STMicroelectronics
ST33H768 Platform Maskset K8K0A version C,
with firmware revision 4,
and optional cryptographic library NESLIB 4.1 and
4.1.1
Security Target for composition
Common Criteria for IT security evaluation
SMD_ST33H_ST_15_001 Rev 01.01
June 2015
www.st.com
BLANK
June 2015 SMD_ST33H_ST_15_001 Rev 01.01 3/68
ST33H768 Platform
Security Target for composition
Common Criteria for IT security evaluation
1 Introduction
1.1 Security Target reference
1 Document identification: ST33H768 Platform Maskset K8K0A version C, with firmware
revision 4, and optional cryptographic library Neslib 4.1 and 4.1.1 - SECURITY TARGET
FOR COMPOSITION.
2 Version number: Rev 01.01, issued June 2015.
3 Registration: registered at ST Microelectronics under number
SMD_ST33H_ST_15_001.
1.2 Purpose
4 This document presents the Security Target for composition (ST) of the ST33H768
Platform Maskset K8K0A version C Security Integrated Circuit (IC), designed on the ST33
platform of STMicroelectronics, with Dedicated Software (DSW) rev 4, and optional
cryptographic library Neslib 4.1 and 4.1.1.
5 The precise reference of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) and the security IC features are
given in Section 3: TOE description.
6 A glossary of terms and abbreviations used in this document is given in Appendix A:
Glossary.
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Contents ST33H768 Platform Security Target for composition
4/68 SMD_ST33H_ST_15_001
Contents
1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1 Security Target reference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2 Purpose . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2 Context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3 TOE description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3.1 TOE identification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .11
3.2 TOE overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3.3 TOE life cycle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
3.4 TOE environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
3.4.1 TOE Development Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
3.4.2 TOE production environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
3.4.3 TOE operational environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
4 Conformance claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
4.1 Common Criteria conformance claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
4.2 PP Claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
4.2.1 PP Reference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
4.2.2 PP Refinements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
4.2.3 PP Additions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
4.2.4 PP Claims rationale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
5 Security problem definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
5.1 Description of assets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
5.2 Threats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
5.2.1 Threats from the PP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
5.2.2 Augmented threats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
5.3 Organisational security policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
5.4 Assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
6 Security objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
6.1 Security objectives for the TOE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
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6.2 Security objectives for the environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
6.3 Security objectives rationale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
6.3.1 TOE threat "Memory Access Violation" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
6.3.2 TOE threats "Application code confidentiality", "Application data
confidentiality", "Application code integrity", "Application data integrity" 31
6.3.3 Organisational security policy "Additional Specific Security Functionality"
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
6.3.4 Organisational security policy "Controlled loading of the Security IC
Embedded Software" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
6.3.5 Organisational security policy "Usage of hardware platform" . . . . . . . . 32
6.3.6 Organisational security policy "Treatment of user data" . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
7 Security requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
7.1 Security functional requirements for the TOE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
7.1.1 Security Functional Requirements from the Protection Profile . . . . . . . 35
7.1.2 Additional Security Functional Requirements for the cryptographic
services. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
7.1.3 Additional Security Functional Requirements for the memories protection.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
7.1.4 Additional Security Functional Requirements related to the Admin
configuration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
7.1.5 Additional Security Functional Requirements related to the applications
protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
7.2 TOE security assurance requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
7.3 Refinement of the security assurance requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
7.3.1 Refinement regarding functional specification (ADV_FSP) . . . . . . . . . . 44
7.3.2 Refinement regarding test coverage (ATE_COV) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
7.4 Security Requirements rationale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
7.4.1 Rationale for the Security Functional Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
7.4.2 Additional security objectives are suitably addressed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
7.4.3 Additional security requirements are consistent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
7.4.4 Dependencies of Security Functional Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
7.4.5 Rationale for the Assurance Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
8 TOE summary specification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
8.1 Limited fault tolerance (FRU_FLT.2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
8.2 Failure with preservation of secure state (FPT_FLS.1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
8.3 Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1) [Test] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
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8.4 Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1) [Admin] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
8.5 Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2) [Test] & [Admin] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
8.6 Audit storage (FAU_SAS.1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
8.7 Resistance to physical attack (FPT_PHP.3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
8.8 Basic internal transfer protection (FDP_ITT.1), Basic internal TSF data
transfer protection (FPT_ITT.1) & Subset information flow control
(FDP_IFC.1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
8.9 Random number generation (FCS_RNG.1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
8.10 Cryptographic operation: DES / 3DES operation (FCS_COP.1 [EDES]) if
EDES+ only . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
8.11 Cryptographic operation: AES operation (FCS_COP.1 [AES]) if AES only 56
8.12 Cryptographic operation: RSA operation (FCS_COP.1 [RSA]) if Neslib only
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
8.13 Cryptographic operation: Elliptic Curves Cryptography operation
(FCS_COP.1 [ECC]) if Neslib only . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
8.14 Cryptographic operation: SHA operation (FCS_COP.1 [SHA]) if Neslib only
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
8.15 Cryptographic operation: DRBG operation (FCS_COP.1 [DRBG]) if Neslib
only . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
8.16 Cryptographic key generation: Prime generation (FCS_CKM.1
[Prime_generation]) if Neslib only . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
8.17 Cryptographic key generation: RSA key generation (FCS_CKM.1
[RSA_key_generation]) if Neslib only . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
8.18 Static attribute initialisation (FMT_MSA.3) [Memories] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
8.19 Management of security attributes (FMT_MSA.1) [Memories] & Specification
of management functions (FMT_SMF.1) [Memories] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
8.20 Complete access control (FDP_ACC.2) [Memories] & Security attribute
based access control (FDP_ACF.1) [Memories] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
8.21 Import of user data without security attributes (FDP_ITC.1) [Loader] . . . 58
8.22 Static attribute initialisation (FMT_MSA.3) [Loader] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
8.23 Management of security attributes (FMT_MSA.1) [Loader] & Specification of
management functions (FMT_SMF.1) [Loader] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
8.24 Subset access control (FDP_ACC.1) [Loader] & Security attribute based
access control (FDP_ACF.1) [Loader] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
8.25 Subset access control (FDP_ACC.1) [APPLI_FWL] & Security attribute
based access control (FDP_ACF.1) [APPLI_FWL] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
8.26 Static atttribute initialisation (FMT_MSA.3) [APPLI_FWL] . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
ST33H768 Platform Security Target for composition Contents
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9 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
Appendix A Glossary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
A.1 Terms. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
A.2 Abbreviations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
10 Revision history . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
List of tables ST33H768 Platform Security Target for composition
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List of tables
Table 1. TOE identification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Table 2. Derivative devices configuration possibilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Table 3. Composite product life cycle phases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Table 4. Summary of security environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Table 5. Summary of security objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Table 6. Security Objectives versus Assumptions, Threats or Policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
Table 7. Summary of functional security requirements for the TOE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
Table 8. FCS_COP.1 iterations (cryptographic operations) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
Table 9. FCS_CKM.1 iterations (cryptographic key generation). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
Table 10. TOE security assurance requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
Table 11. Impact of EAL5 selection on BSI-PP-0035 refinements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
Table 12. Security Requirements versus Security Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
Table 13. Dependencies of security functional requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
Table 14. List of abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
Table 15. Document revision history . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
ST33H768 Platform Security Target for composition List of figures
SMD_ST33H_ST_15_001 9/68
List of figures
Figure 1. ST33H768 Platform block diagram. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Figure 2. Security IC life cycle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Context ST33H768 Platform Security Target for composition
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2 Context
7 The Target of Evaluation (TOE) referred to in Section 3: TOE description, is evaluated under
the French IT Security Evaluation and Certification Scheme and is developed by the Secure
Microcontrollers Division of STMicroelectronics (ST).
8 The assurance level of the performed Common Criteria (CC) IT Security Evaluation is EAL 5
augmented by ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5.
9 The intent of this Security Target is to specify the Security Functional Requirements (SFRs)
and Security Assurance Requirements (SARs) applicable to the TOE security IC, and to
summarise its chosen TSF services and assurance measures.
10 This ST claims to be an instantiation of the "Security IC Platform Protection Profile" (PP)
registered and certified under the reference BSI-PP-0035 in the German IT Security
Evaluation and Certification Scheme, with the following augmentations:
• Addition #1: “Support of Cipher Schemes” from AUG
• Addition #4: “Area based Memory Access Control” from AUG
• Additions specific to this Security Target.
The original text of this PP is typeset as indicated here, its augmentations from AUG as
indicated here, when they are reproduced in this document.
11 Extensions introduced in this ST to the SFRs of the Protection Profile (PP) are exclusively
drawn from the Common Criteria part 2 standard SFRs.
12 This ST makes various refinements to the above mentioned PP and AUG. They are all
properly identified in the text typeset as indicated here. The original text of the PP is
repeated as scarcely as possible in this document for reading convenience. All PP
identifiers have been however prefixed by their respective origin label: BSI for BSI-PP-0035,
AUG1 for Addition #1 of AUG and AUG4 for Addition #4 of AUG.
ST33H768 Platform Security Target for composition TOE description
SMD_ST33H_ST_15_001 11/68
3 TOE description
3.1 TOE identification
13 The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the ST33H768 Platform Maskset K8K0A version C, with
dedicated software rev 4, and/or the optional cryptographic library Neslib 4.1 and 4.1.1, with
guidance documentation.
14 The IC maskset name is the product hardware identification.
The maskset major version is updated when the full maskset is changed (i.e. all layers of the
maskset are changed at the same time).
The IC version is updated for any change in hardware (i.e. part of the layers of the maskset)
or in the OST.
The Product name, IC version (i.e. ST33H768 platform version C), Firmware version and
libraries versions fully identify the TOE.
15 Different derivative devices may be configured depending on the customer needs:
• either by ST during the manufacturing or packaging process,
• or by the customer during the packaging, or composite product integration, or
personalisation process.
16 They all share the same hardware design and the same maskset (denoted by the Master
identification number). The Master identification number is unique for all product
configurations.
17 The configuration of the derivative devices can impact the available IOs, the available NVM
memory size, the availability of the crypto processors and the availability of the LPU, as
detailed here below:
Table 1. TOE identification
ICMaskset
name
Maskset
Major version
IC
version
Master
identification
number (1)
1. Part of the product information.
Firmware
revision
OST
revision
Optional Neslib
crypto library
version(2)
2. See the Neslib User Manual referenced in Section 9.
K8K0 A C 0098h 4 2.2 4.1 and 4.1.1
Table 2. Derivative devices configuration possibilities
Features Possible values
SWP Active, Inactive
SPI Active, Inactive
IART Active, Inactive
NVM size Selectable by 128 Kbytes granularity from 768 Kbytes to 384 Kbytes
Nescrypt Active, Inactive
EDES+ accelerator Active, Inactive
AES accelerator Active, Inactive
Library Protection Unit (LPU) Active, Inactive
TOE description ST33H768 Platform Security Target for composition
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18 All combinations of different features values are possible and covered by this certification.
All possible configurations can vary under a unique IC, and without impact on security.
19 All along the product life, the marking on the die, a set of accessible registers and a set of
specific instructions allow the customer to check the product information, providing the
identification elements, as listed in Table 1: TOE identification, and the configuration
elements as detailed in the Data Sheet and in the System ROM User Manual, referenced in
Section 9.
20 The rest of this document applies to all possible configurations of the TOE, with or without
the Neslib library, except when a restriction is mentioned. For easier reading, the restrictions
are typeset as indicated here.
3.2 TOE overview
21 The TOE is a serial access Smartcard IC designed for secure mobile applications, based on
the most recent generation of ARM® processors for embedded secure systems. Its
SecurCore® SC300™ 32-bit RISC core is built on the Cortex™ M3 core with additional
security features to help to protect against advanced forms of attacks.
22 The TOE offers a high-speed User Flash memory, an internally generated clock, an MPU,
an internal true random number generator (TRNG) and hardware accelerators for advanced
cryptographic functions.
23 The TOE features hardware accelerators for advanced cryptographic functions, with built-in
countermeasures against side channel attacks. If AES is active, the AES (Advanced
Encryption Standard) accelerator provides a high-performance implementation of AES-128,
AES-192 and AES-256 algorithms. If EDES+ is active, the 3-key triple DES accelerator
(EDES+) supports efficiently the Data Encryption Standard (DES [2]), enabling Cipher Block
Chaining (CBC) mode, fast DES and triple DES computation. If Nescrypt is active, the
NESCRYPT crypto-processor allows fast and secure implementation of the most popular
public key cryptosystems with a high level of performance ([4], [9], [15],[16], [17], [18]).
As randomness is a key stone in many applications, the ST33H768 Platform features a
highly reliable True Random Number Generator (TRNG), compliant with PTG.2 Class of
AIS20/AIS31 [1] and directly accessible thru dedicated registers.
This device includes the ARM® SecurCore® SC300™ memory protection unit (MPU),
which enables the user to define its own region organization with specific protection and
access permissions. The MPU can be used to enforce various protection models, ranging
from a basic code dump prevention model up to a full application confinement model.
24 The TOE offers 3 communication channels to the external world: a serial communication
interface fully compatible with the ISO/IEC 7816-3 standard, a single-wire protocol (SWP)
interface for communication with a near-field communication (NFC) router in SIM/NFC
applications, and an alternative and exclusive SPI Slave interface for communication in non-
SIM applications.
ST33H768 Platform Security Target for composition TOE description
SMD_ST33H_ST_15_001 13/68
25 In a few words, the ST33H768 Platform, offers a unique combination of high performances
and very powerful features for high level security:
• Die integrity,
• Monitoring of environmental parameters,
• Protection mechanisms against faults,
• AIS20/AIS31 class PTG.2 compliant True Random Number Generator,
• Memory Protection Unit,
• ISO 3309 CRC calculation block,
• optional hardware Security Enhanced DES accelerator,
• optional hardware AES accelerator,
• optional Library Protection Unit,
• optional Next Step Cryptography accelerator (NESCRYPT),
• optional cryptographic library.
26 The OST ROM contains a Dedicated Software which provides full test capabilities
(operating system for test, called "OST"), not accessible by the Security IC Embedded
Software (ES), after TOE delivery.
27 The System ROM and ST NVM of the TOE contain a Dedicated Software which provides a
very reduced set of commands for final test (operating system for final test, called "FTOS"),
not intended for the Security IC Embedded Software (ES) usage, and not available in User
configuration.
28 The System ROM and ST NVM of the TOE contain a Dedicated Support Software called
Secure Flash Loader, enabling to securely and efficiently download the Security IC
Embedded Software (ES) into the NVM. It also allows the evaluator to load software into the
TOE for test purpose. The Secure Flash Loader is not available in User configuration.
