National Information Assurance Partnership
Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
Validation Report
for
Nessus Agent 8.0.0
Report Number: CCEVS-VR-VID11066-2020
Dated: 8 December 2020
Version: 1.0
National Institute of Standards and Technology
Information Technology Laboratory
100 Bureau Drive
Gaithersburg, MD 20899
National Security Agency
Information Assurance Directorate
9800 Savage Road STE 6940
Fort George G. Meade, MD 20755-6940
®
TM
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Acknowledgements
Validation Team
Jerome F. Myers, PhD
Marybeth Panock
The Aerospace Corporation
Common Criteria Testing Laboratory
Leidos Inc.
Columbia, MD
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Table of Contents
1 Executive Summary................................................................................................................... 1
2 Identification............................................................................................................................. 2
3 TOE Architecture....................................................................................................................... 4
4 Security Policy........................................................................................................................... 6
4.1 Timely Security Updates ...............................................................................................................6
4.2 Cryptographic Support..................................................................................................................6
4.3 User Data Protection.....................................................................................................................6
4.4 Identification and Authentication.................................................................................................6
4.5 Security Management...................................................................................................................6
4.6 Privacy...........................................................................................................................................6
4.7 Protection of the TSF ....................................................................................................................7
4.8 Trusted Path/Channels .................................................................................................................7
5 Assumptions.............................................................................................................................. 8
6 Clarification of Scope ................................................................................................................ 9
7 Documentation ....................................................................................................................... 10
8 IT Product Testing ................................................................................................................... 11
8.1 Developer Testing .......................................................................................................................11
8.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing .......................................................................................11
8.3 Test Configuration.......................................................................................................................11
9 TOE Evaluated Configuration.................................................................................................. 13
9.1 Evaluated Configuration .............................................................................................................13
9.2 Excluded Functionality................................................................................................................13
10 Results of the Evaluation ........................................................................................................ 14
10.1 Evaluation of the Security Target (ST) (ASE)...............................................................................14
10.2 Evaluation of the Development (ADV)........................................................................................14
10.3 Evaluation of the Guidance Documents (AGD)...........................................................................14
10.4 Evaluation of the Life Cycle Support Activities (ALC)..................................................................14
10.5 Evaluation of the Test Documentation and the Test Activity (ATE) ...........................................15
10.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity (AVA).....................................................................................15
10.7 Summary of Evaluation Results ..................................................................................................15
11 Validator Comments/Recommendations ............................................................................... 16
12 Security Target........................................................................................................................ 17
13 Abbreviations and Acronyms.................................................................................................. 18
14 Bibliography ............................................................................................................................ 19
List of Tables
Table 1: Evaluation Identifiers 2
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1 Executive Summary
This report documents the National Information Assurance Partnership (NIAP) assessment of the
evaluation of Tenable Nessus Agent 8.0.0 (the Target of Evaluation, or TOE). It presents the evaluation
results, their justifications, and the conformance results. This Validation Report (VR) is not an
endorsement of the TOE by any agency of the U.S. Government and no warranty of the TOE is either
expressed or implied.
The evaluation was performed by Leidos Common Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL) in Columbia,
Maryland, USA, and was completed in December 2020. The information in this report is largely derived
from the Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) and associated test report, all written by Leidos. The
evaluation determined that the TOE is:
 Common Criteria Part 2 Extended and Part 3 Conformant
and demonstrates exact conformance to:
 Protection Profile for Application Software, Version 1.3, 1 March 2019 [5]
 Functional Package for Transport Layer Security (TLS), Version 1.1, 12 February 2019 [6]
as clarified by all applicable Technical Decisions.
The TOE is Nessus Agent 8.0.0 supported on Red Hat Enterprise Linux (RHEL) 7 and Windows Server 2016.
The TOE identified in this Validation Report has been evaluated at a NIAP approved Common Criteria
Testing Laboratory (CCTL) using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev. 5)
for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev. 5). This Validation
Report applies only to the specific version of the TOE as evaluated. The evaluation has been conducted in
accordance with the provisions of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme and the
conclusions of the testing laboratory in the Evaluation Technical Report are consistent with the evidence
provided.
