Certification Report
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
BSI-DSZ-CC-0387-2007
for
Microsoft Internet Security and Acceleration
Server 2004 - Enterprise Edition - Service Pack 2 -
Version 4.0.3443.594
from
Microsoft Corporation
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)3018 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)3018 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)3018 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0 ZS-01-01-F-326 V3.32
Common Criteria Arrangement
for components up to EAL4
BSI-DSZ-CC-0387-2007
Microsoft Internet Security and Acceleration
Server 2004 - Enterprise Edition - Service
Pack 2 - Version 4.0.3443.594
from
Microsoft Corporation
The IT product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an accredited and licensed/
approved evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Version 2.3
(ISO/IEC 15408:2005) extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL4
for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation, Version 2.3 (ISO/IEC
15408:2005).
Evaluation Results:
Functionality: Product specific Security Target
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance Package: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL4 / augmented by
AVA_VLA.3 – Vulnerability Assessment - Moderately resistant
ALC_FLR.1 – Flaw Remediation – Basic flaw remediation
This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated
configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification scheme
of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions of the evaluation
facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence adduced.
The notes mentioned on the reverse side are part of this certificate.
Bonn, 21. March 2007
The President of the Federal Office
for Information Security
Dr. Helmbrecht L.S.
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)3018 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)3018 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)3018 9582-111
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information
Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty
of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
BSI-DSZ-CC-0387-2007 Certification Report
Preliminary Remarks
1
Under the BSIG Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the
task of issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a
distributor, hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product
according to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised
security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the
BSI or by BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This
report contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the
detailed Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security
functionality of the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and
weaknesses) and instructions for the user.
1
Act setting up the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Errichtungsgesetz, BSIG) of
17 December 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2834
V
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0387-2007
Contents
Part A: Certification
Part B: Certification Results
Part C: Excerpts from the Criteria
VI
BSI-DSZ-CC-0387-2007 Certification Report
A Certification
1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down
in the following:
2
• BSIG
3
• BSI Certification Ordinance
4
• BSI Schedule of Costs
• Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal
Ministry of the Interior)
• DIN EN 45011 standard
• BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
5
• Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), version 2.3
• Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), version 2.3
• BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS)
• Advice from the Certification Body on methodology for assurance
components above EAL4 (AIS 34)
2
Act setting up the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Errichtungsgesetz, BSIG) of
17 December 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2834
3
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of a Certificate by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungsverordnung, BSIZertV) of 7 July 1992,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1230
4
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik (BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519
5
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 10 May 2006 in the Bundesanzeiger
dated 19 May 2006, p. 3730
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0387-2007
2 Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries
a mutual recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are
based on ITSEC or CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
2.1 European Recognition of ITSEC/CC - Certificates
The SOGIS-Agreement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on
ITSEC became effective in March 1998. This agreement has been signed by
the national bodies of Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, The
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United
Kingdom. This agreement on the mutual recognition of IT security certificates
was extended to include certificates based on the CC for all evaluation levels
(EAL 1 – EAL 7). The German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI)
recognizes certificates issued by the national certification bodies of France and
the United Kingdom within the terms of this Agreement.
2.2 International Recognition of CC - Certificates
An arrangement (Common Criteria Arrangement) on the mutual recognition of
certificates based on the CC evaluation assurance levels up to and including
EAL 4 has been signed in May 2000 (CC-MRA). It includes also the recognition
of Protection Profiles based on the CC. As of February 2007 the arrangement
has been signed by the national bodies of:
Australia, Austria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Hungary, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, The
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Republic of Singapore, Spain, Sweden,
Turkey, United Kingdom, United States of America.
The current list of signatory nations resp. approved certification schemes can be
seen on the web site: http:\\www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
This evaluation contains the component AVA_VLA.3 that is not mutually
recognised in accordance with the provisions of the CCRA. For mutual
recognition, AVA_VLA.2 replaces AVA_VLA.3.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0387-2007 Certification Report
3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform
procedure, a uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product Microsoft Internet Security and Acceleration Server 2004 -
Enterprise Edition - Service Pack 2 - Version 4.0.3443.594 has undergone the
certification procedure at BSI. This is a re-certification based on BSI-DSZ-CC-
0262-2005.
The evaluation of the product Microsoft Internet Security and Acceleration
Server 2004 - Enterprise Edition - Service Pack 2 - Version 4.0.3443.594 was
conducted by TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH, Prüfstelle für IT-Sicherheit. The
TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH, Prüfstelle für IT-Sicherheit is an evaluation
facility (ITSEF)6
recognised by BSI.
The sponsor, and vendor and distributor is:
Microsoft Corporation
1 Microsoft Way
Redmond, WA 98052, USA
The certification is concluded with
• the comparability check and
• the production of this Certification Report.
This work was completed by the BSI on 21. March 2007.
The confirmed assurance package is only valid on the condition that
• all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in
the following report, are observed,
• the product is operated in the environment described, where specified in the
following report.
This Certification Report only applies to the version of the product indicated
here. The validity can be extended to new versions and releases of the product,
provided the sponsor applies for re-certification of the modified product, in
accordance with the procedural requirements, and the evaluation does not
reveal any security deficiencies.
For the meaning of the assurance levels and the confirmed strength of
functions, please refer to the excerpts from the criteria at the end of the
Certification Report.
6
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0387-2007
4 Publication
The following Certification Results contain pages B-1 to B-22.
The product Microsoft Internet Security and Acceleration Server 2004 -
Enterprise Edition - Service Pack 2 - Version 4.0.3443.594 has been included in
the BSI list of the certified products, which is published regularly (see also
Internet: http:// www.bsi.bund.de). Further information can be obtained from
BSI-Infoline +49 228 9582-111.
7
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the vendor of
the product. The Certification Report can also be downloaded from the above-
mentioned website.
