KECS-CR-17-33
KOMSCO JK41 V1.0 ESS on S3FT9PE/PS
Certification Report
Certification No.: KECS-ISIS-0797-2017
2017. 6. 21
IT Security Certification Center
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History of Creation and Revision
No. Date
Revised
Pages
Description
00 2017.06.21 -
Certification report for KOMSCO JK41 V1.0 ESS on
S3FT9PE/PS
- First documentation
Certification Report Page 3
This document is the certification report for KOMSCO JK41 V1.0 ESS
on S3FT9PE/PS of KOMSCO.
The Certification Body
IT Security Certification Center
The Evaluation Facility
Telecommunications Technology Association (TTA)
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Table of Contents
1. Executive Summary.............................................................................................5
2. Identification.........................................................................................................6
3. Security Policy .....................................................................................................8
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope............................................................9
5. Architectural Information ....................................................................................9
6. Documentation................................................................................................... 11
7. TOE Testing........................................................................................................ 11
8. Evaluated Configuration....................................................................................12
9. Results of the Evaluation ..................................................................................13
9.1 Security Target Evaluation (ASE)............................................................13
9.2 Life Cycle Support Evaluation (ALC) ......................................................14
9.3 Guidance Documents Evaluation (AGD).................................................15
9.4 Development Evaluation (ADV) ..............................................................16
9.5 Test Evaluation (ATE).............................................................................17
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment (AVA)..............................................................17
9.7 Evaluation Result Summary ...................................................................18
10. Recommendations.............................................................................................19
11. Security Target ...................................................................................................20
12. Acronyms and Glossary....................................................................................20
13. Bibliography.......................................................................................................22
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1. Executive Summary
This report describes the certification result drawn by the certification body on the
results of the EAL5+ evaluation of KOMSCO JK41 V1.0 ESS on S3FT9PE/PS with
reference to the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation (“CC”
hereinafter) [1]. It describes the evaluation result and its soundness and conformity.
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the composite product which is consisting of the
certified integrated circuit chip (IC chip) provided by Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. and
embedded software (IC chip operating system(COS), Java Card APIs (JCAPIs), Java
Card Runtime Environment (JCRE), Java Card Virtual Machine (JCVM), Card Manager,
and Visa Global Platform APIs (VGPAPIs)) in accordance with the Java Card Platform
(Open Configuration) specifications version 2.2.2 [6][7][8], the GlobalPlatform Card
Specification 2.1.1 [9], and the Visa GlobalPlatform Card Specification version 2.1.1
[10]. The TOE provides Java Card Platforms with Open Configuration for multiple
applications by allowing them to be loaded and deleted, cryptographic services to be
used by applications installed on the Java Card Platform.
The TOE KOMSCO JK41 V1.0 ESS on S3FT9PE/PS is composed of the following
components:
 IC chip: Samsung S3FT9PE/S3FT9PS 16-bit RISC Microcontroller for Smart
Card with optional Secure RSA and ECC Library including specific IC
Dedicated Software, see ANSSI-CC-2014/59 and ANSSI-CC-2014/58, and
 Embedded software: KOMSCO JK41 V1.0 ESS provided by Korea Minting,
Security Printing & ID Card Operating CorP. (KOMSCO).
The evaluation of the TOE has been carried out by Telecommunications Technology
Association (TTA) and completed on 24 May 2017. This report grounds on the
evaluation technical report (ETR) TTA had submitted [11] and the Security Target (ST)
[12][13].
The ST is based on the certified Protection Profile (PP) Smart Card Open Platform
Protection Profile V2.2, 20 December 2010, KECS-PP-0097a-2008 [5]. All Security
Assurance Requirements (SARs) in the ST are based only upon assurance component
in CC Part 3, and the TOE satisfies the SARs of Evaluation Assurance Level EAL5
augmented by ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5. Therefore the ST and the resulting TOE is
CC Part 3 conformant. The Security Functional Requirements (SFRs) are based upon
both functional components in CC Part 2 and a newly defined component in the
Extended Component Definition chapter of the ST, and the TOE satisfies the SFRs in
the ST. Therefore the ST and the resulting TOE is CC Part 2 extended.
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[Figure 1] shows the operational environment of the TOE.
[Figure 1] Operational environment of the TOE
Certification Validity: The certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the
government of Republic of Korea or by any other organization that recognizes or gives
effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by the government of
Republic of Korea or by any other organization recognizes or gives effect to the
certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2. Identification
The TOE is composite product consisting of the following components and related
guidance documents.