29 The System ROM and ST NVM of the TOE contain a Dedicated Support Software, which
provides low-level functions (called Flash Drivers), enabling the Security IC Embedded
Software (ES) to modify and manage the NVM contents. The Flash Drivers are available all
through the product life-cycle.
30 The Security IC Embedded Software (ES) is in User NVM.
The ES is not part of the TOE and is out of scope of the evaluation, except Neslib
when it is embedded.
31 The TOE optionally comprises a specific application in User NVM: this applicative
Embedded Software is a cryptographic library called Neslib. Neslib is a cutting edge
cryptographic library in terms of security and performance.
Neslib is embedded by the ES developer in his applicative code.
Note that Neslib can only be used if Nescrypt is active.
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Neslib provides the most useful operations in public key algorithms and protocols, thanks to:
• an asymmetric key cryptographic support module, supporting secure modular
arithmetic with large integers, with specialized functions for Rivest, Shamir & Adleman
Standard cryptographic algorithm (RSA [17]),
• an asymmetric key cryptographic support module that provides very efficient basic
functions to build up protocols using Elliptic Curves Cryptography on prime fields GF(p)
[15][16],
• an asymmetric key cryptographic support module that provides secure hash algorithm
functions (SHA-1(a)
, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512 [4][21]),
• prime number generation [5][3],
• support for a Deterministic Random Bit Generator.
32 The TOE optionally comprises a specific application in User NVM: this applicative
Embedded Software is a MIFARE technology library, MIFARE® Classic, which is not in the
scope of this evaluation.
33 The user guidance documentation, part of the TOE, consists of:
• the product Data Sheet and die description,
• optionally the ST33H768 Platform Technical Notes
• the product family Security Guidance,
• the AIS31 user manuals,
• the Cortex M3 SC300 Technical Reference Manuals,
• the System ROM user manual,
• the Flash loader installation guide,
• optionally the Neslib user manual.
34 The complete list of guidance documents is detailed in Section 9.
35 Figure 1 provides an overview of the ST33H768 Platform.
a. Note that SHA-1 is no longer recommended as a cryptographic function in the context of smart card appli-
cations. Hence, Security IC Embedded Software may need to use another SHA to achieve a suitable
strength.
ST33H768 Platform Security Target for composition TOE description
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Figure 1. ST33H768 Platform block diagram
3.3 TOE life cycle
36 This Security Target is fully conform to the claimed PP. In the following, just a summary and
some useful explanations are given. For complete details on the TOE life cycle, please refer
to the Security IC Platform Protection Profile (BSI-PP-0035), section 1.2.3.
37 The composite product life cycle is decomposed into 7 phases. Each of these phases has
the very same boundaries as those defined in the claimed protection profile.
38 The life cycle phases are summarized in Table 3.
39 The limit of the evaluation corresponds to phases 2, 3 and optionally 4, including the
delivery and verification procedures of phase 1, and the TOE delivery either to the IC
packaging manufacturer or to the composite product integrator ; procedures corresponding
to phases 1, 5, 6 and 7 are outside the scope of this evaluation.
40 In the following, the term "Composite product manufacturing" is uniquely used to indicate
phases 1, optionally 4, 5 and 6 all together.
This ST also uses the term "Composite product manufacturer" which includes all roles
responsible of the TOE during phases 1, optionally 4, 5 and 6.
41 The TOE is delivered after Phase 3 in form of wafers or after Phase 4 in packaged form,
depending on the customer’s order.
42 In the following, the term "TOE delivery" is uniquely used to indicate:
• after Phase 3 (or before Phase 4) if the TOE is delivered in form of wafers or sawn
wafers (dice) or
• after Phase 4 (or before Phase 5) if the TOE is delivered in form of packaged products.
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43 The TOE is only delivered in ADMIN or USER configuration, depending on the customer’s
request.
44 The following figure shows the possible organization of the life cycle, adapted to the TOE
which comprises programmable NVM. Thus, the Security IC Embedded Software may be
loaded onto the TOE in phase 3, 4, 5 or 6, depending on customer’s choice.
Table 3. Composite product life cycle phases
Phase Name Description Responsible party
1
IC embedded software
development
security IC embedded software
development
specification of IC pre-personalization
requirements
IC embedded software
developer
2 IC development
IC design
IC dedicated software development
IC developer: ST
3 IC manufacturing
integration and photomask fabrication
IC production
IC testing
pre-personalisation
IC manufacturer: ST or
TSMC
4 IC packaging
security IC packaging (and testing)
pre-personalisation if necessary
IC packaging
manufacturer: ST or
AMKOR or DISCO or
NEDCARD or SMARTFLEX
or STATSCHIPPAC
5
Composite product
integration
composite product finishing process
composite product testing
Composite product
manufacturer
6 Personalisation
composite product personalisation
composite product testing
Personaliser
7 Operational usage
composite product usage by its issuers
and consumers
End-consumer
ST33H768 Platform Security Target for composition TOE description
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Figure 2. Security IC life cycle
3.4 TOE environment
45 Considering the TOE, three types of environments are defined:
• Development environment corresponding to phase 2,
• Production environment corresponding to phase 3 and optionally 4,
• Operational environment, including phase 1 and from phase 4 or 5 to phase 7.
3.4.1 TOE Development Environment
46 To ensure security, the environment in which the development takes place is secured with
controllable accesses having traceability. Furthermore, all authorised personnel involved
fully understand the importance and the strict implementation of defined security
procedures.
47 The development begins with the TOE's specification. All parties in contact with sensitive
information are required to abide by Non-Disclosure Agreements.
48 Design and development of the IC then follows, together with the dedicated and engineering
software and tools development. The engineers use secure computer systems (preventing
unauthorised access) to make their developments, simulations, verifications and generation
of the TOE's databases. Sensitive documents, files and tools, databases on tapes, and
printed circuit layout information are stored in appropriate locked cupboards/safe. Of
paramount importance also is the disposal of unwanted data (complete electronic erasures)
and documents (e.g. shredding).
49 The development centres involved in the development of the TOE can be the following: ST
ROUSSET (FRANCE), ST SOPHIA (FRANCE), ST GRENOBLE (FRANCE), ST RENNES (FRANCE),
ST CROLLES (FRANCE), ST ANG MO KIO 1 (SINGAPORE), ST ZAVENTEM (BELGIUM).
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50 Reticules and photomasks are generated from the verified IC databases; the former are
used in the silicon Wafer-fab processing. As reticules and photomasks are generated off-
site, they are transported and worked on in a secure environment with accountability and
traceability of all (good and bad) products. During the transfer of sensitive data
electronically, procedures are established to ensure that the data arrive only at the
destination and are not accessible at intermediate stages (e.g. stored on a buffer server
where system administrators make backup copies).
51 The authorized sub-contractors involved in the TOE mask manufacturing can be DNP
(JAPAN), DPE (ITALY), or TSMC (TAIWAN).
3.4.2 TOE production environment
52 As high volumes of product commonly go through such environments, adequate control
procedures are necessary to account for all product at all stages of production.
53 Production starts within the Wafer-fab; here the silicon wafers undergo the diffusion
processing. Computer tracking at wafer level throughout the process is commonplace. The
wafers are then taken into the test area. Testing of each TOE occurs to assure
conformance with the device specification. The wafers are then delivered for assembly onto
the composite products.
54 The authorized front-end plant involved in the manufacturing of the TOE can be ST
ROUSSET (FRANCE) or ST CROLLES (FRANCE) or TSMC (TAIWAN).
55 The authorized EWS (Electrical Wafer Sort) plant involved in the testing of the TOE can be
ST ROUSSET (FRANCE) or ST TOA PAYOH (SINGAPORE).
56 Wafers are then scribed and broken such as to separate the functional from the non-
functional ICs. The latter is discarded in a controlled accountable manner. The good ICs are
then packaged in phase 4, in a back-end plant. When testing, programming or deliveries are
done offsite, ICs are transported and worked on in a secure environment with accountability
and traceability of all (good and bad) products.
57 When the product is delivered after phase 4, the authorized back-end plants involved in the
packaging of the TOE can be ST ANG MO KIO 6 (SINGAPORE), ST BOUSKOURA (MOROCCO),
ST CALAMBA (THE PHILIPPINES), ST MUAR (MALAYSIA), ST SHENZHEN (CHINA), AMKOR (THE
PHILIPPINES or TAIWAN), DISCO (GERMANY), NEDCARD (THE NETHERLANDS), SMARTFLEX
(SINGAPORE), STATS CHIPPAC (SINGAPORE or TAIWAN or SHANGHAI).
58 All ST back-end plants, ST LOYANG (SINGAPORE) and ST ROUSSET (FRANCE) can also be
involved for the logistics.
3.4.3 TOE operational environment
59 A TOE operational environment is the environment of phases 1, optionally 4, then 5 to 7.
60 At phases 1, 4, 5 and 6, the TOE operational environment is a controlled environment.
61 End-user environments (phase 7): composite products are used in a wide range of
applications to assure authorised conditional access. Examples of such are pay-TV, banking
cards, brand protection, portable communication SIM cards, health cards, transportation
cards, access management, identity and passport cards. The end-user environment
therefore covers a wide range of very different functions, thus making it difficult to avoid and
monitor any abuse of the TOE.
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4 Conformance claims
4.1 Common Criteria conformance claims
62 The ST33H768 Platform Security Target claims to be conformant to the Common Criteria
version 3.1 revision 4.
63 Furthermore it claims to be CC Part 2 (CCMB-2012-09-002) extended and CC Part 3
(CCMB-2012-09-003) conformant. The extended Security Functional Requirements are
those defined in the Security IC Platform Protection Profile (BSI-PP-0035).
64 The assurance level for the ST33H768 Platform Security Target is EAL 5 augmented by
ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5.
4.2 PP Claims
4.2.1 PP Reference
65 The ST33H768 Platform Security Target claims strict conformance to the Security IC
Platform Protection Profile (BSI-PP-0035), for the part of the TOE covered by this PP
(Security IC), as required by this Protection Profile.
4.2.2 PP Refinements
66 The main refinements operated on the BSI-PP-0035 are:
• Addition #1: “Support of Cipher Schemes” from AUG,
• Addition #4: “Area based Memory Access Control” from AUG,
• Specific additions for the Secure Flash Loader,
• Refinement of assurance requirements.
67 All refinements versus the PP are indicated with type setting text as indicated here, original
text from the BSI-PP-0035 being typeset as indicated here. Text originating in AUG is
typeset as indicated here.
4.2.3 PP Additions
68 The security environment additions relative to the PP are summarized in Table 4.
69 The additional security objectives relative to the PP are summarized in Table 5.
70 A simplified presentation of the TOE Security Policy (TSP) is added.
71 The additional SFRs for the TOE relative to the PP are summarized in Table 7.
72 The additional SARs relative to the PP are summarized in Table 10.
4.2.4 PP Claims rationale
73 The differences between this Security Target security objectives and requirements and
those of BSI-PP-0035, to which conformance is claimed, have been identified and justified
in Section 6 and in Section 7. They have been recalled in the previous section.
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74 In the following, the statements of the security problem definition, the security objectives,
and the security requirements are consistent with those of the BSI-PP-0035.
75 The security problem definition presented in Section 5, clearly shows the additions to the
security problem statement of the PP.
76 The security objectives rationale presented in Section 6.3 clearly identifies modifications
and additions made to the rationale presented in the BSI-PP-0035.
77 Similarly, the security requirements rationale presented in Section 7.4 has been updated
with respect to the protection profile.
78 All PP requirements have been shown to be satisfied in the extended set of requirements
whose completeness, consistency and soundness have been argued in the rationale
sections of the present document.
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SMD_ST33H_ST_15_001 21/68
5 Security problem definition
79 This section describes the security aspects of the environment in which the TOE is intended
to be used and addresses the description of the assets to be protected, the threats, the
organisational security policies and the assumptions.
80 Note that the origin of each security aspect is clearly identified in the prefix of its label. Most
of these security aspects can therefore be easily found in the Security IC Platform
Protection Profile (BSI-PP-0035), section 3. Only those originating in AUG, and the one
introduced in this Security Target, are detailed in the following sections.
81 A summary of all these security aspects and their respective conditions is provided in
Table 4.
5.1 Description of assets
82 The assets (related to standard functionality) to be protected are:
• the User Data,
• the Security IC Embedded Software, stored and in operation,
• the security services provided by the TOE for the Security IC Embedded Software.
83 The user (consumer) of the TOE places value upon the assets related to high-level security
concerns:
SC1 integrity of User Data and of the Security IC Embedded Software (while being
executed/processed and while being stored in the TOE's memories),
SC2 confidentiality of User Data and of the Security IC Embedded Software (while being
processed and while being stored in the TOE's memories)
SC3 correct operation of the security services provided by the TOE for the Security IC
Embedded Software.
Application note:
As the TOE provides a functionality for Security IC Embedded Software secure
loading into NVM, the ES is considered as User Data being stored in the TOE’s
memories at this step, and the above security concerns are extended accordingly.
84 According to the Protection Profile there is the following high-level security concern related
to security service:
SC4 deficiency of random numbers.
85 To be able to protect these assets the TOE shall protect its security functionality. Therefore
critical information about the TOE shall be protected. Critical information includes:
• logical design data, physical design data, IC Dedicated Software, and configuration
data,
• Initialisation Data and Pre-personalisation Data, specific development aids, test and
characterisation related data, material for software development support, and
photomasks.
Such information and the ability to perform manipulations assist in threatening the above
assets.
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86 The information and material produced and/or processed by ST in the TOE development
and production environment (Phases 2 to 3) can be grouped as follows:
• logical design data,
• physical design data,
• IC Dedicated Software, Security IC Embedded Software, Initialisation Data and pre-
personalisation Data,
• specific development aids,
• test and characterisation related data,
• material for software development support, and
• photomasks and products in any form
as long as they are generated, stored, or processed by ST.
Table 4. Summary of security environment
Label Title
TOE
threats
BSI.T.Leak-Inherent Inherent Information Leakage
BSI.T.Phys-Probing Physical Probing
BSI.T.Malfunction Malfunction due to Environmental Stress
BSI.T.Phys-Manipulation Physical Manipulation
BSI.T.Leak-Forced Forced Information Leakage
BSI.T.Abuse-Func Abuse of Functionality
BSI.T.RND Deficiency of Random Numbers
AUG4.T.Mem-Access Memory Access Violation
T.Data_Modification Unauthorised data modification
T.Impersonate Impersonating authorised users during authentication
T.Cloning Cloning
T.Confid-Applic-Code Application code confidentiality
T.Confid-Applic-Data Application data confidentiality
T.Integ-Applic-Code Applicationcode integrity
T.Integ-Applic-Data Application data integrity
OSPs
BSI.P.Process-TOE Protection during TOE Development and Production
AUG1.P.Add-Functions
Additional Specific Security Functionality (Cipher Scheme
Support)
P.Controlled-ES-Loading Controlled loading of the Security IC Embedded Software
P.Plat-Appl Usage of hardware platform
P.Resp-Appl Treatment of user data
Assumptions
BSI.A.Process-Sec-IC Protection during Packaging, Finishing and Personalisation
BSI.A.Plat-Appl Usage of Hardware Platform
BSI.A.Resp-Appl Treatment of User Data
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5.2 Threats
5.2.1 Threats from the PP
87 The following threats are defined in the BSI-PP-0035. For complete details, refer to this
document, section 3.2. Only those originating in AUG and those introduced in this Security
Target are detailed in the following section.