7
Microsoft Corporation
1 Microsoft Way
Redmond, WA 98052, USA
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0387-2007 Certification Report
B Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
• the security target of the sponsor for the target of evaluation,
• the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
• complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0387-2007
Contents of the certification results
1 Executive Summary 3
2 Identification of the TOE 9
3 Security Policy 10
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope 11
5 Architectural Information 12
6 Documentation 13
7 IT Product Testing 13
8 Evaluated Configuration 15
9 Results of the Evaluation 16
10 Comments/Recommendations 18
11 Annexes 19
12 Security Target 19
13 Definitions 19
14 Bibliography 21
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0387-2007 Certification Report
1 Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) and subject of the Security Target (ST) [6] is
the Firewall product Microsoft Internet Security and Acceleration Server 2004 -
Enterprise Edition - Service Pack 2 - Version 4.0.3443.594 (also named ISA
Server in short).
ISA Server is a dedicated firewall that acts as the secure gateway to the
Internet for internal computers. ISA Server protects all communication between
internal computers and the Internet and runs on a Windows 2003 Server
operating system.
The basic functions of the ISA Server are:
• Web Identification and Authentication: The TOE can be configured that only
particular users are allowed to access the networks through the TOE using
Basic authentication or OWA (Outlook Web Access) forms based
authentication.
• Information flow control: The TOE combines several security mechanisms to
enforce the security policies at different network layers.
• Audit: The TOE generates logging information that is stored in different log
files in the environment.
ISA Server is intended to be used as a multi-layered firewall. IP packet filtering
provides security by inspecting individual packets passing through the firewall.
Application level filtering allows ISA Server to inspect and secure popular
protocols.
Graphical taskpads and wizards do not belong to the TOE but are implemented
in the environment , they shall simplify navigation and configuration for common
tasks.
The operation system Windows 2003 Server maintains security attributes for all
administrators. Windows 2003 Server stores the identification and
authentication data for all known administrators and maintains a method of
associating human users with the authorised administrator role. The TOE itself
offers no additional identification and authentication methods for firewall
administrators.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) used in the Security Target
are Common Criteria Part 2 extended.
The IT product Microsoft Internet Security and Acceleration Server 2004 -
Enterprise Edition - Service Pack 2 - Version 4.0.3443.594 was evaluated by
TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH, Prüfstelle für IT-Sicherheit. The evaluation was
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0387-2007
completed on 02. February 2007. The TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH,
Prüfstelle für IT-Sicherheit is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)8
recognised by BSI.
The sponsor and vendor and distributor is
Microsoft Corporation
1 Microsoft Way
Redmond, WA 98052, USA
1.1 Assurance package
The TOE security assurance requirements are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C of this report,
or [1], part 3 for details).
The TOE meets the assurance requirements of assurance level EAL4+
(Evaluation Assurance Level 4 augmented).
Requirement Identifier
EAL4 TOE evaluation: methodically designed, tested, and reviewed
+: AVA_VLA.3 Vulnerability Assessment - Moderately resistant
+: ALC_FLR.1 Flaw Remediation – Basic flaw remediation
Table 1: Assurance components and EAL-augmentation
1.2 Functionality
The TOE provides following functionality:
Name
SFR
Audit Generation
FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation
FAU_SAR.1 Audit review
FAU_SAR.3 Selectable audit review
FAU_STG.3 Action in case of possible audit data loss
Identification and Authentication
EXT_FIA_AFL.1 Authentication failure handling
EXT_FIA_UID.2 User identification before any action
EXT_FIA_UAU.2 User authentication before any action
Information Flow Control
8
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0387-2007 Certification Report
SFR
Name
FDP_IFC.1 (1) Subset information flow control (1) - UNAUTHENTICATED SFP
FDP_IFC.1 (2) Subset information flow control (2) - UNAUTHENTICATED_APPL
SFP
FDP_IFC.1 (3) Subset information flow control (3) - AUTHENTICATED SFP
FDP_IFF.1 (1) Simple security attributes (1) - UNAUTHENTICATED SFP
FDP_IFF.1 (2) Simple security attributes (2) - UNAUTHENTICATED_APPL SFP
FDP_IFF.1 (3) Simple security attributes (3) - AUTHENTICATED SFP
FDP_RIP.1 Subset residual information protection
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialization
FPT_RVM.1 Non-bypassability of the TSP
Table 2: SFRs for the TOE taken from CC Part 2
These Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functions:
Security function
SF1: Web Identification and Authentication
SF2: Information Flow Control
SF3: Audit
Table 3: Security Functions
Note: Only the titles of the Security Functional Requirements and of the TOE
Security Functions are provided. For more details please refer to the Security
Target [6], chapter 5 and 6.
1.3 Strength of Function
There is no strength of functions claim for the TOE.
1.4 Summary of threats and Organisational Security Policies
(OSPs) addressed by the evaluated IT product
The following list of considered threats for the TOE is defined in the Security
Target [6], chapter 3.3:
T.NOAUTH
An attacker may attempt to bypass the security of the TOE so as to
access and use security functions and/or non-security functions provided
by the TOE.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0387-2007
T.MEDIAT
An attacker may send impermissible information through the TOE, which
results in the exploitation of resources on the internal network and
gathering of information he is not authorised for.
T.OLDINF
Because of a flaw in the TOE functioning, an attacker may gather
residual information from a previous information flow or internal TOE data
by monitoring the padding of the information flows from the TOE.
T.AUDFUL
An attacker may cause audit records to be lost or prevent future records
from being recorded by taking actions to exhaust audit storage capacity,
thus masking an attackers actions.
There is one Security policy to be fulfilled by the TOE, please refer to the
Security Target [6], chapter 3.2:
P.AUDACC
Persons must be accountable for the actions that they conduct. Therefore audit
records must contain sufficient information to prevent an attacker to escape
detection.
1.5 Special configuration requirements
There are two versions of ISA Server available: Standard Edition (single
machine support only) and Enterprise Edition (can be member of a firewall
cluster). The chosen TOE is the Enterprise Edition with local administration.
