National Information Assurance Partnership
Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
Validation Report
for the
Cisco Aggregation Services Router (ASR) 1000 Series,
Version 1.0
Report Number: CCEVS-VR-10816-2017
Dated: 11/17/17
Version: 1.0
National Institute of Standards and Technology National Security Agency
Information Technology Laboratory Information Assurance Directorate
100 Bureau Drive 9800 Savage Road STE 6940
Gaithersburg, MD 20899 Fort George G. Meade, MD 20755-6940
®
TM
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Validation Team
Jerome Myers
Kenneth Stutterheim
Meredith Hennan
The Aerospace Corporation
Common Criteria Testing Laboratory
Kevin Micciche
Zalman Kuperman
Kevin Zhang
Acumen Security, LLC
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Table of Contents
1 Executive Summary............................................................................................................... 5
2 Identification.......................................................................................................................... 6
3 Architectural Information .................................................................................................... 7
3.1 TOE Evaluated Platforms..............................................................................................................................7
3.2 TOE Architecture...........................................................................................................................................8
3.3 Physical Boundaries .......................................................................................................................................9
4 Security Policy...................................................................................................................... 10
4.1 Security Audit ...............................................................................................................................................10
4.2 Cryptographic Support................................................................................................................................10
4.3 Identification and Authentication ...............................................................................................................11
4.4 Security Management ..................................................................................................................................12
4.5 Protection of the TSF ...................................................................................................................................13
4.6 TOE Access ...................................................................................................................................................13
4.7 Trusted Path/Channel ..................................................................................................................................13
5 Assumptions, Threats & Clarification of Scope ............................................................... 14
5.1 Assumptions..................................................................................................................................................14
5.2 Threats...........................................................................................................................................................15
5.3 Clarification of Scope...................................................................................................................................17
6 Documentation..................................................................................................................... 18
7 TOE Evaluated Configuration ........................................................................................... 19
7.1 Evaluated Configuration..............................................................................................................................19
7.2 Excluded Functionality ................................................................................................................................19
8 IT Product Testing............................................................................................................... 20
8.1 Developer Testing .........................................................................................................................................20
8.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing.......................................................................................................20
8.2.1 Test Bed 1 ..................................................................................................................................................20
8.2.2 Test Bed 2 ..................................................................................................................................................21
9 Results of the Evaluation .................................................................................................... 23
9.1 Evaluation of Security Target (ASE) ..........................................................................................................23
9.2 Evaluation of Development Documentation (ADV)...................................................................................23
9.3 Evaluation of Guidance Documents (AGD) ...............................................................................................23
9.4 Evaluation of Life Cycle Support Activities (ALC)...................................................................................24
9.5 Evaluation of Test Documentation and the Test Activity (ATE)..............................................................24
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity (VAN) ..................................................................................................24
9.7 Summary of Evaluation Results..................................................................................................................25
10 Validator Comments & Recommendations ...................................................................... 26
11 Annexes................................................................................................................................. 27
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12 Security Target .................................................................................................................... 28
13 Glossary................................................................................................................................ 29
14 Bibliography......................................................................................................................... 30
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1 Executive Summary
This Validation Report (VR) is intended to assist the end user of this product and any security
certification Agent for that end user in determining the suitability of this Information Technology
(IT) product for their environment. End users should review the Security Target (ST), which is
where specific security claims are made, in conjunction with this VR, which describes how those
security claims were tested and evaluated and any restrictions on the evaluated configuration.
Prospective users should carefully read the Assumptions and Clarification of Scope in Section 5
and the Validator Comments in Section 10, where any restrictions on the evaluated configuration
are highlighted.
This report documents the National Information Assurance Partnership (NIAP) assessment of the
evaluation of the Cisco Aggregation Services Router (ASR) 1000 Series Target of Evaluation
(TOE). It presents the evaluation results, their justifications, and the conformance results. This
VR is not an endorsement of the TOE by any agency of the U.S. Government and no warranty of
the TOE is either expressed or implied. This VR applies only to the specific version and
configuration of the product as evaluated and documented in the ST.
The evaluation was completed by Acumen Security in November 2017. The information in this
report is largely derived from the Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) and associated test report,
all written by Acumen Security. The evaluation determined that the product is both Common
Criteria Part 2 Extended and Part 3 Conformant, and meets the assurance requirements defined in
the U.S. Government Protection Profile for Security Requirements for the collaborative
Protection Profile for Network Devices version 1.0 (NDcPPv1.0).
