BSI-DSZ-CC-1033-2019
for
MTCOS Pro 2.5 EAC with PACE /
SLE78CLFX400VPHM/BPHM/7PHM (M7892)
from
MaskTech International GmbH
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0 CC-Zert-327 V5.23
BSI-DSZ-CC-1033-2019 (*)
Security IC with MRTD EAC/PACE Application
MTCOS Pro 2.5 EAC with PACE / SLE78CLFX400VPHM/BPHM/7PHM
(M7892)
from MaskTech International GmbH
PP Conformance: Machine Readable Travel Document with "ICAO
Application", Extended Access Control with PACE
(EAC PP), Version 1.3.2, 5 December 2012, BSI-
CC-PP-0056-V2-2012-MA-02
Functionality: PP conformant plus product specific extensions
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 5 augmented by ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5
The IT Product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation
facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1
extended by Scheme Interpretations, by advice of the Certification Body for components
beyond EAL 5 and CC Supporting Documents as listed in the Certification Report for
conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1. CC and
CEM are also published as ISO/IEC 15408 and ISO/IEC 18045.
(*) This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its
evaluated configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report and
Notification. For details on the validity see Certification Report part A chapter 5.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification
scheme of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions
of the evaluation facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the
evidence adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT Product by the Federal Office for
Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT Product by the Federal Office for Information
Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is
either expressed or implied.
Bonn, 23 July 2019
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Bernd Kowalski L.S.
Head of Division
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
SOGIS
Recognition Agreement
Common Criteria
Recognition Arrangement
recognition for components
up to EAL 2 only
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1033-2019
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1033-2019 Certification Report
Contents
A. Certification.......................................................................................................................6
1. Preliminary Remarks.....................................................................................................6
2. Specifications of the Certification Procedure................................................................6
3. Recognition Agreements...............................................................................................7
4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification.................................................................8
5. Validity of the Certification Result..................................................................................8
6. Publication.....................................................................................................................9
B. Certification Results........................................................................................................10
1. Executive Summary.....................................................................................................11
2. Identification of the TOE..............................................................................................12
3. Security Policy.............................................................................................................14
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope......................................................................14
5. Architectural Information..............................................................................................15
6. Documentation............................................................................................................16
7. IT Product Testing........................................................................................................16
8. Evaluated Configuration..............................................................................................17
9. Results of the Evaluation.............................................................................................19
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE......................................................20
11. Security Target...........................................................................................................21
12. Regulation specific aspects (eIDAS, QES)...............................................................21
13. Definitions..................................................................................................................21
14. Bibliography...............................................................................................................23
C. Excerpts from the Criteria...............................................................................................25
D. Annexes..........................................................................................................................26
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1033-2019
A. Certification
1. Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of
issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor,
hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according
to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by
BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report
contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed
Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of
the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and
instructions for the user.
2. Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the
following:
● Act on the Federal Office for Information Security2
● BSI Certification and Approval Ordinance3
● BSI Schedule of Costs4
● Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the
Interior)
● DIN EN ISO/IEC 17065 standard
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-
Produkte) [3]
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility, its
approval and licencing process (CC-Stellen) [3]
1
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
2
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
3
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of Security Certificates and approval by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungs- und -Anerkennungsverordnung - BSIZertV) of 17 December
2014, Bundesgesetzblatt 2014, part I, no. 61, p. 2231
4
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
(BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1033-2019 Certification Report
● Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.15
[1] also published as
ISO/IEC 15408.
● Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 [2] also published
as ISO/IEC 18045
● BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]
3. Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or
CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
3.1. European Recognition of CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in
April 2010. It defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition
level and, in addition, at higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain SOGIS
Technical Domains only.
The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels
EAL 1 to EAL 4. For "Smartcards and similar devices" a SOGIS Technical Domain is in
place. For "HW Devices with Security Boxes" a SOGIS Technical Domains is in place, too.
In addition, certificates issued for Protection Profiles based on Common Criteria are part of
the recognition agreement.
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes, details on
recognition, and the history of the agreement can be seen on the website at
https://www.sogisportal.eu.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the
terms of this agreement by the related bodies of the signatory nations. A disclaimer
beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of recognition.
This certificate is recognized under SOGIS-MRA for all assurance components selected.
3.2. International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)
The international arrangement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on the CC
(Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement, CCRA-2014) has been ratified on 08
September 2014. It covers CC certificates based on collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP)
(exact use), CC certificates based on assurance components up to and including EAL 2 or
the assurance family Flaw Remediation (ALC_FLR) and CC certificates for Protection
Profiles and for collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP).
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes can be seen on
the website: https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates
that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the related bodies
of the signatory nations. A disclaimer beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of
recognition.
5
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 12 February 2007 in the Bundesanzeiger dated
23 February 2007, p. 3730
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1033-2019
This certificate is recognized according to the rules of CCRA-2014, i. e. up to and including
CC part 3 EAL 2 components.
4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a
uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product MTCOS Pro 2.5 EAC with PACE / SLE78CLFX400VPHM/BPHM/7PHM
(M7892) has undergone the certification procedure at BSI.
