TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V.
Headoffice:
Westervoortsedijk 73
NL-6827 AV Arnhem
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NL-6802 CE Arnhem
The Netherlands
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P.O. Box 37
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info@nl.tuv.com
www.tuv.com/nl
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Fax +31 (0)88 888 7 879
TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V. is a
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IBAN: NL61DEUT0265155096
Version
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Certification Report
SECORA™ ID X v1.1 (SLJ52GxAyyyzX)
Sponsor and developer: Infineon Technologies AG
Am Campeon 1 - 15
85579 Neubiberg
Germany
Evaluation facility: Brightsight
Brassersplein 2
2612 CT Delft
The Netherlands
Report number: NSCIB-CC-0031318-CR2
Report version: 1
Project number: 0031318_2
Author(s): Jordi Mujal
Date: 16 April 2021
Number of pages: 12
Number of appendices: 0
Reproduction of this report is authorized provided the report is reproduced in its entirety.
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CONTENTS:
Foreword 3
Recognition of the certificate 4
International recognition 4
European recognition 4
1 Executive Summary 5
2 Certification Results 6
2.1 Identification of Target of Evaluation 6
2.2 Security Policy 6
2.3 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope 6
2.4 Architectural Information 6
2.5 Documentation 7
2.6 IT Product Testing 7
2.7 Re-used evaluation results 9
2.8 Evaluated Configuration 9
2.9 Results of the Evaluation 9
2.10 Comments/Recommendations 10
3 Security Target 11
4 Definitions 11
5 Bibliography 12
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Foreword
The Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security (NSCIB) provides a third-party
evaluation and certification service for determining the trustworthiness of Information Technology (IT)
security products. Under this NSCIB, TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V. has the task of issuing
certificates for IT security products, as well as for protection profiles and sites.
Part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product, protection profile or site
according to the Common Criteria assessment guidelines published by the NSCIB. Evaluations are
performed by an IT Security Evaluation Facility (ITSEF) under the oversight of the NSCIB Certification
Body, which is operated by TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V. in cooperation with the Ministry of the
Interior and Kingdom Relations.
An ITSEF in the Netherlands is a commercial facility that has been licensed by TÜV Rheinland
Nederland B.V. to perform Common Criteria evaluations; a significant requirement for such a license is
accreditation to the requirements of ISO Standard 17025 “General requirements for the accreditation
of calibration and testing laboratories”.
By awarding a Common Criteria certificate, TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V. asserts that the product or
site complies with the security requirements specified in the associated (site) security target, or that
the protection profile (PP) complies with the requirements for PP evaluation specified in the Common
Criteria for Information Security Evaluation. A (site) security target is a requirements specification
document that defines the scope of the evaluation activities.
The consumer should review the (site) security target or protection profile, in addition to this
certification report, in order to gain an understanding of any assumptions made during the evaluation,
the IT product's intended environment, its security requirements, and the level of confidence (i.e., the
evaluation assurance level) that the product or site satisfies the security requirements stated in the
(site) security target.
Reproduction of this report is authorized provided the report is reproduced in its entirety.
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Recognition of the certificate
Presence of the Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement and SOG-IS logos on the certificate
indicates that this certificate is issued in accordance with the provisions of the CCRA and the SOG-IS
agreement and will be recognised by the participating nations.
International recognition
The CCRA has been signed by the Netherlands in May 2000 and provides mutual recognition of
certificates based on the CC. Starting September 2014 the CCRA has been updated to provide mutual
recognition of certificates based on cPPs (exact use) or STs with evaluation assurance components
up to and including EAL2+ALC_FLR. The current list of signatory nations and approved certification
schemes can be found on: http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
European recognition
The European SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) version 3 effective from April
2010 provides mutual recognition of Common Criteria and ITSEC certificates at a basic evaluation
level for all products. A higher recognition level for evaluation levels beyond EAL4 (resp. E3-basic) is
provided for products related to specific technical domains. This agreement was initially signed by
Finland, France, Germany, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Italy
joined the SOGIS-MRA in December 2010. The current list of signatory nations, approved certification
schemes and the list of technical domains for which the higher recognition applies can be found on:
http://www.sogisportal.eu.