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) identified in this Validation Report has been evaluated at a
NIAP approved Common Criteria Testing Laboratory using the Common Methodology for IT
Security Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev. 4) for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT
Security Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev. 4), as interpreted by the Assurance Activities contained in
the NDcPP 1.0. This Validation Report applies only to the specific version of the TOE as
evaluated. The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the NIAP
Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme (CCEVS) and the conclusions of the testing
laboratory in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence provided.
The validation team provided guidance on technical issues and evaluation processes and
reviewed the individual work units documented in the ETR and the Assurance Activities Report
(AAR). The validation team found that the evaluation showed that the product satisfies all of the
functional requirements and assurance requirements stated in the Security Target (ST). Based on
these findings, the validation team concludes that the testing laboratory's findings are accurate,
the conclusions justified, and the conformance results are correct. The conclusions of the testing
laboratory in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence produced.
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2 Identification
The CCEVS is a joint National Security Agency (NSA) and National Institute of
Standards effort to establish commercial facilities to perform trusted product evaluations.
Under this program, security evaluations are conducted by commercial testing
laboratories called Common Criteria Testing Laboratories (CCTLs). CCTLs evaluate
products against Protection Profile containing Assurance Activities, which are
interpretation of Common Evaluation Methodology (CEM) work units specific to the
technology described by the PP.
The NIAP Validation Body assigns Validators to monitor the CCTLs to ensure quality
and consistency across evaluations. Developers of information technology products
desiring a security evaluation contract with a CCTL and pay a fee for their product's
evaluation. Upon successful completion of the evaluation, the product is added to NIAP's
Product Compliance List.
Table 1 provides information needed to completely identify the product, including:
 The Target of Evaluation (TOE): the fully qualified identifier of the product as
evaluated.
 The Security Target (ST), describing the security features, claims, and assurances
of the product.
 The conformance result of the evaluation.
 The Protection Profile(s) to which the product is conformant.
 The organizations and individuals participating in the evaluation.
Table 1: Evaluation Identifiers
Item Identifier
Evaluation Scheme United States NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
TOE Cisco Aggregation Services Router (ASR) 1000 Series
Protection Profile collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, version 1.0, February 27, 2015
(NDcPPv1.0)
Security Target Cisco Aggregation Services Router (ASR) 1000 Series Security Target, version 0.7,
October 17, 2017
Evaluation Technical
Report
Cisco Aggregation Services Router (ASR) 1000 Series ETR, version 1.2, November 17,
2017
CC Version Version 3.1, Revision 4
Conformance Result CC Part 2 Extended and CC Part 3 Conformant
Sponsor Cisco Systems, Inc.
Developer Cisco Systems, Inc.
Common Criteria
Testing Lab (CCTL)
Acumen Security
Montgomery Village, MD
CCEVS Validators Jerome Myers, Kenneth Stutterheim, Meredith Hennan
The Aerospace Corporation
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3 Architectural Information
Note: The following architectural description is based on the description presented in the
Security Target.
The Cisco ASR1K Series delivers embedded hardware acceleration for multiple Cisco IOS-XE
Software services. In addition, the Cisco ASR1K Series Router features redundant Route and
Embedded Services Processors, as well as software-based redundancy. In support of the routing
capabilities, the Cisco ASR1K provides IPsec connection capabilities to facilitate secure
communications with external entities, as required.
The hardware models included in the evaluation are: 1004. The TOE consists of a number of
components including:
 Chassis: The TOE chassis includes 4-RU form factor. The chassis is the component of
the TOE in which all other TOE components are housed.
 Embedded Services Processor (ESPr): The Cisco ASR1K Series ESPrs (ESP10, ESP 20,
ESP40) are responsible for the data-plane processing tasks, and all network traffic flows
through them.
 Route Processor (RP): The Cisco ASR1K Series RPs (RP1 and RP2) provide the
advanced routing capabilities of the TOE. They also monitor and manage the other
components in the Cisco ASR1K Series Aggregation Services.
 Shared Port Adaptors (SPAs): Used for connecting to networks. These SPAs interface
with the TOE to provide the network interfaces that will be used to communicate on the
network.