Type Identifier Release Delivery Form
HW/SW Samsung S3FT9PE/S3FT9PS 16-
bit RISC Microcontroller for Smart
Card with optional Secure RSA and
ECC Library including specific IC
Dedicated Software
0 IC Chip Module
(Note: The SW is
contained in FLASH
memory)
Secure RSA/EC Library V2.4
DTRNG FRO Library V6.0
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Type Identifier Release Delivery Form
SW KOMSCO JK41 ESS V1.0
DOC [JK41-MA-0005] Preparative
procedures(ESS)
V1.0 Softcopy
[JK41-MA-0006] Operational User
guidance(ESS)
V1.1
[Table 1] TOE identification
TOE is Composite product that should be considered in the Composite Product life
cycle. Composite product integrator performs Composite product integration (FLASH
code download into the IC chip), preparation and shipping to the personalization for the
Composite product (Composite Product Integration). Then the TOE is issued by Card
Issuer with applications and associated personalization data after the initialization step.
For details on the chips, the IC dedicated software and the crypto libraries, see the
documentation under ANSSI-CC-2014/59 [14] and ANSSI-CC-2014/58 [15].
[Table 2] summarizes additional information for scheme, developer, sponsor, evaluation
facility, certification body, etc..
Scheme Korea Evaluation and Certification Guidelines for IT Security
(27 June 2016)
Korea Evaluation and Certification Scheme for IT Security
(1 November 2012)
TOE KOMSCO JK41 V1.0 ESS on S3FT9PE/PS
- JK41-ESS-PE00-R1
- JK41-ESS-PS00-R1
Common Criteria Common Criteria for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 4, CCMB-2012-09-001 ~
CCMB-2012-09-003, September 2012
EAL EAL5+
(augmented by ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5)
Developer KOMSCO
Sponsor KOMSCO
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Evaluation Facility Telecommunications Technology Association (TTA)
Completion Date of
Evaluation
24 May 2017
Certification Body IT Security Certification Center
[Table 2] Additional identification information
3. Security Policy
The ST [12][13] for the TOE claims demonstrable conformance to the Smart Card
Open Platform PP [5], and complies security policies defined in the Smart Card Open
Platform PP [5] by security objectives and security requirements based on the Java
Card Platform (Open Configuration) specifications version 2.2.2 [6][7][8], the
GlobalPlatform Card Specification 2.1.1 [9], and the Visa GlobalPlatform Card
Specification version 2.1.1 [10]. Thus the TOE provides security features defined in the
Smart Card Open Platform PP [5] as follows:
 Loading, installation, deletion, integrity checking of application,
 Secure operation of application instances through Java Card Platform 2.2.2,
 Securely clearing and destroying of sensitive information (such as keys, PIN),
that is, the TOE shall ensure that no residual information is available and
protect sensitive information that is no longer used,
 Safe data recovery or deletion (atomic transactions) when abnormal event (e.g.
tearing at installation procedure) is occurred.
Furthermore, the TOE is composite product based on the certified IC chips, the TOE
utilizes and therefore provides some security features covered by the IC chip
certification such as security sensors, protection against physical proving, malfunctions,
physical manipulations and abuse of functionality, against leakage of information of
Triple-DES, RSA, and TRNG for AIS31-compliant Random Number Generation.
Therefore, the TOE maintains the integrity and the confidentiality of data stored in the
memory or of security functionalities provided by the TOE. For more details refer to the
Security Target Lite for the IC chip [16][17].
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4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The following assumptions describe the security aspects of the operational
environment in which the TOE will be used or is intended to be used (for the detailed
and precise definition of the assumption refer to the ST [12][13], chapter 3.4):
 There shall be a secure channel between the application installed in the TOE
and the CAD (Card Acceptance Devices).
 The application which is installed in the manner of approved procedure (e.g.
bytecode verification before loading and installation) shall not include malicious
code.
 At all of phases from the manufacturing to the use of the TOE, the training is
provided to each role (such as manufacturer, issuer and cardholder) according
to related regulations. And the TOE is handled in the secure manner when
repairing and replacing due to the breakdown.
 The TSF data that is exposed to outside of the TOE is managed securely.
 Security procedures are used after delivery of the TOE by the TOE
Manufacturer up to delivery to the end-consumer to maintain confidentiality
and integrity of the TOE and of its manufacturing and test data (to prevent any
possible copy, modification, retention, theft or unauthorized use). This means
that the Phases after TOE Delivery are assumed to be protected appropriately.
