BSI-DSZ-CC-1008-2017
for
Dell EqualLogic PS 4000 Series Storage Firmware
v7.1.1
from
Dell Inc.
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0 CC-Zert-327 V5.15
BSI-DSZ-CC-1008-2017 (*)
Storage Area Network
Dell EqualLogic PS 4000 Series Storage Firmware v7.1.1
from Dell Inc.
PP Conformance: None
Functionality: Product specific Security Target
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 2 augmented by ALC_FLR.1
The IT Product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation
facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1
extended by Scheme Interpretations for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT
Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1. CC and CEM are also published as ISO/IEC 15408
and ISO/IEC 18045.
(*) This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its
evaluated configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report and
Notification. For details on the validity see Certification Report part A chapter 4
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification
scheme of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions
of the evaluation facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the
evidence adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT Product by the Federal Office for
Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT Product by the Federal Office for Information
Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is
either expressed or implied.
Bonn, 12 June 2017
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Bernd Kowalski L.S.
Head of Department
SOGIS
Recognition Agreement
Common Criteria
Recognition Arrangement
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1008-2017
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1008-2017 Certification Report
Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of
issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor,
hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according
to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by
BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report
contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed
Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of
the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and
instructions for the user.
1
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1008-2017
Contents
A. Certification.......................................................................................................................7
1. Specifications of the Certification Procedure................................................................7
2. Recognition Agreements...............................................................................................7
3. Performance of Evaluation and Certification.................................................................9
4. Validity of the Certification Result..................................................................................9
5. Publication...................................................................................................................10
B. Certification Results........................................................................................................11
1. Executive Summary....................................................................................................12
2. Identification of the TOE..............................................................................................14
3. Security Policy.............................................................................................................15
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope......................................................................16
5. Architectural Information..............................................................................................16
6. Documentation............................................................................................................16
7. IT Product Testing........................................................................................................16
8. Evaluated Configuration..............................................................................................18
9. Results of the Evaluation.............................................................................................18
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE......................................................20
11. Security Target...........................................................................................................20
12. Definitions..................................................................................................................20
13. Bibliography...............................................................................................................23
C. Excerpts from the Criteria...............................................................................................25
CC Part 1:.......................................................................................................................25
CC Part 3:.......................................................................................................................26
D. Annexes..........................................................................................................................33
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1008-2017 Certification Report
A. Certification
1. Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the
following:
● Act on the Federal Office for Information Security2
● BSI Certification and Approval Ordinance3
● BSI Schedule of Costs4
● Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the
Interior)
● DIN EN ISO/IEC 17065 standard
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-
Produkte) [3]
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility, its
approval and licencing process (CC-Stellen) [3]
● Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.15
[1] also published as
ISO/IEC 15408.
● Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 [2] also published
as ISO/IEC 18045.
● BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]
2. Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or
CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
2.1. European Recognition of ITSEC/CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in
April 2010. It defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition
level and, in addition, at higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain SOGIS
Technical Domains only.
2
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
3
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of Security Certificates and approval by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungs- und -Anerkennungsverordnung - BSIZertV) of 17 December
2014, Bundesgesetzblatt 2014, part I, no. 61, p. 2231
4
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
(BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519
5
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 12 February 2007 in the Bundesanzeiger dated
23 February 2007, p. 3730
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1008-2017
The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels
EAL 1 to EAL 4 and ITSEC Evaluation Assurance Levels E1 to E3 (basic). For
"Smartcards and similar devices" a SOGIS Technical Domain is in place. For "HW Devices
with Security Boxes" a SOGIS Technical Domains is in place, too. In addition, certificates
issued for Protection Profiles based on Common Criteria are part of the recognition
agreement.
The new agreement has been signed by the national bodies of Austria, Finland, France,
Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. The
current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes, details on recognition,
and the history of the agreement can be seen on the website at https://www.sogisportal.eu.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the
terms of this agreement by the nations listed above.
This certificate is recognized under SOGIS-MRA for all assurance components selected.
2.2. International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)
The international arrangement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on the CC
(Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement, CCRA-2014) has been ratified on 08
September 2014. It covers CC certificates based on collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP)
(exact use), CC certificates based on assurance components up to and including EAL 2 or
the assurance family Flaw Remediation (ALC_FLR) and CC certificates for Protection
Profiles and for collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP).
