IDmove v4 on Infineon
in PACE configuration
with AA and/or CA in option
Public Security Target
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© IDEMIA. All rights reserved.
Specifications and information are subject to change without notice.
The products described in this document are subject to continuous development and improvement.
All trademarks and service marks referred to herein, whether registered or not in specific countries, are the properties of their respective owners.
- Printed versions of this document are uncontrolled -
About IDEMIA
OT-Morpho is now IDEMIA, the global leader in trusted identities for an increasingly digital
world, with the ambition to empower citizens and consumers alike to interact, pay, connect,
travel and vote in ways that are now possible in a connected environment.
Securing our identity has become mission critical in the world we live in today. By standing
for Augmented Identity, we reinvent the way we think, produce, use and protect this asset,
whether for individuals or for objects. We ensure privacy and trust as well as guarantee
secure, authenticated and verifiable transactions for international clients from Financial,
Telecom, Identity, Security and IoT sectors.
With close to €3bn in revenues, IDEMIA is the result of the merger between OT (Oberthur
Technologies) and Safran Identity & Security (Morpho). This new company counts 14,000
employees of more than 80 nationalities and serves clients in 180 countries.
| For more information, visit www.idemia.com / Follow @IdemiaGroup on Twitter
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APPROVAL
Name Position Date - Signature
CRON-SILVY, Julien Author
Approuver FQR 110 9128 Issue 2 par Julien CRON-SILVY le 15-07-2019.msg
BOUDINEAU, Jérôme Product Manager
Approuver FQR 110 9128 Issue 2 par Jerome BOUDINEAU le 18-07-2019.msg
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DOCUMENT REVISION
Date Revision Modification Modified by
2019/03/21 0.1 Creation CRON-SILVY Julien
2019/03/26 1.0 Approve Issue 1 of the document CRON-SILVY Julien
2019/05/24 1.1 §2.1.2: Update OS Commercial Version to 090804 and
OS Unique Identifier to 3C1D.
§10: Update [IC_ST] reference
CRON-SILVY Julien
2019/06/20 1.2 §10: Update [TR_03111], [IC_ST], [IC_CERT] &
[IC_PPM] references
§10: Add [ISO_9796_2]
§7.1.2.3: Update FCS_COP.1.1/SIG_GEN referenced
standards
CRON-SILVY Julien
2019/07/18 2 Approve Issue 2 of the document CRON-SILVY Julien
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TABLE OF CONTENT
1 GENERAL ............................................................................................................13
1.1 Introduction........................................................................................................ 13
1.2 Product overview ................................................................................................ 13
2 ST INTRODUCTION ..............................................................................................14
2.1 ST reference and TOE reference............................................................................ 14
2.1.1 ST reference................................................................................................. 14
2.1.2 TOE reference............................................................................................... 14
2.1.3 IC identification............................................................................................. 14
2.1.4 TOE Delivered Parts....................................................................................... 15
2.2 TOE overview...................................................................................................... 16
2.2.1 Usage and major security features of the TOE .................................................. 16
2.2.2 TOE type ...................................................................................................... 19
2.2.3 TOE life cycle ................................................................................................ 20
2.2.3.1 Life cycle overview..................................................................................................... 20
2.2.3.2 Life cycle phases........................................................................................................ 22
2.2.4 Required non-TOE hardware/Software/firmware ............................................. 24
2.3 TOE description................................................................................................... 25
2.3.1 TOE Architecture........................................................................................... 25
2.3.2 Integrated Circuit.......................................................................................... 26
2.3.3 Low layer ..................................................................................................... 27
2.3.3.1 IDEMIA Basic Input/Output System (BIOS)................................................................... 27
2.3.3.2 IDEMIA Cryptographic library (Crypto) ........................................................................ 27
2.3.4 Platform layer............................................................................................... 27
2.3.4.1 Services .................................................................................................................... 27
2.3.5 Authentication Protocols ............................................................................... 28
2.3.5.1 Terminal Authentication (TA)...................................................................................... 28
2.3.5.2 Chip Authentication (CA)............................................................................................ 28
2.3.5.3 Password Authenticated Connection Establishment (PACE v2)...................................... 28
2.3.5.4 Active Authentication (AA) ......................................................................................... 28
2.3.6 Application layer........................................................................................... 29
2.3.6.1 Start-Up and Applications Manager (Boot) .................................................................. 29
2.3.6.2 Application Creation Engine (ACRE)............................................................................. 29
2.3.6.3 Resident Application (RA)........................................................................................... 29
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2.3.6.4 Machine Readable Travel Document (MRTD)............................................................... 29
3 CONFORMANCE CLAIMS......................................................................................30
3.1 Common Criteria conformance............................................................................. 30
3.2 Protection Profile conformance............................................................................ 31
3.2.1 Overview...................................................................................................... 31
3.2.2 Assumptions................................................................................................. 31
3.2.3 Threats ........................................................................................................ 32
3.2.4 Organizational Security Policies ...................................................................... 32
3.2.5 Security Objectives........................................................................................ 33
4 SECURITY PROBLEM DEFINITION ..........................................................................34
4.1 Assets................................................................................................................. 34
4.1.1 Overview...................................................................................................... 34
4.1.2 User data stored on the TOE........................................................................... 34
4.1.2.1 Personal Data............................................................................................................ 34
4.1.2.2 EF.COM..................................................................................................................... 34
4.1.3 User data transferred between the TOE and the terminal connected.................. 35
4.1.4 MRTD tracing data ........................................................................................ 35
4.1.5 Accessibility to the TOE functions and data only for authorised subjects ............. 35
4.1.6 Genuineness of the TOE................................................................................. 35
4.1.7 TOE intrinsic secret cryptographic keys............................................................ 35
4.1.7.1 Chip Authentication Private Key (CA_SK) ..................................................................... 35
4.1.7.2 Active Authentication Private Key (AA_SK)................................................................... 35
4.1.7.3 Secure Messaging session keys (Session_K).................................................................. 35
4.1.7.4 PACE session keys (PACE-Kmac, PACE-Kenc) ................................................................ 35
4.1.7.5 Ephemeral private key PACE (ephem-Skpicc-PACE)....................................................... 35
4.1.8 TOE intrinsic non secret cryptographic material................................................ 36
4.1.8.1 EF.SOD...................................................................................................................... 36
4.1.8.2 Chip Authentication Public Key (CA_PK)....................................................................... 36
4.1.8.3 Active Authentication Public Key (AA_PK).................................................................... 36
4.1.9 MRTD communication establishment authorisation data................................... 36
4.1.9.1 PACE password (PACE_PWD) ...................................................................................... 36
4.1.10 CPLC............................................................................................................ 36
4.1.11 TOE_ID......................................................................................................... 37
4.1.12 Pre-personalization Agent keys (Pre-perso_K) .................................................. 37
4.1.13 Personalization Agent keys (Perso_K) .............................................................. 37
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4.1.14 TOE Life Cycle State (LCS)............................................................................... 37
4.1.15 Configuration Data........................................................................................ 37
4.1.16 Additional Code ............................................................................................ 37
4.1.17 Load Secure Key (LSK) and Diversified LSK (DIV_LSK) ......................................... 37
4.2 Subjects.............................................................................................................. 38
4.2.1 Overview...................................................................................................... 38
4.2.2 MRTD holder ................................................................................................ 38
4.2.3 Traveler ....................................................................................................... 38
4.2.4 Basic Inspection System with PACE (BIS-PACE).................................................. 38
4.2.5 Document Signer (DS).................................................................................... 39
4.2.6 Country Signing Certification Authority (CSCA) ................................................. 39
4.2.7 Personalization Agent.................................................................................... 39
4.2.8 IC manufacturer............................................................................................ 39
4.2.9 MRTD packaging responsible.......................................................................... 39
4.2.10 Embedded software loading responsible ......................................................... 39
4.2.11 Pre-personalization Agent.............................................................................. 39
4.2.12 Terminal ...................................................................................................... 39
4.2.13 Attacker....................................................................................................... 40
4.3 Assumptions....................................................................................................... 41
4.3.1 A.Passive_Auth “PKI for Passive Authentication”.............................................. 41
4.3.2 A.Insp_Sys_Chip_Auth “Inspection Systems for global interoperability on chip
authenticity” ................................................................................................ 41
4.3.3 A.MRTD_Manufact “MRTD manufacturing on steps 4 to 6”............................... 41
4.3.4 A.MRTD_Delivery “MRTD delivery during steps 4 to 6” ..................................... 41
4.4 Threats............................................................................................................... 42
4.4.1 T.Skimming “Skimming travel document / Capturing Card-Terminal Communication”
................................................................................................................... 42
4.4.2 T.Eavesdropping “Eavesdropping on the communication between the TOE and the PACE
terminal”...................................................................................................... 42
4.4.3 T.Tracing “Tracing travel document”.............................................................. 42
4.4.4 T.Forgery “Forgery of Data”......................................................................... 43
4.4.5 T.Abuse-Func “Abuse of Functionality” ......................................................... 43
4.4.6 T.Information_Leakage “Information Leakage from travel document”............. 43
4.4.7 T.Phys-Tamper “Physical Tampering”.......................................................... 43
4.4.8 T.Malfunction “Malfunction due to Environmental Stress”............................ 44
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4.4.9 T.Configuration “Tampering attempt of the TOE during preparation” ................. 44
4.4.10 T.Unauthorized_Load.................................................................................... 44
4.4.11 T.Bad_Activation.......................................................................................... 45
4.4.12 T.Counterfeit “MRTD’s chip” .......................................................................... 45
4.5 Organisational Security Policies............................................................................ 46
4.5.1 P.Pre-Operational “Pre-operational handling of the travel document”................ 46
4.5.2 P.Card_PKI “PKI for Passive Authentication (issuing branch)” ............................. 46
4.5.3 P.Trustworthy_PKI “Trustworthiness of PKI” .................................................... 46
4.5.4 P.Manufact “Manufacturing of the travel document’s chip”............................... 46
4.5.5 P.Terminal “Abilities and trustworthiness of terminals”..................................... 46
5 SECURITY OBJECTIVES..........................................................................................48
5.1 Security objectives for the TOE............................................................................. 48
5.1.1 OT.Data_Integrity “Integrity of Data” ............................................................. 48
5.1.2 OT.Data_Authenticity “Authenticity of Data”................................................... 48
5.1.3 OT.Data_Confidentiality “Confidentiality of Data”............................................ 48
5.1.4 OT.Tracing “Tracing travel document”............................................................. 48
5.1.5 OT.Prot_Abuse-Func “Protection against Abuse of Functionality”....................... 48
5.1.6 OT.Prot_Inf_Leak “Protection against Information Leakage” ............................. 49
5.1.7 OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper “Protection against Physical Tampering” ........................ 49
5.1.8 OT.Prot_Malfunction “Protection against Malfunctions”................................... 49
5.1.9 OT.Identification “Identification of the TOE”.................................................... 49
5.1.10 OT.AC_Pers “Access Control for Personalisation of logical MRTD” ...................... 49
5.1.11 OT.Configuration “Protection of the TOE preparation”...................................... 50
5.1.12 OT.Chip_Auth_Proof “Proof of MRTD’s chip authenticity” ................................. 50
5.1.13 OT.Secure_Load_ACode “Secure loading of the Additional Code”....................... 50
5.1.14 OT.Secure_AC_Activation “Secure activation of the Additional Code”................. 50
5.1.15 OT.TOE_Identification “Secure identification of the TOE” .................................. 50
5.2 Security objectives for the operational environment.............................................. 51
5.2.1 Receiving State or Organisation ...................................................................... 51
5.2.1.1 OE.Exam_Chip_Auth “Examination of the chip authenticity” ........................................ 51
5.2.2 Traveler document Issuer as general responsible.............................................. 51
5.2.2.1 OE.Legislative_Compliance “Issuing of the travel document”........................................ 51
5.2.3 Traveler document Issuer and CVCA : travel document’s PKI (issuing) branch....... 51
5.2.3.1 OE.Passive_Auth_Sign “Authentication of travel document by Signature” ..................... 51
5.2.3.2 OE.Personalisation “Personalisation of travel document”............................................. 51
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5.2.4 Terminal operator : Terminal’s receiving branch............................................... 51
5.2.4.1 OE.Terminal “Terminal operating”.............................................................................. 51
5.2.5 Travel document holder Obligations................................................................ 52
5.2.5.1 OE.Travel_Document_Holder “Travel document holder Obligations” ............................ 52
5.2.6 Issuing State or Organisation.......................................................................... 52
5.2.6.1 OE.MRTD_Manufact “Protection of the MRTD Manufacturing” .................................... 52
5.2.6.2 OE.MRTD_Delivery “Protection of the MRTD delivery” ................................................. 52
5.2.6.3 OE.Auth_MRTD “MRTD Authentication Key” ............................................................... 53
5.3 Security objectives rationale ................................................................................ 54
5.3.1 Introduction ................................................................................................. 54
5.3.2 Rationales for Assumptions............................................................................ 55
5.3.2.1 A.Passive_Auth.......................................................................................................... 55
5.3.2.2 A.Insp_Sys_Chip_Auth ............................................................................................... 55
5.3.2.3 A.MRTD_Manufact .................................................................................................... 55
5.3.2.4 A.MRTD_Delivery....................................................................................................... 55
5.3.3 Rationales for Threats.................................................................................... 55
5.3.3.1 T.Skimming ............................................................................................................... 55
5.3.3.2 T.Eavesdropping ........................................................................................................ 55
5.3.3.3 T.Tracing................................................................................................................... 55
5.3.3.4 T.Abuse-Func............................................................................................................. 56
5.3.3.5 T.Information_Leakage, T.Phys-Tamper and T.Malfunction........................................... 56
5.3.3.6 T.Forgery................................................................................................................... 56
5.3.3.7 T.Configuration.......................................................................................................... 56
5.3.3.8 T.Unauthorized_Load................................................................................................. 56
5.3.3.9 T.Bad_Activation ....................................................................................................... 56
5.3.3.10 T.Counterfeit............................................................................................................. 57
5.3.4 Rationales for Organisational Security Policies.................................................. 57
5.3.4.1 P.Manufact ............................................................................................................... 57
5.3.4.2 P.PRE-Operational ..................................................................................................... 57
5.3.4.3 P.Terminal................................................................................................................. 57
5.3.4.4 P.Card_PKI ................................................................................................................ 57
5.3.4.5 P.Trustworthy_PKI ..................................................................................................... 57
6 EXTENDED COMPONENTS DEFINITION..................................................................58
6.1 Extended components definition.......................................................................... 58
6.1.1 Definition of the Family FAU_SAS.................................................................... 58
6.1.2 Definition of the Family FCS_RND ................................................................... 59
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6.1.3 Definition of the Family FMT_LIM ................................................................... 60
6.1.4 Definition of the Family FPT_EMS ................................................................... 61
6.1.5 Definition of the Family FIA_API...................................................................... 62
7 SECURITY REQUIREMENTS ...................................................................................63
7.1 Security functional requirements.......................................................................... 63
7.1.1 Class FAU “Security Audit”.............................................................................. 65
7.1.1.1 FAU_SAS.1 “Audit Storage” ........................................................................................ 65
7.1.2 Class FCS “Cryptographic Support” .................................................................. 65
7.1.2.1 FCS_CKM.1 “Cryptographic key generation” ................................................................ 65
7.1.2.2 FCS_CKM.4 “Cryptographic key destruction”................................................................ 66
7.1.2.3 FCS_COP.1 “Cryptographic operation”......................................................................... 67
7.1.2.4 FCS_RND.1 “Quality metric for random numbers” ........................................................ 70
7.1.3 Class FIA “Identification and Authentication”.................................................... 71
7.1.3.1 FIA_UID.1 “Timing of identification”............................................................................ 71
7.1.3.2 FIA_UAU.1 “Timing of authentication” ........................................................................ 72
7.1.3.3 FIA_UAU.4 “Single-use authentication mechanisms” .................................................... 73
7.1.3.5 FIA_UAU.5 “Multiple authentication mechanisms”....................................................... 73
7.1.3.6 FIA_UAU.6 “Re-authenticating” .................................................................................. 74
7.1.3.7 FIA_AFL.1 “Authentication failure handling” ................................................................ 75
7.1.3.8 FIA_API.1 “Authentication Proof of Identity” ................................................................ 75
7.1.4 Class FDP “User Data Protection”.................................................................... 76
7.1.4.1 FDP_ACC.1 “Subset access control” ............................................................................. 76
7.1.4.2 FDP_ACF.1 “Basic Security attribute based access control”............................................ 76
7.1.4.3 FDP_RIP.1 “Subset residual information protection” ..................................................... 78
7.1.4.4 FDP_UCT.1 “Basic data exchange confidentiality” ........................................................ 78
7.1.4.5 FDP_UIT.1 “Data exchange integrity” .......................................................................... 79
7.1.4.6 FDP_ITC.1 “Import of user data without security attributes” ......................................... 80
7.1.5 Class FMT “Security Management”.................................................................. 81
7.1.5.1 FMT_MOF “Management of functions in TSF”.............................................................. 81
7.1.5.2 FMT_SMF.1 “Specification of Management Functions” ................................................. 81
7.1.5.3 FMT_SMR.1 “Security roles” ....................................................................................... 81
7.1.5.4 FMT_LIM.1 “Limited capabilities”................................................................................ 82
7.1.5.5 FMT_LIM.2 “Limited availability” ................................................................................ 82
7.1.5.6 FMT_MTD.1 “Management of TSF data” ..................................................................... 83
7.1.6 Class FPT “Protection of the Security Functions”................................................ 85
7.1.6.1 FPT_EMS.1 “TOE Emanation” ..................................................................................... 85
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7.1.6.2 FPT_FLS.1 “Failure with preservation of secure state”................................................... 85
7.1.6.3 FPT_TST.1 “TSF testing”.............................................................................................. 86
7.1.6.4 FPT_PHP.3 “Resistance to physical attack”................................................................... 86
7.1.7 Class FTP “Trusted path/channels”.................................................................. 86
7.1.7.1 FTP_ITC.1 “Inter-TSF trusted channel” ......................................................................... 86
7.2 Security assurance requirements .......................................................................... 88
7.2.1 EAL rationale ................................................................................................ 88
7.2.2 EAL augmentation rationale ........................................................................... 88
7.2.2.1 ALC_DVS.2 "Sufficiency of security measures" ............................................................. 88
7.2.2.2 AVA_VAN.5 “Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis”............................................ 88
7.2.3 Dependencies............................................................................................... 88
7.3 Security requirements rationale ........................................................................... 90
7.3.1 Security Functional Requirements Rationale .................................................... 90
7.3.1.1 Overview .................................................................................................................. 90
7.3.1.2 OT.Data_Integrity ...................................................................................................... 92
7.3.1.3 OT.Data_Authenticity................................................................................................. 92
7.3.1.4 OT.Data_Confidentiality ............................................................................................. 92
7.3.1.5 OT.Tracing................................................................................................................. 92
7.3.1.6 OT.Prot_Abuse_Func ................................................................................................. 93
7.3.1.7 OT.Prot_Inf_Leak....................................................................................................... 93
7.3.1.8 OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper................................................................................................ 93
7.3.1.9 OT.Prot_Malfunction ................................................................................................. 93
7.3.1.10 OT.Identification........................................................................................................ 93
7.3.1.11 OT.AC_Pers ............................................................................................................... 93
7.3.1.12 OT.Configuration ....................................................................................................... 94
7.3.1.13 OT.Chip_Auth_Proof .................................................................................................. 95
7.3.1.14 OT.Secure_Load_ACode ............................................................................................. 96
7.3.1.15 OT.Secure_AC_Activation........................................................................................... 96
7.3.1.16 OT.TOE_Identification................................................................................................ 96
7.3.2 Dependency Rationale................................................................................... 97
7.3.2.1 Overview .................................................................................................................. 97
7.3.2.2 Rationale for the exclusion of dependencies.............................................................. 100
8 TOE SUMMARY SPECIFICATION..........................................................................101
8.1 TOE summary specification ................................................................................ 101
8.1.1 Overview.................................................................................................... 101
8.1.2 Access Control in Reading ............................................................................ 101
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8.1.3 Access Control in Writing ............................................................................. 102
8.1.4 Active Authentication.................................................................................. 102
8.1.5 Chip Authentication .................................................................................... 102
8.1.6 PACE.......................................................................................................... 102
8.1.7 MRTD Personalization ................................................................................. 102
8.1.8 Physical Protection...................................................................................... 103
8.1.9 MRTD Pre-personalization............................................................................ 103
8.1.10 Safe State Management............................................................................... 103
8.1.11 Secure Messaging ....................................................................................... 103
8.1.12 Self Tests.................................................................................................... 103
8.2 SFR and TSF ...................................................................................................... 104
9 GLOSSARY AND ACRONYMS...............................................................................106
9.1 Glossary ........................................................................................................... 106
9.2 Acronyms ......................................................................................................... 112
10 LITERATURE ......................................................................................................113
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1 GENERAL
1.1 Introduction
This security target describes the security needs induced by the IDmove v4 on Infineon in PACE configuration
with AA and/or CA in option product.
The objectives of this Security Target are:
 describe the Target of Evaluation (TOE), its life cycle and to position it in the smart card life cycle,
 describe the security environment of the TOE including the assets to be protected and the threats to
be countered by the TOE and by the operational environment during the platform active phases,
 describe the security objectives of the TOE and its supported environment in terms of integrity and
confidentiality of sensitive information. It includes protection of the TOE (and its documentation) during
the product active phases,
 specify the security requirements including the TOE functional requirements, the TOE assurance
requirements and the security requirements for the environment,
 describe the summary of the TOE specification including a description of the security functions and
assurance measures that meet the TOE security requirements,
 present evidence that this ST is a complete and cohesive set of requirements that the TOE provides
on an effective set of IT security countermeasures within the security environment, and that the TOE
summary specification addresses the requirements.
1.2 Product overview
IDmove v4 product is a multi-configuration MRTD product. It provides four configurations, which are:
 IDmove v4 on Infineon in BAC configuration with AA and/or CA in option,
 IDmove v4 on Infineon in EAC configuration with AA in option,
 IDmove v4 on Infineon in EAC with PACE configuration with AA in option,
 IDMove v4 on Infineon in PACE configuration with AA and/or CA in option.
IDmove v4 on Infineon Operating System is embedded in the components identified in [IC_ST] manufactured
by Infineon.
Mutatis mutandis, the product may also be used as an ISO driving license, compliant to ISO/IEC 18013 or
ISO/IEC TR 19446 supporting PACE, AA and CA, as both applications (MRTD and IDL) share the same
protocols and data structure organisation.
Therefore, in the rest of the document, the word “MRTD” MAY be understood either as a MRTD in the sense
of ICAO, or a driving license compliant to ISO/IEC 18013 or ISO/IEC TR 19446 depending on the targeted
usage envisioned by the issuer.
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2 ST INTRODUCTION
2.1 ST reference and TOE reference
2.1.1 ST reference
Title IDmove v4 on Infineon in PACE configuration with AA and/or CA in option –
Public Security Target
Code FQR 110 9128
Version 2
Authors IDEMIA
Publication date 18/07/2019
CC version 3.1 revision 5
EAL EAL5 augmented with:
 ALC_DVS.2
 AVA_VAN.5
PP See [PP_PACE]
Table 1- ST reference
2.1.2 TOE reference
Developer name IDEMIA
Product name IDmove v4 on Infineon
TOE name IDmove v4 on Infineon in PACE configuration with AA and/or CA in option
TOE identification
Integrated Circuit See Table 3 - IC identification
Embedded Software Operating System Commercial Version:090804
Operation System Unique Identifier: 3C1D
User Guidance documentation Preparative Documentation: FQR 110 8997 Issue 2
Operational Documentation: FQR 110 8998 Issue 1
Table 2 - TOE reference
2.1.3 IC identification
IC certificates See [IC_CERT]
IC public Security Target See [IC_ST]
Table 3 - IC identification
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2.1.4 TOE Delivered Parts
Part of the TOE Format Delivery Method Comment
Integrated Circuit See [IC_ST]
Embedded Software
Specific file containing
APDUs allowing the
embedded software
loading.
Encrypted file in email
The file contains all
commands to be used to
load the embedded
software. These
commands are already
formatted to ensure the
integrity and the
confidentiality of the
embedded software.
Additional Code
Specific file containing
APDUs allowing the
additional code loading.
Encrypted file in email
The file contains all
commands to be used to
load the additional code.
These commands are
already formatted to
ensure the integrity and
the confidentiality of the
additional code.
Final TOE
ID1 cards, wafers,
modules, inlays,
ecovers, eDatapage or
passeports
Secure transport
Customer can ask for
rising of the security of the
delivery method.
User Guidance Documentation Personalized pdf Encrypted file in email -
Table 4- TOE delivery parts
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2.2 TOE overview
2.2.1 Usage and major security features of the TOE
A State or Organisation issues travel documents to be used by the holder for international travel. The traveller
presents a travel document to the inspection system to prove his or her identity. The travel document in context
of this protection profile contains (i) visual (eye readable) biographical data and portrait of the holder, (ii) a
separate data summary (MRZ data) for visual and machine reading using OCR methods in the Machine
readable zone (MRZ) and (iii) data elements on the travel document’s chip according to LDS in case of
contactless machine reading. The authentication of the traveller is based on (i) the possession of a valid travel
document personalised for a holder with the claimed identity as given on the biographical data page and (ii)
biometrics using the reference data stored in the travel document. The issuing State or Organisation ensures
the authenticity of the data of genuine travel documents. The receiving State trusts a genuine travel document
of an issuing State or Organisation.
For this protection profile the travel document is viewed as unit of:
(i) the physical part of the travel document in form of paper and/or plastic and chip. It presents
visual readable data including (but not limited to) personal data of the travel document holder
(a) the biographical data on the biographical data page of the travel document surface,
(b) the printed data in the Machine Readable Zone (MRZ) and
(c) the printed portrait.
(ii) the logical travel document as data of the travel document holder stored according to the
Logical Data Structure as defined in [ICAO_9303] as specified by ICAO on the contact based
or contactless integrated circuit. It presents contact based / contactless readable data
including (but not limited to) personal data of the travel document holder
(a) the digital Machine Readable Zone Data (digital MRZ data, EF.DG1),
(b) the digitized portraits (EF.DG2),
(c) the biometric reference data of finger(s) (EF.DG3) or iris image(s) (EF.DG4) or both1
(d) the other data according to LDS (EF.DG5 to EF.DG16) and
(e) the Document Security Object (SOD).
The issuing State or Organisation implements security features of the travel document to maintain the
authenticity and integrity of the travel document and their data. The physical part of the travel document and
the travel document’s chip are identified by the Document Number.
The physical part of the travel document is protected by physical security measures (e.g. watermark, security
printing), logical (e.g. authentication keys of the travel document’s chip) and organisational security measures
(e.g. control of materials, personalisation procedures) [ICAO_9303]. These security measures can include the
binding of the travel document’s chip to the travel document.
The logical travel document is protected in authenticity and integrity by a digital signature created by the
document signer acting for the issuing State or Organisation and the security features of the travel document’s
chip.
The ICAO defines the baseline security methods Passive Authentication and the optional advanced security
methods Basic Access Control to the logical travel document, Active Authentication of the travel document’s
chip, Extended Access Control to and the Data Encryption of sensitive biometrics as optional security measure
in the ICAO Doc 9303 [ICAO_9303], and Password Authenticated Connection Establishment
[ICAO_TR_SAC]. The Passive Authentication Mechanism is performed completely and independently of the
TOE by the TOE environment.
This protection profile addresses the protection of the logical travel document (i) in integrity by write-only-once
access control and by physical means, and (ii) in confidentiality by the Extended Access Control Mechanism.
This protection profile addresses the Chip Authentication Version 1 described in [TR_03110] as an alternative
to the Active Authentication stated in [ICAO_9303].
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If BAC is supported by the TOE, the travel document has to be evaluated and certified separately. This is due
to the fact that [PP_BAC] does only consider extended basic attack potential to the Basic Access Control
Mechanism (i.e. AVA_VAN.3).
As defined in [ICAO_9303] in §6.1, Active Authentication authenticates the contactless IC by signing a
challenge sent by the IFD (inspection system) with a private key known only to the IC. For this purpose the
contactless IC contains its own Active Authentication Key pair (KPrAA and KPuAA). A hash representation of
Data Group 15 (Public Key (KPuAA) info) is stored in the Document Security Object (SOD) and therefore
authenticated by the issuer’s digital signature. The corresponding Private Key (KPrAA) is stored in the
contactless IC’s secure memory. By authenticating the visual MRZ (through the hashed MRZ in the Document
Security Object (SOD)) in combination with the challenge response, using the eMRTD’s Active Authentication
Key Pair (KPrAA and KPuAA), the inspection system verifies that the Document Security Object (SOD) has
been read from the genuine contactless IC, stored in the genuine eMRTD.
The confidentiality by Password Authenticated Connection Establishment (PACE) is a mandatory security
feature of the TOE. The travel document shall strictly conform to the ‘Common Criteria Protection Profile
Machine Readable Travel Document using Standard Inspection Procedure with PACE ([PP_PACE]). Note that
[PP_PACE] considers high attack potential.
For the PACE protocol according to [ICAO_TR_SAC], the following steps shall be performed:
(i) the travel document's chip encrypts a nonce with the shared password, derived from the MRZ
resp. CAN data and transmits the encrypted nonce together with the domain parameters to
the terminal.
(ii) The terminal recovers the nonce using the shared password, by (physically) reading the MRZ
resp. CAN data.
(iii) The travel document's chip and terminal computer perform a Diffie-Hellmann key agreement
together with the ephemeral domain parameters to create a shared secret. Both parties derive
the session keys KMAC and KENC from the shared secret.
(iv) Each party generates an authentication token, sends it to the other party and verifies the
received token.
After successful key negotiation the terminal and the travel document's chip provide private communication
(secure messaging) [TR_03110], [ICAO_TR_SAC].
The protection profile requires the TOE to implement the Extended Access Control as defined in [TR_03110].
The Extended Access Control consists of two parts (i) the Chip Authentication Protocol Version 1 and (ii) the
Terminal Authentication Protocol Version 1 (v.1). The Chip Authentication Protocol v.1 (i) authenticates the
travel document’s chip to the inspection system and (ii) establishes secure messaging which is used by
Terminal Authentication v.1 to protect the confidentiality and integrity of the sensitive biometric reference data
during their transmission from the TOE to the inspection system. Therefore Terminal Authentication v.1 can
only be performed if Chip Authentication v.1 has been successfully executed. The Terminal Authentication
Protocol v.1 consists of (i) the authentication of the inspection system as entity authorized by the receiving
State or Organisation through the issuing State, and (ii) an access control by the TOE to allow reading the
sensitive biometric reference data only to successfully authenticated authorized inspection systems. The
issuing State or Organisation authorizes the receiving State by means of certification the authentication public
keys of Document Verifiers who create Inspection System Certificates.
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Mutatis mutandis, the TOE may also be used as an ISO driving license, compliant to ISO/IEC 18013 or
ISO/IEC TR 19446 supporting EAC and AA, as both applications (MRTD and IDL) share the same protocols
and data structure organisation. Therefore, in the rest of the document, the word “MRTD” MAY be understood
either as a MRTD in the sense of ICAO, or a driving license compliant to ISO/IEC 18013 or ISO/IEC TR 19446
depending on the targeted usage envisioned by the issuer.
The table below indicates how terms and concept present in the current document shall be read when
considering the TOE to be an ISO driving license:
MRTD ISO driving licence
MRTD IDL
ICAO ISO/IEC
ICAO 9303 ISO/IEC 18013 or ISO/IEC TR 19446
DG3 DG7
DG4 DG8
DG15 DG13
MRZ MRZ or SAI (Scanning area identifier)
Traveler Holder
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2.2.2 TOE type
The TOE is the contactless and/or contact integrated circuit chip of machine readable travel documents
(MRTD’s chip) programmed according to the Logical Data Structure (LDS) and providing the Password
Authenticated Connection Establishment, the Basic Access Control, the Active Authentication and the Chip
Authentication according to [ICAO_9303].
The TOE comprises at least:
 the circuitry of the MRTD’s chip (the integrated circuit, IC),
 the IC Dedicated Software with the parts IC Dedicated Test Software and IC Dedicated Support
Software,
 the IC Embedded Software (operating system),
 the MRTD application,
 the associated guidance documentation.
Note: The antenna and the form factor are not part of the TOE as they do not have any impact on the security.
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2.2.3 TOE life cycle
2.2.3.1 Life cycle overview
The following table presents the TOE subjects and the corresponding responsible:
Subject Responsible
IC developer Infineon
TOE developer IDEMIA
Manufacturer
IC manufacturer Infineon
MRTD packaging responsible IDEMIA or another agent
Embedded software loading responsible Infineon (only applying for Scheme 1), or
IDEMIA (only applying for Scheme 2) or
another agent (only applying for Scheme 3)
Pre-personalization Agent IDEMIA or another agent
Personalization Agent IDEMIA or another agent
Table 5 - Roles identification on the life cycle
Several life cycles are available, depending when the Flash Code is loaded and who loads the Flash Code.
The following tables present the subjects following TOE life cycle steps in accordance with the standard smart
card life cycle [PP_IC], and describe for each of them, (1) the TOE delivery point and (2) the assurance
coverage:
Scheme 1, MRTD chip Embedded Software loaded by the IC Manufacturer in step 3:
Phase Step Subject Emb. Sw.
loading
Covered by Sites
1 - Development
1 IC developer  IC certification IC certification
2 TOE developer  ALC R&D sites
Pessac, Colombes
and Courbevoie
2 - Manufacturing
3
IC manufacturer 
IC certification IC manufacturer site
Embedded software
loading responsible

