TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V.
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Version
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Certification Report
NXP SmartePP on P71, version 03 00 00 10
Sponsor and developer: NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH
Troplowitzstrasse 20
22529 Hamburg
Germany
Evaluation facility: Riscure B.V
Delftechpark 49
2628 XJ Delft
The Netherlands
Report number: NSCIB-CC-0108259-CR
Report version: 1
Project number: 0108259
Author(s): Jordi Mujal
Date: 16 April 2021
Number of pages: 11
Number of appendices: 0
Reproduction of this report is authorized provided the report is reproduced in its entirety.
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CONTENTS:
Foreword 3
Recognition of the certificate 4
International recognition 4
European recognition 4
1 Executive Summary 5
2 Certification Results 6
2.1 Identification of Target of Evaluation 6
2.2 Security Policy 6
2.3 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope 6
2.4 Architectural Information 7
2.5 Documentation 7
2.6 IT Product Testing 7
2.7 Re-used evaluation results 8
2.8 Evaluated Configuration 8
2.9 Results of the Evaluation 8
2.10 Comments/Recommendations 8
3 Security Target 10
4 Definitions 10
5 Bibliography 11
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Foreword
The Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security (NSCIB) provides a third-party
evaluation and certification service for determining the trustworthiness of Information Technology (IT)
security products. Under this NSCIB, TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V. has the task of issuing
certificates for IT security products, as well as for protection profiles and sites.
Part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product, protection profile or site
according to the Common Criteria assessment guidelines published by the NSCIB. Evaluations are
performed by an IT Security Evaluation Facility (ITSEF) under the oversight of the NSCIB Certification
Body, which is operated by TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V. in cooperation with the Ministry of the
Interior and Kingdom Relations.
An ITSEF in the Netherlands is a commercial facility that has been licensed by TÜV Rheinland
Nederland B.V. to perform Common Criteria evaluations; a significant requirement for such a license is
accreditation to the requirements of ISO Standard 17025 “General requirements for the accreditation
of calibration and testing laboratories”.
By awarding a Common Criteria certificate, TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V. asserts that the product or
site complies with the security requirements specified in the associated (site) security target, or that
the protection profile (PP) complies with the requirements for PP evaluation specified in the Common
Criteria for Information Security Evaluation. A (site) security target is a requirements specification
document that defines the scope of the evaluation activities.
The consumer should review the (site) security target or protection profile, in addition to this
certification report, in order to gain an understanding of any assumptions made during the evaluation,
the IT product's intended environment, its security requirements, and the level of confidence (i.e., the
evaluation assurance level) that the product or site satisfies the security requirements stated in the
(site) security target.
Reproduction of this report is authorized provided the report is reproduced in its entirety.
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Recognition of the certificate
Presence of the Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement and SOG-IS logos on the certificate
indicates that this certificate is issued in accordance with the provisions of the CCRA and the SOG-IS
agreement and will be recognised by the participating nations.
International recognition
The CCRA has been signed by the Netherlands in May 2000 and provides mutual recognition of
certificates based on the CC. Starting September 2014 the CCRA has been updated to provide mutual
recognition of certificates based on cPPs (exact use) or STs with evaluation assurance components
up to and including EAL2+ALC_FLR. The current list of signatory nations and approved certification
schemes can be found on: http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
European recognition
The European SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) version 3 effective from April
2010 provides mutual recognition of Common Criteria and ITSEC certificates at a basic evaluation
level for all products. A higher recognition level for evaluation levels beyond EAL4 (resp. E3-basic) is
provided for products related to specific technical domains. This agreement was initially signed by
Finland, France, Germany, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Italy
joined the SOGIS-MRA in December 2010. The current list of signatory nations, approved certification
schemes and the list of technical domains for which the higher recognition applies can be found on:
http://www.sogisportal.eu.