Furthermore, some aspects of threats and organisational security policies are not
covered by the TOE itself, thus these aspects are addressed by the TOE environment:
TOE user training, secure channels, trustworthy applications, secure TSF data
management, etc. Details can be found in the ST [12][13], chapter 3.2, 3.3 and 4.2.
5. Architectural Information
[Figure 1] shows the physical scope of the TOE. The TOE is the composite product
which is consisting of the certified IC chip and the embedded software.
 The Card Manager controls the life cycle of the TOE and applets, and provides
key and applet management functions of TOE with administrator authority in
the TOE user mode. The TOE manages applets through applet load,
installation, and deletion functions. The TOE enforces the security policy for
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the card issuer, and provides the security services as the secure channel
management during data transaction and data access, and PIN management
for card holder verification.
 The JCRE is responsible for the resource management for the java applet
running, the selected applet management, the communication with CAD and
the security of the applet. And the JCRE performs execution of applets using
the JCVM. The JCRE includes the frameworks related to the APDU routing,
ISO communication protocol, JCVM and the classes for handling. The TOE
provides the firewall access control through the JCRE. By isolating a single
applet within the given space through the mechanism of firewall between
applets, it prevents data from being leaked out by other applets and provides
protection against attacks.
 The JCVM executes the CAP file as entity of the applet. It performs bytecode
execution, memory allocation management, object management, security
features, etc. The JCVM is the bytecode interpreter based on Java Card
Specification. The Java Card applet’s methods are converted to bytecode that
can be performed on the JCVM. The TOE can execute the applet independent
from the hardware through the JCVM.
 The JCAPIs are the set of classes provided for development of application in
accordance with Java Card specification. The JCAPIs placed in an upper layer
than the JCRE provide primary APIs and extended API packages, e.g., the
interfaces for cryptographic functions and basic functions to the application.
 The VGPAPIs are defined by Java Card interfaces for Global Platform
functions. They provide access to the OPEN (Global Platform Environment),
services for the application such as cardholder verification, personalization,
security services and Card Content Management service such as card locking,
application life cycle state update.
 The Chip Operating System (COS) is responsible for the operating system to
execute the JCVM and the JCRE, and includes low level I/O functions, memory
management functions, low level transaction and crypto functions.
Cryptographic Library belongs to the TOE hardware and has been certified
together with the IC chip at CC EAL 5+. The primary crypto functions are
implemented in the COS and support TDES, RSA, SHA, and TRNG. The
certified symmetric crypto processor serves TDES algorithms. RSA algorithms
are offered by the certified cryptographic co-processor and cryptographic
libraries for all common public key algorithms. A true random number generator
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(TRNG) is able to supply the CPU with true random numbers in order to fulfill
the quality defined in the AIS31-compliant random number generation.
For the detailed description is referred to the ST [12][13].
6. Documentation
The following documentation is evaluated and provided with the TOE by the developer
to the customer.
Identifier Release Date
[JK31-MA-0005] Preparative procedures(ESS) V1.0 27 March 2017
[JK31-MA-0006] Operational User guidance(ESS) V1.1 15 May 2017
[Table 3] Documentation
7. TOE Testing
The developer took a testing approach based on the component of the TOE and the
respective specification of each component. Physically, the embedded software is not
separated, but logically, it can be divided into Java Card Platform and card manager in
accordance with the Java Card Platform 2.2.2 [6][7][8], the GlobalPlatform 2.1.1 [9] and
the Visa GlobalPlatform 2.1.1 [10], respectively.
The developer conducted 2,233 test cases related to the TSFIs and module interfaces,
and cryptographic functions as described below:
 The automated tools for testing, whether the smartcard specifications (ISO/IEC
7816) and GP/VGP, Java Card specifications are satisfied, are used to conduct
the security function tests and module interface tests through the scenario-
based scripts.
 The developer used an in-house testing tool for some special tests including
crypto test, tear test, card initializations test, and security audit test.
 The developer conducted additional special tests including fault attack
protection mechanisms test, memory range checking test, secure object (key,
PIN) integrity checking test, cryptographic key deletion test, and forcing card
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reset test.
The developer tested all the TSF and analyzed testing results in accordance with the
assurance component ATE_COV.2. This means that the developer tested all the TSFI
defined for each life cycle state of the TOE, and demonstrated that the TSFI behaves
as described in the functional specification.