3.1 TOE Evaluated Platforms
The TOE is a hardware and software solution that makes up the router models as follows:
Chassis:
 ASR 1004; Embedded Services Processors (ESP): ESP20 and ESP40; Route Processor
(RP): RP1, RP2
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3.2 TOE Architecture
The following figure provides a visual depiction of an example TOE deployment.
Figure 1 TOE Example Deployment
ASR1K Appliance
Syslog Server
(Mandatory)
Management
Workstation
(Mandatory)
AAA Server
(Optional)
NTP
Server(Optional)
CA
(Mandatory)
Local
Console
(Mandatory)
Legend
= TOE Boundary
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The following are considered to be in the IT Environment:
 Management Workstation
 Authentication Server
 NTP Server
 Syslog Server
 Local Console
 CA
NOTE: While the previous figure includes several TOE devices and several non-TOE IT
environment devices, the TOE is only the ASR1K device. Only one TOE device is required for
deployment of the TOE in an evaluated configuration.
3.3 Physical Boundaries
The TOE is comprised of the following physical specifications as described in Table 2 below:
Table 2: ASR1K Hardware Models and Specifications
Hardware Model ASR 1004
Dimensions (HxWxD) in
inches
7 x 17.2 x 18.15
Shared Port Adapters 8
Ethernet Port Adapters n/a
Embedded services processor
slots
1
ESP Bandwidth 10 to 40 Gbps
Route processor slots 1
Built-in Gigabit Ethernet
ports
0
Default memory 4-GB DRAM RP1
8-GB DRAM RP2
External USB flash memory 1-GB USB flash-
memory support
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4 Security Policy
The TOE is comprised of several security features. Each of the security features identified above
consists of several security functionalities, as identified below.
1. Security Audit
2. Cryptographic Support
3. Identification and Authentication
4. Security Management
5. Packet Filtering
6. Protection of the TSF
7. TOE Access
8. Trusted Path/Channels
These features are described in more detail in the subsections below. In addition, the TOE
implements all RFCs of the NDcPP v1.0 as necessary to satisfy testing/assurance measures
prescribed therein.
4.1 Security Audit
The ASR1K provides extensive auditing capabilities. The TOE can audit events related to
cryptographic functionality, identification and authentication, and administrative actions. The
TOE generates an audit record for each auditable event. Each security relevant audit event has
the date, timestamp, event description, and subject identity. The administrator configures
auditable events, performs back-up operations and manages audit data storage. The TOE
provides the administrator with a circular audit trail or a configurable audit trail threshold to
track the storage capacity of the audit trail. Audit logs are backed up over an encrypted channel
to an external audit server.
4.2 Cryptographic Support
The TOE provides cryptography in support of other TOE security functionality. All the
algorithms claimed have CAVP certificates.
The TOE provides cryptography in support of VPN connections and remote administrative
management via SSHv2. The cryptographic services provided by the TOE are described in the
table below.
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Table 3: TOE Provided Cryptography
Cryptographic Method Use within the TOE
Internet Key Exchange Used to establish initial IPsec session.
Secure Shell Establishment Used to establish initial SSH session.
RSA/DSA Signature Services Used in IPsec session establishment.
Used in SSH session establishment.
X.509 certificate signing
SP 800-90 RBG Used in IPsec session establishment.
Used in SSH session establishment.
SHS Used to provide IPsec traffic integrity verification
Used to provide SSH traffic integrity verification
Used for keyed-hash message authentication
AES Used to encrypt IPsec session traffic.
Used to encrypt SSH session traffic.
RSA Used in IKE protocols peer authentication
Used to provide cryptographic signature services
ECC Used to provide cryptographic signature services
DH Used as the Key exchange method for SSH
4.3 Identification and Authentication
The TOE performs two types of authentication: device-level authentication of the remote device
(VPN peers) and user authentication for the Authorized Administrator of the TOE. Device-level
authentication allows the TOE to establish a secure channel with a trusted peer. The secure
channel is established only after each device authenticates the other. Device-level authentication
is performed via IKE/IPsec mutual authentication. The TOE supports use of IKEv1 (ISAKMP)
and IKEv2 pre-shared keys for authentication of IPsec tunnels. The IKE phase authentication for
the IPsec communication channel between the TOE and authentication server and between the
TOE and syslog server is considered part of the Identification and Authentication security
functionality of the TOE.