The Enterprise Edition is designed for large-scale deployments with high-
volume Internet traffic environments. It supports multi-server arrays with
centralized management as well as enterprise-level and array-level security
policy.
Both versions - Standard and Enterprise - can be treated the same way in the
scope of this certification because the storage of policy configuration data was
not part of the evaluation (Windows Registry and ADAM with the ADAM
configuration receiver service are outside the scope of the TOE) and also
scalability was not part of the evaluation. The Enterprise Edition has been
tested while running on one machine (for details see chapter 7 of this report.)
For the Enterprise Edition security policy configuration data is stored in ADAM
(a Lightweight Directory Access Protocol / LDAP directory service). The
configuration data is then replicated by a system service into the local Windows
registry and file system.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0387-2007 Certification Report
Network Load Balancing is also a feature that is supported by the Enterprise
Edition but is disabled by default, the evaluated TOE does not use this
interface. No tests according this interface have been performed, therefore it is
not included in the evaluation.
The Enterprise Edition with local administration (which means that ADAM is
located on the same machine as the TOE) identifies the TOE (see the Security
Target [6], chapter 2.1.1).
The evaluated TOE is uniquely named as "Microsoft Internet Security and
Acceleration Server 2004 - Enterprise Edition - Service Pack 2 - Version
4.0.3443.594". Its evaluated software version is detailed in table 4.
The ISA Server software including Service Pack 2 and the Administrator and
User Guidance as parts of the evaluated version for the TOE are provided as a
boxed product that is delivered to the sales channels. The additional Guidance
Documentation Addendum [9] of the guidance documentation [8] is delivered
via the web only.
The Administrator and User Guidance is also available on the internet, however,
relevant for the evaluated version of the TOE is the Administrator and User
Guidance that is delivered together with the software on CD-ROM [8]. The
additional Guidance Documentation Addendum [9] is also part of the evaluated
version of the TOE. It is only available as a pdf document via a secure channel
on the vendors TOE-internet-homepage.
The TOE is running on a Windows 2003 Server Standard Edition operating
system (build 3790, English, SP1 including MS05-042 (KB899587), MS05-039
(KB899588), MS05-027 (KB896422), and patch KB907865) and was tested
using a HP Proliant DL380 G3 hardware platform. For more details please read
the Security Target [6], chapter 2.1.2.
1.6 Assumptions about the operating environment
The following constraints concerning the operating environment are made in the
Security Target, please refer to the Security Target [6], chapter 3.1:
A.DIRECT
The TOE is available to authorised administrators only. Personnel who
has physical access to the TOE and can log in the operating system is
assumed to act as an authorised TOE administrator.
A.GENPUR
The TOE stores and executes security-relevant applications only. It
stores only data required for its secure operation.
A.NOEVIL
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Authorised administrators are non-hostile and follow all administrator
guidance.
A.ENV
The environment implements the following functions which are used by
the TOE security functions: local identification and authentication of user
credentials used for web publishing, reliable time stamp, file protection,
cryptographic support, administration access control, reliable ADAM
implementation, Network Load Balancing.
A.PHYSEC
The TOE is physically secure. Only authorised personnel has physical
access to the system which hosts the TOE.
A.SECINST
Required certificates and user identities are installed using a confidential
path.
A.SINGEN
Information can not flow among the internal and external networks unless
it passes through the TOE.
A.WEBI&A
User credentials are verified by a Radius Server. The Radius Server
returns a value if a valid account exists or not.
A.SSL
All web publishing rules which support Basic authentication have to be
configured by the administrator so that strong encryption for SSL is
enforced (at least 128bit encryption).
1.7 Disclaimers
The Certification Results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the
Certificate and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in
this Certification Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product
by the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation
that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT
product by BSI or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, is either expressed or implied.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0387-2007 Certification Report
2 Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
Microsoft Internet Security and Acceleration Server 2004 - Enterprise Edition -
Service Pack 2 - Version 4.0.3443.594
The following table summarises the TOE components and defines the
evaluated configuration of the TOE:
Deliverables Version Comment
Product Box 4.0.3443.594 1. CD-ROM ISA Server 2004 - Enterprise
Edition
2. CD-ROM ISA Server 2004 - Enterprise
Edition Service Pack 2
3. [8] Guidance - included on CD-ROM
Guidance [8] File properties Microsoft Internet Security and Acceleration
- name: Server 2004 manual – Enterprise Edition,
isa.chm, date: available on CD-ROM (as part of the TOE
18.01.2006, package - ISA Server 2004 Enterprise
size: Edition) (available on installed TOE under
1.185.726 menu “Help -> Help topics -> Microsoft ISA
bytes Server” or directly via “isa.chm”)
Guidance
Documentation
Addendum (of
the Adminis-
trator and User
Guidance) [9]
1.5 Guidance Documentation Addendum [9] can
be downloaded from the ISA Server Common
Criteria web page
(http://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/?linkid=49507).
File integrity
verification
package
See right
hand column
The package can be used by customers to
verify the TOE version. It is a zip file and
consists of following files (name, size, date):
• integritycheck.cmd, 2501bytes, 2006-08-
16
• integritycheck-sp2.cmd, 1469bytes, 2006-
09-06
• ISA2004EE-SP2.xml, 167bytes, 2006-09-
06
• ISA2K4SELE_EN.xml, 93458bytes, 2006-
08-16
• readme.htm, 4053bytes, 2006-09-06
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The package can directly be downloaded on
https://members.microsoft.com/ISACommonC
rit/Integrity_Check_ISA_2004_EE.zip (for
description how to use see [9], chapter 5)
The ISA Server Common Criteria web page
(http://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/?linkid=49507)
also includes a link to download the package.
FCIV tool 2.05 The FCIV tool is used to verify the integrity of
the TOE with the provided integrity check file.