The developer tested both subsystems (including their interactions) and modules
(including their interfaces), and analyzed testing results in accordance with the
assurance component ATE_DPT.3.
The developer correctly performed and documented the tests in accordance with the
assurance component ATE_FUN.1.
The evaluator performed all the developer’s tests listed in this report chapter 7, and
had conducted independent testing based upon test cases devised by the evaluator.
The TOE and test configuration are identical to the developer’s tests. The tests cover
preparative procedures in accordance with the guidance. Some tests were performed
by design and source code analysis to verify fulfillment of the requirements of the
underlying platform to the COS and Application. The implementation of the
requirements of the platform’s ETR and guidance was verified by the evaluators.
Also, the evaluator conducted vulnerability analysis and penetration testing based upon
test cases devised by the evaluator resulting from the independent, methodical search
for potential vulnerabilities. These test cases cover testing APDU commands,
perturbation attacks, observation attacks such as SPA/DPA and SEMA/DEMA, fault
injection attacks, and so on. No exploitable vulnerabilities by attackers possessing high
attack potential were found from penetration testing.
The evaluator confirmed that all the actual testing results correspond to the expected
testing results. The evaluator testing effort, the testing approach, configuration, depth,
and results are summarized in the ETR [11].
8. Evaluated Configuration
The TOE is KOMSCO JK41 V1.0 ESS on S3FT9PE/PS which is composite product
consisting of the following components:
 IC chips : Samsung S3FT9PE/S3FT9PS 16-bit RISC Microcontroller for Smart
Card with optional Secure RSA and ECC Library including specific IC
Dedicated Software (ANSSI-CC-2014/59 and ANSSI-CC-2014/58), and
 Embedded software : KOMSCO JK41 V1.0 ESS
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The TOE is identified by the name, version and release date. The TOE identification
information is provided by the command-response APDU following:
 Command APDU : D088000000
 Response APDU: 4250 191C 4A4B 7100 41E1 xxxxxxxx 9000 or 4250 190E
4A4B 7100 41E1 xxxxxxxx 9000
 IC fabricator : 0x4250 (Samsung)
 IC type : 0x191C (S3FT9PS) or 0x190E (S3FT9PE)
 OS identifier : 0x4A4B (JK)
 OS release date : 0x7100 (YDDD)
 TOE version and OS type : 0x41E1 (OS type : JK41 ESS, TOE version : V1.0)
 9000 : Response APDU Status Word
And the guidance documents listed in this report chapter 6, [Table 3] were evaluated
with the TOE.
9. Results of the Evaluation
The evaluation facility provided the evaluation result in the ETR [11] which references
Single Evaluation Reports for each assurance requirement and Observation Reports.
The evaluation result was based on the CC [1] and CEM [2], and CCRA supporting
documents for the Smartcard and similar device [18][19][20][21][22][23].
As a result of the evaluation, the verdict PASS is assigned to all assurance
components of EAL5 augmented by ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5.
9.1 Security Target Evaluation (ASE)
The ST Introduction correctly identifies the ST and the TOE, and describes the TOE in
a narrative way at three levels of abstraction (TOE reference, TOE overview and TOE
description), and these three descriptions are consistent with each other. Therefore the
verdict PASS is assigned to ASE_INT.1.
The Conformance Claim properly describes how the ST and the TOE conform to the
CC and how the ST conforms to PPs and packages. Therefore the verdict PASS is
assigned to ASE_CCL.1.
The Security Problem Definition clearly defines the security problem intended to be
addressed by the TOE and its operational environment. Therefore the verdict PASS is
assigned to ASE_SPD.1.
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The Security Objectives adequately and completely address the security problem
definition and the division of this problem between the TOE and its operational
environment is clearly defined. Therefore the verdict PASS is assigned to ASE_OBJ.2.
The Extended Components Definition has been clearly and unambiguously defined,
and it is necessary. Therefore the verdict PASS is assigned to ASE_ECD.1.
The Security Requirements is defined clearly and unambiguously, and it is internally
consistent and the SFRs meet the security objectives of the TOE. Therefore the verdict
PASS is assigned to ASE_REQ.2.
The TOE Summary Specification addresses all SFRs, and it is consistent with other
narrative descriptions of the TOE. Therefore the verdict PASS is assigned to
ASE_TSS.1.
Also, the evaluator confirmed that the ST of the composite TOE does not contradict the
ST of the IC chip in accordance with the CCRA supporting document Composite
Product Evaluation [18].