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The TOE provides authentication services for administrative users to connect to the TOE’s
secure CLI administrator interface. The TOE requires Authorized Administrators to authenticate
prior to being granted access to any of the management functionality. The TOE can be
configured to require a minimum password length of 15 characters. The TOE provides
administrator authentication against a local user database. Password-based authentication can be
performed on the serial console or SSH interfaces. The SSHv2 interface also supports
authentication using SSH keys. The TOE optionally supports use of a RADIUS AAA server
(part of the IT Environment) for authentication of administrative users attempting to connect to
the TOE’s CLI.
The TOE provides an automatic lockout when a user attempts to authenticate and enters invalid
information. After a defined number of authentication attempts fail exceeding the configured
allowable attempts, the user is locked out until an authorized administrator can enable the user
account.
The TOE uses X.509v3 certificates as defined by RFC 5280 to support authentication for IPsec,
and SSH connections.
4.4 Security Management
The TOE provides secure administrative services for management of general TOE configuration
and the security functionality provided by the TOE. All TOE administration occurs either
through a secure SSHv2 session or via a local console connection. The TOE provides the ability
to securely manage:
• Administration of the TOE locally and remotely;
• All TOE administrative users;
• All identification and authentication;
• All audit functionality of the TOE;
• All TOE cryptographic functionality;
• The timestamps maintained by the TOE;
• Update to the TOE and verification of the updates;
• Configuration of IPsec functionality;
• TOE configuration file storage and retrieval.
The TOE supports two separate administrator roles: non-privileged administrator and privileged
administrator. Only the privileged administrator can perform the above security relevant
management functions. Management of the TSF data is restricted to Security Administrators.
The ability to enable, disable, determine and modify the behavior of all of the security functions
of the TOE is restricted to authenticated administrators.
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Administrators can create configurable login banners to be displayed at time of login, and can
also define an inactivity timeout for each admin interface to terminate sessions after a set period
of inactivity.
4.5 Protection of the TSF
The TOE protects against interference and tampering by untrusted subjects by implementing
identification, authentication, and access controls to limit configuration to Authorized
Administrators. The TOE prevents reading of cryptographic keys and passwords.
Additionally, Cisco IOS-XE is not a general-purpose operating system and access to Cisco IOS-
XE memory space is restricted to only Cisco IOS-XE functions.
The TOE internally maintains the date and time. This date and time is used as the timestamp that
is applied to audit records generated by the TOE. Administrators can update the TOE’s clock
manually, or can configure the TOE to use NTP to synchronize the TOE’s clock with an external
time source. Finally, the TOE performs testing to verify correct operation of the router itself and
that of the cryptographic module.
The TOE is able to verify any software updates prior to the software updates being installed on
the TOE to avoid the installation of unauthorized software.
Whenever a failure occurs within the TOE that results in the TOE ceasing operation, the TOE
securely disables its interfaces to prevent the unintentional flow of any information to or from
the TOE and reloads.
4.6 TOE Access
The TOE can terminate or lock inactive sessions after an Authorized Administrator configurable
time-period. Once a session has been terminated the TOE requires the user to re-authenticate to
establish a new session. Sessions can also be terminated if an Authorized Administrator enters
the “exit” command.
The TOE can also display a Security Administrator specified banner on the CLI management
interface prior to allowing any administrative access to the TOE.
4.7 Trusted Path/Channel
The TOE allows trusted paths to be established to itself from remote administrators over SSHv2,
and initiates outbound IPsec tunnels to transmit audit messages to remote syslog servers. In
addition, IPsec is used to secure the session between the TOE and the authentication servers. The
TOE can also establish trusted paths of peer-to-peer IPsec sessions. The peer-to-peer IPsec
sessions can be used for securing the communications between the TOE and authentication
server/syslog server, as well as to protect communications with a CA or remote administrative
console.
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5 Assumptions, Threats & Clarification of Scope
5.1 Assumptions
The specific conditions listed in the following subsections are assumed to exist in the TOE’s
environment. These assumptions include both practical realities in the development of the TOE
security requirements and the essential environmental conditions on the use of the TOE.
Table 4: TOE Assumptions
Assumption Assumption Definition
A.PHYSICAL_PROTECTION The network device is assumed to be physically protected in its
operational environment and not subject to physical attacks that
compromise the security and/or interfere with the device’s physical
interconnections and correct operation. This protection is assumed to
be sufficient to protect the device and the data it contains. As a
result, the cPP will not include any requirements on physical tamper
protection or other physical attack mitigations. The cPP will not
expect the product to defend against physical access to the device
that allows unauthorized entities to extract data, bypass other
controls, or otherwise manipulate the device.
