TrustCB B.V.
Registered address:
Van den Berghlaan 48, 2132 AT
Hoofddorp, The Netherlands
nscib@trustcb.com
https://trustcb.com/common-
criteria/nscib/
https://nscib.nl
TrustCB B.V. is a registered
company at the Netherlands
Chamber of Commerce (KVK), under
number 858360275.
Version
2023-03
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Certification Report
Sm@rtCafé® Expert 8.0 C2
Sponsor: Veridos Gmbh
Truderinger Straße 15
81677 Munich
Germany
Developer: Giesecke+Devrient Mobile Security GmbH
Prinzregentenstraße 161
81677 Munich
Germany
Evaluation facility: SGS Brightsight B.V.
Brassersplein 2
2612 CT Delft
The Netherlands
Report number: NSCIB-CC-2300005-01-CR
Report version: 1
Project number: NSCIB-2300005-01
Author(s): Jordi Mujal
Date: 24 May 2023
Number of pages: 13
Number of appendices: 0
Reproduction of this report is authorised only if the report is reproduced in its entirety.
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CONTENTS
Foreword 3
Recognition of the Certificate 4
International recognition 4
European recognition 4
1 Executive Summary 5
2 Certification Results 6
2.1 Identification of Target of Evaluation 6
2.2 Security Policy 6
2.3 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope 7
2.3.1 Assumptions 7
2.3.2 Clarification of scope 7
2.4 Architectural Information 7
2.5 Documentation 8
2.6 IT Product Testing 8
2.6.1 Testing approach and depth 8
2.6.2 Independent penetration testing 8
2.6.3 Test configuration 9
2.6.4 Test results 9
2.7 Reused Evaluation Results 9
2.8 Evaluated Configuration 10
2.9 Evaluation Results 10
2.10 Comments/Recommendations 10
3 Security Target 12
4 Definitions 12
5 Bibliography 13
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Foreword
The Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security (NSCIB) provides a third-party
evaluation and certification service for determining the trustworthiness of Information Technology (IT)
security products. Under this NSCIB, TrustCB B.V. has the task of issuing certificates for IT security
products, as well as for protection profiles and sites.
Part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product, protection profile or site
according to the Common Criteria assessment guidelines published by the NSCIB. Evaluations are
performed by an IT Security Evaluation Facility (ITSEF) under the oversight of the NSCIB Certification
Body, which is operated by TrustCB B.V. in cooperation with the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom
Relations.
An ITSEF in the Netherlands is a commercial facility that has been licensed by TrustCB B.V. to
perform Common Criteria evaluations; a significant requirement for such a licence is accreditation to
the requirements of ISO Standard 17025 “General requirements for the accreditation of calibration and
testing laboratories”.
By awarding a Common Criteria certificate, TrustCB B.V. asserts that the product or site complies with
the security requirements specified in the associated (site) security target, or that the protection profile
(PP) complies with the requirements for PP evaluation specified in the Common Criteria for
Information Security Evaluation. A (site) security target is a requirements specification document that
defines the scope of the evaluation activities.
The consumer should review the (site) security target or protection profile, in addition to this
certification report, to gain an understanding of any assumptions made during the evaluation, the IT
product's intended environment, its security requirements, and the level of confidence (i.e., the
evaluation assurance level) that the product or site satisfies the security requirements stated in the
(site) security target.
Reproduction of this report is authorised only if the report is reproduced in its entirety.
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Recognition of the Certificate
The presence of the Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement (CCRA) and the SOG-IS logos on the
certificate indicates that this certificate is issued in accordance with the provisions of the CCRA and
the SOG-IS Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOG-IS MRA) and will be recognised by the participating
nations.
International recognition
The CCRA was signed by the Netherlands in May 2000 and provides mutual recognition of certificates
based on the Common Criteria (CC). Since September 2014 the CCRA has been updated to provide
mutual recognition of certificates based on cPPs (exact use) or STs with evaluation assurance
components up to and including EAL2+ALC_FLR.
For details of the current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes, see
http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
European recognition
The SOG-IS MRA Version 3, effective since April 2010, provides mutual recognition in Europe of
Common Criteria and ITSEC certificates at a basic evaluation level for all products. A higher
recognition level for evaluation levels beyond EAL4 (respectively E3-basic) is provided for products
related to specific technical domains. This agreement was signed initially by Finland, France,
Germany, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Italy joined the SOG-IS
MRA in December 2010.
For details of the current list of signatory nations, approved certification schemes and the list of
technical domains for which the higher recognition applies, see https://www.sogis.eu.