The evaluation of the product MTCOS Pro 2.5 EAC with PACE /
SLE78CLFX400VPHM/BPHM/7PHM (M7892) was conducted by SRC Security Research
& Consulting GmbH. The evaluation was completed on 12 July 2019. SRC Security
Research & Consulting GmbH is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)6
recognised by the
certification body of BSI.
For this certification procedure the applicant is: MaskTech International GmbH.
The product was developed by: MaskTech International GmbH.
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this
Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
5. Validity of the Certification Result
This Certification Report applies only to the version of the product as indicated. The
confirmed assurance package is valid on the condition that
● all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the
following report, are observed,
● the product is operated in the environment described, as specified in the following report
and in the Security Target.
For the meaning of the assurance components and assurance levels please refer to CC
itself. Detailed references are listed in part C of this report.
The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target
at the date of certification. As attack methods evolve over time, the resistance of the
certified version of the product against new attack methods needs to be re-assessed.
Therefore, the sponsor should apply for the certified product being monitored within the
assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme (e.g. by a re-assessment or
re-certification). Specifically, if results of the certification are used in subsequent evaluation
and certification procedures, in a system integration process or if a user's risk
management needs regularly updated results, it is recommended to perform a re-
assessment on a regular e.g. annual basis.
In order to avoid an indefinite usage of the certificate when evolved attack methods would
require a re-assessment of the products resistance to state of the art attack methods, the
maximum validity of the certificate has been limited. The certificate issued on 23 July 2019
is valid until 22 July 2024. Validity can be re-newed by re-certification.
The owner of the certificate is obliged:
6
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1033-2019 Certification Report
1. when advertising the certificate or the fact of the product's certification, to refer to
the Certification Report as well as to provide the Certification Report, the Security
Target and user guidance documentation mentioned herein to any customer of the
product for the application and usage of the certified product,
2. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately about vulnerabilities of the
product that have been identified by the developer or any third party after issuance
of the certificate,
3. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately in the case that security relevant
changes in the evaluated life cycle, e.g. related to development and production sites
or processes, occur, or the confidentiality of documentation and information related
to the Target of Evaluation (TOE) or resulting from the evaluation and certification
procedure where the certification of the product has assumed this confidentiality
being maintained, is not given any longer. In particular, prior to the dissemination of
confidential documentation and information related to the TOE or resulting from the
evaluation and certification procedure that do not belong to the deliverables
according to the Certification Report part B, or for those where no dissemination
rules have been agreed on, to third parties, the Certification Body at BSI has to be
informed.
In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to
the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e.
re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural
requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.
6. Publication
The product MTCOS Pro 2.5 EAC with PACE / SLE78CLFX400VPHM/BPHM/7PHM
(M7892) has been included in the BSI list of certified products, which is published regularly
(see also Internet: https://www.bsi.bund.de and [5]). Further information can be obtained
from BSI-Infoline +49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer7
of the
product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet
address stated above.
7
MaskTech International GmbH
Nordostpark 45
90411 Nürnberg
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1033-2019
B. Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
● the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
● the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
● complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1033-2019 Certification Report
1. Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the product MTCOS Pro 2.5 EAC with PACE /
SLE78CLFX400VPHM/BPHM/7PHM (M7892) provided by MaskTech International GmbH.
The TOE is an electronic travel document representing a contactless/contact smart card
programmed according to ICAO Technical Report “Supplemental Access Control” [17] and
additionally providing the Extended Access Control according to the ICAO Doc 9303 [18]
and the Technical Guideline TR-03110-1 [19], respectively. The communication between
terminal and chip is protected by Password Authenticated Connection Establishment
(PACE) according to the Protection Profile “Machine Readable Travel Document using
Standard Inspection Procedure with PACE (PACE PP), BSI-CC-PP-0068-V2” [10].
Additionally, Chip Authentication Mapping as an option of PACE (PACE-CAM) and Active
Authentication according to the ICAO Doc 9303 [18] is provided.
The main security features of the TOE are:
● PACE function (mutual authentication and Secure Messaging);
● Active Authentication support function (prevention of copying the IC chip);
● Extended Access Control (chip authentication and terminal authentication protocol);
● Write protection function (protection against writing data after issuing a passport);
● Protection function in transport (protection against attacks during transport before
issuing the TOE); and
● Tamper resistance (protection against confidential information leak due to physical
attacks).
The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is based on the following certified
Protection Profile:
● Machine Readable Travel Document with "ICAO Application", Extended Access Control
with PACE (EAC PP), Version 1.3.2, 5 December 2012, BSI-CC-PP-0056-V2-2012-MA-
02 [9].
The Protection Profile above is strict conformant to the following Protection Profile. In
result, the TOE is also conformant to this PP:
● Machine Readable Travel Document using Standard Inspection Procedure with PACE
(PACE PP), Version 1.0, 2 November 2011, BSI-CC-PP-0068-V2-2011 [10].
