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RSA Security Analytics v10.6.1
Security Target
Version 1.0
December 15, 2016
Prepared for:
RSA The Security Division of EMC2
10700 Parkridge Blvd.
Suite 600
Reston, VA 20191
Prepared By:
Leidos Inc.
Common Criteria Testing Laboratory
6841 Benjamin Franklin Drive, Columbia, Maryland 21046
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
1 SECURITY TARGET INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................ 4
1.1 SECURITY TARGET, TOE AND CC IDENTIFICATION........................................................................................ 4
1.2 CONFORMANCE CLAIMS ................................................................................................................................. 4
1.3 CONVENTIONS ................................................................................................................................................ 5
1.4 GLOSSARY ...................................................................................................................................................... 5
1.5 TERMINOLOGY................................................................................................................................................ 5
2 TOE DESCRIPTION........................................................................................................................................... 8
2.1 TOE OVERVIEW.............................................................................................................................................. 8
2.2 TOE ARCHITECTURE ...................................................................................................................................... 8
2.2.1 SA Product Components ........................................................................................................................ 8
2.2.2 TOE Physical Boundaries.................................................................................................................... 12
2.2.3 TOE Logical Boundaries...................................................................................................................... 19
2.3 TOE DOCUMENTATION................................................................................................................................. 21
3 SECURITY PROBLEM DEFINITION........................................................................................................... 22
3.1 ASSUMPTIONS ............................................................................................................................................... 22
3.1.1 Intended Usage Assumptions ............................................................................................................... 22
3.1.2 Physical Assumptions........................................................................................................................... 22
3.1.3 Personnel Assumptions ........................................................................................................................ 22
3.2 THREATS....................................................................................................................................................... 22
4 SECURITY OBJECTIVES............................................................................................................................... 24
4.1 SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE TOE........................................................................................................... 24
4.2 SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT................................................................... 24
5 IT SECURITY REQUIREMENTS.................................................................................................................. 25
5.1 EXTENDED COMPONENT DEFINITION ........................................................................................................... 25
5.1.1 Extended Family Definitions................................................................................................................ 25
5.2 TOE SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS ............................................................................................. 29
5.2.1 Security audit (FAU)............................................................................................................................ 30
5.2.2 Cryptographic Support (FCS).............................................................................................................. 32
5.2.3 Identification and authentication (FIA) ............................................................................................... 32
5.2.4 Security Monitoring with Security Information and Event Management ............................................ 33
5.2.5 Security management (FMT)................................................................................................................ 33
5.2.6 Protection of the TSF (FPT) ................................................................................................................ 34
5.2.7 TOE Access (FTA)................................................................................................................................ 34
5.2.8 Trusted path/channels (FTP) ............................................................................................................... 35
5.3 TOE SECURITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS............................................................................................... 35
5.3.1 Development (ADV) ............................................................................................................................. 35
5.3.2 Guidance documents (AGD) ................................................................................................................ 36
5.3.3 Life-cycle support (ALC)...................................................................................................................... 37
5.3.4 Tests (ATE)........................................................................................................................................... 38
5.3.5 Vulnerability assessment (AVA)........................................................................................................... 39
6 TOE SUMMARY SPECIFICATION.............................................................................................................. 40
6.1 SECURITY AUDIT........................................................................................................................................... 40
6.2 CRYPTOGRAPHIC SUPPORT............................................................................................................................ 41
6.3 IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION ....................................................................................................... 42
6.4 SECURITY MONITORING WITH SECURITY INFORMATION AND EVENT MANAGEMENT.................................. 43
6.5 SECURITY MANAGEMENT.............................................................................................................................. 46
6.6 PROTECTION OF THE TSF.............................................................................................................................. 46
6.7 TOE ACCESS................................................................................................................................................. 47
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6.8 TRUSTED PATH/CHANNELS............................................................................................................................ 47
7 RATIONALE...................................................................................................................................................... 48
7.1 SECURITY OBJECTIVES RATIONALE.............................................................................................................. 48
7.1.1 Security Objectives Rationale for the TOE and Environment ............................................................. 48
7.2 SECURITY REQUIREMENTS RATIONALE ........................................................................................................ 51
7.2.1 Security Functional Requirements Rationale....................................................................................... 51
7.2.2 Security Assurance Requirements Rationale ....................................................................................... 54
7.3 REQUIREMENT DEPENDENCY RATIONALE.................................................................................................... 54
7.4 TOE SUMMARY SPECIFICATION RATIONALE................................................................................................ 55
LIST OF TABLES
Table 5-1 TOE Security Functional Components........................................................................................................ 30
Table 5-2 Auditable Events.......................................................................................................................................... 30
Table 5-3 EAL2 Augmented with ALC_FLR.1 Assurance Components.................................................................... 35
Table 8-1 Objective to Requirement Correspondence ................................................................................................. 52
Table 8-2 Security Requirements to Security Functions Mapping .............................................................................. 56
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1 Security Target Introduction
This section identifies the Security Target (ST) and Target of Evaluation (TOE), ST conventions, ST conformance
claims, and the ST organization. The TOE is RSA Security Analytics (SA). SA is a collection of appliances that
form a security infrastructure for an enterprise network. This architecture provides converged network security
monitoring and centralized security information and event management (SIEM). SA provides real-time visibility
into the monitored network and long-term network data storage to provide detection, investigation, analysis,
forensics, and compliance reporting. SA’s Capture infrastructure collects log and packet data from the network.
Packet collection extracts metadata, reassembles, and globally normalizes all network traffic at layers 2 through 7 of
the Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) model. This data allows SA to perform real-time session analysis; incident
detection, drill-down investigation, reporting, and forensic analysis functions.
The Security Target contains the following additional sections:
• Security Target Introduction (Section 1)
• TOE Description (Section 2)
• Security Problem Definition (Section 3)
• Security Objectives (Section 4)
• IT Security Requirements (Section 5)
• TOE Summary Specification (Section 6)
• Rationale (Section 7)
1.1 Security Target, TOE and CC Identification
ST Title –RSA Security Analytics v10.6.1 Security Target
ST Version – Version 1.0
ST Date – December 15, 2016
TOE Identification –RSA Security Analytics v10.6.1
TOE Developer – RSA The Security Division of EMC2
Evaluation Sponsor – RSA The Security Division of EMC2
CC Identification – Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1, Revision 4,
September 2012
1.2 Conformance Claims
This TOE is conformant to the following CC specifications:
• Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2: Security functional
requirements, Version 3.1 Revision 4, September 2012.
• Part 2 Extended
• Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 3: Security assurance components,
Version 3.1 Revision 4, September 2012.
• Part 3 Conformant
• Assurance Level: EAL2 augmented with ALC_FLR.1
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1.3 Conventions
The following conventions have been applied in this document:
Extended requirements – Security Functional Requirements not defined in Part 2 of the CC are annotated with a
suffix of _EXT.
Security Functional Requirements – Part 2 of the CC defines the approved set of operations that may be applied to
functional requirements: iteration, assignment, selection, and refinement.
Iteration: allows a component to be used more than once with varying operations. In the ST, iteration is
identified with a number in parentheses following the base component identifier. For example,
iterations of FCS_COP.1 are identified in a manner similar to FCS_COP.1(1) (for the
component) and FCS_COP.1.1(1) (for the elements).
Assignment: allows the specification of an identified parameter. Assignments are indicated using bold and are
surrounded by brackets (e.g., [assignment]). Note that an assignment within a selection would
be identified in italics and with embedded bold brackets (e.g., [[selected-assignment]]).
Selection: allows the specification of one or more elements from a list. Selections are indicated using bold
italics and are surrounded by brackets (e.g., [selection]).
Refinement: allows the addition of details. Refinements are indicated using bold, for additions, and strike-
through, for deletions (e.g., “… all objects …” or “… some big things …”).
Other sections of the ST – Other sections of the ST use bolding to highlight text of special interest, such as captions.
1.4 Glossary
Acronym Description
API Application Programming Interface
ESA Event Stream Analysis
ATD Automated Threat Detection
CC Common Criteria
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
EPS Events per Second
GUI Graphical User Interface
HTTP Hypertext Transfer Protocol
HTTPS Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure
IDS Intrusion Detection System
LAN Local Area Network
OS Operating System
OSI Open Systems Interconnection
PP Protection Profile
SDEE Security Device Event Exchange
SIEM Security Information and Event Management
SMTP Simple Mail Transfer Protocol
SNMP Simple Network Management Protocol
ST Security Target
TLS Transport Layer Security
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Function
1.5 Terminology
The terminology below is described in order to clarify the terms used in the ST as well as those used in the TOE
product documentation.
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Analyzer The function of an IDS that applies analytical processes to collected
IDS data in order to derive conclusions about potential or actual
intrusions.
CloudTrail An application program interface (API) call-recording and log-
monitoring Web service offered by Amazon Web Services (AWS).
Command and Control Malware A system compromise where the malware is sending unauthorized data
back to a system source.
Concentrator A concentrator that receives network packet metadata.
Decoder A decoder that captures network packets.
Feed A list of data that is compared to sessions as they are captured or
processed. For each match, additional metadata is created. This data
could identify and classify malicious IPs or incorporate additional
information such as department and location based on internal network
assignments.
IDS Intrusion Detection System —a combination of services or functions
such as an Analyzer that monitors an IT System for activity that may
inappropriately affect the IT System or its resources, and that can send
alerts if such activity is detected.
IDS data Refers both to raw data collected by the TOE and to the results of
analysis applied by the TOE to that data.
Index Indexes are internal RA data structures that organize for searching the
metadata elements of sessions and are generated during data processing
for a collection. The content of the index, and consequently the
metadata elements that are displayed in the Navigation view, are
controlled by settings in effect during collection processing.
Log Concentrator A concentrator that receives log metadata,
Log Decoder A decoder that captures log data.
Metadata Specific data types (Service Type, Action Event, Source IP Address,
etc.) created by the parsers which are counted and itemized in the
captured data. A detailed list of metadata for each parser may be found
in the SA Guidance.
MongoDB A Free and open-source cross-platform document-oriented database
program.
Parser A software module that defines tokens and instructions for lexical
processing of network streams. Processing includes stream
identification and metadata extraction.
Services Components of the product that work together to provide the security
functions of the TOE such as Analyzer, Concentrator, and Decoder
SIEM Security Information and Event Management—combines security
information management (SIM) and security event management (SEM)
to provide real-time analysis of security alerts generated by network
hardware and applications.
TokuMX An open source distribution of the MongoDB, which, among other
things, replaces the default B-tree data structure found in the basic
MongoDB distribution with a Fractal tree index.
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WHOIS A query and response protocol used for querying databases that store
the registered users or assignees of an Internet resource, such as a
domain name, an IP address block, or an autonomous system.
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2 TOE Description
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is RSA Security Analytics (SA), hereinafter referred to as Security Analytics, SA or
the TOE.
2.1 TOE Overview
SA is a collection of appliances that form a security infrastructure for an enterprise network. This architecture
provides converged network security monitoring and centralized security information and event management
(SIEM). SA provides real-time visibility into the monitored network and long-term network data storage to provide
detection, investigation, analysis, forensics, and compliance reporting. SA’s capture infrastructure imports log data
and collects packet data from the network. Packet collection extracts metadata, reassembles, and globally normalizes
all network traffic at layers 2 through 7 of the OSI model. This data allows SA to perform real-time session analysis.
SA recognizes over 250 event source types, which are aggregated, analyzed, and stored for long-term use.
Data is collected and aggregated by the Decoder and Concentrator appliances. The Windows Legacy Log Collector
supports data collection by importing Legacy Windows log data. Collected data is aggregated into a complete data
structure across all network layers, logs, events, and applications. The Event Stream Analysis (ESA) appliance uses
this data to provide advanced stream analytics such as correlation and complex event processing at high throughputs
and low latency. ESA uses Event Processing Language to bring meaning to the event flows. SA Server’s user
interface uses this aggregated data to provide incident detection, and drill-down investigation1. The Archiver
appliance is a specialized concentrator or variant that receives, indexes, and compresses logs. The Archiver is
adapted to hold indexed and compressed raw log and metadata, and indices for an extended period of time. The
Reporting Engine and SA Server’s user interface use the data to provide compliance reporting and in-depth network
analysis. Raw packets and packet metadata are not stored in the Archiver.
The TOE implements additional security functions such as identification and authentication of TOE users; auditing;
security management; and trusted path.
The security management functions of the TOE are performed via the SA Server Interface, which is a web-based
GUI. This interface allows authorized administrators to manage the user accounts, session lockout values and other
TSF data, and view the IDS data and alerts. The TOE associates users with administrative roles and maintains the
pre-defined roles: Administrator, Analyst, Operator, SOC_Manager, and Malware Analyst. The pre-defined roles
listed in the guidance documentation also includes “The Data Privacy Officer (DPO)” role. The Target of
evaluation does not include or use Data Privacy Officer role since this role provides management of privacy-
sensitive data which is not within the scope of the evaluation. Note that pre-defined roles are not initially assigned to
any user. Note also that though the administrator guidance refers to the roles as: ‘Administrators’, ‘Analysts’,
‘Operators’, ‘SOC_Managers’, and ‘Malware Analysts’; the roles identified in this ST are the same roles whether or
not the ‘s’ is included at the end.
2.2 TOE Architecture
2.2.1 SA Product Components
SA is composed of multiple components that can be combined on appliances or deployed with multiple appliances
depending on network needs. The components are broken into the Capture Architecture and the Analysis
Architecture.
2.2.1.1 Capture Architecture
The SA Capture architecture is composed of the Decoder, Windows Legacy Log Collector, Concentrator, and
Broker. Each component is described below.
1 The SA product provides additional capabilities for reporting, and forensic analysis functions, which are not
included in the scope of evaluation.
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Decoder: The Decoder performs capture for either packets or logs. When deployed, either the packet or log capture
capability is enabled. The term ‘Decoder’ is used for Decoder (packet) and ‘Log Decoder’ for Decoder (log). A
Decoder collects packets, extracts metadata, reassembles and normalizes network traffic. A Log Decoder imports
logs by either retrieving (pulling) the log records from an event source or by receiving the log records from the event
sources (pushed). Each appliance sends its collected data to an assigned Concentrator.
Within a Log Decoder appliance is a Log Collector service2 that imports logs from the following sources:
• Syslog
• SNMP Trap
• NetFlow
• File (pushed by SFTP and FTPS)
• Windows (WinRM)
• ODBC
• Check Point LEA
• VMWare
• SDEE
• CloudTrail
Windows Legacy Log Collector - also identified as Windows (legacy): The Windows Legacy Log Collector is
deployed in a Windows Legacy domain(s). This appliance performs log capture by retrieving (pulling) the log
records from a Legacy Windows event source. Each appliance sends its collected data to an assigned Log Decoder.