The validation team monitored the activities of the evaluation team, provided guidance on technical
issues and evaluation processes, and reviewed the individual work units documented in the Evaluation
Technical Report (ETR) and the Assurance Activities Report (AAR). The validation team found that the
evaluation showed that the product satisfies all the functional requirements and assurance requirements
stated in the Security Target (ST). The conclusions of the testing laboratory in the evaluation technical
report are consistent with the evidence produced. Therefore, the validation team concludes that the
testing laboratory's findings are accurate, the conclusions justified, and the conformance results are
correct.
The Leidos evaluation team determined that the product meets the Common Criteria requirements of the
Protection Profile for Application Software, Version 1.3, 1 March 2019 and the Functional Package for
Transport Layer Security (TLS), Version 1.1, 12 February 2019. The technical information included in this
report was obtained from the Nessus Agent 8.0.0 Security Target, Version 1.0, 4 December 2020 and
analysis performed by the validation team.
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2 Identification
The CCEVS is a joint National Security Agency (NSA) and National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST) effort to establish commercial facilities to perform trusted product evaluations. Under this
program, commercial testing laboratories called Common Criteria Testing Laboratories (CCTLs) use the
Common Criteria and Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM) to conduct security
evaluations, in accordance with National Voluntary Laboratory Assessment Program (NVLAP)
accreditation.
The NIAP Validation Body assigns Validators to monitor the CCTLs to ensure quality and consistency across
evaluations. Developers of IT products desiring a security evaluation contract with a CCTL and pay a fee
for their product’s evaluation. Upon successful completion of the evaluation, the product is added to
NIAP’s Product Compliant List (PCL).
Table 1 provides information needed to completely identify the product, including:
 The Target of Evaluation (TOE)—the fully qualified identifier of the product as evaluated
 The Security Target (ST)—the unique identification of the document describing the security
features, claims, and assurances of the product
 The conformance result of the evaluation
 The PP/PP-Modules to which the product is conformant
 The organizations and individuals participating in the evaluation.
Table 1: Evaluation Identifiers
Item Identifier
Evaluation Scheme United States NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
TOE Nessus Agent 8.0.0
Protection Profiles  Protection Profile for Application Software, Version 1.3, 1 March
2019
 Functional Package for Transport Layer Security (TLS), Version 1.1, 12
February 2019
Security Target Tenable Nessus Agent Security Target, Version 1.0, 4 December 2020
Evaluation Technical
Report
 Evaluation Technical Report for Tenable Nessus Agent 8.0.0, Part 1
(Leidos Non-Proprietary), Version 1.1, 4 December 2020
 Evaluation Technical Report for Tenable Nessus Agent 8.0.0, Part 2
(Leidos Proprietary), Version 1.1, 4 December 2020
CC Version Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 3.1, Release 5, April 2017
Conformance Result CC Part 2 Extended and CC Part 3 Conformant
Sponsor Tenable, Inc.
Developer Tenable, Inc.
Common Criteria Testing
Laboratory (CCTL)
Leidos
Common Criteria Testing Laboratory
6841 Benjamin Franklin Drive
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Item Identifier
Columbia, MD 21046
Validation Personnel Jerome F. Myers, PhD
Marybeth Panock
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3 TOE Architecture
Note: The following architectural description is based on the description presented in the Security Target.
Tenable Nessus Agent is a software product that is designed to be installed on an endpoint system to
facilitate local scanning of that system. Local scanning allows Nessus Agent to collect detailed information
about the system’s hardware, software, and configuration, which can be used to determine compliance
with organizational security policies and whether potential exploitable vulnerabilities are present on that
system.
Nessus Agent is deployed and configured by an environmental instance of Nessus Manager, which also
collects scan results from Nessus Agent for aggregation and analysis. Nessus Manager in turn will transmit
this data to an environmental instance of Tenable.sc (SecurityCenter), where it can be combined with
network traffic and system log data to provide a comprehensive window into the security posture of an
organization.