Please note that in consistency to the claimed protection profile BSI-CC-PP-0056-V2-
2012-MA-02 the security mechanisms Password Authenticated Connection Establishment,
Extended Access Control and Active Authentication are in the focus of this evaluation
process. The further security mechanism Basic Access Control is subject of the separate
evaluation process BSI-DSZ-CC-1034-2019 [20].
The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details).
The TOE meets the assurance requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 5
augmented by ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the
Security Target [6] and [7], chapter 6.1. They are selected from Common Criteria Part 2
and some of them are newly defined. Thus the TOE is CC Part 2 extended.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1033-2019
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functionality:
TOE Security Functionality Addressed issue
F.IC_CL Security functions of the hardware (IC) as well as of the cryptographic
library
F.Access_Control Regulates all access by external entities to operations of the TOE which
are only executed after this TSF allowed access
F.Identification_Authentication Provides identification/authentication of user roles
F.Management Provides management and administrative functionalities
F.Crypto Provides a high-level interface to cryptographic functions
F.Verification TOE internal functions to ensure correct operation
Table 1: TOE Security Functionalities
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6] and [7], chapter 7.
The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6] and [7],
chapter 3.1. Based on these assets the TOE Security Problem is defined in terms of
Assumptions, Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security
Target [6] and [7], chapter 3.
This certification covers the configurations of the TOE as outlined in chapter 8 of this
document.
The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating
for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and
decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate
and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification
Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2. Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
MTCOS Pro 2.5 EAC with PACE / SLE78CLFX400VPHM/BPHM/7PHM (M7892)
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
No Type Identifier Release Form of
Delivery
1 HW/
SW
MTCOS Pro 2.5 EAC with PACE / SLE78CLFX400VPHM/BPHM/7PHM (M7892)
An IC module including the necessary basic software (OS) and ePassport application (file
system)
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1033-2019 Certification Report
No Type Identifier Release Form of
Delivery
1. Hardware Platform
SLE78CLFX400VPHM/BPHM/7PHM (M7892)
secure dual-interface controller of Infineon
Technologies AG (BSI-DSZ-CC-0891-V3 [15]).
MTCOS Pro 2.5 EAC with PACE /
SLE78CLFX400VPHM/BPHM/7PHM (M7892)
uses three derivatives of M7892 with the sales
code:
• SLE78CLFX400VPHM
• SLE78CLFX400BPHM and
• SLE78CLFX4007PHM
M7892 Design Steps
D11 and G12
FW: 78.015.18.2
Crypto libraries:
RSA2048/4096
v2.07.003, EC v2.07.003
SW is
implemented in
NVM memory;
chip is
initialised and
tested before
delivery to
Personalisation
Agent.
Delivery type:
The OS and
application
software
flashed on the
IC Platform
2. TOE Embedded Software
IC Embedded Software (the operating system
MTCOS Pro 2.5, implemented in NVM of the IC)
MTCOS Pro Version 2.5,
Build date 2018-11-22
Short ROM Codes:
MTE1:
SLE78CLFX400VPHM
without OS
MT10T12:
SLE78CLFX400VPHM
incl. MTCOS
MT10T12B:
SLE78CLFX400BPHM
incl. MTCOS
MT10T12S:
SLE78CLFX4007PHM
incl. MTCOS
3. TOE Embedded Applications
IC Embedded Software / Part Application
Software (containing the MRTD Application
implemented in the NVM of the IC with the file
system)
MTCOS Pro 2.5 EAC
with PACE
2 DOC 1. User Guidance MTCOS Pro 2.5 EAC with
PACE / SLE78CLFX400VPHM/BPHM/7PHM
(M7892) Machine Readable Travel Document with
“ICAO Application”, Extended Access Control with
PACE [12]
Version 1.3, 03.07.2019 Password
protected
Secure
Webserver
2. User Guidance for Initialization and Pre-
personalization MTCOS Pro 2.5 EAC with PACE /
SLE78CLFX400VPHM/BPHM/7PHM (M7892)
Supporting Document – Initialization/Pre-
personalization [13]
Version 1.3, 03.07.2019
3. MTCOS Manual - MTCOS 2.5 on IFX
SLE78C(L)FX40xxPH(M) [14]
Version 1.2, 10.01.2019
Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE
For TOEs distributed by Infineon Technologies AG the Short ROM Codes are generated on
order.
Delivery of sensitive electronic data is performed PGP encrypted via email. The guidance
documentation can be obtained by password-protected download from the MaskTech
International GmbH website (http://www.masktech.com).
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1033-2019
Flash image production: The Developer transfers the flash image (HEX file) to the secure
webserver of the Manufacturer via an SSL-protected web access.
TOE for Personalisation: Chip card hardware is securely shipped to the Personalisation
Agent.
For the customer to be able to check the correct delivery visually, a delivery note together
with the hardware stating the product type and certification reference number is provided.
