National Information Assurance Partnership
Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
Validation Report
for the
Enveil ZeroReveal® Compute Fabric Server v2.5.4
Report Number: CCEVS-VR-11151-2021
Dated: 05/28/2021
Version: 1.0
National Institute of Standards and Technology Department of Defense
Information Technology Laboratory ATTN: NIAP, Suite 6982
100 Bureau Drive 9800 Savage Road
Gaithersburg, MD 20899 Fort Meade, MD 20755-6982
®
TM
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Validation Team
Marybeth Panock
Swapna Katikaneni
Ken Elliott
Jerome Myers
Aerospace Corporation
Common Criteria Testing Laboratory
Kenneth Lasoski
Rahul Joshi
Aruna Shaju K
Riya Thomas
Acumen Security, LLC
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Table of Contents
1 Executive Summary............................................................................................................... 4
2 Identification.......................................................................................................................... 6
3 Architectural Information .................................................................................................... 8
4 Security Policy........................................................................................................................ 9
4.1 Cryptographic Support..................................................................................................................................9
4.2 User Data Protection ....................................................................................................................................10
4.3 Identification and Authentication ...............................................................................................................10
4.4 Security Management ..................................................................................................................................10
4.5 Privacy...........................................................................................................................................................10
4.6 Protection of the TSF ...................................................................................................................................10
4.7 Trusted Path/Channels ................................................................................................................................10
5 Assumptions, Threats & Clarification of Scope ............................................................... 11
5.1 Assumptions..................................................................................................................................................11
5.2 Threats...........................................................................................................................................................11
5.3 Clarification of Scope...................................................................................................................................12
6 Documentation..................................................................................................................... 13
7 TOE Evaluated Configuration ........................................................................................... 14
7.1 Evaluated Configuration..............................................................................................................................14
7.2 Excluded Functionality ................................................................................................................................14
8 IT Product Testing............................................................................................................... 15
8.1 Developer Testing .........................................................................................................................................15
8.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing.......................................................................................................15
9 Results of the Evaluation .................................................................................................... 16
9.1 Evaluation of Security Target .....................................................................................................................16
9.2 Evaluation of Development Documentation...............................................................................................16
9.3 Evaluation of Guidance Documents............................................................................................................16
9.4 Evaluation of Life Cycle Support Activities...............................................................................................17
9.5 Evaluation of Test Documentation and the Test Activity .........................................................................17
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity ..............................................................................................................17
9.7 Summary of Evaluation Results..................................................................................................................18
10 Validator Comments & Recommendations ...................................................................... 19
11 Annexes................................................................................................................................. 20
12 Security Target .................................................................................................................... 21
13 Glossary................................................................................................................................ 22
14 Bibliography......................................................................................................................... 23
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1 Executive Summary
This Validation Report (VR) is intended to assist the end user of this product and any security
certification Agent for that end user in determining the suitability of this Information
Technology (IT) product for their environment. End users should review the Security Target
(ST), which is where specific security claims are made, in conjunction with this VR, which
describes how those security claims were tested and evaluated and any restrictions on the
evaluated configuration. Prospective users should carefully read the Assumptions and
Clarification of Scope in Section 5 and the Validator Comments in Section 10, where any
restrictions on the evaluated configuration are highlighted.
This report documents the National Information Assurance Partnership (NIAP) assessment of
the evaluation of the Enveil ZeroReveal® Compute Fabric Server v2.5.4 (the Target of
Evaluation, or TOE). It presents the evaluation results, their justifications, and the conformance
results. This VR is not an endorsement of the TOE by any agency of the U.S. Government and no
warranty of the TOE is either expressed or implied. This VR applies only to the specific version
and configuration of the product as evaluated and documented in the ST.