TOE delivery point
4
MRTD packaging
responsible
 Packaging centre
5
Pre-personalization
agent
 AGD_PRE
3 - Personalization 6 Personalization agent  AGD_PRE
4 - Operational Use 7 End user  AGD_OPE
Table 6 - Subjects identification following life cycle steps – Scheme 1
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Scheme 2, MRTD chip Embedded Software loaded by the Flash Loader with the optional Package 1 (See
[IC_ST]) in step 4 before TOE delivery point:
Phase Step Subject Emb. Sw.
loading
Covered by Sites
1 - Development
1 IC developer  IC certification IC developer site
2 TOE developer  ALC R&D sites
Pessac, Colombes
and Courbevoie
2 - Manufacturing
3 IC manufacturer  IC certification IC manufacturer site
4
MRTD packaging
responsible
 Packaging centre
Embedded software
loading responsible

ALC
Embedded
software
loading centre
IDEMIA audited sites
TOE delivery point
5
Pre-personalization
agent
 AGD_PRE
3 - Personalization 6 Personalization agent  AGD_PRE
4 - Operational Use 7 End user  AGD_OPE
Table 7 - Subjects identification following life cycle steps – Scheme 2
Scheme 3, MRTD chip Embedded Software loaded by the Flash Loader with optional Package 2 (See [IC_ST])
in step 4 after Part of TOE (Embedded Software) delivery point:
Phase Step Subject Emb. Sw.
loading
Covered by Sites
1 - Development
1 IC developer  IC certification IC developer site
2 TOE developer  ALC R&D sites
Pessac, Colombes
and Courbevoie
2 - Manufacturing
3 IC manufacturer  IC certification IC manufacturer site
4
Part of TOE (Embedded Software) delivery point
MRTD packaging
responsible
 Packaging centre
Embedded software
loading responsible
 AGD_PRE
Embedded software
loading centre
5
Pre-personalization
agent
 AGD_PRE
3 - Personalization 6 Personalization agent  AGD_PRE
4 - Operational Use 7 End user  AGD_OPE
Table 8 - Subjects identification following life cycle steps – Scheme 3
Regarding schemes 2 and 3, the security of the loading mechanism is ensured by the Flash Loader covered
by the IC certificate [IC_CERT].
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2.2.3.2 Life cycle phases
The following text was extracted from [PP_PACE]. Due to the previous specified life cycles and to the
technology of the IC, some interpretations have to be done by the reader of this ST. The table below indicates
how terms shall be read:
Term in [PP_PACE] Meaning in this ST
Software developer TOE developer
non-volatile non-programmable memory(ies) Part of the Flash memory where the Flash Loader and the
OS are loaded. This memory is programmable by the IC
manufacturer or using the Flash Loader. Once the Flash
Loader is blocked, this memory is Read Only Memory
ROM
non-volatile programmable memory(ies) Part of the Flash memory where initialization data and user
data are written.
EEPROM
The TOE life cycle is described in terms of the four life cycle phases and subdivided into 7 steps (with respect
to the [PP_IC]).
2.2.3.2.1 Phase 1 “Development”
(Step1) The TOE is developed in phase 1. The IC developer develops the integrated circuit, the IC Dedicated
Software and the guidance documentation associated with these TOE components.
(Step2) The software developer uses the guidance documentation for the integrated circuit and the guidance
documentation for relevant parts of the IC Dedicated Software and develops the IC Embedded Software
(operating system), the MRTD application and the guidance documentation associated with these TOE
components.
The manufacturing documentation of the IC including the IC Dedicated Software and the Embedded Software
in the non-volatile non-programmable memories (ROM) is securely delivered to the IC manufacturer. The IC
Embedded Software in the non-volatile programmable memories, the MRTD application and the guidance
documentation is securely delivered to the MRTD manufacturer.
Note: If scheme 1 is applied, the Embedded Software in the non-volatile non-programmable memories (ROM)
is securely delivered to the IC manufacturer. For details, please refer to ALC and in particular to [ALC_STM].
If scheme 2 or 3 are applied, the Embedded Software in the non-volatile non-programmable memories (ROM)
is securely delivered to the MRTD manufacturer. For details, please refer to ALC and in particular to
[ALC_SCT]
2.2.3.2.2 Phase 2 “Manufacturing”
(Step3) In a first step the TOE integrated circuit is produced containing the MRTD’s chip Dedicated Software
and the parts of the MRTD’s chip Embedded Software in the non-volatile non-programmable memories (ROM).
The IC manufacturer writes the IC Identification Data onto the chip to control the IC as MRTD material during
the IC manufacturing and the delivery process to the MRTD manufacturer. The IC is securely delivered from
the IC manufacture to the MRTD manufacturer.
If necessary the IC manufacturer adds the parts of the IC Embedded Software in the non-volatile
programmable memories (for instance EEPROM).
Note: If scheme 2 or 3 are applied, the TOE integrated circuit is produced containing the Flash Loader in the
non-volatile non-programmable memories (ROM). The IC manufacturer writes the IC Identification Data onto
the chip to control the IC as MRTD material during the IC manufacturing and the delivery process to the MRTD
manufacturer. The IC is securely delivered from the IC manufacture to the MRTD manufacturer.
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Note 2: Regarding key management, the Flash Loader usage is protected by successful Km authentication.
For details, please refer to [IC_PPM]. This key is securely transferred to IC manufacturer as detailed in ALC
and more precisely in [ALC_KM].
(Step4) The MRTD manufacturer combines the IC with hardware for the contactless interface in the passport
book.
Note: If scheme 2 or 3 are applied, the MRTD manufacturer (i) loads the MRTD’s chip Dedicated Software and
the parts of the MRTD’s chip Embedded Software in the non-volatile non-programmable memories (ii) adds
the parts of the IC Embedded Software in the non-volatile programmable memories.
(Step5) The MRTD manufacturer (i) creates the MRTD application and (ii) equips MRTD’s chips with pre-
personalization Data.
Application Note (1 in [PP_PACE]): Creation of the application implies the creation of MF and ICAO.DF.
Note: If one (or several) Additional Code(s) is (are) associated to the MRTD’s chip Embedded Software, it
(they) shall be loaded prior to any operation in (Step5).
The pre-personalized MRTD together with the IC Identifier is securely delivered from the MRTD manufacturer
to the Personalization Agent. The MRTD manufacturer also provides the relevant parts of the guidance
documentation to the Personalization Agent.
2.2.3.2.3 Phase 3 “Personalization of the MRTD”
(Step6) The personalization of the MRTD includes (i) the survey of the MRTD holder’s biographical data, (ii)
the enrolment of the MRTD holder biometric reference data (i.e. the digitized portraits and the optional
biometric reference data), (iii) the printing of the visual readable data onto the physical MRTD, (iv) the writing
of the TOE User Data and TSF Data into the logical MRTD and (v) configuration of the TSF if necessary. The
step (iv) is performed by the Personalization Agent and includes but is not limited to the creation of (i) the
digital MRZ data (EF.DG1), (ii) the digitized portrait (EF.DG2), and (iii) the Document security object.
The signing of the Document security object by the Document Signer [ICAO_9303] finalizes the personalization
of the genuine MRTD for the MRTD holder. The personalized MRTD (together with appropriate guidance for
TOE use if necessary) is handed over to the MRTD holder for operational use.
Application note (2 in [PP_PACE]): The TSF data (data created by and for the TOE, that might affect the
operation of the TOE; cf. [CC_1] §92) comprise (but are not limited to) the Personalization Agent Authentication
Key(s) and the Basic Authentication Control Key.
Application note: This security target distinguishes between the Personalization Agent as entity known to the
TOE and the Document Signer as entity in the TOE IT environment signing the Document security object as
described in [ICAO_9303]. This approach allows but does not enforce the separation of these roles. The
selection of the authentication keys should consider the organization, the productivity and the security of the
personalization process. Asymmetric authentication keys provide comfortable security for distributed
personalization but their use may be more time consuming than authentication using symmetric cryptographic
primitives. Authentication using symmetric cryptographic primitives allows fast authentication protocols
appropriate for centralized personalization schemes but relies on stronger security protection in the
personalization environment.
2.2.3.2.4 Phase 4 “Operational Use”
(Step7) The TOE is used as MRTD chip by the traveler and the inspection systems in the “Operational Use”
phase. The user data can be read according to the security policy of the issuing State or Organization and can
be used according to the security policy of the issuing State but they can never be modified.
Application note: The authorized Personalization Agents might be allowed to add (not to modify) data in the
other data groups of the MRTD application (e.g. person(s) to notify EF.DG16) in the Phase 4 “Operational
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Use”. This will imply an update of the Document Security Object including the re-signing by the Document
Signer.
Application note (4 in [PP_PACE]): The intention of this security target is to consider at least the phases 1 and
parts of phase 2 (i.e. Step1 to Step3) as part of the evaluation and therefore to define the TOE delivery
according to CC after this phase 2 or later. Since specific production steps of phase 2 are of minor security
relevance (e. g. booklet manufacturing and antenna integration) these are not part of the CC evaluation under
ALC. Nevertheless the decision about this has to be taken by the certification body resp. the national body of
the issuing State or Organization. In this case the national body of the issuing State or Organization is
responsible for these specific production steps.
Note that the personalization process and its environment may depend on specific security needs of an issuing
State or Organization. All production, generation and installation procedures after TOE delivery up to the
“Operational Use” (phase 4) have to be considered in the product evaluation process under AGD assurance
class. Therefore, the Security Target has to outline the split up of P.Manufact, P.Personalization and the related
security objectives into aspects relevant before vs. after TOE delivery.
2.2.4 Required non-TOE hardware/Software/firmware
There is no explicit non-TOE hardware, software or firmware required by the TOE to perform its claimed
security features. The TOE is defined to comprise the chip and the complete operating system and application.
Note, the inlay holding the chip as well as the antenna and the booklet (holding the printed MRZ) are needed
to represent a complete MRTD, nevertheless these parts are not inevitable for the secure operation of the
TOE.
Note: in particular the TOE may be used in contact mode, without any inlay or antenna.
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2.3 TOE description
2.3.1 TOE Architecture
The TOE is composed of an IC and some software components as presented in Figure 1. Each part of the
TOE is presented in the following chapters.
Figure 1 - TOE architecture
Application layer
Platform layer
Integrated Circuit
Low layer
IDEMIA BIOS IDEMIA Cryptographic Library
Services
Toolbox FSM ACE SM CKM AKM
Authentication Protocols
TA
CA PACE v2
Start-Up and Applications Manager
Block 1: MRTD/IDL
MRTD/IDL
BAC
Resident Application Application Creation Engine
BAC
MRTD/IDL
EAC
MRTD/IDL
PACE
MRTD/IDL
EAC w. PACE
AA
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2.3.2 Integrated Circuit
The TOE is embedded on Infineon components (cf § Table 3 - IC identification). Theses IC comprise the
following:
Communication protocols:
 ISO 14443 Type A and Type B defined proximity contactless protocol
 ISO 7816 defined standard contact based communication protocol
Core System:
 Proprietary dual CPU implementation being comparable to the 80251 microcontroller architecture from
functional perspective and with enhanced MCS 251 instruction set
 Cache with Post Failure Detection
 Memory Encryption/Decryption Unit (MED)
 Memory Management Unit (MMU)
Memories:
 Read-Only Memory (ROM), not available for the user
 Random Access Memory (RAM)
 SOLID FLASH™ NVM, the flash cell based non-volatile memory
Buses:
 Memory Bus
 Peripheral Bus
Coprocessors:
 Crypto2304T for asymmetric algorithms like RSA and EC
 Symmetric Crypto Coprocessor for AES and 3DES Standards
Control:
 Interface Management Module (IMM)
 Interrupt and Peripheral Event Channel Controller (ITP)
 Clock & Power Management
 Control
System Peripherals
 Sensors & Filters
 User mode Security Life Control (UmSLC)
Peripherals:
 Hybrid Physical True Random Number Generator (HPTRNG) implementing also Deterministic
Random Number Generator (DRNG)
 Watchdog and Timers
 Cyclic Redundancy Check module (CRC)
 Universal Asynchronous Receiver/Transmitter (UART)
 Radio Frequency Interface (RF power and signal interface)
 Analogue Contactless Bridge (ACLB)
 Inter-Integrated Circuit module (I2C)
 General Purpose Input Output (GPIO)
The firmware is composed of the:
 Boot-up software (BOS), the Resource Management System (RMS), the Flash Loader (FL) and the
RFI supporting functions. The BOS applies the essential configuration, internal testing and the start-
up.
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 The RMS implements a low level application interface (API) to the Smartcard Embedded Software and
provides handling and managing routines for RAM, MMU, Branch table, configuration and further
functions.
 The Flash Loader allows downloading user software to the SOLID FLASH™ NVM during the
manufacturing process and also at user premises - if ordered.
 The Radio Frequency Interface Application Interface (RFAPI) functions consist of executable code in
the ROM which is part of the TOE and a SOLID FLASH™ NVM code part which is delivered separately
to the user and which is not part of the TOE.
IC is part of the TOE and also part of the TSF. More information on the chips is given in the related Security
Target [IC_ST].
2.3.3 Low layer
2.3.3.1 IDEMIA Basic Input/Output System (BIOS)
The BIOS module provides access management (read/write) functionalities to upper-layer application. It also
provides exception and communication functionalities.
The BIOS module is part of the TOE and is also part of the TSF.
2.3.3.2 IDEMIA Cryptographic library (Crypto)
The Cryptography module provides secure cryptographic functionalities to upper-layer applications.
The Crypto module is part of the TOE and is also part of the TSF.
2.3.4 Platform layer
2.3.4.1 Services
2.3.4.1.1 File System Management (FSM)
The FSM module manages files and data objects according to ISO 7816-4 and 7816-9. It also manages the
Digitally Blurred Image process, allowing for blurring a JPG or JPEG2000 image stored in a transparent file.
This feature is covered by a patent owned by IDEMIA.
The FSM module is part of the TOE and is also part of the TSF.
2.3.4.1.2 Secure Messaging (SM)
The SM module provides functionalities to encrypt/decrypt data for secure communication in Manufacturing,
Personalization and Operational Use phases (steps 5, 6 and 7). A Secure Messaging session begins after a
successful authentication (GP authentication for Pre-personalization and Personalization phases or CA for
Operational Use phase).
The SM module is part of the TOE and is also part of the TSF.
2.3.4.1.3 Cryptography Key Management (CKM)
The CKM module is responsible for asymmetric cryptography key management and asymmetric cryptography
operations.
The CKM module is part of the TOE and is also part of the TSF.
2.3.4.1.4 Authentication and Key Management (AKM)
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This module supplies:
 Symmetric Key management (read, write, access control),
 Services to manage Global Platform authentication and secure messaging.
The AKM module is part of the TOE and is also part of the TSF.
2.3.4.1.5 Access Condition Engine (ACE)
The ACE module is in charge of the verification of the Access Conditions of an object (files and keys) when an
application tries to access this object.
The ACE module is part of the TOE and is also part of the TSF.
2.3.4.1.6 Toolbox (TBX)
The Toolbox module provides different kind of services to other modules.
 Services to manage APDU,
 Services to handle BER-TLV constructed data object,
 Services to process specific cryptographic operations,
 Services to handle Object Identifier,
 Services to manage MRZ (personalization and misuse management),
 Services to handle data in a secure way.
The TBX module is part of the TOE but and is also part of the TSF
2.3.5 Authentication Protocols
2.3.5.1 Terminal Authentication (TA)
The TA module processes the Terminal Authentication (v1 and v2) mechanism. Terminal Authentication v1 is
part of the EACv1 procedure defined in [TR_03110].
The TA module is part of the TOE but is NOT part of the TSF.
2.3.5.2 Chip Authentication (CA)
The CA module processes the Chip Authentication (v1 and v2) mechanism. Chip Authentication v1 is part of
the EACv1 procedure defined in [TR_03110].
The CA module is part of the TOE and also part of the TSF.
2.3.5.3 Password Authenticated Connection Establishment (PACE v2)
The PACE module provides functionalities to process the PACE v2 mechanism as defined in [ICAO_TR_SAC].
The PACE v2 module is part of the TOE and also part of the TSF.
2.3.5.4 Active Authentication (AA)
The AA module provides functionalities to process the AA mechanism as defined in [ICAO_9303].
The AA module is part of the TOE and is also part of the TSF.
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2.3.6 Application layer
2.3.6.1 Start-Up and Applications Manager (Boot)
The Boot module is responsible to manage the start-up of the applications (MRTD, RA and ACRE).
The Boot module is part of the TOE and is also part of the TSF
2.3.6.2 Application Creation Engine (ACRE)
The Application Creation Engine is a complete set of commands used to (pre-)personalize the card and its
application(s). It includes:
 Additional Code loading,
 Creation of application,
 Import and Generation of the Active Authentication key (ECC and RSA keys),
 Import and Generation of multiple Chip Authentication keys under the ADF (supporting ECC and RSA
Keys),
 Storage of CVCA Keys under each ADF.
The Additional Code Loading process is as follow:
1. Additional Code’s Secure Messaging keys (authenticity and confidentiality) calculation,
2. Additional Code loading,
3. Additional Code activation.
The ACRE module is part of the TOE and is also part of the TSF.
2.3.6.3 Resident Application (RA)
The Resident Application is a complete set of commands, which allows the management of the card in the
Operational Use phase (data management and authentication process under MF).
The RA module is part of the TOE and is also part of the TSF.
2.3.6.4 Machine Readable Travel Document (MRTD)
The MRTD is a complete set of commands, which allows the management of MRTD data in the Operational
Use phase (data management and authentication process under MRTD ADF).
The MRTD module is part of the TOE and is also part of the TSF.
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3 CONFORMANCE CLAIMS
3.1 Common Criteria conformance
This Security Target (ST) claims conformance to the Common Criteria (CC) version 3.1 revision 5.
The conformance to the CC is claimed as follows:
CC Conformance Claim
Part 1 Strict conformance
Part 2 Conformance with extensions:
 FAU_SAS.1 “Audit storage”,
 FCS_RND.1 “Quality metric for random numbers”,
 FMT_LIM.1 “Limited capabilities”,
 FMT_LIM.2 “Limited availability”,
 FPT_EMS.1 “TOE Emanation”,
 FIA_API.11 “Authentication Proof of Identity”.
Part 3 Conformance with package EAL5 augmented with:
 ALC_DVS.2 “Sufficiency of security measures” defined in [CC_3],
 AVA_VAN.5 “Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis” defined in [CC_3]
Table 9 – Common Criteria conformance claim
Remark
As product is targeting “Qualification renforcée” all activities for ALC_FLR.3 have been processed. However,
this assurance package is not properly claimed in the present security target as the chip does not support it.
1
FIA_API.1 has been added to this security target for the needs of the Chip Authentication Protocol and the Active Authentication Protocol.
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3.2 Protection Profile conformance
3.2.1 Overview
This ST claims strict conformance to the following Protection Profile (PP):
Title
Common Criteria Protection Profile – Machine Readable Travel Document using Standard
Inspection Procedure with PACE (PACE PP)
CC Version 3.1 (Revision 3)
Assurance Level The minimum assurance level for this PP is EAL4 augmented
Version Number 1.01 as of 22nd July 2014
Registration BSI-CC-PP-0068-V2-2011-MA-01
Table 10 – Protection Profile conformance
This ST also addresses the Manufacturing and Personalization phases at TOE level (cf. §2.2.3 TOE life cycle),
as well as the Chip Authentication (CA) and Active Authentication (AA) protocols available in operational use
phase. The additions do not contradict any of the threats, assumptions, organizational policies, objectives or
SFRs stated in the [PP_PACE] that covers the advanced security methods PACE in operational use phase.
The following parts list assumptions, threats, OSP, OT and OE for this TOE (i.e. from [PP_PACE] and
additional).
3.2.2 Assumptions
The following Assumptions are assumed for this TOE:
 A.Passive_Auth “PKI for Passive Authentication” defined in [PP_PACE],
 A.Insp_Sys_Chip_Auth “Inspection Systems for global interoperability on chip authenticity” defined
in this ST,
 A.MRTD_Manufact “MRTD manufacturing on steps 4 to 6”, defined in this ST,
 A.MRTD_Delivery “MRTD delivery during steps 4 to 6”, defined in this ST.
A.Insp_Sys_Chip_Auth is additional for the Chip Authentication protocol and for Active Authentication protocol
which are not in the original scope of the [PP_PACE]. This assumption is only linked to threats for the Chip
Authentication protocol and Active Authentication protocol so this assumption neither mitigate a threat (or a
part of a threat) meant to be addressed by security objectives for the TOE in the [PP_PACE], nor fulfils an
OSP (or part of an OSP) meant to be addressed by security objectives for the TOE in the [PP_PACE].
A.MRTD_Manufact is additional for MRTD manufacturing on steps 4 to 6 which is not in the original scope of
the [PP_EACwPACE]. This assumption is only linked to threats for the MRTD manufacturing on steps 4 to 6
so this assumption neither mitigate a threat (or a part of a threat) meant to be addressed by security objectives
for the TOE in the [PP_EACwPACE], nor fulfils an OSP (or part of an OSP) meant to be addressed by security
objectives for the TOE in the [PP_EACwPACE].
A.MRTD_Delivery is additional for MRTD delivery during steps 4 to 6 which is not in the original scope of the
[PP_EACwPACE]. This assumption is only linked to threats for the MRTD delivery during steps 4 to 6 so this
assumption neither mitigate a threat (or a part of a threat) meant to be addressed by security objectives for the
TOE in the [PP_EACwPACE], nor fulfils an OSP (or part of an OSP) meant to be addressed by security
objectives for the TOE in the [PP_EACwPACE].
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3.2.3 Threats
The following threats are averted by this TOE:
 T.Skimming “Skimming travel document / Capturing Card-Terminal Communication” defined in
[PP_PACE],
 T.Eavesdropping “Eavesdropping on the communication between the TOE and the PACE terminal”
defined in [PP_PACE],
 T.Tracing “Tracing travel document” defined in [PP_PACE],
 T.Forgery “Forgery of Data” defined in [PP_PACE],
 T.Abuse-Func “Abuse of Functionality” defined in [PP_PACE],
 T.Information_Leakage “Information Leakage from travel document” in [PP_PACE],
 T.Phys-Tamper “Physical Tampering” defined in [PP_PACE],
 T.Malfunction “Malfunction due to Environmental Stress” defined in [PP_PACE],
 T.Configuration “Tampering attempt of the TOE during preparation” defined in this ST,
 T.Counterfeit “MRTD’s chip” defined in this ST,
 T.Unauthorized_Load defined in [JIL_SRCL],
 T.Bad_Activation, defined in [JIL_SRCL].
3.2.4 Organizational Security Policies
This TOE complies with the following OSP:
 P.Pre-Operational “Pre-operational handling of the travel document” defined in [PP_PACE],
 P.Card_PKI “PKI for Passive Authentication (issuing branch)” defined in [PP_PACE],
 P.Trustworthy_PKI “Trustworthiness of PKI” defined in [PP_PACE],
 P.Manufact “Manufacturing of the travel document’s chip” defined in [PP_PACE],
 P.Terminal “Abilities and trustworthiness of terminals” defined in [PP_PACE].
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3.2.5 Security Objectives
The Security Objectives for this TOE are the following:
 OT.Data_Integrity “Integrity of Data” defined in [PP_PACE],
 OT.Data_Authenticity “Authenticity of Data” defined in [PP_PACE],
 OT.Data_Confidentiality “Confidentiality of Data” defined in [PP_PACE],
 OT.Tracing “Tracing travel document” defined in [PP_PACE],
 OT.Prot_Abuse-Func “Protection against Abuse of Functionality” defined in [PP_PACE],
 OT.Prot_Inf_Leak “Protection against Information Leakage” defined in [PP_PACE],
 OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper “Protection against Physical Tampering” defined in [PP_PACE],
 OT.Prot_Malfunction “Protection against Malfunctions” defined in [PP_PACE],
 OT.Identification “Identification of the TOE” defined in [PP_PACE],
 OT.AC_Pers “Access Control for Personalisation of logical MRTD” defined in [PP_PACE],
 OT.Configuration “Protection of the TOE preparation” defined in this ST,
 OT.Chip_Auth_Proof “Proof of MRTD’s chip authenticity” defined in this ST,
 OT.Secure_Load_ACode “Secure loading of the Additional Code” defined in [JIL_SRCL],
 OT.Secure_AC_Activation “Secure activation of the Additional Code”, defined in [JIL_SRCL],
 OT.TOE_Identification “Secure identification of the TOE” defined in [JIL_SRCL].
The Security Objectives for the environment of this TOE are the following:
 OE.Legislative_Compliance “Issuing of the travel document” defined in [PP_PACE],
 OE.Passive_Auth_Sign “Authentication of travel document by Signature” defined in [PP_PACE],
 OE.Personalisation “Personalisation of travel document” defined in [PP_PACE],
 OE.Terminal “Terminal operating” defined in [PP_PACE]
 OE.Travel_Document_Holder “Travel document holder Obligations” defined in [PP_PACE],
 OE.Exam_Chip_Auth “Examination of the chip authenticity” defined in this ST,
 OE.MRTD_Manufact “Protection of the MRTD Manufacturing” defined in this ST,
 OE.MRTD_Delivery “Protection of the MRTD delivery” defined in this ST,
 OE.Auth_MRTD “MRTD Authentication Key” defined in this ST.
OE.Exam_Chip_Auth and OE.Auth_MRTD are additional objectives for the Chip Authentication protocol and
Active Authentication protocol which are not in the original scope of the [PP_PACE]. These objectives are only
linked to threats for the Chip Authentication protocol and Active Authentication protocol so these objectives
neither mitigate a threat (or a part of a threat) meant to be addressed by security objectives for the TOE in the
[PP_PACE], nor fulfils an OSP (or part of an OSP) meant to be addressed by security objectives for the TOE
in the [PP_PACE].
OE.MRTD_Manufact is additional for the Protection of the MRTD manufacturing on steps 4 to 6 which is not
in the original scope of the [PP_PACE]. This objective is only linked to assumption for the MRTD manufacturing
on steps 4 to 6, so this objective neither mitigate a threat (or a part of a threat) meant to be addressed by
security objectives for the TOE in the [PP_PACE], nor fulfils an OSP (or part of an OSP) meant to be addressed
by security objectives for the TOE in the [PP_PACE].
OE.MRTD_Delivery is additional for the Protection of the MRTD delivery during steps 4 to 6 which is not in the
original scope of the [PP_PACE]. This objective is only linked to threats for the MRTD delivery during steps 4
to 6, so this objective neither mitigate a threat (or a part of a threat) meant to be addressed by security
objectives for the TOE in the [PP_PACE], nor fulfils an OSP (or part of an OSP) meant to be addressed by
security objectives for the TOE in the [PP_PACE].
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4 SECURITY PROBLEM DEFINITION
4.1 Assets
4.1.1 Overview
The following table presents the assets of the TOE and their corresponding phase(s) according to §2.2.3 TOE
life cycle:
Asset Step 5 Step 6 Step 7
Personal Data   
EF.COM   
CA_SK   
AA_SK   
Session_K   
PACE_Kmac   
PACE_Kenc   
ephem-Skpicc-PACE   
EF.SOD   
CA_PK   
AA_PK   
PACE_PWD   
CPLC   
TOE_ID   
Pre-Perso_K   
Perso_K   
LCS   
Configuration data   
Additional Code   
LSK   
DIV_LSK   
Table 11 – Assets of the TOE and their corresponding phase(s)
4.1.2 User data stored on the TOE
All data (being not authentication data) stored in the context of the ePassport application of the MRTD as
defined in [ICAO_TR_SAC] and being allowed to be read out solely by an authenticated terminal acting as
Basic Inspection System with PACE (in the sense of [ICAO_TR_SAC])
This asset covers ‘User Data on the MRTD’s chip’, ‘Logical MRTD Data’ and ‘Sensitive User Data’ in
[PP_BAC].
It includes:
4.1.2.1 Personal Data
The Personal Data are the logical MRTD standard User Data of the MRTD holder.
4.1.2.2 EF.COM
The EF.COM is an elementary file containing the list of the existing elementary files (EF) with the user data.
Application note (6 in [PP_PACE]): Please note that user data being referred to in the table above include,
amongst other, individual-related (personal) data of the travel document holder which also include his sensitive
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(i.e. biometric) data. Hence, the general security policy defined by the current PP also secures these specific
travel document holder’s data as stated above.
4.1.3 User data transferred between the TOE and the terminal connected
All data (being not authentication data) being transferred in the context of the ePassport application of the
MRTD as defined in [ICAO_TR_SAC] between the TOE and an authenticated terminal acting as Basic
Inspection System with PACE (in the sense of [ICAO_TR_SAC]).
User data can be received and sent (exchange  {receive, send}).
4.1.4 MRTD tracing data
Technical information about the current and previous locations of the MRTD gathered unnoticeable by the
MRTD holder recognising the TOE not knowing any PACE password. TOE tracing data can be provided /
gathered.
4.1.5 Accessibility to the TOE functions and data only for authorised subjects
Property of the TOE to restrict access to TSF and TSF-data stored in the TOE to authorised subjects only.
4.1.6 Genuineness of the TOE
Property of the TOE to be authentic in order to provide claimed security functionality in a proper way.
This asset also covers ‘Authenticity of the MRTD’s chip’ in [PP_BAC].
4.1.7 TOE intrinsic secret cryptographic keys
Permanently or temporarily stored secret cryptographic material used by the TOE in order to enforce its
security functionality.
It includes:
4.1.7.1 Chip Authentication Private Key (CA_SK)
The Chip Authentication Private Key is used by the application to process Chip Authentication.
4.1.7.2 Active Authentication Private Key (AA_SK)
The Active Authentication Private Key is used by the application to process Active Authentication.
4.1.7.3 Secure Messaging session keys (Session_K)
Session keys are used to secure communication in confidentiality and authenticity.
4.1.7.4 PACE session keys (PACE-Kmac, PACE-Kenc)
PACE session keys are secure messaging keys for message authentication and for message encryption
agreed between the TOE and a terminal as result of the PACE Protocol.
4.1.7.5 Ephemeral private key PACE (ephem-Skpicc-PACE)
The ephemeral PACE Authentication Key Pair is used for Key Agreement Protocol.
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4.1.8 TOE intrinsic non secret cryptographic material
Permanently or temporarily stored non-secret cryptographic (public) keys and other non-secret material
(Document Security Object SOD containing digital signature) used by the TOE in order to enforce its security
functionality.
It includes:
4.1.8.1 EF.SOD
The elementary file Document Security Object is used by the inspection system for Passive Authentication of
the logical MRTD.
4.1.8.2 Chip Authentication Public Key (CA_PK)
The Chip Authentication Public Key (contained in EF.DG14) is used by the inspection system for the Chip
Authentication.
4.1.8.3 Active Authentication Public Key (AA_PK)
The Active Authentication Public Key (contained in EF.DG15) is used by the inspection system for the Active
Authentication.
4.1.9 MRTD communication establishment authorisation data
Restricted-revealable authorisation information for a human user being used for verification of the authorisation
attempts as authorised user (PACE password). These data are stored in the TOE and are not to be send to it.
It includes:
4.1.9.1 PACE password (PACE_PWD)
Password needed for PACE authentication, e.g. CAN or MRZ.
Application Note (7 in [PP_PACE]): Since the travel document does not support any secret travel document
holder authentication data and the latter may reveal, if necessary, his or her verification values of the PACE
password to an authorised person or device, a successful PACE authentication of a terminal does not
unambiguously mean that the travel document holder is using TOE.
Application Note (8 in [PP_PACE]): travel document communication establishment authorisation data are
represented by two different entities: (i) reference information being persistently stored in the TOE and (ii)
verification information being provided as input for the TOE by a human user as an authorisation attempt.The
TOE shall secure the reference information as well as – together with the terminal connected – the verification
information in the ‘TOE ↔ terminal’ channel, if it has to be transferred to the TOE. Please note that PACE
passwords are not to be send to the TOE.
4.1.10 CPLC
The CPLC Data are the Card Production Life Cycle data. They are considered as user data as they enable to
track the holder. These data are filled during steps 4, 5 and 6 by subjects.
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4.1.11 TOE_ID
These data allow the identification of the TOE. These data are part of the IC Embedded Software in the non-
volatile non-programmable memory. If Additional Code is loaded, then the TOE_ID contains Additional Code
Identification Data.
4.1.12 Pre-personalization Agent keys (Pre-perso_K)
This key set used for mutual authentication between the Pre-personalization agent and the chip, and secure
communication establishment.
4.1.13 Personalization Agent keys (Perso_K)
This key set used for mutual authentication between the Personalization agent and the chip, and secure
communication establishment.
4.1.14 TOE Life Cycle State (LCS)
This is the Life Cycle State of the TOE.
4.1.15 Configuration Data
These specific data set the configuration of the TOE in terms of security features and security functions. These
configuration data can be set in Manufacturing and Personalization phases (Steps 5 and 6) after authentication
of the relevant agent with the relevant key set.
4.1.16 Additional Code
This is the Additional Code to be loaded on the Initial TOE during Pre-personalisation by the Pre-
personalization Agent. The result of this operation is the Final TOE.
4.1.17 Load Secure Key (LSK) and Diversified LSK (DIV_LSK)
This Load Secure Key (LSK) is the secret key used to calculate the Diversified LSK (DIV_LSK). The Diversified
LSK is a session key used to verify the Additional Code confidentiality and integrity.
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4.2 Subjects
4.2.1 Overview
Subject Descr. Step 3 Step 4 Step 5 Step 6 Step 7
MRTD Holder § 4.2.2     
Traveler § 4.2.3     
Basic Inspection System with PACE § 4.2.4     
Document Signer § 4.2.5     
Country Signing Certification Authority § 4.2.6     
Personalization Agent § 4.2.7     
IC manufacturer
(Manufacturer role)
§ 4.2.8     
MRTD packaging responsible
(Manufacturer role)
§ 4.2.9
    