However, the most important check is done implicitly by means of the personalisation
keys. The Personalisation Agent must perform a MUTUAL AUTHENTICATE command to
authenticate himself against the key. The response of the chip to the command must be
verified, either by using Secure Messaging, which is strongly recommended, or by an
explicit verification. Because the personalisation keys are derived from the production key
provided by MaskTech International GmbH and can only be set after authentication against
this production key, the personalisation keys will work only with the correct hardware.
Therefore, by being able to perform personalisation successfully, the customer has
implicitly checked that the hardware part of the delivery is correct.
Further checks can be done using the GET CHIP ID or GET CHIP INFORMATION
command. They return the chip identifier respectively additional information about the
platform, the operating system and the patch level. Whether the chip contains the correct
file system layout can be verified by checking the product identifier stored in the file
EF.KVC (see [12] appendix C).
3. Security Policy
The Security Policy is expressed by the set of Security Functional Requirements and
implemented by the TOE. It covers the following issues: The TOE implements physical and
logical security functionality in order to protect user data stored and operated on the smart
card when used in a hostile environment. Due to the nature of its intended application, the
TOE may be issued to users and may not be directly under the control of trained and
dedicated administrators. As a result, it is imperative that misleading, unreasonable and
conflicting guidance is absent from the guidance documentation, and that secure
procedures for all modes of operation have been addressed. Insecure states should be
easy to detect. The TOE shall be shown to be highly resistant to penetration attacks to
meet the security objectives. Specific details concerning the above mentioned security
policies can be found in [6] and [7], sec. 6.3.
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and
Organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to
specific security objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. The following topics are
of relevance:
● OE.Auth_Key_Travel_Document: Travel document Authentication Key
● OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data: Authorization for Use of Sensitive Biometric Reference Data
● OE.Active_Auth_Key_Travel_Document: Travel document Active Authentication Key
● OE.Exam_Travel_Document: Examination of the physical part of the travel document
● OE.Prot_Logical_Travel_Document: Protection of data from the logical travel document
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1033-2019 Certification Report
● OE.Ext_Insp_Systems: Authorization of Extended Inspection Systems
● OE.Legislative_Compliance: Issuing of the travel document
● OE.Passive_Auth_Sign: Authentication of travel document by Signature
● OE.Personalization: Personalization of travel document
● OE.Terminal: Terminal operating
● OE.Travel_Document_Holder: Travel document holder Obligations
Details can be found in the Security Target [6] and [7], chapter 4.2.
5. Architectural Information
The TOE is a composite product. It is composed from an Integrated Circuit
SLE78CLFX400VPHM/BPHM/7PHM (M7892), IC Dedicated Software including Test and
Support Software, IC Embedded Software (Operating System) and the MRTD Application.
While the IC Embedded software contains the operating system MTCOS Pro 2.5, the NVM
contains the MRTD application. As all these parts of the software are running inside the IC,
the external interface of the TOE to its environment can be defined as the external
interface of this IC, the SLE78CLFX400VPHM/BPHM/7PHM (M7892) secure dual-
interface controller of Infineon Technologies AG (BSI-DSZ-CC-0891-V3 [15], [16]). The
TOE uses three derivatives of M7892 with the sales code:
● SLE78CLFX400VPHM
● SLE78CLFX400BPHM and
● SLE78CLFX400/7PHM
These derivatives differ only in the antenna capacity of the module. This difference is not
security relevant, thus all three derivatives are taken as one configuration. The chip and
cryptographic library are certified according to CC EAL6 augmented compliant to the
Protection Profile BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014. For details concerning the CC evaluation of the
Infineon IC and its cryptographic libraries see the evaluation documentation under the
Certification ID BSI-DSZ-CC-0891-V3-2018 [15], [16].
The security functions of the TOE are enforced by the following subsystems:
Subsystem TSF supported
Application Data SP.Access_Control, SP.Identification_Authentication
Operation System Kernel SP.Access_Control, SP.Crypto,
SP.Identification_Authentication, SP.Management,
SP.Verification
HAL SP.IC_CL, SP.Crypto,
SP.Identification_Authentication, SP.Verification
Hardware SP.IC_CL
Table 3: Subsystems enforcing TSF
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1033-2019
6. Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the product to
the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of
the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of
this report have to be followed.
7. IT Product Testing
7.1. Developer Test concept
Test Configuration
Suitable samples were chosen from the described configurations (chapter 8) to test all
security functions.
Testing approach
Each security function is covered by at least one test case. The tests performed can be
categorized into two groups: tests with the real card and tests with the emulator. The latter
are used for situations that cannot be achieved in a real card's life.
Amount of developer testing performed
The test cases are dedicated to the demonstration of the proper implementation of all
security functions, card commands and operating system functionalities. For all commands
resp. functionality, test cases are specified in order to demonstrate the expected behaviour
including error cases.
Testing Results
All test cases were executed successfully and matched the expected result.
7.2. Evaluator Tests
Independent Testing according to ATE_IND
Test Configuration
Suitable samples were chosen from the described configurations (chapter 8) to test all
security functions.
