TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V.
Head Office:
Westervoortsedijk 73
NL-6827 AV Arnhem
P.O. Box 2220
NL-6802 CE Arnhem
The Netherlands
Location Leek:
Eiberkamp 10
NL-9351 VT Leek
P.O. Box 37
NL-9350 AA Leek
The Netherlands
info@nl.tuv.com
www.tuv.com/nl
Tel. +31 (0)88 888 7 888
Fax +31 (0)88 888 7 879
TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V. is a
registered company at the
Netherlands Chamber of Commerce
(KVK), under number 27288788.
VAT number: NL815820380B01
IBAN: NL61DEUT0265155096
Version
2021-04
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Certification Report
JCOP 3 P60
Sponsor and developer: NXP Semiconductors GmbH
Business Unit Security & Connectivity
Troplowitzstrasse 20
22529 Hamburg
Germany
Evaluation facility: Brightsight B.V.
Brassersplein 2
2612 CT Delft
The Netherlands
Report number: NSCIB-CC-98209-CR5
Report version: 5
Project number: 98209
Author(s): Kjartan Jæger Kvassnes
Date: 23 July 2021
Number of pages: 14
Number of appendices: 0
Reproduction of this report is authorised only if the report is reproduced in its entirety.
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CONTENTS
Foreword 3
Recognition of the Certificate 4
International recognition 4
European recognition 4
1 Executive Summary 5
2 Certification Results 7
2.1 Identification of Target of Evaluation 7
2.2 Security Policy 7
2.3 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope 8
2.3.1 Assumptions 8
2.3.2 Clarification of scope 8
2.4 Architectural Information 8
2.5 Documentation 9
2.6 IT Product Testing 10
2.6.1 Testing approach and depth 10
2.6.2 Independent penetration testing 10
2.6.3 Test configuration 10
2.6.4 Test results 10
2.7 Reused Evaluation Results 11
2.8 Evaluated Configuration 11
2.9 Evaluation Results 11
2.10 Comments/Recommendations 11
3 Security Target 13
4 Definitions 13
5 Bibliography 14
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Foreword
The Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security (NSCIB) provides a third-party
evaluation and certification service for determining the trustworthiness of Information Technology (IT)
security products. Under this NSCIB, TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V. has the task of issuing
certificates for IT security products, as well as for protection profiles and sites.
Part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product, protection profile or site
according to the Common Criteria assessment guidelines published by the NSCIB. Evaluations are
performed by an IT Security Evaluation Facility (ITSEF) under the oversight of the NSCIB Certification
Body, which is operated by TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V. in cooperation with the Ministry of the
Interior and Kingdom Relations.
An ITSEF in the Netherlands is a commercial facility that has been licensed by TÜV Rheinland
Nederland B.V. to perform Common Criteria evaluations; a significant requirement for such a licence is
accreditation to the requirements of ISO Standard 17025 “General requirements for the accreditation
of calibration and testing laboratories”.
By awarding a Common Criteria certificate, TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V. asserts that the product or
site complies with the security requirements specified in the associated (site) security target, or that
the protection profile (PP) complies with the requirements for PP evaluation specified in the Common
Criteria for Information Security Evaluation. A (site) security target is a requirements specification
document that defines the scope of the evaluation activities.
The consumer should review the (site) security target or protection profile, in addition to this
certification report, to gain an understanding of any assumptions made during the evaluation, the IT
product's intended environment, its security requirements, and the level of confidence (i.e., the
evaluation assurance level) that the product or site satisfies the security requirements stated in the
(site) security target.
Reproduction of this report is authorised only if the report is reproduced in its entirety.
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Recognition of the Certificate
The presence of the Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement (CCRA) and the SOG-IS logos on the
certificate indicates that this certificate is issued in accordance with the provisions of the CCRA and
the SOG-IS Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOG-IS MRA) and will be recognised by the participating
nations.