Embedded software loading responsible
(Manufacturer role)
§ 4.2.10
    
Pre-personalization Agent
(Manufacturer role)
§ 4.2.11     
Terminal § 4.2.12     
Attacker § 4.2.13     
Table 12 – Subjects of the TOE and their corresponding phase(s)
4.2.2 MRTD holder
MRTD holder is the travel document holder defined in [PP_PACE]:
A person for whom the travel document Issuer has personalised the travel document. This entity is
commensurate with ‘MRTD Holder’ in [PP_BAC]. Please note that a travel document holder can also be an
attacker.
4.2.3 Traveler
A person presenting the travel document to a terminal and claiming the identity of the travel document holder.
This external entity is commensurate with ‘Traveller’ in [PP_BAC]. Please note that a travel document
presenter can also be an attacker.
4.2.4 Basic Inspection System with PACE (BIS-PACE)
A technical system being used by an inspecting authority and verifying the travel document presenter as the
travel document holder (for ePassport: by comparing the real biometric data (face) of the travel document
presenter with the stored biometric data (DG2) of the travel document holder).
BIS-PACE implements the terminal’s part of the PACE protocol and authenticates itself to the travel document
using a shared password (PACE password) and supports Passive Authentication.
See also par. 1.2.5 in [PP_PACE].
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4.2.5 Document Signer (DS)
An organisation enforcing the policy of the CSCA and signing the Document Security Object stored on the
travel document for passive authentication. A Document Signer is authorised by the national CSCA issuing
the Document Signer Certificate, see [ICAO_9303]. This role is usually delegated to a Personalisation Agent.
4.2.6 Country Signing Certification Authority (CSCA)
An organisation enforcing the policy of the travel document Issuer with respect to confirming correctness of
user and TSF data stored in the travel document. The CSCA represents the country specific root of the PKI
for the travel document and creates the Document Signer Certificates within this PKI. The CSCA also issues
the self-signed CSCA Certificate having to be distributed by strictly secure diplomatic means, see
[ICAO_9303], 5.5.1.
4.2.7 Personalization Agent
An organisation acting on behalf of the travel document Issuer to personalise the travel document for the travel
document holder by some or all of the following activities: (i) establishing the identity of the travel document
holder for the biographic data in the travel document, (ii) enrolling the biometric reference data of the travel
document holder, (iii) writing a subset of these data on the physical travel document (optical personalisation)
and storing them in the travel document (electronic personalisation) for the travel document holder as defined
in [ICAO_9303], (iv) writing the document details data, (v) writing the initial TSF data, (vi) signing the Document
Security Object defined in [ICAO_9303] (in the role of DS). Please note that the role ‘Personalisation Agent’
may be distributed among several institutions according to the operational policy of the travel document Issuer.
This entity is commensurate with ‘Personalisation agent’ in [PP_BAC].
4.2.8 IC manufacturer
This additional subject is a refinement of the role Manufacturer as described in [PP_PACE]. It is the
manufacturer of the IC.
If scheme 1 is applied (cf. § 2.2.3), this subject is responsible for the embedded software downloading in the
IC. This subject does not use Flash loader, even if it is embedded in the IC.
4.2.9 MRTD packaging responsible
This additional subject is a refinement of the role Manufacturer as described in [PP_PACE]. This subject is
responsible for the combination of the IC with hardware for the contactless and/or contact interface.
4.2.10 Embedded software loading responsible
This additional subject is a refinement of the role Manufacturer as described in [PP_PACE]. This subject is
responsible for the embedded software loading when scheme 2 is applied (cf. § 2.2.3). This subject does not
exist if scheme 1 is applied (cf. § 2.2.3). This subject uses the Flash loader embedded in the IC.
4.2.11 Pre-personalization Agent
This additional subject is a refinement of the role Manufacturer as described in [PP_PACE]. This subject is
responsible for the preparation of the card, i.e. creation of the MF and MRTD ADF. He also sets Personalization
Agent keys and Configuration data.
4.2.12 Terminal
A terminal is any technical system communicating with the TOE through the contactless/contact interface. The
role ‘Terminal’ is the default role for any terminal being recognised by the TOE as not being PACE
authenticated (‘Terminal’ is used by the travel document presenter).
This entity is commensurate with ‘Terminal’ in [PP_BAC].
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4.2.13 Attacker
A threat agent (a person or a process acting on his behalf) trying to undermine the security policy defined by
the current PP, especially to change properties of the assets having to be maintained.The attacker is assumed
to possess an at most high attack potential.
Please note that the attacker might ‘capture’ any subject role recognised by the TOE.
This external entity is commensurate with ‘Attacker’ in [PP_BAC].
Application Note (9 in [PP_PACE]): Since the TOE does not use BAC, a Basic Inspection System with BAC
(BIS-BAC) cannot be recognised by the TOE, see par. 1.2.5 in [PP_PACE].
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4.3 Assumptions
4.3.1 A.Passive_Auth “PKI for Passive Authentication”
The issuing and receiving States or Organisations establish a public key infrastructure for passive
authentication i.e. digital signature creation and verification for the logical travel document. The issuing State
or Organisation runs a Certification Authority (CA) which securely generates, stores and uses the Country
Signing CA Key pair. The CA keeps the Country Signing CA Private Key secret and is recommended to
distribute the Country Signing CA Public Key to ICAO, all receiving States maintaining its integrity. The
Document Signer (i) generates the Document Signer Key Pair, (ii) hands over the Document Signer Public
Key to the CA for certification, (iii) keeps the Document Signer Private Key secret and (iv) uses securely the
Document Signer Private Key for signing the Document Security Objects of the travel documents. The CA
creates the Document Signer Certificates for the Document Signer Public Keys that are distributed to the
receiving States and Organisations. It is assumed that the Personalisation Agent ensures that the Document
Security Object contains only the hash values of genuine user data according to [ICAO_9303]
4.3.2 A.Insp_Sys_Chip_Auth “Inspection Systems for global interoperability on chip authenticity”
The Inspection System implements Active Authentication to authenticate the MRTD’s chip. The Inspection
System uses the signature returned by the TOE during Active Authentication as proof of authenticity.
4.3.3 A.MRTD_Manufact “MRTD manufacturing on steps 4 to 6”
It is assumed that appropriate functionality testing of the MRTD is used. It is assumed that security procedures
are used during all manufacturing and test operations to maintain confidentiality and integrity of the MRTD and
of its manufacturing and test data (to prevent any possible copy, modification, retention, theft or unauthorized
use).
Note: for scheme 3, MRTD means the Integrated Circuit and its embedded Loader and the Loader associated
keys, the Embedded Software to be loaded and the Logical MRTD data.
4.3.4 A.MRTD_Delivery “MRTD delivery during steps 4 to 6”
Procedures shall guarantee the control of the TOE delivery and storage process and conformance to its
objectives:
 Procedures shall ensure protection of TOE material/information under delivery and storage.
 Procedures shall ensure that corrective actions are taken in case of improper operation in
the delivery process and storage.
 Procedures shall ensure that people dealing with the procedure for delivery have got the
required skill.
Note: for scheme 3, MRTD means the Integrated Circuit and its embedded Loader and the Loader associated
keys, the Embedded Software to be loaded and the Logical MRTD data.
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4.4 Threats
4.4.1 T.Skimming “Skimming travel document / Capturing Card-Terminal Communication”
Adverse action: An attacker imitates an inspection system in order to get access to the user data stored
on or transferred between the TOE and the inspecting authority connected via the
contactless/contact interface of the TOE.
Threat agent: having high attack potential, cannot read and does not know the correct value of the
shared password (PACE password) in advance
Asset: confidentiality of logical travel document data
Application Note (10 in [PP_PACE]): A product using BIS-BAC cannot avert this threat in the context of the
security policy defined in [PP_PACE].
Application Note (11 in [PP_PACE]): MRZ is printed and CAN is printed or stuck on the travel document.
Please note that neither CAN nor MRZ effectively represent secrets, but are restricted-revealable, cf.
OE.Travel_Document_Holder
4.4.2 T.Eavesdropping “Eavesdropping on the communication between the TOE and the PACE
terminal”
Adverse action: An attacker is listening to the communication between the travel document and the PACE
authenticated BIS-PACE in order to gain the user data transferred between the TOE and
the terminal connected.
Threat agent: having high attack potential, cannot read and does not know the correct value of the
shared password (PACE password) in advance
Asset: confidentiality of logical travel document data
Application Note (12 in [PP_PACE]): A product using BIS-BAC cannot avert this threat in the context of the
security policy defined in [PP_PACE]
4.4.3 T.Tracing “Tracing travel document”
Adverse action: An attacker tries to gather TOE tracing data (i.e. to trace the movement of the travel
document) unambiguously identifying it remotely by establishing or listening to a
communication via the contactless/contact interface of the TOE.
Threat agent: having high attack potential, cannot read and does not know the correct value of the
shared password (PACE password) in advance
Asset: privacy of the travel document holder
Application Note (13 in [PP_PACE]): This Threat completely covers and extends “T.Chip-ID” from [PP_BAC].
Application Note (14 in [PP_PACE]): A product using BAC (whatever the type of the inspection system is: BIS-
BAC) cannot avert this threat in the context of the security policy defined in [PP_PACE], see also the par. 1.2.5
in [PP_PACE].
Application Note (15 in [PP_PACE]): Since the Standard Inspection Procedure does not support any unique-
secret-based authentication of the travel document’s chip (no Chip Authentication or Active Authentication), a
threat like T.Counterfeit (counterfeiting travel document) cannot be averted by the current TOE.
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Application Note: As our TOE supports Chip Authentication and Active Authentication in addition to Standard
Inspection Procedure, the previous application note extracted from PP does not apply.
4.4.4 T.Forgery “Forgery of Data”
Adverse action: An attacker fraudulently alters the User Data or/and TSF-data stored on the travel
document or/and exchanged between the TOE and the terminal connected in order to
outsmart the PACE authenticated BIS-PACE by means of changed travel document
holder’s related reference data (like biographic or biometric data). The attacker does it in
such a way that the terminal connected perceives these modified data as authentic one.
Threat agent: having high attack potential
Asset: integrity of the travel document
4.4.5 T.Abuse-Func “Abuse of Functionality”
Adverse action: An attacker may use functions of the TOE which shall not be used in TOE operational
phase in order (i) to manipulate or to disclose the User Data stored in the TOE, (ii) to
manipulate or to disclose the TSF-data stored in the TOE or (iii) to manipulate (bypass,
deactivate or modify) soft-coded security functionality of the TOE. This threat addresses
the misuse of the functions for the initialisation and personalisation in the operational
phase after delivery to the travel document holder.
Threat agent: having high attack potential, being in possession of one or more legitimate travel
documents
Asset: integrity and authenticity of the travel document, availability of the functionality of the
travel document
Application Note (16 in [PP_PACE]): Details of the relevant attack scenarios depend, for instance, on the
capabilities of the test features provided by the IC Dedicated Test Software being not specified here.
4.4.6 T.Information_Leakage “Information Leakage from travel document”
Adverse action: An attacker may exploit information leaking from the TOE during its usage in order to
disclose confidential User Data or/and TSF-data stored on the travel document or/and
exchanged between the TOE and the terminal connected. The information leakage may
be inherent in the normal operation or caused by the attacker.
Threat agent: having high attack potential
Asset: confidentiality of User Data and TSF-data of the travel document
Application Note (17 in [PP_PACE]): Leakage may occur through emanations, variations in power
consumption, I/O characteristics, clock frequency, or by changes in processing time requirements. This
leakage may be interpreted as a covert channel transmission, but is more closely related to measurement of
operating parameters which may be derived either from measurements of the contactless interface
(emanation) or direct measurements (by contact to the chip still available even for a contactless chip) and can
then be related to the specific operation being performed. Examples are Differential Electromagnetic Analysis
(DEMA) and Differential Power Analysis (DPA). Moreover the attacker may try actively to enforce information
leakage by fault injection (e.g. Differential Fault Analysis)
4.4.7 T.Phys-Tamper “Physical Tampering”
Adverse action: An attacker may perform physical probing of the travel document in order (i) to disclose
the TSF-data, or (ii) to disclose/reconstruct the TOE’s Embedded Software. An attacker
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may physically modify the travel document in order to alter (I) its security functionality
(hardware and software part, as well), (ii) the User Data or the TSF-data stored on the
travel document.
Threat agent: having high attack potential, being in possession of one or more legitimate travel
documents
Asset: integrity and authenticity of the travel document, availability of the functionality of the
travel document, confidentiality of User Data and TSF-data of the travel document
Application Note (18 in [PP_PACE]): Physical tampering may be focused directly on the disclosure or
manipulation of the user data (e.g. the biometric reference data for the inspection system) or the TSF data
(e.g. authentication key of the travel document) or indirectly by preparation of the TOE to following attack
methods by modification of security features (e.g. to enable information leakage through power analysis).
Physical tampering requires a direct interaction with the travel document’s internals. Techniques commonly
employed in IC failure analysis and IC reverse engineering efforts may be used. Before that, hardware security
mechanisms and layout characteristics need to be identified. Determination of software design including
treatment of the user data and the TSF data may also be a pre-requisite. The modification may result in the
deactivation of a security function. Changes of circuitry or data can be permanent or temporary.
4.4.8 T.Malfunction “Malfunction due to Environmental Stress”
Adverse action: An attacker may cause a malfunction the travel document’s hardware and Embedded
Software by applying environmental stress in order to (i) deactivate or modify security
features or functionality of the TOE’ hardware or to (ii) circumvent, deactivate or modify
security functions of the TOE’s Embedded Software. This may be achieved e.g. by
operating the travel document outside the normal operating conditions, exploiting errors
in the travel document’s Embedded Software or misusing administrative functions. To
exploit these vulnerabilities an attacker needs information about the functional operation
Threat agent: having high attack potential, being in possession of one or more legitimate travel
documents, having information about the functional operation
Asset: integrity and authenticity of the travel document, availability of the functionality of the
travel document, confidentiality of User Data and TSF-data of the travel document
Application note (19 in [PP_PACE]): A malfunction of the TOE may also be caused using a direct interaction
with elements on the chip surface. This is considered as being a manipulation (refer to the threat T.Phys-
Tamper) assuming a detailed knowledge about TOE’s internals
4.4.9 T.Configuration “Tampering attempt of the TOE during preparation”
Adverse action: An attacker may access to the TOE at Manufacturing and Personalization phases (steps
5 and 6) to try to (i) deactivate or modify security features or functions of the TOE or (ii)
circumvent, deactivate or modify security functions of the MRTD’s chip Embedded
Software.
Threat agent: having high attack potential, being in possession of one or more MRTD in Pre-
personalization or Personalization phases.
Asset: authenticity of logical MRTD data
4.4.10 T.Unauthorized_Load
Adverse action: An attacker tries to load an additional code that is not intended to be assembled with the
initial TOE, i.e. the evidence of authenticity or integrity is not correct.
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Threat agent: having high attack potential, knowing the MSK, LSK and derivation data, being in
possession of a legitimate MRTD
Asset: Logical MRTD data
4.4.11 T.Bad_Activation
Adverse action: An attacker tries to perturbate the additional code activation such as the final TOE is
different than the expected one (initial TOE or perturbed TOE).
Threat agent: having high attack potential, knowing the MSK, LSK and derivation data, being in
possession of a legitimate MRTD, being in possession of an additional code that is
authorized to be loaded.
Asset: Logical MRTD data
4.4.12 T.Counterfeit “MRTD’s chip”
Adverse action: An attacker with high attack potential produces an unauthorized copy or reproduction of
a genuine MRTD’s chip to be used as part of a counterfeit MRTD. This violates the
authenticity of the MRTD’s chip used for authentication of a traveler by possession of a
MRTD. The attacker may generate a new data set or extract completely or partially the
data from a genuine MRTD’s chip and copy them on another appropriate chip to imitate
this genuine MRTD’s chip.
Threat agent: having high attack potential, being in possession of one or more legitimate MRTDs
Asset: authenticity of logical MRTD data
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4.5 Organisational Security Policies
4.5.1 P.Pre-Operational “Pre-operational handling of the travel document”
1.) The travel document Issuer issues the travel document and approves it using the terminals complying
with all applicable laws and regulations.
2.) The travel document Issuer guarantees correctness of the user data (amongst other of those,
concerning the travel document holder) and of the TSF-data permanently stored in the TOE.
3.) The travel document Issuer uses only such TOE’s technical components (IC) which enable traceability
of the travel documents in their manufacturing and issuing life cycle phases, i.e. before they are in the
operational phase, cf. sec. 1.2.3 in [PP_PACE].
4.) If the travel document Issuer authorises a Personalisation Agent to personalise the travel document
for travel document holders, the travel document Issuer has to ensure that the Personalisation Agent
acts in accordance with the travel document Issuer’s policy.
4.5.2 P.Card_PKI “PKI for Passive Authentication (issuing branch)”
Application Note (20 in [PP_PACE]): The description below states the responsibilities of involved parties and
represents the logical, but not the physical structure of the PKI. Physical distribution ways shall be implemented
by the involved parties in such a way that all certificates belonging to the PKI are securely distributed / made
available to their final destination, e.g. by using directory services.
1.) The travel document Issuer shall establish a public key infrastructure for the passive authentication,
i.e. for digital signature creation and verification for the travel document. For this aim, he runs a Country
Signing Certification Authority (CSCA). The travel document Issuer shall publish the CSCA Certificate
(CCSCA).
2.) The CSCA shall securely generate, store and use the CSCA key pair. The CSCA shall keep the CSCA
Private Key secret and issue a self-signed CSCA Certificate (CCSCA) having to be made available to
the travel document Issuer by strictly secure means, see [ICAO_9303], 5.5.1. The CSCA shall create
the Document Signer Certificates for the Document Signer Public Keys (CDS) and make them
available to the travel document Issuer, see [ICAO_9303], 5.5.1.
3.) A Document Signer shall (i) generate the Document Signer Key Pair, (ii) hand over the Document
Signer Public Key to the CSCA for certification, (iii) keep the Document Signer Private Key secret and
(iv) securely use the Document Signer Private Key for signing the Document Security Objects of travel
documents.
4.5.3 P.Trustworthy_PKI “Trustworthiness of PKI”
The CSCA shall ensure that it issues its certificates exclusively to the rightful organisations (DS) and DSs shall
ensure that they sign exclusively correct Document Security Objects to be stored on the travel document.
4.5.4 P.Manufact “Manufacturing of the travel document’s chip”
The Initialization Data are written by the IC Manufacturer to identify the IC uniquely. The travel document
Manufacturer writes the Pre-personalisation Data which contains at least the Personalisation Agent Key.
4.5.5 P.Terminal “Abilities and trustworthiness of terminals”
The Basic Inspection Systems with PACE (BIS-PACE) shall operate their terminals as follows:
1.) The related terminals (basic inspection system, cf. above) shall be used by terminal operators and by
travel document holders as defined in [ICAO_9303].
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2.) They shall implement the terminal parts of the PACE protocol [ICAO_TR_SAC], of the Passive
Authentication [ICAO_9303] and use them in this order28. The PACE terminal shall use randomly and
(almost) uniformly selected nonces, if required by the protocols (for generating ephemeral keys for
Diffie-Hellmann).
3.) The related terminals need not to use any own credentials.
4.) They shall also store the Country Signing Public Key and the Document Signer Public Key (in form of
CCSCA and CDS) in order to enable and to perform Passive Authentication (determination of the
authenticity of data groups stored in the travel document, [ICAO_9303]).
5.) The related terminals and their environment shall ensure confidentiality and integrity of respective data
handled by them (e.g. confidentiality of PACE passwords, integrity of PKI certificates, etc.), where it is
necessary for a secure operation of the TOE according to [PP_PACE].
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5 SECURITY OBJECTIVES
This chapter describes the security objectives for the TOE (OT) and the security objectives for the TOE
environment (OE). The security objectives for the TOE environment are separated into security objectives for
the development and production environment and security objectives for the operational environment.
5.1 Security objectives for the TOE
This section describes the security objectives for the TOE addressing the aspects of identified threats to be
countered by the TOE and organizational security policies to be met by the TOE.
5.1.1 OT.Data_Integrity “Integrity of Data”
The TOE must ensure integrity of the User Data and the TSF-data stored on it by protecting these data against
unauthorised modification (physical manipulation and unauthorised modifying).The TOE must ensure integrity
of the User Data and the TSF-data during their exchange between the TOE and the terminal connected (and
represented by PACE authenticated BIS-PACE) after the PACE Authentication.
5.1.2 OT.Data_Authenticity “Authenticity of Data”
The TOE must ensure authenticity of the User Data and the TSF-data stored on it by enabling verification of
their authenticity at the terminal-side.The TOE must ensure authenticity of the User Data and the TSF-data
during their exchange between the TOE and the terminal connected (and represented by PACE authenticated
BIS-PACE) after the PACE Authentication. It shall happen by enabling such a verification at the terminal-side
(at receiving by the terminal) and by an active verification by the TOE itself (at receiving by the TOE).
5.1.3 OT.Data_Confidentiality “Confidentiality of Data”
The TOE must ensure confidentiality of the User Data and the TSF-data by granting read access only to the
PACE authenticated BIS-PACE connected. The TOE must ensure confidentiality of the User Data and the
TSF-data during their exchange between the TOE and the terminal connected (and represented by PACE
authenticated BIS-PACE) after the PACE Authentication.
5.1.4 OT.Tracing “Tracing travel document”
The TOE must prevent gathering TOE tracing data by means of unambiguous identifying the travel document
remotely through establishing or listening to a communication via the contactless/contact interface of the TOE
without knowledge of the correct values of shared passwords (PACE passwords) in advance.
Application note (21 in [PP_PACE]): Since the Standard Inspection Procedure does not support any unique-
secret-based authentication of the travel document’s chip (no Chip Authentication), a security objective like
OT.Chip_Auth_Proof (proof of travel document authenticity) cannot be achieved by the current TOE.
Application Note: As our TOE supports Chip Authentication and Active Authentication in addition to Standard
Inspection Procedure, the previous application note extracted from PP does not apply.
5.1.5 OT.Prot_Abuse-Func “Protection against Abuse of Functionality”
The TOE must prevent that functions of the TOE, which may not be used in TOE operational phase, can be
abused in order (i) to manipulate or to disclose the User Data stored in the TOE, (ii) to manipulate or to disclose
the TSF-data stored in the TOE, (iii) to manipulate (bypass, deactivate or modify) soft-coded security
functionality of the TOE.
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5.1.6 OT.Prot_Inf_Leak “Protection against Information Leakage”
The TOE must provide protection against disclosure of confidential User Data or/and TSF-data stored and/or
processed by the travel document
 by measurement and analysis of the shape and amplitude of signals or the time between events found
by measuring signals on the electromagnetic field, power consumption, clock, or I/O lines,
 by forcing a malfunction of the TOE and/or
 by a physical manipulation of the TOE.
Application note (22 in [PP_PACE]): This objective pertains to measurements with subsequent complex signal
processing due to normal operation of the TOE or operations enforced by an attacker.
5.1.7 OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper “Protection against Physical Tampering”
The TOE must provide protection of confidentiality and integrity of the User Data, the TSF-data and the travel
document’s Embedded Software by means of
 measuring through galvanic contacts representing a direct physical probing on the chip’s surface
except on pads being bonded (using standard tools for measuring voltage and current) or
 measuring not using galvanic contacts, but other types of physical interaction between electrical
charges (using tools used in solid-state physics research and IC failure analysis),
 manipulation of the hardware and its security functionality, as well as
 controlled manipulation of memory contents (User Data, TSF-data) with a prior
 reverse-engineering to understand the design and its properties and functionality.
5.1.8 OT.Prot_Malfunction “Protection against Malfunctions”
The TOE must ensure its correct operation. The TOE must prevent its operation outside the normal operating
conditions where reliability and secure operation have not been proven or tested. This is to prevent functional
errors in the TOE. The environmental conditions may include external energy (esp. electromagnetic) fields,
voltage (on any contacts), clock frequency or temperature.
The following TOE security objectives address the aspects of identified threats to be countered involving TOE’s
environment.
5.1.9 OT.Identification “Identification of the TOE”
The TOE must provide means to store Initialisation and Pre-Personalisation Data in its non-volatile memory.
The Initialisation Data must provide a unique identification of the IC during the manufacturing and the card
issuing life cycle phases of the travel document. The storage of the Pre-Personalisation data includes writing
of the Personalisation Agent Key(s).
Note: for scheme 3, TOE means the Integrated Circuit and its embedded Loader, the Embedded Software to
be loaded and the Logical MRTD data. The IC shall be able to authenticate itself to external entities. The
Initialisation Data are used for IC authentication verification data.
5.1.10 OT.AC_Pers “Access Control for Personalisation of logical MRTD”
The TOE must ensure that the logical travel document data in EF.DG1 to EF.DG16, the Document Security
Object according to LDS [ICAO_9303] and the TSF data can be written by authorized Personalisation Agents
only. The logical travel document data in EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 and the TSF data may be written only during
and cannot be changed after personalisation of the document.
Application note (23 in [PP_PACE]): The OT.AC_Pers implies that the data of the LDS groups written during
personalisation for travel document holder (at least EF.DG1 and EF.DG2) can not be changed using write
access after personalisation.
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5.1.11 OT.Configuration “Protection of the TOE preparation”
During Pre-personalization and Personalization phases, the TOE must control the access to its sensitive
information and its functions and must provide the means to secure exchanges using cryptographic functions.
It must also ensure secure erasing of useless keys.
5.1.12 OT.Chip_Auth_Proof “Proof of MRTD’s chip authenticity”
The TOE must support the Inspection Systems to verify the identity and authenticity of the MRTD’s chip as
issued by the identified issuing State or Organization by means of the Chip Authentication as defined in
[TR_03110], or the Active Authentication as defined in [TR_03110], or the PACE protocol with Chip
Authentication Mapping method as defined in [ICAO_TR_SAC]. These protocols shall be executed in
combination with the Document Security Object (SOD) verification to verify the SOD belongs to the data page,
the chip is genuine and chip and data page belong to each other as defined in [ICAO_9303].The authenticity
proof provided by MRTD’s chip shall be protected against attacks with high attack potential.
5.1.13 OT.Secure_Load_ACode “Secure loading of the Additional Code”
The Loader of the Initial TOE shall check an evidence of authenticity and integrity of the loaded Additional