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1 Executive Summary
This Certification Report states the outcome of the Common Criteria security evaluation of the NXP
SmartePP on P71, version 03 00 00 10. The developer of the NXP SmartePP on P71, version 03 00
00 10 is NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH located in Hamburg, Germany and they also act as the
sponsor of the evaluation and certification. A Certification Report is intended to assist prospective
consumers when judging the suitability of the IT security properties of the product for their particular
requirements.
The TOE is the NXP Smart ePP on P71 Secure Element. It implements a native operating system and
an application compliant with ICAO specifications referenced in the [ST]. The TOE supports the
advanced security methods Basic Access Control (BAC) and Active Authentication, and this
certification applies to the BAC configuration with or without Active Authentication. The TOE is a
composite TOE based upon the underlying P71 platform with its Crypto Library and Software Library.
The TOE has been evaluated by Riscure B.V. located in Delft, The Netherlands. The evaluation was
completed on 16 April 2021 with the approval of the ETR. The certification procedure has been
conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of
IT Security [NSCIB].
The scope of the evaluation is defined by the security target [ST], which identifies assumptions made
during the evaluation, the intended environment for the NXP SmartePP on P71, version 03 00 00 10,
the security requirements, and the level of confidence (evaluation assurance level) at which the
product is intended to satisfy the security requirements. Consumers of the NXP SmartePP on P71,
version 03 00 00 10 are advised to verify that their own environment is consistent with the security
target, and to give due consideration to the comments, observations and recommendations in this
certification report.
The results documented in the evaluation technical report [ETR]
1
for this product provides sufficient
evidence that the TOE meets the EAL4 augmented (EAL4+) assurance requirements for the evaluated
security functionality. This assurance level is augmented with ALC_DVS.2 (Sufficiency of security
measures) and ALC_FLR.1 (Basic flaw remediation).
The evaluation was conducted using the Common Methodology for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5 and [CEM] for conformance to the Common Criteria for Information
Technology Security Evaluation, version 3.1 Revision 5 [CC] (Parts I, II and III).
TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V., as the NSCIB Certification Body, declares that the evaluation meets
all the conditions for international recognition of Common Criteria Certificates and that the product will
be listed on the NSCIB Certified Products list. It should be noted that the certification results only apply
to the specific version of the product as evaluated.
1
The Evaluation Technical Report contains information proprietary to the developer and/or the
evaluator, and is not releasable for public review.
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2 Certification Results
2.1 Identification of Target of Evaluation
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) for this evaluation is the NXP SmartePP on P71, version 03 00 00 10
from NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH located in Hamburg, Germany.
The TOE is comprised of the following main components:
Delivery
item type
Identifier Version
Hardware NXP Secure Smart Card Controller N7121 B1
Software
Libraries
IC Dedicated Software 9.2.3.0
Software
Libraries
IC Dedicated Crypto Library 0.7.6
Software 53 6D 61 72 74 65 50 50 -"SmartePP" 03 00 00 10
To ensure secure usage a set of guidance documents is provided together with the NXP SmartePP on
P71, version 03 00 00 10. Details can be found in section 2.5 of this report.
For a detailed and precise description of the TOE lifecycle refer to the [ST], chapter 1.3.5.
2.2 Security Policy
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the integrated circuit chip of the machine readable travel document
(MRTD chip), loaded with a the native Card Operating System, SmartePP, programmed with the
Logical Data Structure (LDS) providing Basic Access Control (BAC) and optionally Active
Authentication. TOE functionality is according to ICAO Documents referenced in the [ST] and the set
of Security Functional Requirements defined in the [ST] and implemented by the TOE.
The TOE features include
• Authentication mechanisms in accordance to the ICAO specification:
o Basic access control (BAC)
o Active authentication (AA)
• Access control to allow retrieval of less sensitive data.
2.3 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
2.3.1 Assumptions
The assumptions defined in the Security Target are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead
to specific Security Objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. Detailed information on these
security objectives that must be fulfilled by the TOE environment can be found in section 4.2 of the
[ST].