Thus, the ST is sound and internally consistent, and suitable to be used as the basis
for the TOE evaluation.
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class ASE.
9.2 Life Cycle Support Evaluation (ALC)
The developer has used a documented model of the TOE life-cycle. Therefore the
verdict PASS is assigned to ALC_LCD.1.
The developer has used well-defined development tools that yield consistent and
predictable results, and implementation standards have been applied. Therefore the
verdict PASS is assigned to ALC_TAT.2.
The developer has clearly identified the TOE and its associated configuration items,
and the ability to modify these items is properly controlled by automated tools, thus
making the CM system less susceptible to human error or negligence. Therefore the
verdict PASS is assigned to ALC_CMC.4.
The configuration list includes the TOE, the parts that comprise the TOE, the TOE
implementation representation, security flaws, development tools and related
information, and the evaluation evidence. These configuration items are controlled in
accordance with CM capabilities. Therefore the verdict PASS is assigned to
ALC_CMS.5.
The developer's security controls on the development environment are adequate to
provide the confidentiality and integrity of the TOE design and implementation that is
Certification Report Page 15
necessary to ensure that secure operation of the TOE is not compromised. Additionally,
sufficiency of the measures as applied is intended be justified. Therefore the verdict
PASS is assigned to ALC_DVS.2.
The delivery documentation describes all procedures used to maintain security of the
TOE when distributing the TOE to the user. Therefore the verdict PASS is assigned to
ALC_DEL.1.
Also, the evaluator confirmed that the correct version of the embedded software is
installed onto/into the correct version of the underlying IC chip, and the delivery
procedures of IC chip and embedded software developers are compatible with the
acceptance procedure of the composite product integrator in accordance with the
CCRA supporting document Composite Product Evaluation [18].
Thus, the security procedures that the developer uses during the development and
maintenance of the TOE are adequate. These procedures include the life-cycle model
used by the developer, the configuration management, the security measures used
throughout TOE development, the tools used by the developer throughout the life-cycle
of the TOE, the handling of security flaws, and the delivery activity.
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class ALC.
9.3 Guidance Documents Evaluation (AGD)
The procedures and steps for the secure preparation of the TOE have been
documented and result in a secure configuration. Therefore the verdict PASS is
assigned to AGD_PRE.1.
The operational user guidance describes for each user role the security functionality
and interfaces provided by the TSF, provides instructions and guidelines for the secure
use of the TOE, addresses secure procedures for all modes of operation, facilitates
prevention and detection of insecure TOE states, or it is misleading or unreasonable.
Therefore the verdict PASS is assigned to AGD_OPE.1.
Thus, the guidance documents are adequately describing the user can handle the TOE
in a secure manner. The guidance documents take into account the various types of
users (e.g. those who accept, install, administrate or operate the TOE) whose incorrect
actions could adversely affect the security of the TOE or of their own data.
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class AGD.
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9.4 Development Evaluation (ADV)
The TOE design provides a description of the TOE in terms of subsystems sufficient to
determine the TSF boundary, and provides a description of the TSF internals in terms
of modules. It provides a detailed description of the SFR-enforcing and SFR-supporting
modules and enough information about the SFR-non-interfering modules for the
evaluator to determine that the SFRs are completely and accurately implemented; as
such, the TOE design provides an explanation of the implementation representation.
Therefore the verdict PASS is assigned to ADV_TDS.4.
The developer has completely described all of the TSFI in a manner such that the
evaluator was able to determine whether the TSFI are completely and accurately
described, and appears to implement the security functional requirements of the ST.
Therefore the verdict PASS is assigned to ADV_FSP.5.
The TSF is structured such that it cannot be tampered with or bypassed, and TSFs that
provide security domains isolate those domains from each other. Therefore the verdict
PASS is assigned to ADV_ARC.1. Also, the evaluator confirmed that the requirements
in accordance with the CCRA supporting document ADV_ARC Evaluation [22][23].
The implementation representation is sufficient to satisfy the functional requirements of
the ST and is a correct realisation of the low-level design. Therefore the verdict PASS
is assigned to ADV_IMP.1.
The TSF internal is well-structured such that the likelihood of flaws is reduced and that
maintenance can be more readily performed without the introduction of flaws.
Therefore the verdict PASS is assigned to ADV_INT.2.
Also, the evaluator confirmed that the requirements on the embedded software,
imposed by the IC chip, are fulfilled in the composite product in accordance with the
CCRA supporting document Composite Product Evaluation [18].