Code.
The Loader enforces that only the allowed version of the Additional Code can be loaded on the Initial TOE.
The Loader shall forbid the loading of an Additional Code not intended to be assembled with the Initial TOE.
During the Load Phase of an Additional Code, the TOE shall remain secure.
5.1.14 OT.Secure_AC_Activation “Secure activation of the Additional Code”
Activation of the Additional Code and update of the Identification Data shall be performed at the same time in
an Atomic way.
All the operations needed for the code to be able to operate as in the Final TOE shall be completed before
activation.
If the Atomic Activation is successful, then the resulting product is the Final TOE, otherwise (in case of
interruption or incident which prevents the forming of the Final TOE such as tearing, integrity violation, error
case…), the Initial TOE shall remain in its initial state or fail secure.
5.1.15 OT.TOE_Identification “Secure identification of the TOE”
The Identification Data identifies the Initial TOE and Additional Code. The TOE provides means to store
Identification Data in its non-volatile memory and guarantees the integrity of these data.
After Atomic Activation of the Additional Code, the Identification Data of the Final TOE allows identifications of
Initial TOE and Additional Code. The user must be able to uniquely identify Initial TOE and Additional Code(s)
which are embedded in the Final TOE.
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5.2 Security objectives for the operational environment
5.2.1 Receiving State or Organisation
The receiving State or Organisation will implement the following security objectives of the TOE environment.
5.2.1.1 OE.Exam_Chip_Auth “Examination of the chip authenticity”
The Inspection System performs the Chip Authentication Protocol or the Active Authentication Protocol to
verify the Authenticity of the presented MRTD’s chip.
5.2.2 Traveler document Issuer as general responsible
The travel document Issuer as the general responsible for the global security policy related will implement the
following security objectives for the TOE environment:
5.2.2.1 OE.Legislative_Compliance “Issuing of the travel document”
The travel document Issuer must issue the travel document and approve it using the terminals complying with
all applicable laws and regulations.
5.2.3 Traveler document Issuer and CVCA : travel document’s PKI (issuing) branch
The travel document Issuer and the related CSCA will implement the following security objectives for the TOE
environment (see also the Application Note 20 above):
5.2.3.1 OE.Passive_Auth_Sign “Authentication of travel document by Signature”
The travel document Issuer has to establish the necessary public key infrastructure as follows: the CSCA
acting on behalf and according to the policy of the travel document Issuer must (i) generate a cryptographically
secure CSCA Key Pair, (ii) ensure the secrecy of the CSCA Private Key and sign Document Signer Certificates
in a secure operational environment, and (iii) publish the Certificate of the CSCA Public Key (CCSCA). Hereby
authenticity and integrity of these certificates are being maintained.
A Document Signer acting in accordance with the CSCA policy must (i) generate a cryptographically secure
Document Signing Key Pair, (ii) ensure the secrecy of the Document Signer Private Key, (iii) hand over the
Document Signer Public Key to the CSCA for certification, (iv) sign Document Security Objects of genuine
travel documents in a secure operational environment only. The digital signature in the Document Security
Object relates to all hash values for each data group in use according to [ICAO_9303]. The Personalisation
Agent has to ensure that the Document Security Object contains only the hash values of genuine user data
according to [ICAO_9303]. The CSCA must issue its certificates exclusively to the rightful organisations (DS)
and DSs must sign exclusively correct Document Security Objects to be stored on travel document.
5.2.3.2 OE.Personalisation “Personalisation of travel document”
The travel document Issuer must ensure that the Personalisation Agents acting on his behalf (i) establish the
correct identity of the travel document holder and create the biographical data for the travel document, (ii) enrol
the biometric reference data of the travel document holder, (iii) write a subset of these data on the physical
Passport (optical personalisation) and store them in the travel document (electronic personalisation) for the
travel document holder as defined in [ICAO_9303], (iv) write the document details data, (v) write the initial TSF
data, (vi) sign the Document Security Object defined in [ICAO_9303] (in the role of a DS).
5.2.4 Terminal operator : Terminal’s receiving branch
5.2.4.1 OE.Terminal “Terminal operating”
The terminal operators must operate their terminals as follows:
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1) The related terminals (basic inspection systems, cf. above) are used by terminal operators and by
travel document holders as defined in [ICAO_9303].
2) The related terminals implement the terminal parts of the PACE protocol [ICAO_TR_SAC], of the
Passive Authentication [ICAO_TR_SAC] (by verification of the signature of the Document Security
Object) and use them in this order. The PACE terminal uses randomly and (almost) uniformly selected
nonces, if required by the protocols (for generating ephemeral keys for Diffie-Hellmann).
3) The related terminals need not to use any own credentials.
4) The related terminals securely store the Country Signing Public Key and the Document Signer Public
Key (in form of C_CSCA and C_DS) in order to enable and to perform Passive Authentication of the
travel document (determination of the authenticity of data groups stored in the travel document,
[ICAO_9303])
5) The related terminals and their environment must ensure confidentiality and integrity of respective data
handled by them (e.g. confidentiality of the PACE passwords, integrity of PKI certificates, etc.), where
it is necessary for a secure operation of the TOE according to the [PP_PACE].
Application note (24 in [PP_PACE]): OE.Terminal completely covers and extends “OE.Exam_MRTD”, “
OE.Passive_Auth_Verif“ and “OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD” from [PP_BAC].
5.2.5 Travel document holder Obligations
5.2.5.1 OE.Travel_Document_Holder “Travel document holder Obligations”
The travel document holder may reveal, if necessary, his or her verification values of the PACE password to
an authorized person or device who definitely act according to respective regulations and are trustworthy.
5.2.6 Issuing State or Organisation
The issuing State or Organisation will implement the following security objectives of the TOE environment.
5.2.6.1 OE.MRTD_Manufact “Protection of the MRTD Manufacturing”
Appropriate functionality testing of the TOE shall be used in step 4 to 6.
During all manufacturing and test operations, security procedures shall be used through phases 4, 5 and 6 to
maintain confidentiality and integrity of the TOE and its manufacturing and test data.
Note: for scheme 3, TOE means the Integrated Circuit and its embedded Loader, the Embedded Software to
be loaded and the Logical MRTD data. Therefore, security procedures shall be used to:
1. maintain confidentiality and integrity of the code loading process during Phase 4, Phase 5 and Phase
6,
2. Protect the Loader functionality against misuse, limit the capability of the Loader and terminate
irreversibly the Loader after intended usage of the Loader,
3. Implement the authentication verification mechanism and know authentication reference data of the
TOE,
4. Fulfil the access conditions required by the Loader.
5.2.6.2 OE.MRTD_Delivery “Protection of the MRTD delivery”
Procedures shall ensure protection of TOE material/information under delivery including the following
objectives:
 non-disclosure of any security relevant information,
 identification of the element under delivery,
 meet confidentiality rules (confidentiality level, transmittal form, reception acknowledgment),
 physical protection to prevent external damage,
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 secure storage and handling procedures (including rejected TOE’s),
 traceability of TOE during delivery including the following parameters:
- origin and shipment details,
- reception, reception acknowledgement,
- location material/information.
Procedures shall ensure that corrective actions are taken in case of improper operation in the delivery process
(including if applicable any non-conformance to the confidentiality convention) and highlight all non-
conformance to this process.
Procedures shall ensure that people (shipping department, carrier, reception department) dealing with the
procedure for delivery have got the required skill, training and knowledge to meet the procedure requirements
and be able to act fully in accordance with the above expectations.
Note: for scheme 3, TOE means the Integrated Circuit and its embedded Loader, the Embedded Software to
be loaded and the Logical MRTD data. Therefore, security procedures shall be used to:
1. maintain confidentiality and integrity of the code to be loaded during Phase 4, Phase 5 and Phase 6,
2. realize appropriate Loader key management in the environment (confidentiality must be maintained).
5.2.6.3 OE.Auth_MRTD “MRTD Authentication Key”
The issuing State or Organization has to establish the necessary public key infrastructure in order to
(i) generate the MRTD’s Authentication Key Pair(s), (ii) ensure the secrecy of the MRTD’s Authentication
Private Key(s), (iii) sign and store the Authentication Public Key(s) in the Authentication Public Key data (i.e in
EF.DG14 for Chip Authentication Public Key and in EF.DG15 for Active Authentication Public Key) and (iv)
support inspection systems of receiving States or organizations to verify the authenticity of the MRTD’s chip
used for genuine MRTD by certification of the Authentication Public Key by means of the Document Security
Object.
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5.3 Security objectives rationale
5.3.1 Introduction
Assumption Related Security Objective(s) Rationale
A.Passive_Auth OE.Passive_Auth_Sign § 5.3.2.1
A.Insp_Sys_Chip_Auth OE.Exam_Chip_Auth § 5.3.2.2
A.MRTD_Manufact OE.MRTD_Manufact § 5.3.2.3
A.MRTD_Delivery OE.MRTD_Delivery § 5.3.2.4
Table 13- Assumptions of the TOE and Security Objectives
Threat Related Security Objective(s) Rationale
T.Skimming
OT.Data_Integrity
OT.Data_Authenticity
OT.Data_Confidentiality
OE.Travel_Document_Holder
§ 5.3.3.1
T.Eavesdropping OT.Data_Confidentiality § 5.3.3.2
T.Tracing
OT.Tracing
OE.Travel_Document_Holder
§ 5.3.3.3
T.Abuse-Func OT.Prot_Abuse-Func § 5.3.3.4
T.Information_Leakage OT.Prot_Inf_Leak § 5.3.3.5
T.Phys-Tamper OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper § 5.3.3.5
T.Malfunction OT.Prot_Malfunction § 5.3.3.5
T.Forgery
OT.AC_Pers
OT.Data_Integrity
OT.Data_Authenticity
OT.Prot_Abuse-Func
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper
OE.Personalisation
OE.Passive_Auth_Sign
OE.Terminal
§ 5.3.3.6
T.Configuration
OT.Configuration
OT.TOE_Identification
§ 5.3.3.7
T_Unauthorized_Load
OT.Secure_Load_ACode
OT.TOE_Identification
§ 5.3.3.8
T_Bad_Activation
OT.Secure_AC_Activation
OT.TOE_Identification
§ 5.3.3.9
T.Counterfeit
OT.Chip_Auth_Proof
OE.Exam_Chip_Auth
OE.Auth_MRTD
§ 5.3.3.10
Table 14- Threats of the TOE and Security Objectives
OSP Related Security Objective(s) Rationale
P.Manufact OT.Identification § 5.3.4.1
P.Pre-Operational
OT.AC_Pers
OT.Identification
OE.Personalisation
OE.Legislative_Compliance
§ 5.3.4.2
P.Terminal OE.Terminal § 5.3.4.3
P.Card_PKI OE.Passive_Auth_Sign § 5.3.4.4
P.Trustworthy_PKI OE.Passive_Auth_Sign § 5.3.4.5
Table 15- OSP of the TOE and Security Objectives
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5.3.2 Rationales for Assumptions
5.3.2.1 A.Passive_Auth
The assumption A.Passive_Auth “PKI for Passive Authentication” is directly addressed by
OE.Passive_Auth_Sign requiring the travel document issuer to establish a PKI for Passive Authentication,
generating Document Signing private keys only for rightful organisations and requiring the Document Signer
to sign exclusively correct Document Security Objects to be stored on travel document.
5.3.2.2 A.Insp_Sys_Chip_Auth
The examination of the MRTD passport book addressed by the assumption A.Insp_Sys_Chip_Auth
“Inspection Systems for global interoperability on chip authenticity” is covered by the security objectives for the
TOE environment OE.Exam_Chip_Auth “Examination of the chip authenticity”.
5.3.2.3 A.MRTD_Manufact
The assumption A.MRTD_Manufact “MRTD manufacturing on steps 4 to 6” is covered by the security
objective for the TOE environment OE.MRTD_Manufact “Protection of the MRTD Manufacturing” that requires
to use security procedures during all manufacturing steps.
5.3.2.4 A.MRTD_Delivery
The assumption A.MRTD_Delivery “MRTD delivery during steps 4 to 6” is covered by the security objective
for the TOE environment OE.MRTD_Delivery “Protection of the MRTD delivery” that requires to use security
procedures during delivery steps of the MRTD.
5.3.3 Rationales for Threats
5.3.3.1 T.Skimming
The threat T.Skimming “Skimming travel document / Capturing Card-Terminal Communication” addresses
accessing the User Data (stored on the TOE or transferred between the TOE and the terminal) using the TOE’s
contactless/contact interface. This threat is countered by the security objectives OT.Data_Integrity “Integrity
of Data”, OT.Data_Authenticity “Authenticity of Data” and OT.Data_Confidentiality “Confidentiality of Data”
through the PACE authentication. The objective OE.Travel_Document_Holder “Travel document holder
Obligations” ensures that a PACE session can only be established either by the travel document holder itself
or by an authorised person or device, and, hence, cannot be captured by an attacker.
5.3.3.2 T.Eavesdropping
The threat T.Eavesdropping “Eavesdropping on the communication between the TOE and the PACE
terminal” addresses listening to the communication between the TOE and a rightful terminal in order to gain
the User Data transferred there. This threat is countered by the security objective OT.Data_Confidentiality
“Confidentiality of Data” through a trusted channel based on the PACE authentication.
5.3.3.3 T.Tracing
The threat T.Tracing “Tracing travel document” addresses gathering TOE tracing data identifying it remotely
by establishing or listening to a communication via the contactless/contact interface of the TOE, whereby the
attacker does not a priori know the correct values of the PACE password. This threat is directly countered by
security objectives OT.Tracing “Tracing travel document” (no gathering TOE tracing data) and
OE.Travel_Document_Holder “Travel document holder Obligations” (the attacker does not a priori know the
correct values of the shared passwords).
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5.3.3.4 T.Abuse-Func
The threat T.Abuse-Func “Abuse of Functionality” addresses attacks of misusing TOE’s functionality to
manipulate or to disclosure the stored User- or TSF-data as well as to disable or to bypass the soft-coded
security functionality. The security objective OT.Prot_Abuse-Func “Protection against Abuse of Functionality”
ensures that the usage of functions having not to be used in the operational phase is effectively prevented.
5.3.3.5 T.Information_Leakage, T.Phys-Tamper and T.Malfunction
The threats T.Information_Leakage “Information Leakage from travel document”, T.Phys-Tamper
“Physical Tampering” and T.Malfunction “Malfunction due to Environmental Stress” are typical for
integrated circuits like smart cards under direct attack with high attack potential. The protection of the TOE
against these threats is obviously addressed by the directly related security objectives OT.Prot_Inf_Leak
“Protection against Information Leakage”, OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper “Protection against Physical Tampering”
and OT.Prot_Malfunction “Protection against Malfunctions”, respectively.
5.3.3.6 T.Forgery
The threat T.Forgery “Forgery of Data” addresses the fraudulent, complete or partial alteration of the User
Data or/and TSF-data stored on the TOE or/and exchanged between the TOE and the terminal. The security
objective OT.AC_Pers “Access Control for Personalisation of logical MRTD” requires the TOE to limit the write
access for the travel document to the trustworthy Personalisation Agent (cf. OE.Personalisation). The TOE will
protect the integrity and authenticity of the stored and exchanged User Data or/and TSF-data as aimed by the
security objectives OT.Data_Integrity “Integrity of Data” and OT.Data_Authenticity “Authenticity of Data”,
respectively. The objectives OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper “Protection against Physical Tampering” and
OT.Prot_Abuse-Func “Protection against Abuse of Functionality” contribute to protecting integrity of the User
Data or/and TSF-data stored on the TOE. A terminal operator operating his terminals according to
OE.Terminal “Terminal operating” and performing the Passive Authentication using the Document Security
Object as aimed by OE.Passive_Auth_Sign “Authentication of travel document by Signature” will be able to
effectively verify integrity and authenticity of the data received from the TOE.
5.3.3.7 T.Configuration
The threat T.Configuration “Tampering attempt of the TOE during preparation” addresses attacks in Pre-
personalization and Personalization phases. The attacker trying to access to unauthorized TOE functions,
trying to access or to modify sensitive information exchanged between the TOE and the Personalization
system. Protection of the TOE during these two phases is directly addressed by OT.Configuration “Protection
of the TOE preparation”. OT.TOE_Identification also covers this threat allowing to identify uniquely the Final
TOE.
5.3.3.8 T.Unauthorized_Load
The threat T.Unauthorized_Load addresses the attack of loading an unauthorized code on the smart card
product, when the loader (additional code loader) is available, that means in phase 5. Although this threat is
mitigated by the conditions of loading in a secure environment, the TOE scope considers this attack as the
TOE delivery point is end of phase 3. This threat is mitigated by the authentication of the Pre-personalization
Agent with MSK and the calculation of the DIV_LSK which constitutes in itself the proof of authenticity and
integrity of the additional code to be loaded. The objective OT.Secure_Load_ACode “Secure loading of the
Additional Code” covers then this threat. Furthermore, the objective OT.TOE_Identification also covers this
threat allowing to identify uniquely the Final TOE.
5.3.3.9 T.Bad_Activation
The threat T.Bad_Activation addresses the attack of perturbation of activation an allowed source code. We
consider that the source code allowance for this threat is correct, that means that this threat only covers
allowed source code. The attacker perturbates the activation such as to invalidate the additional source code
activation or obtaining a bad TOE. This threat is mitigated by the objective OT.Secure_AC_Activation
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“Secure activation of the Additional Code” which requires the TOE protects this activation. This activation is
performed within one LOAD_SECURE command. Furthermore, the objective OT.TOE_Identification also
covers this threat allowing to identify uniquely the Final TOE.
5.3.3.10 T.Counterfeit
The threat T.Counterfeit “MRTD’s chip” addresses the attack of unauthorized copy or reproduction of the
genuine MRTD chip. This attack is thwarted by chip an identification and authenticity proof required by
OT.Chip_Auth_Proof “Proof of MRTD’s chip authenticity” using a authentication key pair to be generated by
the issuing State or Organization. The Public Chip Authentication Key has to be written into EF.DG14 and
signed by means of Documents Security Objects as demanded by OE.Auth_MRTD “MRTD Authentication
Key”. According to OE.Exam_Chip_Auth “Examination of the chip authenticity” the inspection system has to
perform the Chip Authentication Protocol to verify the authenticity of the MRTD’s chip.
This threat is also covered by OE.Exam_Chip_Auth “Examination of the chip authenticity” using a
authentication key pair to be generated by the issuing State or Organization. The Public Active Authentication
Key has to be written into EF.DG15 and signed by means of Documents Security Objects as demanded by
OE.Auth_MRTD “MRTD Authentication Key”. According to OE.Exam_Chip_Auth “Examination of the chip
authenticity” the inspection system has to perform the Active Authentication Protocol to verify the authenticity
of the MRTD’s chip.
5.3.4 Rationales for Organisational Security Policies
5.3.4.1 P.Manufact
The OSP P.Manufact “Manufacturing of the travel document’s chip” requires a unique identification of the IC
by means of the Initialization Data and the writing of the Pre-personalisation Data as being fulfilled by
OT.Identification “Identification of the TOE”.
5.3.4.2 P.PRE-Operational
The OSP P.Pre-Operational “Pre-operational handling of the travel document” is enforced by the following
security objectives: OT.Identification “Identification of the TOE” is affine to the OSP’s property ‘traceability
before the operational phase’; OT.AC_Pers “Access Control for Personalisation of logical MRTD” and
OE.Personalisation “Personalisation of travel document” together enforce the OSP’s properties ‘correctness
of the User- and the TSF-data stored’ and ‘authorisation of Personalisation Agents’;
OE.Legislative_Compliance “Issuing of the travel document” is affine to the OSP’s property ‘compliance with
laws and regulations’.
5.3.4.3 P.Terminal
The OSP P.Terminal “Abilities and trustworthiness of terminals” is obviously enforced by the objective
OE.Terminal “Terminal operating”, whereby the one-to-one mapping between the related properties is
applicable.
5.3.4.4 P.Card_PKI
The OSP P.Card_PKI “PKI for Passive Authentication (issuing branch)” is enforced by establishing the issuing
PKI branch as aimed by the objectives OE.Passive_Auth_Sign “Authentication of travel document by
Signature” (for the Document Security Object).
5.3.4.5 P.Trustworthy_PKI
The OSP P.Trustworthy_PKI “Trustworthiness of PKI” is enforced by OE.Passive_Auth_Sign
“Authentication of travel document by Signature” (for CSCA, issuing PKI branch).
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6 EXTENDED COMPONENTS DEFINITION
6.1 Extended components definition
6.1.1 Definition of the Family FAU_SAS
To define the security functional requirements of the TOE a sensitive family (FAU_SAS) of the Class FAU
(Security Audit) is defined here. This family describes the functional requirements for the storage of audit data.
It has a more general approach than FAU_GEN, because it does not necessarily require the data to be
generated by the TOE itself and because it does not give specific details of the content of the audit records.
The family “Audit data storage (FAU_SAS)” is specified as follows.
FAU_SAS “Audit data storage”
Family behavior
This family defines functional requirements for the storage of audit data.
Component leveling
FAU_SAS.1 Requires the TOE to the possibility to store audit data
Management: FAU_SAS.1
There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit: FAU_SAS.1
There are no actions defined to be auditable.
FAU_SAS.1 “Audit storage”
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FAU_SAS.1.1 The TSF shall provide [assignment: authorized users] with the capability to store
[assignment: list of audit information] in the audit records.
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6.1.2 Definition of the Family FCS_RND
To define the IT security functional requirements of the TOE a sensitive family (FCS_RND) of the Class FCS
(cryptographic support) is defined here. This family describes the functional requirements for random number
generation used for cryptographic purposes. The component FCS_RND is not limited to generation of
cryptographic keys unlike the component FCS_CKM.1. The similar component FIA_SOS.2 is intended for non-
cryptographic use.
The family “Generation of random numbers (FCS_RND)” is specified as follows.
FCS_RND “Generation of random numbers”
Family behavior
This family defines quality requirements for the generation of random numbers which are intended to be used
for cryptographic purposes.
Component leveling:
FCS_RND.1 Generation of random numbers requires that random numbers meet a defined quality
metric.
Management: FCS_RND.1
There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit: FCS_RND.1
There are no actions defined to be auditable.
FCS_RND.1 “Quality metric for random numbers”
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FCS_RND.1.1 The TSF shall provide a mechanism to generate random numbers that meet
[assignment: a defined quality metric].
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6.1.3 Definition of the Family FMT_LIM
The family FMT_LIM describes the functional requirements for the Test Features of the TOE. The new
functional requirements were defined in the class FMT because this class addresses the management of
functions of the TSF. The examples of the technical mechanism used in the TOE show that no other class is
appropriate to address the specific issues of preventing the abuse of functions by limiting the capabilities of
the functions and by limiting their availability.
The family “Limited capabilities and availability (FMT_LIM)” is specified as follows.
FMT_LIM “Limited capabilities and availability”
Family behavior
This family defines requirements that limit the capabilities and availability of functions in a combined manner.
Note that FDP_ACF restricts the access to functions whereas the Limited capability of this family requires the
functions themselves to be designed in a specific manner.
Component leveling:
FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities requires that the TSF is built to provide only the capabilities
(perform action, gather information) necessary for its genuine purpose.
FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability requires that the TSF restrict the use of functions (refer to Limited
capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)). This can be achieved, for instance, by removing or by
disabling functions in a specific phase of the TOE’s life-cycle).
Management: FMT_LIM.1, FMT_LIM.2
There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit: FMT_LIM.1, FMT_LIM.2
There are no actions defined to be auditable.
To define the IT security functional requirements of the TOE a sensitive family (FMT_LIM) of the Class FMT
(Security Management) is defined here. This family describes the functional requirements for the Test Features
of the TOE. The new functional requirements were defined in the class FMT because this class addresses the
management of functions of the TSF. The examples of the technical mechanism used in the TOE show that
no other class is appropriate to address the specific issues of preventing the abuse of functions by limiting the
capabilities of the functions and by limiting their availability.
FMT_LIM.1 “Limited capabilities”
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability.
FMT_LIM.1.1 The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their capabilities so that in
conjunction with “Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)” the following policy is
enforced [assignment: Limited capability and availability policy].
The TOE Functional Requirement “Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)” is specified as follows.
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FMT_LIM.2 “Limited availability”
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities.
FMT_LIM.2.1 The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their availability so that in
conjunction with “Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)” the following policy is
enforced [assignment: Limited capability and availability policy].
6.1.4 Definition of the Family FPT_EMS
The sensitive family FPT_EMS (TOE Emanation) of the Class FPT (Protection of the TSF) is defined here to
describe the IT security functional requirements of the TOE. The TOE shall prevent attacks against the TOE
and other secret data where the attack is based on external observable physical phenomena of the TOE.
Examples of such attacks are evaluation of TOE’s electromagnetic radiation, simple power analysis (SPA),
differential power analysis (DPA), timing attacks, etc. This family describes the functional requirements for the
limitation of intelligible emanations which are not directly addressed by any other component of [CC_2].
The family “TOE Emanation (FPT_EMS)” is specified as follows.
Family behavior
This family defines requirements to mitigate intelligible emanations.
Component levelling:
FPT_EMS.1 TOE emanation has two constituents:
FPT_EMS.1.1 Limit of Emissions requires to not emit intelligible emissions enabling access to TSF
data or user data.
FPT_EMS.1.2 Interface Emanation requires to not emit interface emanation enabling access to TSF
data or user data.
Management: FPT_EMS.1
There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit: FPT_EMS.1
There are no actions defined to be auditable.
FPT_EMS.1 “TOE Emanation”
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FPT_EMS.1.1 The TOE shall not emit [assignment: types of emissions] in excess of
[assignment: specified limits] enabling access to [assignment: list of types of
TSF data] and [assignment: list of types of user data].
FPT_EMS.1.2 The TSF shall ensure [assignment: type of users] are unable to use the following
interface [assignment: type of connection] to gain access to assignment: list of
types of TSF data] and [assignment: list of types of user data].
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6.1.5 Definition of the Family FIA_API
To describe the IT security functional requirements of the TOE a sensitive family (FIA_API) of the Class FIA
(Identification and authentication) is defined here. This family describes the functional requirements for the
proof of the claimed identity for the authentication verification by an external entity where the other families of
the class FIA address the verification of the identity of an external entity.
FIA_API “Authentication Proof of Identity”
Family behavior
This family defines functions provided by the TOE to prove their identity and to be verified by an external entity
in the TOE IT environment.
Component leveling:
FIA_API.1 Authentication Proof of Identity.
Management: FIA_API.1
The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:
Management of authentication information used to prove the claimed identity.
Audit: There are no actions defined to be auditable.
FIA_API.1 “Authentication Proof of Identity”
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FIA_API.1.1 The TSF shall provide a [assignment: authentication mechanism] to prove the
identity of the [assignment: authorized user or role].
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7 SECURITY REQUIREMENTS
7.1 Security functional requirements
This section on security functional requirements for the TOE is divided into sub-section following the main
security functionality.
SFR in ST SFR in [PP_PACE]
Descr.
Step
Before
5
5 6 7
Class FAU “Security Audit”
FAU_SAS.1.1 FAU_SAS.1.1 7.1.1.1    
Class FCS “Cryptographic Support”
FCS_CKM.1.1/DH_PACE FCS_CKM.1.1/DH_PACE
7.1.2.1
   