The TOE consists of the Nessus Agent application, which is a C application. The TOE has both Linux and
Windows platform versions. The following figure depicts a sample deployment of the TOE with other
Tenable applications in its operational environment.
Figure 1 – Example Deployment
SecurityCenter
Nessus Manager
Nessus Network
Monitor
Log
Configuration
Engine
Remote Admin
Remote Log
Sources
TCP/8835 (HTTPS)
Network Assets
Nessus Agent
Monitored Client
TOE Component
Environmental Component
TSF Interface
Non-TSF Interface
TCP/443 (HTTPS)
TCP/8834 (HTTPS)
TCP/8834 (HTTPS)
TCP/8835 (HTTPS)
TCP/8836 (HTTPS)
TCP/1243 (HTTPS)
TCP/8834 (HTTPS)
TCP/22 (SSH)
various
various
The TOE has the following system requirements for its host platform:
 1x dual-core CPU (any dual-core CPU’s clock speed is sufficient)
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 under 1 GB RAM
 under 1 GB disk storage
 15-50 IOPS disk speed
These system requirements reflect the lightest usage scenarios for the TOE. Additional factors such as
network size and storage retention requirements will affect the system requirements for a particular
deployment. Refer to the relevant Guidance Section (as referenced in Section 7 Documentation) for the
specific system requirements that apply to a given deployment.
The following network port must be open for the TOE to function, but the specific port is configurable if
the default port cannot be used:
 TCP/8834 (for communications with Nessus Manager)
The TOE’s operational environment includes the following:
 Other Tenable components (an instance of Nessus Manager – Tenable.sc, Nessus Network
Monitor, and Log Correlation Engine are expected to be present in the TOE’s operational
environment because they all contribute to the same overall capability, but the TOE does not
interact with these applications directly).
 Platform (hardware and software) on which the TOE is hosted.
o The TOE is capable of running on a general-purpose Windows or Linux operating system
on standard consumer-grade hardware on either a physical or virtual machine. For the
evaluated configuration, the TOE was tested on virtualized instances of Windows Server
2016 and RHEL 7, each running on VMware ESXi 6.5 on a system using an AMD Ryzen
Threadripper 1950X processor with the Zen microarchitecture.
 Full disk encryption is required for the TOE platform to ensure adequate data-at-rest protection.
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4 Security Policy
The TOE enforces the following security policies as described in the ST.
Note: Much of the description of the security policy has been derived from the ST and the Final ETR.
4.1 Timely Security Updates
The TOE developer has internal mechanisms for receiving reports of security flaws, tracking product
vulnerabilities, and distributing software updates to customers in a timely manner.
4.2 Cryptographic Support
The TOE implements cryptography to protect data in transit. The TOE does not store credential data on
the local system so no separate data at rest protection mechanism is implemented.
For data in transit, the TOE implements TLS/HTTPS as a client to communicate with an instance of Nessus
Manager in the operational environment. The TOE’s TLS client does not support mutual authentication.
The TOE implements all cryptography used for this function using its own implementations of OpenSSL
with NIST-approved algorithms. The TOE’s DRBG is seeded using entropy from the underlying OS platform.
4.3 User Data Protection
The TOE is compatible with the use of platform full disk encryption to protect sensitive data at rest.
The TOE relies on the network connectivity and system log capabilities of its host OS platform. The TOE
supports application-initiated uses of the network. The TOE also access various system resources as part
of conducting system scans. Specifically, the TOE supports local scanning of the system that it is installed
on.
4.4 Identification and Authentication
The TOE supports X.509 certificate validation as part of establishing TLS and HTTPS connections. The TOE
supports various certificate validity checking methods and can also check certificate revocation status
using OCSP. If the validity status of a certificate cannot be determined, the certificate will be accepted. All
other cases where a certificate is found to be invalid will result in rejection without an administrative
override.
4.5 Security Management
Both the TOE binary components themselves and the configuration settings they use are stored in
locations recommended by the platform vendors.