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1 Executive Summary
This Certification Report states the outcome of the Common Criteria security evaluation of the
Sm@rtCafé® Expert 8.0 C2. The developer of the Sm@rtCafé® Expert 8.0 C2 is Giesecke+Devrient
Mobile Security GmbH located in Munich, Germany and Veridos Gmbh was the sponsor of the
evaluation and certification. A Certification Report is intended to assist prospective consumers when
judging the suitability of the IT security properties of the product for their particular requirements.
The TOE described in the [ST] is a dual-interface, contact based or a pure contactless smart card with
a Javacard operating system (OS). The TOE is a multi-purpose Java card where applets of different
kinds can be installed. Since a post-issuance installation of applets is possible, the TOE corresponds
to an open configuration, as defined in [PP].
The TOE was previously evaluated by SGS Brightsight B.V. located in Delft, The Netherlands and was
certified under the accreditation of TÜV Rheinland Nederland on 01 September 2022 (CC-22-
0289060). This current evaluation of the TOE has also been conducted by SGS Brightsight B.V. and
was completed on 24 May 2023 with the approval of the ETR. The certification procedure has been
conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of
IT Security [NSCIB].
The major changes from previous evaluations are:
- Additional Chip memory size is supported.
- TOE scope is modified: RSA-PSS is added and change in RNG from DRG.4 to DRG.3 is applied.
- Localized code updates.
- MoC Library is removed.
- Guidance updates.
The security evaluation reused the evaluation results of previously performed evaluations. A full, up-
to-date vulnerability analysis has been made.
The scope of the evaluation is defined by the security target [ST], which identifies assumptions made
during the evaluation, the intended environment for the Sm@rtCafé® Expert 8.0 C2, the security
requirements, and the level of confidence (evaluation assurance level) at which the product is
intended to satisfy the security requirements. Consumers of the Sm@rtCafé® Expert 8.0 C2 are
advised to verify that their own environment is consistent with the security target, and to give due
consideration to the comments, observations and recommendations in this certification report.
The results documented in the evaluation technical report [ETR] 1 for this product provide sufficient
evidence that the TOE meets the EAL6 augmented (EAL6+) assurance requirements for the evaluated
security functionality. This assurance level is augmented with ALC_FLR.1 (Basic Flaw Remediation).
The evaluation was conducted using the Common Methodology for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5 [CEM] for conformance to the Common Criteria for Information
Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5 [CC] (Parts I, II and III).
TrustCB B.V., as the NSCIB Certification Body, declares that the evaluation meets all the conditions
for international recognition of Common Criteria Certificates and that the product will be listed on the
NSCIB Certified Products list. Note that the certification results apply only to the specific version of the
product as evaluated.
1 The Evaluation Technical Report contains information proprietary to the developer and/or the
evaluator, and is not available for public review.
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2 Certification Results
2.1 Identification of Target of Evaluation
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) for this evaluation is the Sm@rtCafé® Expert 8.0 C2 from Veridos
Gmbh located in Munich, Germany.
The TOE is comprised of the following main components:
Delivery
item type
Identifier Version
Hardware IFX SLC37GDA448/512 (BSI-DSZ-CC-1107-V3-2022)
IFX_CCI_00002Dh, IFX_CCI_000039h, IFX_CCI_00003Ah,
IFX_CCI_000044h, IFX_CCI_000045h, IFX_CCI_000046h,
IFX_CCI_000047h, IFX_CCI_000048h, IFX_CCI_000049h,
IFX_CCI_00004Ah, IFX_CCI_00004Bh, IFX_CCI_00004Ch,
IFX_CCI_00004Dh, IFX_CCI_00004Eh
T11 (design
step)
Firmware (of
certified IC)
BOS & POWS 80.306.16.0 &
80.306.16.1
Flash Loader 09.12.0005
Software (of
the certified IC)
UMSLC v01.30.0564
Software
(embedded)
Sm@rtCafé® Expert 8.0 C2
To ensure secure usage a set of guidance documents is provided, together with the Sm@rtCafé®
Expert 8.0 C2. For details, see section 0 “The logical architecture, originating from the Security Target
[ST] of the TOE can be depicted as follows:
TOE Boundary
Pre/Post-Issuance Applets
Smart Card Platform
Card Manager
IC IC OS
G&D Crypto
Library
Java Card System
APDU Layer
Documentation” of this report.
For a detailed and precise description of the TOE lifecycle, see the [ST], Chapter 2.4.