The TOE is the ZeroReveal Compute Fabric Server (otherwise referred to as the ZeroReveal
Server, or the TOE) software application which communicates to one or more instances of the
ZeroReveal Client software application via REST over mutually authenticated TLS. The REST APIs
may be used over HTTPS/TLS and require that the system communicating with the Server have
at least once instance of the ZeroReveal Client software application installed. Users and
applications communicate to the ZeroReveal Server through the REST APIs to retrieve data. An
administrator interacts with and manages the ZeroReveal Server via configuration files
(modifiable by a text editor) via the host platform. Note that the ZeroReveal Server does not
provide a graphical user interface (GUI) or a command line interface (CLI). The TOE is evaluated
as a software application only. Enveil ZeroReveal™ Compute Fabric contains functionality that is
not covered by Protection Profile for Application Software. As with all evaluations claiming
conformance to a NIAP-approved protection profile, only the functionality specified in the
profile is evaluated. The TOE’s homomorphic encryption techniques and the associated
databases, including accessing, retrieving, storing, or operations on databases, are outside the
scope of this evaluation. This evaluation makes no security claims about these features.
Additionally, the ZeroReveal client software, which is required for the operation of the TOE, is
outside the scope of this evaluation and was evaluated as another evaluation separately.
The evaluation was completed by Acumen Security in May 2021. The information in this report
is largely derived from the Assurance Activities Report (AAR) and associated test reports
authored by Acumen Security. The evaluation determined that the product is conformant with
both Common Criteria Part 2 Extended and Part 3 Extended and meets the assurance
requirements defined in the U.S. Government Protection Profile for Security Requirements for
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Protection Profile for Application Software, Version 1.3, dated 01 March 2019 [SWAPP] and
Functional Package for Transport Layer Security (TLS), Version 1.1, dated 12 February 2019 [TLS-
PKG].
The TOE identified in this VR has been evaluated at a NIAP-approved Common Criteria Testing
Laboratory using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev. 5) for
conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev. 5), as
interpreted by the Assurance Activities(AAs) contained in the Protection Profile for Application
Software, Version 1.3, dated 01 March 2019 [SWAPP] and Functional Package for Transport
Layer Security (TLS), Version 1.1, dated 12 February 2019 [TLS-PKG]. This VR applies only to the
specific version of the TOE as evaluated. The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with
the provisions of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme and the
conclusions of the testing laboratory in the Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) are consistent
with the evidence provided.
The validation team provided guidance on technical issues and evaluation processes and
reviewed the individual work units documented in the ETR and the Assurance Activities Report
(AAR). The validation team found that the evaluation showed that the product satisfies all the
functional requirements and assurance requirements stated in the ST. Based on these findings,
the validation team concludes that the testing laboratory's findings are accurate, the
conclusions justified, and the conformance results are correct. The conclusions of the testing
laboratory in the ETR are consistent with the evidence produced.
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2 Identification
The CCEVS is a joint National Security Agency (NSA) and National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST) effort to establish commercial facilities to perform trusted product
evaluations.
Under this program, security evaluations are conducted by commercial testing laboratories
called Common Criteria Testing Laboratories (CCTLs). CCTLs evaluate products against
Protection Profile containing AAs, which are interpretations of the CEM work units specific to
the technology described by the PP.
The NIAP Validation Body assigns Validators to monitor the CCTLs to ensure quality and
consistency across evaluations. Developers of IT products desiring a security evaluation
contract with a CCTL and pay a fee for their product's evaluation. Upon successful completion
of the evaluation, the product is added to NIAP's Product Compliance List.
Table 1 provides information needed to completely identify the product, including:
• The Target of Evaluation (TOE): the fully qualified identifier of the product as
evaluated.
• The Security Target (ST), describing the security features, claims, and assurances
of the product.
• The conformance result of the evaluation.
• The Protection Profile(s) to which the product is conformant.
• The organizations and individuals participating in the evaluation.
Table 1: Evaluation Identifiers
Item Identifier
Evaluation Scheme United States NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
TOE Enveil ZeroReveal® Compute Fabric Server v2.5.4
Protection Profile Protection Profile for Application Software, Version 1.3, dated 01 March 2019 [SWAPP]
and Functional Package for Transport Layer Security (TLS), Version 1.1, dated 12
February 2019 [TLS-PKG]
Security Target Enveil ZeroReveal® Compute Fabric Server v2.5.4 Security Target
Evaluation Technical
Report
Evaluation Technical Report for Enveil ZeroReveal® Compute Fabric Server v2.5.4
CC Version Version 3.1, Revision 5
Conformance Result CC Part 2 Extended and CC Part 3 Extended
Sponsor Enveil, Inc.