It can be downloaded from:
http://support.microsoft.com/default.aspx?scid
=kb;enus;841290 (for further information see
[9], chapter 5)
Table 4: Deliverables of the TOE
Note: Although administration and management tools (e. g. for reporting and
alerting, cache, monitoring, logging, remote management) are delivered
together with the TOE, they are excluded from the TOE and are considered part
of the environment. Graphical taskpads and wizards that simplify navigation and
configuration for common tasks do not belong to the TOE because they are
supplied with the operating system Windows 2003 Server. The TOE is the ISA
Server with Basic authentication or OWA forms based authentication.
The TOE environment also includes applications that are not delivered with the
ISA Server, but are used functionality of the underlying operating system
Windows 2003 Server (e. g. File System, System Event Log File, Registry,
Network Interface, Cryptographic Support Interface, User Account Database,
MSDE, MMC, WINAPI, Network Load Balancing).
3 Security Policy
The security policy of the TOE is to provide controlled and audited access to
services, both from inside and outside an organisation's network, by allowing,
denying, and/or redirecting the flow of data through the firewall.
The TOE allows or denies a set of computers or a group of users to access
specific servers. If a rule is defined specifically to users, the TOE checks how
the user should be authenticated. The evaluated TOE supports Basic
authentication which is the standard method of authentication for Hypertext
Transfer Protocol (HTTP) transmissions. Basic authentication sends and
receives user information as text characters. The TOE also supports OWA
forms based Authentication, which is a filter for form based authentication for
Outlook Web Access.
The TOE controls the flow of incoming and outgoing IP packets and controls
information flow on protocol level. Information flow control is subdivided into
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0387-2007 Certification Report
firewall policy rules, web filters, application filters, system policy rules. It also
comprises a lockdown mode when only a restricted set of system policy rules is
active.
The TOE also features the generation of different logging information to be
stored in the environment.
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
4.1 Usage assumptions
Based on the personnel assumptions, the following usage conditions exist.
Please refer to the Security Target [6], chapter 3.1 for more detail:
• Personnel who has physical access to the TOE and can log in the operating
system is assumed to act as an authorised TOE administrator. That means
that the TOE is available to authorised administrators only (A.DIRECT).
• Authorised administrators are non-hostile and follow all administrator
guidance (A.NOEVIL).
4.2 Environmental assumptions
The following assumptions about physical and connectivity aspects defined by
the Security Target have to be met (refer to Security Target [6], chapter 3.1):
• Only authorised personnel has physical access to the TOE because the
TOE is physically secured (A.PHYSEC).
• The TOE stores and executes security-relevant applications only. It stores
only data required for its secure operation (A.GENPUR).
• Information can not flow among the internal and external networks unless it
passes through the TOE (A.SINGEN).
• Required certificates and user identities are installed using a confidential
path (A.SECINST).
• The environment implements the following functions which are used by the
TOE security functions: local identification and authentication of user
credentials used for web publishing, reliable time stamp, file protection,
cryptographic support, administration access control, reliable ADAM
implementation, Network Load Balancing (A.ENV).
• User credentials are verified by a Radius Server that is placed on the
internal network server. The Radius Server returns a value to indicate if a
valid account exists or not (A.WEBI&A).
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0387-2007
• All web publishing rules which support Basic authentication have to be
configured by the administrator so that strong encryption for SSL is enforced
(at least 128bit encryption) (A.SSL).
Furthermore, the Security Target [6], chapter 3.2 defines an Organisational
Security Policy (P.AUDACC) that states that audit records must contain
sufficient information to prevent an attacker to escape detection in order to
make persons accountable for the actions they conduct.
4.3 Clarification of scope
Additional threats that are not addressed by the TOE and its evaluated security
functions were not addressed by this product evaluation.
5 Architectural Information
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) and subject of the Security Target (ST) [6] is
the Firewall product Microsoft Internet Security and Acceleration Server 2004 -
Enterprise Edition - Service Pack 2 - Version 4.0.3443.594.
ISA Server 2004 is a firewall that helps to provide secure Internet connectivity.
ISA Server protects all communication between internal computers and the
Internet and runs on a Windows 2003 Server operating system. As a multi-
layered firewall, the TOE provides security at different levels. IP packet filtering
provides security by inspecting individual packets passing through the firewall.
Application-level filtering allows ISA Server 2004 to inspect and secure popular
protocols. The TOE has the possibility to create filters that allow or deny traffic
on the packet layer and with data-aware filters to determine if packets should be
accepted, rejected, redirected, or modified. The identification and authentication
capabilities can be configured separately for incoming and outgoing requests.
The TOE also includes the generation of security and access logs. The log files
can be configured and enabled for packet and application filters. They are
human readable and can be reviewed with additional tools that belong to the
TOE environment.
The operating system Windows 2003 Server maintains security attributes for all
administrators. Windows 2003 Server stores the identification and
authentication data for all known administrators and maintains a method of
associating human users with the authorised administrator role. The TOE itself
offers no additional identification and authentication methods for firewall
administrators.
Figure 2.1 (TOE Demarcation) in the Security Target [6] shows the boundaries
of the TOE, whereas the arrows indicate the interfaces between the TOE and
the operating system Windows 2003 Server.
The three main security functionality of the TOE are:
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0387-2007 Certification Report
• Web Identification and Authentication:
The web publishing rules of the TOE can be configured to allow or deny a
set of computers or a group of users to access specific servers. If the rule
applies specifically to users, the TOE checks how the user should be
authenticated. It is possible to configure incoming and outgoing Web request
settings so that users must always be authenticated. It is possible to choose
between different authentication methods and separately for incoming and
outgoing requests.
• Information flow control:
The TOE controls the flow of incoming and outgoing IP packets and controls
information flow on protocol level. This control has to be active before any
information can be transmitted through the TOE. Information flow control is
subdivided into Firewall Policy Rules that consist of Access Rules, Network
Rules, Server Publishing Rules, Mail Publishing Rules, Web Publishing
Rules. Also, there are Web filters for HTTP and OWA and Application
Filters, namely FTP access filter, RPC filter, and SMTP filter. Another part of
the security function is the Lockdown mode of the TOE.