2.3.2 Clarification of scope
The evaluation did not reveal any threats to the TOE that are not countered by the evaluated security
functions of the product.
Note that the ICAO MRTD infrastructure critically depends on the objectives for the environment to be
met. These are not weaknesses of this particular TOE, but aspects of the ICAO MRTD infrastructure
as a whole.
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The environment in which the TOE is personalized must perform proper and safe personalization
according to the guidance and referred ICAO guidelines.
The environment in which the TOE is used must ensure that the inspection system protects the
confidentiality and integrity of the data send and read from the TOE.
2.4 Architectural Information
The TOE is a native OS called Smart ePP running on top of an already evaluated base TOE
subsystem comprising:
• the circuitry of the MRTD’s chip, assessed as part of the base TOE subsystem evaluation
• the IC Dedicated Software and Crypto Library, assessed as part of the base TOE subsystem
evaluation
• the IC Embedded Software (smart ePP)
• a personalised filesystem, created in accordance with the guidance
2.5 Documentation
The following documentation is provided with the product by the developer to the customer:
Identifier Version
SmartePP User manual and administrator guide 1.4
SmartePP ICAO Personalization Guide 1.4
2.6 IT Product Testing
Testing (depth, coverage, functional tests, independent testing): The evaluators examined the
developer’s testing activities documentation and verified that the developer has met their testing
responsibilities.
2.6.1 Testing approach and depth
The developer has performed extensive testing on functional specification, subsystem and module
level. All parameter choices have been addressed at least once. All boundary cases identified have
been tested explicitly, and additionally the near-boundary conditions have been covered
probabilistically. The testing was largely automated using industry standard and proprietary test suites.
Test scripts were extensively used to verify that the functions return the expected values.
The test results of the underlying base TOE are extendable to composite evaluations, as the base
TOE is used according to its guidance and the composite evaluation requirements are met.
For the testing performed by the evaluators, the developer has provided samples and a test
environment. The evaluators have reproduced a selection of the developer tests, as well as a small
number of test cases designed by the evaluator.
2.6.2 Independent Penetration Testing
The vulnerability analysis was performed based on the structure of the attack methods defined by
JHAS [JIL-AM] and [JIL-AAPS]. For each attack method, we describe the objective of the attack and
how the attack method applies to the TOE. The following was considered for each attack method:
• The design and implementation of the features relevant for the attack method
• Specific attack techniques from the evaluator’s attack repository
• Implemented countermeasures
• User guidance and ETRfc from the underlying platform [HW-ETRfc].
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Based on these items, it was determined whether an attack method was applicable to the TOE and
should be tested during the penetration testing phase.
The total test effort expended by the evaluators was 6 weeks. During that test campaign 100% of the
total time was spent on Perturbation attacks.
2.6.3 Test Configuration
The identity and configuration of the hardware and software was verified in accordance with the
procedures and information presented in [ST] and the TOE guidance presented in section 2.5.
2.6.4 Testing Results
The testing activities, including configurations, procedures, test cases, expected results and observed
results are summarised in the [ETR], with references to the documents containing the full details.
The developer’s tests and the independent functional tests produced the expected results, giving
assurance that the TOE behaves as specified in its [ST] and functional specification.
No exploitable vulnerabilities were found with the independent penetration tests.
The algorithmic security level of cryptographic functionality has not been rated in this certification
process, but the current consensus on the algorithmic security level in the open domain, i.e. from the
current best cryptanalytic attacks published, has been taken into account.
2.7 Re-used evaluation results
There has been extensive re-use of the ALC aspects for the sites involved in the development and
production of the TOE, by use of 6 site certificates.
No sites have been visited as part of this evaluation.
2.8 Evaluated Configuration
The TOE is defined uniquely by its name and version number NXP SmartePP on P71, version 03 00
00 10. The guidance documents describe how to verify the TOE and configure it.
