
TOE provides roles with differing
privileges for the management of
the TOE.
O.AUDIT
The TOE must gather audit
records of actions on the TOE
which may be indicative of misuse.
FAU_GEN.1
Audit data generation
Security-relevant events must be
audited by the TOE.
FAU_SAR.1
Audit review
The TOE must provide the ability
to review the audit trail of the
system.
EXT_FAU_STG.1
External audit trail storage
The TOE ensures the backup of
the ESXi log files to a separate
part of the TOE.
O.IDAUTH
The TOE must be able to identify
and authenticate users prior to
allowing access to TOE
administrative functions and data.
FIA_UAU.2
User authentication before any
action
The TOE will not give any security
sensitive access to a user until the
user has been identified
(FIA_UID.2) and authenticated
(FIA_UAU.2).
FIA_UID.2
User identification before any
action
The TOE will not give any security
sensitive access to a user until the
user has been identified
(FIA_UID.2) and authenticated
(FIA_UAU.2).
EXT_FIA_VC_LOGIN.1
vCenter Server user login request
For vCenter Server, the TOE
requires support from the TOE
environment to verify the user
credentials.
O.SECURE
The TOE must ensure the
confidentiality and integrity of all
data as it passes between the
remote components of the TOE or
from the TOE to another trusted
IT product.
FCS_COP.1
Cryptographic Operation
The System must protect the
confidentiality of information
during transmission to a remote
component of the TOE.
FPT_ITC.1
Inter-TSF confidentiality during
transmission
The TOE shall protect all TOE
data transmitted from the TOE to
another trusted IT product from
unauthorized disclosure during
transmission.
FPT_ITT.1
Basic internal TSF data transfer
protection
The System must protect the
confidentiality of information
during transmission to a remote
component of the TOE.
O.VLAN FDP_IFC.2 The TOE must ensure that
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Objective Requirements Addressing the
Objective
Rationale
The TOE must ensure that
network traffic traversing a vSwitch
is only delivered to virtual
machines and physical interfaces
that are part of the intended
VLAN.
Complete information flow
control
network traffic traversing a
vSwitch is only delivered to virtual
machines and physical interfaces
that are part of the intended
VLAN.
O.VM
The TOE must provide virtual
machines with a domain of
execution which is protected from
interference and tampering by
virtual machines.
EXT_FAU_ARP.1
System event automatic response
The TOE generates automated
alarms that notify the appropriate
users of the TOE when there is a
potential system malfunction or
system performance degradation.
This prevents virtual machines
from not receiving the resources
they require.
EXT_VDS_VMM.1
ESXi virtual machine domain
separation
The TOE must isolate each virtual
machine by providing a domain of
execution which is protected
from interference and tampering
by virtual machines.
O.VSWITCH
The TOE must ensure that
network traffic traversing a vSwitch
is only delivered to the intended
virtual machines and physical
interfaces.
FDP_IFF.1
Simple security attributes
All data transmitted from or to a
VM or a physical interface
associated with a vSwitch will only
be delivered to the intended
destination.
8.5.2 Security Assurance Requirements Rationale
EAL4, augmented with ALC_FLR.2 was chosen to provide a moderate- to high-level of assurance that is
consistent with good commercial practices. The chosen assurance level is appropriate with the threats
defined for the environment. At EAL4+, the TOE will have an undergone an independent vulnerability
analysis demonstrating resistance to penetration attackers with a low attack potential.
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8.5.3 Dependency Rationale
This ST does satisfy all the requirement dependencies of the Common Criteria.
Table 20 lists each requirement to which the TOE claims conformance with a dependency and indicates
whether the dependent requirement was included. As the table indicates, all dependencies have been met.
Table 20 – Functional Requirements Dependencies
SFR ID Dependencies Dependency
Met
Rationale
EXT_FAU_ARP.1 No dependencies 
EXT_FAU_STG.1 FAU_GEN.1 
EXT_FIA_VC_LOGIN.1 No dependencies 
EXT_VDS_VMM.1 No dependencies 
FAU_GEN.1 FPT_STM.1  FPT_STM.1 is not
included because time
stamps are provided by
the environment. An
environmental objective
states that the TOE will
receive reliable
timestamps.
FAU_SAR.1 FAU_GEN.1 
FCS_COP.1 No dependencies  FCS_CKM.1 and
FCS_CKM.4 are not
included, following the
guidance of CCS
Instruction #4. The
cryptographic keys must
be generated and
destroyed by the TOE.