Concentrator: Concentrators are deployed as either a packet or log Concentrator. These appliances aggregate and
store metadata received from multiple Decoders. Metadata received on a Concentrator is indexed and also may be
sent to an ESA device for further analysis for detection and alerting. Concentrators also perform queries to retrieve
stored metadata, as requested by external users or the SA Server.
Broker: Brokers facilitate queries between Concentrators, allowing the SA Server access to metadata across the
network. The Broker is installed on the same appliance as the SA Server.
2.2.1.2 Analysis Architecture
The Analysis architecture is composed of the SA Server, Archiver, ESA, Malware Analysis, Automated Threat
Detection, Incident Management, and Reporting Engine. Each component is described below. Unless otherwise
stated, each component is deployed on the same appliance as the SA Server.
SA Server: The SA Server hosts the user interface. This interface enables an administrator to perform incident
detection, management, investigation, and device and user administration. The SA Server User Interface (UI) is
accessed through HTTPS only (i.e., HTTP over TLS in FIPS mode).
Archiver: The Archiver is a stand-alone appliance. Archiver receives, indexes, and compresses log data from Log
Decoders. The Archiver is adapted to hold indexed and compressed raw log and metadata and indices for an
extended period of time. The Reporting Engine and SA Server’s user interface use the data (via the Broker) to
provide compliance reporting and in-depth network analysis.
ESA: ESA is installed on its own appliance (along with the ATD Service). ESA provides advanced stream analytics
such as correlation and event processing. ESA receives event data from multiple Concentrators. ESA uses an
advanced Event Processing Language (EPL) to filter, aggregate, join, correlate, and recognize patterns across
multiple disparate event streams. ESA provides incident detection and alerting3.
2 The Log Collector service can also be deployed separately from a Log Decoder appliance as a Virtual Log
Collector.
3 SA can send alerts over email, syslog or SNMP traps, but these types of alert notification are not within the scope
of evaluation.
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Malware Analysis: The Malware Analysis service analyzes file objects to assess the likelihood the file is malicious.
This service uses network session analysis and static file analysis4 to check for malware. The service can perform
continuous or on-demand polling of Decoders or Brokers to extract sessions identified as potentially carrying
malware.
Automated Threat Detection: The Automated Threat Detection (ATD) Service is deployed on the same appliance
as ESA and receives metadata data from multiple Concentrators. The ATD applies rule logic across metadata to
identify outliers, abnormal behavior, and malicious activity. Currently included with the service is rule logic
associated with http network traffic that produces alerts and incidents for possible command and control activity.
Incident Management: Collects Alerts and provides authorized users the ability to group them logically and start
an Incident response workflow to investigate and remediate the security issues raised. Incident Management allows
the user to configure rules to automate the aggregation of Alerts into Incidents. The Incident Management service
periodically runs rules to aggregate multiple Alerts into an Incident and set some attributes of the Incident (e.g.
severity, category, etc.). Users can access these functions through the SA UI.
Reporting Engine: The Reporting Engine supports the definition and generation of reports and alerts.
Administrators can create rules that govern how data is represented in reports and alerts. The Reporting Engine also
manages the alert queue, allowing administrators to enable and disable alerts.
Each appliance in the SA solution can also be deployed as a virtual appliance. The functionality of the virtual
appliance is the same as the hardware-based solution, though there are differences in supported throughput.
Figure 2-1 below depicts the TOE in its evaluated configuration. Note that each SA Server and ESA host also
contains a TokuMX database though not shown in the figure. Also not depicted is the Windows Legacy Log
Collector deployed in a Windows Legacy domain(s). The Windows Legacy Log Collector sends log data over the
network to the Log Decoder.
4 The SA product provides additional capabilities for dynamic file analysis, and security community analysis, which
are not included in the scope of evaluation.
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Figure 2-1 Evaluated Configuration
Decoder
(packet)
Hardware
OS
ESA/ATD
Hardware
OS
JVM
Broker
Hardware
OS
JVM
Reporting
Engine
JVM
SA
Server
JVM`
Malware
Analysis
PostgreSQL
JVM
UI
Log Decoder
Hardware
OS
Concentrator
(packet)
Hardware
OS
Log
Concentrator
Hardware
OS
Archiver
Hardware
OS
Warehouse
Appliance
Broker
JVM
Report
ing
Engine
JVM
Incident
Manage
ment
JVM
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Communications between components are protected using TLS. The TOE configuration is described further in
Section 2.2.2.4.
2.2.2 TOE Physical Boundaries
2.2.2.1 Included Product Components
Product components included in the TOE are listed below. Figure 2-1 Evaluated Configuration shows a
representative deployment of the TOE in its evaluated configuration.
1. Windows Legacy Log Collector (zero or more)
Note: A SA deployment includes at least one Windows Legacy Log Collector
2. Decoder (zero or more)
3. Log Decoder (zero or more)
Note: A SA deployment includes at least one Decoder and one Log Decoder.
4. Concentrator (zero or more)
5. Log Concentrator (zero or more)
Note: A SA deployment that contains a Log Decoder must include a Log Concentrator. Likewise, a
deployment that includes a Decoder for network packets must include a Concentrator for network packets.
6. Broker (zero or more)
Note: A SA deployment includes at least one Broker.
7. Event Stream Analysis (ESA) (zero or more)
Note: A SA deployment includes at least one ESA.
8. Archiver (zero or more)
Note: A SA deployment includes at least one Archiver.
9. Security Analytics Server (one or more)
10. Incident Management (zero or more)
Note: A SA deployment includes at least one Incident Management.
11. Malware Analysis (zero or more)
Note: A SA deployment includes at least one Malware Analysis.
12. Automated Threat Detection (one for each ESA host)
13. Reporting Engine (one per SA Server)
14. Java Virtual Machine (JVM) (one for each of the following services on the SA Server: Broker, Incident
Management, Malware Analysis, Reporting Engine Services, and one for the UI and SA Server itself.
Additionally, the ESM runs in its own JVM)
15. PostgreSQL database (one for each malware analysis)
16. TokuMX database (one for each SA Server and ESA)
2.2.2.2 Excluded Product Components
SA product components excluded from the TOE in the evaluated configuration are:
1. Warehouse appliance
2. RSA Live (content delivery and Live Connect)
3. Malware Community
4. Malware Sandbox
SA product features excluded from the TOE in the evaluated configuration are:
1. Direct-Attached Capacity (DAC) storage for Archiver
2. Representational State Transfer, Application Programming Interface (REST API)
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3. External authentication services (such as RADIUS, LDAP, and Windows Active Directory)
4. Export of security audit records to Syslog server
5. Sending SMTP, SNMP, or Syslog alerts
6. Integrated Dell Remote Access Controller (iDRAC) out-of-band appliance management capabilities
7. Serial and USB device connections (Used during installation and maintenance only)
2.2.2.3 Services and Products in the Operational Environment
The TOE relies on the following services and products in the operational environment:
1. Operating System: provides execution environment for SA components. The OS is CentOS version 6.6
running on a Dell R630 or R730xd.
2. Customer provided hardware and Windows operating system for Legacy Windows Log Collector:
a. Windows 2008 R2 SP1 64-Bit
b. Processor – Intel Xeon CPU @2.0Ghz or faster
c. Memory – 4GB or faster
d. Available Disk Space - 320GB
3. Hypervisor: provides virtualization for SA virtual appliances. The hypervisor is ESXi version 5.0 or later.
4. Administrator Workstation / Browser: provides human users access to SA Server user interface. SA
supports Microsoft Internet Explorer (versions 10 and 11), Firefox (version 26 to 30), Safari (version 6),
and Chrome (version 34 and 35.x).
5. Network Traffic Sources: source of network traffic. Note: The TOE has a direct physical connection to a
network traffic source (Decoder (packet) network connection)
6. Log Decoder and Collector Event Sources: provide log data to the TOE. SA supports event sources:
a. Syslog
b. SNMP Trap
c. NetFlow
d. File
e. Windows (WinRM)
f. Windows (Legacy)
g. ODBC
h. Check Point LEA
i. VMWare
j. SDEE
k. CloudTrail
The following services can be deployed in the operational environment but were not covered by the evaluation:
1. Syslog server: SA Server can forward security audit records and alerts to an external Syslog server.
2. SMTP Server: SA Server can send email messages via SMTP server.
3. SNMP Server: SA Server can send SNMP traps.
4. Authentication Servers: provides external authentication methods (such as Windows Active Director,
RADIUS, and LDAP).
2.2.2.4 TOE Configurations
RSA deploys Security Analytics as a collection of appliances providing services. RSA provides the TOE as either
hardware appliances or virtual appliances. The deployment of appliances varies from customer to customer. A
customer with a small volume of network or log data would combine services onto a few appliances. A large
enterprise customer would have appliances for each service with multiple Decoder, Concentrator, and Broker
appliances. The evaluated configuration represents the range of deployments.
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2.2.2.4.1 Hardware Appliance Deployments
The evaluated configuration includes the following appliances (see Figure 2-1 Evaluated Configuration):
• Security Analytics Server (hosting SA Server UI, Broker, Incident Management, Malware Analysis, and
Reporting Engine services)
a. Broker, Incident Management, and Reporting Engine Services each have their own JVM.
Malware Analysis has its own JVM and a PostgreSQL.
b. Also contains a TokuMX High Performance MongoDB distribution.
• One Legacy Windows Log Collector appliance
• One Decoder appliance
• One Log Decoder appliance
Note: A SA deployment includes at least one Decoder or Log Decoder with the following deployment.
a. Can be deployed standalone or on appliance with Concentrator.
b. Typical deployment is one-to-one Decoder/ Concentrator pairs; though multiple Decoders per
Concentrators or multiple Concentrators per Decoder are technically possible.
• One Concentrator appliance for packet data
• One Concentrator appliance for log data
Note: A SA deployment that contains a Log Decoder must include a Log Concentrator. Likewise, a
deployment that includes a Decoder for network packets must include a Concentrator for network packets.
a. Can be deployed standalone or on appliance with Decoder
b. Typical deployment is one-to-one Decoder/ Concentrator pairs; though it is possible for a single
Concentrator to aggregate from multiple Decoders or for a single Decoder to aggregate to multiple
Concentrators.
• One Event Stream Analysis appliance (and JVM)
a. Deployed standalone
b. Receives event data from multiple Concentrators (packet and log)
c. Includes Automated Threat Detection service and a TokuMX High Performance MongoDB
distribution.
Note: Deployments could have more than one ESA appliance.
• One Archiver appliance
Note: Deployments could have more than one Archiver.
a. Deployed standalone
b. Only aggregates capture data from Log Decoder
The deployment described above includes sufficient appliances to demonstrate the TOE security functions even
when additional appliances are used in a deployment. The deployment uses each of the TOE components. The
interactions between TOE components remain the same when multiple components are installed on a single
appliance, albeit without the need for protected communication.
Note: The Malware Analysis component shipped with SA Server has a capacity limit of 100 file scans per day. The
Malware Analysis appliance runs the same RSA-developed software but without license limitations on the number
of file scans per day. The capability of the Malware Analysis component shipped with the SA Server was tested as
part of the evaluation but the standalone Malware Analysis device was not.
Hardware Specifications per Appliance Model:
Decoder
Series 4S Packet Decoder
Throughput: 2 Gbps
Form Factor: 1U, Full Depth
Processors: Dual Eight Core, 2.6GHz
RAM: 96GB
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RAID Controller Card: 6Gb/s
Capacity Drive Count: 2 - 1TB HDD
Available Capacity: N/A
Series 5 Packet Decoder
Throughput: 2-10 Gbps
Form Factor: 1U, Full Depth
Processors: Dual Eight Core, 3.2GHz
RAM: 128GB
RAID Controller Card: 12Gb/s
Capacity Drive Count: 2 - 1TB HDD & 2 – 2TB HDD
Available Capacity: N/A
Series 4S Log Decoder
Throughput: up to 60K EPS
Form Factor: 1U, Full Depth
Processors:Dual Eight Core, 2.6GHz
RAM; 96GB
RAID Controller Card: 6Gb/s
Capacity Drive Count: 2 - 1TB HDD
Available Capacity: N/A
Concentrator
Series 5 Log Decoder
Throughput: up to 60K EPS
Form Factor: 1U, Full Depth
Processors: Dual Eight Core, 3.2GHz
RAM: 128GB
RAID Controller Card: 12Gb/s
Capacity Drive Count: 2 - 1TB HDD & 2 – 2TB HDD
Available Capacity: N/A
Series 4S Log Concentrator/ Series 4S Packet Concentrator
Throughput: N/A
Form Factor: 1U, Full Depth
Processors: Dual Eight Core, 2.6GHz
RAM: 96GB
RAID Controller Card: 6Gb/s
Capacity Drive Count: 2 - 1TB HDD
Available Capacity: N/A
Hybrid
Series 5 Log Concentrator/ Series 5 Packet Concentrator
Throughput: N/A
Form Factor: 1U, Full Depth
Processors: Dual Eight Core, 3.2GHz
RAM: 128GB
RAID Controller Card: 12Gb/s
Capacity Drive Count: 2 - 1TB HDD & 2 – 2TB HDD
Available Capacity: N/A
Series 4S Hybrid for Packets (Packet Decoder and Concentrator)
Throughput: 622 Mbps
Form Factor: 1U, Full Depth
Processors: Dual Eight Core, 2.6GHz
RAM: 96GB
RAID Controller Card: 6Gb/s
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Capacity Drive Count: 10 - 1TB HDD
Available Capacity: 4.2 TB
Series 5 Hybrid for Packets (Packet Decoder and Concentrator)
Throughput: 1Gbps
Form Factor: 1U, Full Depth
Processors: Dual Eight Core, 3.2GHz
RAM: 128GB
RAID Controller Card: 12Gb/s
Capacity Drive Count: 4 - 1TB HDD, 8 – 6TB HDD, & 2 – 800GB SSD
Available Capacity: 48TB
Series 4S Hybrid for Logs (Log Collector, Log Decoder, and Concentrator)
Throughput: up to 20K EPS
Form Factor: 1U, Full Depth
Processors: Dual Eight Core, 2.6GHz
RAM: 96GB
RAID Controller Card: 6Gb/s
Capacity Drive Count: 10 - 1TB HDD
Available Capacity: 8 TB
Series 5 Hybrid for Logs (Log Collector, Log Decoder, and Concentrator)
Throughput: up to 20K EPS
Form Factor: 1U, Full Depth
Processors: Dual Eight Core, 3.2GHz
RAM: 128GB
RAID Controller Card: 12Gb/s
Capacity Drive Count: 4 - 1TB HDD, 8 – 6TB HDD, & 2 – 800GB SSD
Available Capacity: 48TB
Series 4S All-In-One for Packets
Throughput: 310 Mbps
Form Factor: 1U, Full Depth
Processors: Dual Eight Core, 2.6GHz
RAM: 96GB
RAID Controller Card: 6Gb/s
Capacity Drive Count: 10 - 1TB HDD
Available Capacity: 3.99TB
All In One for Packet includes Packet Decoder, Concentrator, Broker, SA Server, and Malware Analysis (free
version)
Series 4S All-In-One for Logs
Throughput: up to 7,500 EPS
Form Factor: 1U, Full Depth
Processors: Dual Eight Core, 2.6GHz
RAM: 96GB
RAID Controller Card: 6Gb/s
Capacity Drive Count: 10 - 1TB HDD
Available Capacity: 2.6TB
All In One for Logs includes Log Decoder, Log Collector, Concentrator, Broker, SA Server, and Malware Analysis
(free version)