Thus, the design documentation is adequate to understand how the TSF meets the
SFRs and how the implementation of these SFRs cannot be tampered with or
bypassed. Design documentation consists of a functional specification (which
describes the interfaces of the TSF), a TOE design description (which describes the
architecture of the TSF in terms of how it works in order to perform the functions
related to the SFRs being claimed), an implementation description (a source code level
description), and TSF internals description (which describes evidence of the structure
of the design and implementation of the TSF). In addition, there is a security
architecture description (which describes the architectural properties of the TSF to
explain how its security enforcement cannot be compromised or bypassed).
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class ADV.
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9.5 Test Evaluation (ATE)
The developer has tested all of the TSFIs, and that the developer's test coverage
evidence shows correspondence between the tests identified in the test documentation
and the TSFIs described in the functional specification. Therefore the verdict PASS is
assigned to ATE_COV.2.
The developer has tested all the TSF subsystems and modules against the TOE design
and the security architecture description. Therefore the verdict PASS is assigned to
ATE_DPT.3.
The developer correctly performed and documented the tests in the test documentation.
Therefore the verdict PASS is assigned to ATE_FUN.1.
By independently testing a subset of the TSF, the evaluator confirmed that the TOE
behaves as specified in the design documentation, and had confidence in the
developer's test results by performing all of the developer's tests. Therefore the verdict
PASS is assigned to ATE_IND.2.
Also, the evaluator confirmed that composite product as a whole exhibits the properties
necessary to satisfy the functional requirements of its ST in accordance with the CCRA
supporting document Composite Product Evaluation [18].
Thus, the TOE behaves as described in the ST and as specified in the evaluation
evidence (described in the ADV class).
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class ATE.
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment (AVA)
By penetrating testing, the evaluator confirmed that there are no exploitable
vulnerabilities by attackers possessing High attack potential in the operational
environment of the TOE. Therefore the verdict PASS is assigned to AVA_VAN.5.
Also, the evaluator confirmed that there is no exploitability of flaws or weakness in the
composite TOE as a whole in the intended environment in accordance with the CCRA
supporting document Composite Product Evaluation [18][19][20][21][22][23].
Thus, potential vulnerabilities identified, during the evaluation of the development and
anticipated operation of the TOE or by other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses or
quantitative or statistical analysis of the security behaviour of the underlying security
mechanisms), don’t allow attackers possessing High attack potential to violate the
SFRs.
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The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class AVA.
9.7 Evaluation Result Summary
Assurance
Class
Assurance
Component
Evaluator
Action
Elements
Verdict
Evaluator
Action
Elements
Assurance
Component
Assurance
Class
ASE ASE_INT.1 ASE_INT.1.1E PASS PASS PASS
ASE_INT.1.2E PASS
ASE_CCL.1 ASE_CCL.1.1E PASS PASS
ASE_SPD.1 ASE_SPD.1.1E PASS PASS
ASE_OBJ.2 ASE_OBJ.2.1E PASS PASS
ASE_ECD.1 ASE_ECD.1.1E PASS PASS
ASE_ECD.1.2E PASS
ASE_REQ.2 ASE_REQ.2.1E PASS PASS
ASE_TSS.1 ASE_TSS.1.1E PASS PASS
ASE_TSS.1.2E PASS
ALC ALC_LCD.1 ALC_LCD.1.1E PASS PASS PASS
ALC_TAT.2 ALC_TAT.2.1E PASS PASS
ALC_CMS.5 ALC_CMS.5.1E PASS PASS
ALC_CMC.4 ALC_CMC.4.1E PASS PASS
ALC_DVS.2 ALC_DVS.2.1E PASS PASS
ALC_DVS.2.2E PASS
ALC_DEL.1 ALC_DEL.1.1E PASS PASS
AGD AGD_PRE.1 AGD_PRE.1.1E PASS PASS PASS
AGD_PRE.1.2E PASS PASS
AGD_OPE.1 AGD_OPE.1.1E PASS PASS
ADV ADV_TDS.4 ADV_TDS.4.1E PASS PASS PASS
ADV_TDS.4.2E PASS PASS
ADV_FSP.5 ADV_FSP.5.1E PASS PASS
ADV_FSP.5.2E PASS
ADV_ARC.1 ADV_ARC.1.1E PASS PASS
ADV_IMP.1 ADV_IMP.1.1E PASS PASS
ADV_INT.2 ADV_INT.2.1E PASS PASS
Certification Report Page 19
Assurance
Class
Assurance
Component
Evaluator
Action
Elements
Verdict
Evaluator
Action
Elements
Assurance
Component
Assurance
Class
ADV_INT.2.2E PASS
ATE ATE_COV.2 ATE_COV.2.1E PASS PASS PASS
ATE_DPT.3 ATE_DPT.3.1E PASS PASS
ATE_FUN.1 ATE_FUN.1.1E PASS PASS
ATE_IND.2 ATE_IND.2.1E PASS PASS
ATE_IND.2.2E PASS
ATE_IND.2.3E PASS
AVA AVA_VAN.5 AVA_VAN.5.1E PASS PASS PASS
AVA_VAN.5.2E PASS
AVA_VAN.5.3E PASS
AVA_VAN.5.4E PASS
[Table 4] Evaluation Result Summary
10. Recommendations
The TOE security functionality can be ensured only in the evaluated TOE operational