The TOE does not include a direct user interface to manage its functionality. Security-relevant
configuration of the TOE is initiated from the Nessus Manager application in the TOE’s operational
environment. This configuration relates to the circumstances under which the TOE will transmit data
about the local system’s hardware, software, and configuration information (i.e., scan results) back to its
operational environment.
4.6 Privacy
The TOE does not handle Personally Identifiable Information (PII) of any individuals.
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4.7 Protection of the TSF
The TOE enforces various mechanisms to prevent itself from being used as an attack vector to its host OS
platform. Each TOE platform version (Windows and Linux) implements address space layout
randomization (ASLR), does not allocate any memory with both write and execute permissions, does not
write user-modifiable files to directories that contain executable files, is compiled using stack overflow
protection, and is compatible with the security features of its host OS platform.
Each TOE platform version contains libraries and invokes system APIs that are well-known and explicitly
identified.
The TOE has a mechanism to determine its current software version. Software updates to the TOE can be
acquired by leveraging its OS platform or through its connection with the environmental Nessus Manager
application. The format of the software update is dependent on the TOE platform version. All updates are
digitally signed to guarantee their authenticity and integrity.
4.8 Trusted Path/Channels
The TOE encrypts sensitive data in transit between itself and its operational environment using TLS and
HTTPS.
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5 Assumptions
The ST references the PP to which it claims conformance for assumptions about the use of the TOE. Those
assumptions, drawn from the claimed PP, are as follows:
 The TOE relies upon a trustworthy computing platform with a reliable time clock for its execution.
This includes the underlying platform and whatever runtime environment it provides to the TOE.
 The user of the application software is not willfully negligent or hostile and uses the software in
compliance with the applied enterprise security policy.
 The administrator of the application software is not careless, willfully negligent or hostile, and
administers the software in compliance with the applied enterprise security policy.
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6 Clarification of Scope
All evaluations (and all products) have limitations, as well as potential misconceptions that need clarifying.
This text covers some of the more important limitations and clarifications of this evaluation. Note that:
 As with any evaluation, this evaluation only shows that the evaluated configuration meets the
security claims made, with a certain level of assurance (the evaluation activities specified in
Protection Profile for Application Software, Version 1.3, 1 March 2019 [5] and in Functional
Package for Transport Layer Security (TLS), Version 1.1, 12 February 2019 [6], and performed by
the evaluation team).
 Consistent with the expectations of the Protection Profile, this evaluation did not specifically
search for, nor seriously attempt to counter, vulnerabilities that were not “obvious” or
vulnerabilities to objectives not claimed in the ST. The CEM defines an “obvious” vulnerability as
one that is easily exploited with a minimum of understanding of the TOE, technical sophistication
and resources.
 The evaluation of security functionality of the product was limited to the functionality specified
in the claimed PPs. Any additional security related functional capabilities included in the product
were not covered by this evaluation. In particular, the functionality listed in Section 9.2 of this
document is not covered.
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7 Documentation
Tenable offers guidance documents describing the installation process for the TOE as well as guidance for
subsequent administration and use of the applicable security features. The guidance documentation
examined during the evaluation and delivered with the TOE model is as follows:
 Nessus Agent 8.0.x User Guide, Last Updated: October 29, 2020.
To use the product in the evaluated configuration, the product must be configured as specified in the sub-
section “Configure Nessus Agent for NIAP Compliance” found within this guide.
The documentation listed above is the only documentation that should be trusted to install, administer,
or use the TOE in its evaluated configuration. Any additional customer documentation provided with the
product, or that which may be available online, was not included in the scope of the evaluation and
therefore should not be relied upon to configure or operate the device as evaluated. Consumers are
encouraged to download the evaluated administrative guidance documentation from the NIAP website.
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8 IT Product Testing
This section describes the testing efforts of the developer and the evaluation team. The information is
derived from the Evaluation Technical Report for Tenable Nessus Agent, Part 2 (Leidos Proprietary),
Version 1.1, 4 December 2020 [ETR Prop-P2] and the test report, Tenable Nessus Agent 8.0.0 Common
Criteria Test Report and Procedures, Version 1.1, 4 December 2020 [12], which are listed in the
bibliography section 14 of this document. A non-proprietary description of the tests performed, and their
results is provided in the Assurance Activities Report for Nessus Agent 8.0.0, Version 1.1, 4 December 2020
[11].