Series 4S Broker
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Throughput: N/A
Form Factor: 1U, Full Depth
Processors: Dual Eight Core, 2.6GHz
RAM: 96GB
RAID Controller Card: 6Gb/s
Capacity Drive Count: 2 - 1TB HDD
Available Capacity: N/A
Series 5 Broker
Throughput: N/A
Form Factor: 1U, Full Depth
Processors: Dual Eight Core, 3.2GHz
RAM: 128GB
RAID Controller Card: 12Gb/s
Capacity Drive Count: 2 - 1TB HDD & 2 – 2TB HDD
Available Capacity: N/A
Series 4S Security Analytics Server5
Throughput: N/A
Form Factor: 1U, Full Depth
Processors: Dual Eight Core, 2.6GHz
RAM: 96GB
RAID Controller Card: 6Gb/s
Capacity Drive Count: 2 - 1TB HDD
Available Capacity: N/A-In-One
Series 5 Security Analytics Server5
Throughput: N/A
Form Factor: 1U, Full Depth
Processors: Dual Eight Core, 3.2GHz
RAM: 128GB
RAID Controller Card: 12Gb/s
Capacity Drive Count: 2 - 1TB HDD & 2 – 2TB HDD
Available Capacity: N/A
Series 4S Archiver
Throughput: N/A
Form Factor: 1U, Full Depth
Processors: Dual Eight Core, 2.6GHz
RAM: 96GB
RAID Controller Card: 6Gb/s
Capacity Drive Count: 2 - 1TB HDD
Available Capacity: N/A
Event Stream Analytics
Series 5 Archiver
Throughput: N/A
Form Factor: 1U, Full Depth
Processors: Dual Eight Core, 3.2GHz
RAM: 128GB
RAID Controller Card: 12Gb/s
Capacity Drive Count: 2 - 1TB HDD & 2 – 2TB HDD
Available Capacity: N/A
5 Series 4S and Series 5 Security Analytics Server appliances include Broker software.
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Series 4S Event Stream Analytics
Throughput: N/A
Form Factor: 1U, Full Depth
Processors: Dual Eight Core, 2.6GHz
RAM: 96GB
RAID Controller Card: 6Gb/s
Capacity Drive Count: 10 - 1TB HDD
Available Capacity:10TB
Series 5 Event Stream Analytics
Throughput: N/A
Form Factor: 1U, Full Depth
Processors: Dual Twelve Core, 2.5GHz
RAM: 256GB
RAID Controller Card: 12Gb/s
Capacity Drive Count: 2 - 1TB HDD & 4 – 2TB HDD
Available Capacity: 8TB
Series 4S Malware Analysis
Form Factor: 1U, Full Depth
Processors: Dual Eight Core, 2.6GHz
RAM: 96GB
RAID Controller Card: 6Gb/s
Capacity Drive Count: 10 - 1TB HDD
Available Capacity: 8 TB
Series 5 Malware Analysis
Form Factor: 1U, Full Depth
Processors: Dual Eight Core, 3.2GHz
RAM: 128GB
RAID Controller Card: 12Gb/s
Capacity Drive Count: 2 - 1TB HDD & 2 – 2TB HDD
Available Capacity: N/A
2.2.2.4.2 Virtual Deployments
The TOE components can also be deployed as virtual appliances in the evaluated configuration. The virtual
appliances are the same TOE image and operating system as the physical appliances. Virtual appliances differ from
physical appliances in capacity. Hence evaluation on hardware appliances is adequate validation of virtual
appliances.
The SA Server, Incident Management, Reporting Engine and the collocated version of Malware Analysis services
are to be hosted as one virtual appliance in the virtual environment. Broker is not included in this virtual appliance
and must be deployed as a separate virtual appliance. The hardware requirements for the virtual machine are
cumulative for these components.
The following table lists CPU, Memory, and OS Disk partition minimum requirements for the virtual appliances.
• The disk requirements are fixed sizes for the OVA packages.
• RAM and CPU metrics are minimums and are also dependent on the capture and ingest environment.
Virtual Appliance Type Quantity of CPUs CPU Specifications RAM Disk
Packet Decoder 4 Intel Xeon CPU @2.93 Ghz 16 GB 320 GB
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Virtual Appliance Type Quantity of CPUs CPU Specifications RAM Disk
Log Decoder 4 Intel Xeon CPU @2.93 Ghz 16 GB 320 GB
Concentrator 4 Intel Xeon CPU @2.93 Ghz 16 GB 320 GB
Archiver 4 Intel Xeon CPU @2.93 Ghz 16 GB 320GB
Broker 4 Intel Xeon CPU @2.93 Ghz 16 GB 320 GB
Security Analytics Server 4 Intel Xeon CPU @2.93 Ghz 16 GB 320 GB
ESA 4 Intel Xeon CPU @2.93 Ghz 16 GB 320 GB
Legacy Windows Log Collector6 4 Intel Xeon CPU @2.93 Ghz 16 GB 320 GB
Virtual Log Collector 2 Intel Xeon CPU @2.00 Ghz 2 GB 150 GB
The TOE relies on each hosting OS to protect its applications, processes, and any locally stored data. The TOE also
relies on the hosting OS for reliable time to use with the audit, IDS data.
2.2.3 TOE Logical Boundaries
This section identifies the security functions that RSA Security Analytics v10.6.1 provides. The logical boundaries
of the TOE include the security functions of the TOE interfaces. The TOE logically supports the following security
functions:
• Security Audit
• Cryptographic Support
• Identification & Authentication
• Security Monitoring with Security Information and Event Management (SIEM)
• Security Management
• Protection of the TSF
• TOE Access
• Trusted path/channels
2.2.3.1 Security Audit
The TOE generates audit records of security relevant events that include at least date and time of the event, subject
identity and outcome for security events. The TOE provides the default Administrator and Operator roles with the
ability to read the audit events. The environment stores the audit records and also provides the system clock
information that is used by the TOE to timestamp each audit record.
2.2.3.2 Cryptographic Support
The Transport Layer Security (TLS 1.2) protocol in FIPS mode is used to provide protection of the communications
surrounding the remote administrative sessions from disclosure and from modification. TLS is also used for
distributed internal TOE component communications. The TOE uses a FIPS-validated module for SSH protected
communication pathways for the transfer of file event source data from log data sources to the TOE.
The TOE uses Crypto-C ME 4.1.2 (FIPS 140-2 validation certificates #2300/2294) for both SSH and TLS
communications.
The TOE uses the RSA BSAFE Crypto-J cryptographic library: BSAFE SSL-J 6.1.3.1 for Java applications, which
incorporates BSAFE Crypto-J 6.1 (FIPS 140-2 Certificates #2058/2057).
6 Basic requirements for Legacy Windows Log Collector are the same whether virtual or physical. See also Section
2.2.2.3.
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2.2.3.3 Identification & Authentication
The TOE allows the users to acknowledge end-user license agreements and view warning banners prior to providing
identification and authentication data. No other access to the TOE is permitted until the user is successfully
authenticated. The TOE maintains the following security attributes belonging to individual human users:
username, password and role.
The TOE provides authentication failure handling that allows administrators to configure the number of times a user
may attempt to login and the time that the user will be locked out if the configured number of attempts has been
surpassed. The TOE detects when the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has been surpassed,
and enforces the described behavior (locks the user account for a specified time period).
2.2.3.4 Security Monitoring with Security Information and Event Management (SIEM)
The TOE receives network packets, reconstructs network transactions, extracts metadata, and applies rules. The
rules identify interesting events, effectively matching signatures and performing statistical analysis. Likewise, the
TOE receives log data, parses the data, extracts metadata, correlates events, and applies rules. Through statistical
and signature analysis, the TOE can identify potential misuse or intrusions and send an alarm to incident
management SA views. The incident management SA views provide the analytical results to authorized users in a
manner suitable for the user to interpret the information. The analytical results are recorded with information such
as date and time. Only users with the Analysis and Administrator roles can read the metadata, raw logs, raw packet
data, and incident management data from the IDS data.
2.2.3.5 Security Management
Authorized administrators manage the security functions and TSF data of the TOE via the web-based User Interface.
The ST defines and maintains the administrative roles: Administrator, Analyst, Operator, SOC_Manager, and
Malware Analyst. Authorized administrators perform all security functions of the TOE including starting and
stopping the services and audit function, creating and managing user accounts, manage authentication failure
handling and session inactivity values and read the audit and analyzer data.
2.2.3.6 Protection of the TSF
The TOE provides protection mechanisms for its security functions. One of the protection mechanisms is that users
must authenticate and have the appropriate permissions before any administrative operations or access to TOE data
and resources can be performed on the TSF. The TOE is a collection of special-purpose appliances. Each appliance
provides only functions for the necessary operation of the TOE, and limits user access to authorized users with an
administrative role.
Communication with remote administrators is protected by TLS in FIPS mode, protecting against the disclosure and
undetected modification of data exchanged between the TOE and the administrator. The TOE runs in a FIPS
compliant mode of operation and uses FIPS-validated cryptographic modules.
2.2.3.7 TOE Access
The TOE terminates interactive sessions after administrative configured period of time. The TOE also allows user-
initiated termination of the user's own interactive session by closing the browser or explicitly logging off.
Before establishing a user session, the TOE displays an advisory warning message regarding unauthorized use of the
TOE.
2.2.3.8 Trusted path/channels
The TOE requires remote users to initiate a trusted communication path using TLS for initial user authentication.
The TOE also requires that the trusted path be used for the transmission of all SA interface session data. The use of
the trusted path provides assured identification of end points and protection of the communicated data from
modification, and disclosure. The TOE uses a FIPS-validated module for SSH protected communication pathways
for the transfer of file event source data from log data sources to the TOE. TLS and SSH ensure the administrative
session and file transfer communication pathways are secured from disclosure and modification.
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2.3 TOE Documentation
RSA has a number of administration and configuration guides for SA which include the following:
• System Security and User Management: https://community.rsa.com/docs/DOC-54481
• Licensing Guide: https://community.rsa.com/docs/DOC-54375
• Getting Started with Security Analytics Guide: https://community.rsa.com/docs/DOC-54482
• Host and Services Getting Started Guide: https://community.rsa.com/docs/DOC-54372
• Archiver Configuration Guide: https://community.rsa.com/docs/DOC-54367
• Broker and Concentrator Configuration Guide: https://community.rsa.com/docs/DOC-54368
• Decoder/Log Decoder Configuration Guide: https://community.rsa.com/docs/DOC-54371
• Event Stream Analysis (ESA) Configuration Guide: https://community.rsa.com/docs/DOC-54401
• RSA Security Analytics Alerting using ESA Guide: https://community.rsa.com/docs/DOC-54396.
• Malware Analysis Configuration Guide: https://community.rsa.com/docs/DOC-54490
• Incident Management Configuration Guide: https://community.rsa.com/docs/DOC-54373
• Reporting Engine Configuration Guide: https://community.rsa.com/docs/DOC-54395
• Virtual Host Setup Guide: https://community.rsa.com/docs/DOC-54405
• Event Source Management Guide:
• Log Collection Guide: https://community.rsa.com/docs/DOC-54588
• RSA Security Analytics System Maintenance Guide: https://community.rsa.com/docs/DOC-54404
• RSA Product Verification Checklist (Secure Acceptance Procedures): RSA portal/customer section
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3 Security Problem Definition
The TOE security environment describes the security aspects of the intended environment in which the TOE is to be
used and the manner in which it is expected to be employed. The statement of the TOE security environment defines
the following:
• Threats that the TOE and the environment of the TOE counter
• Assumptions made about the operational environment and the intended method of use for the TOE
The statement of TOE security environment does not include any Organizational Policies.
The TOE is intended to be used in environments where the relative assurance that its security functions are enforced
is commensurate with EAL 2 augmented with ALC_FLR.1 as defined in the CC.
3.1 Assumptions
The following conditions are assumed to exist in the operational environment.
3.1.1 Intended Usage Assumptions
A.AUDIT_PROTECTION The operational environment will provide the capability to protect audit information.
A.DATA_SOURCES The data sources in the environment provide complete and reliable data to the TOE.
A.TIME The environment will provide reliable time sources for use by the TOE.
3.1.2 Physical Assumptions
A.DEPLOY TOE Administrators will properly configure the network in the TOE operational
environment and configure adequate network capacity for the deployed TOE
components.
A.PHYSICAL The TOE hardware and software critical to the security policy enforcement will be
located within controlled access facilities which will prevent unauthorized physical
access.
3.1.3 Personnel Assumptions
A.MANAGE There will be one or more competent individuals assigned to manage the TOE and
the security of the information it contains.
A.TRUSTED_ADMIN TOE Administrators will follow and apply all administrator guidance in a trusted
manner.
A.USER Users will protect their authentication data.
3.2 Threats
T.MALICIOUS_ACTIVITY Malicious activity by an attacker may occur on the network the TOE monitors
may go undetected.
T.INADVERTENT_ACTIVITY Inadvertent activity and access by a user or a process that may occur on the
network the TOE monitors may go undetected.
T.MISUSE Unauthorized accesses and activity indicative of misuse by a user or a process
that may occur on the network the TOE monitors may go undetected.
T.TSF_COMPROMISE A user may cause, through an unsophisticated attack, TSF data, or security
functions to be inappropriately accessed (viewed, modified, or deleted).
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T.UNAUTHORIZED_ACCESS An unauthorized user may gain access to the TOE Security functions and data.
T.UNACCOUNTABLE_USERS Authorized users of the TOE might not be held accountable for their actions.
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4 Security Objectives
This chapter identifies the security objectives of the TOE and its environment. Security objectives identify the
responsibilities of the TOE and the support needed by the TOE from its environment.
4.1 Security Objectives for the TOE
O.ANALYZE The TOE will apply analytical processes and information to derive conclusions
about potential unauthorized/malicious intrusions and send appropriate alerts.
O.AUDIT_GENERATION: The TOE will provide the capability to detect and create records of security
relevant events associated with users.
O.AUDIT_PROTECTION: The TOE will provide the capability for protection of the audit information
from unauthorized users via the TOE interfaces.