5.2.2 Augmented threats
88 The following additional threat is selected from AUG.
89 The following additional threats are related to Application Protection.
BSI.T.Leak-Inherent Inherent Information Leakage
BSI.T.Phys-Probing Physical Probing
BSI.T.Malfunction Malfunction due to Environmental Stress
BSI.T.Phys-Manipulation Physical Manipulation
BSI.T.Leak-Forced Forced Information Leakage
BSI.T.Abuse-Func Abuse of Functionality
BSI.T.RND Deficiency of Random Numbers
AUG4.T.Mem-Access Memory Access Violation:
Parts of the Security IC Embedded Software may cause security violations
by accidentally or deliberately accessing restricted data (which may include
code). Any restrictions are defined by the security policy of the specific
application context and must be implemented by the Security IC
Embedded Software.
Clarification: This threat does not address the proper definition and
management of the security rules implemented by the Security IC
Embedded Software, this being a software design and correctness issue.
This threat addresses the reliability of the abstract machine targeted by the
software implementation. To avert the threat, the set of access rules
provided by this TOE should be undefeated if operated according to the
provided guidance. The threat is not realized if the Security IC Embedded
Software is designed or implemented to grant access to restricted
information. It is realized if an implemented access denial is granted under
unexpected conditions or if the execution machinery does not effectively
control a controlled access.
Here the attacker is expected to (i) take advantage of flaws in the design
and/or the implementation of the TOE memory access rules (refer to
BSI.T.Abuse-Func but for functions available after TOE delivery), (ii)
introduce flaws by forcing operational conditions (refer to
BSI.T.Malfunction) and/or by physical manipulation (refer to BSI.T.Phys-
Manipulation). This attacker is expected to have a high level potential of
attack.
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5.3 Organisational security policies
90 The TOE provides specific security functionality that can be used by the Security IC
Embedded Software. In the following specific security functionality is listed which is not
derived from threats identified for the TOE’s environment because it can only be decided in
the context of the Security IC application, against which threats the Security IC Embedded
Software will use the specific security functionality.
91 ST applies the Protection policy during TOE Development and Production (BSI.P.Process-
TOE) as specified below.
T.Confid-Applic-Code Application code confidentiality:
A sensitive application code may need to be protected against
unauthorized disclosure. This relates to attacks at runtime to gain read or
compare access to memory area where the sensitive application
executable code is stored.
The attacker executes an application to disclose code belonging to the
sensitive application.
Clarification: the "sensitive application" above mentioned is an
application chosen by the customer that needs to be protected.
T.Confid-Applic-Data Application data confidentiality:
A sensitive application data may need to be protected against
unauthorized disclosure. This relates to attacks at runtime to gain read or
compare access to the sensitive application data by another application.
For example, the attacker executes an application that tries to read data
belonging to the sensitive application.
Clarification: the "sensitive application" above mentioned is an
application chosen by the customer that needs to be protected.
T.Integ-Applic-Code Application code integrity:
A sensitive application code may need to be protected against
unauthorized modification. This relates to attacks at runtime to gain write
access to memory area where the sensitive application executable code is
stored.
The attacker executes an application that tries to alter (part of) the
sensitive application code.
Clarification: the "sensitive application" above mentioned is an
application chosen by the customer that needs to be protected.
T.Integ-Applic-Data Application data integrity:
A sensitive application data may need to be protected against
unauthorized modification. This relates to attacks at runtime to gain write
access to the sensitive application data by another application.
The attacker executes an application that tries to alter (part of) the
sensitive application data.
Clarification: the "sensitive application" above mentioned is an
application chosen by the customer that needs to be protected.
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92 ST applies the Additional Specific Security Functionality policy (AUG1.P.Add-Functions) as
specified below.
93 A new Organisational Security Policy (OSP) is defined here below:
94 P.Controlled-ES-Loading is related to the capability provided by the TOE to load Security IC
Embedded Software into the NVM after TOE delivery, in a controlled manner, during
composite product manufacturing. The use of this capability is optional, and depends on the
customer’s production organization.
5.4 Assumptions
95 The assumptions are described in the BSI-PP-0035, section 3.4.
BSI.P.Process-TOE Protection during TOE Development and Production:
An accurate identification is established for the TOE. This requires that
each instantiation of the TOE carries this unique identification.
AUG1.P.Add-Functions Additional Specific Security Functionality:
The TOE shall provide the following specific security functionality to the
Security IC Embedded Software:
– Data Encryption Standard (DES): if EDES+ is active,
– Triple Data Encryption Standard (3DES): if EDES+ is active,
– Advanced Encryption Standard (AES): if AES is active,
– Elliptic Curves Cryptography on GF(p): when Neslib is embedded
only,
– Secure Hashing (SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512):
when Neslib is embedded only,
– Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA): when Neslib is embedded only,
– Prime Number Generation: when Neslib is embedded only,
– Deterministic Random Bit Generator: when Neslib is embedded only.
Note that DES is no longer recommended as an encryption function in the
context of smart card applications. Hence, Security IC Embedded Software
may need to use triple DES to achieve a suitable strength.
Note that SHA-1 is no longer recommended as a cryptographic function in
the context of smart card applications. Hence, Security IC Embedded
Software may need to use another SHA to achieve a suitable strength.
P.Controlled-ES-Loading Controlled loading of the Security IC Embedded Software:
The TOE shall provide the capability to import the Security IC Embedded
Software into the NVM, in a controlled manner, either before TOE delivery,
under ST authority, either after TOE delivery, under the composite product
manufacturer authority.
This capability is not available in User configuration.
P.Plat-Appl Usage of hardware platform:
The Security IC Embedded Software, part of the TOE, uses the TOE
hardware platform according to the assumption A.Plat-Appl defined in BSI-
PP-0035.
P.Resp-Appl Treatment of user data:
The Security IC Embedded Software, part of the TOE, treats user data
according to the assumption A.Resp-Appl defined in BSI-PP-0035.
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BSI.A.Process-Sec-IC Protection during Packaging, Finishing and Personalisation
BSI.A.Plat-Appl Usage of Hardware Platform
BSI.A.Resp-Appl Treatment of User Data
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6 Security objectives
96 The security objectives of the TOE cover principally the following aspects:
• integrity and confidentiality of assets,
• protection of the TOE and associated documentation during development and
production phases,
• provide random numbers,
• provide cryptographic support and access control functionality.
97 A summary of all security objectives is provided in Table 5.
98 Note that the origin of each objective is clearly identified in the prefix of its label. Most of
these security aspects can therefore be easily found in the protection profile. Only those
originating in AUG, and the one introduced in this Security Target, are detailed in the
following sections.
6.1 Security objectives for the TOE
Table 5. Summary of security objectives
Label Title
TOE
BSI.O.Leak-Inherent Protection against Inherent Information Leakage
BSI.O.Phys-Probing Protection against Physical Probing
BSI.O.Malfunction Protection against Malfunctions
BSI.O.Phys-Manipulation Protection against Physical Manipulation
BSI.O.Leak-Forced Protection against Forced Information Leakage
BSI.O.Abuse-Func Protection against Abuse of Functionality
BSI.O.Identification TOE Identification
BSI.O.RND Random Numbers
AUG1.O.Add-Functions Additional Specific Security Functionality
AUG4.O.Mem-Access Dynamic Area based Memory Access Control
O.Controlled-ES-Loading Controlled loading of the Security IC Embedded Software
O.Plat-Appl Usage of hardware platform
O.Resp-Appl Treatment of user data
O.Firewall Application firewall
Environments
BSI.OE.Plat-Appl Usage of Hardware Platform
BSI.OE.Resp-Appl Treatment of User Data
BSI.OE.Process-Sec-IC Protection during composite product manufacturing
BSI.O.Leak-Inherent Protection against Inherent Information Leakage
BSI.O.Phys-Probing Protection against Physical Probing
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BSI.O.Malfunction Protection against Malfunctions
BSI.O.Phys-Manipulation Protection against Physical Manipulation
BSI.O.Leak-Forced Protection against Forced Information Leakage
BSI.O.Abuse-Func Protection against Abuse of Functionality
BSI.O.Identification TOE Identification
BSI.O.RND Random Numbers
AUG1.O.Add-Functions Additional Specific Security Functionality:
The TOE shall provide the following specific security functionality to
the Security IC Embedded Software:
– Data Encryption Standard (DES): if EDES+ is active,
– Triple Data Encryption Standard (3DES): if EDES+ is active,
– Advanced Encryption Standard (AES): if AES is active,
– Elliptic Curves Cryptography on GF(p): when Neslib is
embedded only,
– Secure Hashing (SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-
512): when Neslib is embedded only,
– Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA): when Neslib is embedded only,
– Prime Number Generation: when Neslib is embedded only,
– Deterministic Random Bit Generator: when Neslib is embedded
only.
Note that DES is no longer recommended as an encryption function
in the context of smart card applications. Hence, Security IC
Embedded Software may need to use triple DES to achieve a
suitable strength.
Note that SHA-1 is no longer recommended as a cryptographic
function in the context of smart card applications. Hence, Security IC
Embedded Software may need to use another SHA to achieve a
suitable strength.
AUG4.O.Mem-Access Dynamic Area based Memory Access Control:
The TOE must provide the Security IC Embedded Software with the
capability to define dynamic memory segmentation and
protection. The TOE must then enforce the defined access rules
so that access of software to memory areas is controlled as required,
for example, in a multi-application environment.
O.Controlled-ES-Loading Controlled loading of the Security IC Embedded Software:
The TOE must provide the capability to load the Security IC
Embedded Software into the NVM, either before TOE delivery, under
ST authority, either after TOE delivery, under the composite product
manufacturer authority. The TOE must restrict the access to these
features. The TOE must provide control means to check the integrity
of the loaded user data.
This capability is not available in User configuration.
O.Firewall Application firewall:
The TOE provides a service to ensure isolation of data and code
between a Protected Application and the other applications. Another
application shall not read, write, compare any piece of data or code
belonging to the Protected Application.
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6.2 Security objectives for the environment
99 Security Objectives for the Security IC Embedded Software development environment
(phase 1):
100 Security Objectives for the operational Environment (phase 4 up to 6):
6.3 Security objectives rationale
101 The main line of this rationale is that the inclusion of all the security objectives of the BSI-
PP-0035 protection profile, together with those in AUG, and those introduced in this ST,
guarantees that all the security environment aspects identified in Section 5 are addressed
by the security objectives stated in this chapter.
102 Thus, it is necessary to show that:
• security environment aspects from AUG, and from this ST, are addressed by security
objectives stated in this chapter,
• security objectives from AUG, and from this ST, are suitable (i.e. they address security
environment aspects),
• security objectives from AUG, and from this ST, are consistent with the other security
objectives stated in this chapter (i.e. no contradictions).
103 The selected augmentations from AUG introduce the following security environment
aspects:
• TOE threat "Memory Access Violation, (AUG4.T.Mem-Access)",
• organisational security policy "Additional Specific Security Functionality, (AUG1.P.Add-
Functions)".
O.Plat-Appl Usage of hardware platform:
To ensure that the TOE is used in a secure manner the Security IC
Embedded Software, part of the TOE, shall be designed so that the
requirements from the following documents are met: (i) hardware
data sheet for the TOE, (ii) data sheet of the IC dedicated software of
the TOE, (iii) TOE application notes, other guidance documents, and
(iii) findings of the TOE evaluation reports relevant for the Security IC
Embedded Software.
O.Resp-Appl Treatment of user data:
Security relevant User Data (especially cryptographic keys) are
treated by the Security IC Embedded Software as required by the
security needs of the specific application context.
For example the Security IC Embedded Software will not disclose
security relevant user data to unauthorised users or processes when
communicating with a terminal.
BSI.OE.Plat-Appl Usage of Hardware Platform
BSI.OE.Resp-Appl Treatment of User Data
BSI.OE.Process-Sec-IC Protection during composite product manufacturing
Security objectives ST33H768 Platform Security Target for composition
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104 The augmentation made in this ST introduces the following security environment aspects:
• organisational security policies "Controlled loading of the Security IC Embedded
Software, (P.Controlled-ES-Loading)".
105 As required by CC Part 1 (CCMB-2012-09-001), no assumption nor objective on the
environment has been added to those of the BSI-PP-0035 Protection Profile, to which strict
conformance is claimed.
106 The justification of the additional policies and additional threat provided in the next
subsections shows that they do not contradict to the rationale already given in the protection
profile BSI-PP-0035 for the assumptions, policy and threats defined there.
6.3.1 TOE threat "Memory Access Violation"
107 The justification related to the threat “Memory Access Violation, (AUG4.T.Mem-Access)” is
as follows:
108 According to AUG4.O.Mem-Access the TOE must enforce the dynamic memory
segmentation and protection so that access of software to memory areas is controlled.
Any restrictions are to be defined by the Security IC Embedded Software. Thereby security
Table 6. Security Objectives versus Assumptions, Threats or Policies
Assumption, Threat or Organisational
Security Policy
Security Objective Notes
BSI.A.Plat-Appl BSI.OE.Plat-Appl Phase 1
BSI.A.Resp-Appl BSI.OE.Resp-Appl Phase 1
BSI.P.Process-TOE BSI.O.Identification Phase 2-3
BSI.A.Process-Sec-IC BSI.OE.Process-Sec-IC Phase 4-6
P.Controlled-ES-Loading O.Controlled-ES-Loading Phase 4-6
AUG1.P.Add-Functions AUG1.O.Add-Functions
P.Plat-Appl O.Plat-Appl
P.Resp-Appl O.Resp-Appl
BSI.T.Leak-Inherent BSI.O.Leak-Inherent
BSI.T.Phys-Probing BSI.O.Phys-Probing
BSI.T.Malfunction BSI.O.Malfunction
BSI.T.Phys-Manipulation BSI.O.Phys-Manipulation
BSI.T.Leak-Forced BSI.O.Leak-Forced
BSI.T.Abuse-Func BSI.O.Abuse-Func
BSI.T.RND BSI.O.RND
AUG4.T.Mem-Access AUG4.O.Mem-Access
T.Confid-Applic-Code O.Firewall
T.Confid-Applic-Data O.Firewall
T.Integ-Applic-Code O.Firewall
T.Integ-Applic-Data O.Firewall
ST33H768 Platform Security Target for composition Security objectives
SMD_ST33H_ST_15_001 31/68
violations caused by accidental or deliberate access to restricted data (which may include
code) can be prevented (refer to AUG4.T.Mem-Access). The threat AUG4.T.Mem-Access is
therefore removed if the objective is met.