environment with the evaluated TOE configuration, thus the TOE shall be operated by
complying with the followings:
 As the TOE is the composite product consisting of IC chip and smart card open
platform, the TOE is generated by downloading the card open platform
software on the IC chip hardware at the Manufacturing Phase. The scope of
this evaluation is limited to delivering the TOE to card issuer. The delivery
between card manufacturer, card issuer, final user (card holder) falls outside
the scope of this evaluation. Thus, the TOE user including card manufacturer
and card issuer shall establish the secure delivery and acquisition process
after the Manufacturing Phase.
 In the Initialization and Issuance Phase (initialization, issue, and loading
application) and the Use Phase (loading application), if secure communication
is not used, the TOE user shall establish physical, procedural, and personnel
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security measures which can guarantee the reliability for transmission.
 As the TOE supports S3FT9PE and S3FT9PS as a secure IC chip platform, it
is recommended to refer to the user’s manual provided along with the TOE and
check the identification information of the TOE.
 When accepting the TOE, it is recommended that the TOE user shall verify the
integrity of the Flash code and data according the user’s manual provided
along with the TOE.
 As the non-TSF cryptographic functions cannot satisfy the requirement for
resistance to high attack potential for vulnerability analysis of AVA_VAN.5, the
TOE user shall not use them to protect important asset except for the use only
for compatibility with the VGP/GP specifications.
 The application provider shall carefully verify that any malicious code is
inserted in applications loaded in the TOE.
 It is recommended that the TOE user shall establish security measures to
manage the TSF data securely when the TSF data (key, PIN, and so on) is
processed in outside of operational environment of the TOE.
11. Security Target
The KOMSCO JK41 V1.0 ESS on S3FT9PE/PS Security Target V1.1, 12 May 2017 [12]
is included in this report by reference. For the purpose of publication, it is provided as
sanitized version [13] according to the CCRA supporting document ST sanitising for
publication [24].
12. Acronyms and Glossary
APDU Application Protocol Data Unit
API Application Programming Interface
CAD Card Acceptance Device
CC Common Criteria
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
JCRE Java Card Runtime Environment
JCVM Java Card Virtual Machine
Certification Report Page 21
PP Protection Profile
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SFR Security Functional Requirement
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
TSFI TSF Interface
Applet Firewall The mechanism that prevents unauthorized accesses to
objects in contexts other than currently active context
Application Provider Entity that owns an application and is responsible for the
application's behavior
Bytecode Machine-independent code generated by the compiler
and executed by the Java virtual machine
CAD The device where the card is inserted, and which is used
to communicate with the card
CAP file The CAP file is produced by the Converter and is the
standard file format for the binary compatibility of the
Java Card platform
Card Issuer Entity that owns the card and is ultimately responsible
for the behavior of the card
Card Manager Generic term for the 3 card management entities of a
GlobalPlatform card i.e. the OPEN, Issuer Security
Domain and the Cardholder Verification Method Services
provider
Cardholder The end user of a card
Cardholder Verification
Method(CVM)
A method to ensure that the person presenting the card
is the person to whom the card was issued
Context A context is an object-space partition associated to a
package. Applets within the same Java technology-
based package belong to the same context
GlobalPlatform Registry A container of information related to Card Content
management
Issuer Security Domain On-card entity providing support for the control, security,
and communication requirements of the Card Issuer
JCRE The runtime environment under which Java programs in
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a smart card are executed
JCVM The embedded interpreter of bytecodes
Life Cycle State A specific state within the Life Cycle of the card or of
Card Content
Load File A file transferred to a GlobalPlatform card that contains a
Load File Data Block and possibly one or more DAP
Blocks
Open Platform Environment
(OPEN)
The central on-card administrator that owns the
GlobalPlatform Registry
Package A package is a namespace within the Java programming
language that may contain classes and interfaces
13. Bibliography
The certification body has used following documents to produce this report.