Testing approach
The tests performed can be categorized into two groups: tests with the real card and tests
with the emulator. The latter are used for situations that cannot be achieved in a real card's
life. From all existing file system setups, a representative subset of setups was chosen for
evaluator testing. For the chosen setups the evaluators conducted all test cases of the
developer’s test suite for non-interactive tests using the test equipment provided by the
developer. The evaluators decided to focus their own independent tests on tests with real
cards, but emulator tests were also conducted. For these tests the evaluators derived
some test ideas from the developer tests under consideration of the described security
functionality. Furthermore, the evaluators used fuzzy testing to determine the correct
implementation of the TOE.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1033-2019 Certification Report
Testing Results
All test cases developed by the evaluator were executed successfully and ended up with
the expected result.
All repeated developer tests have been conducted successfully and all the actual test
results were as the expected ones (as gained by the developer). For the test results of the
emulator tests, the evaluator repeated the emulator tests executed by the developer. The
repetition of the emulator tests showed that the test results are consistent. Fuzzy testing
did not reveal any flaws in the TOE’s implementation.
Penetration Testing according to AVA_VAN
Penetration testing approach
The penetration testing was performed using the test environment of the evaluation facility.
All relevant information as well as evaluation documentation was taken into account for the
analysis by the evaluators. For the penetration analysis, the evaluator analysed the CC
deliverables for potential vulnerabilities already during the evaluation work for the
corresponding aspects. The evaluators found no exploitable vulnerabilities in the
evaluation deliverables. The evaluator used the potential vulnerabilities from the JIL
document as the leads for further investigations. All possible attack methods against an
authentic operational TOE were analysed. Thereby the results and experience of the ISCI
working group consolidated in the corresponding document were taken into account.
Testing Results
The overall test result is that no deviations were found between the expected and the
actual test results. No attack scenario with the attack potential High was actually
successful in the TOE’s operational environment as defined in [6] provided that all
measures required by the developer are applied. Potential vulnerabilities cannot be
exploited during the phases development, manufacturing and personalisation.
8. Evaluated Configuration
This certification covers the following TOE:
MTCOS Pro 2.5 EAC with PACE / SLE78CLFX400VPHM/BPHM/7PHM (M7892)
consisting of:
● Operating system and a file system in the context of the ICAO application with the
Infineon Technologies AG SLE78CLFX400VPHM/BPHM/7PHM (M7892) Chip; software
completely contained in NVM
● File system layout according to the selected configuration (see table 4 and user
guidance [12])
● User guidance [12]
● Initialization/Pre-Personalization Guidance [13]
● Product Manual [14]
The IC embedded software consists of the operating system MTCOS Pro 2.5 and an
application layer, consisting of the MRTD application.
The product is provided in various configurations. These differ in the amount of memory
space for user data, the combination of data groups, the cryptographic method provided
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for Active Authentication and the Secure Messaging method used for default Chip
Authentication. The configurations that are in the scope of this certification are depicted in
table 4:
No Configuration-ID Description
1 LayoutA-86-AA_RSA-SM_3DES 86 kbytes memory space for user data, RSA for Active
Authentication and 3DES for Secure Messaging
2 LayoutA-86-AA_RSA-SM_AES-128 86 kbytes memory space for user data, RSA for Active
Authentication and 128 bit AES for Secure Messaging
3 LayoutA-86-AA_EC-SM_3DES 86 kbytes memory space for user data, EC for Active
Authentication and 3DES for Secure Messaging
4 LayoutA-86-AA_EC-SM_AES-128 86 kbytes memory space for user data, EC for Active
Authentication and 128 bit AES for Secure Messaging
5 LayoutB-86-AA_RSA-SM_3DES 86 kbytes memory space for user data, RSA for Active
Authentication and 3DES for Secure Messaging
6 LayoutB-86-AA_RSA-SM_AES-128 86 kbytes memory space for user data, RSA for Active
Authentication and 128 bit AES for Secure Messaging
7 LayoutB-86-AA_EC-SM_3DES 86 kbytes memory space for user data, EC for Active
Authentication and 3DES for Secure Messaging
8 LayoutB-86-AA_EC-SM_AES-128 86 kbytes memory space for user data, EC for Active
Authentication and 128 bit AES for Secure Messaging
9 LayoutC-160-AA_RSA-SM_3DES 160 kbytes memory space for user data, RSA for Active
Authentication and 3DES for Secure Messaging
10 LayoutC-160-AA_RSA-SM_AES-128 160 kbytes memory space for user data, RSA Active
Authentication and 128 bit AES for Secure Messaging
11 LayoutC-160-AA_EC-SM_3DES 160 kbytes memory space for user data, EC for Active
Authentication and 3DES for Secure Messaging
12 LayoutC-160-AA_EC-SM_AES-128 160 kbytes memory space for user data, EC for Active
Authentication and 128 bit AES for Secure Messaging
13 LayoutD-131-AA_RSA-SM_3DES 131 kbytes memory space for user data, RSA for Active
Authentication and 3DES for Secure Messaging
14 LayoutD-131-AA_RSA-SM_AES-128 131 kbytes memory space for user data, RSA for Active
Authentication and 128 bit AES for Secure Messaging
15 LayoutG-160-AA_RSA-SM_3DES 160 kbytes memory space for user data, RSA for Active
Authentication and 3DES for Secure Messaging
16 LayoutG-160-AA_RSA-SM_AES-128 160 kbytes memory space for user data, RSA for Active
Authentication and 128 bit AES for Secure Messaging
17 LayoutG-160-AA_EC-SM_3DES 160 kbytes memory space for user data, EC for Active
Authentication and 3DES for Secure Messaging
18 LayoutG-160-AA_EC-SM_AES-128 160 kbytes memory space for user data, EC for Active
Authentication and 128 bit AES for Secure Messaging
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19 Layout0-S 86 kbytes memory space for user data, after pre-
personalisation corresponds to LayoutA-86-AA_RSA-
SM_3DES, no proprietary file EF.ID included
20 Layout0-L 131 kbytes memory space for user data, after pre-
personalisation corresponds to LayoutD-131-AA_RSA-
SM_3DES, no proprietary file EF.ID included
Table 4: Product configurations and corresponding file system layouts
The configuration identifiers indicate the algorithm (RSA, EC) used for Active
Authentication and the algorithm for Secure Messaging with default Chip Authentication
(3DES, AES). Further details are given in the User Guidance [12].