8.1 Developer Testing
No evidence of developer testing is required in the Assurance Activities for this product.
8.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing
The purpose of the testing activity was to confirm the TOE behaves in accordance with the TOE security
functional requirements as specified in the ST for a product that claims conformance to Protection Profile
for Application Software ([5]) and Functional Package for Transport Layer Security (TLS) ([6]).
The evaluation team devised a Test Plan based on the Testing Assurance Activities specified in Protection
Profile for Application Software and Functional Package for Transport Layer Security (TLS). The Test Plan
described how each test activity was to be instantiated within the TOE test environment. The evaluation
team executed the tests specified in the Test Plan and documented the results in the team test report
listed above.
Independent testing took place at Leidos CCTL facilities in Columbia, Maryland. Testing occurred from
February 3, 2020 to October 23, 2020; testing was completed in October 2020.
The evaluators received the TOE in the form that customers would receive it, installed and configured the
TOE in accordance with the vendor-provided guidance, and exercised the Team Test Plan on equipment
configured in the testing laboratory. The Independent Testing activity is documented in the Assurance
Activities Report (AAR), which is publicly available, and is not duplicated here. A description of the test
configurations and the test tools may be found in Section 2.8 of that report.
Given the complete set of test results from the test procedures exercised by the evaluators, the testing
requirements for Protection Profile for Application Software and Functional Package for Transport Layer
Security (TLS) were fulfilled.
8.3 Test Configuration
The evaluation team established a test configuration comprising:
 TOE components:
o Tenable Nessus Agent 8.0.0, running on Red Hat Enterprise Linux (RHEL) 7.7. RHEL itself
was running on ESXi 6.5 on AMD Ryzen Threadripper 1950X (Zen)
o Tenable Nessus Agent 8.0.0, running on Windows Server 2016 Standard. Windows
Server itself was running on ESXi 6.5 on AMD Ryzen Threadripper 1950X (Zen)
 Operational and test environment components:
o Tenable.sc on Linux RHEL 7.7
o Tenable Nessus Manager on Linux RHEL 7.7
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o Tenable Nessus Manager on Windows Server 2016 Standard
o Tenable Nessus Network Monitor running on Windows Server 2016 Standard
o Tenable Nessus Network Monitor running on RHEL 7.7
o Tenable Log Correlation Engine on RHEL 7.7
o Linux TLS Test Server.
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9 TOE Evaluated Configuration
9.1 Evaluated Configuration
The TOE consists of the Tenable Nessus Agent 8.0.0 application, which is a C application. The TOE has both
Linux and Windows platform versions.
The TOE is evaluated on Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7 and Windows Server 2016
The TOE has the following system requirements for its host platform:
 1x dual-core CPU (any dual-core CPU’s clock speed is sufficient)
 under 1 GB RAM
 under 1 GB disk storage
 15-50 IOPS disk speed
The TOE requires the following in its operational environment:
 Other Tenable components (an instance of Nessus Manager – Tenable.sc, Nessus Network
Monitor, and Log Correlation Engine are expected to be present in the TOE’s operational
environment because they all contribute to the same overall capability but the TOE does not
interact with these applications directly).
 Platform (hardware and software) on which the TOE is hosted.
o In the evaluated configuration, RHEL 7 and Windows Server 2016 are the supported OS
platforms.
 Full disk encryption is required for the TOE platform to ensure adequate data-at-rest protection.
9.2 Excluded Functionality
The TOE’s scanning and data collection capabilities are outside the scope of the TOE (aside from the
trusted channel used to transmit the collected data), as is any other product behavior that is not described
in the App PP or TLS Package. The content and execution of plugins is similarly excluded from the TOE,
although they are discussed in the context of network communications because the TSF must use platform
network resources to acquire them.