109 The added objective for the TOE AUG4.O.Mem-Access does not introduce any
contradiction in the security objectives for the TOE.
6.3.2 TOE threats "Application code confidentiality", "Application data
confidentiality", "Application code integrity", "Application data
integrity"
110 The justification related to the threats “Application code confidentiality, (T.Confid-Applic-
Code)”, “Application data confidentiality, (T.Confid-Applic-Data)”, “Application code integrity,
(T.Integ-Applic-Code)”, and “Application data integrity, (T.Integ-Applic-Data)” is as follows:
111 Since O.Firewall requires that the TOE ensures isolation of code and data between a
sensitive application and the other applications, the code and data of the sensitive
application is protected against unauthorised disclosure and modification, therefore
T.Confid-Applic-Code, T.Confid-Applic-Data, T.Integ-Applic-Code, and T.Integ-Applic-Data
are covered by O.Firewall.
112 The added objective for the TOE O.Firewall does not introduce any contradiction in the
security objectives for the TOE.
6.3.3 Organisational security policy "Additional Specific Security
Functionality"
113 The justification related to the organisational security policy "Additional Specific Security
Functionality, (AUG1.P.Add-Functions)” is as follows:
114 Since AUG1.O.Add-Functions requires the TOE to implement exactly the same specific
security functionality as required by AUG1.P.Add-Functions, and in the very same
conditions, the organisational security policy is covered by the objective.
115 Nevertheless the security objectives BSI.O.Leak-Inherent, BSI.O.Phys-Probing, ,
BSI.O.Malfunction, BSI.O.Phys-Manipulation and BSI.O.Leak-Forced define how to
implement the specific security functionality required by AUG1.P.Add-Functions. (Note that
these objectives support that the specific security functionality is provided in a secure way
as expected from AUG1.P.Add-Functions.) Especially BSI.O.Leak-Inherent and
BSI.O.Leak-Forced refer to the protection of confidential data (User Data or TSF data) in
general. User Data are also processed by the specific security functionality required by
AUG1.P.Add-Functions.
116 The added objective for the TOE AUG1.O.Add-Functions does not introduce any
contradiction in the security objectives for the TOE.
6.3.4 Organisational security policy "Controlled loading of the Security IC
Embedded Software"
117 The justification related to the organisational security policy "Controlled loading of the
Security IC Embedded Software, (P.Controlled-ES-Loading)” is as follows:
118 Since O.Controlled-ES-Loading requires the TOE to implement exactly the same specific
security functionality as required by P.Controlled-ES-Loading, and in the very same
conditions, the organisational security policy is covered by the objective.
Security objectives ST33H768 Platform Security Target for composition
32/68 SMD_ST33H_ST_15_001
119 The added objective for the TOE O.Controlled-ES-Loading does not introduce any
contradiction in the security objectives.
6.3.5 Organisational security policy "Usage of hardware platform"
120 The justification related to the organisational security policy "Usage of hardware platform,
(P.Plat-Appl)” is as follows:
121 The policy states that the Security IC Embedded Software included in the TOE, uses the
TOE hardware according to the respective PP assumption BSI.A.Plat-Appl. O.Plat-Appl has
the same objective as BSI.OE.Plat-Appl defined in the PP. Thus, the objective O.Plat-Appl
covers the policy P.Plat-Appl.
122 The added objective for the TOE O.Plat-Appl does not introduce any contradiction in the
security objectives.
6.3.6 Organisational security policy "Treatment of user data"
123 The justification related to the organisational security policy "Treatment of user data,
(P.Resp-Appl)” is as follows:
124 In analogy to P.Plat-Appl, the policy P.Resp-Appl is covered in the same way by the
objective O.Resp-Appl.
125 The added objective for the TOE O.Resp-Appl does not introduce any contradiction in the
security objectives.
ST33H768 Platform Security Target for composition Security requirements
SMD_ST33H_ST_15_001 33/68
7 Security requirements
126 This chapter on security requirements contains a section on security functional
requirements (SFRs) for the TOE (Section 7.1), a section on security assurance
requirements (SARs) for the TOE (Section 7.2), a section on the refinements of these SARs
(Section 7.3) as required by the "BSI-PP-0035" Protection Profile. This chapter includes a
section with the security requirements rationale (Section 7.4).
7.1 Security functional requirements for the TOE
127 Security Functional Requirements (SFRs) from the "BSI-PP-0035" Protection Profile (PP)
are drawn from CCMB-2012-09-002, except the following SFRs, that are extensions to
CCMB-2012-09-002:
• FCS_RNG Generation of random numbers,
• FMT_LIM Limited capabilities and availability,
• FAU_SAS Audit data storage.
The reader can find their certified definitions in the text of the "BSI-PP-0035" Protection
Profile.
128 All extensions to the SFRs of the "BSI-PP-0035" Protection Profiles (PPs) are exclusively
drawn from CCMB-2012-09-002.
129 All iterations, assignments, selections, or refinements on SFRs have been performed
according to section C.4 of CCMB-2012-09-001. They are easily identified in the following
text as they appear as indicated here. Note that in order to improve readability, iterations
are sometimes expressed within tables.
130 The selected security functional requirements for the TOE, their respective origin and type
are summarized in Table 7.
Table 7. Summary of functional security requirements for the TOE
Label Title Addressing Origin Type
FRU_FLT.2 Limited fault tolerance
Malfunction BSI-PP-0035
CCMB-2012-09-002
FPT_FLS.1
Failure with preservation of
secure state
FMT_LIM.1 [Test] Limited capabilities Abuse of TEST
functionality
BSI-PP-0035
Extended
FMT_LIM.2 [Test] Limited availability
FMT_LIM.1 [Admin] Limited capabilities Abuse of ADMIN
functionality
Security Target
Operated
FMT_LIM.2 [Admin] Limited availability
FAU_SAS.1 Audit storage Lack of TOE identification
BSI-PP-0035
Operated
Security requirements ST33H768 Platform Security Target for composition
34/68 SMD_ST33H_ST_15_001
FPT_PHP.3 Resistance to physical attack
Physical manipulation &
probing
BSI-PP-0035
CCMB-2012-09-002
FDP_ITT.1
Basic internal transfer
protection
Leakage
FPT_ITT.1
Basic internal TSF data
transfer protection
FDP_IFC.1
Subset information flow
control
FCS_RNG.1 Random number generation
Weak cryptographic
quality of random
numbers
BSI-PP-0035
Operated
Extended
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation
Cipher scheme support
AUG #1
Operated
CCMB-2012-09-002
FCS_CKM.1
(if Neslib)
Cryptographic key
generation
Security Target
Operated
FDP_ACC.2 [Memories] Complete access control
Memory access violation
Security Target
Operated
FDP_ACF.1 [Memories]
Security attribute based
access control
AUG #4
Operated
FMT_MSA.3 [Memories] Static attribute initialisation
Correct operation
FMT_MSA.1 [Memories]
Management of security
attribute
FMT_SMF.1 [Memories]
Specification of management
functions
Security Target
Operated
FDP_ITC.1 [Loader]
Import of user data without
security attributes
User data loading access
violation
Security Target
Operated
CCMB-2012-09-002
FDP_ACC.1 [Loader] Subset access control
FDP_ACF.1 [Loader]
Security attribute based
access control
FMT_MSA.3 [Loader] Static attribute initialisation
Correct operation
FMT_MSA.1 [Loader]
Management of security
attribute
FMT_SMF.1 [Loader]
Specification of management
functions
Abuse of ADMIN
functionality
FDP_ACC.1 [APPLI_FWL] Subset access control
Application intrinsic
confidentiality and
integrity
FDP_ACF.1 [APPLI_FWL]
Security attribute based
access control
FMT_MSA.3 [APPLI_FWL] Static attribute initialisation
Table 7. Summary of functional security requirements for the TOE (continued)
Label Title Addressing Origin Type
ST33H768 Platform Security Target for composition Security requirements
SMD_ST33H_ST_15_001 35/68
7.1.1 Security Functional Requirements from the Protection Profile
Limited fault tolerance (FRU_FLT.2)
131 The TSF shall ensure the operation of all the TOE’s capabilities when the following failures
occur: exposure to operating conditions which are not detected according to the
requirement Failure with preservation of secure state (FPT_FLS.1).
Failure with preservation of secure state (FPT_FLS.1)
132 The TSF shall preserve a secure state when the following types of failures occur: exposure
to operating conditions which may not be tolerated according to the requirement
Limited fault tolerance (FRU_FLT.2) and where therefore a malfunction could occur.
133 Refinement:
The term “failure” above also covers “circumstances”. The TOE prevents failures for the
“circumstances” defined above.
Regarding application note 15 of BSI-PP-0035, the TOE provides information on the
operating conditions monitored during Security IC Embedded Software execution and after
a warm reset. No audit requirement is however selected in this Security Target.
Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1) [Test]
134 The TSF shall be designed and implemented in a manner that limits their capabilities so that
in conjunction with “Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)” the following policy is enforced:
Limited capability and availability Policy [Test].
Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2) [Test]
135 The TSF shall be designed and implemented in a manner that limits their availability so that
in conjunction with “Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)” the following policy is enforced:
Limited capability and availability Policy [Test].
136 SFP_1: Limited capability and availability Policy [Test]
Deploying Test Features after TOE Delivery does not allow User Data to be disclosed or
manipulated, TSF data to be disclosed or manipulated, software to be reconstructed and no
substantial information about construction of TSF to be gathered which may enable other
attacks.
Audit storage (FAU_SAS.1)
137 The TSF shall provide the test process before TOE Delivery with the capability to store
the Initialisation Data and/or Pre-personalisation Data and/or supplements of the
Security IC Embedded Software in the NVM.
Resistance to physical attack (FPT_PHP.3)
138 The TSF shall resist physical manipulation and physical probing, to the TSF by
responding automatically such that the SFRs are always enforced.
139 Refinement:
The TSF will implement appropriate mechanisms to continuously counter physical
manipulation and physical probing. Due to the nature of these attacks (especially
manipulation) the TSF can by no means detect attacks on all of its elements. Therefore,
permanent protection against these attacks is required ensuring that security functional
Security requirements ST33H768 Platform Security Target for composition
36/68 SMD_ST33H_ST_15_001
requirements are enforced. Hence, “automatic response” means here (i)assuming that there
might be an attack at any time and (ii)countermeasures are provided at any time.
Basic internal transfer protection (FDP_ITT.1)
140 The TSF shall enforce the Data Processing Policy to prevent the disclosure of user data
when it is transmitted between physically-separated parts of the TOE.
Basic internal TSF data transfer protection (FPT_ITT.1)
141 The TSF shall protect TSF data from disclosure when it is transmitted between separate
parts of the TOE.
142 Refinement:
The different memories, the CPU and other functional units of the TOE (e.g. a cryptographic
co-processor) are seen as separated parts of the TOE.
This requirement is equivalent to FDP_ITT.1 above but refers to TSF data instead of User
Data. Therefore, it should be understood as to refer to the same Data Processing Policy
defined under FDP_IFC.1 below.
Subset information flow control (FDP_IFC.1)
143 The TSF shall enforce the Data Processing Policy on all confidential data when they are
processed or transferred by the TSF or by the Security IC Embedded Software.
144 SFP_2: Data Processing Policy
User Data and TSF data shall not be accessible from the TOE except when the Security IC
Embedded Software decides to communicate the User Data via an external interface. The
protection shall be applied to confidential data only but without the distinction of attributes
controlled by the Security IC Embedded Software.
Random number generation (FCS_RNG.1)
145 The TSF shall provide a physical random number generator that implements:
• A total failure test detects a total failure of entropy source immediately when the
RNG has started. When a total failure is detected, no random numbers will be
output.
• If a total failure of the entropy source occurs while the RNG is being operated,
the RNG prevents the output of any internal random number that depends on
some raw random numbers that have been generated after the total failure of the
entropy source.
• The online test shall detect non-tolerable statistical defects of the raw random
number sequence (i) immediately when the RNG has started, and (ii) while the
RNG is being operated. The TSF must not output any random numbers before
the power-up online test has finished successfully or when a defect has been
detected.
• The online test procedure shall be effective to detect non-tolerable weaknesses
of the random numbers soon.
• The online test procedure checks the quality of the raw random number
sequence. It is triggered externally. The online test is suitable for detecting non-
tolerable statistical defects of the statistical properties of the raw random
numbers within an acceptable period of time.
ST33H768 Platform Security Target for composition Security requirements
SMD_ST33H_ST_15_001 37/68
146 The TSF shall provide octets of bits that meet
• Test procedure A does not distinguish the internal random numbers from output
sequences of an ideal RNG.
• The average Shannon entropy per internal random bit exceeds 0.997.
7.1.2 Additional Security Functional Requirements for the cryptographic
services.
Cryptographic operation (FCS_COP.1)
147 The TSF shall perform the operations in Table 8 in accordance with a specified
cryptographic algorithm in Table 8 and cryptographic key sizes of Table 8 that meet the
standards in Table 8. The list of operations depends on the presence of Neslib or
crypto accelerators, as indicated in Table 8 (Restrict).
Table 8. FCS_COP.1 iterations (cryptographic operations)
Restrict Iteration label
[assignment: list of
cryptographic
operations]
[assignment:
cryptographic
algorithm]
[assignment:
cryptographic
key sizes]
[assignment: list of
standards]
If
EDES+
EDES
* encryption
* decryption
- in Cipher Block Chaining
(CBC) mode
- in Electronic Code Book
(ECB) mode
* MAC computation in
CBC-MAC
Data Encryption
Standard (DES)
56 bits
FIPS PUB 46-3
ISO/IEC 9797-1
ISO/IEC 10116
Triple Data
Encryption
Standard (3DES)
168 bits
If
AES
AES
* ECB encryption
* ECB decryption
* CBC encryption
* CBC decryption
* CMAC MAC
computation
* key expansion
* randomize
Advanced
Encryption
Standard
128, 192 and
256 bits
ISO/IEC 10116
NIST SP 800-38B
FIPS PUB 197
If
Neslib
RSA
* RSA public key
operation
* RSA private key
operation without the
Chinese Remainder
Theorem
* RSA private key
operation with the
Chinese Remainder
Theorem
Rivest, Shamir &
Adleman’s
up to 4096 bits PKCS #1 V2.1
Security requirements ST33H768 Platform Security Target for composition
38/68 SMD_ST33H_ST_15_001
148 Note that DES is no longer recommended as an encryption function in the context of smart
card applications. Hence, Security IC Embedded Software may need to use triple DES to
achieve a suitable strength.