FCS_CKM.1.1/MSK_DIV
Additional SFR
   
FCS_CKM.1.1/GP    
FCS_CKM.1.1/LSK_DIV    
FCS_CKM.1.1/CA    
FCS_CKM.1.1/KEY_GEN   
FCS_CKM.4.1 FCS_CKM.4.1 7.1.2.2    
FCS_COP.1.1/PACE_ENC FCS_COP.1.1/PACE_ENC
7.1.2.3
   
FCS_COP.1.1/PACE_MAC FCS_COP.1.1/PACE_MAC    
FCS_COP.1.1/MSK_SHA
Additional SFR
   
FCS_COP.1.1/GP_ENC    
FCS_COP.1.1/GP_AUTH    
FCS_COP.1.1/GP_MAC    
FCS_COP.1.1/GP_SDT_DEC   
FCS_COP.1.1/ADDCODE_DEC    
FCS_COP.1.1/ADDCODE_MAC    
FCS_COP.1.1/ADDCODE_SHA    
FCS_COP.1.1/CA_SHA    
FCS_COP.1.1/CA_ENC    
FCS_COP.1.1/CA_MAC    
FCS_COP.1.1/SIG_GEN    
FCS_COP.1.1/CA_DATA_GEN    
FCS_RND.1.1 FCS_RND.1.1 7.1.2.4    
Class FIA “Identification and Authentication”
FIA_UID.1.1/PACE FIA_UID.1.1/PACE
7.1.3.1
   
FIA_UID.1.2/PACE FIA_UID.1.2/PACE    
FIA_UID.1.1/PACE_CAM
Additional SFR
 
FIA_UID.1.2/PACE_CAM  
FIA_UAU.1.1/PACE FIA_UAU.1.1/PACE
7.1.3.2
   
FIA_UAU.1.2/PACE FIA_UAU.1.2/PACE    
FIA_UAU.1.1/PACE_CAM
Additional SFR
 
FIA_UAU.1.2/PACE_CAM  
FIA_UAU.4.1/PACE FIA_UAU.4.1/PACE 7.1.3.3    
FIA_UAU.5.1/PACE FIA_UAU.5.1/PACE
7.1.3.5
 
FIA_UAU.5.2/PACE FIA_UAU.5.2/PACE  
FIA_UAU.5.2/PACE_CAM Additional SFR  
FIA_UAU.6.1/PACE FIA_UAU.6.1/PACE
7.1.3.6
   
FIA_UAU.6.1/MP
Additional SFR
  
FIA_UAU.6.1/ADD_CODE    
FIA_UAU.6.1/CA    
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SFR in ST SFR in [PP_PACE]
Descr.
Step
Before
5
5 6 7
FIA_AFL.1.1/PACE FIA_AFL.1.1/PACE
7.1.3.7
   
FIA_AFL.1.2/PACE FIA_AFL.1.2/PACE    
FIA_AFL.1.1/MP
Additional SFR
   
FIA_AFL.1.2/MP    
FIA_API.1.1/CA
7.1.3.8
   
FIA_API.1.1/AA    
FIA_API.1.1/PACE_CAM Additional SFR    
Class FDP “User Data Protection”
FDP_ACC.1.1/TRM FDP_ACC.1.1/TRM
7.1.4.1
   
FDP_ACC.1.1/MP
Additional SFR
   
FDP_ACC.1.1/ID  
FDP_ACF.1.1/TRM FDP_ACF.1.1/TRM
7.1.4.2
   
FDP_ACF.1.2/TRM FDP_ACF.1.2/TRM    
FDP_ACF.1.3/TRM FDP_ACF.1.3/TRM    
FDP_ACF.1.4/TRM FDP_ACF.1.4/TRM    
FDP_ACF.1.1/MP
Additional SFR
   
FDP_ACF.1.2/MP    
FDP_ACF.1.3/MP    
FDP_ACF.1.4/MP    
FDP_ACF.1.1/ID  
FDP_ACF.1.2/ID  
FDP_ACF.1.3/ID  
FDP_ACF.1.4/ID  
FDP_RIP.1.1 FDP_RIP.1.1 7.1.4.3    
FDP_UCT.1.1/TRM FDP_UCT.1.1/TRM
7.1.4.4
   
FDP_UCT.1.1/MP
Additional SFR
   
FDP_UCT.1.1/ADD_CODE    
FDP_UCT.1.1/CA    
FDP_UIT.1.1/TRM FDP_UIT.1.1/TRM
7.1.4.5
   
FDP_UIT.1.2/TRM FDP_UIT.1.2/TRM    
FDP_UIT.1.1/MP
Additional SFR
   
FDP_UIT.1.2/MP    
FDP_UIT.1.1/ADD_CODE    
FDP_UIT.1.2/ADD_CODE    
FDP_UIT.1.1/CA    
FDP_UIT.1.2/CA    
FDP_ITC.1.1/MP
7.1.4.6
   
FDP_ITC.1.2/MP   
FDP_ITC.1.3/MP   
Class FMT “Security Management”
FMT_MOF.1.1/PROT
Additional SFR 7.1.5.1
  
FMT_MOF.1.1/GP   
FMT_SMF.1.1 FMT_SMF.1.1 7.1.5.2    
FMT_SMR.1.1/PACE FMT_SMR.1.1/PACE
7.1.5.3
   
FMT_SMR.1.2/PACE FMT_SMR.1.2/PACE    
FMT_LIM.1.1 FMT_LIM.1.1 7.1.5.4    
FMT_LIM.2.1 FMT_LIM.2.1 7.1.5.5    
FMT_MTD.1.1/INI_ENA FMT_MTD.1.1/INI_ENA
7.1.5.6
   
FMT_MTD.1.1/INI_DIS FMT_MTD.1.1/INI_DIS    
FMT_MTD.1.1/KEY_READ FMT_MTD.1.1/KEY_READ  
FMT_MTD.1.1/PA FMT_MTD.1.1/PA    
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SFR in ST SFR in [PP_PACE]
Descr.
Step
Before
5
5 6 7
FMT_MTD.1.1/PACE_PWD
Additional SFR
   
FMT_MTD.1.1/CAPK    
FMT_MTD.1.1/MP_KEY_WRITE    
FMT_MTD.1.1/AA_KEY_WRITE    
FMT_MTD.1.1/LCS_PREP    
FMT_MTD.1.1/LCS_PERS  
FMT_MTD.1.1/LSK_READ  
FMT_MTD.1.1/ADDCODE_LOAD  
FMT_MTD.1.1/ADDCODE_ACT  
FMT_MTD.1.1/AA_KEY_GEN  
FMT_MTD.1.1/CA_KEY_GEN  
Class FPT “Protection of the Security Functions”
FPT_EMS.1.1 FPT_EMS.1.1
7.1.6.1
   
FPT_EMS.1.2 FPT_EMS.1.2  
FPT_FLS.1.1 FPT_FLS.1.1 7.1.6.2    
FPT_TST.1.1 FPT_TST.1.1
7.1.6.3
   
FPT_TST.1.2 FPT_TST.1.2    
FPT_TST.1.3 FPT_TST.1.3    
FPT_PHP.3.1 FPT_PHP.3.1 7.1.6.4    
Class FTP “Trusted path/channels”
FTP_ITC.1.1/PACE FTP_ITC.1.1/PACE
7.1.7.1
   