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10 Results of the Evaluation
The results of the evaluation of the TOE against its target assurance requirements are generally described
in this section and are presented in detail in the proprietary Evaluation Technical Report for Tenable
Nessus Agent Part 2 ([11]). The reader of this VR can assume that all assurance activities and work units
received passing verdicts.
A verdict for an assurance component is determined by the resulting verdicts assigned to the
corresponding evaluator action elements. The evaluation was conducted based upon CC version 3.1,
revision 5 ([1], [2], [3]) and CEM version 3.1, revision 5 ([4]), and the specific evaluation activities specified
in Protection Profile for Application Software, Version 1.3, 1 March 2019 ([5]) and Functional Package for
Transport Layer Security (TLS), Version 1.1, 12 February 2019 ([6]). The evaluation determined the TOE
satisfies the conformance claims made in the Tenable Nessus Agent 8.0.0 Security Target, of Part 2
extended and Part 3 extended. The TOE satisfies the requirements specified in:
 Protection Profile for Application Software, Version 1.3, 1 March 2019 ([5])
 Functional Package for Transport Layer Security (TLS), Version 1.1, 12 February 2019 ([6]).
The Validators reviewed all the work of the evaluation team and agreed with their practices and findings.
10.1 Evaluation of the Security Target (ST) (ASE)
The evaluation team performed each TSS assurance activity and ASE CEM work unit. The ST evaluation
ensured the ST contains an ST introduction, TOE overview, TOE description, security problem definition in
terms of threats, policies and assumptions, description of security objectives for the operational
environment, a statement of security requirements claimed to be met by the product that are consistent
with the claimed Protection Profile, and security function descriptions that satisfy the requirements.
10.2 Evaluation of the Development (ADV)
The evaluation team performed each ADV assurance activity and applied each ADV_FSP.1 CEM work unit.
The evaluation team assessed the evaluation evidence and found it adequate to meet the requirements
specified in the claimed Protection Profile for design evidence. The ADV evidence consists of the TSS
descriptions provided in the ST and product guidance documentation providing descriptions of the TOE
external interfaces.
10.3 Evaluation of the Guidance Documents (AGD)
The evaluation team performed each guidance assurance activity and applied each AGD work unit. The
evaluation team determined the adequacy of the operational user guidance in describing how to operate
the TOE in accordance with the descriptions in the ST. The evaluation team followed the guidance in the
TOE preparative procedures to test the installation and configuration procedures to ensure the
procedures result in the evaluated configuration. The guidance documentation was assessed during the
design and testing phases of the evaluation to ensure it was complete.
10.4 Evaluation of the Life Cycle Support Activities (ALC)
The evaluation team performed each ALC assurance activity and applied each ALC_CMC.1 and ALC_CMS.1
CEM work unit, to the extent possible given the evaluation evidence required by the claimed Protection
Profiles. The evaluation team ensured the TOE is labeled with a unique identifier consistent with the TOE
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identification in the evaluation evidence, and that the ST describes how timely security updates are made
to the TOE.
10.5 Evaluation of the Test Documentation and the Test Activity (ATE)
The evaluation team performed each test activity and applied each ATE_FUN.1 CEM work unit. The
evaluation team ran the set of tests specified by the claimed PP and recorded the results in the Test
Report, summarized in the AAR.
10.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity (AVA)
The evaluation team performed each AVA assurance activity and applied each AVA_VAN.1 CEM work unit.
The evaluation team performed a vulnerability analysis following the processes described in the claimed
PP. This comprised performance of a virus scan on the installation packages for the TOE and a search of
public vulnerability databases. The virus scans did not detect any virus or malware in any of the TOE
installation packages.
Searches of public vulnerability repositories were performed on 4 December 2020.
The evaluation team searched the following public vulnerability repositories.
 National Vulnerability Database (http://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/search)
 SecurityFocus Database (https://www.securityfocus.com/vulnerabilities)
 US-CERT Vulnerability Notes Database (https://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/).