149 Note that SHA-1 is no longer recommended as a cryptographic function in the context of
smart card applications. Hence, Security IC Embedded Software may need to use another
SHA to achieve a suitable strength.
Cryptographic key generation (FCS_CKM.1)
150 If Neslib is embedded only, the TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a
specified cryptographic key generation algorithm, in Table 9, and specified cryptographic
key sizes of Table 9 that meet the following standards in Table 9.
If
Neslib
ECC
* private scalar
multiplication
* prepare Jacobian
* public scalar
multiplication
* point validity check
* convert Jacobian to
affine coordinates
* general point addition
* point expansion
* point compression
Elliptic Curves
Cryptography on
GF(p)
up to 640 bits
IEEE 1363-2000,
chapter 7
IEEE 1363a-2004
If
Neslib
SHA
* SHA-1
* SHA-224
* SHA-256
* SHA-384
* SHA-512
* Protected SHA-1
* Protected SHA-256
* HMAC
Secure Hash
Algorithm
assignment
pointless
because
algorithm has
no key
FIPS PUB 180-4
FIPS PUB 198-1
If
Neslib
DRBG
* SHA-1
* SHA-224
* SHA-256
* SHA-384
* SHA-512
Hash-DRBG None
NIST SP 800-90A
FIPS PUB 180-4
AES CTR-DRBG
128, 192 and
256 bits
NIST SP 800-90A
FIPS PUB 197
Table 8. FCS_COP.1 iterations (cryptographic operations) (continued)
Restrict Iteration label
[assignment: list of
cryptographic
operations]
[assignment:
cryptographic
algorithm]
[assignment:
cryptographic
key sizes]
[assignment: list of
standards]
ST33H768 Platform Security Target for composition Security requirements
SMD_ST33H_ST_15_001 39/68
7.1.3 Additional Security Functional Requirements for the memories
protection.
Static attribute initialisation (FMT_MSA.3) [Memories]
151 The TSF shall enforce the Dynamic Memory Access Control Policy to provide minimally
protective(b)
default values for security attributes that are used to enforce the SFP.
152 The TSF shall allow none to specify alternative initial values to override the default values
when an object or information is created.
Application note:
The security attributes are the set of access rights currently defined. They are dynamically
attached to the subjects and objects locations, i.e. each logical address.
Management of security attributes (FMT_MSA.1) [Memories]
153 The TSF shall enforce the Dynamic Memory Access Control Policy to restrict the ability
to modify the security attributes current set of access rights to software running in
privileged mode.
Complete access control (FDP_ACC.2) [Memories]
154 The TSF shall enforce the Dynamic Memory Access Control Policy on all subjects
(software), all objects (data including code stored in memories) and all operations
among subjects and objects covered by the SFP.
155 The TSF shall ensure that all operations between any subject controlled by the TSF and any
object controlled by the TSF are covered by an access control SFP.
Security attribute based access control (FDP_ACF.1) [Memories]
156 The TSF shall enforce the Dynamic Memory Access Control Policy to objects based on
the following: software mode, the object location, the operation to be performed, and
the current set of access rights.
Table 9. FCS_CKM.1 iterations (cryptographic key generation)
Iteration label
[assignment: cryptographic
key generation algorithm]
[assignment:
cryptographic key
sizes]
[assignment: list of
standards]
Prime generation
prime generation and RSA
prime generation algorithm,
optionally protected against
side channel attacks, and/or
optionally with conditions
up to 2048 bits
FIPS PUB 140-2
FIPS 186-3
RSA key generation
RSA key pair generation
algorithm, optionally
protected against side
channel attacks, and/or
optionally with conditions
up to 4096 bits FIPS PUB 140-2
b. See the Datasheet referenced in Section 9 for actual values.
Security requirements ST33H768 Platform Security Target for composition
40/68 SMD_ST33H_ST_15_001
157 The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among controlled
subjects and controlled objects is allowed: the operation is allowed if and only if the
software mode, the object location and the operation matches an entry in the current
set of access rights.
158 The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on the following
additional rules: none.
159 The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the following additional
rules: in Admin or User configuration, any access (read, write, execute) to the OST
ROM is denied, and in User configuration, any write access to the ST NVM is denied.
Note: It should be noted that this level of policy detail is not needed at the application level. The
composite Security Target writer should describe the ES access control and information flow
control policies instead. Within the ES High Level Design description, the chosen setting of
IC security attributes would be shown to implement the described policies relying on the IC
SFP presented here.
160 The following SFP Dynamic Memory Access Control Policy is defined for the
requirement "Security attribute based access control (FDP_ACF.1)":
161 SFP_3: Dynamic Memory Access Control Policy
162 The TSF must control read, write, execute accesses of software to data, based on the
software mode and on the current set of access rights.
Specification of management functions (FMT_SMF.1) [Memories]
163 The TSF will be able to perform the following management functions: modification of the
current set of access rights security attributes by software running in privileged
mode, supporting the Dynamic Memory Access Control Policy.
7.1.4 Additional Security Functional Requirements related to the Admin
configuration
164 The following SFRs are extensions to "BSI-PP-0035" Protection Profile (PP), related to the
possible availability of final test and loading capabilities in phases 4 to 6 of the TOE life-
cycle.
Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1) [Admin]
165 The TSF shall be designed and implemented in a manner that limits their capabilities so that
in conjunction with “Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)” the following policy is enforced:
Limited capability and availability Policy [Admin].
Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2) [Admin]
166 The TSF shall be designed and implemented in a manner that limits their availability so that
in conjunction with “Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)” the following policy is enforced:
Limited capability and availability Policy [Admin].
167 SFP_4: Limited capability and availability Policy [Admin]
168 Deploying Loading or Final Test Artifacts after TOE Delivery to final user (phase 7 / USER
configuration) does not allow User Data to be disclosed or manipulated, TSF data to be
disclosed or manipulated, stored software to be reconstructed or altered, and no substantial
information about construction of TSF to be gathered which may enable other attacks.
ST33H768 Platform Security Target for composition Security requirements
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Import of user data without security attributes (FDP_ITC.1) [Loader]
169 The TSF shall enforce the Loading Access Control Policy when importing user data,
controlled under the SFP, from ouside of the TOE.
170 The TSF shall ignore any security attributes associated with the User data when imported
from outside of the TOE.
171 The TSF shall enforce the following rules when importing user data controlled under the
SFP from outside of the TOE:
• the integrity of the loaded user data is checked at the end of each loading
session,
• the loaded user data is received encrypted, internally decrypted, then stored into
the NVM.
Static attribute initialisation (FMT_MSA.3) [Loader]
172 The TSF shall enforce the Loading Access Control Policy to provide restrictive default
values for security attributes that are used to enforce the SFP.
173 The TSF shall allow none to specify alternative initial values to override the default values
when an object or information is created.
Management of security attributes (FMT_MSA.1) [Loader]
174 The TSF shall enforce the Loading Access Control Policy to restrict the ability to modify
the security attributes password to the Standard Loader.
Subset access control (FDP_ACC.1) [Loader]
175 The TSF shall enforce the Loading Access Control Policy on the execution of the
Standard Loader instructions and/or the Advanced Loader instructions.
Security attribute based access control (FDP_ACF.1) [Loader]
176 The TSF shall enforce the Loading Access Control Policy to objects based on the
following: an external process may execute the Standard Loader instructions and/or
the Advanced Loader instructions, depending on the presentation of valid
passwords.
177 The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among controlled
subjects and controlled objects is allowed: the Standard Loader instructions and/or
Advanced Loader instructions can be executed only if valid passwords have been
presented.
178 The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on the following
additional rules: none.
179 The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the following additional
rules: none.
180 The following SFP Loading Access Control Policy is defined for the requirement "Security
attribute based access control (FDP_ACF.1)":
181 SFP_5: Loading Access Control Policy
182 According to a password control, the TSF grants execution of the instructions of the
Standard Loader, Advanced Loader or Profiler.
Security requirements ST33H768 Platform Security Target for composition
42/68 SMD_ST33H_ST_15_001
Specification of management functions (FMT_SMF.1) [Loader]
183 The TSF will be able to perform the following management functions: modification of the
Standard Loader behaviour, by the Advanced Loader, under the Loading Access
Control Policy.
7.1.5 Additional Security Functional Requirements related to the
applications protection
Subset access control (FDP_ACC.1) [APPLI_FWL]
184 The TSF shall enforce the Protected Application Firewall Access Control Policy on the
Protected Application code and data.
Security attribute based access control (FDP_ACF.1) [APPLI_FWL]
185 The TSF shall enforce the Protected Application Firewall Access Control Policy to
objects based on the following: Protected Application code and data.
186 The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among controlled
subjects and controlled objects is allowed: Another application cannot read, write,
compare any piece of data or code belonging to the Protected Application.
187 The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on the following
additional rules: None.
188 The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the following additional
rules:
• Another application cannot read, write, compare any piece of data or code
belonging to the Protected Application.
189 The following SFP Protected Application Firewall Access Control Policy is defined for
the requirement "Security attribute based access control (FDP_ACF.1) [APPLI_FWL]":
190 SFP_6: Protected Application Firewall Access Control Policy
191 Another application cannot read, write, compare any piece of data or code belonging to the
Protected Application.
Application note:
One only application can be protected by the LPU.
Static attribute initialisation (FMT_MSA.3) [APPLI_FWL]
192 The TSF shall enforce the Protected Application Firewall Access Control Policy to
provide restrictive default values for security attributes that are used to enforce the SFP.
193 The TSF shall allow no subject to specify alternative initial values to override the default
values when an object or information is created.
7.2 TOE security assurance requirements
194 Security Assurance Requirements for the TOE for the evaluation of the TOE are those taken
from the Evaluation Assurance Level 5 (EAL5) and augmented by taking the following
components:
• ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5.
ST33H768 Platform Security Target for composition Security requirements
SMD_ST33H_ST_15_001 43/68
195 Regarding application note 21 of BSI-PP-0035, the continuously increasing maturity level of
evaluations of Security ICs justifies the selection of a higher-level assurance package.
196 The set of security assurance requirements (SARs) is presented in Table 10, indicating the
origin of the requirement.
7.3 Refinement of the security assurance requirements
197 As BSI-PP-0035 defines refinements for selected SARs, these refinements are also claimed
in this Security Target.
198 The main customizing is that the IC Dedicated Software is an operational part of the TOE
after delivery, although it is not available to the user.
199 Regarding application note 22 of BSI-PP-0035, the refinements for all the assurance
families have been reviewed for the hierarchically higher-level assurance components
selected in this Security Target.
200 The text of the impacted refinements of BSI-PP-0035 is reproduced in the next sections.
201 For reader’s ease, an impact summary is provided in Table 11.
Table 10. TOE security assurance requirements
Label Title Origin
ADV_ARC.1 Security architecture description EAL5/BSI-PP-0035
ADV_FSP.5
Complete semi-formal functional specification with
additional error information
EAL5
ADV_IMP.1 Implementation representation of the TSF EAL5/BSI-PP-0035
ADV_INT.2 Well-stuctured internals EAL5
ADV_TDS.4 Semiformal modular design EAL5
AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance EAL5/BSI-PP-0035
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures EAL5/BSI-PP-0035
ALC_CMC.4
Production support, acceptance procedures and
automation
EAL5/BSI-PP-0035
ALC_CMS.5 Development tools CM coverage EAL5
ALC_DEL.1 Delivery procedures EAL5/BSI-PP-0035
ALC_DVS.2 Sufficiency of security measures BSI-PP-0035
ALC_LCD.1 Developer defined life-cycle model EAL5/BSI-PP-0035
ALC_TAT.2 Compliance with implementation standards EAL5
ATE_COV.2 Analysis of coverage EAL5/BSI-PP-0035
ATE_DPT.3 Testing: modular design EAL5
ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing EAL5/BSI-PP-0035
ATE_IND.2 Independent testing - sample EAL5/BSI-PP-0035
AVA_VAN.5 Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis BSI-PP-0035
Security requirements ST33H768 Platform Security Target for composition
44/68 SMD_ST33H_ST_15_001
7.3.1 Refinement regarding functional specification (ADV_FSP)
202 Although the IC Dedicated Test Software is a part of the TOE, the test functions of the IC
Dedicated Test Software are not described in the Functional Specification because the IC
Dedicated Test Software is considered as a test tool delivered with the TOE but not
providing security functions for the operational phase of the TOE. The IC Dedicated
Software provides security functionalities as soon as the TOE becomes operational
(boot software). These are properly identified in the delivered documentation.
203 The Functional Specification refers to datasheet to trace security features that do not
provide any external interface but that contribute to fulfil the SFRs e.g. like physical
protection. Thereby they are part of the complete instantiation of the SFRs.
204 The Functional Specification refers to design specifications to detail the mechanisms
against physical attacks described in a more general way only, but detailed enough to be
able to support Test Coverage Analysis also for those mechanisms where inspection of the
layout is of relevance or tests beside the TSFI may be needed.
205 The Functional Specification refers to data sheet to specify operating conditions of the
TOE. These conditions include but are not limited to the frequency of the clock, the power
supply, and the temperature.
206 All functions and mechanisms which control access to the functions provided by the IC
Dedicated Test Software (refer to the security functional requirement (FMT_LIM.2)) are part
of the Functional Specification. Details will be given in the document for ADV_ARC, refer to
Section 6.2.1.5. In addition, all these functions and mechanisms are subsequently be
refined according to all relevant requirements of the Common Criteria assurance class ADV
because these functions and mechanisms are active after TOE Delivery and need to be part
of the assurance aspects Tests (class ATE) and Vulnerability Assessment (class AVA).
Therefore, all necessary information is provided to allow tests and vulnerability assessment.
207 Since the selected higher-level assurance component requires a security functional
specification presented in a “semi-formal style" (ADV_FSP.5.2C) the changes affect the
Table 11. Impact of EAL5 selection on BSI-PP-0035 refinements
Assurance
Family
BSI-PP-0035
Level
ST
Level
Impact on refinement
ADO_DEL 1 1 None
ALC_DVS 2 2 None
ALC_CMS 4 5 None, refinement is still valid
ALC_CMC 4 4 None
ADV_ARC 1 1 None
ADV_FSP 4 5
Presentation style changes, IC Dedicated Software is
included
ADV_IMP 1 1 None
ATE_COV 2 2 IC Dedicated Software is included
AGD_OPE 1 1 None
AGD_PRE 1 1 None
AVA_VAN 5 5 None
ST33H768 Platform Security Target for composition Security requirements
SMD_ST33H_ST_15_001 45/68
style of description, the BSI-PP-0035 refinements can be applied with changes covering the
IC Dedicated Test Software and are valid for ADV_FSP.5.