Developer Enveil, Inc
Common Criteria
Testing Lab (CCTL)
Acumen Security
2400 Research Blvd. #395
Rockville, MD 20850
CCEVS Validators Marybeth Panock
Swapna Katikaneni
Ken Elliott
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Jerry Myers
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3 Architectural Information
The TOE is Enveil ZeroReveal® Compute Fabric Server. The evaluated version of the TOE is 2.5.4.
The TOE is a software application which communicates to one or more instances of the ZeroReveal
Client software application via REST over mutually authenticated TLS. The REST APIs may be used over
HTTPS/TLS and require that the system communicating with the Server have at least once instance of
the ZeroReveal Client software application installed. Note that the ZeroReveal Server does not provide a
graphical user interface (GUI) or a command line interface (CLI). Users and applications communicate to
the ZeroReveal Server through the REST APIs to retrieve data. An administrator interacts with and
manages the ZeroReveal Server via configuration files (modifiable by a text editor) via the host platform.
The diagram below shows the parts of the TOE application, and how the evaluation security boundary is
identified. The Client application is evaluated separately and is not part of this evaluation.
Figure 1 - TOE Operational Environment
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4 Security Policy
The TOE provides the security functionality required by [SWAPP] and [TLS-PKG].
4.1 Cryptographic Support
The cryptographic services provided by the TOE are described below:
Cryptographic Method Use within the TOE
AES-GCM TLS encryption
ECDSA TLS key generation, signature generation and verification
RSA TLS key generation, signature generation and verification
HMAC Message integrity and authentication for TLS
AES-CCM Storage of credentials
DRBG Random bit generation for all cryptographic functions
Table 2 TOE Provided Cryptography
Each of these cryptographic algorithms have been validated for conformance to the
requirements specified in their respective standards, as identified below:
Algorithm Standard Mode/Keysize CAVP Cert. #
HMAC_DRBG NIST SP 800-90A HMAC-SHA2-512 with 256 bits of
entropy seeded by the platform DRBG
C1874
ECDSA
KeyGen
ECDH Key
Establishment
ECDSA
SigGen/SigVer
FIPS Pub 186-4, Appendix B.4
NIST SP 800-56Arev3
FIPS Pub 186-4, Section 5
Curves P-256 and P-384 C1874
RSA KeyGen
RSA
SigGen/SigVer
FIPS Pub 186-4, Appendix B.3
FIPS Pub 186-4, Section 4
2048 bits C1874
AES-GCM NIST SP 800-38D 256 bits C1874
AES-CCM NIST SP 800-38C 256 bits C1874
SHA2-256
SHA2-384
SHA2-512
FIPS Pub 180-4 Digest size 256 bits
Digest size 384 bits
Digest size 512 bits
C1874
HMAC-SHA2-
256
FIPS Pub 198-1 Key size 256 bits, block size 512 bits,
digest size 256 bits
C1874
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Algorithm Standard Mode/Keysize CAVP Cert. #
HMAC-SHA2-
384
HMAC-SHA-
512
Key size 384 bits, block size 1024 bits,
digest size 384 bits
Key size 512 bits, block size 1024 bits,
digest size 512 bits
Table 3 CAVP Algorithm Testing References
4.2 User Data Protection
The ZeroReveal Server network communication is restricted to user-initiated communication
for responses to API requests from ZeroReveal Clients.
4.3 Identification and Authentication
The ZeroReveal server performs X.509v3 certificate validation functions to authenticate the
certificate(s) during the establishment of the TLS trusted channel.
4.4 Security Management
An enterprise manages the TOE via configuration files on each installation platform. There is no
management GUI, CLI, or interface to manage the TOE over the network.
The TOE does not include any predefined or default credentials and utilizes the platform
recommended storage process for configuration files.
4.5 Privacy
The TOE does not collect or transmit Personally Identifiable Information (PII) over the network.
4.6 Protection of the TSF
The TOE leverages platform provided package management for secure installation and updates.
The TOE installation package includes only those third-party libraries necessary for its intended
operation. The TOE is designed to utilize compiler-provided anti-exploitation capabilities.
4.7 Trusted Path/Channels
The TOE communicates to the ZeroReveal® Compute Fabric Client via REST API over mutually
authenticated TLS. Administrators configure the TOE via local access only, making changes to
configuration files.