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1 Executive Summary
This Certification Report states the outcome of the Common Criteria security evaluation of the
SECORA™ ID X v1.1 (SLJ52GxAyyyzX). The developer of the SECORA™ ID X v1.1
(SLJ52GxAyyyzX) is Infineon Technologies AG located in Neubiberg, Germany and they also act as
the sponsor of the evaluation and certification. A Certification Report is intended to assist prospective
consumers when judging the suitability of the IT security properties of the product for their particular
requirements.
The TOE is a Java Card Platform compliant with Java Card Specification (Classic Edition) version
3.0.5 and GlobalPlatform Specification v.2.3.1 and the GlobalPlatform Card ID Configuration v1.0. The
TOE allows post-issuance downloading of applications that have been previously verified by an off-
card verifier. It constitutes a secure generic platform that supports multi-application runtime
environment and provides facilities for secure loading and interoperability between different
applications.
The TOE has been originally evaluated by Brightsight B.V. located in Delft, The Netherlands and was
certified on 9 July 2020. The re-evaluation also took place by Brightsight B.V. and was completed on
16 April 2021 with the approval of the ETR. The re-certification procedure has been conducted in
accordance with the provisions of the Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security
[NSCIB].
This second issue of the Certification Report is a result of a “recertification with major changes”.
The major changes are related to the update of the Java Card OS. In addition, there were updates to
the Security target and user guidance. The underlying hardware remained unchanged.
The security evaluation re-used the evaluation results of previously performed evaluations. A full, up to
date vulnerability analysis has been made.
The scope of the evaluation is defined by the security target [ST], which identifies assumptions made
during the evaluation, the intended environment for the SECORA™ ID X v1.1 (SLJ52GxAyyyzX), the
security requirements, and the level of confidence (evaluation assurance level) at which the product is
intended to satisfy the security requirements. Consumers of the SECORA™ ID X v1.1
(SLJ52GxAyyyzX) are advised to verify that their own environment is consistent with the security
target, and to give due consideration to the comments, observations and recommendations in this
certification report.
The results documented in the evaluation technical report [ETR]1
for this product provides sufficient
evidence that the TOE meets the EAL6 augmented (EAL6+) assurance requirements for the evaluated
security functionality. This assurance level is augmented with ALC_FLR.1 (Flaw Remediation)
The evaluation was conducted using the Common Methodology for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5 and [CEM] for conformance to the Common Criteria for Information
Technology Security Evaluation, version 3.1 Revision 5 [CC] (Parts I, II and III).
TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V., as the NSCIB Certification Body, declares that the evaluation meets
all the conditions for international recognition of Common Criteria Certificates and that the product will
be listed on the NSCIB Certified Products list. It should be noted that the certification results only apply
to the specific version of the product as evaluated.
1
The Evaluation Technical Report contains information proprietary to the developer and/or the
evaluator, and is not releasable for public review.
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2 Certification Results
2.1 Identification of Target of Evaluation
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) for this evaluation is the SECORA™ ID X v1.1 (SLJ52GxAyyyzX) from
Infineon Technologies AG located in Neubiberg, Germany.
The TOE is comprised of the following main components:
Delivery
item type
Identifier Version
Hardware Hardware Platform IFX_CCI_000010
Firmware Firmware 80.102.06.1
Software
Asymmetric Crypto Library (ACL), including Base, RSA4096,
EC, and Toolbox libraries
2.07.003
Software Symmetric Crypto Library (SCL) 2.04.002
Software Hardware Support Library (HSL) 03.12.8812
Software Embedded OS 1482
To ensure secure usage a set of guidance documents is provided together with the SECORA™ ID X
v1.1 (SLJ52GxAyyyzX). Details can be found in section 2.5 of this report.
For a detailed and precise description of the TOE lifecycle refer to the [ST], chapter 1.4.4.