7.3.2 Refinement regarding test coverage (ATE_COV)
208 The TOE is tested under different operating conditions within the specified ranges. These
conditions include but are not limited to the frequency of the clock, the power supply, and
the temperature. This means that “Fault tolerance (FRU_FLT.2)” is proven for the complete
TSF. The tests must also cover functions which may be affected by “ageing” (such as
EEPROM writing).
209 The existence and effectiveness of measures against physical attacks (as specified by the
functional requirement FPT_PHP.3) cannot be tested in a straightforward way. Instead
STMicroelectronics provides evidence that the TOE actually has the particular physical
characteristics (especially layout design principles). This is done by checking the layout
(implementation or actual) in an appropriate way. The required evidence pertains to the
existence of mechanisms against physical attacks (unless being obvious).
210 The IC Dedicated Test Software is seen as a “test tool” being delivered as part of the TOE.
However, the Test Features do not provide security functionality. Therefore, Test Features
need not to be covered by the Test Coverage Analysis but all functions and mechanisms
which limit the capability of the functions (cf. FMT_LIM.1) and control access to the
functions (cf. FMT_LIM.2) provided by the IC Dedicated Test Software must be part of the
Test Coverage Analysis. The IC Dedicated Software provides security functionalities as
soon as the TOE becomes operational (boot software). These are part of the Test
Coverage Analysis.
7.4 Security Requirements rationale
7.4.1 Rationale for the Security Functional Requirements
211 Just as for the security objectives rationale of Section 6.3, the main line of this rationale is
that the inclusion of all the security requirements of the BSI-PP-0035 protection profile,
together with those in AUG, and with those introduced in this Security Target, guarantees
that all the security objectives identified in Section 6 are suitably addressed by the security
requirements stated in this chapter, and that the latter together form an internally consistent
whole.
Table 12. Security Requirements versus Security Objectives
Security Objective TOE Security Functional and Assurance Requirements
BSI.O.Leak-Inherent
FDP_ITT.1 Basic internal transfer protection
FPT_ITT.1 Basic internal TSF data transfer protection
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control
BSI.O.Phys-Probing FPT_PHP.3 Resistance to physical attack
BSI.O.Malfunction
FRU_FLT.2 Limited fault tolerance
FPT_FLS.1 Failure with preservation of secure state
BSI.O.Phys-Manipulation FPT_PHP.3 Resistance to physical attack
Security requirements ST33H768 Platform Security Target for composition
46/68 SMD_ST33H_ST_15_001
BSI.O.Leak-Forced
All requirements listed for BSI.O.Leak-Inherent
FDP_ITT.1, FPT_ITT.1, FDP_IFC.1
plus those listed for BSI.O.Malfunction and BSI.O.Phys-
Manipulation
FRU_FLT.2, FPT_FLS.1, FPT_PHP.3
BSI.O.Abuse-Func
FMT_LIM.1 [Test] Limited capabilities
FMT_LIM.2 [Test] Limited availability
FMT_LIM.1 [Admin] Limited capabilities
FMT_LIM.2 [Admin] Limited availability
plus those for BSI.O.Leak-Inherent, BSI.O.Phys-Probing,
BSI.O.Malfunction, BSI.O.Phys-Manipulation, BSI.O.Leak-
Forced
FDP_ITT.1, FPT_ITT.1, FDP_IFC.1, FPT_PHP.3, FRU_FLT.2,
FPT_FLS.1
BSI.O.Identification FAU_SAS.1 Audit storage
BSI.O.RND
FCS_RNG.1 Random number generation
plus those for BSI.O.Leak-Inherent, BSI.O.Phys-Probing,
BSI.O.Malfunction, BSI.O.Phys-Manipulation, BSI.O.Leak-
Forced
FDP_ITT.1, FPT_ITT.1, FDP_IFC.1, FPT_PHP.3, FRU_FLT.2,
FPT_FLS.1
BSI.OE.Plat-Appl Not applicable
BSI.OE.Resp-Appl Not applicable
BSI.OE.Process-Sec-IC Not applicable
AUG1.O.Add-Functions
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation
AUG4.O.Mem-Access
FDP_ACC.2 [Memories] Complete access control
FDP_ACF.1 [Memories] Security attribute based access
control
FMT_MSA.3 [Memories] Static attribute initialisation
FMT_MSA.1 [Memories] Management of security attribute
FMT_SMF.1 [Memories] Specification of management
functions
O.Controlled-ES-Loading
FDP_ITC.1 [Loader] Import of user data without security
attributes
FDP_ACC.1 [Loader] Subset access control
FDP_ACF.1 [Loader] Security attribute based access control
FMT_MSA.3 [Loader] Static attribute initialisation
FMT_MSA.1 [Loader] Management of security attribute
FMT_SMF.1 [Loader] Specification of management functions
O.Plat-Appl All SFRs from the PP
Table 12. Security Requirements versus Security Objectives (continued)
Security Objective TOE Security Functional and Assurance Requirements
ST33H768 Platform Security Target for composition Security requirements
SMD_ST33H_ST_15_001 47/68
212 As origins of security objectives have been carefully kept in their labelling, and origins of
security requirements have been carefully identified in Table 7 and Table 10, it can be
verified that the justifications provided by the BSI-PP-0035 protection profile and AUG can
just be carried forward to their union.
213 From Table 5, it is straightforward to identify additional security objectives for the TOE
(AUG1.O.Add-Functions and AUG4.O.Mem-Access) tracing back to AUG, and additional
objectives (O.Controlled-ES-Loading, O.Plat-Appl, O.Resp-Appl, and O.Firewall) introduced
in this Security Target. This rationale must show that security requirements suitably address
these thirteen.
214 Furthermore, a more careful observation of the requirements listed in Table 7 and Table 10
shows that:
• there are security requirements introduced from AUG (FCS_COP.1, FDP_ACC.2
[Memories], FDP_ACF.1 [Memories], FMT_MSA.3 [Memories] and FMT_MSA.1
[Memories]),
• there are additional security requirements introduced by this Security Target
(FCS_CKM.1, FMT_LIM.1 [Admin], FMT_LIM.2 [Admin], FDP_ITC.1 [Loader],
FDP_ACC.1 [Loader], FDP_ACF.1 [Loader], FMT_MSA.3 [Loader], FMT_MSA.1
[Loader], FMT_SMF.1 [Loader], FMT_SMF.1 [Memories], FDP_ACC.1 [APPLI_FWL]
FDP_ACF.1 [APPLI_FWL] and FMT_MSA.3 [APPLI_FWL], and various assurance
requirements of EAL5).
215 Though it remains to show that:
• security objectives from this Security Target and from AUG are addressed by security
requirements stated in this chapter,
• additional security requirements from this Security Target and from AUG are mutually
supportive with the security requirements from the BSI-PP-0035 protection profile, and
they do not introduce internal contradictions,
• all dependencies are still satisfied.
216 The justification that the additional security objectives are suitably addressed, that the
additional security requirements are mutually supportive and that, together with those
already in BSI-PP-0035, they form an internally consistent whole, is provided in the next
subsections.
7.4.2 Additional security objectives are suitably addressed
Security objective “Dynamic Area based Memory Access Control
(AUG4.O.Mem-Access)”
217 The justification related to the security objective “Dynamic Area based Memory Access
Control (AUG4.O.Mem-Access)” is as follows:
O.Resp-Appl All SFRs defined additionnaly in the ST
O.Firewall
FDP_ACC.1 [APPLI_FWL] Subset access control
FDP_ACF.1 [APPLI_FWL] Security attribute based access
control
FMT_MSA.3 [APPLI_FWL] Static attribute initialisation
Table 12. Security Requirements versus Security Objectives (continued)
Security Objective TOE Security Functional and Assurance Requirements
Security requirements ST33H768 Platform Security Target for composition
48/68 SMD_ST33H_ST_15_001
218 The security functional requirements "Complete access control (FDP_ACC.2) [Memories]"
and "Security attribute based access control (FDP_ACF.1) [Memories]", with the related
Security Function Policy (SFP) “Dynamic Memory Access Control Policy” exactly require
to implement a Dynamic area based memory access control as demanded by
AUG4.O.Mem-Access. Therefore, FDP_ACC.2 [Memories] and FDP_ACF.1 [Memories]
with their SFP are suitable to meet the security objective.
219 The security functional requirement "Static attribute initialisation (FMT_MSA.3) [Memories]"
requires that the TOE provides default values for security attributes. The ability to update
the security attributes is restricted to privileged subject(s) as further detailed in the
security functional requirement "Management of security attributes (FMT_MSA.1)
[Memories]". These management functions ensure that the required access control can be
realised using the functions provided by the TOE.
Security objective “Additional Specific Security Functionality
(AUG1.O.Add-Functions)”
220 The justification related to the security objective “Additional Specific Security Functionality
(AUG1.O.Add-Functions)” is as follows:
221 The security functional requirements “Cryptographic operation (FCS_COP.1)” and
"Cryptographic key generation (FCS_CKM.1)" exactly require those functions to be
implemented that are demanded by AUG1.O.Add-Functions. Therefore, FCS_COP.1 is
suitable to meet the security objective, together with FCS_CKM.1.
Security objective “Controlled loading of the Security IC Embedded
Software (O.Controlled-ES-Loading)”
222 The justification related to the security objective “Controlled loading of the Security IC
Embedded Software (O.Controlled-ES-Loading)” is as follows:
223 The security functional requirements "Import of user data without security attributes
(FDP_ITC.1) [Loader]", "Subset access control (FDP_ACC.1) [Loader]" and "Security
attribute based access control (FDP_ACF.1) [Loader]", with the related Security Function
Policy (SFP) “Loading Access Control Policy” exactly require to implement a controlled
loading of the Security IC Embedded Software as demanded by O.Controlled-ES-Loading.
Therefore, FDP_ITC.1 [Loader], FDP_ACC.1 [Loader] and FDP_ACF.1 [Loader] with their
SFP are suitable to meet the security objective.
224 The security functional requirement "Static attribute initialisation (FMT_MSA.3) [Loader]"
requires that the TOE provides default values for security attributes. The ability to update
the security attributes is restricted to privileged subject(s) as further detailed in the security
functional requirement "Management of security attributes (FMT_MSA.1) [Loader]". The
security functional requirement "Specification of management functions (FMT_SMF.1)
[Loader]" provides additional controlled facility for adapting the loader behaviour to the
user’s needs. These management functions ensure that the required access control,
associated to the loading feature, can be realised using the functions provided by the TOE.
Security objective “Usage of hardware platform (O.Plat-Appl)”
225 The justification related to the security objective “Usage of hardware platform (O.Plat-Appl)”
is as follows:
226 The objective was translated from an environment objective in the PP into a TOE objective
in this ST. Its goal is to ensure that the hardware platform is used in a secure manner, which
is based on the insight that hardware and software have to supplement each other in order
ST33H768 Platform Security Target for composition Security requirements
SMD_ST33H_ST_15_001 49/68
to build a secure whole. The ST claims conformance to the PP and the PP SFRs do cover
the PP TOE objectives. The PP uses the environment objective OE.Plat-Appl to ensure
appropriate software support for its SFRs, but since the TOE does now consist of hardware
and software, the PP SFRs do also apply to the Security IC Embedded Software included in
the TOE, and thereby all PP SFRs fulfil the objective O.Plat-Appl. In other words: the
software support required by the hardware-focused PP is now included in this combined
hardware-software TOE and both hardware and software fulfil the PP SFRs.
Security objective “Treatment of user data (O.Resp-Appl)”
227 The justification related to the security objective “Treatment of user data (O.Resp-Appl)” is
as follows:
228 The objective was translated from an environment objective in the PP into a TOE objective
in this ST. The objective is that “Security relevant User Data (especially cryptographic keys)
are treated by the Security IC Embedded Software as required by the security needs of the
specific application context.” The application context is defined by the security environment
described in this ST. The additional SFRs defined in this ST do address the additional TOE
objectives of the ST based on the ST security environment, therefore O.Resp-Appl is
fulfilled by the additional ST SFRs.
Security objective “Application firewall (O.Firewall)”
229 The justification related to the security objective “Application firewall (O.Firewall)” is as
follows:
230 The security functional requirements "Subset access control (FDP_ACC.1) [APPLI_FWL]"
and "Security attribute based access control (FDP_ACF.1) [APPLI_FWL]", supported by
"Static attribute initialisation (FMT_MSA.3) [APPLI_FWL]", require that no application can
read, write, compare any piece of data or code belonging to a protected application. This
meets the objective O.Firewall.
7.4.3 Additional security requirements are consistent
"Cryptographic operation (FCS_COP.1) & key generation
(FCS_CKM.1)"
231 These security requirements have already been argued in Section : Security objective
“Additional Specific Security Functionality (AUG1.O.Add-Functions)” above.
"Static attribute initialisation (FMT_MSA.3 [Memories]),
Management of security attributes (FMT_MSA.1 [Memories]),
Complete access control (FDP_ACC.2 [Memories]),
Security attribute based access control (FDP_ACF.1 [Memories])"
232 These security requirements have already been argued in Section : Security objective
“Dynamic Area based Memory Access Control (AUG4.O.Mem-Access)” above.
Security requirements ST33H768 Platform Security Target for composition
50/68 SMD_ST33H_ST_15_001
"Import of user data without security attribute (FDP_ITC.1 [Loader]),
Static attribute initialisation (FMT_MSA.3 [Loader]),
Management of security attributes (FMT_MSA.1 [Loader]),
Subset access control (FDP_ACC.1 [Loader]),
Security attribute based access control (FDP_ACF.1 [Loader]),
Specification of management function (FMT_SMF.1 [Loader])"
233 These security requirements have already been argued in Section : Security objective
“Controlled loading of the Security IC Embedded Software (O.Controlled-ES-Loading)”
above.
"Subset access control (FDP_ACC.1 [APPLI_FWL]),
Security attribute based access control (FDP_ACF.1 [APPLI_FWL]),
Static attribute initialisation (FMT_MSA.3 [APPLI_FWL]),
234 These security requirements have already been argued in Section Security objective
“Application firewall (O.Firewall)” above.
7.4.4 Dependencies of Security Functional Requirements
235 All dependencies of Security Functional Requirements have been fulfilled in this Security
Target except :
• those justified in the BSI-PP-0035 protection profile security requirements rationale,
• those justifed in AUG security requirements rationale (except on FMT_MSA.2, see
discussion below),
• the dependency of FCS_COP.1 and FCS_CKM.1 on FCS_CKM.4 (see discussion
below),
• the dependency of FMT_MSA.1 [Loader] and FMT_MSA.3 [Loader] on FMT_SMR.1
(see discussion below),
• the dependency of FMT_MSA.3 [APPLI_FWL] on FMT_MSA.1 and FMT_SMR.1 (see
discussion below).