The evaluation team used the following search terms in the searches of these repositories:
 “tenable”
 “nessus agent”
 “tls v1.2”
 “openssl 1.1.1d”
The results of these searches did not identify any vulnerabilities that are applicable to the TOE. The
conclusion drawn from the vulnerability analysis is that no residual vulnerabilities exist that are
exploitable by attackers with Basic Attack Potential as defined by the Certification Body in accordance
with the guidance in the CEM.
10.7 Summary of Evaluation Results
The evaluation team’s assessment of the evaluation evidence demonstrates that the claims in the ST are
met, sufficient to satisfy the assurance activities specified in the claimed Protection Profiles. Additionally,
the evaluation team’s testing also demonstrated the accuracy of the claims in the ST.
The validation team’s assessment of the evidence provided by the evaluation team is that it demonstrates
that the evaluation team followed the procedures defined in the CEM, and correctly verified that the
product meets the claims in the ST.
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11 Validator Comments/Recommendations
The validators suggest that the consumer pay particular attention to the evaluated configuration of the
TOE. As stated in the Clarification of Scope, the evaluated functionality is scoped exclusively to the security
functional requirements specified in the Security Target, and the only evaluated functionality was that
which was described by the SFRs claimed in the Security Target.
Note that there is not a separate Common Criteria Configuration Guide. The information needed to use
the product in the evaluated configuration, it must be configured as specified in the sub-section
“Configure Tenable Nessus Agent 8.0.x for NIAP Compliance” found within Tenable Nessus Agent 8.0.x
User Guide.
All other functionality provided, to include software, firmware, or hardware that was not part of the
evaluated configuration needs to be assessed separately and no further conclusions can be drawn about
their effectiveness. The excluded functionality is specified in section 9.2 of this report.
All other items and scope issues have been sufficiently addressed elsewhere in this document.
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12 Security Target
The ST for this product’s evaluation is Nessus Agent 8.0.0 Security Target, Version 1.0, 4 December 2020
[7].
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13 Abbreviations and Acronyms
This section identifies abbreviations and acronyms used in this document.
API Application Programming Interface
CC Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation
CCTL Common Criteria Testing Laboratory
CEM Common Evaluation Methodology
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
IT Information Technology
OCSP Online Certificate Status Protocol
PCL Product Compliant List
PII Personally Identifiable Information
RHEL Red Hat Enterprise Linux
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SFR Security Functional Requirement
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functions
TSS TOE Summary Specification
VR Validation Report
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14 Bibliography
The validation team used the following documents to produce this VR:
[1] Common Criteria Project Sponsoring Organizations. Common Criteria for Information Technology
Security Evaluation: Part 1: Introduction and general model, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017.
[2] Common Criteria Project Sponsoring Organizations. Common Criteria for Information Technology
Security Evaluation: Part 2: Security functional components, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017.
[3] Common Criteria Project Sponsoring Organizations. Common Criteria for Information Technology
Security Evaluation: Part 3: Security assurance requirements, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017.
[4] Common Criteria Project Sponsoring Organizations. Common Evaluation Methodology for
Information Technology Security, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017.
[5] Protection Profile for Application Software, Version 1.3, 1 March 2019.
[6] Functional Package for Transport Layer Security (TLS), Version 1.1, 12 February 2019.
[7] Nessus Agent 8.0.0 Security Target, Version 1.0, 4 December 2020. [ST]
[8] Tenable Nessus Agent 8.0.x User Guide, Last Updated: October 29, 2020. [User Guide]
[9] Evaluation Technical Report for Tenable Nessus Agent 8.0.0, Part 1 (Leidos Non-Proprietary),
Version 1.1, 4 December 2020. [ETR P1]
[10] Evaluation Technical Report for Tenable Nessus Agent 8.0.0, Part 2 (Leidos Proprietary), Version
1.1, 4 December 2020. [ETR P2]
[11] Assurance Activities Report for Nessus Agent 8.0.0, Version 1.1, 4 December 2020. [AAR]
[12] Tenable Nessus Agent 8.0.0 Common Criteria Test Report and Procedures, Version 1.1, 4
December 2020. [DTR]
[13] Tenable Nessus Agent Vulnerability Assessment, Version 1.1, 4 December 2020 [AVA]