A.LIMITED_FUNCTIONALITY The device is assumed to provide networking functionality as its
core function and not provide functionality/ services that could be
deemed as general purpose computing. For example the device
should not provide computing platform for general purpose
applications (unrelated to networking functionality).
A.NO_THRU_TRAFFIC_PROTECTION A standard/generic network device does not provide any assurance
regarding the protection of traffic that traverses it. The intent is for
the network device to protect data that originates on or is destined to
the device itself, to include administrative data and audit data.
Traffic that is traversing the network device, destined for another
network entity, is not covered by the ND cPP. It is assumed that this
protection will be covered by cPPs for particular types of network
devices (e.g, firewall).
A.TRUSTED_ADMINISTRATOR The Security Administrator(s) for the network device are assumed to
be trusted and to act in the best interest of security for the
organization. This includes being appropriately trained, following
policy, and adhering to guidance documentation. Administrators are
trusted to ensure passwords/credentials have sufficient strength and
entropy and to lack malicious intent when administering the device.
The network device is not expected to be capable of defending
against a malicious administrator that actively works to bypass or
compromise the security of the device.
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Assumption Assumption Definition
A.REGULAR_UPDATES The network device firmware and software is assumed to be updated
by an administrator on a regular basis in response to the release of
product updates due to known vulnerabilities.
A.ADMIN_CREDENTIALS_SECURE The administrator’s credentials (private key) used to access the
network device are protected by the platform on which they reside.
5.2 Threats
The following table lists the threats addressed by the TOE and the IT Environment. The
assumed level of expertise of the attacker for all the threats identified below is Enhanced-Basic.
Table 5: Threats
Threat Threat Definition
T.UNAUTHORIZED_ADMINISTRATOR_ACCESS Threat agents may attempt to gain administrator access
to the network device by nefarious means such as
masquerading as an administrator to the device,
masquerading as the device to an administrator,
replaying an administrative session (in its entirety, or
selected portions), or performing man-in-the-middle
attacks, which would provide access to the
administrative session, or sessions between network
devices. Successfully gaining administrator access
allows malicious actions that compromise the security
functionality of the device and the network on which it
resides.
T.WEAK_CRYPTOGRAPHY Threat agents may exploit weak cryptographic
algorithms or perform a cryptographic exhaust against
the key space. Poorly chosen encryption algorithms,
modes, and key sizes will allow attackers to compromise
the algorithms, or brute force exhaust the key space and
give them unauthorized access allowing them to read,
manipulate and/or control the traffic with minimal
effort.
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Threat Threat Definition
T.UNTRUSTED_COMMUNICATION_CHANNELS Threat agents may attempt to target network devices that
do not use standardized secure tunneling protocols to
protect the critical network traffic. Attackers may take
advantage of poorly designed protocols or poor key
management to successfully perform man-in-the-middle
attacks, replay attacks, etc. Successful attacks will result
in loss of confidentiality and integrity of the critical
network traffic, and potentially could lead to a
compromise of the network device itself.
An attacker may acquire sensitive TOE or user data that
is transmitted to or from the TOE because an untrusted
communication channel causes a disclosure of data in
transit.
T.WEAK_AUTHENTICATION_ENDPOINTS Threat agents may take advantage of secure protocols
that use weak methods to authenticate the endpoints –
e.g., shared password that is guessable or transported as
plaintext. The consequences are the same as a poorly
designed protocol, the attacker could masquerade as the
administrator or another device, and the attacker could
insert themselves into the network stream and perform a
man-in-the-middle attack. The result is the critical
network traffic is exposed and there could be a loss of
confidentiality and integrity, and potentially the network
device itself could be compromised.
T.UPDATE_COMPROMISE Threat agents may attempt to provide a compromised
update of the software or firmware which undermines
the security functionality of the device. Non-validated
updates or updates validated using non-secure or weak
cryptography leave the update firmware vulnerable to
surreptitious alteration.
T.UNDETECTED_ACTIVITY Threat agents may attempt to access, change, and/or
modify the security functionality of the network device
without administrator awareness. This could result in the
attacker finding an avenue (e.g., misconfiguration, flaw
in the product) to compromise the device and the
administrator would have no knowledge that the device
has been compromised.