2.2 Security Policy
The TOE is a Java Card Platform compliant with Java Card Specification (Classic Edition) version
3.0.5 and GlobalPlatform Specification v.2.3.1 and the GlobalPlatform Card ID Configuration v1.0. The
TOE allows post-issuance downloading of applications that have been previously verified by an off-
card verifier. It constitutes a secure generic platform that supports multi-application runtime
environment and provides facilities for secure loading and interoperability between different
applications.
2.3 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
2.3.1 Assumptions
The assumptions defined in the Security Target are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead
to specific Security Objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. Detailed information on these
security objectives that must be fulfilled by the TOE environment can be found in section 5.2 of the
[ST].
2.3.2 Clarification of scope
The evaluation did not reveal any threats to the TOE that are not countered by the evaluated security
functions of the product.
2.4 Architectural Information
The logical architecture, originating from the Security Target of the TOE can be depicted as follows:
Page: 7/12 of report number: NSCIB-CC-0031318-CR2, dated 16 April 2021
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The TOE has the features that are described in Section 1.3.2 of [ST]. In the following, the
JCRE/JCVM/JCAPI v3.0.5 is referred to as JC OS.
2.5 Documentation
The following documentation is provided with the product by the developer to the customer:
Identifier Version
SECORA™ ID X v1.1 Administration Guide 1.50
SECORA™ ID X v1.1 Data Book 1.40
SECORA™ ID X v1.1 Security Guide 1.40
SECORA™ ID X v1.1 SLJ52GxAyyyzX System Release Notes 1.20
SECORA™ ID X v1.1 Product API Specification 1.00.1482
2.6 IT Product Testing
Testing (depth, coverage, functional tests, independent testing): The evaluators examined the
developer’s testing activities documentation and verified that the developer has met their testing
responsibilities.
2.6.1 Testing approach and depth
During the baseline evaluation, the developer performed extensive testing on functional specification,
subsystem and SFR-enforcing module level. All parameter choices have been addressed at least
once. All boundary cases identified have been tested explicitly, and additionally the near-boundary
conditions have been covered probabilistically. The testing was largely automated using industry
standard and proprietary test suites. Test scripts were extensively used to verify that the functions
return the expected values.
The underlying hardware and crypto-library test results are extendable to composite evaluations, as
the underlying platform is operated according to its guidance and the composite evaluation
requirements are met.
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For RC3 (OS version 1482), the changed parts are tested by the developer’s test cases mainly by
automatic testing. The developer provided code coverage test results, showing that changed code
parts are covered by newly defined or updated test cases. The assurance obtained for the baseline
evaluation of the TOE is valid for this re-evaluation.
During the baseline evaluation, for the testing performed by the evaluators, the developer provided
samples and a test environment. The evaluators reproduced a selection of the developer tests, as well
as a small number of test cases designed by the evaluator.
As the developer has added sufficient additional test cases for RC3 (OS version 1482) in this re-
evaluation to cover the associated changes to the implementation, no additional independent tests
were identifed by the evaluator.
2.6.2 Independent Penetration Testing
The methodical analysis performed was conducted along the following steps:
• When evaluating the evidence in the classes ASE, ADV and AGD the evaluator considers
whether potential vulnerabilities can already be identified due to the TOE type and/or specified
behaviour.
• A thorough implementation representation review (ADV_IMP) was performed. The analysis
was driven by the attack methods defined in [JIL-AAPS] and [JIL-AM]. An important source for
assurance in this step is the technical report [HW-ETRfC] of the underlying platform.
• All potential vulnerabilities are analysed and a judgment was made on their exploitability. The
potential vulnerabilities are addressed by penetration testing, a guidance update or code
update.
During this re-evaluation, the vulnerability analysis and assurance from penetration testing were
refreshed. The methodical analysis is repeated on the basis of a delta code review, resulting in the
identification of no additional penetration test. In addition, as the penetration testing campaign for the
baseline evaluation was performed less than one year ago and the Lab considered there are no
significant advances in the involved tools and techniques, no testing effort was carried out during the
evaluation. As conclusion, it is considered that the results obtained in the baseline evaluation are valid
for the current TOE.