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1
Revision 4, CCMB-2012-09-001 ~ CCMB-2012-09-003, September 2012
Part 1: Introduction and general model
Part 2: Security functional components
Part 3: Security assurance components
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version
3.1 Revision 4, CCMB-2012-09-004, September 2012
[3] Korea Evaluation and Certification Guidelines for IT Security (27 June 2016)
[4] Korea Evaluation and Certification Scheme for IT Security (1 November 2012)
[5] Smart Card Open Platform Protection Profile V2.2, 20 December 2010, KECS-
PP-0097a-2008
[6] Runtime Environment Specification, Java Card Platform, Version 2.2.2, March
2006
[7] Virtual Machine Specification, Java Card Platform, Version 2.2.2, March 2006
[8] Application Programming Interface, Java Card Platform, Version 2.2.2, March
2006
[9] GlobalPlatform Card Specification Version 2.1.1, March 2003
[10] Visa GlobalPlatform 2.1.1 Card Implementation Requirements, Version 2.0, July
2007
Certification Report Page 23
[11] TTA-CCE-16-015 KOMSCO JK41 V1.0 ESS on S3FT9PE/PS Evaluation
Technical Report V1.3, 29 May 2017
[12] KOMSCO JK41 V1.0 ESS on S3FT9PE/PS Security Target v1.1, 12 May 2017
(Confidential Version)
[13] KOMSCO JK41 V1.0 ESS on S3FT9PE/PS Security Target Public Version v1.0,
15 May 2017 (Sanitized Version)
[14] Rapport de certification ANSSI-CC-2014/59, Microcontrôleur SAMSUNG
S3FT9PE Révision 0 embarquant la bibliothèque RSA/ECC optionnelle
TORNADO 2MX2 v2.4, 14 August 2014
Rapport de surveillance ANSSI-CC-2014/59-S02, Microcontrôleur SAMSUNG
S3FT9PE Révision 0 embarquant la bibliothèque RSA/ECC optionnelle
TORNADO 2MX2 v2.4, 12 May 2016
[15] Rapport de certification ANSSI-CC-2014/58, Microcontrôleurs SAMSUNG
S3FT9PF, S3FT9PT et S3FT9PS Revision 0 embarquant la bibliothèque
optionnelle RSA/ECC TORNADO 2MX2 v2.4, 14 August 2014
Rapport de surveillance ANSSI-CC-2014/58-S02, Microcontrôleurs SAMSUNG
S3FT9PF, S3FT9PT et S3FT9PS Revision 0 embarquant la bibliothèque
optionnelle RSA/ECC TORNADO 2MX2 v2.4, 19 May 2016
[16] Security Target Lite V3.3 of Samsung S3FT9PE 16-bit RISC Microcontroller for
Smart Card with optional Secure RSA and ECC Library including specific IC
Dedicated Software, 21 May 2016
[17] Security Target Lite V3.3 of Samsung S3FT9PF/S3FT9PT/S3FT9PS 16-bit
RISC Microcontroller for Smart Card with optional Secure RSA and ECC Library
including specific IC Dedicated Software, 21 May 2016
[18] Composite product evaluation for Smartcards and similar devices Version 1.2,
CCDB-2012-04-01, April 2012
[19] Application of Attack Potential to Smartcard Version 2.9, CCDB-2013-05-002,
May 2013
[20] The Application of CC to Integrated Circuits Version 3.0 Revision 1, CCDB-
2009-03-002, March 2009
[21] Requirements to perform Integrated Circuit Evaluations, Version 1.1, CCDB-
2013-05-001, May 2013
[22] Security Architecture requirements (ADV_ARC) for smart cards and similar
devices Version 2.1, CCDB-2014-04-001, April 2014.
[23] Security Architecture requirements (ADV_ARC) for smart cards and similar
devices Version 2.0 – Appendix 1, CCDB-2012-04-004, April 2012.
Certification Report Page 24
[24] ST sanitising for publication, CCDB-2006-04-004, April 2006
[25] ISO/IEC 7816 Identification cards – Integrated circuit(s) cards with contacts