O.MANAGE: The TOE will provide all the functions necessary to support the authorized
administrators in their management of the security of the TOE, and restrict these
functions from unauthorized use.
O.TOE_ACCESS The TOE will provide mechanisms that control a user’s logical access to the
TOE.
O.PROTECTED_COMMS The TOE will provide protected communication channels for remote
administrators, IT entities and for TOE device to TOE device communications.
4.2 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment
The TOE’s operating environment must satisfy the following objectives.
OE.AUDIT_PROTECTION The operational environment provides the capability to protect audit
information.
OE.DATA_SOURCES The data sources in the environment provide complete and reliable data to the
TOE.
OE.DEPLOY The TOE Administrators will properly configure the network in the TOE
operational environment and configure adequate network capacity for the
deployed TOE components
OE.MANAGE Personnel working as authorized administrators shall be carefully selected and
trained for proper operation of the TSF.
OE.PHYSICAL The TOE hardware and software critical to the security policy enforcement will
be located within controlled access facilities which will prevent unauthorized
physical access.
OE.TIME The environment provides reliable time sources for use by the TOE.
OE.TRUSTED_ADMIN TOE Administrators are trusted to follow and apply all administrator guidance
in a trusted manner.
OE.USER Users must ensure that their authentication data is held securely and not
disclosed to unauthorized persons.
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5 IT Security Requirements
The security requirements for the TOE have been drawn from Parts 2 and 3 of the Common Criteria. The security
functional requirements have been selected to correspond to the actual security functions implemented by the TOE
while the assurance requirements have been selected to offer a low to moderate degree of assurance that those
security functions are properly realized.
5.1 Extended Component Definition
This Security Target includes Security Functional Requirements (SFRs) that are not drawn from CC Part 2. These
Extended SFRs are identified by having a label ‘_EXT’ in the requirement name for TOE SFRs. The structure of
the extended SFRs is modeled after the SFRs included in CC Part 2. The structure is as follows:
A. Class – The extended SFRs included in this ST are part of the identified classes of requirements.
B. Family – The extended SFRs included in this ST are part of several SFR families including the new
families defined below.
C. Component – The extended SFRs are not hierarchical to any other components, though they may have
identifiers terminating on other than “1”. The dependencies for each extended component are
identified in the TOE SFR Dependencies section of this ST (Section 7.3, Requirement Dependency
Rationale).
5.1.1 Extended Family Definitions
5.1.1.1 Transport Layer Security Components
Class FCS: Cryptographic support
Family: Transport Layer Security (FCS_TLS)
Family Behavior
This family identifies the behavior of the TOE when the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol is
implemented. The TOE must implement one or more of the identified protocols and ciphersuites.
The FCS_TLS family contains one component.
Management:
There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit:
The following actions should be auditable if FAU_GEN Security audit data generation is included in the
PP/ST:
Basic:
• Failure to establish a TLS Session
• Establishment/Termination of a TLS session
5.1.1.1.1 Definition
FCS_TLS_EXT.1 – Transport Layer Security Protocol
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: None
FCS_TLS_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall implement the following protocols [selection: TLS 1.0, TLS 1.1, TLS 1.2)]
supporting the following ciphersuites:
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[selection:
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_ SHA256
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_ SHA256
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_ SHA256
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384
].
5.1.1.1.2 Extended Requirements Rationale:
FCS_TLS_EXT.1 is modeled on the standard component FCS_CKM.1: Cryptographic key generation.
FCS_TLS_EXT.1 needed to be defined as an extended family/component because the Transport Layer Security
functionality does not exist in the CC part 2.
5.1.1.2 SSH Protocol Components
Class FCS: Cryptographic support
Family: SSH Protocol (FCS_SSH)
Family Behavior
This family identifies the behavior of the TOE when the SSH protocol is implemented. The TOE must
implement one or more of the identified protocols and ciphersuites.
The FCS_SSH family contains one component with 6 elements.
Management:
There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit:
The following actions should be auditable if FAU_GEN Security audit data generation is included in the
PP/ST:
Basic:
• Failure to establish an SSH Session
• Establishment/Termination of an SSH session
5.1.1.2.1Definition
FCS_SSH_EXT.1 – SSH Protocol
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: None
FCS_SSH_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall implement the SSH protocol.
FCS_SSH_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall ensure that the SSH protocol implementation supports the following
authentication method as described in RFC 4252: [selection: password, public key-
based].
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FCS_SSH_EXT.1.3 The TSF shall ensure that the SSH transport implementation uses the following
encryption algorithms: AES-CBC-256, [selection: AES-CBC-128, AES-CBC-192, AES-
CTR-128, AES-CTR-192, AES-CTR-256, 3DES-CBC, no other algorithms].
FCS_SSH_EXT.1.4 The TSF shall ensure that the SSH transport implementation uses [selection: SSH_RSA,
SSH_DSS] and [selection: PGP-SIGN-RSA, PGP-SIGN-DSS, ecdsa-sha2-nistp384, no
other public key algorithms,] as its public key algorithm(s).
FCS_SSH_EXT.1.5 The TSF shall ensure that data integrity algorithms used in SSH transport connection is
[selection: hmac-sha1, hmac-sha1-96, hmac-sha2-256, hmac-sha2-512].
FCS_SSH_EXT.1.6 The TSF shall ensure that diffie-hellman-group14-sha1 is the only allowed key exchange
method used for the SSH protocol.
5.1.1.2.2Extended Requirements Rationale:
FCS_SSH_EXT.1 is modeled on the standard component FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation.
FCS_SSH_EXT.1 needed to be defined as an extended family/component because the SSH Protocol functionality
does not exist in the CC part 2
5.1.1.3 Intrusion Detection System
Class IDS: Intrusion Detection System
This class is defined specifically for the security functionality provided by the Security Analytics TOE that
is not defined in CC Part 2. This class of requirements covers the security functions provided by the TOE
regarding the analyzing and reporting (alerts) of the information from targeted IT System resource(s) (the
IT network monitored by the TOE). This functionality is typical of an Intrusion Detection System (IDS).
The IDS Class, Families and Components are modeled on the FAU Class, Families and Components
defined CC Part 2.
5.1.1.4 Analyzer
Family: Intrusion Detection System Analyzer analysis (IDS_ANL)
Family Behavior
This family defines the Security Analytics functionality to perform analysis on all log and network traffic
in the monitored network (IDS traffic). The TOE must also derive conclusions about potential intrusions
and record the result of the analysis.
The IDS_ANL family contains one component.
Management:
There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit:
There are no auditable events foreseen.
5.1.1.4.1 Definition
IDS_ANL_EXT.1 – Analyzer
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: none
IDS_ANL_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall perform the following analysis function(s) on IDS data:
a) [selection: statistical, signature, integrity]; and
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b) [assignment: other analytical functions].
Application Note: Statistical analysis involves identifying deviations from normal patterns of behavior. For
example, it may involve mean frequencies and measures of variability to identify abnormal or malicious
usage. Signature analysis involves the use of patterns corresponding to known attacks or misuse. For
example, patterns of System settings and user activity can be compared against a database of known
attacks. Integrity analysis involves comparing System settings or user activity at some point in time with
those of another point in time to detect differences.
IDS_ANL_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall record within each analytical result at least the following information:
a. Date and time of the result, type of result, identification of data source; and
b. [assignment: other security relevant information about the result].
5.1.1.4.2 Extended Requirements Rationale:
IDS_ANL_EXT.1 is modeled on the standard components from CC part 2 and needed to be defined as an extended
component because there is no requirement in the CC part 2 to cover this functionality of the TOE.
5.1.1.5 Analyzer React
Family: Intrusion Detection System Analyzer react (IDS_RCT)
Family Behavior
This family defines the Security Analytics functionality to send an alarm and perform other actions when
analysis of the network traffic in the monitored network (performed in IDS_ANL) indicates there have
been potential intrusions.
The IDS_RCT family contains one component.
Management:
There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit:
There are no auditable events foreseen.
5.1.1.5.1 Definition
IDS_RCT_EXT.1 – Analyzer React
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: IDS_ANL_EXT.1
IDS_RCT_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall send an alarm to [assignment: alarm destination] and take [assignment:
appropriate actions] when an intrusion is detected.
Application Note: There must be an alarm, though the ST should refine the nature of the alarm and
define its target (e.g., administrator console, audit log). The Analyser may optionally
perform other actions when intrusions are detected; these actions should be defined
in the ST. An intrusion in this requirement applies to any conclusions reached by the
analyser related to past, present, and future intrusions or intrusion potential.
5.1.1.5.2 Extended Requirements Rationale:
IDS_RCT_EXT.1 is modeled closely on the standard components from CC part 2 and needed to be defined as an
extended component because there is no requirement in the CC part 2 to cover this functionality of the TOE.
5.1.1.6 Restricted Data Review
Family: Intrusion Detection System Restricted Data Review (IDS_RDR)
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Family Behavior
This family defines the Security Analytics functionality for data analyzing tools that must be available to
authorized users to assist in the review of data collected from the monitoring network. This family indicates
that the TOE must provide authorized users the capability to obtain, review and interpret the information.
This family consists of two components.
Management:
There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit:
There are no auditable events foreseen.
5.1.1.6.1 Definition
IDS_RDR_EXT.1 – Restricted Data Review
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: IDS_ANL_EXT.1
IDS_RDR_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall provide [assignment: authorised users] with the capability to read
[assignment: list of IDS data] from the IDS data.
Application Note: This requirement applies to authorised users of the TSF. The requirement is left open for
the writers of the ST to define which authorised users may access what TSF data.
IDS_RDR_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall provide the IDS data in a manner suitable for the user to interpret the
information.
IDS_RDR_EXT.1.3 The TSF shall prohibit all users read access to the IDS data, except those users that have
been granted explicit read-access.
5.1.1.6.2 Extended Requirements Rationale:
IDS_RDR_EXT.1 is modeled closely on the standard components from CC part 2 (more specifically, this SFR is
modeled on FAU_SAR components) and needed to be defined as an extended component because there is no
requirement in the CC part 2 to cover this functionality of the TOE
5.2 TOE Security Functional Requirements
The following table identifies the SFRs that are satisfied by RSA Security Analytics.
Requirement Class Requirement Component
FAU: Security Audit FAU_GEN.1: Audit data generation
FAU_GEN.2: User identity association
FAU_SAR.1: Audit review
FAU_SAR.2: Restricted audit review
FAU_STG.1: Protected audit trail storage
FCS: Cryptographic support FCS_SSH_EXT.1: SSH Protocol
FCS_TLS_EXT.1: Transport Layer Security Protocol
FIA: Identification and
authentication
FIA_AFL.1: Authentication failure handling (Human user)
FIA_ATD.1: User attribute definition
FIA_UAU.1: Timing of authentication
FIA_UAU.5: Multiple authentication mechanisms
FIA_UID.1: Timing of identification
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Security Monitoring with Security
Information and Event
Management (SIEM)
IDS_ANL_EXT.1: Analyser analysis
IDS_RCT_EXT.1: Analyser react
IDS_RDR_EXT.1: Restricted Data Review
FMT: Security management FMT_MOF.1: Management of security functions behaviour
FMT_MTD.1: Management of TSF data
FMT_SMF.1: Specification of Management Functions
FMT_SMR.1: Security roles
FPT: Protection of the TSF FPT_ITT.1: Basic internal TSF data transfer protection
TOE Access FTA_SSL.3: TSF-initiated Termination
FTA_SSL.4: User-initiated Termination
FTA_TAB.1: Default TOE access banners
FTP: Trusted path/channels FTP_TRP.1: Trusted Path
Table 5-1 TOE Security Functional Components
5.2.1 Security audit (FAU)
5.2.1.1 Audit data generation (FAU_GEN.1)
FAU_GEN.1.1 The TSF shall be able to generate an audit record of the following auditable events:
a) Start-up and shutdown of the audit functions;
b) All auditable events for the [not specified] level of audit; and [
c) The specifically defined auditable events listed in Table 5-2 Auditable Events].
FAU_GEN.1.2 The TSF shall record within each audit record at least the following information:
a) Date and time of the event, type of event, subject identity, and the outcome
(success or failure) of the event; and
b) For each audit event type, based on the auditable event definitions of the
functional components included in the PP/ST, [information specified in column
three of Table 5-2 Auditable Events].
Table 5-2 Auditable Events
Security
Functional
Requirement
RSA Identified Auditable Event
Additional
Audit Record
Contents
FIA_AFL.1 Each failed authentication attempt is audited No additional
information
FIA_UAU.1 Failed login No additional
information
FIA_UAU.5 An SFTP connection will generate logs for both
failed and successful connections.
No additional
information
FIA_UID.1 Failed login No additional
information
FMT_SMF.1 Create, modify, delete users Module or Service
where audit record
originated
Connection
information (IP
address)
FMT_SMF.1 Configuration of the banner No additional
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Security
Functional
Requirement
RSA Identified Auditable Event
Additional
Audit Record
Contents
information
FMT_SMF.1 Create, modify LockBox password Module or Service
where audit record
originated
FMT_SMR.1 Creating/updating/enabling/disabling users;
Creating/updating roles
No additional
information
FTA_SSL.4 User logouts are audited, which terminates
session
No additional
information
FTP_TRP.1 Initiation of trusted channel (Successful logins)
FCS_TLS_EXT.1 or FIA_UAU.1 audit events
serve here since TLS and authentication are the
trusted path mechanisms.
No additional
information
Termination of trusted channel (User logouts)
FTA_SSL.4 audit events serve here since TLS
and authentication are the trusted path
mechanisms.
No additional
information
Failures of the trusted path functions (Failed
logins)
FCS_TLS_EXT.1 or FIA_UAU.1 audit events
serve here since TLS and authentication are the
trusted path mechanisms.
No additional
information
5.2.1.2 User identity association (FAU_GEN.2)
FAU_GEN.2.1 For audit events resulting from actions of identified users, the TSF shall be able to
associate each auditable event with the identity of the user that caused the event.
5.2.1.3 Audit review (FAU_SAR.1)
FAU_SAR.1.1 The TSF shall provide [Operator and Administrator] with the capability
to read [all audit information] from the audit records.
FAU_SAR.1.2 The TSF shall provide the audit records in a manner suitable for the user to interpret the
information.
5.2.1.4 Audit Restricted audit review (FAU_SAR.2)
FAU_SAR.2.1 The TSF shall prohibit all users read access to the audit records, except those users that
have been granted explicit read-access.
5.2.1.1 Protected audit trail storage (FAU_STG.1)
FAU_STG.1.1 The TSF shall protect the stored audit records in the audit trail from
unauthorised deletion.
FAU_STG.1.2 The TSF shall be able to [prevent] unauthorised modifications to the stored audit records
in the audit trail.
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5.2.2 Cryptographic Support (FCS)
5.2.2.1 SSH Protocol (FCS_SSH_EXT.1)
FCS_SSH_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall implement the SSH protocol.