• Audit:
The TOE allows the generation of different log files. Logging information can
be stored in Firewall service log file, Web proxy service log files, and
Windows application event log files, outside the TOE.
6 Documentation
The following documentation is provided with the product by the developer to
the customer:
[8] Microsoft Internet Security and Acceleration Server 2004 manual –
Enterprise Edition, available on CD-ROM (part of ISA Server 2004 EE
package), File properties - name: isa.chm, date: 2006-01-18, size:
1.185.726 bytes
[9] ISA Server 2004 Enterprise Edition Common Criteria Evaluation,
Guidance Documentation Addendum – Enterprise Edition; Version 1.5;
Date: 2007-02-09
7 IT Product Testing
Developer Tests
Test Configuration
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The TOE has been tested within a configuration that consists of three networks.
The TOE as the centre of the configuration has been connected to the three
networks which are:
• the internal network,
• the external network (internet),
• and the DMZ network.
Test Approach
The developer's tests were conducted to confirm that the TOE meets the
security functional requirements. The developer's strategy was to test the TOE
against the specification of all security functions detailed in the developer’s
functional specification.
The tests cover all security functions defined in the Security Target [6]. The
amount of developer tests ensures that the TSF behave as specified in the
Security Target [6] and as detailed in the developer’s functional specification.
The majority of tests were performed as automated testing using a proprietary
automated test tool named Xcite.
Test Results
The developer specified, conducted and documented suitable functional tests
for each security function. The test results obtained for all of the performed tests
turned out to be as expected. In a few cases retraceable aberrance to the
expected results could be explained.
No errors or other flaws occurred with regard to the security functionality
described in the functional specification. Consequently, the test results
demonstrate that the behaviour of the security functions is as specified.
All security functions could be tested successfully. The manufacturer was able
to demonstrate that all security functions behave as specified in the Security
Target [6] and as detailed in the developer’s functional specification.
Independent Evaluator Tests
Test Configuration
Basis of all test configurations is an installed TOE as identified in the Security
Target [6]. For the testing, ISA Server has been installed on HP/Compaq
ProLiant DL380 G3 hardware, the underlying operation system is Windows
Server 2003 Standard Edition (English) (build 3790) with SP1 including MS05-
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042 (KB899587), MS05-039 (KB899588), MS05-027 (KB896422), and patch
KB907865.
For ITSEF’s independent testing as well as for the penetration testing, two test
configurations including a configuration similar to the developer tests were
used. The other configuration consists of an internal and an external network,
separated by the TOE.
The evaluator tests have been performed at the ITSEF facility in Essen.
Test Approach:
The evaluation facility included all security functions in its test activities.
For choosing a sample of tests, the ITSEF accompanied all developer tests. All
test cases and tests that were already conducted by the developer were taken
into consideration, automated tests as well as manual tests.
Additionally, independent tests according to each TOE security function and
other miscellaneous tests were conducted by the ITSEF. The objective was to
test the functionality of the TOE and to verify the developer’s test results.
To verify and reject possible vulnerabilities, the ITSEF performed penetration
tests. Additionally, the TOE has been scanned with the vulnerability scanner
Nessus and with the Internet Security Scanner (ISS) to identify possible
vulnerabilities and to perform a port scan.
Test Results
The independent tests as well as the repeated manufacturer tests confirmed
that the TOE’s security functions behave as specified in the Security Target [6]
and as detailed in the developer’s functional specification.
Penetration tests have been performed by the evaluation facility to assess
possible vulnerabilities found during the evaluation of the different CC
assurance classes. The TOE withstood the penetration efforts of attackers
possessing basic or medium attack potential.
8 Evaluated Configuration
The TOE configuration consists of the software package "Microsoft Internet
Security and Acceleration Server 2004 - Enterprise Edition - Service Pack 2 -
Version 4.0.3443.594". Web Cache, GUI (except Log Viewer component), RAS
& VPN, Storage Service, IDS, other Management and Identification &
Authentication functionality, Extensibility Features, some protocol filters and the
used functionality of the underlying operating system and IT environment are
not part of the evaluation.
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Graphical taskpads and wizards do not belong to the TOE but are implemented
in the environment , they shall simplify navigation and configuration for common
tasks.
The operation system Windows 2003 Server maintains security attributes for all
administrators. The TOE itself offers no additional identification and
authentication methods for firewall administrators.
The storage of policy configuration data was not part of the evaluation
(Windows Registry and ADAM with the ADAM configuration receiver service are
outside the scope of the TOE), also scalability was not part of the evaluation.
The Enterprise Edition has been tested while running on one machine.
The evaluated TOE does not use Network Load Balancing, therefore it is not
included in the evaluation.
The Enterprise Edition with local administration (which means that ADAM is
located on the same machine as the TOE) identifies the TOE.
The ISA Server software including Service Pack 2 and the Administrator and
User Guidance as parts of the evaluated version for the TOE are delivered on
CD-ROM through the sales channels. The guidance documentation [8] that is
used for the evaluation is present on the distributed CD-ROM. The additional
Guidance Documentation Addendum [9] of the guidance documentation [8] is
delivered via the web only.
The TOE is running on a is Windows Server 2003 Standard Edition (English)
(build 3790) with SP1 operating system with additional corrections and was
tested using a HP Proliant DL380 G3 hardware platform. For more details
please read the Security Target [6], chapter 2.1.2. The TOE comprises the
Enterprise Edition of the ISA Server 2004 with local administration.
9 Results of the Evaluation
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR), [7] was provided by the ITSEF
according to the Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of
the Scheme [3] and all interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as
relevant for the TOE.
The evaluation methodology CEM [2] was used for those components identical
with EAL4. For components beyond EAL4 the methodology was defined in co-
ordination with the Certification Body [4, AIS 34]).