FTP_ITC.1.2/PACE FTP_ITC.1.2/PACE    
FTP_ITC.1.3/PACE FTP_ITC.1.3/PACE    
FTP_ITC.1.1/MP
Additional SFR
  
FTP_ITC.1.2/MP   
FTP_ITC.1.3/MP   
Table 16 – SFR of the TOE
7.1.1 Class FAU “Security Audit”
7.1.1.1 FAU_SAS.1 “Audit Storage”
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies
FAU_SAS.1.1 The TSF shall provide the Manufacturer with the capability to store the IC
Identification Data in the audit records.
7.1.2 Class FCS “Cryptographic Support”
7.1.2.1 FCS_CKM.1 “Cryptographic key generation”
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution or
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
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FCS_CKM.1.1/
DH_PACE
The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key generation algorithm [Algorithm] and specified
cryptographic key sizes [Key size(s)] that meet the following: [Standard].
Algorithm Key size(s) Standard
DH compliant to
PKCS#3
1024 to 2048 bit by
steps of 256 bits
[ICAO_TR_SAC]
ECDH compliant to
[TR_03111]
192 to 521 bit
FCS_CKM.1.1/
MSK_DIV
The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key generation algorithm MSK derivation from initial MSK,
using SHA-256 and specified cryptographic key sizes 256 bit that meet the
following: none.
Application note: In Step 5, (Master) MSK is diversified during the first command, and then
replaced by the derived MSK generated by FCS_CKM.1/MSK. The secure
erasing of the keys is ensured by FCS_CKM.4.
FCS_CKM.1.1/
GP
The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key generation algorithm [Algorithm] and specified
cryptographic key sizes [Key size(s)] that meet the following: [Standard].
Algorithm Key size(s) Standard
Triple-DES in CBC
mode
112 bit
[GPC_SPE_034];
appendix E.4.1
AES in CBC mode 128, 192, 256 bit
FCS_CKM.1.1/
LSK_DIV
The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key generation algorithm LSK derivation from Initial LSK
and Derivation Data, using AES 128 ECB and specified cryptographic
key sizes 128 bit that meet the following: None.
FCS_CKM.1.1/
CA
The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key generation algorithm [Algorithm] and specified
cryptographic key sizes [Key size(s)] that meet the following: [Standard].
Algorithm Key size(s) Standard
DH compliant to
PKCS#3
1024 to 2048 bit by steps of 256
bits
[TR_03110]
ECDH compliant to
[ISO_15946]
192 to 521 bit
FCS_CKM.1.1/
KEY_GEN
The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key generation algorithm [Algorithm] and specified cryptographic
key sizes [key size(s)] that meet the following:[standard].
Algorithm key size(s) standard
RSA key generation 1024 to 2048 in steps of 256 bits [ANSIX9.31]
Key pair over Elliptic
curve
192 to 521 bit with prime field p [IEEE]
7.1.2.2 FCS_CKM.4 “Cryptographic key destruction”
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
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FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4.1 The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key destruction method zeroisation that meets the following:
none.
Application note: This SFR addresses the destruction of the MSK, ISK, and SM sessions keys.
7.1.2.3 FCS_COP.1 “Cryptographic operation”
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1.1/
PACE_ENC
The TSF shall perform secure messaging – encryption and decryption in accordance
with a specified cryptographic algorithm [Algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes [Key
size(s)] that meets the following [Standard].
Algorithm Key size(s) Standard
Triple-DES in CBC
mode
112 bit
[ICAO_TR_SAC]
AES in CBC mode 128, 192 and 256 bit
FCS_COP.1.1/
PACE_MAC
The TSF shall perform secure messaging – message authentication code in accordance
with a specified cryptographic algorithm [Algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes [Key
size(s)] that meets the following [Standard].
Algorithm Key size(s) Standard
Retail MAC 112 bit
[ICAO_TR_SAC]
AES CMAC 128, 192 and 256 bit
FCS_COP.1.1/
MSK_SHA
The TSF shall perform hashing for MSK diversification in accordance with a specified
cryptographic algorithm SHA-256 and cryptographic key sizes none that meets the
following [FIPS_180_2].
FCS_COP.1.1/
GP_ENC
The TSF shall perform secure messaging (GP) – encryption and decryption in
accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [Algorithm] and cryptographic key
sizes [Key size(s)] that meets the following: [Standard].
Algorithm Key size(s) Standard
Triple-DES in CBC
mode
112 bit [FIPS_46_3]
AES in CBC mode 128, 192 and 256 bit [FIPS_197]
FCS_COP.1.1/
GP_AUTH
The TSF shall perform symmetric authentication – encryption and decryption in
accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [Algorithm] and cryptographic key
sizes [Key size(s)] that meets the following [Standard].
Algorithm Key size(s) Standard
Triple-DES 112 bit [FIPS_46_3]
AES 128, 192 and 256 bit [FIPS_197]
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Application Note: The Authentication Mechanisms based on Triple-DES is the authentication process
performed in phases 5 and 6.
FCS_COP.1.1/
GP_MAC
The TSF shall perform secure messaging – message authentication code in accordance
with a specified cryptographic algorithm [Algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes [Key
size(s)] that meets the following: [Standard].
Algorithm Key size(s) Standard
MAC Algorithm 1 with
Padding M2
112 bit [ISO_9797_1]
AES CMAC 128, 192 and 256 bit [NIST_800_38B]
FCS_COP.1.1/
GP_SDT_DEC
The TSF shall perform key decryption in accordance with a specified cryptographic
algorithm [Algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes [Key size(s)] that meets the following:
[Standard].
Algorithm Key size(s) Standard
Triple-DES in CBC
mode
112 bit [FIPS_46_3]
AES in CBC mode 128, 192 and 256 bit [FIPS_197]
FCS_COP.1.1/
ADDCODE_DEC
The TSF shall perform secure messaging – decryption in accordance with a specified
cryptographic algorithm AES in CBC mode and cryptographic key sizes 128 bit that meets
the following [FIPS_197]
FCS_COP.1.1/
ADDCODE_MAC
The TSF shall perform secure messaging – message authentication code in accordance
with a specified cryptographic algorithm AES CMAC and cryptographic key sizes 128 bit
that meets the following [NIST_800_38B].
FCS_COP.1.1/
ADDCODE_SHA
The TSF shall perform hashing in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm
SHA-256 and cryptographic key sizes none that meets the following [FIPS_180_2].
FCS_COP.1.1/
CA_SHA
The TSF shall perform hashing in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm
SHA-1 and SHA-256 and cryptographic key sizes none that meets the following
[FIPS_180_2].
FCS_COP.1.1/
CA_ENC
The TSF shall perform secure messaging – encryption and decryption in accordance
with a specified cryptographic algorithm [Algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes [Key
size(s)] that meets the following [Standard].
Algorithm Key size(s) Standard
Triple-DES in CBC
mode
112 bit
[TR_03110]
AES in CBC mode 128, 192 and 256 bit
FCS_COP.1.1/
CA_MAC
The TSF shall perform secure messaging – message authentication code in accordance
with a specified cryptographic algorithm [Algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes [Key
size(s)] that meets the following [Standard].
Algorithm Key size(s) Standard
Retail MAC 112 bit [ISO_9797_1]
AES CMAC 128, 192 and 256 bit [NIST_800_38B]
FCS_COP.1.1/
SIG_GEN
The TSF shall perform digital signature creation in accordance with a specified
cryptographic algorithm [Algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes [Key size(s)] that meet
the following [Standard].
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Algorithm Key size(s) Standard
RSA CRT with SHA-1,
SHA-224, SHA-256,
SHA-384 and SHA-512
1024 to 2048 bit by
steps of 256 bits
[ISO_9796_2]
ECDSA with SHA-1,
SHA-224, SHA-256,
SHA-384 and SHA-512
192 to 521 bit [TR_03111]
FCS_COP.1.1/
CA_DATA_GEN
The TSF shall perform chip authentication data generation in accordance with a specified
cryptographic algorithm [Algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes [Key size(s)] that meet
the following: [Standard].
Algorithm Key size(s) Standard
Chip authentication
data generation using
DH keys compliant to
PKCS#3
1024 to 2048 bit by
steps of 256 bits
[ICAO_TR_SAC]
Chip authentication
data generation using
ECDH keys compliant
to [ISO_15946]
192 to 521 bit [ICAO_TR_SAC]
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7.1.2.4 FCS_RND.1 “Quality metric for random numbers”
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FCS_RND.1.1 The TSF shall provide a mechanism to generate random numbers that meet:
1. The requirement for random number generation following
[RGS2_B1].
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7.1.3 Class FIA “Identification and Authentication”
7.1.3.1 FIA_UID.1 “Timing of identification”
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FIA_UID.1.1/
PACE
The TSF shall allow
1. to establish the communication channel,
2. carrying out the PACE Protocol according to [ICAO_TR_SAC]
3. to read the Initialization Data if it is not disable by TSF according
to FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS
on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is identified.
FIA_UID.1.2/
PACE
The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before allowing
any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
FIA_UID.1.1/
PACE_CAM
The TSF shall allow
1. to establish the communication channel,
2. carrying out the PACE Protocol following the Chip Authentication
Mapping method according to [ICAO_TR_SAC]
3. to read the Initialization Data if it is not disable by TSF according
to FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS
4. to carry out the Terminal Authentication Protocol v.1 according to
[TR_03110]
FIA_UID.1.2/
PACE_CAM
The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before allowing
any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
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7.1.3.2 FIA_UAU.1 “Timing of authentication”
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification.
FIA_UAU.1.1/
PACE
The TSF shall allow
1. to establish the communication channel,
2. carrying out the PACE Protocol according to [ICAO_TR_SAC]
3. to read the Initialization Data if it is not disable by TSF according
to FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS,
on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is authenticated.
FIA_UAU.1.2/
PACE
The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before
allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
FIA_UAU.1.1/
PACE_CAM
The TSF shall allow
1. to establish the communication channel,
2. carrying out the PACE Protocol following the Chip Authentication
Mapping method according to [ICAO_TR_SAC]
3. to read the Initialization Data if it is not disable by TSF according
to FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS,
4. to carry out the Terminal Authentication Protocol v.1 according to
[TR_03110]
on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is authenticated.
FIA_UAU.1.2/
PACE_CAM
The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before
allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
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7.1.3.3 FIA_UAU.4 “Single-use authentication mechanisms”
Hierarchical to: No other components.7.1.3.4
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FIA_UAU.4.1/
PACE
The TSF shall prevent reuse of authentication data related to
1. PACE Protocol according to [ICAO_TR_SAC],
2. Authentication Mechanisms based on:
 Triple-DES,
 AES.
Application Note: The Authentication Mechanisms based on Triple-DES is the authentication
process performed in phases 5 and 6.
7.1.3.5 FIA_UAU.5 “Multiple authentication mechanisms”
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FIA_UAU.5.1/
PACE
The TSF shall provide
1. PACE Protocol according to [ICAO_TR_SAC]
2. Passive Authentication according to [ICAO_9303]
3. Secure messaging in MAC-ENC mode according to
[ICAO_TR_SAC]
4. Symmetric Authentication Mechanism based on:
 Triple-DES,
 AES
FIA_UAU.5.2/
PACE
The TSF shall authenticate any user’s claimed identity according to the
following rules:
1. Having successfully run the PACE protocol the TOE accepts only
received commands with correct message authentication code
sent by means of secure messaging with the key agreed with the
terminal by means of the PACE protocol.
2. The TOE accepts the authentication attempt as Personalisation
Agent by the Authentication Mechanism with Personalization Agent
Key(s).
3. The TOE accepts the authentication attempt as Personalisation
Agent by the Authentication Mechanism with Pre-personalization Agent
Key(s).
4. After run of the Chip Authentication Protocol the TOE accepts only
received commands with correct message authentication code
sent by means of secure messaging with key agreed with the
terminal by means of the Chip Authentication Mechanism
FIA_UAU.5.2/
PACE_CAM
In addition to the rules from FIA_UAU.5.2/PACE, the TSF shall authenticate any
user’s claimed identity according to the following rules:
1. After run of the PACE protocol following Chip Authentication
Mapping method the TOE accepts only received commands with
correct message authentication code sent by means of secure
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messaging with key agreed with the terminal by means of the PACE
protocol.
2. The TOE accepts the authentication attempt by means of the
Terminal Authentication Protocol v.1 only if the terminal uses the
public key presented during PACE following Chip Authentication
Mapping method and the secure messaging established by means
of the PACE protocol.
7.1.3.6 FIA_UAU.6 “Re-authenticating”
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FIA_UAU.6.1/
PACE
The TSF shall re-authenticate the user under the conditions each command
sent to the TOE after successful run of the PACE protocol shall be verified
as being sent by the PACE terminal.
FIA_UAU.6.1/
MP
The TSF shall re-authenticate the user under the conditions each command
sent to the TOE after successful authentication of the terminal with the
Symmetric Authentication Mechanism shall be verified as being sent by
the authenticated terminal.
Application note This requirement applies to the authentication protocol used by (1) the
Manufacturer and (2) the Personalization Agent
FIA_UAU.6.1/
ADD_CODE
The TSF shall re-authenticate the user under the conditions each command
sent to the TOE shall be verified as being prepared by the TOE Developer.
Application note This requirement applies to the Additional Code loading
FIA_UAU.6.1/
CA
The TSF shall re-authenticate the user under the conditions each command
sent to the TOE after successful run of the Chip Authentication Protocol
shall be verified as being sent by the GIS.
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7.1.3.7 FIA_AFL.1 “Authentication failure handling”
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication.
FIA_AFL.1.1/
PACE
The TSF shall detect when an administrator configurable positive integer
within range of acceptable values 0 to 255 consecutive unsuccessful
authentication attempts occur related to authentication attempts using the
PACE password shared password.
FIA_AFL.1.2/
PACE
When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has been
met, the TSF shall wait for an increasing time between receiving of the
terminal challenge and sending of the TSF response during the PACE
authentication attempts.
FIA_AFL.1.1/
MP
The TSF shall detect when 3 unsuccessful authentication attempts occur related
to authentication of the Manufacturer and the Personalization Agent.
FIA_AFL.1.2/
MP
When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has been
met or surpassed, the TSF shall wait for an increasing time between
receiving of the terminal challenge and sending of the TSF response
during the Authentication Mechanisms (based on Triple-DES or AES)
attempts.
7.1.3.8 FIA_API.1 “Authentication Proof of Identity”
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FIA_API.1.1/
CA
The TSF shall provide a Chip Authentication protocol according to
[TR_03110] to prove the identity of the TOE.
FIA_API.1.1/
AA
The TSF shall provide an Active Authentication protocol according to
[ICAO_9303] to prove the identity of the TOE.
FIA_API.1.1/
PACE_CAM
The TSF shall provide a Chip Authentication Mapping method for the PACE
protocol according to [ICAO_TR_SAC] to prove the identity of the TOE.
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7.1.4 Class FDP “User Data Protection”
7.1.4.1 FDP_ACC.1 “Subset access control”
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control
FDP_ACC.1.1/
TRM
The TSF shall enforce the Access Control SFP on terminals gaining access
to the User Data stored in the travel document.
FDP_ACC.1.1/
MP
The TSF shall enforce the GP Access Control SFP on terminals gaining
write, read and modification access to the Pre-Perso_K, the Perso_K, the
LCS, the Configuration Data, the Additional Code, the Active
Authentication Keys (AA_PK and AA_SK) and the Chip Authentication
Keys (CA_PK and CA_SK).
FDP_ACC.1.1/
ID
The TSF shall enforce the ID Access Control on terminals gaining write,
read and modification access to the CPLC and the TOE_ID.
7.1.4.2 FDP_ACF.1 “Basic Security attribute based access control”
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialization
FDP_ACF.1.1/
TRM
The TSF shall enforce the Access Control SFP to objects based on the
following:
1. Subjects:
a. Terminal,
b. BIS-PACE;
2. Objects:
a. data in EF.DG1, EF.DG2 and EF.DG5 to EF.DG16, EF.SOD
and EF.COM of the logical travel document
b. data in EF.DG3 of the logical travel document,
c. data in EF.DG4 of the logical travel documents,
3. Security attributes:
a. Authentication status of terminals
FDP_ACF.1.2/
TRM
The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among
controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed:
1. A BIS-PACE is allowed to read data objects from FDP_ACF.1/TRM
according to [ICAO_TR_SAC] after a successful PACE
FDP_ACF.1.3/
TRM
The TSF shall explicitly authorize access of subjects to objects based on the
following additional rules: none.
FDP_ACF.1.4/
TRM
The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the
following additional rules:
1. Any terminal being not authenticated as PACE authenticated BIS-
PACE is not allowed to read, to write, to modify, to use any data
stored on the travel document.
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2. Terminal not using secure messaging are not allowed to read, to
write, to modify, to use any data stored on the travel document
FDP_ACF.1.1/
MP
The TSF shall enforce the GP Access Control SFP to objects based on the
following
1. Subjects:
a. Manufacturer,
b. Personalization Agent,
2. Objects:
a. the Pre-Perso_K,
b. the Perso_K,
c. the LCS,
d the Configuration Data,
e the Additional Code,
f. the Active Authentication Private Key,
g. the Active Authentication Public Key,
h. the Chip Authentication Private Key,
i. the Chip Authentication Public Key.
3. Security attributes
a. authentication status of the Manufacturer,
b. authentication status of the Personalization Agent.
FDP_ACF.1.2/
MP
The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among
controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed:
1. the Manufacturer is allowed to write the Pre-Perso_K, the Perso_K,
the LCS and the Configuration Data,
2. the Manufacturer is allowed to read the Configuration Data and the
LCS,
3. the Personalization Agent is allowed to write the Perso_K, the LCS
and the Configuration Data,
4. the Personalization Agent is allowed to read the Configuration
Data and the LCS,
5. the Manufacturer is allowed to load and activate the Additional
Code,
6. the Personalization Agent is allowed to import the Active
Authentication Private Key,
7. the Personalization Agent is allowed to generate the Active
Authentication Private Key and the Active Authentication Public
Key
8. the Personalization Agent is allowed to import the Chip
Authentication Private Key,
9. the Personalization Agent is allowed to generate the Chip
Authentication Private Key and the Chip Authentication Public
Key.
FDP_ACF.1.3/
MP
The TSF shall explicitly authorize access of subjects to objects based on the
following additional rules: none.
FDP_ACF.1.4/
MP
The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the
following additional rules: none.
FDP_ACF.1.1/
ID
The TSF shall enforce the ID Access Control SFP to objects based on the
following
1. Subjects:
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a. Manufacturer,
b. Personalization Agent,
c. BIS-PACE,
d. Terminal,
2. Objects:
a. the TOE_ID,
b. the CPLC,
3. Security attributes
a. authentication status of the Manufacturer,
b. authentication status of the Personalization Agent,
c. authentication status of the terminal as BIS-PACE.
FDP_ACF.1.2/
ID
The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among
controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed:
1. the Manufacturer is allowed to write and read the CPLC,
2. the Personalization Agent is allowed to write and read the CPLC,
3. the BIS-PACE is allowed to read the CPLC,
FDP_ACF.1.3/
ID
The TSF shall explicitly authorize access of subjects to objects based on the
following additional rules: none
FDP_ACF.1.4/
ID
The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the
following additional rules:
1. Any Terminal is not allowed to read the CPLC and the TOE_ID,
2. Any Terminal is not allowed to modify the CPLC.
7.1.4.3 FDP_RIP.1 “Subset residual information protection”
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FDP_RIP.1.1 The TSF shall ensure that any previous information content of a resource is
made unavailable upon the deallocation of the resource from the following
objects:
1. Session Keys (immediately after closing related communication
session),
2. the ephemeral private key ephem-Skpicc-PACE (by having
generated a DH shared secret K)
7.1.4.4 FDP_UCT.1 “Basic data exchange confidentiality”
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel, or
FTP_TRP.1 Trusted path]
[FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
FDP_UCT.1.1/
TRM
The TSF shall enforce the Access Control SFP to be able to transmit and
receive user data in a manner protected from unauthorized disclosure.
FDP_UCT.1.1/
MP
The TSF shall enforce the GP Access Control SFP to transmit and receive
user data in a manner protected from unauthorized disclosure.
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Application Note: Additional SFR FDP_UCT.1/MP enforces confidentiality of data import and
export in steps 5 and 6.
FDP_UCT.1.1/
ADD_CODE
The TSF shall enforce the GP Access Control SFP to receive user data in a
manner protected from unauthorised disclosure.
Application Note: Additional SFR FDP_UCT.1/ADD_CODE enforces confidentiality of data import
in step 5.
FDP_UCT.1.1/
CA
The TSF shall enforce the CA Access Control SFP to be able to transmit and
receive user data in a manner protected from unauthorized disclosure after
Chip Authentication.
7.1.4.5 FDP_UIT.1 “Data exchange integrity”
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
[FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel, or
FTP_TRP.1 Trusted path]
FDP_UIT.1.1/
TRM
The TSF shall enforce the Access Control SFP to be able to transmit and
receive user data in a manner protected from modification, deletion,
insertion and replay errors.
FDP_UIT.1.2/
TRM
The TSF shall be able to determine on receipt of user data, whether
modification, deletion, insertion and replay has occurred.
FDP_UIT.1.1/
MP
The TSF shall enforce the GP Access Control SFP to transmit and receive
user data in a manner protected from modification, deletion, insertion and
replay errors.
FDP_UIT.1.2/
MP
The TSF shall be able to determine on receipt of user data, whether
modification, deletion, insertion and replay has occurred.
Application Note: Additional SFR FDP_UIT.1/MP enforces integrity of data import and export in
steps 5 and 6.
FDP_UIT.1.1/
ADD_CODE
The TSF shall enforce the GP Access Control SFP to receive user data in a
manner protected from modification, deletion, insertion and replay errors.
FDP_UIT.1.2/
ADD_CODE
The TSF shall be able to determine on receipt of user data, whether
modification, deletion, insertion and replay has occurred.
Application Note: Additional SFR FDP_UIT.1/ADD_CODE enforces integrity of data import in step
5.
FDP_UIT.1.1/
CA
The TSF shall enforce the CA Access Control SFP to transmit and receive
user data in a manner protected from modification, deletion, insertion and
replay errors after Chip Authentication protocol
FDP_UIT.1.2/
CA
The TSF shall be able to determine on receipt of user data, whether
modification, deletion, insertion and replay has occurred after Chip
Authentication protocol.
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7.1.4.6 FDP_ITC.1 “Import of user data without security attributes”
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialization
FDP_ITC.1.1/
MP
The TSF shall enforce the GP Access Control SFP when importing user data,
controlled under the SFP, from outside the TOE.
FDP_ITC.1.2/
MP
The TSF shall ignore any security attributes associated with the user data when
imported from outside the TOE.
FDP_ITC.1.3/
MP
The TSF shall enforce the following rules when importing user data controlled
under the SFP from outside the TOE: sensitive data (Pre-Perso_K, Perso_K,
PACE_PWD, CA_SK and AA_SK) shall be encrypted.
Application Note: Additional SFR FDP_ITC.1/MP enforces confidentiality of sensitive data import
in steps 5 and 6.
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7.1.5 Class FMT “Security Management”
7.1.5.1 FMT_MOF “Management of functions in TSF”
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_MOF.1.1/
PROT
The TSF shall restrict the ability to enable the functions
- Active Authentication,
- Chip Authentication v1
- Chip Authentication v1 through MSE: SET KAT
- Chip Authentication Mapping method for PACE
to the Manufacturer.
FMT_MOF.1.1/
GP
The TSF shall restrict the ability to enable the functions
- transmission of user data in a manner protected from
unauthorized disclosure,
- reception of user data in a manner protected from unauthorized
disclosure,
- transmission of user data in a manner protected from
modification, deletion, insertion and replay errors,
- reception of user data in a manner protected from modification,
deletion, insertion and replay errors,
to the Manufacturer and the Personalization Agent.
7.1.5.2 FMT_SMF.1 “Specification of Management Functions”
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No Dependencies.
FMT_SMF.1.1 The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions:
1. Initialization
2. Pre-personalization
3. Personalization
4. Configuration
5. Active Authentication protocol,
6. Chip Authentication protocol,
7. Protection of incoming user data,
8. Protection of outgoing user data,
9. Basic Access Control expiration
7.1.5.3 FMT_SMR.1 “Security roles”
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification.
FMT_SMR.1.1/ The TSF shall maintain the roles:
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PACE
1. Manufacturer,
2. Personalization Agent,
3. Terminal,
4. PACE authenticated BIS-PACE.
FMT_SMR.1.2/
PACE
The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.
Note This SFR also applies to the refinement of the role Manufacturer.
7.1.5.4 FMT_LIM.1 “Limited capabilities”
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability.
FMT_LIM.1.1 The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their capabilities so that in
conjunction with “Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)” the following policy is
enforced:
Deploying Test Features after TOE Delivery does not allow
1. User Data to be manipulated and disclosed,
2. TSF data to be manipulated or disclosed,
3. software to be reconstructed and,
4. substantial information about construction of TSF to be gathered
which may enable other attacks.
7.1.5.5 FMT_LIM.2 “Limited availability”
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities.
FMT_LIM.2.1 The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their availability so that in
conjunction with “Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)” the following policy is
enforced:
Deploying Test Features after TOE Delivery does not allow
1. User Data to be manipulated and disclosed,
2. TSF data to be manipulated or disclosed,
3. software to be reconstructed and,
4. substantial information about construction of TSF to be gathered
which may enable other attacks.
Application note (25 in [PP_PACE]): The functional requirements FMT_LIM.1 and FMT_LIM.2 assume
existence of two types of mechanisms (limited capabilities and limited availability) which together shall provide
protection in order to enforce the related policy. This also allows that:
(i)the TSF is provided without restrictions in the product in its user environment, but its capabilities are so
limited that the policy is enforced
or conversely
(ii)the TSF is designed with high functionality, but is removed or disabled in the product in its user environment.
The combination of both the requirements shall enforce the related policy.
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7.1.5.6 FMT_MTD.1 “Management of TSF data”
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MTD.1.1/
INI_ENA
The TSF shall restrict the ability to write the Initialization Data and Pre-
personalization Data to the Manufacturer.
FMT_MTD.1.1/
INI_DIS
The TSF shall restrict the ability to disable read access for users to the
Initialization Data to the Personalization Agent.
FMT_MTD.1.1/
KEY_READ
The TSF shall restrict the ability to read the
1. PACE passwords,
2. Pre-personalization Agent Keys,
3. Personalization Agent Keys,
4. Chip Authentication Private Key,
5. Active Authentication Private Key,
6. Manufacturer Keys
to none
FMT_MTD.1.1/
PA
The TSF shall restrict the ability to write the Document Security Object (SOD)
to the Personalization Agent.
FMT_MTD.1.1/
PACE_PWD
The TSF shall restrict the ability to load the PACE Password to the
Personalization Agent.
FMT_MTD.1.1/
CAPK
The TSF shall restrict the ability to load the Chip Authentication Private Key
to the Personalization Agent.
FMT_MTD.1.1/
MP_KEY_WRITE
The TSF shall restrict the ability to write the Pre-personalization Agent Keys
and the Personalization Agent Keys to the Manufacturer.
FMT_MTD.1.1/
AA_KEY_WRITE
The TSF shall restrict the ability to write the Active Authentication Private
Key to the Personalization Agent.
FMT_MTD.1.1/
LCS_PREP
The TSF shall restrict the ability to switch the LCS from phase 5 to phase 6
to the Manufacturer.
FMT_MTD.1.1/
LCS_PERS
The TSF shall restrict the ability to switch the LCS from phase 6 to phase 7
to the Personalization Agent.
FMT_MTD.1.1/
LSK_READ
The TSF shall restrict the ability to read the Load Secure Key to none.
FMT_MTD.1.1/
ADDCODE_LOAD
The TSF shall restrict the ability to write the Additional Code to the
Manufacturer.
FMT_MTD.1.1/
ADDCODE_ACT
The TSF shall restrict the ability to activate the Additional Code to the
Manufacturer.
FMT_MTD.1.1/
AA_KEY_GEN
The TSF shall restrict the ability to generate the Active Authentication
Keys (AA_PK and AA_SK) to the Personalization Agent.
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FMT_MTD.1.1/
CA_KEY_GEN
The TSF shall restrict the ability to generate the Chip Authentication
Keys (CA_PK and CA_SK) to the Personalization Agent.
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7.1.6 Class FPT “Protection of the Security Functions”
7.1.6.1 FPT_EMS.1 “TOE Emanation”
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No Dependencies.
FPT_EMS.1.1 The TOE shall not emit power variations, timing variations during command
execution in excess of non useful information enabling access to
1. PACE session keys (PACE-Kmac, PACE-Kenc),
2. the ephemeral private key ephem-Skpicc-PACE,
3. - Personal Data including Biometric Data,
- EF.COM,
- EF.SOD,
- Chip Authentication Private Key,
- Chip Authentication Public Key,
- Active Authentication Private Key,
- Active Authentication Public Key,
- CPLC,
- TOE_ID,
- Pre-personalization Agent Keys,
- Secure Messaging Session Keys,
- TOE Life Cycle State,
- Configuration Data,
- Additional Code
FPT_EMS.1.2 The TSF shall ensure any users are unable to use the following interface smart
card circuit contacts to gain access to
1. PACE session keys (PACE-Kmac, PACE-Kenc),
2. the ephemeral private key ephem-Skpicc-PACE,
3. - Personal Data including Biometric Data,
- EF.COM,
- EF.SOD,
- Chip Authentication Private Key,
- Chip Authentication Public Key,
- Active Authentication Private Key,
- Active Authentication Public Key,
- CPLC,
- TOE_ID,
- Pre-personalization Agent Keys,
- Secure Messaging Session Keys,
- TOE Life Cycle State,
- Configuration Data,
Additional Code.
7.1.6.2 FPT_FLS.1 “Failure with preservation of secure state”
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No Dependencies.
FPT_FLS.1.1 The TSF shall preserve a secure state when the following types of failures
occur:
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1. Exposure to out-of-range operating conditions where therefore a
malfunction could occur,
2. failure detected by TSF according to FPT_TST.1.
7.1.6.3 FPT_TST.1 “TSF testing”
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No Dependencies.
FPT_TST.1.1 The TSF shall run a suite of self tests at the conditions
- At reset,
- Before any cryptographic operation,
- When accessing a DG or any EF,
- Prior to any use of TSF data,
- Before execution of any command,
- When performing a PACE authentication,
- When performing the EAC Authentication,
- When performing the Active Authentication.
To demonstrate the correct operation of the TSF.
FPT_TST.1.2 The TSF shall provide authorized users with the capability to verify the integrity
of TSF data.
FPT_TST.1.3 The TSF shall provide authorized users with the capability to verify the integrity
of stored TSF executable code.
7.1.6.4 FPT_PHP.3 “Resistance to physical attack”
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No Dependencies.
FPT_PHP.3.1 The TSF shall resist physical manipulation and physical probing to the TSF
by responding automatically such that the SFRs are always enforced.