International recognition
The CCRA was signed by the Netherlands in May 2000 and provides mutual recognition of certificates
based on the Common Criteria (CC). Since September 2014 the CCRA has been updated to provide
mutual recognition of certificates based on cPPs (exact use) or STs with evaluation assurance
components up to and including EAL2+ALC_FLR.
For details of the current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes, see
http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
European recognition
The SOG-IS MRA Version 3, effective since April 2010, provides mutual recognition in Europe of
Common Criteria and ITSEC certificates at a basic evaluation level for all products. A higher
recognition level for evaluation levels beyond EAL4 (respectively E3-basic) is provided for products
related to specific technical domains. This agreement was signed initially by Finland, France,
Germany, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Italy joined the SOG-IS
MRA in December 2010.
For details of the current list of signatory nations, approved certification schemes and the list of
technical domains for which the higher recognition applies, see https://www.sogis.eu.
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1 Executive Summary
This Certification Report states the outcome of the Common Criteria security evaluation of the JCOP 3
P60. The developer of the JCOP 3 P60 is NXP Semiconductors GmbH located in Hamburg, Germany
and they also act as the sponsor of the evaluation and certification. A Certification Report is intended
to assist prospective consumers when judging the suitability of the IT security properties of the product
for their particular requirements.
The TOE is a composite TOE, consisting of a Java Card operating system, a library which provides
cryptographic functions, and an underlying platform, which is a secure microcontroller. The TOE
provides Java Card 3.04 functionality with post-issuance applet loading, card content management
and secure channel features as specified in Global Platform 2.2.1 including SCP03.
Cryptographic functionality includes AES, DES, Triple-DES (3DES), RSA, RSA-CRT, RSA key-
generation ECC over GF(p), ECC over GF(P) key generation, ECC over GF(p) secure point addition,
and SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512 hash algorithms and includes MAC, CMAC and
various modes of operation (e.g. ECB, CBC). Furthermore, the TOE provides random number
generation according to class DRG.3 of AIS 20. It includes a configuration service for TOE
configuration and patch loading purposes. The Secure Box feature allows providing native functions to
applets through a Secure Box Native Library. Finally, it provides three communication protocols, i.e.
ISO/IEC 7816 T=1, T=0 and ISO/IEC 14443 T=CL (contactless) over two physical interfaces (i.e.
ISO/IEC 7816 and ISO/IEC 14443).
Please note that a Secure Box Native Library is not part of the TOE, the Secure Box feature however
is a part of the TOE.
The TOE was evaluated initially by Brightsight B.V located in Delft, The Netherlands and was certified
on 02-08-2017. The TOE was recertified on 15 January 2018 and maintained on 19 May 2018,
followed by recertification on 29 November 2018 and maintenance on 29 July 2019, and a further
recertification that was completed on 14 January 2020. This re-evaluation of the TOE has also been
conducted by Brightsight B.V and was completed on 20 July 2021 with the approval of the ETR. The
re-certification procedure has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Netherlands
Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security [NSCIB].
This fifth issue of the Certification Report is a result of a “recertification with major changes”.
As in the previous re-certification, the major changes are the recertification of the hardware platform
with changes. To the guidance, the recertification of the cryptographic library, and associated change
to the TOE´s guidance and ST.
For clarity to composite evaluations and certifications, this certification report has been updated to
explicitly state that the additional minor hardware configurations were removed for the underlying
hardware recertification [HW-CERT].
The security evaluation reused the evaluation results of previously performed evaluations. A full, up-
to-date vulnerability analysis has been made, as well as renewed testing.
The scope of the evaluation is defined by the security target [ST], which identifies assumptions made
during the evaluation, the intended environment for the JCOP 3 P60, the security requirements, and
the level of confidence (evaluation assurance level) at which the product is intended to satisfy the
security requirements. Consumers of the JCOP 3 P60 are advised to verify that their own environment
is consistent with the security target, and to give due consideration to the comments, observations and
recommendations in this certification report.