The verdicts for the CC, Part 3 assurance components (according to EAL4
augmented and the class ASE for the Security Target evaluation) are
summarised in the following table:
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Assurance classes and components Verdict
Security Target evaluation CC Class ASE PASS
TOE description ASE_DES.1 PASS
Security environment ASE_ENV.1 PASS
ST introduction ASE_INT.1 PASS
Security objectives ASE_OBJ.1 PASS
PP claims ASE_PPC.1 PASS
IT security requirements ASE_REQ.1 PASS
Explicitly stated IT security requirements ASE_SRE.1 PASS
TOE summary specification ASE_TSS.1 PASS
Configuration management CC Class ACM PASS
Partial CM automation ACM_AUT.1 PASS
Generation support and acceptance procedures ACM_CAP.4 PASS
Problem tracking CM coverage ACM_SCP.2 PASS
Delivery and operation CC Class ADO PASS
Detection of modification ADO_DEL.2 PASS
Installation, generation, and start-up procedures ADO_IGS.1 PASS
Development CC Class ADV PASS
Fully defined external interfaces ADV_FSP.2 PASS
Security enforcing high-level design ADV_HLD.2 PASS
Subset of the implementation of the TSF ADV_IMP.1 PASS
Descriptive low-level design ADV_LLD.1 PASS
Informal correspondence demonstration ADV_RCR.1 PASS
Informal TOE security policy model ADV_SPM.1 PASS
Guidance documents CC Class AGD PASS
Administrator guidance AGD_ADM.1 PASS
User guidance AGD_USR.1 PASS
Life cycle support CC Class ALC PASS
Identification of security measures ALC_DVS.1 PASS
Evaluation of flaw remediation ALC_FLR.1 PASS
Developer defined life-cycle model ALC_LCD.1 PASS
Well-defined development tools ALC_TAT.1 PASS
Tests CC Class ATE PASS
Analysis of coverage ATE_COV.2 PASS
Testing: high-level design ATE_DPT.1 PASS
Functional testing ATE_FUN.1 PASS
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Assurance classes and components Verdict
Independent testing – sample ATE_IND.2 PASS
Vulnerability assessment CC Class AVA PASS
Validation of analysis AVA_MSU.2 PASS
Strength of TOE security function evaluation AVA_SOF.1 PASS
Moderately resistant AVA_VLA.3 PASS
Table 5: Verdicts for the assurance components
The evaluation has shown that:
• Security Functional Requirements specified for the TOE are Common
Criteria Part 2 extended
• the assurance of the TOE is Common Criteria Part 3 conformant, EAL4
augmented by AVA_VLA.3 and ALC_FLR.1.
• there is no rateable security function within the TOE, therefore there is no
strength of function claim.
This is a re-certification based on BSI-DSZ-CC-0262-2005 which is the
standard edition of ISA Server 2004. The results of the evaluation are only
applicable to the product Microsoft Internet Security and Acceleration Server
2004 - Enterprise Edition - Service Pack 2 - Version 4.0.3443.594 in the
configuration as defined in the Security Target and summarised in this report
(refer to the Security Target [6] and the chapters 2, 4 and 8 of this report). The
validity can be extended to new versions and releases of the product, provided
the sponsor applies for re-certification or assurance continuity of the modified
product, in accordance with the procedural requirements, and the evaluation of
the modified product does not reveal any security deficiencies.
10 Comments/Recommendations
The User Guidance documentation (refer to chapter 6 of this report) contains
necessary information about the secure usage of the TOE. Additionally, for
secure usage of the TOE the fulfilment of the assumptions about the
environment in the Security Target [6] and the Security Target as a whole has to
be taken into account. Therefore a user/administrator has to follow the guidance
in these documents. Please read also chapter 8 of this report.
The user of the TOE has to be aware of the existence and purpose of the
Guidance Documentation Addendum [9]. Therefore, the TOE’s Internet product
homepage has to provide information about the existence of the document and
describe how to access the document. The reference has to be unambiguous
and permanent.
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The guidance and the Guidance Documentation Addendum contain necessary
information about the usage of the TOE and all security hints therein have to be
considered.
11 Annexes
None.
12 Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the security target [6] of the target of evaluation
(TOE) is provided within a separate document.
13 Definitions
13.1 Acronyms
ADAM Active Directory Application Mode
AGD Guidance Documentation (according to the CC assurance class “
Guidance Documentation”)
API Application Programming Interface
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal
Office for Information Security
DMZ Originally an abbreviation for demilitarised zone. In firewall terms a
DMZ separates the internal network from the hostile forces of the
Internet.
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
FTP File Transfer Protocol
GUI Graphical User Interface
HTTP Hypertext Transfer Protocol
ISA-Server Internet Security and Acceleration Server
IT Information Technology
LDAP Lightweight Directory Access Protocol
MMC Microsoft Management Console, a configuration management tool
supplied with Windows 2003 Server that can be extended with
plugins
MSDE Microsoft Database Engine
OWA Outlook Web Access
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PP Protection Profile
RAS Remote Access Service
RPC Remote Processor Call
SF Security Function
SFP Security Function Policy
SMTP Simple Mail Transfer Protocol
SOF Strength of Function
SSL Secure Sockets Layer, a protocol that supplies secure data
communication.
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSC TSF Scope of Control
TSF TOE Security Functions
TSFI TSF Interface
TSP TOE Security Policy
VPN Virtual Private Network
13.2 Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more assurance component(s) from CC
Part 3 to an EAL or assurance package.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not
contained in part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in part 3 of the
CC.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics
based on well-established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - An entity within the TSC that contains or receives information and
upon which subjects perform operations.
Protection Profile - An implementation-independent set of security require-
ments for a category of TOEs that meet specific consumer needs.
Security Function - A part or parts of the TOE that have to be relied upon for
enforcing a closely related subset of the rules from the TSP.
Security Target - A set of security requirements and specifications to be used
as the basis for evaluation of an identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined
semantics.
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Strength of Function - A qualification of a TOE security function expressing
the minimum efforts assumed necessary to defeat its expected security
behaviour by directly attacking its underlying security mechanisms.