The CCRA-2014 replaces the old CCRA signed in May 2000 (CCRA-2000). Certificates
based on CCRA-2000, issued before 08 September 2014 are still under recognition
according to the rules of CCRA-2000. For on 08 September 2014 ongoing certification
procedures and for Assurance Continuity (maintenance and re-certification) of old
certificates a transition period on the recognition of certificates according to the rules of
CCRA-2000 (i.e. assurance components up to and including EAL 4 or the assurance
family Flaw Remediation (ALC_FLR)) is defined until 08 September 2017.
As of September 2014 the signatories of the new CCRA-2014 are government
representatives from the following nations: Australia, Austria, Canada, Czech Republic,
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, India, Israel, Italy, Japan,
Malaysia, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Republic of Korea,
Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom, and the United States.
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes can be seen on
the website: http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates
that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the nations listed
above.
This certificate is recognized under CCRA-2014 for all assurance components selected.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1008-2017 Certification Report
3. Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a
uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product Dell EqualLogic PS 4000 Series Storage Firmware v7.1.1 has undergone the
certification procedure at BSI. This is a re-certification based on BSI-DSZ-CC-0902-2017.
Specific results from the evaluation process BSI-DSZ-CC-0902-2017 were re-used.
The evaluation of the product Dell EqualLogic PS 4000 Series Storage Firmware v7.1.1
was conducted by atsec information security GmbH. The evaluation was completed on 24
May 2017. atsec information security GmbH is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)6
recognised
by the certification body of BSI.
For this certification procedure the sponsor and applicant is: Dell Inc.
The product was developed by: Dell Inc.
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this
Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
4. Validity of the Certification Result
This Certification Report only applies to the version of the product as indicated. The
confirmed assurance package is only valid on the condition that
● all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the
following report, are observed,
● the product is operated in the environment described, as specified in the following report
and in the Security Target.
For the meaning of the assurance levels please refer to the excerpts from the criteria at
the end of the Certification Report or in the CC itself.
The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target
at the date of certification. As attack methods evolve over time, the resistance of the
certified version of the product against new attack methods needs to be re-assessed.
Therefore, the sponsor should apply for the certified product being monitored within the
assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme (e.g. by a re-certification).
Specifically, if results of the certification are used in subsequent evaluation and certification
procedures, in a system integration process or if a user's risk management needs regularly
updated results, it is recommended to perform a re-assessment on a regular e.g. annual
basis.
In order to avoid an indefinite usage of the certificate when evolved attack methods require
a re-assessment of the products resistance to state of the art attack methods, the
maximum validity of the certificate has been limited. The certificate issued on 12 June
2017 is valid until 11 June 2022. Validity can be re-newed by re-certification.
The owner of the certificate is obliged:
1. when advertising the certificate or the fact of the product's certification, to refer to
the Certification Report as well as to provide the Certification Report, the Security
6
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1008-2017
Target and user guidance documentation mentioned herein to any customer of the
product for the application and usage of the certified product,
2. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately about vulnerabilities of the
product that have been identified by the developer or any third party after issuance
of the certificate,
3. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately in the case that security relevant
changes in the evaluated life cycle, e.g. related to development and production sites
or processes, occur, or the confidentiality of documentation and information related
to the Target of Evaluation (TOE) or resulting from the evaluation and certification
procedure where the certification of the product has assumed this confidentiality
being maintained, is not given any longer. In particular, prior to the dissemination of
confidential documentation and information related to the TOE or resulting from the
evaluation and certification procedure that do not belong to the deliverables
according to the Certification Report part B, or for those where no dissemination
rules have been agreed on, to third parties, the Certification Body at BSI has to be
informed.
In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to
the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e.
re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural
requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.
5. Publication
The product Dell EqualLogic PS 4000 Series Storage Firmware v7.1.1 has been included
in the BSI list of certified products, which is published regularly (see also Internet:
https://www.bsi.bund.de and [5]). Further information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline
+49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer7
of the
product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet
address stated above.
7
Dell Inc.
300 Innovative Way
Nashua, NH 03062
USA
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1008-2017 Certification Report
B. Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
● the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
● the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
● complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1008-2017
1. Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is Dell EqualLogic PS 4000 Series Storage Firmware
v7.1.1.