9. Results of the Evaluation
9.1. CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [8] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used for those components up to EAL 5
extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 5 and guidance
specific for the technology of the product [4] (AIS 34).
The following guidance specific for the technology was used:
(i) Security Architecture requirements (ADV_ARC) for smart cards and similar devices
(see [4], AIS 25),
(ii) Application of CC to Integrated Circuits, (see [4], AIS 25)
(iii) Attack Methods for Smartcards and Similar Devices,(see [4], AIS 26)
(iv) Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards,(see [4], AIS 26)
(v) Evaluation Methodology for CC Assurance Classes for EAL5+ and EAL6, (see [4],
AIS 34)
(vi) Minimum Requirements for Evaluating Side-Channel Attack Resistance of RSA,
DSA and Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange Implementations (see [4], AIS 46)
(vii) Informationen zur Evaluierung von kryptographischen Algorithmen (see [4], AIS 46).
(viii) Guidance for Smartcard Evaluation (see [4], AIS 37).
(ix) Composite product evaluation for Smart Cards and similar devices (see AIS 36).
According to this concept the relevant guidance documents of the underlying
platform and the documents ETR for Composition from the platform evaluations
(i.e. on hardware [15], [16]), have been applied in the TOE evaluation.
For smart card specific methodology the scheme interpretations AIS 25, AIS 26 and AIS 36
were used (see [4]). For RNG assessment the scheme interpretations AIS 31 and AIS 20
were used (see [4]).
As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
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● All components of the EAL 5 package including the class ASE as defined in the CC (see
also part C of this report)
● The components ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5 augmented for this TOE evaluation.
Even though the evaluation work performed for this certification procedure was not carried
out as a re-evaluation, several specific evaluation tasks were re-used from the certification
procedure with the Certification ID BSI-DSZ-CC-0995-2018.
The evaluation has confirmed:
● PP Conformance: Machine Readable Travel Document with "ICAO Application",
Extended Access Control with PACE (EAC PP), Version 1.3.2, 5
December 2012, BSI-CC-PP-0056-V2-2012-MA-02 [9]
● for the Functionality: PP conformant plus product specific extensions
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
● for the Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 5 augmented by ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5
For specific evaluation results regarding the development and production environment see
annex B in part D of this report.
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and
the configurations as outlined in chapter 8 above.
The evaluation was performed as a composite evaluation according to AIS 36 and
therefore relies on the platform certifications of the used IC (Certification ID BSI-DSZ-CC-
0891-V3) [15], [16].
9.2. Results of cryptographic assessment
The table A.1 presented in chapter A of the Security Target [6] gives an overview of the
cryptographic functionalities inside the TOE to enforce the security policy and outlines the
standard of application where its specific appropriateness is stated. The strength of the
cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of this certification procedure (see
BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2). An explicit validity period is not given.
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE
The documents as outlined in table 2 contain necessary information about the usage of the
TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered. In addition, all aspects of
Assumptions, Threats and OSPs as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE
itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his
system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and
techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment of the
TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
The limited validity for the usage of cryptographic algorithms as outlined in chapter 9 has
to be considered by the user and his system risk management process, too.
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11. Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [7] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is
provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report. It is a sanitised version of
the complete Security Target [6] used for the evaluation performed. Sanitisation was
performed according to the rules as outlined in the relevant CCRA policy (see AIS 35 [4]).