FCS_SSH_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall ensure that the SSH protocol implementation supports the following
authentication method as described in RFC 4252: [public key-based].
FCS_SSH_EXT.1.3 The TSF shall ensure that the SSH transport implementation uses the following
encryption algorithms: AES-CBC-256, [AES-CBC-128, AES-CBC-192, AES-CTR-128,
AES-CTR-192, AES-CTR-256, 3DES-CBC].
FCS_SSH_EXT.1.4 The TSF shall ensure that the SSH transport implementation uses [SSH_RSA,
SSH_DSS] and [no other public key algorithms] as its public key algorithm(s).
FCS_SSH_EXT.1.5 The TSF shall ensure that data integrity algorithms used in SSH transport connection is
[hmac-sha1, hmac-sha1-96].
FCS_SSH_EXT.1.6 The TSF shall ensure that diffie-hellman-group14-sha1 is the only allowed key exchange
method used for the SSH protocol
5.2.2.2 Transport Layer Security Protocol (FCS_TLS_EXT.1)
FCS_TLS_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall implement the following protocols [TLS 1.2] supporting the following
ciphersuites: [
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA].
5.2.3 Identification and authentication (FIA)
5.2.3.1 Authentication failure handling (Human user) (FIA_AFL.1)
FIA_AFL.1.1 The TSF shall detect when [[an administrator configurable positive integer within [0 and no
maximum value]]] unsuccessful authentication attempts occur related to [SA UI user
authentication].
FIA_AFL.1.2 When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has
been [surpassed], the TSF shall [lock account for a specified time period as configured by
authorized administrator].
5.2.3.2 User attribute definition (FIA_ATD.1)
FIA_ATD.1.1 The TSF shall maintain the following list of security attributes belonging to individual
users: [
• Username;
• password; and
• role].
5.2.3.3 Timing of authentication (FIA_UAU.1)
FIA_UAU.1.1 The TSF shall allow [acknowledge end-user license agreement and view warning
banner] on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is authenticated.
FIA_UAU.1.2 The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before
allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
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5.2.3.4 Multiple authentication mechanisms (FIA_UAU.5)
FIA_UAU.5.1 The TSF shall provide [SSH public-key, and password-based authentication
mechanisms] to support user authentication.
FIA_UAU.5.2 The TSF shall authenticate any user’s claimed identity according to the [TOE users
authenticate using password-based and authorized IT entities authenticate using
SSH public-key authentication mechanisms].
5.2.3.5 Timing of identification (FIA_UID.1)
FIA_UID.1.1 The TSF shall allow [acknowledge end-user license agreement and view warning
banner] on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is identified.
FIA_UID.1.2 The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before
allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
5.2.4 Security Monitoring with Security Information and Event
Management
5.2.4.1 Analyzer analysis (IDS_ANL_EXT.1)
IDS_ANL_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall perform the following analysis function(s) on IDS data:
[statistical, signature]; and [no other analytical functions].
IDS_ANL_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall record within each analytical result at least the following information:
a. Date and time of the result, type of result, identification of data source; and
b. [no additional information]. _
5.2.4.2 Analyzer react (IDS_RCT_EXT.1)
IDS_RCT_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall send an alarm to [incident management SA views] and take [no other
action] when an intrusion is detected.
5.2.4.3 Restricted data review (IDS_RDR_EXT.1)
IDS_RDR_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall provide [Analyst and Administrator role] with the capability to read [all
metadata, raw logs, raw packet data, and Incident Management data] from the IDS
data.
IDS_RDR_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall provide the IDS data in a manner suitable for the user to interpret the
information.
IDS_RDR_EXT.1.3 The TSF shall prohibit all users read access to the IDS data, except those users that have
been granted explicit read-access.
5.2.5 Security management (FMT)
5.2.5.1 Management of security functions behaviour (FMT_MOF.1)
FMT_MOF.1.1 The TSF shall restrict the ability to [disable, enable] the functions [audit function, the
specified start/stop services (decoder, concentrator, broker, ESA, Archiver, Incident
Management, Malware Analysis, Reporting Engine, and Automated Threat
Detection)] to [Administrator, Operator].
5.2.5.2 Management of TSF data (FMT_MTD.1)
FMT_MTD.1.1 The TSF shall restrict the ability to [query, [manage]] the [TSF data] to [authorized
identified roles in Table 5-3 Management of TSF Data].
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Table 5-3: Management of TSF Data
TSF data Operation(s) Role
Login failure limit Change Administrator
Lockout period Change Administrator
Session inactivity period Change Administrator
User accounts Create, modify, delete Administrator
Security audit Read (query) Operators, Administrator
Analyzer data Read (query) Analysts, SOC_Manager
Malware Analysis data Read (query) Malware Analyst
Text (system settings) Enable/disable, customize Administrator
Devices Add. Remove Administrator
Log Decoder event
sources connections
Add, update, delete Administrator and Operator
Signatures Add, modify, remove Administrator and Operator
LockBox password for
Log Collectors
Create, modify Administrator and Operator
5.2.5.3 Specification of Management Functions (FMT_SMF.1)
FMT_SMF.1.1 The TSF shall be capable of performing the following security management functions: [
• Manage TSF functions as specified in FMT_MOF.1
• Manage TSF data as specified in FMT_MTD.1
• Manage security audit as specified in FMT_MTD.1, FAU_STG.1
].
5.2.5.4 Security roles (FMT_SMR.1)
FMT_SMR.1.1 The TSF shall maintain the roles: [
• Administrator
• Analyst
• Operator
• SOC_Manager
• Malware Analyst].
FMT_SMR.1.2 The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.
5.2.6 Protection of the TSF (FPT)
5.2.6.1 Basic internal TSF data transfer protection (FPT_ITT.1)
FPT_ITT.1.1 The TSF shall protect TSF data from [disclosure, modification] when it is transmitted
between separate parts of the TOE.
5.2.7 TOE Access (FTA)
5.2.7.1 TSF-initiated termination (FTA_SSL.3)
FTA_SSL.3.1 The TSF shall terminate an interactive session after a [time interval of user inactivity
configured by authorized administrator].
5.2.7.2 TSF-initiated termination (FTA_SSL.4)
FTA_SSL.4.1 The TSF shall allow user-initiated termination of the user’s own
interactive session.
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5.2.7.3 Default TOE access banners (FTA_TAB.1)
FTA_TAB.1.1 Before establishing a user session, the TSF shall display an advisory
warning message regarding unauthorised use of the TOE.
5.2.8 Trusted path/channels (FTP)
5.2.8.1 Trusted Path (FTP_TRP.1)
FTP_TRP.1.1 The TSF shall provide a communication path between itself and [remote administrative,
authorized IT entities] users that is logically distinct from other communication paths
and provides assured identification of its end points and protection of the communicated
data from [modification, disclosure].
FTP_TRP.1.2 The TSF shall permit [remote users, authorized IT entities] to initiate communication
via the trusted path.
FTP_TRP.1.3 The TSF shall require the use of the trusted path for [initial user authentication [all SA
interface session data, transfer of file event source data]].
5.3 TOE Security Assurance Requirements
The security assurance requirements for the TOE are the EAL 2 augmented with ALC_FLR.1 components as
specified in Part 3 of the Common Criteria. No operations are applied to the assurance components.
Requirement Class Requirement Component
ADV: Development ADV_ARC.1: Security architecture description
ADV_FSP.2: Security-enforcing functional specification
ADV_TDS.1: Basic design
AGD: Guidance documents AGD_OPE.1: Operational user guidance
AGD_PRE.1: Preparative procedures
ALC: Life-cycle support ALC_CMC.2: Use of a CM system
ALC_CMS.2 Parts of the TOE CM coverage
ALC_DEL.1: Delivery procedures
ALC_FLR.1: Basic flaw remediation
ASE: Security Target evaluation ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
ASE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
ASE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
ASE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification
ATE: Tests ATE_COV.1: Evidence of coverage
ATE_FUN.1: Functional testing
ATE_IND.2: Independent testing — sample
AVA: Vulnerability assessment AVA_VAN.2 Vulnerability analysis
Table 5-3 EAL2 Augmented with ALC_FLR.1 Assurance Components
5.3.1 Development (ADV)
5.3.1.1 Security architecture description (ADV_ARC.1)
ADV_ARC.1.1d The developer shall design and implement the TOE so that the security features of the TSF cannot
be bypassed.
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ADV_ARC.1.2d The developer shall design and implement the TSF so that it is able to protect itself from
tampering by untrusted active entities.
ADV_ARC.1.3d The developer shall provide a security architecture description of the TSF.
ADV_ARC.1.1c The security architecture description shall be at a level of detail commensurate with the
description of the SFR-enforcing abstractions described in the TOE design document.
ADV_ARC.1.2c The security architecture description shall describe the security domains maintained by the TSF
consistently with the SFRs.
ADV_ARC.1.3c The security architecture description shall describe how the TSF initialization process is secure.
ADV_ARC.1.4c The security architecture description shall demonstrate that the TSF protects itself from tampering.
ADV_ARC.1.5c The security architecture description shall demonstrate that the TSF prevents bypass of the SFR-
enforcing functionality.
ADV_ARC.1.1e The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and
presentation of evidence.
5.3.1.2 Security-enforcing functional specification (ADV_FSP.2)
ADV_FSP.2.1d The developer shall provide a functional specification.
ADV_FSP.2.2d The developer shall provide a tracing from the functional specification to the SFRs.
ADV_FSP.2.1c The functional specification shall completely represent the TSF.
ADV_FSP.2.2c The functional specification shall describe the purpose and method of use for all TSFI.
ADV_FSP.2.3c The functional specification shall identify and describe all parameters associated with each TSFI.
ADV_FSP.2.4c For each SFR-enforcing TSFI, the functional specification shall describe the SFR-enforcing
actions associated with the TSFI.
ADV_FSP.2.5c For each SFR-enforcing TSFI, the functional specification shall describe direct error messages
resulting from processing associated with the SFR-enforcing actions.
ADV_FSP.2.6c The tracing shall demonstrate that the SFRs trace to TSFIs in the functional specification.
ADV_FSP.2.1e The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and
presentation of evidence.
ADV_FSP.2.2e The evaluator shall determine that the functional specification is an accurate and complete
instantiation of the SFRs.
5.3.1.3 Basic design (ADV_TDS.1)
ADV_TDS.1.1d The developer shall provide the design of the TOE.
ADV_TDS.1.2d The developer shall provide a mapping from the TSFI of the functional specification to the lowest
level of decomposition available in the TOE design.
ADV_TDS.1.1c The design shall describe the structure of the TOE in terms of subsystems.
ADV_TDS.1.2c The design shall identify all subsystems of the TSF.
ADV_TDS.1.3c The design shall describe the behaviour of each SFR-supporting or SFR-non-interfering TSF
subsystem in sufficient detail to determine that it is not SFR-enforcing.
ADV_TDS.1.4c The design shall summarise the SFR-enforcing behaviour of the SFR-enforcing subsystems.
ADV_TDS.1.5c The design shall provide a description of the interactions among SFR-enforcing subsystems of the
TSF, and between the SFR-enforcing subsystems of the TSF and other subsystems of the TSF.
ADV_TDS.1.6c The mapping shall demonstrate that all TSFIs trace to the behaviour described in the TOE design
that they invoke.
ADV_TDS.1.1e The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and
presentation of evidence.
ADV_TDS.1.2e The evaluator shall determine that the design is an accurate and complete instantiation of all
security functional requirements.
5.3.2 Guidance documents (AGD)
5.3.2.1 Operational user guidance (AGD_OPE.1)
AGD_OPE.1.1d The developer shall provide operational user guidance.
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AGD_OPE.1.1c The operational user guidance shall describe, for each user role, the user-accessible functions and
privileges that should be controlled in a secure processing environment, including appropriate
warnings.
AGD_OPE.1.2c The operational user guidance shall describe, for each user role, how to use the available interfaces
provided by the TOE in a secure manner.
AGD_OPE.1.3c The operational user guidance shall describe, for each user role, the available functions and
interfaces, in particular all security parameters under the control of the user, indicating secure
values as appropriate.
AGD_OPE.1.4c The operational user guidance shall, for each user role, clearly present each type of security-
relevant event relative to the user-accessible functions that need to be performed, including
changing the security characteristics of entities under the control of the TSF.
AGD_OPE.1.5c The operational user guidance shall identify all possible modes of operation of the TOE (including
operation following failure or operational error), their consequences and implications for
maintaining secure operation.
AGD_OPE.1.6c The operational user guidance shall, for each user role, describe the security measures to be
followed in order to fulfil the security objectives for the operational environment as described in
the ST.
AGD_OPE.1.7c The operational user guidance shall be clear and reasonable.
AGD_OPE.1.1e The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and
presentation of evidence.
5.3.2.2 Preparative procedures (AGD_PRE.1)
AGD_PRE.1.1d The developer shall provide the TOE including its preparative procedures.
AGD_PRE.1.1c The preparative procedures shall describe all the steps necessary for secure acceptance of the
delivered TOE in accordance with the developer’s delivery procedures.
AGD_PRE.1.2c The preparative procedures shall describe all the steps necessary for secure installation of the TOE
and for the secure preparation of the operational environment in accordance with the security
objectives for the operational environment as described in the ST.
AGD_PRE.1.1e The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and
presentation of evidence.
AGD_PRE.1.2e The evaluator shall apply the preparative procedures to confirm that the TOE can be prepared
securely for operation.
5.3.3 Life-cycle support (ALC)
5.3.3.1 Use of a CM system (ALC_CMC.2)
ALC_CMC.2.1dThe developer shall provide the TOE and a reference for the TOE.
ALC_CMC.2.2dThe developer shall provide the CM documentation.
ALC_CMC.2.3dThe developer shall use a CM system.
ALC_CMC.2.1c The TOE shall be labelled with its unique reference.
ALC_CMC.2.2c The CM documentation shall describe the method used to uniquely identify the configuration
items.
ALC_CMC.2.3c The CM system shall uniquely identify all configuration items.
ALC_CMC.2.1e The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and
presentation of evidence.
5.3.3.2 Parts of the TOE CM coverage (ALC_CMS.2)
ALC_CMS.2.1d The developer shall provide a configuration list for the TOE.
ALC_CMS.2.1c The configuration list shall include the following: The TOE itself; the evaluation evidence
required by the SARs; and the parts that comprise the TOE.
ALC_CMS.2.2c The configuration list shall uniquely identify the configuration items.
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ALC_CMS.2.3c For each TSF relevant configuration item, the configuration list shall indicate the developer of the
item.
ALC_CMS.2.1e The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and
presentation of evidence.
5.3.3.3 Delivery procedures (ALC_DEL.1)
ALC_DEL.1.1d The developer shall document and provide procedures for delivery of the TOE or parts of it to the
consumer.