2.2 Security Policy
The TOE has the following main features:
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• The hardware platform [HW_CERT] with the following configurations according to [HW_ST]:
• FLASH: up to 512 kBytes
• ROM: only used by IFX
• RAM for the user: up to 16 kByte
• SCP (Symmetric Crypto Co-processor for DES and AES Standards): accessible
• Crypto2304T (Crypto Co-processor for asymmetric algorithms like RSA and EC): accessible
• Interfaces: ISO/IEC 7816 and/or ISO/IEC 14443
• Java Card Runtime Environment (JCRE)
• Java Card Virtual Machine (JCVM)
• Java Card API
• On-card Installer
• Applet Deletion Manager
• Card Manager
• Logical Channels
• Object Deletion
• Transaction and atomicity
• firewall access control
• Cryptographic services implemented in the G&D crypto library:
• RSA-CRT and RSA key generation,
• ECC over GF(p) key generation
• RSA and RSA-RCT signature generation, RSA signature verification, RSA and RSA-CRT
decryption and RSA Encryption.
• 3DES for en-/decryption (CBC and ECB) and MAC generation and verification (2-key3DES, 3-
key 3DES, Retail-MAC, CMAC and CBC-MAC).
• AES (Advanced Encryption Standard) for en-/decryption (GCM, CBC and ECB) and MAC
generation and verification (CMAC, CBC-MAC).
• ECC over GF(p) for signature generation and verification (ECDSA).
• Random number generation according to class DRG.4
• ECC over GF(p) Diffie Hellman and Generic Mapping key exchange
• SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384 and SHA-512
• Integrity check of checksum-protected data
• Secure state of information
• Non-observability of operations on sensitive information
• Unavailability of previous information content
• Secure installation of post-issuance applications on the card
• Secure post-issuance deletion of previously installed applets
2.3 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
2.3.1 Assumptions
The assumptions defined in the Security Target are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead
to specific Security Objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. For detailed information on the
security objectives that must be fulfilled by the TOE environment, see section 6.2 of the [ST].
2.3.2 Clarification of scope
The evaluation did not reveal any threats to the TOE that are not countered by the evaluated security
functions of the product.
2.4 Architectural Information
The logical architecture, originating from the Security Target [ST] of the TOE can be depicted as
follows:
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TOE Boundary
Pre/Post-Issuance Applets
Smart Card Platform
Card Manager
IC IC OS
G&D Crypto
Library
Java Card System
APDU Layer
2.5 Documentation
The following documentation is provided with the product by the developer to the customer:
Identifier Version
Preparative Procedures Sm@rtCafé® Expert 8.0 C2 2.4
Operational User Guidance Sm@rtCafé® Expert 8.0 C2 2.6
2.6 IT Product Testing
Testing (depth, coverage, functional tests, independent testing): The evaluators examined the
developer’s testing activities documentation and verified that the developer has met their testing
responsibilities.
2.6.1 Testing approach and depth
The developer performed extensive testing on functional specification, subsystem and SFR-enforcing
module level. All parameter choices were addressed at least once. All boundary cases identified were
tested explicitly, and additionally the near-boundary conditions were covered probabilistically. The
testing was largely automated using industry standard and proprietary test suites. Test scripts were
used extensively to verify that the functions return the expected values. During this re-evaluation, the
developer repeated and extended the previous test plan.
The underlying hardware and crypto-library test results are extendable to composite evaluations,
because the underlying platform is operated according to its guidance and the composite evaluation
requirements are met.
During the baseline evaluation, for the testing performed by the evaluators, the developer provided
samples and a test environment. The evaluators reproduced a selection of the developer tests, as well
as a small number of test cases designed by the evaluator. During this re-evaluation, the evaluator
reused previous test results.
2.6.2 Independent penetration testing
The independent vulnerability analysis performed was conducted along the following steps:
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• When evaluating the evidence in the classes ASE, ADV and AGD the evaluator considered
whether potential vulnerabilities could already be identified due to the TOE type and/or
specified behaviour in such an early stage of the evaluation.
• For ADV_IMP a thorough implementation representation review was performed on the TOE.
During this attack-oriented analysis the protection of the TOE was analysed using the
knowledge gained from all evaluation classes. This resulted in the identification of (additional)
potential vulnerabilities. This analysis used the attack methods in [JIL-AM] and [JIL-AAPS].
• All potential vulnerabilities were analysed using the knowledge gained from all evaluation
classes and information from the public domain. A judgment was made on how to assure that
these potential vulnerabilities are not exploitable. The potential vulnerabilities were addressed
by penetration testing, a guidance update or in other ways that are deemed appropriate.