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5 Assumptions, Threats & Clarification of Scope
5.1 Assumptions
The specific conditions listed in the following subsections are assumed to exist in the TOE’s
environment. These assumptions include both practical realities in the development of the TOE
security requirements and the essential environmental conditions on the use of the TOE.
The following assumptions are drawn directly from the [SWAPP]:
ID Assumption
A.PLATFORM1
The TOE relies upon a trustworthy computing platform with a reliable time clock for
its execution. This includes the underlying platform and whatever runtime
environment it provides to the TOE.
A.PROPER_USER The user of the application software is not willfully negligent or hostile, and uses the
software in compliance with the applied enterprise security policy.
A.PROPER_ADMIN The administrator of the application software is not careless, willfully negligent or
hostile, and administers the software in compliance with the applied enterprise
security policy.
Table 4 Assumptions
5.2 Threats
The following table lists the threats addressed by the TOE and the IT Environment. The
assumed level of expertise of the attacker for all the threats identified below is Enhanced-Basic.
The following threats are drawn directly from the [SWAPP]:
ID Threat
T.NETWORK_ATTACK An attacker is positioned on a communications channel or elsewhere on the
network infrastructure. Attackers may engage in communications with the
application software or alter communications between the application software and
other endpoints in order to compromise it.
T.NETWORK_EAVESDROP An attacker is positioned on a communications channel or elsewhere on the
network infrastructure. Attackers may monitor and gain access to data exchanged
between the application and other endpoints.
T.LOCAL_ATTACK An attacker can act through unprivileged software on the same computing platform
on which the application executes. Attackers may provide maliciously formatted
input to the application in the form of files or other local communications.
T.PHYSICAL_ACCESS An attacker may try to access sensitive data at rest.
Table 5 Threats
1
This Assumption is modified by TD0427.
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5.3 Clarification of Scope
All evaluations (and all products) have limitations, as well as potential misconceptions that need
clarifying. This text covers some of the more important limitations and clarifications of this
evaluation. Note that:
• As with any evaluation, this evaluation only shows that the evaluated configuration
meets the security claims made, with a certain level of assurance. The level of assurance
for this evaluation is defined within the PP_APP_v1.3 and PKG_TLS_V1.1.
• This evaluation covers only the specific software version identified in this document, and
not any earlier or later versions released or in process.
• Consistent with the expectations of the Protection Profile, this evaluation did not
specifically search for, nor seriously attempt to counter, vulnerabilities that were not
“obvious” or vulnerabilities to objectives not claimed in the ST. The CEM defines an
“obvious” vulnerability as one that is easily exploited with a minimum of understanding
of the TOE, technical sophistication and resources.
• The evaluation of security functionality of the product was limited to the functionality
specified in the claimed PPs. Any additional security related functional capabilities
included in the product were not covered by this evaluation. This includes:
o Databases, including accessing, retrieving, storing, or operations on databases.
o The homomorphic encryption process, including the algorithms, uses and the
security strength of the resultant ciphertext.
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6 Documentation
The following document is available for downloading from the NIAP web site. It should be
considered to be delivered with the TOE:
• Enveil ZeroReveal® Compute Fabric Configuration Guide for Common Criteria v3.1,
Version 2.5.4
The above document and the specific portions of other documents referenced by it are the only
documents that should be trusted to install, administer, or use the TOE in its evaluated
configuration.
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7 TOE Evaluated Configuration
7.1 Evaluated Configuration
The TOE consists of the Enveil ZeroReveal Compute Fabric Server v2.5.4 software when
installed and configured in accordance with the documentation specified above in Section 6.
The TOE has been evaluated on the following host platforms:
• CentOS 8.1 on Intel Core i7-10710U
Note: The TOE is the application software only. The host platforms are not part of the
evaluation.
The TOE supports secure connectivity with several other IT environment devices as described
below:
Component Required Usage/Purpose Description
Enveil ZeroReveal®
Compute Fabric
Server platform
Yes The TOE is a ZeroReveal® Compute Fabric Server, which communicates with an
instance of the ZeroReveal Client to process data queries in a way that does
not disclose the nature of the query to any observer. The TOE does not serve a
useful function without the ZeroReveal® Client.