The results documented in the evaluation technical report [ETR]
1
for this product provide sufficient
evidence that the TOE meets the EAL5 augmented (EAL5+) assurance requirements for the
evaluated security functionality. This assurance level is augmented with ASE_TSS.2 (TOE Summary
Specification), ALC_FLR.1 (Flaw Remediation), ALC_DVS.2 (Sufficiency of security measures) and
AVA_VAN.5 (Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis).
1
The Evaluation Technical Report contains information proprietary to the developer and/or the
evaluator, and is not available for public review.
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The evaluation was conducted using the Common Methodology for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5 [CEM] for conformance to the Common Criteria for Information
Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5 [CC] (Parts I, II and III).
TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V., as the NSCIB Certification Body, declares that the evaluation meets
all the conditions for international recognition of Common Criteria Certificates and that the product will
be listed on the NSCIB Certified Products list. Note that the certification results apply only to the
specific version of the product as evaluated.
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2 Certification Results
2.1 Identification of Target of Evaluation
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) for this evaluation is the JCOP 3 P60 from NXP Semiconductors
GmbH located in Hamburg, Germany.
The TOE is comprised of the following main components:
Component type Name Version Form of
delivery
Hardware
(platform)
NXP Secure Smart Card Controller
P6022y VB
P6022J VB (y = J)
Nameplate “9072B”
18 January 2016
wafer,
module,
inlay,
package
IC dedicated
Software
Test ROM software 10.1D
25-04-2015
On-Chip-
software
Boot ROM software 10.1D
25-04-2015
On-Chip-
software
Firmware Operating System (FOS) 0C.60, 04-2016
0C.70, 04-2016
On-Chip-
software
Test ROM software 10.1D, 25-04-2015 On-Chip-
software
Crypto Library V3.1.x on P6022y VB”
(NSCIB-CC-15-67206-CR3)
V3.1.2 On-Chip-
software
Software TOE OSB RC9; On-Chip
Software
Rom Code (Platform ID): svn6521 JxHyyy0019790400
Patch Code (Patch ID):
o 03 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 (PL3)
o 04 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 (PL4)
OSC RC9. On-Chip
Software
ROM Code (Platform ID) : svn7702 JxHyyy0077020400
Patch code (platform ID):
o 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 (PL1)
To ensure secure usage a set of guidance documents is provided, together with the JCOP 3 P60. For
details, see section 2.5 “Documentation” of this report.
For a detailed and precise description of the TOE lifecycle, see the [ST], Chapter 1.3.2.
2.2 Security Policy
The TOE is a composite TOE, consisting of a Java Card smart card operating system, a library which
provides cryptographic functions, and an underlying platform, which is a secure micro controller. The
TOE provides Java Card 3.0.4 functions with post-issuance applet loading, card content management
and secure channel features as specified in Global Platform 2.2.1 including SCP03.
Cryptographic functionality includes AES, DES, Triple-DES (3DES), RSA, RSA-CRT, RSA key-
generation, ECC over GF(p), ECC over GF(P) key generation, ECC over GF(p) secure point addition,
and SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512 hash algorithms and includes MAC, CMAC and
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various modes of operation (e.g. ECB, CBC). Furthermore, the TOE provides random number
generation according to class DRG.3 of AIS 20. It includes a configuration service for TOE
configuration and patch loading purposes. Finally, it provides three communication protocols, i.e.
ISO/IEC 7816 T=1, T=0 and ISO/IEC 14443 T=CL (contactless) over two physical interfaces (i.e.
ISO/IEC 7816 and ISO/IEC 14443).
2.3 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
2.3.1 Assumptions
The assumptions defined in the Security Target are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead
to specific Security Objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. For detailed information on the
security objectives that must be fulfilled by the TOE environment, see section 5.2 of the [ST].
2.3.2 Clarification of scope
The evaluation did not reveal any threats to the TOE that are not countered by the evaluated security
functions of the product.
Note that a Secure Box Native Library is not part of the TOE, the Secure Box feature however is a part
of the TOE.