The Dell EqualLogic PS Series Storage Array is a high performance, enterprise-level
Storage Area Network (SAN) device. Each device, called an array, contains multiple, hot
swappable drives for storing large quantities of data plus one to two controller cards.
Multiple arrays can be connected together to function as a single array. One or more
logical volumes can be created within a single array or that span across multiple arrays.
Client computers connect to the volumes using the iSCSI protocol. A volume can be
assigned to one or more iSCSI Clients (through the use of volume access control lists) and
used by these clients as filesystems.
Each array supports multiple iSCSI connections for communicating with iSCSI Clients. The
arrays support administrative interfaces on the same network as the iSCSI Clients. They
also support separate connections for administrative consoles (physically separated from
the iSCSI network). Multiple arrays can be logically linked together into a Group. Grouping
allows volumes to be spread across multiple arrays and provides performance advantages
as well.
Administrative access can be secured via SSH.
The TOE is the firmware and the supporting guidance documentation.
The Operational Environment for the TOE consists of the hardware model PS4000.
The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is not based on a certified
Protection Profile.
The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details).
The TOE meets the assurance requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 2
augmented by ALC_FLR.1.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the
Security Target [6], chapter 6.1. They are selected from Common Criteria Part 2 and one
of them is newly defined. Thus the TOE is CC Part 2 extended.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1008-2017 Certification Report
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functions:
TOE Security Functions Addressed issue
Auditing Based on the Audit Policy the TOE monitor access of users and administrators
the system. Administrators can review the audit logs.
Identification &
Authentication
The TOE supports I&A of all client users (including administrators). Users are
required to authenticate when connecting via the iSCSI protocol, the network
administrative interfaces (i.e., GUI, SAN HQ, SSH/SCP), and the serial
connection. No actions can be performed by a user until after the user has
been successfully identified and authenticated. Access banners can be used to
remind administrators about the responsibilities involved when using the TOE
management interfaces.
User Data Protection The TOE implements both access control lists (ACLs) and Access Policies to
protect access to user data. The TOE also ensures that residual data from
earlier storage allocations are not available upon reallocation. In addition does
the TOE support the use of Self-Encrypting Drives to support the data
protection at rest.
Security Management The TOE implements a role-based management functionality to manage users
and the TSF.
Reliable Time Stamps The TOE uses an internal time source in the environment to provide reliable
time stamps for audit records.
Trusted Channel The TOE provides SSH-based access for securely accessing the TOE
command-line management interface via the network.
Default Access Banners The TOE displays an access banner to all users accessing the administrative
interfaces to indicate that the system is trusted and no unauthorized personnel
may use it.
Table 1: TOE Security Functionalities
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6], chapter 7.1.
The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6], chapter 3.1.
Based on these assets the TOE Security Problem is defined in terms of Assumptions,
Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security Target [6],
chapters 3.1 – 3.3.
This certification covers the configurations of the TOE as outlined in chapter 8.