12. Regulation specific aspects (eIDAS, QES)
None
13. Definitions
13.1. Acronyms
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
AIS Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme
APDU Application Protocol Data Unit
BAC Basic Access Control
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for
Information Security, Bonn, Germany
BSIG BSI-Gesetz / Act on the Federal Office for Information Security
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
cPP Collaborative Protection Profile
DES Data Encryption Standard; symmetric block cipher algorithm
3DES Triple-DES
EAC Extended Access Control
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
EC Elliptic Curve
ECC Elliptic Curve Cryptography
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
HEX Hexadecimal
HW Hardware
IC Integrated Circuit
ICAO International Civil Aviation Organisation
IFX Infineon
IT Information Technology
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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MAC Message Authentication Code
MRTD Machine Readable Travel Document
NVM Non-Volatile Memory
MRZ Machine Readable Zone
OS Operating System
PACE Password Authenticated Connection Establishment
PP Protection Profile
ROM Read-only memory
RSA Rivest-Shamir-Adleman Algorithm
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
SM Secure Messaging
SSL secure socket layer
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
13.2. Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.
Collaborative Protection Profile - A Protection Profile collaboratively developed by an
International Technical Community endorsed by the Management Committee.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in CC
part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in CC part 3.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on well-
established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - A passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon which
subjects perform operations.
Package - named set of either security functional or security assurance requirements
Protection Profile - A formal document defined in CC, expressing an implementation
independent set of security requirements for a category of IT Products that meet specific
consumer needs.
Security Target - An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific
identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Subject - An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.
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Target of Evaluation - An IT Product and its associated administrator and user guidance
documentation that is the subject of an Evaluation.
TOE Security Functionality - Combined functionality of all hardware, software, and
firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs.
14. Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Part 1: Introduction and general model, Revision 5, April 2017
Part 2: Security functional components, Revision 5, April 2017
Part 3: Security assurance components, Revision 5, April 2017
https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Rev. 5, April 2017,
https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[3] BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-
Produkte) and Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility,
approval and licencing (CC-Stellen), https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierung
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE8
https://www.bsi.bund.de/AIS
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148), periodically updated list published also
on the BSI Website, https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierungsreporte
[6] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-1033-2019 - MTCOS Pro 2.5 EAC with PACE /
SLE78CLFX400VPHM/BPHM/7PHM (M7892) Machine Readable Travel Document
with “ICAO Application”, Extended Access Control with PACE, Version 0.8,
03.07.2019, MaskTech International GmbH (confidential document)
[7] Security Target Lite BSI-DSZ-CC-1033-2019 - MTCOS Pro 2.5 EAC with PACE /
SLE78CLFX400VPHM/BPHM/7PHM (M7892) Machine Readable Travel Document
with “ICAO Application”, Extended Access Control with PACE, Version 1.3,
03.07.2019, MaskTech International GmbH (sanitised public document)
8
specifically
• AIS 20, Version 3, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für deterministische
Zufallszahlengeneratoren
• AIS 25, Version 9, Anwendung der CC auf Integrierte Schaltungen including JIL Document and CC
Supporting Document
• AIS 26, Version 10, Evaluationsmethodologie für in Hardware integrierte Schaltungen including JIL
Document and CC Supporting Document
• AIS 31, Version 3, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für physikalische
Zufallszahlengeneratoren
• AIS 35, Version 2, Öffentliche Fassung des Security Targets (ST-Lite) including JIL Document and
CC Supporting Document and CCRA policies
• AIS 36, Version 5, Kompositionsevaluierung including JIL Document and CC Supporting Document
• AIS 38, Version 2, Reuse of evaluation results
• AIS 46, Version 3, Informationen zur Evaluierung von kryptographischen Algorithmen und
ergänzende Hinweise für die Evaluierung von Zufallszahlengeneratoren
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[8] Evaluation Technical Report, BSI-DSZ-CC-1033-2019, Version 1.7, 05 July 2019,
MTCOS Pro 2.5 EAC with PACE / SLE78CLFX400VPHM/BPHM/7PHM (M7892),
SRC Security Research & Consulting GmbH (confidential document)
[9] Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel Document with "ICAO Application",
Extended Access Control with PACE (EAC PP), Version 1.3.2, 5 December 2012,
BSI-CC-PP-0056-V2-2012-MA-02, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik (BSI)
[10] Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel Document using Standard Inspection
Procedure with PACE (PACE PP), Version 1.0, 02.11.2011, BSI-CC-PP-0068-V2-