2.4 Architectural Information
The architecture of the TOE is as follows:
The TOE is a composite TOE, consisting of:
JC_BOOT
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 Hardware “NXP Secure Smart Card Controller P6022y VB including IC dedicated software”
used as evaluated platform [HW-CERT], where only the P6022J VB (y=J) configuration os
allowed for this TOE.
 Cryptographic Library “Crypto Library V3.1.x on P6022y VB” built upon this hardware
platform [CL-CERT], where only the V3.1.2 version is allowed for this TOE.
 Operating System “JCOP OS” built upon this hardware platform and using the crypto library
as follows:
o “svn6521”, or
o “svn7702”
 Patch code as follows:
o For “svn6521”: “03 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 (PL3)” or “04 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 (PL4)”
o For “svn7702”: “01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 (PL1)”
The TOE is a Jaca Card (version 3.0.4) smart card allowing post-issuance of applications using the
Global Platform (version 2.2.1) framework. It includes a configuration service for TOE configuration
and patch loading purposes. Please note that HMAC is not supported. The Secure Box feature allows
providing native functions to applets through a Secure Box Native Library. Please note that a secure
box Native Library is not part of the TOE, the Secure Box feature is however part of the TOE. The
MIFARE and FIDO U2F related functionality is not part of the evaluation.
2.5 Documentation
The following documentation is provided with the product by the developer to the customer:
For EMV and Secure ID Use Cases:
Type Name Version Date
Electronic
Document
User Guidance and Administrator Manual 3.6 26-05-2021
Electronic
Document
ES_JCOP 3 SECID P60 CS (OSB) Errata Sheet 2.6 26-05-2021
Product Data Sheet SmartMX2 family P6022y VB Secure high-
performance smart card controller
3.6 22-08-2019
Electronic
Document
HW Wafer and delivery specification 3.3 12-07-2019
For Fingerprint and Token Use Cases:
Type Name Version Date
Electronic
Document
User Guidance and Administrator Manual 1.8 05-02-2021
Electronic
Document
ES_JCOP3 SECID P60 Errata Sheet 1.1 25-05-2021
Product Data
Sheet
SmartMX2 family P6022y VB Secure high-
performance smart card controller
3.6 22-08-2019
Electronic
Document
HW Wafer and delivery specification 3.3 12-07-2019
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2.6 IT Product Testing
Testing (depth, coverage, functional tests, independent testing): The evaluators examined the
developer’s testing activities documentation and verified that the developer has met their testing
responsibilities.
2.6.1 Testing approach and depth
The developer performed extensive testing on functional specification, subsystem and module level.
All parameter choices were addressed at least once. All boundary cases identified were tested
explicitly, and additionally the near-boundary conditions were covered probabilistically. The testing
was largely automated using industry standard and proprietary test suites. Test scripts were used
extensively to verify that the functions return the expected values.
The underlying hardware and crypto-library test results are extendable to composite evaluations,
because the underlying platform is operated according to its guidance and the composite evaluation
requirements are met.
For the testing performed by the evaluators, the developer provided samples and a test environment.
The evaluators reproduced a selection of the developer tests, as well as a small number of test cases
designed by the evaluator.
2.6.2 Independent penetration testing
The evaluator independent penetration testing was conducted according to the following testing
approach:
 When evaluating the evidence in the classes ASE, ADV and AGD, the evaluator considers
whether potential vulnerabilities can already be identified due to the TOE type and/or specified
behaviour in such an early stage of the evaluation.
 For ADV_IMP a thorough implementation representation review is performed on the TOE.
During this attack oriented analysis, the protection of the TOE is analysed using the
knowledge gained from all previous evaluation classes. This results in the identification of
(additional) potential vulnerabilities. For this step, analysis will be performed according to the
attack methods in [JIL-AM]. An important source for assurance in this step is the technical
report [ETRfC-HW] and [ETRfC-CL] of the underlying platform.
 All potential vulnerabilities are analysed using the knowledge gained from all evaluation
classes and information from the public domain. A judgment was made on how to assure that
these potential vulnerabilities are not exploitable. The potential vulnerabilities are addressed
by penetration testing, a guidance update or in other ways that are deemed appropriate.