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Threat Threat Definition
T.SECURITY_FUNCTIONALITY_COMPROMISE Threat agents may compromise credentials and device
data enabling continued access to the network device
and its critical data. The compromise of credentials
include replacing existing credentials with an attacker’s
credentials, modifying existing credentials, or obtaining
the administrator or device credentials for use by the
attacker.
T.PASSWORD_CRACKING Threat agents may be able to take advantage of weak
administrative passwords to gain privileged access to the
device. Having privileged access to the device provides
the attacker unfettered access to the network traffic, and
may allow them to take advantage of any trust
relationships with other network devices.
T.SECURITY_FUNCTIONALITY_FAILURE A component of the network device may fail during
start-up or during operations causing a compromise or
failure in the security functionality of the network
device, leaving the device susceptible to attackers.
5.3 Clarification of Scope
All evaluations (and all products) have limitations, as well as potential misconceptions that need
clarifying. This text covers some of the more important limitations and clarifications of this
evaluation. Note that:
 As with any evaluation, this evaluation only shows that the evaluated configuration meets
the security claims made, with a certain level of assurance. The level of assurance for this
evaluation is defined within the NDcPP 1.0.
 This evaluation covers only the specific device models and software as identified in this
document, and not any earlier or later versions released or in process.
 Consistent with the expectations of the Protection Profile, this evaluation did not
specifically search for, nor seriously attempt to counter, vulnerabilities that were not
“obvious” or vulnerabilities to objectives not claimed in the ST. The CEM defines an
“obvious” vulnerability as one that is easily exploited with a minimum of understanding
of the TOE, technical sophistication and resources.
 The evaluation of security functionality of the product was limited to the functionality
specified in the claimed PPs and applicable Technical Decisions. Any additional security
related functional capabilities included in the product were not covered by this
evaluation.
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6 Documentation
The following documents were provided by the vendor with the TOE for evaluation:
 Cisco Aggregation Services Router (ASR) 1000 Series Security Target, version 0.7,
October 17, 2017
 Cisco Aggregation Services Router (ASR) 1000 Series Common Criteria Operational
User Guidance And Preparative Procedures, version 0.5, September 27, 2017
Any additional customer documentation delivered with the product or that is available through
download was not included in the scope of the evaluation, and therefore should not be relied
upon when configuring or using the products as evaluated.
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7 TOE Evaluated Configuration
7.1 Evaluated Configuration
The TOE is a hardware and software solution that makes up the router models as follows:
Chassis:
 ASR 1004; Embedded Services Processors (ESP): ESP20 and ESP40; Route Processor
(RP): RP1, RP2
The network, on which they reside, is considered part of the environment. The software is pre-
installed and is comprised of the Cisco IOS-XE software image Release 16.3, and configured in
accordance with the AGD [8]. In addition, the software image is also downloadable from the
Cisco web site. A login id and password is required to download the software image.
7.2 Excluded Functionality
In addition to any functionality not covered by Security Functional Requirements (SFRs) in the
NDcPPv1.0, the following functionality is excluded from the evaluation:
Table 6: Excluded Functionality
Excluded Functionality Exclusion Rationale
Non-FIPS 140-2 mode of operation This mode of operation includes non-FIPS allowed operations.
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8 IT Product Testing
This section describes the testing efforts of the developer and the evaluation team. It is derived
from information contained in the proprietary Test Plan for a Cisco ASR 1004 NDcPP 1.0, and
summarized in the Common Criteria NDcPP Assurance Activity Report for Cisco Aggregation
Services Router (ASR) 1000 Series, version 1.3, November 11, 2017 (AAR), which is publicly
available.
8.1 Developer Testing
No evidence of developer testing is required in the Assurance Activities for this product.
8.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing
The evaluation team verified the product according the vendor-provided guidance documentation
and ran the tests specified in the NDcPP 1.0. The Independent Testing activity is documented in
the Assurance Activities Report, which is publicly available, and is not duplicated here.
The following is the test infrastructure used by the evaluators:
8.2.1 Test Bed 1
Figure 2: Test Bed 1
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8.2.1.1 Configuration Information
The following provides configuration information about each test device and test tool on the test
network.