7.1.7 Class FTP “Trusted path/channels”
7.1.7.1 FTP_ITC.1 “Inter-TSF trusted channel”
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No Dependencies.
FTP_ITC.1.1/
PACE
The TSF shall provide a communication channel between itself and another
trusted IT product that is logically distinct from other communication channels
and provides assured identification of its end points and protection of the
channel data from modification or disclosure.
FTP_ITC.1.2/
PACE
The TSF shall permit another trusted IT product to initiate communication via
the trusted channel.
FTP_ITC.1.3/
PACE
The TSF shall enforce communication via the trusted channel for any data
exchange between the TOE and the Terminal.
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FTP_ITC.1.1/
MP
The TSF shall provide a communication channel between itself and another
trusted IT product that is logically distinct from other communication channels
and provides assured identification of its end points and protection of the
channel data from modification or disclosure.
FTP_ITC.1.2/
MP
The TSF shall permit another trusted IT product to initiate communication via
the trusted channel.
FTP_ITC.1.3/
MP
The TSF shall initiate communication via the trusted channel for loading
sensitive data (Pre-Perso_K, Perso_K, PACE_PWD, CA_SK and AA_SK)
shall be encrypted.
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7.2 Security assurance requirements
The assurance components for the evaluation of the TOE and its development and operating environment are
those taken from the Evaluation Assurance Level 5 (EAL5) and augmented by taking the following component:
ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5.
7.2.1 EAL rationale
The EAL5 was chosen to permit a developer to gain maximum assurance from security engineering based
upon rigorous commercial development practices supported by moderate application of specialist security
engineering techniques.
EAL5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a high level of
independently assured security in a planned development and require a rigorous development approach
without incurring unreasonable costs attributable to specialist security engineering techniques.
7.2.2 EAL augmentation rationale
7.2.2.1 ALC_DVS.2 "Sufficiency of security measures"
The selection of the component ALC_DVS.2 provides a higher assurance of the security of the MRTD’s
development and manufacturing especially for the secure handling of the MRTD’s material.
The component ALC_DVS.2 augmented to EAL5 has no dependencies to other security requirements.
7.2.2.2 AVA_VAN.5 “Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis”
The selection of the component AVA_VAN.5 provides a higher assurance than the pre-defined EAL4 package
pre-defined in [PP_PACE], namely requiring a vulnerability analysis to assess the resistance to penetration
attacks performed by an attacker possessing a high attack potential (see also Table 3, entry ‘Attacker’ in
[PP_PACE]). This decision represents a part of the conscious security policy for the travel document required
by the travel document Issuer and reflected by the [PP_PACE].
The component AVA_VAN.5 has the following dependencies:
 ADV_ARC.1 “Security architecture description”
 ADV_FSP.4 “Security-enforcing functional specification”
 ADV_TDS.3 “Basic modular design”
 ADV_IMP.1 “Implementation representation of the TSF”
 AGD_OPE.1 “Operational user guidance”
 AGD_PRE.1 “Preparative procedures”
 ATE_DPT.1 “Testing: basic design”
All of these are met or exceeded in the EAL5 assurance package
7.2.3 Dependencies
SAR Dependencies Support of the Dependencies
ADV_ARC.1 ADV_FSP.1
ADV_TDS.1
ADV_FSP.5
ADV_TDS.4
ADV_FSP.5 ADV_TDS.1
ADV_IMP.1
ADV_TDS.4
ADV_IMP.1
ADV_IMP.1 ADV_TDS.3
ALC_TAT.1
ADV_TDS.4
ALC_TAT.2
ADV_INT.2 ADV_IMP.1
ADV_TDS.3
ALC_TAT.1
ADV_IMP.1
ADV_TDS.4
ALC_TAT.2
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SAR Dependencies Support of the Dependencies
ADV_TDS.4 ADV_FSP.5 ADV_FSP.5
AGD_OPE.1 ADV_FSP.1 ADV_FSP.5
AGD_PRE.1 No dependencies n.a.
ALC_CMC.4 ALC_CMS.1
ALC_DVS.1
ALC_LCD.1
ALC_CMS.5
ALC_DVS.2
ALC_LCD.1
ALC_CMS.5 No dependencies n.a.
ALC_DEL.1 No dependencies n.a.
ALC_DVS.2 No dependencies n.a.
ALC_LCD.1 No dependencies n.a.
ALC_TAT.2 ADV_IMP.1 n.a.
ASE_CCL.1 ASE_INT.1
ASE_ECD.1
ASE_REQ.1
ASE_INT.1
ASE_ECD.1
ASE_REQ.2
ASE_ECD.1 No dependencies n.a.
ASE_INT.1 No dependencies n.a.
ASE_OBJ.2 ASE_SPD.1 ASE_SPD.1
ASE_REQ.2 ASE_OBJ.2
ASE_ECD.1
ASE_OBJ.2
ASE_ECD.1
ASE_SPD.1 No dependencies n.a.
ASE_TSS.1 ASE_INT.1
ASE_REQ.1
ADV_FSP.1
ASE_INT.1
ASE_REQ.2
ADV_FSP.5
ATE_COV.2 ADV_FSP.2
ATE_FUN.1
ADV_FSP.5
ATE_FUN.1
ATE_DPT.3 ADV_ARC.1
ADV_TDS.4
ATE_FUN.1
ADV_ARC.1
ADV_TDS.4
ATE_FUN.1
ATE_FUN.1 ATE_COV.1 ATE_COV.2
ATE_IND.2 ADV_FSP.2
AGD_OPE.1
AGD_PRE.1
ATE_COV.1
ATE_FUN.1
ADV_FSP.5
AGD_OPE.1
AGD_PRE.1
ATE_COV.2
ATE_FUN.1
AVA_VAN.5 ADV_ARC.1
ADV_FSP.4
ADV_TDS.3
ADV_IMP.1
AGD_OPE.1
AGD_PRE.1
ATE_DPT.1
ADV_ARC.1
ADV_FSP.5
ADV_TDS.4
ADV_IMP.1
AGD_OPE.1
AGD_PRE.1
ATE_DPT.3
Table 17 – SARs dependencies
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7.3 Security requirements rationale
7.3.1 Security Functional Requirements Rationale
7.3.1.1 Overview
The following table provides an overview for security functional requirements coverage.
SO
SFR
OT.Data_Integrity
OT.Data_Authenticity
OT.Data_Confidentiality
OT.Tracing
OT.Prot_Abuse-Func
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper
OT.Prot_Malfunction
OT.Identification
OT.AC_Pers
OT.Configuration
OT.Chip_Auth_Proof
OT.Secure_Load_ACode
OT.Secure_AC_Activation
OT.TOE_Identification
FAU_SAS.1 x x x
FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE x x x x
FCS_CKM.1/MSK_DIV x
FCS_CKM.1/GP x
FCS_CKM.1/LSK_DIV x x x
FCS_CKM.1/CA x x x x x
FCS_CKM.1/KEY_GEN x
FCS_CKM.4 x x x x
FCS_COP.1/PACE_ENC x x
FCS_COP.1/PACE_MAC x x
FCS_COP.1/MSK_SHA x
FCS_COP.1/GP_ENC x
FCS_COP.1/GP_AUTH x x
FCS_COP.1/GP_MAC x
FCS_COP.1/GP_SDT_DEC x
FCS_COP.1/ADDCODE_DEC x x
FCS_COP.1/ADDCODE_MAC x x x
FCS_COP.1/ADDCODE_SHA x x
FCS_COP.1/CA_SHA x x x
FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC x x x x
FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC x x x x
FCS_COP.1/SIG_GEN x
FCS_COP.1/CA_DATA_GEN x
FCS_RND.1 x x x x
FIA_UID.1/PACE x x x x
FIA_UID.1/PACE_CAM x x x x x
FIA_UAU.1/PACE x x x x
FIA_UAU.1/PACE_CAM x x x x x
FIA_UAU.4/PACE x x x x x x
FIA_UAU.5/PACE x x x x x
FIA_UAU.5/PACE_CAM x x x x x
FIA_UAU.6/PACE x x x x
FIA_UAU.6/MP x x x x x x
FIA_UAU.6/ADD_CODE x x x
FIA_UAU.6/CA x x
FIA_AFL.1/PACE x
FIA_AFL.1/MP x x x
FIA_API.1/CA x
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SO
SFR
OT.Data_Integrity
OT.Data_Authenticity
OT.Data_Confidentiality
OT.Tracing
OT.Prot_Abuse-Func
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper
OT.Prot_Malfunction
OT.Identification
OT.AC_Pers
OT.Configuration
OT.Chip_Auth_Proof
OT.Secure_Load_ACode
OT.Secure_AC_Activation
OT.TOE_Identification
FIA_API.1/AA x
FIA_API.1/PACE_CAM x x
FDP_ACC.1/TRM x x x
FDP_ACC.1/MP x
FDP_ACC.1/ID x x x x
FDP_ACF.1/TRM x x x
FDP_ACF.1/MP x
FDP_ACF.1/ID x x x
FDP_RIP.1 x x x
FDP_UCT.1/TRM x x
FDP_UCT.1/MP x x
FDP_UCT.1/ADD_CODE x x x
FDP_UIT.1/TRM x x
FDP_UIT.1/MP x x x
FDP_UIT.1/ADD_CODE x x x
FDP_ITC.1/MP x
FMT_MOF.1/PROT x x
FMT_MOF.1/GP x x
FMT_SMF.1 x x x x x x
FMT_SMR.1/PACE x x x x x x
FMT_LIM.1 x
FMT_LIM.2 x
FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA x x
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS x x
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ x x x x x
FMT_MTD.1/PA x x x x
FMT_MTD.1/PACE_PWD x
FMT_MTD.1/CAPK x x
FMT_MTD.1/MP_KEY_WRITE x x
FMT_MTD.1/AA_KEY_WRITE x x
FMT_MTD.1/LCS_PREP x x
FMT_MTD.1/LCS_PERS x
FMT_MTD.1/LSK_READ x x
FMT_MTD.1/ADDCODE_LOAD x x
FMT_MTD.1/ADDCODE_ACT x x
FMT_MTD.1/AA_KEY_GEN x
FMT_MTD.1/CA_KEY_GEN x
FPT_EMS.1 x x
FPT_FLS.1 x x
FPT_TST.1 x x
FPT_PHP.3 x x x
FTP_ITC.1/PACE x x x x
FTP_ITC.1/MP x x
Table 18 - SFRs and Security Objectives
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7.3.1.2 OT.Data_Integrity
The security objective OT.Data_Integrity “Integrity of Data” aims that the TOE always ensures integrity of the
User- and TSF-data stored and, after the PACE authentication, of these data exchanged (physical
manipulation and unauthorised modifying).Physical manipulation is addressed by FPT_PHP.3.Logical
manipulation of stored user data is addressed by (FDP_ACC.1, FDP_ACF.1). FIA_UAU.4/PACE,
FIA_UAU.5/PACE and FCS_CKM.4 represent some required specific properties of the protocols
used.Unauthorised modifying of the exchanged data is addressed, in the first line, by FDP_UCT.1/TRM,
FDP_UIT.1/TRM and FTP_ITC.1/PACE using FCS_COP.1/PACE_MAC. A prerequisite for establishing this
trusted channel is a successful PACE Authentication (FIA_UID.1/PACE, FIA_UAU.1/PACE) using
FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE and possessing the special properties FIA_UAU.5/PACE, FIA_UAU.6/PACE.
FDP_RIP.1 requires erasing the values of session keys (here: for KMAC). The SFR FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ
restricts the access to the PACE passwords.FMT_MTD.1/PA requires that SOD containing signature over the
User Data stored on the TOE and used for the Passive Authentication is allowed to be written by the
Personalisation Agent only and, hence, is to be considered as trustworthy.The SFR FCS_RND.1 represents a
general support for cryptographic operations needed.The SFRs FMT_SMF.1 and FMT_SMR.1/PACE support
the functions and roles related.
7.3.1.3 OT.Data_Authenticity
The security objective OT.Data_Authenticity “Authenticity of Data” aims ensuring authenticity of the User-
and TSF-data (after the PACE Authentication) by enabling its verification at the terminal-side and by an active
verification by the TOE itself.This objective is mainly achieved by FTP_ITC.1/PACE using
FCS_COP.1/PACE_MAC. A prerequisite for establishing this trusted channel is a successful PACE
Authentication (FIA_UID.1/PACE, FIA_UAU.1/PACE) using FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE and possessing the
special properties FIA_UAU.5/PACE, FIA_UAU.6/PACE. FDP_RIP.1 requires erasing the values of session
keys (here: for KMAC). The SFR FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ restricts the access to the PACE passwords.
FMT_MTD.1/PA requires that SOD containing signature over the User Data stored on the TOE and used for
the Passive Authentication is allowed to be written by the Personalisation Agent only and, hence, is to be
considered as trustworthy.FIA_UAU.4/PACE, FIA_UAU.5/PACE and FCS_CKM.4 represent some required
specific properties of the protocols used. The SFR FCS_RND.1 represents a general support for cryptographic
operations needed. The SFRs FMT_SMF.1 and FMT_SMR.1/PACE support the functions and roles related.
7.3.1.4 OT.Data_Confidentiality
The security objective OT.Data_Confidentiality “Confidentiality of Data” aims that the TOE always ensures
confidentiality of the User- and TSF-data stored and, after the PACE Authentication, of these data
exchanged.This objective for the data stored is mainly achieved by (FDP_ACC.1/TRM,
FDP_ACF.1/TRM).FIA_UAU.4/PACE, FIA_UAU.5/PACE and FCS_CKM.4 represent some required specific
properties of the protocols used.This objective for the data exchanged is mainly achieved by FDP_UCT.1/TRM,
FDP_UIT.1/TRM and FTP_ITC.1/PACE using FCS_COP.1/PACE_ENC. A prerequisite for establishing this
trusted channel is a successful PACE Authentication (FIA_UID.1/PACE, FIA_UAU.1/PACE) using
FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE and possessing the special properties FIA_UAU.5/PACE, FIA_UAU.6/PACE.
FDP_RIP.1 requires erasing the values of session keys (here: for KENC). The SFR FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ
restricts the access to the PACE passwords.FMT_MTD.1/PA requires that SOD containing signature over the
User Data stored on the TOE and used for the Passive Authentication is allowed to be written by the
Personalisation Agent only and, hence, is to be considered trustworthy .The SFR FCS_RND.1 represents the
general support for cryptographic operations needed.The SFRs FMT_SMF.1 and FMT_SMR.1/PACE support
the functions and roles related.
7.3.1.5 OT.Tracing
The security objective OT.Tracing “Tracing travel document” aims that the TOE prevents gathering TOE
tracing data by means of unambiguous identifying the travel document remotely through establishing or
listening to a communication via the contactless/contact interface of the TOE without a priori knowledge of the
correct values of shared PACE passwords.This objective is achieved as follows:(i) while establishing PACE
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communication with a PACE password (non-blocking authorisation data) – by FIA_AFL.1/PACE;(ii) for
listening to PACE communication (is of importance for the current PP, since SOD is card-individual) –
FTP_ITC.1/PACE.
7.3.1.6 OT.Prot_Abuse_Func
The security objective OT.Prot_Abuse-Func “Protection against Abuse of Functionality” aims preventing
TOE’s functions being not intended to be used in the operational phase from manipulating and disclosing the
User- and TSF-data.This objective is achieved by FMT_LIM.1 and FMT_LIM.2 preventing misuse of test and
other functionality of the TOE having not to be used in the TOE’s operational life cycle phase.
7.3.1.7 OT.Prot_Inf_Leak
The security objective OT.Prot_Inf_Leak “Protection against Information Leakage” aims protection against
disclosure of confidential User- or/and TSF-data stored on / processed by the TOE. This objective is achieved:
• by FPT_EMS.1 for measurement and analysis of the shape and amplitude of signals or the time between
events found by measuring signals on the electromagnetic field, power consumption, clock, or I/O lines,
• by FPT_FLS.1 and FPT_TST.1 for forcing a malfunction of the TOE, and
• by FPT_PHP.3 for a physical manipulation of the TOE.
7.3.1.8 OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper
The security objective OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper “Protection against Physical Tampering” aims protection of the
confidentiality and integrity of the User- and TSF-data as well as embedded software stored in the TOE.This
objective is completely covered by FPT_PHP.3 in an obvious way.
7.3.1.9 OT.Prot_Malfunction
The security objective OT.Prot_Malfunction “Protection against Malfunctions” aims ensuring a correct
operation of the TOE by preventing its operation outside the normal operating conditions.This objective is
covered by FPT_TST.1 requiring self tests to demonstrate the correct operation of the TOE and tests of
authorised users to verify the integrity of the TSF-data and the embedded software (TSF code) as well as by
FPT_FLS.1 requiring entering a secure state of the TOE in case of detected failure or operating conditions
possibly causing a malfunction.
7.3.1.10 OT.Identification
The security objective OT.Identification “Identification of the TOE” addresses the storage of Initialisation and
Pre-Personalisation Data in its non-volatile memory, whereby they also include the IC Identification Data
uniquely identifying the TOE’s chip.
This will be ensured by TSF according to SFR FAU_SAS.1. The SFR FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA allows only the
Manufacturer to write Initialisation and Pre-personalisation Data (including the Personalisation Agent key). The
SFR FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS requires the Personalisation Agent to disable access to Initialisation and Pre-
personalisation Data in the life cycle phase ‘operational use’.The SFRs FMT_SMF.1 and FMT_SMR.1/PACE
support the functions and roles related.
7.3.1.11 OT.AC_Pers
The security objective OT.AC_Pers “Access Control for Personalisation of logical MRTD” aims that only
Personalisation Agent can write the User- and the TSF-data into the TOE. The justification for the SFRs
FAU_SAS.1, FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA and FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS arises from the justification for OT.Identification
above with respect to the Pre-personalisation Data. FMT_MTD.1/PA covers the related property of
OT.AC_Pers (writing SOD and, in generally, personalisation data). The SFRs FMT_SMF.1 and
FMT_SMR.1/PACE support the functions and roles related. The SFR FMT_MTD.1./KEY_READ restricts the
access to the Personalisation Agent Keys.
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The authentication of the terminal as Personalisation Agent shall be performed by TSF according to SFR
FIA_UAU.4/PACE and FIA_UAU.5/PACE. If the Personalisation Terminal want to authenticate itself to the
TOE by means of the Terminal Authentication Protocol v.1 (after Chip Authentication v.1) with the
Personalisation Agent Keys the TOE will use TSF according to the FCS_RND.1 (for the generation of the
challenge), FCS_CKM.1/CA (for the derivation of the new session keys after Chip Authentication v.1), and
FCS_COP.1/CA_SHA, FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC and FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC (for the ENC_MAC_Mode secure
messaging). If the Personalisation Terminal wants to authenticate itself to the TOE by means of the
Authentication Mechanism with Personalisation Agent Key the TOE will use TSF according to the FCS_RND.1
(for the generation of the challenge) and FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC (to verify the authentication attempt). The
session keys are destroyed according to FCS_CKM.4 after use.
The Personalisation Agent can load the PACE password according to FMT_MTD.1/PACE_PWD.
Only the Personalization Agent is allowed to generate Chip Authentication Key pair and Active Authentication
Key pair according to respectively FMT_MTD.1/CA_KEY_GEN and FMT_MTD.1/AA_KEY_GEN, following
rules define in FDP_ACC.1/MP and FDP_ACF.1/MP. The generation of these key pairs is ensured by
FCS_CKM.1/KEY_GEN.
7.3.1.12 OT.Configuration
The security objective OT.Configuration “Protection of the TOE preparation” addresses management of the
Data Configuration, Pre-personalization Agent keys, Personalization Agent keys, CPLC Data and the Life
Cycle State of the TOE.
The Manufacturer Secret Key (MSK) loaded by Embedded software loading responsible (scheme 2 and
scheme 3) or IC manufacturer (scheme 1) is diversified at first command according to SFR
FCS_CKM.1/MSK_DIV and FCS_CKM.1/MSK_SHA. This secures the transport of the chip between IC
manufacturing centre and MRTD manufacturing centre.
The authentication of the terminal as Manufacturer is performed by TSF according to SFR FIA_UAU.4 and
FIA_UAU.5/MP. The Manufacturer can be authenticated by using the symmetric authentication mechanism
(FCS_COP.1/GP_AUTH) with the Pre-personalization key. FIA_UAU.6/MP describes the re-authentication. In
case of failed authentication attempts FIA_AFL.1/MP enforces additional waiting time prolonging the
necessary amount of time for facilitating a brute force attack. The SFR FTP_ITC.1/MP allows the Manufacturer
to communicate with the OS.
Once step 4 is done, the MRTD packaging responsible is allowed to set the Pre-personalization Agent keys
according to the SFR FMT_MTD.1/MP_KEY_WRITE, FDP_ITC.1/MP and FCS_COP.1/GP_SDT_DEC. The
SFR FMT_MTD.1/MP_KEY_READ prevents read access to the Pre-personalization keys and ensure together
with the SFR FPT_EMS.1, FPT_FLS.1 and FPT_PHP.3 the confidentially of these keys. This operation
destroys the MSK (FCS_CKM.4).
The write access to these data is defined by the SFR FDP_ACC.1/MP and FDP_ACF.1/MP as follows: only
the successfully authenticated Pre-personalization Agent and Personalization Agent are allowed to write these
data.
In step 5, the authentication of the terminal as Manufacturer shall be performed by TSF according to SFR
FIA_UAU.4 and FIA_UAU.5/MP. The Manufacturer shall be authenticated by using the symmetric
authentication mechanism (FCS_COP.1/GP_AUTH).
In case of failed authentication attempts FIA_AFL.1/MP enforces additional waiting time prolonging the
necessary amount of time for facilitating a brute force attack
The SFR FIA_UAU.6/MP describes the re-authentication and FDP_UCT.1/MP and FDP_UIT.1/MP the
protection of the transmitted data by means of secure messaging implemented by the cryptographic functions
according to FCS_CKM.1/GP, FCS_RND.1 (for key generation), and FCS_COP.1/GP_ENC as well as
FCS_COP.1/GP_MAC for the ENC_MAC_Mode. The SFR FCS_CKM.4 enforces the destruction of Secure
Messaging session keys.
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The Manufacturer is also able to detect any modification of the transmitted logical Additional Code data by
means of the Symmetric Authentication mechanism. The SFR FIA_UAU.6/ADD_CODE,
FDP_UCT.1/ADD_CODE and FDP_UIT.1/ADD_CODE requires the protection of the received data by means
of secure messaging implemented by the cryptographic functions according to FCS_CKM.1/LSK_DIV, and
FCS_COP.1/ADDCODE_DEC and FCS_COP.1/ ADDCODE_MAC for the ENC_MAC_Mode. The LSK used
as a seed for DIV_LSK cannot be read by anyone in accordance to FMT_MTD.1/LSK_READ. FCS_CKM.4
enforces the destruction of Secure Messaging session keys. FCS_CKM.4 also enforces the destruction of the
LSK once the TOE is in Step 6.
The Manufacturer is the only one who can load and activate Additional Codes according to SFR
FMT_MTD.1.1/ADDCODE_LOAD and FMT_MTD.1.1/ADDCODE_ACT. The Additional Code activation is
enforced by the cryptographic function FCS_COP.1/ADDCODE_SHA.
The Manufacturer can enable Chip Authentication and Active Authentication functionalities following
FMT_MOF.1.1/PROT.
The Manufacturer and the Personalization Agent can select the protection mode of user data following
FMT_MOF.1.1/GP.
The SFR FMT_SMR.1 lists the roles and the SFR FMT_SMF.1 lists the TSF management functions setting
the Pre-personalization Agent Keys according to the SFR FMT_MTD.1/MP_KEY_WRITE as authentication
reference data. The SFR FMT_MTD.1/MP_KEY_READ prevents read access to the secret key of the
Personalization Agent Keys and ensure together with the SFR FCS_CKM.4, FPT_EMS.1, FPT_FLS.1 and
FPT_PHP.3 the confidentially of these keys.
SFR FDP_ACF.1/ID and FDP_ACC.1/ID define rules to access TOE_ID and CPLC which allow the TOE
identification.
The Manufacturer is the only subject allowed to ends Pre-personalization of logical MRTD, setting the TOE
Life Cycle State in Personalization state according to FMT_MTD.1.1/LCS_PREP. Since then it is no more
possible to return in manufacturing state and the role Manufacturer is no longer available as FCS_CKM.4
destroys Manufacturer keys.
7.3.1.13 OT.Chip_Auth_Proof
The security objective OT.Chip_Auth_Proof “Proof of MRTD’s chip authenticity” is ensured by the Chip
Authentication Protocol v.1 provided by FIA_API.1/CA or the Active Authentication protocol provided by
FIA_API.1/AA or the PACE protocol with Chip Authentication Mapping method provided by
FIA_API.1/PACE_CAM proving the identity of the TOE. The Chip Authentication Protocol v.1 defined by
FCS_CKM.1/CA is performed using a TOE internally stored confidential private key as required by
FMT_MTD.1/CAPK and FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ.
The Chip Authentication Protocol v.1 defined by FCS_CKM.1/CA is performed using a TOE internally stored
confidential private key as required by FMT_MTD.1/CAPK and FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ. The Chip
Authentication Protocol v.1 [TR_03110] requires additional TSF according to FCS_CKM.1/CA (for the
derivation of the session keys), FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC and FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC (for the ENC_MAC_Mode
secure messaging).The SFRs FMT_SMF.1 and FMT_SMR.1/PACE support the functions and roles related.
The Active Authentication defined by FCS_COP.1/SIG_GEN for the generation of the RSA Signature is
performed using a TOE internally stored confidential private key as required by FMT_MTD.1/AA_KEY_WRITE
and FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ. According to FDP_ACF.1, only the successfully authenticated Inspection
Systems are allowed to request Active Authentication (FDP_ACF.1.2, rule 2).
The PACE protocol with Chip Authentication Mapping, defined by FIA_API.1/PACE_CAM, is executed using
a TOE internally stored confidential private key as required by FMT_MTD.1/CAPK and
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ. FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE is used for the session key generation,
FCS_COP.1/CA_DATA_GEN for the Chip Authentication Data generation and FCS_COP.1.1/PACE_ENC for
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the Chip Authentication Data encryption as per [ICAO_TR_SAC], following FIA_UID.1/PACE_CAM,
FIA_UAU.1/PACE_CAM, FIA_UAU.4/PACE, FIA_UAU.5/PACE_CAM, FIA_UAU.6/PACE. The SFRs
FMT_SMF.1 and FMT_SMR.1/PACE support the functions and roles related.
7.3.1.14 OT.Secure_Load_ACode
The security objective OT.Secure_Load_ACode “Secure loading of the Additional Code”addresses the
loading of the Additional Code.
The Manufacturer is also able to detect any modification of the transmitted logical Additional Code data by
means of the Symmetric Authentication mechanism. The SFR FIA_UAU.6/ADD_CODE,
FDP_UCT.1/ADD_CODE and FDP_UIT.1/ADD_CODE requires the protection of the received data by means
of secure messaging implemented by the cryptographic functions according to FCS_CKM.1/LSK_DIV, and
FCS_COP.1/ADDCODE_DEC and FCS_COP.1/ ADDCODE_MAC for the ENC_MAC_Mode. The LSK used
as a seed for DIV_LSK cannot be read by anyone in accordance to FMT_MTD.1/LSK_READ. FCS_CKM.4
enforces the destruction of Secure Messaging session keys. FCS_CKM.4 also enforces the destruction of the
LSK once the TOE is in Step 6.
The Manufacturer is the only one who can load and activate Additional Codes according to SFR
FMT_MTD.1.1/ADDCODE_LOAD and FMT_MTD.1.1/ADDCODE_ACT. The Additional Code activation is
enforced by the cryptographic function FCS_COP.1/ADDCODE_SHA.
7.3.1.15 OT.Secure_AC_Activation
The security objective OT.Secure_AC_Activation “Secure activation of the Additional Code” addresses the
activation of the Additional Code.
The Manufacturer is also able to detect any modification of the transmitted logical Additional Code data by
means of the Symmetric Authentication mechanism. The SFR FIA_UAU.6/ADD_CODE,
FDP_UCT.1/ADD_CODE and FDP_UIT.1/ADD_CODE requires the protection of the received data by means
of secure messaging implemented by the cryptographic functions according to FCS_CKM.1/LSK_DIV, and
FCS_COP.1/ADDCODE_DEC and FCS_COP.1/ ADDCODE_MAC for the ENC_MAC_Mode. The LSK used
as a seed for DIV_LSK cannot be read by anyone in accordance to FMT_MTD.1/LSK_READ. FCS_CKM.4
enforces the destruction of Secure Messaging session keys. FCS_CKM.4 also enforces the destruction of the
LSK once the TOE is in Step 6.
The Manufacturer is the only one who can load and activate Additional Codes according to SFR
FMT_MTD.1.1/ADDCODE_LOAD and FMT_MTD.1.1/ADDCODE_ACT. The Additional Code activation is
enforced by the cryptographic function FCS_COP.1/ADDCODE_SHA.
7.3.1.16 OT.TOE_Identification
The security objective OT.TOE_Identification “Secure identification of the TOE” address the storage of the
IC Identification Data uniquely identifying the MRTD’s chip in its non-volatile memory. This will be ensured by
TSF according to SFR FAU_SAS.1.
SFR FDP_ACF.1/ID and FDP_ACC.1/ID define rules to read and write TOE_ID and CPLC which allow the
TOE identification.
The authentication of the terminal as Manufacturer is performed by TSF according to SFR FIA_UAU.4 and
FIA_UAU.5. The Manufacturer can be authenticated by using the symmetric authentication mechanism
(FCS_COP.1/GP_AUTH) with the Pre-personalization key. FIA_UAU.6/MP describes the re-authentication. In
case of failed authentication attempts FIA_AFL.1/MP enforces additional waiting time prolonging the
necessary amount of time for facilitating a brute force attack. The SFR FTP_ITC.1/MP allows the Manufacturer
to communicate with the OS.
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7.3.2 Dependency Rationale
7.3.2.1 Overview
The Table 19 shows the dependencies between the SFR of the TOE.
SFR Dependencies Support of the
Dependencies
FAU_SAS.1 No dependencies n.a.
FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE
[FCS_CKM.2 or
FCS_COP.1],
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1/PACE_ENC and
FCS_COP.1/PACE_MAC
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_CKM.1/MSK_DIV
FCS_COP.1/GP_ENC and
FCS_COP.1/GP_MAC
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_CKM.1/GP
FCS_COP.1/GP_ENC and
FCS_COP.1/GP_MAC
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_CKM.1/LSK_DIV
FCS_COP.1/
ADDCODE_DEC and
FCS_COP.1/
ADDCODE_MAC
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_CKM.1/CA
FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC and
FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_CKM.1/KEY_GEN
FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC and
FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC and
FCS_COP.1/SIG_GEN
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_CKM.4
FDP_ITC.1, or
FDP_ITC.2, or
FCS_CKM.1]
FCS_CKM.1/PACE_DH and
FCS_CKM.1/ MSK_DIV and
FCS_CKM.1/GP and
FCS_CKM.1/CA
FCS_COP.1/PACE_ENC
[FDP_ITC.1, or
FDP_ITC.2, or
FCS_CKM.1],
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP./PACE_MAC
FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1/MSK_SHA
FCS_CKM.1/MSK_DIV
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1/GP_ENC
FCS_CKM.1/MSK_DIV and
FCS_CKM.1/GP
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1/GP_AUTH
FCS_CKM.1/MSK_DIV and
FCS_CKM.1/GP
FCS_CKM.4
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SFR Dependencies Support of the
Dependencies
FCS_COP.1/GP_MAC
FCS_CKM.1/MSK_DIV and
FCS_CKM.1/GP
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1/GP_SDT_DEC
FCS_CKM.1/MSK_DIV and
FCS_CKM.1/GP
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1/ADDCODE_DEC
FCS_CKM.1/LSK_DIV
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1/ADDCODE_MAC
FCS_CKM.1/LSK_DIV
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1/ADDCODE_SHA
FCS_CKM.1/LSK_DIV
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1/CA_SHA
FCS_CKM.1/CA
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC
FCS_CKM.1/CA
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC
FCS_CKM.1/CA
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1/SIG_GEN
FDP_ITC.1/MP
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1/CA_DATA_GEN
FCS_CKM.1/CA
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_RND.1 No dependencies n.a.
FIA_UID.1/PACE No dependencies n.a.
FIA_UID.1/PACE_CAM No dependencies n.a.
FIA_UAU.1/PACE FIA_UID.1 FIA_UID.1/PACE
FIA_UAU.1/PACE_CAM FIA_UID.1 FIA_UID.1/PACE_CAM
FIA_UAU.4/PACE No dependencies n.a.
FIA_UAU.5/PACE No dependencies n.a.
FIA_UAU.5/PACE_CAM No dependencies n.a.
FIA_UAU.6/PACE
No dependencies n.a.
FIA_UAU.6/MP
FIA_UAU.6/CA
FIA_AFL.1/PACE
FIA_UAU.1 FIA_UAU.1
FIA_AFL.1/MP
FIA_API.1/CA No dependencies n.a.
FIA_API.1/AA No dependencies n.a.
FIA_API.1/PACE_CAM No dependencies n.a.
FDP_ACC.1/TRM
FDP_ACF.1
FDP_ACF.1/TRM
FDP_ACC.1/MP FDP_ACF.1/MP
FDP_ACC.1/ID FDP_ACF.1/ID
FDP_ACF.1/TRM
FDP_ACC.1,
FMT_MSA.3
FDP_ACC.1/TRM
See justification in §7.3.2.2.1
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SFR Dependencies Support of the
Dependencies
FDP_ACF.1/MP
FDP_ACC.1/MP
See justification in §7.3.2.2.2
FDP_ACF.1/ID
FDP_ACC.1/ID
See justification in §7.3.2.2.2
FDP_RIP.1 No dependencies n.a.
FDP_UCT.1/TRM
[FTP_ITC.1, or
FTP_TRP.1],
[FDP_IFC.1, or
FDP_ACC.1]
FTP_ITC.1
FDP_ACC.1/TRM
FDP_UCT.1/MP
FTP_ITC.1
FDP_ACC.1/MP
FDP_UCT.1/ADD_CODE
FTP_ITC.1/MP
FDP_ACC.1/MP
FDP_UCT.1/CA
FTP_ITC.1
FDP_ACC.1/CA
FDP_UIT.1/TRM
[FTP_ITC.1, or
FTP_TRP.1],
[FDP_IFC.1, or
FDP_ACC.1]
FTP_ITC.1
FDP_ACC.1/TRM
FDP_UIT.1/MP
FTP_ITC.1
FDP_ACC.1/MP
FDP_UIT.1/ADD_CODE
FTP_ITC.1/MP
FDP_ACC.1/MP
FDP_UIT.1/CA
FTP_ITC.1
FDP_ACC.1/CA
FDP_ITC.1/MP
[FDP_ACC.1, or
FDP_IFC.1]
FMT_MSA.3
FDP_ACC.1/MP
See justification in §7.3.2.2.3
FMT_MOF.1/PROT FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.1
FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.1/PACE
FMT_MOF.1/GP
FMT_SMF.1 No dependencies n.a.
FMT_SMR.1/PACE FIA_UID.1 FIA_UID.1/PACE
FMT_LIM.1 FMT_LIM.2 FMT_LIM.2
FMT_LIM.2 FMT_LIM.1 FMT_LIM.1
FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA
FMT_SMF.1,
FMT_SMR.1
FMT_SMF.1,
FMT_SMR.1/PACE
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ
FMT_MTD.1/PA
FMT_MTD.1/PACE_PWD
FMT_MTD.1/CAPK
FMT_MTD.1/MP_KEY_WRITE
FMT_MTD.1/AA_KEY_WRITE
FMT_MTD.1/LCS_PREP
FMT_MTD.1/LCS_PERS
FMT_MTD.1/LSK_READ
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SFR Dependencies Support of the
Dependencies
FMT_MTD.1/ADDCODE_LOAD
FMT_MTD.1/ADDCODE_ACT
FMT_MTD.1/AA_KEY_GEN
FMT_MTD.1/CA_KEY_GEN
FPT_EMS.1 No dependencies n.a.
FPT_FLS.1 No dependencies n.a.
FPT_TST.1 No dependencies n.a.
FPT_PHP.3 No dependencies n.a.
FTP_ITC.1/PACE
No dependencies n.a.
FTP_ITC.1/MP
Table 19 - Dependencies between the SFR for the TOE
7.3.2.2 Rationale for the exclusion of dependencies
7.3.2.2.1 FDP_ACF.1/TRM and FDP_ACF.1/UPD_FILE
The access control TSF according to FDP_ACF.1/TRM uses security attributes which are defined during the
personalisation and are fixed over the whole life time of the TOE. No management of these security attribute
(i.e. SFR FMT_MSA.1 and FMT_MSA.3) is necessary here.
7.3.2.2.2 FDP_ACF.1/MP and FDP_ACF.1/ID
The access control TSF according to FDP_ACF.1/MP and FDP_ACF.1/ID uses security attributes which are
fixed during the development of the OS and are fixed over the whole life time of the TOE. No management of
these security attribute (i.e. SFR FMT_MSA.1 and FMT_MSA.3) is necessary here.
7.3.2.2.3 FDP_ITC.1/MP
The SFR FDP_ITC.1/MP requires the verification of security attributes when Manufacturer and Personalization
Agent imports user data. There is no need for FMT_MSA.3, e.g. to initialize these security attributes, as they
are fixed during the development of the OS.
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8 TOE SUMMARY SPECIFICATION
8.1 TOE summary specification
8.1.1 Overview
The TOE provides the following Security Functions (TSF):
TSF Acronym Descr. Step
5 6 7
Access Control in Reading F.ACR § 8.1.2   
Access Control in Writing F.ACW § 8.1.3   
Active Authentication F.AA § 8.1.4   