The Server platform must include the Java Runtime as shown in Figure 1 and
the CentOS 8.1 OS as defined above.
Enveil ZeroReveal®
Compute Fabric
Client workstation
Yes This is the client application which communicates with the ZeroReveal server
to process data queries in a way that does not disclose the nature of the query
to any observer. The workstation on which the Client runs must support the
REST APIs used to communicate with the TOE.
Data Repository Yes Locally installed and configured databases containing information against
which ZeroReveal queries are executed.
Table 6 IT Environment Components
7.2 Excluded Functionality
The TOE is a software application, and as such many of the functions of the application itself are
out of scope of a Common Criteria Evaluation. The following functionality is explicitly excluded
from the scope of evaluation; it was not evaluated during the common criteria evaluation, and
no claims are made regarding the applicability, suitability, or functionality of the following TOE
functions:
• Databases, including accessing, retrieving, storing, or operations on databases.
• The homomorphic encryption process, including the algorithms, uses and the security
strength of the resultant ciphertext.
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8 IT Product Testing
This section describes the testing efforts of the developer and the evaluation team. It is derived
from information contained in the Evaluation Test Report for Enveil ZeroReveal® Compute
Fabric Server v2.5.4, which is not publicly available. The AAR provides an overview of testing
and the prescribed AAs.
8.1 Developer Testing
No evidence of developer testing is required in the AAs for this product.
8.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing
The evaluation team verified the product according the vendor-provided guidance
documentation and ran the tests specified in the PP_APP_v1.3 and PKG_TLS_V1.1. The
Independent Testing activity is documented in the AAR, which is publicly available, and is not
duplicated here. A description of the test tools and test configurations may be found in Section
4 of the AAR.
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9 Results of the Evaluation
The results of the assurance requirements are generally described in this section and are
presented in detail in the proprietary documents: the Detailed Test Report (DTR) and the ETR.
The reader of this document can assume that activities and work units received a passing
verdict.
A verdict for an assurance component is determined by the resulting verdicts assigned to the
corresponding evaluator action elements. The evaluation was conducted based upon CC
version 3.1 rev 5 and CEM version 3.1 rev 5. The evaluation determined the Enveil ZeroReveal®
Compute Fabric Server v2.5.4 to be Part 2 extended, and meets the SARs contained in the PP.
Additionally, the evaluator performed the AAs specified in the NDPP.
9.1 Evaluation of Security Target
The evaluation team applied each ASE CEM work unit. The ST evaluation ensured the ST
contains a description of the environment in terms of policies and assumptions, a statement of
security requirements claimed to be met by the Enveil ZeroReveal® Compute Fabric Server
v2.5.4 that are consistent with the Common Criteria, and product security function descriptions
that support the requirements. Additionally, the evaluator performed an assessment of the AAs
specified in the PP_APP_v1.3 and PKG_TLS_V1.1.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted
in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by the
evaluation team was justified.
9.2 Evaluation of Development Documentation
The evaluation team applied each EAL 1 ADV CEM work unit. The evaluation team assessed the
design documentation and found it adequate to aid in understanding how the TSF provides the
security functions. The design documentation consists of a functional specification contained in
the ST’s TOE Summary Specification (TSS). Additionally, the evaluator performed the AAs
specified in the PP_APP_v1.3 and PKG_TLS_V1.1 related to the examination of the information
contained in the TSS.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted
in accordance with the AAs, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation team was
justified.
9.3 Evaluation of Guidance Documents
The evaluation team applied each EAL 1 AGD CEM work unit. The evaluation team ensured the
adequacy of the user guidance in describing how to use the operational TOE. Additionally, the
17
evaluation team ensured the adequacy of the administrator guidance in describing how to
securely administer the TOE. The guides were assessed during the design and testing phases of
the evaluation to ensure they were complete. Additionally, the evaluator performed the AAs
specified in the PP_APP_v1.3 and PKG_TLS_V1.1 related to the examination of the information
contained in the operational guidance documents.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the AAs, and that the conclusion reached by
the evaluation team was justified.
9.4 Evaluation of Life Cycle Support Activities
The evaluation team applied each EAL 1 ALC CEM work unit. The evaluation team found
that the TOE was identified.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted
in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by the
evaluation team was justified.