8.2.1.1.1 Cisco ASR 1004
• Software Version: IOS-XE 16.3
• IP Address: 10.20.40.60, 10.1.2.135
8.2.1.1.2 Cisco Catalyst 3650
• Software Version: Cisco IOS-XE 16.3
• IP Address: 10.20.40.50, 10.1.2.19, 20.20.20.10
8.2.1.1.3 Cisco ASR 1001X
• Software Version: Cisco IOS-XE 16.3
• IP Address: 20.20.20.20
8.2.1.1.4 Test Laptop
• Software Version: Windows 10
• IP Address: 192.168.254.208
• Ubuntu 64-bit (running in VMware Workstation Player 12)
• Kiwi Syslog Server 9.6
• Wireshark 2.2.6
• Putty 0.68
8.2.2 Test Bed 2
Figure 3: Test Bed 2
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8.2.2.1 Configuration Information
The following provides configuration information about each test device and test tool on the test
network.
8.2.2.1.1 Cisco ASR 1004
• Software Version: IOS-XE 16.3
• IP Address: Varied based on test script run:
o 10.32.0.X (IPsec)
o 10.11.0.110 (SSH)
o 10.10.10.1 (Telnet)
o 10.41.0.110
o 10.44.0.1
o 10.21.0.110
o 10.22.0.210
o 10.12.0.210
8.2.2.1.2 CC_REF
• Software Version: Cisco IOS-XE 16.3
• IP Address: Varied based on test script run:
o 10.13.0.1
o 10.33.0.X
o 10.11.0.101
o 10.41.0.401
o 10.43.0.1
o 50.0.0.1
o 10.22.0.2
o 10.42.0.X
8.2.2.1.3 Test User Laptop
• IP Address: 10.11.0.103
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9 Results of the Evaluation
The results of the assurance requirements are generally described in this section and are
presented in detail in the proprietary documents: the Detailed Test Report (DTR) and the
Evaluation Technical Report (ETR). The reader of this document can assume that activities and
work units received a passing verdict.
A verdict for an assurance component is determined by the resulting verdicts assigned to the
corresponding evaluator action elements. The evaluation was conducted based upon CC version
3.1 rev 4 and CEM version 3.1 rev 4. The evaluation determined the Cisco Aggregation Services
Router (ASR) 1000 Series to be Part 2 extended, and meets the SARs contained in the PP.
Additionally the evaluator performed the Assurance Activities specified in the NDcPP1.0.
9.1 Evaluation of Security Target (ASE)
The evaluation team applied each ASE CEM work unit. The ST evaluation ensured the ST
contains a description of the environment in terms of policies and assumptions, a statement of
security requirements claimed to be met by the Cisco Aggregation Services Router (ASR) 1000
Series that are consistent with the Common Criteria, and product security function descriptions
that support the requirements. Additionally, the evaluator performed an assessment of the
Assurance Activities specified in the NDcPP 1.0.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted in
accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation
team was justified.
9.2 Evaluation of Development Documentation (ADV)
The evaluation team applied each ADV CEM work unit. The evaluation team assessed the
design documentation and found it adequate to aid in understanding how the TSF provides the
security functions. The design documentation consists of a functional specification contained in
the Security Target's TOE Summary Specification. Additionally, the evaluator performed the
Assurance Activities specified in the NDcPP 1.0 related to the examination of the information
contained in the TOE Summary Specification.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted
in accordance with the Assurance Activities, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation
team was justified.
9.3 Evaluation of Guidance Documents (AGD)
The evaluation team applied each AGD CEM work unit. The evaluation team ensured the
adequacy of the user guidance in describing how to use the operational TOE. Additionally, the
evaluation team ensured the adequacy of the administrator guidance in describing how to
securely administer the TOE. The guides were assessed during the design and testing phases of
24
the evaluation to ensure they were complete. Additionally, the evaluator performed the
Assurance Activities specified in the NDcPP 1.0 related to the examination of the information
contained in the operational guidance documents.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the Assurance Activities, and that the conclusion reached by
the evaluation team was justified.
9.4 Evaluation of Life Cycle Support Activities (ALC)
The evaluation team applied each ALC CEM work unit. The evaluation team found
that the TOE was identified.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted in
accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation
team was justified.
9.5 Evaluation of Test Documentation and the Test Activity (ATE)
The evaluation team applied each ATE CEM work unit. The evaluation team ran the set of tests
specified by the Assurance Activities in the NDcPP 1.0 and recorded the results in a Test Report,
summarized in the Evaluation Technical Report and Assurance Activities Report.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence was
provided by the evaluation team to show that the evaluation activities addressed the test activities
in the NDcPP 1.0, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation team was justified.