2.6.3 Test Configuration
The developer tested the TOE in the following configuration during the baseline evaluation:
HW identifier: 80 03 00 00 10
EMVCo identifier: 81 06 00 22 00 1C 00 00
JC OS Build Number: 82 02 13 58
HCL version: 83 04 00 00 00 00
ACL version: 84 05 20 70 03 34 20
SCL version: 85 04 20 40 02 20
HSL version: 86 04 03 12 88 12
RSA: 87 02 00 01
The evaluator tested the TOE in the following configuration during the baseline evaluation:
HW identifier: 80 03 00 00 10
EMVCo identifier: 81 06 00 22 00 03 00 00, and 81 06 00 22 00 0B 00 00
JC OS Build Number: 82 02 13 58
HCL version: 83 04 00 00 00 00
ACL version: 84 05 20 70 03 34 20
SCL version: 85 04 20 40 02 20
HSL version: 86 04 03 12 88 12
RSA: 87 02 00 01
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The developer tested the TOE in the following configuration during the current re-evaluation:
HW identifier: 80 03 00 00 10
EMVCo identifier: 81 06 00 22 00 1C 00 00
JC OS Build Number: 82 02 14 82
HCL version: 83 04 00 00 00 00
ACL version: 84 05 20 70 03 34 20
SCL version: 85 04 20 40 02 20
HSL version: 86 04 03 12 88 12
RSA: 87 02 00 01
This is the same configuration as stated in the [ST].
2.6.4 Testing Results
The testing activities, including configurations, procedures, test cases, expected results and observed
results are summarised in the [ETR], with references to the documents containing the full details.
The developer’s tests and the independent functional tests produced the expected results, giving
assurance that the TOE behaves as specified in its [ST] and functional specification.
No exploitable vulnerabilities were found with the independent penetration tests.
The algorithmic security level of cryptographic functionality has not been rated in this certification
process, but the current consensus on the algorithmic security level in the open domain, i.e. from the
current best cryptanalytic attacks published, has been taken into account. The strength of the
implementation of the cryptographic functionality has been assessed in the evaluation, as part of the
AVA_VAN activities. No exploitable vulnerabilities were found with the independent penetration tests.
The TOE supports a wide range of key sizes (see [ST]), including those with sufficient algorithmic
security level to exceed 100 bits as required for high attack potential (AVA_VAN.5).
Not all key sizes specified in the [ST] have sufficient cryptographic strength for satisfying the
AVA_VAN.5 “high attack potential”. In order to be protected against attackers with a "high attack
potential", appropriate cryptographic algorithms with sufficiently large cryptographic key sizes shall be
used (references can be found in national and international documents and standards).
For composite evaluations, please consult the [ETRfC] for details.
2.7 Re-used evaluation results
This is a re-certification. Documentary evaluation results of the earlier version of the TOE have been
re-used, but vulnerability analysis has been renewed. As a result of this new analysis, the penetration
testing has been reused.
There has been extensive re-use of the ALC aspects for the sites involved in the software component
of the TOE. Sites involved in the development and production of the hardware platform were re-used
by composition.
No sites have been visited as part of this evaluation.
2.8 Evaluated Configuration
The TOE is defined uniquely by its name and version number SECORA™ ID X v1.1
(SLJ52GxAyyyzX).
2.9 Results of the Evaluation
The evaluation lab documented their evaluation results in the [ETR], which references an ASE
Intermediate Report and other evaluator documents. To support composite evaluations according to
[CCDB-2007-09-01] a derived document [ETRfC] was provided and approved. This document
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provides details of the TOE evaluation that have to be considered when this TOE is used as platform
in a composite evaluation.
The verdict of each claimed assurance requirement is “Pass”.
Based on the above evaluation results the evaluation lab concluded the SECORA™ ID X v1.1
(SLJ52GxAyyyzX), to be CC Part 2 extended, CC Part 3 conformant, and to meet the requirements
of EAL 6 augmented with ALC_FLR.1. This implies that the product satisfies the security
requirements specified in Security Target [ST].
The Security Target claims ‘demonstrable’ conformance to the Protection Profile [PP].