ALC_DEL.1.2d The developer shall use the delivery procedures.
ALC_DEL.1.1c The delivery documentation shall describe all procedures that are necessary to maintain security
when distributing versions of the TOE to the consumer.
ALC_DEL.1.1e The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and
presentation of evidence.
5.3.3.4 Systematic flaw remediation (ALC_FLR.1)
ALC_FLR.1.1d The developer shall document and provide flaw remediation procedures addressed to TOE
developers.
ALC_FLR.1.1c The flaw remediation procedures documentation shall describe the procedures used to track all
reported security flaws in each release of the TOE.
ALC_FLR.1.2c The flaw remediation procedures shall require that a description of the nature and effect of each
security flaw be provided, as well as the status of finding a correction to that flaw.
ALC_FLR.1.3c The flaw remediation procedures shall require that corrective actions be identified for each of the
security flaws.
ALC_FLR.1.4c The flaw remediation procedures documentation shall describe the methods used to provide flaw
information, corrections and guidance on corrective actions to TOE users.
ALC_FLR.1.1e The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and
presentation of evidence.
5.3.4 Tests (ATE)
5.3.4.1 Evidence of coverage (ATE_COV.1)
ATE_COV.1.1d The developer shall provide evidence of the test coverage.
ATE_COV.1.1c The evidence of the test coverage shall show the correspondence between the tests in the test
documentation and the TSFIs in the functional specification.
ATE_COV.1.1e The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and
presentation of evidence.
5.3.4.2 Functional testing (ATE_FUN.1)
ATE_FUN.1.1d The developer shall test the TSF and document the results.
ATE_FUN.1.2d The developer shall provide test documentation.
ATE_FUN.1.1c The test documentation shall consist of test plans, expected test results and actual test results.
ATE_FUN.1.2c The test plans shall identify the tests to be performed and describe the scenarios for performing
each test. These scenarios shall include any ordering dependencies on the results of other tests.
ATE_FUN.1.3c The expected test results shall show the anticipated outputs from a successful execution of the
tests.
ATE_FUN.1.4c The actual test results shall be consistent with the expected test results.
ATE_FUN.1.1e The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and
presentation of evidence.
5.3.4.3 Independent testing — sample (ATE_IND.2)
ATE_IND.2.1d The developer shall provide the TOE for testing.
ATE_IND.2.1c The TOE shall be suitable for testing.
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ATE_IND.2.2c The developer shall provide an equivalent set of resources to those that were used in the
developer’s functional testing of the TSF.
ATE_IND.2.1e The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and
presentation of evidence.
ATE_IND.2.2e The evaluator shall execute a sample of tests in the test documentation to verify the developer test
results.
ATE_IND.2.3e The evaluator shall test a subset of the TSF to confirm that the TSF operates as specified.
5.3.5 Vulnerability assessment (AVA)
5.3.5.1 Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VAN.2)
AVA_VAN.2.1d The developer shall provide the TOE for testing.
AVA_VAN.2.1c The TOE shall be suitable for testing.
AVA_VAN.2.1e The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and
presentation of evidence.
AVA_VAN.2.2e The evaluator shall perform a search of public domain sources to identify potential vulnerabilities
in the TOE.
AVA_VAN.2.3e The evaluator shall perform an independent vulnerability analysis of the TOE using the guidance
documentation, functional specification, TOE design and security architecture description to
identify potential vulnerabilities in the TOE.
AVA_VAN.2.4e The evaluator shall conduct penetration testing, based on the identified potential vulnerabilities, to
determine that the TOE is resistant to attacks performed by an attacker possessing Basic attack
potential.
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6 TOE Summary Specification
This chapter describes the following security functions:
• Security audit
• Cryptographic support
• Identification and authentication
• Security Monitoring with Security Information and Event Management (SIEM)
• Security management
• Protection of the TSF
• TOE Access
• Trusted path/channels
6.1 Security audit
The TOE generates audit records for the following auditable events:
• Start-up and shutdown of the audit function,
• Start-up and shutdown of the TOE,
• All auditable events as specified in Table 5-2 Auditable Events in Section 5.2.1.1.
Each audit record includes the date and time of the event, type of event, subject identity, and the outcome (success
or failure) of the event.
The operating system in the environment provides protection, and storage of the audit records. The operating
system also provides the system clock information that is used by the TOE to timestamp each audit record. The audit
records are stored on the local file system of the host appliance. The TOE is a multi-host distributed architecture,
where the TOE subsystems run on a number of hosts. The audit records are stored on the local file system of the
host on which the related auditable event is detected. Consequently, the aggregate audit record for an entire TOE
system is distributed across multiple hosts, rather than being stored in a single location.
The TOE provides a web-based SA Server UI, through which an authorized user with the Operator or Administrator
role has the ability to read all audit information from the audit records on each appliance. Additionally, the TOE
does not provide any interfaces to delete or modify audit records.
The TOE relies upon the environment to provide typical operating system file services including protected data
storage. The TOE relies upon the operating system in the operational environment to provide the file system which
allows the TOE to store information securely. The TOE relies upon the environment to prevent unauthorized
modification or deletion of the audit files.
The TOE does not provide the ability to start and stop the audit mechanism independently from the starting and
stopping of the services. The audit mechanism is started and stopped when the service is started and stopped. The
TOE generates an audit event when each service is started and stopped.
The Security audit function is designed to satisfy the following security functional requirements:
• FAU_GEN.1: Audit records are generated for security relevant events and include the date and time of the
event, type of event, subject identity, outcome of the event, and other data identified earlier in this section.
• FAU_GEN.2: The TOE associates each auditable event resulting from actions of identified users with the
identity of the user that caused the event.
• FAU_SAR.1: The TOE provides users with the Operator and Administrator roles with the capability to
read all audit information from the audit records. The TSF provides the audit records in a manner suitable
for the user to interpret the information.
• FAU_SAR.2: The TOE prohibits all users read access to the audit records, except those users that have
been granted explicit read-access.
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• FAU_STG.1: The TOE does not provide the capability to delete or modify audit records. Hence, the TOE
protects the stored audit records in the audit trail from unauthorised deletion. The TOE is able to prevent
unauthorised modifications to the stored audit records in the audit trail.
6.2 Cryptographic support
The TOE uses cryptography to support the protection of the following types of communication pathways:
• Administrative login and management sessions, and
• TOE appliance to TOE appliance and
• File event source to Log Collector.
A remote administrative management session is initiated by a login and occurs only over HTTPS using TLS (TLS
version 1.2 in FIPS mode). The TOE performs TLS cryptographic operations in a FIPS-compliant mode of operation
using a FIPS-validated cryptographic module. TOE to TOE communication occurs for the purpose of TOE
device/appliance communication with one another. Each instance of the TOE ensures that such communication
occurs only over a TLS in FIPS mode protected communication pathway.
The TOE uses the RSA BSAFE Crypto-J cryptographic library: BSAFE SSL-J 6.1.3.1 for Java applications, which
incorporates BSAFE Crypto-J 6.1. The latter is certified under FIPS 140-2 Certificate #2058, which also falls under
Consolidated Validation Certificate #0036. The Lockbox uses the Common Security Toolkit, version 3.1. RSA
BSAFE Micro Edition Suite version 4.1.2, and is covered by Certificates #2300 and 2294.7 The lockbox uses
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA and TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256.
The TOE uses a FIPS-validated module for SSH protected communication pathways for the transfer of file event
source data from log data sources to the TOE. The TOE implements the SSH protocol and supports public key-based
authentication as described in RFC 4252. The TSF uses the following encryption algorithms: AES-CBC-256, AES-
CBC-128, AES-CBC-192, AES-CTR-128, AES-CTR-192, AES-CTR-256, 3DES-CBC for SSH transport. The SSH
transport implementation uses SSH_RSA, SSH_DSS public key algorithms; and hmac-sha1 and hmac-sha1-96 data
integrity algorithms for the SSH transport connection. Diffie-hellman-group14-sha1 is the key exchange method
used for the SSH protocol.
The TOE uses RSA BSAFE Micro Edition Suite version 4.1.2, which has undergone a FIPS 140-2 certification
(certificate #2300/2294) for both SSH and TLS. The TOE operates in FIPS mode in the evaluated configuration.
The FIPS cryptographic functionality must be enabled to place the product into FIPS-compliant mode with strong
cipher suite.
The TOE implements TLS version 1.2 as specified by RFC 5246 using the following ciphersuites.
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA (used only by Archiver, Concentrator (packet and log), Log
Collector Deployed separately from Decoder, Decoder (packet and log (with collector)))
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA (used by all TOE components: SA Server, ESA/ATD, Report
Engine, Malware Analysis, Archiver, Incident Management, Concentrator (packet and log), Log Collector
Deployed separately from Decoder, Decoder (packet and log)
• TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA (used only by Archiver, Concentrator (packet and log),
Log Collector Deployed separately from Decoder, Decoder (packet and log(with collector)))
• TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA (used only by Archiver, Concentrator (packet and log),
Log Collector Deployed separately from Decoder, Decoder (packet and log (with collector)))
The Cryptographic support function is designed to satisfy the following security functional requirements:
• FCS_SSH_EXT.1: The TOE implements the SSH protocol according to RFC 4252 for public key-based
and using the algorithms and key exchange method as described in the text above.
7 Lockbox protects the passwords required for some Log Sources by encryption (using a FIPS-validated
cryptographic module). This protection does not contribute to satisfying any TOE security functional requirements.
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• FCS_TLS_EXT.1: The TOE implements TLS Version 1.2 protocol which is used as described in the text
above. The TOE implementation of TLS provides the ciphersuites listed above.
6.3 Identification and authentication
The TOE maintains user accounts for the authorized users of the TOE and a list of security attributes for each user
which includes the username, role membership, and password. The TOE maintains the security relevant roles of
Administrator, Operator, Analyst, SOC_Manager, and Malware Analyst.
The TOE requires users to provide unique identification and passwords before any access to the TOE is granted
other than acknowledging the end-user license agreement and viewing the warning banner. The TOE authenticates
claimed identities for TOE users using password-based mechanisms and for authorized IT entities using SSH public-
key authentication mechanisms. IT entities are log collection sources that have been configured to send logs to the
TOE. SSH public-key authentication is used when log sources send file event sources (SFTP).
The TOE maintains role and user attributes on each device. The TOE associates attributes with a user through SA
Server login and SA trusted connections. The SA server login authenticates the identity of a human user and SA
trusted management connections initiated by administrators by providing the user identity from the SA server to
other SA devices. SA trusted connections use client authentication for TLS connections. For example, when SA
server establishes an SA trusted connection to a Concentrator, the Concentrator (TLS server) authenticates the SA
server (TLS client). Once authenticated, the SA server provides the Concentrator with the user’s authenticated
identity and roles. TOE devices will trust the certificate of the SA server when an administrator has added the TLS
client’s PEM encoded certificate to the server’s trusted peer list. When the Concentrator then subsequently
establishes a connection to other devices, it will present an authentication token for the user, which contains the
username, and role. If the device recognizes the TLS client device’s certificate as trusted and if the role is defined
locally, it will allow the user access. If the TLS server device does not accept the TLS client device’s certificate,
then the client must authenticate by providing the username and role(s) for that session. If a role is not defined
locally, it is ignored. For example for Archiver, Log Collector, Log and Packet Decoder/Concentrator; if the device
does not have the role defined it is ignored and SA Server has to connect using the legacy method (present
usrname/passwd credentials). For all other devices/services (that is, Broker, ESA, Malware Analysis devices) trust
is determined as follows. If the TLS client device reports user “tim” has roles “A”, “B”, “C” but the TLS server
device only defines roles “X” and “Y” then when user tim makes an API call the API call will be rejected on any
APIs that are controlled with roles “X” and “Y”. The SA Server acts as the TLS client and the device acts as the
TLS server. The device uses the SA Server certificate in the TLS exchange to authenticate the SA Server. The TLS
client device does not authenticate the TLS server device.
Once access to the TOE is granted, authorization to access functions and data is implemented via the user’s role
membership. User roles are the central point of authorization in the TOE’s security model. User roles are created
with a specific set of permissions which apply to all users assigned to the role.
The TOE is able to detect when an administrator configurable positive integer of unsuccessful authentication
attempts occur related to SA Server UI user authentication. When the defined number of unsuccessful
authentication attempts has been surpassed, the TOE locks the user account for a specified time period as configured
by authorized administrator. The range of time values which can be configured for the maximum number of login
attempts is min 0, no max and default is 5 (Maximum number of login attempts allowed before an account is locked
out is 5). The range of time values which can be configured for the lockout time is min 0, no max and default is 20
minutes (Period of time where locked out accounts remain locked out). Note that 0 means lockout is disabled. Once
the session is locked and the timeframe for locking the session has passed the user may log back in by providing
their username and password. When an unsuccessful authentication attempt has been detected the TOE audits the
failed authentication attempt.
The Identification and authentication function is designed to satisfy the following security functional requirements:
• FIA_AFL.1: The TOE is able to detect when an administrator configurable positive integer of unsuccessful
authentication attempts occur related to SA UI user authentication. When the defined number of
unsuccessful authentication attempts has been surpassed, the TOE locks the user account for a specified
time period as configured by authorized administrator.
• FIA_ATD.1: The TOE maintains a list of security attributes: Username, password, role for individual users.
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• FIA_UAU.1: The TOE allows “acknowledge end-user license agreement and view warning banner” on
behalf of the user to be performed before the user is authenticated. Otherwise the TOE requires each user
to be successfully authenticated before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
• FIA_UAU.5: The TOE provides SSH public-key, and password-based authentication mechanisms to
support user authentication. The TOE authenticates claimed identities for TOE users using password-based
and for authorized IT entities using SSH public-key authentication mechanisms.
• FIA_UID.1: The TOE allows “acknowledge end-user license agreement and view warning banner” on
behalf of the user to be performed before the user is identified. Otherwise the TOE requires each user to be
successfully identified before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
6.4 Security Monitoring with Security Information and Event
Management
The TOE accepts network and log data and analyzes the data for anomalous and inappropriate activity. The TOE:
• Reconstructs network traffic,
• Parses network traffic and log data to identify metadata,
• Analyzes and adds metadata with Decoder rules and feeds,
• Indexes metadata on the Concentrator for analysis,
• Analyzes metadata by applying ESA, Malware Analysis, and ATD rules,
• Generates an alert when a scoring threshold is met or when a rule matches.
The parsers, indices, and rules encapsulate signatures of anomalous and inappropriate activity. Feeds are used to
create metadata based on externally defined metadata values. The analysis process includes signature analysis and
malware analysis when indicated. The TOE identifies known patterns based on parsed metadata from transactions.