FDP_IFC.2 FDP_IFF.1 
FDP_IFF.1 FMT_MSA.3 
FDP_IFC.1 
FIA_UAU.2 FIA_UID.1 
FIA_UID.2 No dependencies 
FMT_MSA.1 FMT_SMR.1(b) 
FMT_SMF.1 
FDP_IFC.2 
FMT_MSA.3 FMT_MSA.1 
FMT_SMR.1(b) 
FMT_MTD.1 FMT_SMF.1 
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SFR ID Dependencies Dependency
Met
Rationale
FMT_SMR.1(a) 
FMT_SMR.1(b) 
FMT_SMF.1 No dependencies 
FMT_SMR.1(a) FIA_UID.1 
FMT_SMR.1(b) FIA_UID.1 
FPT_ITC.1 No dependencies 
FPT_ITT.1 No dependencies 
FTA_SSL.3 No dependencies 
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9 Acronyms and Terms
This section describes the acronyms and terms used in this document.
Table 21 below lists the acronyms used in this document.
Table 21 – Acronyms
Acronym Definition
ADAM Microsoft Active Directory Application Mode
AD LDS
Microsoft Active Directory Lightweight Directory
Services
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
API Application Programming Interface
BIOS Basic Input Output Signal
CAVP Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program
CC
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security
Evaluation
CPU Central Processing Unit
DB Database
DCUI Direct Console User Interface
DRS Distributed Resource Scheduler
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
FIPS Federal Information Processing Standard
FTP File Transfer Protocol
GB Gigabyte
HA High Availability
HCL Hardware Compatibility List
HTTP HyperText Transfer Protocol
HTTPS HyperText Transfer Protocol Secure
IEEE Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers
I/O Input/Output
IP Internet Protocol
iSCSI Internet Small Computer System Interface
ISP Internet Service Provider
IT Information Technology
MB Megabyte
NFS Network File System
NTP Network Time Protocol
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Acronym Definition
OEM Original Equipment Manufacturer
OS Operating System
OSGI Open Services Gateway Initiative
POSIX Portable Operating System Interface for Unix
PP Protection Profile
PVLAN Private Virtual Local Area Network
R2 Release 2
RAM Random Access Memory
SAN Storage Area Network
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SDK Software Development Kit
SFR Security Functional Requirement
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
SMP Symmetric Multiprocessing
SNMP Simple Network Management Protocol
SP Service Pack
SQL Structured Query Language
SSL Secure Sockets Layer
SSH Secure Shell
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSC TOE Scope of Control
TSF TOE Security Functionality
TSP TOE Security Policy
USB Universal Serial Bus
vCLI vSphere Command Line Interface
vDS vNetwork Distributed Switch
VLAN Virtual Local Area Network
VM Virtual Machine
vMA VMware Management Assistant
VPXA vCenter Server Agent
vSMP Virtual Symmetric Multi-Processing
VUM VMware Update Manager
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Table 22 below lists the VMware vSphere 5.0 terms used in this document and gives brief descriptions.
Table 22 – VMware vSphere 5.0 Terms
Term Description
Clusters
A collection of ESXi hosts and associated virtual machines intended to work
together as a unit.
Datacenters
An aggregation of all the different types of objects needed to work in
virtualized computing environments: hosts, virtual machines, networks, and
datastores.
Datastores
A virtual representation of combinations of underlying physical storage
resources in the data center. A datastore is the storage location for virtual
machine files.
Folders
A top-level structure for vCenter Server only. Folders allow the users to
group objects of the same type so they can be easily managed. A folder can
contain other folders, or a group of objects of the same type: datacenters,
clusters, datastores, networks, virtual machines, templates, or hosts.
Hosts
The physical computer on which the virtualization platform software
(hypervisor), such as ESXi, is installed and on which all virtual machines
reside.
Networks
A set of virtual network interface cards (virtual NIC), virtual switches
(vSwitch), and port groups that connect virtual machines to each other or to
the physical network outside of the virtual datacenter.
Resource
Pools
A structure that allows delegation of control over the resource of a host.
Resource pools are used to compartmentalize all resources in a cluster. The
managed resources are CPU and memory.
Templates
A master copy of a virtual machine that can be used to create and provision
new virtual machines.
Virtual
Machines
A virtualized x86 or x64 personal computer environment in which a guest
operating system and associated application software can run.
Table 23 – Documentation References below lists the VMware vSphere 5.0 Guidance Documents that are
referenced in this document.
Table 23 – Documentation References
Reference Document
vSphere
Install Guide
vSphere Installation and Setup, vSphere 5.0, ESXi 5.0, and vCenter Server 5.0
Prepared by:
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