2011, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI)
[11] Configuration List for MTCOS Pro 2.5 EAC with PACE /
SLE78CLFX400VPHM/BPHM/7PHM (M7892), Version 0.5, 03.07.2019, MaskTech
International GmbH (confidential document)
[12] User Guidance: MTCOS Pro 2.5 EAC with PACE /
SLE78CLFX400VPHM/BPHM/7PHM (M7892) Machine Readable Travel Document
with “ICAO Application”, Extended Access Control with PACE, BSI-DSZ-CC-
1033/1034, Version 1.3, 03.07.2019, MaskTech International GmbH
[13] Guidance for Initialization and Pre-personalization MTCOS Pro 2.5 EAC with
PACE / SLE78CLFX400VPHM/BPHM/7PHM (M7892) Supporting Document –
Initializa-tion/Pre-personalization, Version 1.3, 03.07.2019, MaskTech GmbH
[14] User Guidance: MTCOS MANUAL MTCOS 2.5 on IFX SLE78C(L)FX40xxPH(M),
BSI-DSZ-CC-1033/1034, Version 1.2, 10.01.2019, MaskTech International GmbH
[15] Certification Report, BSI-DSZ-CC-0891-V3-2018 for Infineon Security Controller,
M7892 Design Steps D11 and G12, with specific IC dedicated firmware and optional
software from Infineon Technologies AG, 09.01.2018, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in
der Informationstechnik (BSI)
[16] ETR for Composite Evaluation (ETR COMP), Certification ID BSI-DSZ-CC-0891-V3-
2018, TOE M7892 G12 and D11, Version 1, 29.11.2017, TÜV Informationstechnik
GmbH (confidential document)
[17] ICAO Technical Report: Supplemental Access Control for Machine Readable Travel
Documents, V1.1, International Civil Aviation Organization, 15.04.2014
[18] ICAO Doc 9303, Machine Readable Travel Documents, ICAO, 2015
[19] TR-03110-1, Technical Guideline TR-03110-1: Advanced Security Mechanisms for
Machine Readable Travel Documents and eIDAS Token - Part 1 - eMRTDs with
BAC/PACEv2 and EACv1, BSI, Version 2.20, 2015-02-26
[20] Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1034-2019 for MTCOS Pro 2.5 EAC with PACE /
SLE78CLFX400VPHM/BPHM/7PHM (M7892) (BAC) from MaskTech International
GmbH, 23 July 2019, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI)
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C. Excerpts from the Criteria
For the meaning of the assurance components and levels the following references to the
Common Criteria can be followed:
• On conformance claim definitions and descriptions refer to CC part 1 chapter 10.5
• On the concept of assurance classes, families and components refer to CC Part 3
chapter 7.1
• On the concept and definition of pre-defined assurance packages (EAL) refer to CC
Part 3 chapters 7.2 and 8
• On the assurance class ASE for Security Target evaluation refer to CC Part 3
chapter 12
• On the detailled definitions of the assurance components for the TOE evaluation
refer to CC Part 3 chapters 13 to 17
• The table in CC part 3 , Annex E summarizes the relationship between the
evaluation assurance levels (EAL) and the assurance classes, families and
components.
The CC are published at https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/cc/
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D. Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Security Target provided within a separate document.
Annex B: Evaluation results regarding development
and production environment
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Annex B of Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1033-2019
Evaluation results regarding
development and production
environment
The IT product MTCOS Pro 2.5 EAC with PACE / SLE78CLFX400VPHM/BPHM/7PHM
(M7892) (Target of Evaluation, TOE) has been evaluated at an approved evaluation facility
using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 extended
by Scheme Interpretations by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL
5 and CC Supporting Documents for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security
Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1.
As a result of the TOE certification, dated 23 July 2019, the following results regarding the
development and production environment apply. The Common Criteria assurance
requirements ALC – Life cycle support (i.e. ALC_CMC.4, ALC_CMS.5, ALC_DEL.1,
ALC_DVS.2, ALC_LCD.1, ALC_TAT.2 and ALC_COMP.1) are fulfilled for the development
and production sites of the TOE listed below:
a) MaskTech International GmbH, Nordostpark 45, 90411 Nuremberg, Germany
(Software Development, Initialisation/Pre-personalisation)
b) SmarTrac Technology Ltd., 142 Moo, Hi-Tech Industrial Estate, Tambon Ban
Laean, Amphor Bang-pa-in, 13160 Ayutthaya, Thailand, BSI-DSZ-CC-S-0097-
2017, Site Certificate valid until 26.12.2019, (Initialisation/Pre-personalisation)
c) HID Global Ireland, Teoranta Pairc Tionscail na Tullaigh, Baile na hAbhann Co.
Galway, Ireland, BSI-DSZ-CC-S-0114-2018, Site Certificate valid until
18.09.2020, (Initialisation/Pre-personalisation)
d) HID Global Sdn. Bhd. No. 2, Jalan i-Park 1/1 Kawasan Perindustrian i-Park,
Bandar Indahpura 81000 Kulai, Johor Malaysia, BSI-DSZ-CC-S-0085-2018,
Site Certificate valid until 14.05.2020 (Initialisation/Pre-personalisation)
e) Gemalto AG, Hintere Bahnhofstrasse 12, CH-5001 Aarau, Switzerland, BSI-
DSZ-CC-S-0104-2018, Site Certificate valid until 05.06.2020, (Initialisation/Pre-
personalisation)
f) For development and production sites regarding the platform at Infineon
Technologies AG (headquarters), Am Campeon 1-12 85579 Neubiberg
Germany, please refer to the certification report BSI-DSZ-CC-0891-V3-2018
[15], (IC Development, Initialisation/Pre-personalisation)
For the sites listed above, the requirements have been specifically applied in accordance
with the Security Target [6]. The evaluators verified, that the threats, security objectives
and requirements for the TOE life cycle phases up to delivery (as stated in the Security
Target [6] and [7]) are fulfilled by the procedures of these sites.
Note: End of report
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