SOF-basic - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that
the function provides adequate protection against casual breach of TOE
security by attackers possessing a low attack potential.
SOF-medium - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows
that the function provides adequate protection against straightforward or
intentional breach of TOE security by attackers possessing a moderate attack
potential.
SOF-high - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that
the function provides adequate protection against deliberately planned or
organised breach of TOE security by attackers possessing a high attack
potential.
Subject - An entity within the TSC that causes operations to be performed.
Target of Evaluation - An IT product or system and its associated
administrator and user guidance documentation that is the subject of an
evaluation.
TOE Security Functions - A set consisting of all hardware, software, and
firmware of the TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the
TSP.
TOE Security Policy - A set of rules that regulate how assets are managed,
protected and distributed within a TOE.
TSF Scope of Control - The set of interactions that can occur with or within a
TOE and are subject to the rules of the TSP.
14 Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 2.3, August 2005
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
(CEM), Evaluation Methodology, Version 2.3, August 2005
[3] BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for
the TOE.
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148, BSI 7149), periodically
updated list published also on the BSI Web-site
[6] ISA Server 2004 Common Criteria Evaluation - Security Target, Version
1.1, Date 2006-05-11, Microsoft Corporation
[7] Evaluation Technical Report, BSI-DSZ-CC-0387-2007, Version 3, Datum
2007-02-22, TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH (confidential document)
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[8] Microsoft Internet Security and Acceleration Server 2004 manual –
Enterprise Edition, available on CD-ROM (part of ISA Server 2004 EE
package), File properties - name: isa.chm, date: 2006-01-18, size:
1.185.726 bytes
[9] ISA Server 2004 Enterprise Edition Common Criteria Evaluation,
Guidance Documentation Addendum – Enterprise Edition; Version 1.5;
Date: 2007-02-09
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C Excerpts from the Criteria
CC Part1:
Conformance results (chapter 7.4)
„The conformance result indicates the source of the collection of requirements
that is met by a TOE or PP that passes its evaluation. This conformance result
is presented with respect to CC Part 2 (functional requirements), CC Part 3
(assurance requirements) and, if applicable, to a pre-defined set of
requirements (e.g., EAL, Protection Profile).
The conformance result consists of one of the following:
a) CC Part 2 conformant - A PP or TOE is CC Part 2 conformant if the
functional requirements are based only upon functional components in
CC Part 2.
b) CC Part 2 extended - A PP or TOE is CC Part 2 extended if the
functional requirements include functional components not in CC Part 2.
plus one of the following:
a) CC Part 3 conformant - A PP or TOE is CC Part 3 conformant if the
assurance requirements are based only upon assurance components in
CC Part 3.
b) CC Part 3 extended - A PP or TOE is CC Part 3 extended if the
assurance requirements include assurance requirements not in CC Part
3.
Additionally, the conformance result may include a statement made with respect
to sets of defined requirements, in which case it consists of one of the following:
a) Package name Conformant - A PP or TOE is conformant to a pre-
defined named functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the
requirements (functions or assurance) include all components in the
packages listed as part of the conformance result.
b) Package name Augmented - A PP or TOE is an augmentation of a pre-
defined named functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the
requirements (functions or assurance) are a proper superset of all
components in the packages listed as part of the conformance result.
Finally, the conformance result may also include a statement made with respect
to Protection Profiles, in which case it includes the following:
a) PP Conformant - A TOE meets specific PP(s), which are listed as part of
the conformance result.“
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CC Part 3:
Assurance categorisation (chapter 7.5)
“The assurance classes, families, and the abbreviation for each family are
shown in Table 1.
Assurance Class Assurance Family
CM automation (ACM_AUT)
ACM: Configuration management CM capabilities (ACM_CAP)
CM scope (ACM_SCP)
ADO: Delivery and operation Delivery (ADO_DEL)
Installation, generation and start-up (ADO_IGS)
Functional specification (ADV_FSP)
High-level design (ADV_HLD)
Implementation representation (ADV_IMP)
ADV: Development TSF internals (ADV_INT)
Low-level design (ADV_LLD)
Representation correspondence (ADV_RCR)
Security policy modeling (ADV_SPM)
AGD: Guidance documents Administrator guidance (AGD_ADM)
User guidance (AGD_USR)
Development security (ALC_DVS)
ALC: Life cycle support Flaw remediation (ALC_FLR)
Life cycle definition (ALC_LCD)
Tools and techniques (ALC_TAT)
Coverage (ATE_COV)
ATE: Tests Depth (ATE_DPT)
Functional tests (ATE_FUN)
Independent testing (ATE_IND)
Covert channel analysis (AVA_CCA)
AVA: Vulnerability assessment Misuse (AVA_MSU)
Strength of TOE security functions (AVA_SOF)
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VLA)
Table 1: Assurance family breakdown and mapping”
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Evaluation assurance levels (chapter 11)
“The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that
balances the level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of
acquiring that degree of assurance. The CC approach identifies the separate
concepts of assurance in a TOE at the end of the evaluation, and of
maintenance of that assurance during the operational use of the TOE.
It is important to note that not all families and components from CC Part 3 are
included in the EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful
and desirable assurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and
components will be considered for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and
STs for which they provide utility.”
Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview (chapter 11.1)
“Table 6 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a
hierarchically ordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families.
Each number in the resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component
where applicable.
As outlined in the next section, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation
assurance levels are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE's assurance.
They are hierarchically ordered inasmuch as each EAL represents more
assurance than all lower EALs. The increase in assurance from EAL to EAL is
accomplished by substitution of a hierarchically higher assurance component
from the same assurance family (i.e. increasing rigour, scope, and/or depth)
and from the addition of assurance components from other assurance families
(i.e. adding new requirements).
These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as
described in chapter 7 of this Part 3. More precisely, each EAL includes no
more than one component of each assurance family and all assurance
dependencies of every component are addressed.