Chip Authentication F.CA § 8.1.5   
PACE F.PACE § 8.1.6   
MRTD Personalization F.PERS § 8.1.7   
Physical Protection F.PHY § 8.1.8   
MRTD Pre-personalization F.PREP § 8.1.9   
Safe State Management F.SS § 8.1.10   
Secure Messaging F.SM § 8.1.11   
Self Tests F.STST § 8.1.12   
Table 20 - TSF of the TOE
8.1.2 Access Control in Reading
This function controls access to read functions and enforces the security policy for data retrieval. Prior to any
data retrieval, it authenticates the actor trying to access the data, and checks the access conditions are fulfilled
as well as the life cycle state. It ensures that at any time, the following keys are never readable:
- MSK,
- Pre-personalization Agent keys,
- Personalization Agent keys,
- AA private key,
- CA private key,
- LSK.
It controls access to the CPLC data as follow:
- It ensures the CPLC data can be read during the personalization phase,
- It ensures it cannot be readable without authentication at the end of the personalization step.
It controls access to the TOE_ID as follow:
- It ensures the TOE_ID data can be read during the manufacturing and personalization phases,
- It ensures it cannot be readable without authentication in operational use phase.
Regarding the file structure:
In the Operational Use phase:
- The terminal can read user data, the Document Security Object, EF.COM only after BAC
authentication and through a valid secure channel.
In the Manufacturing and Personalization phases:
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- The Manufacturer and the Personalization Agent can read all the data stored in the TOE after it is
authenticated by the TOE (using its authentication keys).
It ensures as well that no other part of the memory can be accessed at anytime
8.1.3 Access Control in Writing
This function controls access to write functions (in EEPROM) and enforces the security policy for data writing.
Prior to any data update, it authenticates the actor, and checks the access conditions are fulfilled as well as
the life cycle state.
It also ensures the CPLC data cannot be written anymore once the TOE is in Operational Use phase.
Regarding the file structure:
In the Operational Use phase:
It is not possible to create any files (system or data files). Furthermore, it is not possible to update any files
(system or data files), except for CVCA which can be updated if the “Secure Messaging” access condition is
verified.
In the Manufacturing and Personalization phases:
The Manufacturing and Personalization Agent can create and write through a valid secure channel all the data
files it needs after it is authenticated by the TOE (using its authentication keys).
8.1.4 Active Authentication
This TSF provides the Active Authentication as described in [ICAO_9303]. It also provides management of this
function in phase 5.
8.1.5 Chip Authentication
This TSF provides the Chip Authentication, authentication and session keys generation to be used by F.SM,
as described in [TR_03110].
8.1.6 PACE
This TSF provides the Password Authenticated Connection Establishment authentication and session keys
generation to be used by F.SM, as described in [TR_03110].
8.1.7 MRTD Personalization
This security functionality ensures that the TOE, when delivered to the Personalization Agent, provides and
requires authentication for data exchange. This authentication is based on a Triple DES authentication
mechanism. This function allows to:
 Manage symmetric authentication using Personalization Agent keys,
 Compute session keys to be used by F.SM,
 Load user data,
 Load Chip Authentication keys and Active Authentication keys,
 Set Personalization Agent CPLC Data,
 Set TOE life cycle in Operational Use phase.
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8.1.8 Physical Protection
This Security Function protects the TOE against physical attacks, so that the integrity and confidentiality of the
TOE is ensured, including keys, user data, CPLC data, configuration data and TOE life cycle. It detects physical
tampering, responds automatically, and also controls the emanations sent out by the TOE.
8.1.9 MRTD Pre-personalization
This security functionality ensures that the TOE, when delivered to the Manufacturer, provides and requires
an authentication mechanism for data exchange. This authentication is based on Triple DES symmetric
authentication mechanism. This function allows to:
 Diversify the MSK,
 Manage symmetric authentication using Pre-personalization Agent keys,
 Compute session keys to be used by F.SM,
 Load and activate Additional Code,
 Load data,
 Create the MRTD application
 Load Personalization Agent keys,
 Load the Pre-personalization Agent CPLC Data,
 Set TOE life cycle in Personalization phase.
This security function ensures the destruction of the MSK, once ISK is loaded. This security function ensures
the destruction of the ISK, once Personalization Agent keys are loaded.
8.1.10 Safe State Management
This security functionality ensures that the TOE gets back to a secure state when:
 an integrity error is detected by F.STST described in § 8.1.12,
 a tearing occurs (during a copy of data in EEPROM).
This security functionality ensures that if such a case occurs, the TOE is either switched in the state "kill card"
or becomes mute.
8.1.11 Secure Messaging
This security functionality ensures the confidentiality, authenticity and integrity of the communication between
the TOE and the interface device. In the operational phase, after a successful Authentication Procedure (i.e.
BAC or CA), a secure channel is established. This security functionality also provides a Secure Messaging
(SCP02) for the Pre-personalization and Personalization phases. The protocols can be configured to protect
the exchanges integrity and/or confidentiality. If an error occurs in the secure messaging layer, the session
keys are destroyed.
8.1.12 Self Tests
The TOE performs self-tests to verify the integrity of the TSF data:
 At Reset,
 Before using the TSF data,
 Before using Chip Authentication key and Active Authentication key.
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8.2 SFR and TSF
TSF
SFR
F.ACR
F.ACW
F.AA
F.CA
F.PACE
F.PERS
F.PHY
F.PREP
F.SS
F.SM
F.STST
FAU_SAS.1           
FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE           
FCS_CKM.1/MSK_DIV           
FCS_CKM.1/GP           
FCS_CKM.1/LSK_DIV           
FCS_CKM.1/CA           
FCS_CKM.1/KEY_GEN           
FCS_CKM.4           
FCS_COP.1/PACE_ENC           
FCS_COP.1/PACE_MAC           
FCS_COP.1/MSK_SHA           
FCS_COP.1/GP_ENC           
FCS_COP.1/GP_AUTH           
FCS_COP.1/GP_MAC           
FCS_COP.1/GP_SDT_DEC           
FCS_COP.1/ADDCODE_DEC           
FCS_COP.1/ADDCODE_MAC           
FCS_COP.1/ADDCODE_SHA           
FCS_COP.1/CA_SHA           
FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC           
FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC           
FCS_COP.1/SIG_GEN           
FCS_COP.1/CA_DATA_GEN           
FCS_RND.1           
FIA_UID.1/PACE           
FIA_UID.1/PACE_CAM           
FIA_UAU.1/PACE           
FIA_UAU.1/PACE_CAM           
FIA_UAU.4/PACE           
FIA_UAU.5/PACE           
FIA_UAU.5/PACE_CAM           
FIA_UAU.6/PACE           
FIA_UAU.6/MP           
FIA_UAU.6/ADD_CODE           
FIA_UAU.6/CA           
FIA_AFL.1/PACE           
FIA_AFL.1/MP           
FIA_API.1/CA           
FIA_API.1/AA           
FIA_API.1/PACE_CAM           
FDP_ACC.1/TRM           
FDP_ACC.1/MP           
FDP_ACC.1/ID           
FDP_ACF.1/TRM           
FDP_ACF.1/MP           
FDP_ACF.1/ID           
FDP_RIP.1           
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TSF
SFR
F.ACR
F.ACW
F.AA
F.CA
F.PACE
F.PERS
F.PHY
F.PREP
F.SS
F.SM
F.STST
FDP_UCT.1/TRM           
FDP_UCT.1/MP           
FDP_UCT.1/ADD_CODE           
FDP_UCT.1/CA           
FDP_UIT.1/TRM           
FDP_UIT.1/MP           
FDP_UIT.1/ADD_CODE           
FDP_UIT.1/CA           
FDP_ITC.1/MP           
FMT_MOF.1/PROT           
FMT_MOF.1/GP           
FMT_SMF.1           
FMT_SMR.1/PACE           
FMT_LIM.1           
FMT_LIM.2           
FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA           
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS           
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ           
FMT_MTD.1/PA           
FMT_MTD.1/PACE_PWD           
FMT_MTD.1/CAPK           
FMT_MTD.1/MP_KEY_WRITE           
FMT_MTD.1/AA_KEY_WRITE           
FMT_MTD.1/LCS_PREP           
FMT_MTD.1/LCS_PERS           
FMT_MTD.1/LSK_READ           
FMT_MTD.1/ADDCODE_LOAD           
FMT_MTD.1/ADDCODE_ACT           
FMT_MTD.1/AA_KEY_GEN           
FMT_MTD.1/CA_KEY_GEN           
FPT_EMS.1           
FPT_FLS.1           
FPT_TST.1           
FPT_PHP.3           
FTP_ITC.1/PACE           
FTP_ITC.1/MP           
Table 21- SFR and TSF
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9 GLOSSARY AND ACRONYMS
9.1 Glossary
Term Definition
Active Authentication Security mechanism defined in [ICAO_9303] option by which means the
MRTD’s chip proves and the inspection system verifies the identity and
authenticity of the MRTD’s chip as part of a genuine MRTD issued by a known
State or Organization.
Agreement This term is used in the current PP in order to reflect an appropriate relationship
between the parties involved, but not as a legal notion.
Application note Optional informative part of the PP containing sensitive supporting information
that is considered relevant or useful for the construction, evaluation or use of
the TOE.
Audit records Write-only-once non-volatile memory area of the travel document’s chip to store
the Initialisation Data and Pre-personalisation Data.
Authenticity Ability to confirm that the travel document itself and the data elements stored in
were issued by the travel document Issuer
Basic Access Control
(BAC)
Security mechanism defined in [ICAO_9303] by which means the travel
document’s chip proves and the basic inspection system (with BAC) protects
their communication by means of secure messaging with Document Basic
Access Keys (see there) based on MRZ information as key seed and access
condition to data stored on travel document’s chip according to LDS.
Basic Inspection System
with Basic Access Control
protocol (BIS-BAC)
A technical system being used by an official organisation103 and operated by
a governmental organisation and verifying correspondence between the stored
and printed MRZ.
BIS-BAC implements the terminal’s part of the Basic Access Control protocol
and authenticates itself to the travel document using the Document Basic
Access Keys drawn form printed MRZ data for reading the less-sensitive data
(travel document document details data and biographical data) stored on the
travel document.
See also par. 1.2.5; also [ICAO_9303].
Basic Inspection System
with PACE protocol (BIS-
PACE)
A technical system being used by an inspecting authority104 and verifying the
travel document presenter as the travel document holder (for ePassport: by
comparing the real biometric data (face) of the travel document presenter with
the stored biometric data (DG2) of the travel document holder).
BIS-PACE implements the terminal’s part of the PACE protocol and
authenticates itself to the travel document using a shared password (PACE
password) and supports Passive Authentication. A technical system being
used by an inspecting authority and verifying the
ePass presenter as the ePass holder (for ePassport: by comparing the real
biometrical data (face) of the ePass presenter with the stored biometrical data
(DG2) of the ePass holder).
The Basic Inspection System with PACE is a PCT additionally
supporting/applying the Passive Authentication protocol.
Biographical data
(biodata)
The personalised details of the travel document holder appearing as text in the
visual and machine readable zones of and electronically stored in the travel
document. The biographical data are less-sensitive data.
Biometric reference data Data stored for biometric authentication of the travel document holder in the
travel document as (i) digital portrait and (ii) optional biometric reference data
(e.g. finger and iris).
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Term Definition
Card Access Number
(CAN)
A short password that is printed or displayed on the document. The CAN is a
non-blocking password. The CAN may be static (printed on the Passport), semi-
static (e.g. printed on a label on the Passport) or dynamic (randomly chosen by
the electronic travel document and displayed by it using e.g. ePaper, OLED or
similar technologies), see [ICAO_TR_SAC]
Counterfeit An unauthorised copy or reproduction of a genuine security document made by
whatever means [ICAO_9303].
Country Signing CertA
Certificate (C
CSCA
)
Certificate of the Country Signing Certification Authority Public Key (K
PuCSCA
)
issued by Country Signing Certification Authority and stored in the rightful
terminals.
Country Signing
Certification Authority
(CSCA)
An organisation enforcing the policy of the ePass Issuer with respect to
confirming correctness of user and TSF data stored in the ePass. The CSCA
represents the country specific root of the PKI for the ePasss and creates the
Document Signer Certificates within this PKI.
The CSCA also issues the self-signed CSCA Certificate (CCSCA) having to be
distributed by strictly secure diplomatic means, see. [ICAO_9303], 5.5.1.
Document Basic Access
Keys
Pair of symmetric (two-key) Triple-DES keys used for secure messaging with
encryption (key KBENC) and message authentication (key KBMAC) of data
transmitted between the TOE and an inspection system using BAC
[ICAO_9303]. They are derived from the MRZ and used within BAC to
authenticate an entity able to read the printed MRZ of the passport book; see
[ICAO_9303].
Document Details Data Data printed on and electronically stored in the travel document representing
the document details like document type, issuing state, document number, date
of issue, date of expiry, issuing authority. The document details data are less-
sensitive data.
Document Security
Object (SO
D
)
A RFC 3369 CMS Signed Data Structure, signed by the Document Signer (DS).
Carries the hash values of the LDS Data Groups: A hash for each Data Group
in use shall be stored in the Security Data. It is stored in the ePassport
application (EF.SOD) of the travel document. It may carry the Document Signer
Certificate (CDS); see [ICAO_9303], sec. A.10.4.
Document Signer (DS) An organisation enforcing the policy of the CSCA and signing the Document
Security Object stored on the ePass for passive authentication.
A Document Signer is authorised by the national CSCA issuing the Document
Signer Certificate (CDS)(CDS), see [ICAO_9303].
This role is usually delegated to a Personalisation Agent.
Eavesdropper A threat agent reading the communication between the travel document and
the terminal to gain the data on the travel document.
Enrolment The process of collecting biometric samples from a person and the subsequent
preparation and storage of biometric reference templates representing that
person's identity; see [ICAO_9303].
ePassport application A part of the TOE containing the non-executable, related user data (incl.
biometric) as well as the data needed for authentication (incl. MRZ); this
application is intended to be used by authorities, amongst other as a machine
readable travel document (MRTD). See [ICAO_TR_SAC].
Forgery Fraudulent alteration of any part of the genuine document, e.g. changes to the
biographical data or portrait; see [ICAO_9303].
Global Interoperability The capability of inspection systems (either manual or automated) in different
States throughout the world to exchange data, to process data received from
systems in other States, and to utilise that data in inspection operations in their
respective States. Global interoperability is a major objective of the
standardised specifications for placement of both eye-readable and machine
readable data in all travel documents; see [ICAO_9303].
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Term Definition
IC Dedicated Software Software developed and injected into the chip hardware by the IC manufacturer.
Such software might support special functionality of the IC hardware and be
used, amongst other, for implementing delivery procedures between different
players. The usage of parts of the IC Dedicated Software might be restricted to
certain life cycle phases.
IC Embedded Software Software embedded in an IC and not being designed by the IC developer. The
IC Embedded Software is designed in the design life cycle phase and
embedded into the IC in the manufacturing life cycle phase of the TOE.
Impostor A person who applies for and obtains a document by assuming a false name
and identity, or a person who alters his or her physical appearance to represent
himself or herself as another person for the purpose of using that person’s
document; see [ICAO_9303]
Improperly documented
person
A person who travels, or attempts to travel with: (a) an expired travel document
or an invalid visa; (b) a counterfeit, forged or altered travel document or visa;
(c) someone else’s travel document or visa; or (d) no travel document or visa,
if required; see [ICAO_9303]
Initialisation Data Any data defined by the travel document manufacturer and injected into the
non-volatile memory by the Integrated Circuits manufacturer. These data are,
for instance, used for traceability and for IC identification as travel document
material (IC identification data).
Inspection The act of an official organisation (inspection authority) examining an travel
document presented to it by an travel document presenter and verifying its
authenticity as the travel document holder. See also [ICAO_9303]
Inspection system
see BIS-PACE for this PP.
see also BIS-BAC for general information
Integrated circuit (IC) Electronic component(s) designed to perform processing and/or memory
functions. The travel document’s chip is an integrated circuit.
Integrity Ability to confirm the travel document and its data elements stored upon have
not been altered from that created by the travel document Issuer.
Issuing Organisation Organisation authorised to issue an official travel document (e.g. the United
Nations Organisation, issuer of the Laissez-passer); see [ICAO_9303]
Issuing State The country issuing the travel document; see [ICAO_9303]
Logical Data Structure
(LDS)
The collection of groupings of Data Elements stored in the optional capacity
expansion technology [ICAO_9303]. The capacity expansion technology used
is the travel document’s chip.
Machine readable zone
(MRZ)
Fixed dimensional area located on the front of the travel document or MRP Data
Page or, in the case of the TD1, the back of the travel document, containing
mandatory and optional data for machine reading using OCR methods; see
[ICAO_9303].
The MRZ-Password is a restricted-revealable secret that is derived from the
machine readable zone and may be used for both PACE and BAC.
Machine-verifiable
biometrics feature
A unique physical personal identification feature (e.g. an iris pattern, fingerprint
or facial characteristics) stored on a travel document in a form that can be read
and verified by machine; see [ICAO_9303].
Manufacturer Generic term for the IC Manufacturer producing integrated circuit and the travel
document Manufacturer completing the IC to the travel document. The
Manufacturer is the default user of the TOE during the manufacturing life-cycle
phase. The TOE itself does not distinguish between the IC Manufacturer and
travel document Manufacturer using this role Manufacturer.
PACE password A password needed for PACE authentication, e.g. CAN or MRZ.
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Term Definition
PACE Terminal (PCT)
A technical system verifying correspondence between the password stored in
the travel document and the related value presented to the terminal by the travel
document presenter.
PCT implements the terminal’s part of the PACE protocol and authenticates
itself to the ePass using a shared password (CAN or MRZ).
Passive authentication Security mechanism implementing (i) verification of the digital signature of the
Card/Chip or Document Security Object and (ii) comparing the hash values of
the read data fields with the hash values contained in the Card/Chip or
Document Security Object. See [ICAO_9303].
Passport (physical and
electronic)
An optically and electronically readable document in form of a paper/plastic
cover and an integrated smart card. The Passport is used in order to verify that
identity claimed by the Passport presenter is commensurate with the identity of
the Passport holder stored on/in the card.
Password Authenticated
Connection
Establishment (PACE)
A communication establishment protocol defined in [ICAO_TR_SAC]. The
PACE Protocol is a password authenticated Diffie-Hellman key agreement
protocol providing implicit password-based authentication of the communication
partners (e.g. smart card and the terminal connected): i.e. PACE provides a
verification, whether the communication partners share the same value of a
password π). Based on this authentication, PACE also provides a secure
communication, whereby confidentiality and authenticity of data transferred
within this communication channel are maintained.
Personalisation The process by which the Personalisation Data are stored in and
unambiguously, inseparably associated with the travel document.
Personalisation Agent
An organisation acting on behalf of the travel document Issuer to personalise
the travel document for the travel document holder by some or all of the
following activities:
(i)establishing the identity of the travel document holder for the biographic
data in the travel document,
(ii)enrolling the biometric reference data of the travel document holder,
(iii)writing a subset of these data on the physical travel document (optical
personalisation) and storing them in the travel document (electronic
personalisation) for the travel document holder as defined in [ICAO_9303],
(iv) writing the document details data,
(v) writing the initial TSF data,
(vi)signing the Document Security Object defined in [ICAO_9303] (in the
role of DS).
Please note that the role ‘Personalisation Agent’ may be distributed among
several institutions according to the operational policy of the travel document
Issuer.
Generating signature key pair(s) is not in the scope of the tasks of this role.
Personalisation Data A set of data incl. (i) individual-related data (biographic and biometric data,) of
the travel document holder, (ii) dedicated document details data and (iii)
dedicated initial TSF data (incl. the Card/Chip Security Object, if installed, and
the Document Security Object). Personalisation data are gathered and then
written into the non-volatile memory of the TOE by the Personalisation Agent in
the life cycle phase card issuing.
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Term Definition
Pre-personalisation Data Any data that is injected into the non-volatile memory of the TOE by the
Manufacturer for traceability of the non-personalised travel document and/or to
secure shipment within or between the life cycle phases manufacturing and
card issuing.
Pre-personalised travel
document’s chip
travel document’s chip equipped with a unique identifier and a unique
Authentication Key Pair of the chip.
Receiving State The Country to which the travel document holder is applying for entry; see
[ICAO_9303].
Reference data Data enrolled for a known identity and used by the verifier to check the
verification data provided by an entity to prove this identity in an authentication
attempt.
RF-terminal A device being able to establish communication with an RF-chip according to
ISO/IEC 14443
Rightful equipment
(rightful terminal or
rightful Card)
A technical device being expected and possessing a valid, certified key pair for
its authentication, whereby the validity of the related certificate is verifiable up
to the respective root CertA. A rightful terminal can be either BIS-PACE (see
Inspection System).
Secondary image A repeat image of the holder’s portrait reproduced elsewhere in the document
by whatever means; see [ICAO_9303].
Secure messaging in
combined mode
Secure messaging using encryption and message authentication code
according to ISO/IEC 7816-4
Skimming Imitation of a rightful terminal to read the travel document or parts of it via the
contactless/contact communication channel of the TOE without knowledge of
the printed MRZ and CAN dataPACE password.
Standard Inspection
Procedure
A specific order of authentication steps between an travel document and a
terminal as required by [ICAO_TR_SAC], namely (i) PACE and (ii) Passive
Authentication with SOD. SIP can generally be used by BIS-PACE and BIS-
BAC.
Supplemental Access
Control
A Technical Report which specifies PACE v2 as an access control mechanism
that is supplemental to Basic Access Control.
Terminal A Terminal is any technical system communicating with the TOE through a
contactless / contact interface.
TOE tracing data Technical information about the current and previous locations of the travel
document gathered by inconspicuous (for the travel document holder)
recognising the travel document
Travel document Official document issued by a state or organisation which is used by the holder
for international travel (e.g. passport, visa, official document of identity) and
which contains mandatory visual (eye readable) data and a separate mandatory
data summary, intended for global use, reflecting essential data elements
capable of being machine read; see [ICAO_9303] (there “Machine readable
travel document”).
Travel document
(electronic)
The contactless/contact smart card integrated into the plastic or paper, optical
readable cover and providing the following application: ePassport.
Travel document holder A person for whom the ePass Issuer has personalised the travel document.
Travel document Issuer
(issuing authority)
Organisation authorised to issue an electronic Passport to the travel document
holder
Travel document
presenter
A person presenting the travel document to a terminal and claiming the identity
of the travel document holder.
TSF data Data created by and for the TOE that might affect the operation of the TOE (CC
part 1 [CC_1]).
Unpersonalised travel
document
travel document material prepared to produce a personalised travel document
containing an initialised and pre-personalised travel document’s chip.
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Term Definition
User Data
All data (being not authentication data)
(i)stored in the context of the ePassport application of the travel document as
defined in [ICAO_9303] and
(ii)being allowed to be read out solely by an authenticated terminal acting as
Basic Inspection System with PACE (in the sense of [ICAO_TR_SAC]).
CC give the following generic definitions for user data:
Data created by and for the user that does not affect the operation of the TSF
(CC part 1 [CC_1]). Information stored in TOE resources that can be operated
upon by users in accordance with the SFRs and upon which the TSF places no
special meaning (CC part 2 [CC_2]).
Verification data Data provided by an entity in an authentication attempt to prove their identity to
the verifier. The verifier checks whether the verification data match the
reference data known for the claimed identity.
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9.2 Acronyms
Acronym Term
BAC Basic Access Control
BIS-BAC Basic Inspection System with BAC (equivalent to
Basic Inspection System as used in [PP_BAC])
BIS-PACE Basic Inspection System with PACE
CAN Card Access Number
CC Common Criteria
CertA Certification Authority
MRZ Machine readable zone
n.a. Not applicable
OSP Organisational security policy
PACE Password Authenticated Connection Establishment
PCD Proximity Coupling Device
PICC Proximity Integrated Circuit Chip
PP Protection Profile
RF Radio Frequency
SAC Supplemental Access Control
SAR Security assurance requirements
SFR Security functional requirement
SIP Standard Inspection Procedure, see
[ICAO_TR_SAC]
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE security functionality
TSP TOE Security Policy (defined by the current
document)
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10 LITERATURE
Common Criteria
[CC_1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 1: Introduction and
General Model; CCMB-2012-09-001, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017
[CC_2] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 2: Security Functional
Components; CCMB-2012-09-002, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017
[CC_3] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 3: Security Assurance
Requirements; CCMB-2012-09-003, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017
[CC_EM] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Evaluation
Methodology; CCMB-2012-09-004, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017
Protection Profiles
[PP_0002] PP conformant to Smartcard IC Platform Protection Profile, Version 1.0, July 2001;
registered and certified by Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI)
under the reference BSI-PP-0002-2001
Smartcard Integrated Circuit Platform Augmentations, Version 1.00, March 8th, 2002
[PP_IC] Security IC Platform Protection Profile with Augmented Packages, Version 1.0;
registered and certified by BSI (Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik)
under the reference BSI-PP-0084-2014
[PP_BAC] Machine readable travel documents with “ICAO Application”, Basic Access control –
BSI-PP-0055 v1.10 25th march 2009
[PP_EAC] Common Criteria Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel Document with ”ICAO
Application", Extended Access Control, BSI-PP-0056, Version 1.10, 25th March 2009
[PP_PACE] Common Criteria Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel Document using
Standard Inspection Procedure with PACE (PACE PP), BSI-CC-PP-0068-V2-2011-
MA-01, V1.01 22nd July 2014
[PP_EACwPACE] Common Criteria Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel Document with “ICAO
Application”, Extended Application Control with PACE (EAC PP), BSI-CC-PP-0056-V2-
2012-MA-02, Version 1.3.2, 5th December 2012
ANSSI
[JIL_SRCL] Joint Interpretation Library – Security requirements for post-delivery code loading –
Version 1.0, February 2016
IC
[IC_CERT] BSI-DSZ-CC-1110-V2-2019 – Infineon Security Controller IFX_CCI_000003h,
000005h, 000008h, 00000Ch, 000013h, 000014h, 000015h, 00001Ch, 00001Dh,
000021h, 00022h H13 including the products from the second production line and
optional software packages: Flash Loader, Asymmetric Crypto Library, Symmetric
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Cryptographic Library, Hardware Support Layer, Hash Crypto Library, Mifare
Compatible Software, and CIPURSETM
Crypto Library from Infineon Technologies AG,
18 June 2019
[IC_ST] Common Criteria Public Security Target – EAL6 augmented / EAL6+ -
IFX_CCI_000003h, IFX_CCI_000005h, IFX_CCI_000008h, IFX_CCI_00000Ch,
IFX_CCI_000013h, IFX_CCI_000014h, IFX_CCI_000015h, IFX_CCI_00001Ch,
IFX_CCI_00001Dh, IFX_CCI_000021h, IFX_CCI_000022h – H13 – Resistance to
attackers with HIGH attack potential – Including optional Software Libraries: Flash Loader
– Flash Loader – 3xACL – 4xHSL - 2xSCL – HCL – MCS - CCL – Revision 1.6, 2019-06-
05
[IC_PPM] Production and Personalization – 16-bit Security Controller
Rev. 3.4, 2019-01-22
ICAO
[ICAO_9303] ICAO Doc 9303, Machine Readable Travel Documents, Seventh Edition, 2015 –
Security Mechanisms for MRTDs
[ICAOT] INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION FACILITATION (FAL) DIVISION,
twelfth session (Cairo, Egypt, 22 March – 1 April 2004)
[ICAO_TR_SAC] International Civil Aviation Organization, ICAO MACHINE READABLE TRAVEL
DOCUMENTS, TECHNICAL REPORT, Supplemental Access Control for Machine
Readable Travel Documents, Version 1.1, April 2014
ISO
[ISO_9797_1] ISO/IEC 9797-1 Information technology – Security techniques – Message Authentication
codes (MACs) – part 1: Mechanisms using a block cipher, Second edition 2011-03-01
[ISO_15946] Information technology -- Security techniques -- Cryptographic techniques based on
elliptic curves
[ISO_9796_2] ISO/IEC 9796-2:2010 Information technology — Security techniques — Digital signature
schemes giving message recovery — Part 2: Integer factorization based mechanisms
IDEMIA
[ALC_KM] Key management for Flash code, I CRD13 2 CRD 512 03, January 2016
[ALC_SCT] ID division: sensitive code transfer, I/R&D/2/SQA 515 01, March 2010
[ALC_STM] Secure transfer of masks, I CRD13 2 CRD 507 04, January 2012
Other
[TR_03110] Technical Guideline Advanced Security Mechanisms for Machine Readable Travel
Documents – Extended Access Control (EAC), Version 1.11, TR-03110, Bundesamt für
Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI)
[TR_03111] BSI: Technical Guideline TR-03111: Elliptic Curve Cryptography, Version 2.0, 2012
[FIPS_180_2] FIPS 180-2, Federal Information Processing Standards Publication (FIPS PUB) 180-2,
Secure Hash Standard, August 2002
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[FIPS_46_3] FIPS 46-3, Federal Information Processing Standards Publication (FIPS PUB) 46-3,
Data Encryption Standard (DES), 1999 October 25
[FIPS_186_3] FIPS 186-3, Federal Information Processing Standards Publication (FIPS PUB) 186-3,
Digital Signature Standard (DSS), June 2009
[FIPS_197] FIPS 197, Federal Information Processing Standards Publication (FIPS PUB 197),
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)
[NIST_800_38B] NIST Special Publication 800-38B: 2005, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of
Operation: The CMAC Mode for Authentication, May 2005
[GPC_SPE_034] GlobalPlatform – Card Specification – Version 2.2.1 – Public Release, January 2011
[RGS2_B1] Référentiel Général de Sécurité version 2.0 – Annexe B1 – Mécanismes
cryptographiques – Règles et recommandations concernant le choix et lme
dimensionnement des mécanismes cryptographiques, Version 2.03 du 21 février 2014.
[IEEE] IEEE Std 1363a-2004 Standard Specification of Public-Key Cryptography
[ANSIX9.31] "Digital Signatures using Reversible Public Key Cryptography for the Financial Services
Industry (DSA)" - ANSI X9.31-1998, American Bankers Association