2.10 Comments/Recommendations
The user guidance as outlined in section 2.5 contains necessary information about the usage of the
TOE. Certain aspects of the TOE’s security functionality, in particular the countermeasures against
attacks, depend on accurate conformance to the user guidance of both the software and the hardware
part of the TOE. There are no particular obligations or recommendations for the user apart from
following the user guidance. Please note that the documents contain relevant details with respect to
the resistance against certain attacks.
In addition, all aspects of assumptions, threats and policies as outlined in the Security Target not
covered by the TOE itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his system risk
management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and techniques to be covered, he
should define the period of time until a re-assessment for the TOE is required and thus requested from
the sponsor of the certificate.
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms and protocols was not rated in the course of this
evaluation. This specifically applies to the following proprietary or non-standard algorithms, protocols
and implementations: none.
Not all key sizes specified in the [ST] have sufficient cryptographic strength for satisfying the
AVA_VAN.5 “high attack potential”. In order to be protected against attackers with a "high attack
potential", appropriate cryptographic algorithms with sufficiently large cryptographic key sizes shall be
used (references can be found in national and international documents and standards).
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3 Security Target
The SECORA™ ID X v1.1 (SLJ52GxAyyyzX), Rev1.3, 22 March 2021 [ST] is included here by
reference.
4 Definitions
This list of Acronyms and the glossary of terms contains elements that are not already defined by the
CC or CEM:
IT Information Technology
ITSEF IT Security Evaluation Facility
JCAPI Java Card Application Programming Interface
JC OS Java Card Operating System
JCRE Java Card Runtime Environment
JCVM Java Card Virtual Machine
JIL Joint Interpretation Library
NSCIB Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the area of IT security
PP Protection Profile
TOE Target of Evaluation
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5 Bibliography
This section lists all referenced documentation used as source material in the compilation of this
report:
[CC] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Parts I, II and III,
Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017.
[CEM] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1
Revision 5, April 2017.
[ETR] Evaluation Technical Report “SECORA™ ID X v1.1 (SLJ52GxAyyyzX)” – EAL6+,
20-RPT-305, v7.0, 16 April 2021.
[ETRfC] Evaluation Technical Report for Composition “SECORA™ ID X v1.1
(SLJ52GxAyyyzX)” – EAL6+, 20-RPT-306, v6.0, 16 April 2021.
[HW-CERT] BSI-DSZ-CC-1079-V2-2020 for Infineon Security Controller IFX_CCI_00000Fh
IFX_CCI_000010h IFX_CCI_000026h IFX_CCI_000027h IFX_CCI_000028h
IFX_CCI_000029h IFX_CCI_00002Ah IFX_CCI_00002Bh IFX_CCI_00002Ch in
the design step G12 and including optional software libraries and dedicated
firmware, 16 June 2020.
[HW-ETRfC] EVALUATION TECHNICAL REPORT FOR COMPOSITE EVALUATION (ETR
COMP) BSI-DSZ-CC-1079-V2, Version 2, 15 May 2020.
[HW-ST] Public Security Target Common Criteria v3.1 – EAL6 augmented / EAL 6+
IFX_CCI_00000Fh, IFX_CCI_000010h, IFX_CCI_000026h, IFX_CCI_000027h,
IFX_CCI_000028h, IFX_CCI_000029h, IFX_CCI_00002Ah, IFX_CCI_00002Bh,
IFX_CCI_00002Ch G12, Revision 0.8, 03 April 2020.
[JIL-AAPS] JIL Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards, Version 3.1, June 2020.
[JIL-AM] Attack Methods for Smartcards and Similar Devices, Version 2.4, January 2020
(sensitive with controlled distribution).
[NSCIB] Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security, Version 2.5, 28
March 2019.
[PP] Javacard Protection Profile Open Configuration, v3.0.5, December 2017,
registered under the reference BSI-CC-PP-0099-2017.
[ST] SECORA™ ID X v1.1 (SLJ52GxAyyyzX), Rev1.3, 22 March 2021.
(This is the end of this report).