The out of the box rules identify patterns representing known attacks. Additional rule content is developed
specifically for threats and can include a file type rule which when matched would result in Malware Analysis
processing. Malware analysis uses network session analysis, and static file analysis to check for malware. The
device can perform continuous or on-demand polling to extract sessions identified as potentially carrying malware.
There are three types of Decoder rules: Correlation, Network, and Application.
Basic Correlation Rules are applied at the session level and alert the user to specific activities that may be occurring
in their environment. Correlation rules are applied over a configurable slice of time on a Decoder. When the
conditions are met, alert metadata is created for this activity and there is a visible indicator of the suspicious activity.
Network rules do not apply to Log Decoders. Network layer rules are applied at the packet level on a Decoder and
are made up of rule sets from Layer 2 ‐ Layer 4. Network rules can apply to multiple network layers (for example,
when a network rule filters out specific ports for a specific IP address).
Application rules can be applied to both Decoders and Log Decoders. Application layer rules are applied at the
session level. Rule conditions trigger an action when matched. One of the following actions is applied when a
matching packet is found depending on the defined rule.
• Keep: The packet payload and associated meta are saved when they match the rule.
• Filter: The packet is not saved when it matches the rule.
• Truncate: The packet payload is not saved when it matches the rule, but packet headers and associated meta
are retained.
• Alert: The packet payload and associated meta are saved and an alert is triggered when they match the rule.
Automated Threat Detection service residing on ESA applies rule logic using behavior-based statistical algorithms
to analyze metadata to identify outliers, abnormal behavior, and malicious activity. The current algorithms and rules
focus on metadata associated with network http traffic but the service is built to allow for expansion to add
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additional algorithms and rules for other types of data. ESA ingests metadata from the Concentrators and utilizes the
metadata for both for ESA rules and Automated Threat Detection. The service only selects metadata associated with
algorithms/rules it had loaded for its analysis. As data is analyzed, certain behaviors (or conditions) are checked, and
if behaviors or conditions occur, it moves to the next step in the process. The following includes some examples of
the workflow and behaviors or conditions. (IDS_ANL.1)
• Whitelist is checked- If a whitelist was created, the ESA checks this list to rule out domains. If a domain in
the event is whitelisted, the event is ignored.
• The domain profile is checked - Automated Threat Detection checks to see if the domain is newly seen
(approximately three days), has few source IP connections, has many connections without a referer, or has
connections with a rare user agent. If one or several of these conditions is true, the domain is next checked
for periodic beaconing.
• The domain is checked for periodic beaconing. Beaconing occurs when the malware regularly sends
communications back to the command and control server to notify it that a machine has been compromised
and the malware is awaiting further instructions. If the site displays beaconing behavior, then the domain
registration information is checked.
• Domain registration information is checked. WHOIS is used to see if the domain is recently registered or
nearly expired. Domains that have a very short lifespan are often hallmarks of malware.
• Command and control (C2) aggregates scores. Each of the above factors generates a separate score which
is weighted to denote various levels of importance. The weighted scores determine if an alert should be
generated. If an alert is generated, the aggregated alerts appear in the Incident Manager and can then be
investigated further from there.
The TOE is capable of receiving events from different source types (e.g. Syslog, SNMP Trap, NetFlow…) covering
over 350 specific devices. RSA content team authors rules for parsing content from a particular device (Log
Decoder). These parser rules make up the signatures for log events (and network packets) to be collected
(IDS_ANL.1). Parsing rules or signatures are included for the following event sources:
a. Syslog
b. SNMP Trap
c. NetFlow
d. File
e. Windows (WinRM)
f. Windows (Legacy)
g. ODBC
h. Check Point LEA
i. VMWare
j. SDEE
k. CloudTrail
Note: LockBox protects credentials for log sources, but the functionality does not implement any security functional
requirements. The TOE protects log source by encryption (using a FIPS-validated cryptographic module). This
protection does not contribute to satisfying any TOE security functional requirements.
Categories of ESA Rules (out of the box):
• Log Events with certain criteria
• Active Directory Policy Modification
• Adapter Events
• Backdoor Activity
• Brute Force Login
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• Traffic detection with certain criteria
• Port Activity and port scan
• Login and attempted login activity including account lockouts
• DNS activity
• Account creation and password changes
• Connection attempts
• Scan Events
• P2P Software detection
• Privilege escalation
• Configuration changes
• Windows account creation with subsequent management activity
• Windows audit log cleared
Malware Analysis Rules / Methodologies (out of the box):
• Network Session Analysis: metadata check: attribution checks (e.g. from China, new domain, …) and
scores metadata.
• Static File Analysis: 2000 rules consisting of WinPE, Office, and PDF checks such as Payload, Header,
High-Risk scripting, Obfuscation, Artifacts, Country, and Meta.
Automated Threat Detection Rules (out of the box):
• HTTP network traffic Analysis: metadata is analyzed for possible command and control activity.
Analytical results are recorded with the following information: date and time of the result, type of result, and
identification of data source. Type of result corresponds to the rule that generates an alert. There are original data
sources and metadata sources. The original sources are from the operational environment (Cisco, Juniper, etc.). The
metadata sources are internal to SA and are also identified in the user interface. It is the original sources that
correspond to data source in the requirement.
The TOE uses results of the analysis to determine whether or not to send an alarm. If analysis identifies potential
intrusion, malware or misuse an alarm (alert) is sent to the incident management SA views (IDS_RCT.1).
‘intrusions’ are anomalous events or events that merit further investigation. Authorized administrators can view,
and work with alarm notifications via the incident management menu available remotely through the SA Server
User Interface (UI). The IDS data (metadata, raw logs, raw packet data, and incident management data) can also be
viewed from the UI by users with the Analyst and Administrator administrative roles. The data are provided in a
readable format to authorized users (IDS_RDR.1). Updates to the rules can be obtained by licensed customers at the
vendor’s website Live. Only authorized Administrators are permitted to download these updates.
The Security Monitoring with Security Information and Event Management function is designed to satisfy the
following security functional requirements:
• IDS_ANL_EXT.1: The TOE performs statistical and signature analysis on IDS data. The TOE records
within each analytical result the following information: date and time of the result, type of result, and
identification of the data source.
• IDS_RCT_EXT.1: The TOE sends an alarm to incident management SA views when an intrusion is
detected.
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• IDS_RDR_EXT.1: The TOE provides the Analyst and Administrator roles with the capability to read all
metadata, raw logs, raw packet data, rules, and incident management data from the IDS data. The TOE
provides the IDS data in a manner suitable for the user to interpret the information. The TOE prohibits all
users read access to the IDS data, except those users that have been granted explicit read-access.
6.5 Security management
The ST defines the Administrator, Analyst, Operator, SOC_Manager, and Malware Analyst roles to distinguish
users who can perform various security management functions. The TOE defines roles with various security
management functions protected with privileges. A user that is assigned a role has the associated privileges assigned
to that role and can perform those associated security management functions. Note that internally, some TOE
components associate groups to users. However these groups are essentially the same as the roles previously
described differing only in reference (e.g. group rather than role).
Only authorized administrators with the Administrator role can create, modify, or delete users. The ability to query
and manage the TSF data is restricted to the users as identified in Table 5-3: Management of TSF Data in Section
5.2.5.2.
The SA Server UI Interface provides the interface through which the authorized administrator manages the security
functions of the TOE and the TSF data. There are no local administrative interfaces provided in the evaluated
configuration for either management or installation. Only authorized administrators with the Administrator or
Operator role can start/stop services and start or stop the Audit function. Users with the Operator role only have
permissions to those services explicitly assigned to them by the user with the Administrator role. User accounts are
per service. The Administrator should not create an account for the Analyst or Operator on services they should not
have access to.
The Security management function is designed to satisfy the following security functional requirements:
• FMT_MOF.1: The TOE restricts the ability to disable, enable, the audit function, start/stop services
(Decoder, Concentrator, Broker, ESA, …) functions to the authorised identified roles. Starting and
stopping the services also starts and stops the Audit collection function as each TOE appliance/service
generates its own audit records.
• FMT_MTD.1: The TOE restricts the ability to query and manage the TSF data to the authorised identified
roles.
• FMT_SMF.1: The TOE provides management functions identified in the text above to support the
authorised identified role’s ability to manage the TSF data, functions, and security audit as described in the
above section.
• FMT_SMR.1: The TOE maintains the security roles: Administrator, Analyst, Operator, SOC_Manager, and
Malware Analyst. The TSF is able to associate users with roles.
6.6 Protection of the TSF
The TOE uses TLS in FIPS-compliant mode to protect the TSF data transmitted between distributed parts of the
TOE. This protection is enforced across all TOE Device components/appliances (e.g. device to device). The data
that is protected across the communication channel consist of audit data, and collected data: all metadata, raw logs,
raw packet data, rules, and incident management data. TLS is automatically configured in FIPS mode which is the
evaluated configuration mode.
The Protection of the TSF function is designed to satisfy the following security functional and assurance
requirements:
• FPT_ITT.1: The TOE utilizes TLS to protect data transmitted between distributed parts of the TOE (Device
to Device only).
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6.7 TOE Access
The TOE terminates an interactive session after a time interval of user inactivity configured by an authorized
administrator. Authorized administrators can configure the interval to be between min 0 and no max but default is
600 (Expiry for all sessions in minutes) via the remote administrative GUI interface. Note that zero is permitted,
which disables lockout. An interactive remote session that is inactive (i.e., no commands issued and no activity from
the remote client browser to the SA Server UI) for the defined timeout value will be terminated.
The TOE allows user-initiated termination of the user’s own interactive session by closing the browser or explicitly
logging off.
Before establishing an interactive user session, the TOE displays an advisory warning message regarding
unauthorised use of the TOE.
The TOE access function is designed to satisfy the following security functional requirements:
• FTA_SSL.3: The TOE terminates an interactive session after a time interval of user inactivity configured
by an authorized administrator.
• FTA_SSL.4: The TOE allows user-initiated termination of the user’s own interactive session.
• FTA_TAB.1: Before establishing a user session, the TSF shall display an advisory warning message
regarding unauthorised use of the TOE.
6.8 Trusted path/channels
The TOE requires an HTTPS connection for remote users to authenticate to the TOE from a browser that is part of
the environment. To successfully establish an interactive administrative session, the administrator must be able to
provide acceptable user credentials (e.g., user id and password), after which they will be able to access the GUI
interface. This initial authentication action occurs over TLS in FIPS mode negotiated using the ciphers defined as
valid for a TLS in FIPS mode session as described in section 6.2. Subsequently, all SA interface session data
transmission also occurs over TLS. The TOE uses a FIPS-validated module for SSH protected communication
pathways for the transfer of file event source data from log data sources to the TOE. TLS and SSH ensure the
administrative session and file transfer communication pathways are secured from disclosure and modification.
The Trusted path/channels function is designed to satisfy the following security functional requirements:
• FTP_TRP.1: The TOE provides a communication path between itself and remote administrative and
authorized IT Entity users that is logically distinct from other communication paths and provides assured
identification of its end points and protection of the communicated data from modification and disclosure.
• FTP_TRP.1: The TOE permits remote administrative and authorized IT Entity users to initiate
communication via the trusted path.
• FTP_TRP.1: The TOE requires the use of the trusted path for initial user authentication, all SA interface
session data, and for the transfer of file event source data from log data sources to the TOE.
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7 Rationale
This section provides the rationale for completeness and consistency of the Security Target. The rationale addresses
the following areas:
• Security Objectives;
• Security Functional Requirements;
• Security Assurance Requirements;
• Requirement Dependencies;
• TOE Summary Specification.
7.1 Security Objectives Rationale
This section shows that all secure usage assumptions, organizational security policies, and threats are completely
covered by security objectives. In addition, each objective counters or addresses at least one assumption,
organizational security policy, or threat.
7.1.1 Security Objectives Rationale for the TOE and Environment
This section provides evidence demonstrating the coverage of organizational policies and usage assumptions by the
security objectives.
T.MALICIOUS_ACTIVITY
T.INADVERTENT_ACTIVITY
T.MISUSE
T.TSF_COMPROMISE
T.
UNAUTHORIZED_ACCESS
T.UNACCOUNTABLE_USERS
A.AUDIT_PROTECTION
A.DATA_SOURCES
A.
DEPLOY
A.
MANAGE
A.
PHYSICAL
A.TIME
A.TRUSTED_ADMIN
A.USER
O.ANALYZE X X X
O.AUDIT_GENERATION X X
O.AUDIT_PROTECTION X
O.MANAGE X X X X X
O.PROTECTED_COMMS X X
O.TOE_ACCESS X X X
OE.AUDIT_PROTECTION X
OE. DATA_SOURCES X
OE.DEPLOY X
OE.MANAGE X
OE.PHYSICAL X
OE.TIME X
OE.TRUSTED_ADMIN X
OE.USER X
7.1.1.1 T.MALICIOUS_ACTIVITY
Malicious activity by an attacker may occur on the network the TOE monitors may go undetected.
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This Threat is countered by ensuring that:
• O.ANALYZE: The TOE applies analytical processes and collects information to derive conclusions and
send alerts about potential unauthorized/malicious activities in the monitored network.
• O.MANAGE: The TOE provide tools necessary to support the authorized administrators in their
management of the security of the TOE, this includes reviewing the alarms and IDS data.
7.1.1.2 T.INADVERTENT_ACTIVITY
Inadvertent activity and access by a user or a process that may occur on the network the TOE monitors
may go undetected.
This Threat is countered by ensuring that:
• O.ANALYZE: The TOE applies analytical processes and collects information to derive conclusions and
send alerts about potential unauthorized/malicious activities in the monitored network.
• O.MANAGE: The TOE provide tools necessary to support the authorized administrators in their
management of the security of the TOE, this includes reviewing the alarms and IDS data.
7.1.1.3 T.MISUSE
Unauthorized accesses and activity indicative of misuse by a user or a process that may occur on the
network the TOE monitors may go undetected.
This Threat is countered by ensuring that:
• O.ANALYZE: The TOE applies analytical processes and collects information to derive conclusions and
send alerts about potential misuse in the monitored network.
• O.MANAGE: The TOE provide tools necessary to support the authorized administrators in their
management of the security of the TOE, this includes reviewing the alarms and IDS data.
7.1.1.4 T.TSF_COMPROMISE
A user may cause, through an unsophisticated attack, TSF data, or security functions to be inappropriately
accessed (viewed, modified, or deleted).
This Threat is countered by ensuring that:
• O.MANAGE: The TOE restricts access to the security functions and TSF data to authorized
administrators.
• O.AUDIT_PROTECTION: The TOE helps to protect the audit records by not providing interfaces to
modify or delete the audit records.
• O.PROTECTED_COMMS: Administrative communications with the TOE; IT entities (log sources) and
TOE device to TOE Device communications are protected from disclosure and medication.
• O.TOE_ACCESS: To reduce the potential of unauthorized access to TOE security functions and data, the
TOE ensures that only authorized administrators can log in and access security management functions and
TOE data.