The total test effort expended by the evaluators during the baseline evaluation was 16 weeks. During
that test campaign, 13% of the total time was spent on Perturbation attacks, 79% on side-channel
testing, and 8% on logical tests. Vulnerability analysis was refreshed during this evaluation, but no
additional penetration tests were required as a result of this activity.
2.6.3 Test configuration
During the original evaluation, the configuration of the sample used for independent evaluator testing
and penetration testing was the same as described in the [ST] and in some specific cases, an earlier
revision of the TOE was also used. The assurance gained from testing on an earlier revision has been
assessed to be valid for the final TOE version, because the changes introduced were minimal and did
not have an impact on the TSF. No testing was performed by the evaluator during this re-evaluation.
2.6.4 Test results
The testing activities, including configurations, procedures, test cases, expected results and observed
results are summarised in the [ETR], with references to the documents containing the full details.
The developer’s tests and the independent functional tests produced the expected results, giving
assurance that the TOE behaves as specified in its [ST] and functional specification.
No exploitable vulnerabilities were found with the independent penetration tests.
The algorithmic security level of cryptographic functionality has not been rated in this certification
process, but the current consensus on the algorithmic security level in the open domain, i.e., from the
current best cryptanalytic attacks published, has been taken into account.
Not all key sizes specified in the [ST] have sufficient cryptographic strength for satisfying the
AVA_VAN.5 “high attack potential”. The TOE supports a wider range of key sizes (see [ST]), including
those with sufficient algorithmic security level to exceed 100 bits as required for high attack potential
(AVA_VAN.5).
The strength of the implementation of the cryptographic functionality has been assessed in the
evaluation, as part of the AVA_VAN activities.
For composite evaluations, please consult the [ETRfC] for details.
2.7 Reused Evaluation Results
This is a re-certification. Documentary evaluation results of the earlier version of the TOE have been
reused, but vulnerability analysis has been renewed.
There has been extensive reuse of the ALC aspects for the sites involved in the development and
production of the TOE, by use of 4 Site Technical Audit Reports.
All assurance components that are needed for the sites are considered during the evaluation. In
determining whether the TOE meets the EAL6+ ALC requirements, STARs were used to re-use site
audit results of sites involved in the TOE life-cycle. For several production sites, these STARs were
the results of audits at EAL5+. Nonetheless, the evaluator has established that the TOE meets all
EAL6+ requirements, independent of which production site is used.
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2.8 Evaluated Configuration
The TOE is defined uniquely by its name and version number Sm@rtCafé® Expert 8.0 C2.
2.9 Evaluation Results
The evaluation lab documented their evaluation results in the [ETR], which references an ASE
Intermediate Report and other evaluator documents. To support composite evaluations according to
[COMP] a derived document [ETRfC] was provided and approved. This document provides details of
the TOE evaluation that must be considered when this TOE is used as platform in a composite
evaluation.
The verdict of each claimed assurance requirement is “Pass”.
Based on the above evaluation results the evaluation lab concluded the Sm@rtCafé® Expert 8.0 C2,
to be CC Part 2 extended, CC Part 3 conformant, and to meet the requirements of EAL 6
augmented with ALC_FLR.1. This implies that the product satisfies the security requirements
specified in Security Target [ST].
The Security Target claims ‘demonstrable’/’strict’ conformance to the Protection Profile [PP].
2.10 Comments/Recommendations
The user guidance as outlined in section 0 “The logical architecture, originating from the Security
Target [ST] of the TOE can be depicted as follows:
TOE Boundary
Pre/Post-Issuance Applets
Smart Card Platform
Card Manager
IC IC OS
G&D Crypto
Library
Java Card System
APDU Layer
Documentation” contains necessary information about the usage of the TOE. Certain aspects of the
TOE’s security functionality, in particular the countermeasures against attacks, depend on accurate
conformance to the user guidance of both the software and the hardware part of the TOE. There are
no particular obligations or recommendations for the user apart from following the user guidance.
Please note that the documents contain relevant details concerning the resistance against certain
attacks.
In addition, all aspects of assumptions, threats and policies as outlined in the Security Target not
covered by the TOE itself must be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his system risk
management process. For the evolution of attack methods and techniques to be covered, the
customer should define the period of time until a re-assessment for the TOE is required and thus
requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
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The strength of the cryptographic algorithms and protocols was not rated in the course of this
evaluation. This specifically applies to the following proprietary or non-standard algorithms, protocols
and implementations: none.
Not all key sizes specified in the [ST] have sufficient cryptographic strength to satisfy the AVA_VAN.5
“high attack potential”. To be protected against attackers with a "high attack potential", appropriate
cryptographic algorithms with sufficiently large cryptographic key sizes shall be used (references can
be found in national and international documents and standards).