236 Details are provided in Table 13 below.
Table 13. Dependencies of security functional requirements
Label Dependencies
Fulfilled by security requirements in
this Security Target
Dependency already
in BSI-PP-0035 or
in AUG
FRU_FLT.2 FPT_FLS.1 Yes Yes, BSI-PP-0035
FPT_FLS.1 None No dependency Yes, BSI-PP-0035
FMT_LIM.1 [Test] FMT_LIM.2 [Test] Yes Yes, BSI-PP-0035
FMT_LIM.2 [Test] FMT_LIM.1 [Test] Yes Yes, BSI-PP-0035
FMT_LIM.1 [Admin] FMT_LIM.2 [Admin] Yes Yes, BSI-PP-0035
FMT_LIM.2 [Admin] FMT_LIM.1 [Admin] Yes Yes, BSI-PP-0035
FAU_SAS.1 None No dependency Yes, BSI-PP-0035
FPT_PHP.3 None No dependency Yes, BSI-PP-0035
ST33H768 Platform Security Target for composition Security requirements
SMD_ST33H_ST_15_001 51/68
FDP_ITT.1
FDP_ACC.1 or
FDP_IFC.1
Yes Yes, BSI-PP-0035
FPT_ITT.1 None No dependency Yes, BSI-PP-0035
FDP_IFC.1 FDP_IFF.1 No, see BSI-PP-0035 Yes, BSI-PP-0035
FCS_RNG.1 None No dependency Yes, BSI-PP-0035
FCS_COP.1
[FDP_ITC.1 or
FDP_ITC.2 or
FCS_CKM.1]
Yes, by FDP_ITC.1 and FCS_CKM.1,
see discussion below
Yes, AUG #1
FCS_CKM.4 No, see discussion below
FCS_CKM.1
[FDP_CKM.2 or
FCS_COP.1]
Yes, by FCS_COP.1
FCS_CKM.4 No, see discussion below
FDP_ACC.2
[Memories]
FDP_ACF.1
[Memories]
Yes No, CCMB-2012-09-002
FDP_ACF.1
[Memories]
FDP_ACC.1
[Memories]
Yes, by FDP_ACC.2 [Memories]
Yes, AUG #4
FMT_MSA.3
[Memories]
Yes
FMT_MSA.3
[Memories]
FMT_MSA.1
[Memories]
Yes
Yes, AUG #4
FMT_SMR.1
[Memories]
No, see AUG #4
FMT_MSA.1
[Memories]
[FDP_ACC.1
[Memories] or
FDP_IFC.1]
Yes, by FDP_ACC.2 [Memories] and
FDP_IFC.1
Yes, AUG #4
FMT_SMF.1
[Memories]
Yes No, CCMB-2012-09-002
FMT_SMR.1
[Memories]
No, see AUG #4 Yes, AUG #4
FMT_SMF.1
[Memories]
None No dependency No, CCMB-2012-09-002
FMT_ITC.1 [Loader]
[FDP_ACC.1 [Loader]
or FDP_IFC.1]
Yes
No, CCMB-2012-09-002
FMT_MSA.3 [Loader] Yes
FDP_ACC.1
[Loader]
FDP_ACF.1 [Loader] Yes No, CCMB-2012-09-002
FDP_ACF.1
[Loader]
FDP_ACC.1 [Loader] Yes
No, CCMB-2012-09-002
FMT_MSA.3 [Loader] Yes
Table 13. Dependencies of security functional requirements (continued)
Label Dependencies
Fulfilled by security requirements in
this Security Target
Dependency already
in BSI-PP-0035 or
in AUG
Security requirements ST33H768 Platform Security Target for composition
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237 Part 2 of the Common Criteria defines the dependency of "Cryptographic operation
(FCS_COP.1)" on "Import of user data without security attributes (FDP_ITC.1)" or "Import of
user data with security attributes (FDP_ITC.2)" or "Cryptographic key generation
(FCS_CKM.1)". In this particular TOE, both "Cryptographic key generation (FCS_CKM.1)"
and "Import of user data without security attributes (FDP_ITC.1) [Loader]" may be used for
the purpose of creating cryptographic keys, but also, the ES has all possibilities to
implement its own creation function, in conformance with its security policy.
238 Part 2 of the Common Criteria defines the dependency of "Cryptographic operation
(FCS_COP.1)" and "Cryptographic key generation (FCS_CKM.1)" on "Cryptographic key
destruction (FCS_CKM.4)". In this particular TOE, there is no specific function for the
destruction of the keys. The ES has all possibilities to implement its own destruction
function, in conformance with its security policy. Therefore, FCS_CKM.4 is not defined in
this ST.
239 Part 2 of the Common Criteria defines the dependency of "Management of security
attributes (FMT_MSA.1) [Loader]" and "Static attribute initialisation (FMT_MSA.3) [Loader]"
on "Security roles (FMT_SMR.1) [Loader]". This dependency is considered to be satisfied,
because the access control defined for the loader is not role-based but enforced for each
subject. Therefore, there is no need to identify roles in form of a Security Functional
Requirement "FMT_SMR.1".
240 Part 2 of the Common Criteria defines the dependency of "Static attribute initialisation
(FMT_MSA.3) [APPLI_FWL]" on "Management of security attributes (FMT_MSA.1)" and
"Security roles (FMT_SMR.1)". For this particular instantiation of the access control
attributes aimed at protecting a protected application code and data from unauthorised
accesses, the security attributes are only static, initialized at product start. Therefore, there
FMT_MSA.3
[Loader]
FMT_MSA.1 [Loader] Yes
No, CCMB-2012-09-002
FMT_SMR.1 [Loader] No, see discussion below
FMT_MSA.1
[Loader]
[FDP_ACC.1 [Loader]
or FDP_IFC.1]
Yes
No, CCMB-2012-09-002
FDP_SMF.1 [Loader] Yes
FDP_SMR.1 [Loader] No, see discussion below
FDP_SMF.1
[Loader]
None No dependency No, CCMB-2012-09-002
FDP_ACC.1
[APPLI_FWL]
FDP_ACF.1
[APPLI_FWL]
Yes No, CCMB-2012-09-002
FDP_ACF.1
[APPLI_FWL]
FDP_ACC.1
[APPLI_FWL]
Yes
No, CCMB-2012-09-002
FMT_MSA.3
[APPLI_FWL]
Yes
FMT_MSA.3
[APPLI_FWL]
FMT_MSA.1 No, see discussion below
No, CCMB-2012-09-002
FMT_SMR.1 No, see discussion below
Table 13. Dependencies of security functional requirements (continued)
Label Dependencies
Fulfilled by security requirements in
this Security Target
Dependency already
in BSI-PP-0035 or
in AUG
ST33H768 Platform Security Target for composition Security requirements
SMD_ST33H_ST_15_001 53/68
is no need to identify management capabilities and associated roles in form of Security
Functional Requirements "FMT_MSA.1" and "FMT_SMR.1".
7.4.5 Rationale for the Assurance Requirements
Security assurance requirements added to reach EAL5 (Table 10)
241 Regarding application note 21 of BSI-PP-0035, this Security Target chooses EAL5 because
developers and users require a high level of independently assured security in a planned
development and require a rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable
costs attributable to specialist security engineering techniques.
242 EAL5 represents a meaningful increase in assurance from EAL4 by requiring semiformal
design descriptions, a more structured (and hence analyzable) architecture, and improved
mechanisms and/or procedures that provide confidence that the TOE will not be tampered
during development.
243 The assurance components in an evaluation assurance level (EAL) are chosen in a way that
they build a mutually supportive and complete set of components. The requirements chosen
for augmentation do not add any dependencies, which are not already fulfilled for the
corresponding requirements contained in EAL5. Therefore, these components add
additional assurance to EAL5, but the mutual support of the requirements and the internal
consistency is still guaranteed.
244 Note that detailed and updated refinements for assurance requirements are given in
Section 7.3.
Dependencies of assurance requirements
245 Dependencies of security assurance requirements are fulfilled by the EAL5 package
selection.
246 Augmentation to this package are identified in paragraph 194 and do not introduce
dependencies not already satisfied by the EAL5 package.
TOE summary specification ST33H768 Platform Security Target for composition
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8 TOE summary specification
247 This section demonstrates how the TOE meets each Security Functional Requirement,
which will be further detailed in the ADV_FSP documents.
248 The complete TOE summary specification has been presentad and evaluated in the
ST33H768 Platform Maskset K8K0A version C with firmware revision 4, and optional
cryptographic library Neslib 4.1 and 4.1.1 - SECURITY TARGET.
249 For confidentiality reasons, the TOE summary specification is not fully reproduced here.
8.1 Limited fault tolerance (FRU_FLT.2)
250 The TSF provides limited fault tolerance, by managing a certain number of faults or errors
that may happen, related to memory contents, CPU, random number generation and
cryptographic operations, thus preventing risk of malfunction.
8.2 Failure with preservation of secure state (FPT_FLS.1)
251 The TSF provides preservation of secure state by detecting and managing the following
events, resulting in an immediate reset:
• Die integrity violation detection,
• Errors on memories,
• Glitches,
• High voltage supply,
• CPU errors,
• MPU errors,
• External clock incorrect frequency,
• etc..
252 The ES can generate a software reset.
8.3 Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1) [Test]
253 The TSF ensures that only very limited test capabilities are available in USER configuration,
in accordance with SFP_1: Limited capability and availability Policy [Test].
8.4 Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1) [Admin]
254 The TSF ensures that the Secure Flash Loader and the final test capabilities are unavailable
in USER configuration, in accordance with SFP_4: Limited capability and availability Policy
[Admin].
8.5 Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2) [Test] & [Admin]
255 The TOE is either in TEST, ADMIN or USER configuration.
ST33H768 Platform Security Target for composition TOE summary specification
SMD_ST33H_ST_15_001 55/68
256 The only authorised TOE configuration modifications are:
• TEST to ADMIN configuration,
• TEST to USER configuration,
• ADMIN to USER configuration.
257 The TSF ensures the switching and the control of TOE configuration.
258 The TSF reduces the available features depending on the TOE configuration.
8.6 Audit storage (FAU_SAS.1)
259 In Admin configuration, the TOE provides commands to store data and/or pre-
personalisation data and/or supplements of the ES in the NVM. These commands are only
available to authorized processes, and only until phase 6.
8.7 Resistance to physical attack (FPT_PHP.3)
260 The TSF ensures resistance to physical tampering, thanks to the following features:
• The TOE implements counter-measures that reduce the exploitability of physical
probing.
• The TOE is physically protected by an active shield that commands an automatic
reaction on die integrity violation detection.
8.8 Basic internal transfer protection (FDP_ITT.1), Basic internal
TSF data transfer protection (FPT_ITT.1) & Subset
information flow control (FDP_IFC.1)
261 The TSF prevents the disclosure of internal and user data thanks to:
• Memories scrambling and encryption,
• Bus encryption,
• Mechanisms for operation execution concealment,
• etc..
8.9 Random number generation (FCS_RNG.1)
262 The TSF provides 8-bit true random numbers that can be qualified with the test metrics
required by the BSI-AIS20/AIS31 standard for a PTG.2 class device.
8.10 Cryptographic operation: DES / 3DES operation (FCS_COP.1
[EDES]) if EDES+ only
263 The TOE provides an EDES accelerator that has the capability to perform DES and Triple
DES encryption and decryption conformant to FIPS PUB 46-3.
Note that DES is no longer recommended as an encryption function in the context of smart
TOE summary specification ST33H768 Platform Security Target for composition
56/68 SMD_ST33H_ST_15_001
card applications. Hence, Security IC Embedded Software may need to use triple DES to
achieve a suitable strength.
264 The EDES accelerator offers a Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) mode conformant to ISO/IEC
10116, and a Cipher Block Chaining Message Authentication Code (CBC-MAC) mode
conformant to ISO/IEC 9797-1.
8.11 Cryptographic operation: AES operation (FCS_COP.1 [AES])
if AES only
265 If AES is active, the AES accelerator provides the following standard AES cryptographic
operations for key sizes of 128, 192 and 256 bits, conformant to FIPS PUB 197 with intrinsic
counter-measures against attacks:
• randomize,
• key expansion,
• cipher,
• inverse cipher.
8.12 Cryptographic operation: RSA operation (FCS_COP.1 [RSA])
if Neslib only
266 The cryptographic library Neslib provides the RSA public key cryptographic operation for
modulus sizes up to 4096 bits, conformant to PKCS #1 V2.1.
267 The cryptographic library Neslib provides the RSA private key cryptographic operation with
or without CRT for modulus sizes up to 4096 bits, conformant to PKCS #1 V2.1.
8.13 Cryptographic operation: Elliptic Curves Cryptography
operation (FCS_COP.1 [ECC]) if Neslib only
268 The cryptographic library Neslib provides to the ES developer the following efficient basic
functions for Elliptic Curves Cryptography over prime fields, all conformant to IEEE 1363-
2000 and IEEE 1363a-2004:
• private scalar multiplication,
• preparation of Elliptic Curve computations in affine coordinates,
• public scalar multiplication,
• point validity check,
• Jacobian conversion to affine coordinates,
• general point addition,
• point expansion and compression.
ST33H768 Platform Security Target for composition TOE summary specification
SMD_ST33H_ST_15_001 57/68
8.14 Cryptographic operation: SHA operation (FCS_COP.1 [SHA])
if Neslib only
269 The cryptographic library Neslib provides the SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-
512 secure hash functions conformant to FIPS PUB 180-4.
Note that SHA-1 is no longer recommended as a cryptographic function in the context of
smart card applications. Hence, Security IC Embedded Software may need to use another
SHA to achieve a suitable strength.
270 The cryptographic library Neslib provides the SHA-1 and SHA-256 secure hash function
conformant to FIPS PUB 180-4 and offering resistance against side channel and fault
attacks.
271 Additionally, the cryptographic library Neslib offers support for the HMAC mode of use, as
specified in FIPS PUB 198-1, to be used in conjunction with the protected versions of SHA-
1 and SHA-256.
8.15 Cryptographic operation: DRBG operation (FCS_COP.1
[DRBG]) if Neslib only
272 The cryptographic library Neslib gives support for a DRBG generator, based on
cryptographic algorithms specified in NIST SP 800-90A.
273 The cryptographic library Neslib implements three of the DRBG specified in NIST SP 800-
90A:
• Hash-DRBG,
• CTR-DRBG.
8.16 Cryptographic key generation: Prime generation
(FCS_CKM.1 [Prime_generation]) if Neslib only
274 The cryptographic library Neslib provides prime numbers generation for key sizes up to
2048 bits conformant to FIPS PUB 140-2 and FIPS 186-3, optionally with conditions and/or
optionally offering resistance against side channel and fault attacks.