 During the re-certification, the vulnerability analysis was re-assessed. This showed that part of
the test results was outdated. To address this, a number of representative tests have been
performed to provide assurance and validate outdated tests
The total test effort expended by the evaluators was 10 weeks. During that test campaign, 25% of the
total time was spent on Perturbation attacks, 50% on side-channel testing, and 25% on logical tests.
2.6.3 Test configuration
The TOE was tested in the following configurations:
 OS: JCOP 3 P60 Platform ID: “JxHyyy0019790400”, Patch ID: “03 00 00 00 00 00 00 00”
 OS: JCOP 3 P60 Platform ID: “JxHyyy0077020400”, Patch ID: “01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00”
2.6.4 Test results
The testing activities, including configurations, procedures, test cases, expected results and observed
results are summarised in the [ETR], with references to the documents containing the full details.
The developer’s tests and the independent functional tests produced the expected results, giving
assurance that the TOE behaves as specified in its [ST] and functional specification.
No exploitable vulnerabilities were found with the independent penetration tests.
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The algorithmic security level of cryptographic functionality has not been rated in this certification
process, but the current consensus on the algorithmic security level in the open domain, i.e., from the
current best cryptanalytic attacks published, has been taken into account.
The strength of the implementation of the cryptographic functionality has been assessed in the
evaluation, as part of the AVA_VAN activities. These activities revealed that for some cryptographic
functionality the security level could be reduced from an algorithmic security level above 100 bits to a
practical remaining security level lower than 100 bits. The remaining security level still exceeds 80 bits,
so this is considered sufficient. Therefore, no exploitable vulnerabilities were found with the
independent penetration tests.
For composite evaluations, please consult the [ETRfC] for details.
2.7 Reused Evaluation Results
This is a re-certification. Documentary evaluation results of the earlier version of the TOE have been
reused, but vulnerability analysis and penetration testing has been renewed.
Sites involved in the development and production of the hardware platform and Crypto library where
re-used by composition
There has been extensive reuse of the ALC aspects for the sites involved in the development and
production of the TOE, by use of four STAR reports.
o NXP Semiconductors Hamburg
o NXP Semiconductors Austria GmbH Styria
o NXP Bangalore
o NXP Glasgow 2
2.8 Evaluated Configuration
The TOE is defined uniquely by its name and version number JCOP 3 P60 as described in the
identification part of this report.
2.9 Evaluation Results
The evaluation lab documented their evaluation results in the [ETR], which references an ASE
Intermediate Report and other evaluator documents. To support composite evaluations according to
[CCDB-2007-09-01] a derived document [ETRfC] was provided and approved. This document
provides details of the TOE evaluation that must be considered when this TOE is used as platform in a
composite evaluation.
The verdict of each claimed assurance requirement is “Pass”.
Based on the above evaluation results the evaluation lab concluded the JCOP 3 P60, to be CC Part 2
extended, CC Part 3 conformant, (check ST compliance claim) and to meet the requirements of EAL
5 augmented with AVA_VAN.5, ALC_DVS.2, ASE_TSS.2 and ALC_FLR.1. This implies that the
product satisfies the security requirements specified in Security Target [ST].
The Security Target claims ‘strict’ conformance to the Protection Profile [PP].
2.10 Comments/Recommendations
The user guidance as outlined in section 2.5 “Documentation” contains necessary information about
the usage of the TOE. Certain aspects of the TOE’s security functionality, in particular the
countermeasures against attacks, depend on accurate conformance to the user guidance of both the
software and the hardware part of the TOE. There are no particular obligations or recommendations
for the user apart from following the user guidance. Please note that the documents contain relevant
details concerning the resistance against certain attacks.