While the EALs are defined in the CC, it is possible to represent other
combinations of assurance. Specifically, the notion of “augmentation” allows the
addition of assurance components (from assurance families not already
included in the EAL) or the substitution of assurance components (with another
hierarchically higher assurance component in the same assurance family) to an
EAL. Of the assurance constructs defined in the CC, only EALs may be
augmented. The notion of an “EAL minus a constituent assurance component”
is not recognised by the standard as a valid claim. Augmentation carries with it
the obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility and added value of
the added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also be extended
with explicitly stated assurance requirements.
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Assurance Class Assurance
Family
Assurance Components by
Evaluation Assurance Level
EAL1 EAL2 EAL3 EAL4 EAL5 EAL6 EAL7
Configuration
management
ACM_AUT 1 1 2 2
ACM_CAP 1 2 3 4 4 5 5
ACM_SCP 1 2 3 3 3
Delivery and
operation
ADO_DEL 1 1 2 2 2 3
ADO_IGS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Development ADV_FSP 1 1 1 2 3 3 4
ADV_HLD 1 2 2 3 4 5
ADV_IMP 1 2 3 3
ADV_INT 1 2 3
ADV_LLD 1 1 2 2
ADV_RCR 1 1 1 1 2 2 3
ADV_SPM 1 3 3 3
Guidance
documents
AGD_ADM 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
AGD_USR 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Life cycle
support
ALC_DVS 1 1 1 2 2
ALC_FLR
ALC_LCD 1 2 2 3
ALC_TAT 1 2 3 3
Tests ATE_COV 1 2 2 2 3 3
ATE_DPT 1 1 2 2 3
ATE_FUN 1 1 1 1 2 2
ATE_IND 1 2 2 2 2 2 3
Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_CCA 1 2 2
AVA_MSU 1 2 2 3 3
AVA_SOF 1 1 1 1 1 1
AVA_VLA 1 1 2 3 4 4
Table 6: Evaluation assurance level summary”
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Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL1) - functionally tested (chapter 11.3)
“Objectives
EAL1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but
the threats to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where
independent assurance is required to support the contention that due care has
been exercised with respect to the protection of personal or similar information.
EAL1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer,
including independent testing against a specification, and an examination of the
guidance documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL1 evaluation could
be successfully conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE,
and for minimal outlay.
An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a
manner consistent with its documentation, and that it provides useful protection
against identified threats.”
Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL2) - structurally tested (chapter 11.4)
“Objectives
EAL2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of
design information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the
part of the developer than is consistent with good commercial practice. As such
it should not require a substantially increased investment of cost or time.
EAL2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users
require a low to moderate level of independently assured security in the
absence of ready availability of the complete development record. Such a
situation may arise when securing legacy systems, or where access to the
developer may be limited.”
Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL3) - methodically tested and checked
(chapter 11.5)
“Objectives
EAL3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from
positive security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of
existing sound development practices.
EAL3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
moderate level of independently assured security, and require a thorough
investigation of the TOE and its development without substantial re-
engineering.”
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Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL4) - methodically designed, tested, and
reviewed (chapter 11.6)
“Objectives
EAL4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security
engineering based on good commercial development practices which, though
rigorous, do not require substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other
resources. EAL4 is the highest level at which it is likely to be economically
feasible to retrofit to an existing product line.
EAL4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users
require a moderate to high level of independently assured security in
conventional commodity TOEs and are prepared to incur additional security-
specific engineering costs.”
Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL5) - semiformally designed and tested
(chapter 11.7)
“Objectives
EAL5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security
engineering based upon rigorous commercial development practices supported
by moderate application of specialist security engineering techniques. Such a
TOE will probably be designed and developed with the intent of achieving EAL5
assurance. It is likely that the additional costs attributable to the EAL5
requirements, relative to rigorous development without the application of
specialised techniques, will not be large.
EAL5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users
require a high level of independently assured security in a planned development
and require a rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable
costs attributable to specialist security engineering techniques.”
Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL6) - semiformally verified design and
tested (chapter 11.8)
“Objectives
EAL6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security
engineering techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to
produce a premium TOE for protecting high value assets against significant
risks.
EAL6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for
application in high risk situations where the value of the protected assets
justifies the additional costs.”
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Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL7) - formally verified design and tested
(chapter 11.9)
“Objectives
EAL7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in
extremely high risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies
the higher costs. Practical application of EAL7 is currently limited to TOEs with
tightly focused security functionality that is amenable to extensive formal
analysis.“
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Strength of TOE security functions (AVA_SOF) (chapter 19.3)
“Objectives
Even if a TOE security function cannot be bypassed, deactivated, or corrupted,
it may still be possible to defeat it because there is a vulnerability in the concept
of its underlying security mechanisms. For those functions a qualification of their
security behaviour can be made using the results of a quantitative or statistical
analysis of the security behaviour of these mechanisms and the effort required
to overcome them. The qualification is made in the form of a strength of TOE
security function claim.”
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VLA) (chapter 19.4)
"Objectives
Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether vulnerabilities
identified, during the evaluation of the construction and anticipated operation of
the TOE or by other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses), could allow users to
violate the TSP.
Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that a user will be able to discover
flaws that will allow unauthorised access to resources (e.g. data), allow the
ability to interfere with or alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorised
capabilities of other users.”
"Application notes
A vulnerability analysis is performed by the developer in order to ascertain the
presence of security vulnerabilities, and should consider at least the contents of
all the TOE deliverables including the ST for the targeted evaluation assurance
level. The developer is required to document the disposition of identified
vulnerabilities to allow the evaluator to make use of that information if it is found
useful as a support for the evaluator's independent vulnerability analysis.”
“Independent vulnerability analysis goes beyond the vulnerabilities identified by
the developer. The main intent of the evaluator analysis is to determine that the
TOE is resistant to penetration attacks performed by an attacker possessing a
low (for AVA_VLA.2 Independent vulnerability analysis), moderate (for
AVA_VLA.3 Moderately resistant) or high (for AVA_VLA.4 Highly resistant)
attack potential.”
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