8.17 Cryptographic key generation: RSA key generation
(FCS_CKM.1 [RSA_key_generation]) if Neslib only
275 The cryptographic library Neslib provides standard RSA public and private key computation
for key sizes upto 4096 bits conformant to FIPS PUB 140-2, optionally with conditions
and/or optionally offering resistance against side channel and fault attacks.
8.18 Static attribute initialisation (FMT_MSA.3) [Memories]
276 The TOE enforces a default memory protection policy when none other is programmed by
the ES.
TOE summary specification ST33H768 Platform Security Target for composition
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8.19 Management of security attributes (FMT_MSA.1) [Memories]
& Specification of management functions (FMT_SMF.1)
[Memories]
277 The TOE provides a dynamic Memory Protection Unit (MPU), that can be configured by the
ES.
8.20 Complete access control (FDP_ACC.2) [Memories] &
Security attribute based access control (FDP_ACF.1)
[Memories]
278 The TOE enforces the dynamic memory protection policy for data access and code access
thanks to a dynamic Memory Protection Unit (MPU), programmed by the ES. Overriding the
MPU set of access rights, the TOE enforces additional protections on specific parts of the
memories.
8.21 Import of user data without security attributes (FDP_ITC.1)
[Loader]
279 In Admin configuration, the System Firmware provides the capability of securely loading
user data into the NVM (Secure Flash Loader). The ciphered data is automatically
decrypted, before installation in the NVM.
The integrity of the loaded data is systematically checked, and the integrity of the NVM can
also be checked by the ES.
8.22 Static attribute initialisation (FMT_MSA.3) [Loader]
280 In Admin configuration, the System Firmware provides restrictive default values for the
Flash Loader security attributes.
8.23 Management of security attributes (FMT_MSA.1) [Loader] &
Specification of management functions (FMT_SMF.1)
[Loader]
281 In Admin configuration, the System Firmware provides the capability to change part of the
Flash Loader security attributes, only once in the product lifecycle.
8.24 Subset access control (FDP_ACC.1) [Loader] & Security
attribute based access control (FDP_ACF.1) [Loader]
282 In Admin configuration, the System Firmware grants access to the Flash Loader functions,
only after presentation of the required valid passwords.
ST33H768 Platform Security Target for composition TOE summary specification
SMD_ST33H_ST_15_001 59/68
8.25 Subset access control (FDP_ACC.1) [APPLI_FWL] & Security
attribute based access control (FDP_ACF.1) [APPLI_FWL]
283 If the Library Protection Unit is active, it can be used to isolate the Protected Application
(code in NVM and data in NVM and RAM) from the rest of the code embedded in the device.
8.26 Static atttribute initialisation (FMT_MSA.3) [APPLI_FWL]
284 At product start, all the static attributes are initialised, which are needed to protect the
segments where the Protected Application code and data are stored.
References ST33H768 Platform Security Target for composition
60/68 SMD_ST33H_ST_15_001
9 References
285 Protection Profile references
286 ST33H768 Platform Security Target reference
287 Guidance documentation references
Component description Reference Revision
Security IC Platform Protection Profile BSI-PP-0035 1.0
Component description Reference
ST33H768 Platform Maskset K8K0A version C with
firmware revision 4, and optional cryptographic library
Neslib 4.1 and 4.1.1 - SECURITY TARGET
SMD_ST33H_ST_13_001
Component description Reference Revision
ST33H768 Secure MCU with 32-bit ARM SecurCore
SC300 - Datasheet
DS_ST33H768 4
ST33H768 platform: BP and BM specific product
profiles - Technical note
TN_ST33H768_01 1
ST33H768 platform: LS, LC and BS specific product
profiles - Technical note
TN_ST33H768_02 1
ST33H768: CMOS M10+ 80-nm technology die and
wafer delivery description
DD_ST33H768 2
ARM Cortex SC300 r0p0 Technical Reference Manual ARM DDI 0337 F
ARM® Cortex M3 r2p0 Technical Reference Manual ARM_DDI_0037F3c F3c
ARM SC300 r0p0 SecurCore Technical Reference
Manual Supplement 1A
ARM DDI 0337 Supp 1A A
ARM SecurCore SC300 technical limitations ES_SC300 1
ST33 ARM Execute-only memory support for
SecurCore® SC300 devices - Application note
AN_33_EXE 2
ST33 uniform timing application note AN_33_UT 2
ST33H768 Firmware user manual UM_ST33H768_FW 4
ST33G and ST33H Firmware support for LPU regions -
application note
AN_33G_33H_LPU 1
NesLib 4.1 & 4.1.1 for ST33 Secure MCUs
cryptographic library user manual
UM_33_NESLIB_4 4
ST33G and ST33H - AIS31 Compliant Random Number
user manual
UM_33G_33H_AIS31 2
ST33G and ST33H - AIS31 Reference implementation -
Startup, online and total failure tests - Application note
AN_33G_33H_AIS31 1
ST33H768 Platform Security Target for composition References
SMD_ST33H_ST_15_001 61/68
288 Standards references
ST33G and ST33H Secure MCU platforms - Security
Guidance
AN_SECU_ST33 3
ST33G and ST33H Power supply glitch detector
characteristics - application note
AN_33_GLITCH 2
ST33 Secure MCU family - Neslib 4.1 & 4.1.1 Security
Recommendations - Application Note
AN_SECU_33_NESLIB_4 7
External Management of New Codes and
Personalizations for Secure Microcontroller products -
Reference Manual
SE_CD_10_002 4
Blackbox project - Developer Kit System Overview OPE_UG_09_001 2.02
Blackbox Data Sheet DS_BLACKBOX 2
ST33HFlash loader installation guide UM_33H_FL 2
Component description Reference Revision
Ref Identifier Description
[1] BSI-AIS20/AIS31
A proposal for: Functionality classes for random number generators,
W. Killmann & W. Schindler
BSI, Version 2.0, 18-09-2011
[2] FIPS PUB 46-3
FIPS PUB 46-3, Data encryption standard (DES), National Institute of
Standards and Technology, U.S. Department of Commerce, 1999
[3] FIPS PUB 140-2
FIPS PUB 140-2, Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules,
National Institute of Standards and Technology, U.S. Department of
Commerce, 1999
[4] FIPS PUB 180-4
FIPS PUB 180-4, Secure Hash Standard (SHS), National Institute of
Standards and Technology, March 2012
[5] FIPS 186-3
FIPS 186-3, Digital Signature Standard (DSS), National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST), 2009
[6] FIPS PUB 197
FIPS PUB 197, Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), National
Institute of Standards and Technology, U.S. Department of Commerce,
November 2001
[7] ISO/IEC 9797-1
ISO/IEC 9797, Information technology - Security techniques -
Message Authentication Codes (MACs) - Part 1: Mechanisms using a
block cipher, ISO, 1999
[8] ISO/IEC 10116
ISO/IEC 10116, Information technology - Security techniques - Modes
of operation of an n-bit block cipher algorithm, ISO, 1997
[9] ISO/IEC 14888
Information technology - Security techniques - Digital signatures with
appendix - Part 1: General (1998), Part 2: Identity-based mechanisms
(1999), Part 3: Certificate based mechanisms (2006), ISO
[10] CCMB-2012-09-001
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation - Part
1: Introduction and general model, September 2012, version 3.1
Revision 4
References ST33H768 Platform Security Target for composition
62/68 SMD_ST33H_ST_15_001
[11] CCMB-2012-09-002
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation - Part
2: Security functional components, September 2012, version 3.1
Revision 4
[12] CCMB-2012-09-003
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation - Part
3: Security assurance components, September 2012, version 3.1
Revision 4
[13] AUG
Smartcard Integrated Circuit Platform Augmentations,
Atmel, Hitachi Europe, Infineon Technologies, Philips Semiconductors,
Version 1.0, March 2002.
[14] MIT/LCS/TR-212
On digital signatures and public key cryptosystems,
Rivest, Shamir & Adleman
Technical report MIT/LCS/TR-212, MIT Laboratory for computer
sciences, January 1979
[15] IEEE 1363-2000
IEEE 1363-2000, Standard Specifications for Public Key Cryptography,
IEEE, 2000
[16] IEEE 1363a-2004
IEEE 1363a-2004, Standard Specifications for Public Key
Cryptography - Amendment 1:Additional techniques, IEEE, 2004
[17] PKCS #1 V2.1
PKCS #1 V2.1 RSA Cryptography Standard, RSA Laboratories, June
2002
[18] MOV 97
Alfred J. Menezes, Paul C. van Oorschot and Scott A. Vanstone,
Handbook of Applied Cryptography, CRC Press, 1997
[19] NIST SP 800-38B
NIST special publication 800-38B, Recommandation for Block Cipher
Modes of Operation: The CMAC Mode for Authentication, National
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), May 2005
[20] NIST SP 800-90A
The NIST SP 800-90A Deterministic Random Bit Generator Validation
System (DRBGVS), National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST), February 14 2013
[21] FIPS PUB 198-1
FIPS PUB 198-1, The Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code
(HMAC), National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), July
2008
[22] ANSI X9.31
ANSI X9.31, Digital Signature Using Reversible Public Key
Cryptography for the Financial Services Industry (rDSA), American
National Standard for Financial Services, 1998
Ref Identifier Description
ST33H768 Platform Security Target for composition Glossary
SMD_ST33H_ST_15_001 63/68
Appendix A Glossary
A.1 Terms
Authorised user
A user who may, in accordance with the TSP, perform an operation.
Composite product
Security IC product which includes the Security Integrated Circuit (i.e. the TOE) and the
Embedded Software and is evaluated as composite target of evaluation.
End-consumer
User of the Composite Product in Phase 7.
Integrated Circuit (IC)
Electronic component(s) designed to perform processing and/or memory functions.
IC Dedicated Software or Firmware
IC proprietary software embedded in a Security IC (also known as IC firmware) and
developed by ST. Such software is required for testing purpose (IC Dedicated Test
Software) but may provide additional services to facilitate usage of the hardware and/or
to provide additional services (IC Dedicated Support Software).
IC Dedicated Test Software
That part of the IC Dedicated Software which is used to test the TOE before TOE
Delivery but which does not provide any functionality thereafter.
IC developer
Institution (or its agent) responsible for the IC development.
IC manufacturer
Institution (or its agent) responsible for the IC manufacturing, testing, and pre-
personalization.
IC packaging manufacturer
Institution (or its agent) responsible for the IC packaging and testing.
Initialisation data
Initialisation Data defined by the TOE Manufacturer to identify the TOE and to keep
track of the Security IC’s production and further life-cycle phases are considered as
belonging to the TSF data. These data are for instance used for traceability and for
TOE identification (identification data)
Object
An entity within the TSC that contains or receives information and upon which subjects
perform operations.
Packaged IC
Security IC embedded in a physical package such as micromodules, DIPs, SOICs or
TQFPs.
Pre-personalization data
Any data supplied by the Card Manufacturer that is injected into the non-volatile
memory by the Integrated Circuits manufacturer (Phase 3). These data are for instance
used for traceability and/or to secure shipment between phases.
Secret
Glossary ST33H768 Platform Security Target for composition
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Information that must be known only to authorised users and/or the TSF in order to
enforce a specific SFP.
Security IC
Composition of the TOE, the Security IC Embedded Software, User Data, and the
package.
Security IC Embedded SoftWare (ES)
Software embedded in the Security IC and not developed by the IC designer. The
Security IC Embedded Software is designed in Phase 1 and embedded into the
Security IC in Phase 3.
Security IC embedded software (ES) developer
Institution (or its agent) responsible for the security IC embedded software
development and the specification of IC pre-personalization requirements, if any.
Security attribute
Information associated with subjects, users and/or objects that is used for the
enforcement of the TSP.
Sensitive information
Any information identified as a security relevant element of the TOE such as:
– the application data of the TOE (such as IC pre-personalization requirements, IC
and system specific data),
– the security IC embedded software,
– the IC dedicated software,
– the IC specification, design, development tools and technology.
Smartcard
A card according to ISO 7816 requirements which has a non volatile memory and a
processing unit embedded within it.
Subject
An entity within the TSC that causes operations to be performed.
Test features
All features and functions (implemented by the IC Dedicated Software and/or
hardware) which are designed to be used before TOE Delivery only and delivered as
part of the TOE.
TOE Delivery
The period when the TOE is delivered which is after Phase 3 or Phase 4 in this
Security target.
TSF data
Data created by and for the TOE, that might affect the operation of the TOE.
User
Any entity (human user or external IT entity) outside the TOE that interacts with the
TOE.
User data
All data managed by the Smartcard Embedded Software in the application context.
User data comprise all data in the final Smartcard IC except the TSF data.
ST33H768 Platform Security Target for composition Glossary
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A.2 Abbreviations
Table 14. List of abbreviations
Term Meaning
AIS Application notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (BSI)
ALU Arithmetical and Logical Unit.
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik.
CBC Cipher Block Chaining.
CBC-MAC Cipher Block Chaining Message Authentication Code.
CC Common Criteria Version 3.1.
CPU Central Processing Unit.
CRC Cyclic Redundancy Check.
DCSSI Direction Centrale de la Sécurité des Systèmes d’Information
DES Data Encryption Standard.
DIP Dual-In-Line Package.
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level.
ECB Electronic Code Book.
EDES Enhanced DES.
EEPROM Electrically Erasable Programmable Read Only Memory.
ES Security IC Embedded SoftWare.
FIPS Federal Information Processing Standard.
I/O Input / Output.
IC Integrated Circuit.
ISO International Standards Organisation.
IT Information Technology.
LPU Library Protection Unit
MPU Memory Protection Unit.
NESCRYPT Next Step Cryptography Accelerator.
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology.
NVM Non Volatile Memory.
OSP Organisational Security Policy.
OST Operating System for Test.
PP Protection Profile.
PUB Publication Series.
RAM Random Access Memory.
RF Radio Frequency.
RF UART Radio Frequency Universal Asynchronous Receiver Transmitter.
Glossary ST33H768 Platform Security Target for composition
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ROM Read Only Memory.
RSA Rivest, Shamir & Adleman.
SAR Security Assurance Requirement.
SFP Security Function Policy.
SFR Security Functional Requirement.
SOIC Small Outline IC.
ST Context dependent : STMicroelectronics or Security Target.
TOE Target of Evaluation.
TQFP Thin Quad Flat Package.
TRNG True Random Number Generator.
TSC TSF Scope of Control.
TSF TOE Security Functionality.
TSFI TSF Interface.
TSP TOE Security Policy.
TSS TOE Summary Specification.
Table 14. List of abbreviations (continued)
Term Meaning
ST33H768 Platform Security Target for composition Revision history
SMD_ST33H_ST_15_001 67/68
10 Revision history
Table 15. Document revision history
Date Revision Changes
10-Apr-2015 01.00 Initial release
08-Jun-2015 01.01
Clarification of LPU
Update of references
ST33H768 Platform Security Target for composition
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