7.1.1.5 T.UNAUTHORIZED_ACCESS
An unauthorized user may gain access to the TOE Security functions and data.
This threat is satisfied by ensuring that:
• O.MANAGE: The TOE restricts access to the security functions and TSF data to authorized
administrators.
• O.PROTECTED_COMMS: To reduce the potential that an unauthorized user might gain unauthorized
access to the TOE or its data via data transmitted across a network, the TOE is expected to protect its
administrator communication channels from disclosure, modification. The TOE also requires that TOE
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device to TOE device communications and log source to TOE communications are protected from
disclosure, modification.
• O. AUDIT_GENERATION: To reduce the potential of unauthorized access attempts that might go
unnoticed, the TOE is expected to log security relevant events.
• O.TOE_ACCESS: To reduce the potential of unauthorized access to TOE security functions and data, the
TOE is expected to be designed to ensure that only authorized administrators can log in and access security
management functions and TOE data.
7.1.1.6 T.UNACCOUNTABLE_USERS
Authorized users of the TOE might not be held accountable for their actions.
.
This threat is satisfied by ensuring that:
• O.AUDIT_GENERATION: To reduce the potential of security relevant actions occurring without notice,
the TOE is expected to audit security relevant events and associates the user that the caused the event with
the audit record. This helps to mitigate the threat by ensuring that the user that caused the security relevant
events can be identified.
• O.TOE_ACCESS: This objective helps to mitigate this threat by ensuring each user is uniquely identified
and authenticated.
7.1.1.7 A.AUDIT_PROTECTION
The operational environment will provide the capability to protect audit information.
This Assumption is satisfied by ensuring that:
• OE.AUDIT_PROTECTION: The operational environment provides the capability to protect audit
information.
7.1.1.8 A.DATA_SOURCES
The data sources in the environment will provide complete and reliable data to the TOE.
This Assumption is satisfied by ensuring that:
• OE.DATA_SOURCES: The data sources in the environment provide complete and reliable data to the
TOE.
7.1.1.9 A.DEPLOY
TOE Administrators will properly configure the network in the TOE operational environment and
configure adequate network capacity for the deployed TOE components.
This assumption is countered by ensuring that:
OE.DEPLOY: The TOE Administrators will properly configure the network in the TOE operational
environment and configure adequate network capacity for the deployed TOE components.
7.1.1.10 A.MANAGE
There will be one or more competent individuals assigned to manage the TOE and the security of the
information it contains.
This assumption is countered by ensuring that:
OE.MANAGE: Personnel working as authorized administrators shall be carefully selected and trained for
proper operation of the TSF.
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7.1.1.11 A.PHYSICAL
The TOE hardware and software critical to the security policy enforcement will be located within
controlled access facilities which will prevent unauthorized physical access.
This assumption is countered by ensuring that:
OE.PHYSICAL The TOE hardware and software critical to the security policy enforcement will be
located within controlled access facilities which will prevent unauthorized physical access.
7.1.1.12 A.TIME
The environment will provide reliable time sources for use by the TOE.
This assumption is countered by ensuring that:
OE.TIME: The environment must provide a time source for use by the TOE
7.1.1.13 A.TRUSTED_ADMIN
TOE Administrators will follow and apply all administrator guidance in a trusted manner.
This assumption is countered by ensuring that:
OE.TRUSTED_ADMIN: TOE Administrators are trusted to follow and apply all administrator guidance
in a trusted manner.
7.1.1.14 A.USER
Users will protect their authentication data.
This assumption is countered by ensuring that:
OE.USER: Users must ensure that their authentication data is held securely and not disclosed to
unauthorized persons.
7.2 Security Requirements Rationale
This section provides evidence supporting the internal consistency and completeness of the components
(requirements) in the Security Target. Note Table 7-1 indicates the requirements that effectively satisfy the
individual objectives.
7.2.1 Security Functional Requirements Rationale
All of the Security Functional Requirements (SFR) identified in this Security Target are fully addressed in this
section and each SFR is mapped to the objective for which it is intended to satisfy.
O.ANALYZE
O.AUDIT_PROTECTION
O.AUDIT_GENERATION
O.MANAGE
O.PROTECTED_
COMMS
O.TOE_ACCESS
FAU_GEN.1 X
FAU_GEN.2 X
FAU_SAR.1 X
FAU_SAR.2 X
FAU_STG.1 X
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O.ANALYZE
O.AUDIT_PROTECTION
O.AUDIT_GENERATION
O.MANAGE
O.PROTECTED_
COMMS
O.TOE_ACCESS
FCS_SSH_EXT.1 X
FCS_TLS_EXT.1 X
FIA_AFL.1 X
FIA_ATD.1 X
FIA_UAU.1 X
FIA_UAU.5 X
FIA_UID.1 X
FMT_MOF.1 X
FMT_MTD.1 X
FMT_SMF.1 X
FMT_SMR.1 X
FPT_ITT.1 X
FTA_SSL.3 X
FTA_SSL.4 X
FTA_TAB.1 X
FTP_TRP.1 X
IDS_ANL_EXT.1 X
IDS_RCT_EXT.1 X
IDS_RDR_EXT.1 X
Table 7-1 Objective to Requirement Correspondence
7.2.1.1 O.ANALYZE
The TOE will apply analytical processes and information to derive conclusions about potential
unauthorized/malicious intrusions and send appropriate alerts.
This TOE Security Objective is satisfied by ensuring that:
• IDS_ANL_EXT.1: The TOE performs statistical and signature analysis functions on IDS data. The
TOE records each analytical result and includes at least the following information in the record: Date and
time of the result, type of result, identification of data source.
• IDS_RCT_EXT.1: The TOE sends an alarm to incident management SA views when an intrusion is
detected.
7.2.1.2 O.AUDIT_GENERATION
The TOE will provide the capability to detect and create records of security relevant events associated with
users.
This TOE Security Objective is satisfied by ensuring that:
• FAU_GEN.1: The TOE is required to provide a set of events that it is capable of recording. Among these
events the TOE is able to audit must be security relevant events occurring within the TOE. This
requirement also defines the information that must be recorded for each auditable event.
• FAU_GEN.2: The TOE is required to associate a user identity with the auditable events being recorded.
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7.2.1.3 O.AUDIT_PROTECTION
The TOE will provide the capability for protection of the audit information from unauthorized users via the TOE
interfaces.
This TOE Security Objective is satisfied by ensuring that:
• FAU_STG.1: The TOE is required to protect the stored audit records from unauthorized modification or
deletion.
7.2.1.4 O.MANAGE
The TOE will provide all the functions necessary to support the authorized administrators in their
management of the security of the TOE, and restrict these functions from unauthorized use.
This TOE Security Objective is satisfied by ensuring that:
• FAU_SAR.1: The TOE is required to provide authorized administrators with the capability to read all audit
information from the audit records. The TOE is required to provide the audit records in a manner suitable
for the user to interpret the information.
• FAU_SAR.2: The TOE is required to prohibit all users read access to the audit records, except those users
that have been granted explicit read-access.
• FMT_MOF.1: The TOE is required to restrict the ability to enable disable on security functions to
authorized administrators.
• FMT_MTD.1: The TOE is required to restrict to authorized administrators the ability to manipulate TOE
data used to enforce the TOE security functions.
• FMT_SMF.1: The TOE is required to provide at least the identified management functions for use by the
authorized administrators.
• FMT_SMR.1: The TOE is required to establish, maintain and enforce authorized administrator roles.
• IDS_RDR_EXT.1: The TOE is required to provide users with the Analyst and/or Administrator roles with
the capability to read all metadata, raw logs, raw packet data, rules, and incident management data from the
IDS data. The TOE provides the data in a manner suitable for the user to interpret the information; and
prohibits all users read access to the IDS data, except those users that have been granted explicit read-
access.
7.2.1.5 O.PROTECTED_COMMS
The TOE will provide protected communication channels for remote administrators, IT entities and for
TOE device to TOE device communication channels.
This TOE Security Objective is satisfied by ensuring that:
• FCS_SSH_EXT.1: The TOE implements SSH to protect log data being sent to the TOE from authorized IT
entities (log sources).
• FCS_TLS_EXT.1: The TOE is required to implement TLS to protect applicable network communication
channels.
• FPT_ITT.1: The TOE is required to protect communications from disclosure and detect the modification
of those communications when it is transmitted between distributed parts of the TOE.
• FTP_TRP.1: The TOE is required to protect communication between itself and its remote administrative
users from disclosure and detect the modification of those communications. The TOE is required to use
HTTP over TLS to provide these protections.
7.2.1.6 O.TOE_ACCESS
The TOE will provide mechanisms that control a user’s logical access to the TOE.
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This TOE Security Objective is satisfied by ensuring that:
• FIA_AFL.1: The TOE must detect when an administrator configurable positive integer within the
configured timeframe of unsuccessful authentication attempts occur related to SA UI user authentication.
When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has been met, the TSF shall lock account
for a specified time period as configured by authorized administrator.
• FIA_ATD.1: The TOE maintains the following list of security attributes belonging to individual human
users: Username, password, role. The attributes of users, are used by the TOE to determine a user’s identity
and role memberships and enforce what type of access the user has to the TOE.
• FIA_UAU.1: The TOE is required to ensure that users must be authenticated in order to access functions,
other than those specifically identified (view the warning banner and acknowledging the end-user license).
• FIA_UAU.5: The TOE provides password-based authentication for administrative users and SSH public-
key based authentication for authorized IT entities (log sources) sending log data to the TOE.
Administrative users must successfully authenticate by providing a valid username and password in order
to access functions, other than those specifically identified (view the warning banner and acknowledging
the end-user license). IT entities must successfully authenticate using public key-based authentication prior
to sending any log data to the TOE.
• FIA_UID.1: The TOE is required to ensure that users must be identified in order to access functions of the
TOE other than those specifically identified (view the warning banner and acknowledging the end-user
license).
• FTA_SSL.3: The TOE will terminate an interactive session after a time period configured by an authorized
administrator.
• FTA_SSL.4: The TOE must allow user-initiated termination of the user's own interactive session.
• FTA_TAB.1: Before establishing a user session, the TOE shall display an advisory warning message
regarding unauthorised use of the TOE.
7.2.2 Security Assurance Requirements Rationale
The security assurance requirements for the TOE are the EAL 2 augmented with ALC_FLR.1 components as
specified in Part 3 of the Common Criteria. No operations are applied to the assurance components.
EAL 2 augmented with ALC_FLR.1 was selected as the assurance level because the TOE is a commercial product
whose users require a low to moderate degree of independently assured security. ALC_FLR.1 was selected to
augment EAL2 assurance requirements in order to ensure that identified flaws are addressed. The TOE is targeted at
a relatively benign environment with good physical access security and competent administrators. Within such
environments it is assumed that attackers will have little attack potential. As such, EAL 2 augmented with
ALC_FLR.1 is appropriate to provide the assurance necessary to counter the limited potential for attack.
7.3 Requirement Dependency Rationale
The following table demonstrates the dependencies among the claimed security requirements. It shows that all
dependencies are satisfied. Therefore the requirements work together to accomplish the overall objectives defined
for the TOE.
ST Requirement CC Dependencies ST Dependencies
FAU_GEN.1 FPT_STM.1 See TimeStamp Note Below.
FAU_GEN.2 FAU_GEN.1 and FIA_UID.1 FAU_GEN.1 and FIA_UID.1
FAU_SAR.1 FAU_GEN.1 FAU_GEN.1
FAU_SAR.2 FAU_SAR.1 FAU_SAR.1
FAU_STG.1 FAU_GEN.1 FAU_GEN.1
FCS_SSH_EXT.1 None None
FCS_TLS_EXT.1 None None
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FIA_AFL.1 FIA_UAU.1 FIA_UAU.1
FIA_ATD.1 None None
FIA_UAU.1 FIA_UID.1 FIA_UID.1
FIA_UAU.5 None None
FIA_UID.1 None None
FMT_MOF.1 FMT_SMR.1 and FMT_SMF.1 FMT_SMR.1 and FMT_SMF.1
FMT_MTD.1 FMT_SMR.1 and FMT_SMF.1 FMT_SMR.1 and FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMF.1 None None
FMT_SMR.1 FIA_UID.1 FIA_UID.1
FPT_ITT.1 None None
FTA_SSL.3 None None
FTA_SSL.4 None None
FTA_TAB.1 None None
FTP_TRP.1 None None
IDS_ANL_EXT.1 None None
IDS_RCT_EXT.1 IDS_ANL_EXT.1 IDS_ANL_EXT.1
IDS_RDR_EXT.1 IDS_ANL_EXT.1 IDS_ANL_EXT.1
Timestamp Note: The TOE is not a physical device and operates as an application within a process provided by the
environment. Thus, the environment is providing resources for the TOE. The environmental objective OE.TIME
requires that the TOE’s environment provide a reliable timestamp which the TOE can use as needed (e.g., within
audit records). Thus, the functionality reflected in the dependency of FAU_GEN.1 upon FPT_STM.1 is available to
the TOE from the environment.
7.4 TOE Summary Specification Rationale
Each subsection in Section 6, the TOE Summary Specification, describes a security function of the TOE. Each
description is followed with rationale that indicates which requirements are satisfied by aspects of the corresponding
security function. The set of security functions work together to satisfy all of the security functions and assurance
requirements. Furthermore, all of the security functions are necessary in order for the TSF to provide the required
security functionality.
This Section in conjunction with Section 6, the TOE Summary Specification, provides evidence that the security
functions are suitable to meet the TOE security requirements. The collection of security functions work together to
provide all of the security requirements. The security functions described in the TOE summary specification are all
necessary for the required security functionality in the TSF. Table 7-2 Security Requirements to Security
Functions Mapping demonstrates the relationship between security requirements and security functions.
Security
audit
Cryptographic
support
Identification
and
authentication
Security
Monitoring
with
SIEM
Security
management
Protection
of
the
TSF
TOE
Access
Trusted
path/channels
FAU_GEN.1 X
FAU_GEN.2 X
FAU_SAR.1 X
FAU_SAR.2 X
FAU_STG.1 X
FCS_SSH_EXT.1 X
FCS_TLS_EXT.1 X
FIA_AFL.1 X
FIA_ATD.1 X
FIA_UAU.1 X
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FIA_UAU.5 X
FIA_UID.1 X
IDS_ANL_EXT.1 X
IDS_RCT_EXT.1 X
IDS_RDR_EXT.1 X
FMT_MOF.1 X
FMT_MTD.1 X
FMT_SMF.1 X
FMT_SMR.1 X
FPT_ITT.1 X
FTA_SSL.3 X
FTA_SSL.4 X
FTA_TAB.1 X
FTP_TRP.1 X
Table 7-2 Security Requirements to Security Functions Mapping