9.5 Evaluation of Test Documentation and the Test Activity
The evaluation team applied each EAL 1 ATE CEM work unit. The evaluation team ran the set of
tests specified by the AAs in the PP_APP_v1.3 and PKG_TLS_V1.1 and recorded the results in a
Test Report, summarized in the ETR and AAR.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence was
provided by the evaluation team to show that the evaluation activities addressed the test
activities in the PP_APP_v1.3 and PKG_TLS_V1.1, and that the conclusion reached by the
evaluation team was justified.
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity
The evaluation team applied each EAL 1 AVA CEM work unit. The evaluation team performed a
public search for vulnerabilities, performed vulnerability testing and did not discover any issues
with the TOE. The potential vulnerabilities considered in the analysis is characterized by the
date of the search (May 12, 2021), the search terms used, and the databases that were
searched. This information is detailed in Section 7.5 of the AAR.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation addressed the
vulnerability analysis AAs in the PP_APP_v1.3 and PKG_TLS_V1.1, and that the conclusion
reached by the evaluation team was justified.
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9.7 Summary of Evaluation Results
The evaluation team's assessment of the evaluation evidence demonstrates that the claims in
the ST are met. Additionally, the evaluation team's test activities also demonstrated the
accuracy of the claims in the ST.
The validation team's assessment of the evidence provided by the evaluation team is that it
demonstrates that the evaluation team performed the AAs in the PP_APP_v1.3 and
PKG_TLS_V1.1, and correctly verified that the product meets the claims in the ST.
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10 Validator Comments & Recommendations
All the validators’ comments are covered in the Clarification of Scope section (5.3) of this
report. There are no additional validator comments or recommendations.
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11 Annexes
Not applicable.
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12 Security Target
Enveil ZeroReveal® Compute Fabric Server Security Target Version 1.4.
22
13 Glossary
The following definitions are used throughout this document:
• Common Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL). An IT security evaluation facility accredited
by the National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP) and approved by
the CCEVS Validation Body to conduct Common Criteria-based evaluations.
• Conformance. The ability to demonstrate in an unambiguous way that a given
implementation is correct with respect to the formal model.
• Evaluation. The assessment of an IT product against the Common Criteria using the
Common Criteria Evaluation Methodology to determine whether or not the claims made
are justified; or the assessment of a protection profile against the Common Criteria
using the Common Evaluation Methodology to determine if the Profile is complete,
consistent, technically sound and hence suitable for use as a statement of requirements
for one or more TOEs that may be evaluated.
• Evaluation Evidence. Any tangible resource (information) required from the sponsor or
developer by the evaluator to perform one or more evaluation activities.
• Feature. Part of a product that is either included with the product or can be ordered
separately.
• Target of Evaluation (TOE). A group of IT products configured as an IT system, or an IT
product, and associated documentation that is the subject of a security evaluation
under the CC.
• Validation. The process carried out by the CCEVS Validation Body leading to the issue of
a Common Criteria certificate.
• Validation Body. A governmental organization responsible for carrying out validation
and for overseeing the day-to-day operation of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation
and Validation Scheme.
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14 Bibliography
The Validation Team used the following documents to produce this VR:
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Revision 5, April 2017. Part 1: Introduction and general model.
[2] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Revision 5, April 2017. Part 2: Security functional components.
[3] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1
Revision 5, April 2017. Part 3: Security assurance components.
[4] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version
3.1, 5, April 2017. Evaluation methodology.
[5] Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme - Guidance to CCEVS
Approved Common Criteria Testing Laboratories, Version 2.0, 8 Sep 2008.
[6] Enveil ZeroReveal® Compute Fabric Server v2.5.4 Security Target Version 1.4
[7] Enveil ZeroReveal® Compute Fabric Configuration Guide for Common Criteria
v3.1, Version 2.5.4
[8] Assurance Activity Report for Enveil ZeroReveal® Compute Fabric Server v2.5.4
Version 1.3, May 28, 2021
[9] Evaluation Technical Report for Enveil ZeroReveal® Compute Fabric Server v2.5.4
Version 1.3, May 28, 2021
[10] Test Plan for Enveil ZeroReveal® Compute Fabric Server v2.5.4 Version 1.3, May
28, 2021