Page: 12/13 of report number: NSCIB-CC-2300005-01-CR, dated 24 May 2023
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3 Security Target
The Veridos Security Target Sm@rtCafé® Expert 8.0 C2, Version 4.0/Status 10.05.2023 [ST] is
included here by reference.
4 Definitions
This list of acronyms and definitions contains elements that are not already defined by the CC or CEM:
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
CBC Cipher Block Chaining (a block cipher mode of operation)
CBC-MAC Cipher Block Chaining Message Authentication Code
DES Data Encryption Standard
CPLC Card Production Life Cycle
CRT Chinese Remainder Theorem
DES Data Encryption Standard
DRG Deterministic Random Generator
ECB Electronic Code Book (a block cipher mode of operation)
ECC Elliptic Curve Cryptography
ECDSA Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
ECDH Elliptic Curve Diffie Hellman
EDC Error Detection Code
EdDSA Elliptic Curve Edwards-curve Digital Signature Algorithm
GCM Galois/Counter Mode
GF Galois Field
GP Global Platform
GCM Galois/Counter Mode
IT Information Technology
ITSEF IT Security Evaluation Facility
JIL Joint Interpretation Library
MAC Message Authentication Code
NSCIB Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the area of IT security
PP Protection Profile
RSA Rivest-Shamir-Adleman Algorithm
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
TOE Target of Evaluation
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5 Bibliography
This section lists all referenced documentation used as source material in the compilation of this
report.
[CC] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Parts I, II and
III, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017
[CEM] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017
[COMP] Joint Interpretation Library, Composite product evaluation for Smart Cards and
similar devices, Version 1.5.1, May 2018
[ETR] Evaluator Assessment of Changes Report (EAR) Sm@rtCafe Expert 8.0 C2 –
Partial ETR, 23-RPT-098, version 5.0, 10 May 2023
[ETRfC] Evaluation Technical Report for Composition “Sm@rtCafé® Expert 8.0 C2” –
EAL6+ Recertification, 23-RPT-398, version 3.0, 10 May 2023
[HW-CERT] BSI-DSZ-CC-1107-V3-2022 for IFX_CCI_00002Dh, IFX_CCI_000039h,
IFX_CCI_00003Ah,IFX_CCI_000044h, IFX_CCI_000045h,
IFX_CCI_000046h,IFX_CCI_000047h, IFX_CCI_000048h,
IFX_CCI_000049h,IFX_CCI_00004Ah, IFX_CCI_00004Bh,IFX_CCI_00004Ch,
IFX_CCI_00004Dh, IFX_CCI_00004Ehdesign step T11 with firmware
80.306.16.0 & 80.306.16.1,optional NRG™ SW 05.03.4097, optional
HSLv3.52.9708, UMSLC lib v01.30.0564, optional SCLv2.15.000 and
v2.11.003, optional ACL v3.33.003 andv3.02.000, optional RCL v1.10.007,
optional HCLv1.13.002 and user guidance, 16 May 2022
[HW-ETRfC] EVALUATION TECHNICAL REPORT FOR COMPOSITE EVALUATION (ETR
COMP) Common Criteria CC 3.1, (EAL6 augmented with ALC_FLR.1), Project
/ Certification ID: 8120103228 / BSI-DSZ-CC-1107-V3, Version 5, 11 May
2022.
[HW-ST] IFX_CCI_00002Dh, IFX_CCI_000039h, IFX_CCI_00003Ah,
IFX_CCI_000044h, IFX_CCI_000045h, IFX_CCI_000046h, IFX_CCI_000047h,
IFX_CCI_000048h, IFX_CCI_000049h, IFX_CCI_00004Ah,
IFX_CCI_00004Bh, IFX_CCI_00004Ch, IFX_CCI_00004Dh,
IFX_CCI_00004Eh T11, Security Target Lite, v 4.3.1, 10 May 2022.
[JIL-AAPS] JIL Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards, Version 3.1, June 2020
[JIL-AM] Attack Methods for Smartcards and Similar Devices, Version 2.4, January 2020
(sensitive with controlled distribution)
[NSCIB] Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security, Version 2.6,
22 August 2022
[PP] Java Card Protection Profile - Open Configuration, version 3.1, April 2020 (BSI-
CC-PP-0099-V2-2020)
[ST] Veridos Security Target Sm@rtCafé® Expert 8.0 C2, Version 4.0/Status
10.05.2023
(This is the end of this report.)