2.9 Results of the Evaluation
The evaluation lab documented their evaluation results in the [ETR], which references an ASE
Intermediate Report and other evaluator documents.
The verdict of each claimed assurance requirement is “Pass”.
Based on the above evaluation results the evaluation lab concluded the NXP SmartePP on P71,
version 03 00 00 10, to be CC Part 2 extended, CC Part 3 conformant, and to meet the requirements
of EAL 4 augmented with ALC_DVS.2 and ALC_FLR.1. This implies that the product satisfies the
security requirements specified in Security Target [ST].
The Security Target claims strict conformance to the Protection Profile [PP].
2.10 Comments/Recommendations
The user guidance as outlined in section 2.5 contains necessary information about the usage of the
TOE. Certain aspects of the TOE’s security functionality, in particular the countermeasures against
attacks, depend on accurate conformance to the user guidance of both the software and the hardware
part of the TOE. There are no particular obligations or recommendations for the user apart from
following the user guidance. Please note that the documents contain relevant details with respect to
the resistance against certain attacks.
In addition all aspects of assumptions, threats and policies as outlined in the Security Target not
covered by the TOE itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his system risk
management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and techniques to be covered, he
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should define the period of time until a re-assessment for the TOE is required and thus requested from
the sponsor of the certificate.
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms and protocols was not rated in the course of this
evaluation. This specifically applies to the following proprietary or non-standard algorithms, protocols
and implementations: None.
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3 Security Target
The Security Target NXP SmartePP on P71 - BAC, v1.5, 02 March 2021 [ST] is included here by
reference.
Please note that for the need of publication a public version [ST-lite] has been created and verified
according to [ST-SAN].
4 Definitions
This list of Acronyms and the glossary of terms contains elements that are not already defined by the
CC or CEM:
BAC Basic Access Control
EAC Extended Access Control
eMRTD electronic MRTD
ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization
IT Information Technology
ITSEF IT Security Evaluation Facility
JIL Joint Interpretation Library
LDS Logical Data Structure
MRTD Machine Readable Travel Document
NSCIB Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the area of IT security
PACE Password Authenticated Connection Establishment
PP Protection Profile
TOE Target of Evaluation
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5 Bibliography
This section lists all referenced documentation used as source material in the compilation of this
report:
[CC] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Parts I, II and III,
Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017.
[CEM] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1
Revision 5, April 2017.
[ETR] Evaluation Technical Report for NXP Smart ePP on P71 - ICAO EAC with
SAC/PACE and NXP Smart ePP on P71 - BAC 03 00 00 10, 20190534-D3, v1.6,
14 April 2021.
[HW-CERT] Certification report - BSI-DSZ-CC-1136-2021 for NXP Smart Card Controller
N7121 with IC Dedicated Software and Crypto Library (R1/R2) from NXP
Semiconductors Germany GmbH,10 February 2021.
[HW-ETRfC] Evaluation Technical Report for composite evaluation – NXP Secure Smart Card
Controller N7121 with IC Dedicated Software and Crypto Library (R1/R2), v3, 05
February 2021.
[JIL-AAPS] JIL Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards, Version 3.1, June 2020.
[JIL-AM] Attack Methods for Smartcards and Similar Devices, Version 2.4, January 2020
(sensitive with controlled distribution).
[NSCIB] Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security, Version 2.5, 28
March 2019.
[PP] Protection Profile – Machine Readable Travel Document with “ICAO Application”
and Basic Access Control (MRTD-PP), version 1.10, 25th March 2009, registered
under the reference BSI-CC-PP-0055-2009.
[ST] Security Target NXP SmartePP on P71 - BAC, v1.5, 02 March 2021.
[ST-lite] Security Target Lite NXP SmartePP on P71 - BAC, v1.3, 02 March 2021.
[ST-SAN] ST sanitising for publication, CC Supporting Document CCDB-2006-04-004, April
2006.
(This is the end of this report).