In addition, all aspects of assumptions, threats and policies as outlined in the Security Target not
covered by the TOE itself must be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his system risk
management process. For the evolution of attack methods and techniques to be covered, the
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customer should define the period of time until a re-assessment for the TOE is required and thus
requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms and protocols was not rated in the course of this
evaluation. This specifically applies to the following proprietary or non-standard algorithms, protocols
and implementations:
 MIFARE and FIDO U2F support (as there are no security claims)
Not all key sizes specified in the [ST] have sufficient cryptographic strength to satisfy the AVA_VAN.5
“high attack potential”. To be protected against attackers with a "high attack potential", appropriate
cryptographic algorithms with sufficiently large cryptographic key sizes shall be used (references can
be found in national and international documents and standards).
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3 Security Target
The JCOP 3 P60 Security target, Rev. 4.3, 10 June 2021 [ST] is included here by reference.
Please note that, to satisfy the need for publication, a public version [ST-lite] has been created and
verified according to [ST-SAN].
4 Definitions
This list of acronyms and definitions contains elements that are not already defined by the CC or CEM:
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
CBC Cipher Block Chaining (a block cipher mode of operation)
CBC-MAC Cipher Block Chaining Message Authentication Code
DES Data Encryption Standard
DFA Differential Fault Analysis
ECB Electronic Code Book (a block-cipher mode of operation)
ECC Elliptic Curve Cryptography
ECDH Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman algorithm
ECDSA Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
EMA Electromagnetic Analysis
IC Integrated Circuit
IT Information Technology
ITSEF IT Security Evaluation Facility
JIL Joint Interpretation Library
MAC Message Authentication Code
NSCIB Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the area of IT
Security
PACE Password Authenticated Connection Establishment
PKI Public Key Infrastructure
PP Protection Profile
RMI Remote Method Invocation
RNG Random Number Generator
RSA Rivest-Shamir-Adleman Algorithm
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
SPA/DPA Simple/Differential Power Analysis
TRNG True Random Number Generator
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5 Bibliography
This section lists all referenced documentation used as source material in the compilation of this
report.
[CC] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Parts I, II
and III, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017
[CEM] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017
[CL-CERT] NSCIB-CC-67206-CR5 Certification Report Crypto Library V3.1.x on P6022y
VB, Version 1.0, 07 July 2021
[CL-ETRfC] ETR for Composite Evaluation Crypto Library V3.1.x on P6022y VB EAL6+,
18-RPT-116, version 9.0, 06 July 2021.
[CL-ST] Crypto Library V3.1.x on P6022y VB Security Target, Rev. 2.0, 22 March
2018
[ETR] Evaluation Technical Report "JCOP 3 P60” – EAL5+, 21-RPT-589, Version
3.0, 16 July 2021
[ETRfC] Evaluation Technical Report for Composition “JCOP 3 P60” – EAL5+,21-
RPT-290, Version 3.0, 16 July 2021
[HW-CERT] BSI-DSZ-CC-1059-V4-2021 for NXP Secure Smart Card Controller P6022y
VB* including IC Dedicated Software from NXP Semiconductors Germany
GmbH, 24 June 2021
[HW-ETRfC] Evaluation Technical for Composite Evaluation (ETR COMP) for the P6022y
VB VB, version 2, 2021-05-31
[HW-ST] Security Target Lite BSI-DSZ-CC-1059-V4-2021, NXP Secure Smart Card
Controller P6022y VB – Security Target Lite, Version 2.8, 2021-03-09
[JIL-AM] Attack Methods for Smartcards and Similar Devices, Version 2.4, January
2020 (sensitive with controlled distribution)
[NSCIB] Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security, Version 2.5,
28 March 2019
[PP] Java Card Protection Profile – Open Configuration, Version 3.0, May 2012
Published by Oracle, Inc. registered and certified by ANSSI under the
reference ANSSI-PP-2010/03-M01
[ST] JCOP 3 P60 Security target, Rev. 4.3, 10 June 2021
[ST-lite] JCOP 3 P60 Security Target Lite Rev. 4.3 — 10 June 2021
[ST-SAN] ST sanitising for publication, CC Supporting Document CCDB-2006-04-004,
April 2006
(This is the end of this report.)