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity (VAN)
The evaluation team applied each AVA CEM work unit. The vulnerability analysis is in the
Detailed Test Report (DTR) prepared by the evaluator. The vulnerability analysis includes a
public search for vulnerabilities. The public search for vulnerabilities did not uncover any
residual vulnerability.
The evaluator searched the Internet for potential vulnerabilities in the TOE using the web sites
listed below. The sources of the publicly available information are provided below.
 http://nvd.nist.gov/
 http://www.us-cert.gov
 http://www.securityfocus.com/
The evaluator performed the public domain vulnerability searches using the following key
words.
 Aggregation Services Router
 IOS-XE 16.3
 ASR1k
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 ASR 1004
The evaluator selected the search key words based upon the following criteria.
 The vendor name was searched,
 The software running on the TOE devices were searched. Further, the version the TOE
software in evaluation was searched,
 The name of the hardware devices within the TOE,
 The secure protocols supported by the TOE,
 The type of TOE device.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation addressed the
vulnerability analysis Assurance Activities in the NDcPP 1.0, and that the conclusion reached by
the evaluation team was justified. This analysis was performed and completed in October 2017
and reviewed prior to issuing of the certificate.
9.7 Summary of Evaluation Results
The evaluation team's assessment of the evaluation evidence demonstrates that the claims in
the ST are met. Additionally, the evaluation team's test activities also demonstrated the
accuracy of the claims in the ST.
The validation team's assessment of the evidence provided by the evaluation team is that it
demonstrates that the evaluation team performed the Assurance Activities in the NDcPP 1.0, and
correctly verified that the product meets the claims in the ST.
26
10 Validator Comments & Recommendations
All validator comments have been addressed in the Assumptions and Clarifications of Scope
sections.
27
11 Annexes
Not applicable.
28
12 Security Target
Cisco Aggregation Services Router (ASR) 1000 Series Security Target, version 0.7, October 17,
2017.
29
13 Glossary
The following definitions are used throughout this document:
 Common Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL). An IT security evaluation facility
accredited by the National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP) and
approved by the CCEVS Validation Body to conduct Common Criteria-based
evaluations.
 Conformance. The ability to demonstrate in an unambiguous way that a given
implementation is correct with respect to the formal model.
 Evaluation. The assessment of an IT product against the Common Criteria using the
Common Criteria Evaluation Methodology to determine whether or not the claims made
are justified; or the assessment of a protection profile against the Common Criteria using
the Common Evaluation Methodology to determine if the Profile is complete, consistent,
technically sound and hence suitable for use as a statement of requirements for one or
more TOEs that may be evaluated.
 Evaluation Evidence. Any tangible resource (information) required from the sponsor or
developer by the evaluator to perform one or more evaluation activities.
 Feature. Part of a product that is either included with the product or can be ordered
separately.
 Target of Evaluation (TOE). A group of IT products configured as an IT system, or an
IT product, and associated documentation that is the subject of a security evaluation
under the CC.
 Validation. The process carried out by the CCEVS Validation Body leading to the issue
of a Common Criteria certificate.
 Validation Body. A governmental organization responsible for carrying out validation
and for overseeing the day-to-day operation of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation
and Validation Scheme.
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14 Bibliography
The Validation Team used the following documents to produce this Validation Report:
1. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation - Part 1: Introduction
and general model, Version 3.1 Revision 4.
2. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation - Part 2: Security
functional requirements, Version 3.1 Revision 4.
3. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation - Part 3: Security
assurance requirements, Version 3.1 Revision 4.
4. Common Evaluation Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 3.1 Revision 4.
5. Cisco Aggregation Services Router (ASR) 1000 Series Security Target, version 0.7,
October 17, 2017. (ST)
6. Common Criteria NDcPP Assurance Activity Report for Cisco Aggregation Services
Router (ASR) 1000 Series, version 1.3, November 11, 2017 (AAR)
7. Cisco Aggregation Services Router (ASR) 1000 Series ETR, version 1.2, November 17,
2017 (ETR)
8. Cisco Aggregation Services Router (ASR) 1000 Series Common Criteria Operational
User Guidance And Preparative Procedures, version 0.5, September 27, 2017 (AGD)