The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating
for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and
decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate
and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification
Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1008-2017
2. Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
Dell EqualLogic PS 4000 Series Storage Firmware v7.1.1
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
No Type Identifier Release Form of
Delivery
1 SW Dell EqualLogic PS Series Storage Array Firmware
V7-1-1-R400572.zip
That archive contains both 32-bit and 64-bit versions8
:
● kit_64_V7.1.1-R400572_548262610.tgz
● kit_V7.1.1-R400572_351401522.tgz
sha256(V7-1-1-R400572.zip):
a6833f99a088f3e73f3db9eb021e45f81401b32c320513618a17a
11c49b76f8d
7.1.1 Download
2 Doc Updating Firmware for Dell EqualLogic PS Series Storage Arrays
and FS Series Appliances
sha256(110-6196-EN-R2_Updating_Firmware.pdf):
ba4da120efaeebf5e88104d2589e1d050c09a9461f28df18cbbc25
c28b678678
110-6196-
EN-R2
Download
3 Doc EqualLogic Master Glossary Version 7.0
sha256(110-6177-EN-R1_Master_Gloss_web.pdf):
b90614d38abf9af02387feb927a4d38ef333eeb29314e9ae5a96f8
e4115d5b23
110-6177-
EN-R1
Download
4 Doc Dell EqualLogic PS Series Storage Arrays iSCSI Initiator and
Operating System Considerations
sha256(110-6176-EN_R4_Optimizing_SAN_Environment.pdf):
f90afe9b7619bce43dbf045e637d76696a52eba56c47598bacb4d
6d2665bc9ba
110-6176-
EN-R4
Download
5 Doc Dell EqualLogic PS Series Storage Arrays Release Notes and
Fix List PS Series Firmware 7.1.1
sha256(110-6171-EN_R14_RelNotes_V7.1.1.pdf):
bf1a410d4271a65e5b9ae0171dc94509db4c9f79b59366cbe5079
e7f4b989be7
110-6171-
EN-R14
Download
6 Doc Dell EqualLogic Group Manager Administrator's Manual PS
Series Firmware 7.0, FS Series Firmware 3.0
sha256(110-6152-EN-R1_Admin_web.pdf):
073a987d3af25b82db422145f0b81683b186d349693cf7dd6dc87
70abdac2820
110-6152-
EN-R1
Download
8
Note that only the 32bit image applies to the TOE.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1008-2017 Certification Report
No Type Identifier Release Form of
Delivery
7 Doc Dell EqualLogic Group Manager Online Help PS Series
Firmware Version 7.0 FS Series Firmware Version 3.0
sha256(OLH-g11n-kit.zip):
731dd58de06091a8a3468f62c87d3b5789f1eabba4660789dacd
273fbcdad303
7.0/3.0 Download
8 Doc Dell EqualLogic Group Manager CLI Reference Guide PS Series
Firmware 7.0, FS Series Firmware 3.0
sha256(110-6157-EN-R1_CLI_web.pdf):
789e1d75fa007bdf055b72c961d78d396fdbf60d0b5e3da59f707f
79d15a7ba5
110-6157-
EN-R1
Download
9 Doc PS Series Storage Arrays Common Criteria Configuration Guide
7.1.1
sha256(110-6188-EN-R3_CommonCriteria.pdf):
a2de1585b9cf7aaf9d78f4352bc1c3bab1eab85564f60b2105e96b
f7a4822537
110-6188-
EN-R3
Download
10 Doc Dell EqualLogic Events Guide PS Series Firmware 7.0, FS
Series Firmware 3.0
sha256(110-6158-EN-R1_Events_web.pdf):
14bcc4178910ca98be4f10cca6dc8f35fa50d36e2ad1af1d7c81ed
ecf8f9c8ad
110-6158-
EN-R1
Download
Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE
The TOE firmware is to be downloaded from the Dell/Equalogic website on
https://eqlsupport.dell.com/support/. The download is secured by the HTTPS protocol. In
order to access this site a user id and password are needed. The credentials can be
obtained from Dell customer support by customers that have an active service plan with
Dell.
The TOE firmware version can be queried in the running system in the “Controllers” tab on
the member display of the administrative UI. It shows information similar to the following:
Firmware: Storage Array Firmware V7.1.1 (R400572)
The same information can be queried in the CLI environment via the show subcommand.
3. Security Policy
The Security Policy is expressed by the set of Security Functional Requirements and
implemented by the TOE. It covers the following issues: Auditing, identification &
authentication, user data protection, security management, reliable time stamps, trusted
channel and default access banners.
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4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and
Organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to
specific security objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. The following topics are
of relevance: trained and trusted administrators, trusted administrative client software,
protected authentication servers, trusted DNS, usage of anti-virus tools and firewalls,
protected network, secure generation of sufficiently complex security credentials, physical
protection of underlying hardware, unaccessible SNMP interface, strong iSCSI client
authentication, trained users, reliable NTP servers, reliable RTC, secure usage of SSH
and cryptographic certificates. Details can be found in the Security Target [6], chapter 4.2.
5. Architectural Information
The operating software (i.e. the firmware) of the array consists of two major parts, a
network stack and a storage stack, which are executed in parallel. Memory protection is
used for separation. Dedicated memory regions are used for the stacks to communicate.
The network stack implements high speed network protocols (e.g., iSCSI) as well as the
lower layers of the TCP/IP protocol. The storage stack implements the high speed storage
algorithms and provides the execution environment for low speed background operations
that are implemented as user mode processes. These user mode processes provide the
administration algorithms and system monitoring functions.
6. Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the product to
the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of
the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of
this report have to be followed.
7. IT Product Testing
7.1. Developer Tests
The developer performed the majority of the testing not on the model PS4000, which is for
this certification, but on the PS6010 (32bit) and PS6210 (64bit). The reason for this is that
the firmware code is exactly the same, and the binaries are only different between the
32bit build and the 64bit build. Testing on the 32bit and the 64 bit firmware therefore
covers all models. The PS4000 model defined for this TOE uses the 32bit firmware. The
one caveat for the PS4000 is that it provides not all the functionality (no SED, no IPsec)
because of the missing cryptographic hardware support of this model. The reason why the
firmware still does not differ from others is that it dynamically detects whether the
cryptographic hardware support is available or not, and refuses to provide the functionality
if it is absent. Any tests that exercise the missing functionality will fail, while the tests for
the remaining functionality will execute like for the other models. To make sure that the
missing hardware support does not lead to a general TOE failure and affect other
functionality the developer created a separate test for the PS4000 that involves some
basic features:
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1008-2017 Certification Report
● SSH to the administrative GUI
● management of volumes on the administrative GUI
● CLI login
● controller management via the CLI
● usage of the configured volumes via iSCSI
The developer used automatic and manual tests. Manual tests have been used to verify
functions on the admin GUI interface. Because the automatic test suites contain thousands
of tests, these are only executed on the base product version (e.g. V7.1). For the
evaluated TOE version 7.1.1, the developer filtered these and only chose a subset of the
tests that where security-relevant for the claimed TOE security functions. The automatic
test framework comes with the web interface that allows the tester to easily select subsets
of tests to be executed. The test framework also shows the running status and results of
each test.
All security functions were tested by using only the external visible TOE interfaces. The
tests mainly used the typical interfaces to the CLI (via SSH or telnet) in order to perform
tests automatically. The tests themselves are feature-centric, that means that a specific
functionality is tested rather than pursuing the test of specific type of interfaces. With this,
a large number of functions is covered using CLI and which often-times involve
identification and authentication functions.
All developer tests ran successfully.
7.2. Independent Evaluator Tests
The test configuration comprised of a group array configuration of two TOE instances, that
were using the hardware models PS6000 and PS4100.
All evaluator tests were performed on the TOE firmware version 7.1.1.
The independent functional evaluator test comprised 24 test cases including a variation of
9 developer test during test witnessing. The cryptographic tests test 7 valid and 6 invalid
SSH cipher and protocol combinations.
The following security functions have been tested: I&A of user and administrators,
cryptographic operations of SSH, security management of audit, access control,
communication channels, auditing and access banners.
The approach was to use normal external TOE interfaces for the tests.
The tests where mainly manual tests with some scripting support.
The independent tests covered a broad range of TOE functions including tests from the
previous evaluation. The focus lay on I&A and cryptographic tests. For the I&A tests
different configurations with external authentication servers were tested to verify that the
separation of users and administrators was not violated. For the cryptographic tests
several supported ciphers and the lack of weak ciphers where tested. One test was an
extension of a developer test that verified authorization of specific management
commands tunnelled through iSCSI.
All developer tests that were rerun by the evaluator as well as the evaluator tests were
executed successfully with all actual test results matching the expected results.
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8. Evaluated Configuration
The TOE is the firmware and the supporting guidance documentation. The evaluated
configuration is defined by the configuration laid out in the Common Criteria Configuration
Guide [16].
The following main configuration changes compared to the factory default define the
evaluated configuration:
● Strong passwords, conforming to a policy described in Common Criteria Configuration
Guide [16] must be used for the accounts as well as the group and replication partners
● iSCSI target authentication must be used
● PSAPI and SNMPv3 must be turned off
● Administrative access is only allowed through SSH
● Only a specific set of cryptographic algorithms and protocols must be used.
● Unencrypted access (FTP, telnet) must be turned off
● Certificates using the MD5 hash algorithm must not be used; certificates with SHA-1 or
SHA-2 (SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512) hash algorithms should be used instead.
● Dell EqualLogic FS Series Network-Attached Storage (NAS) must not be used
9. Results of the Evaluation
9.1. CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [7] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used.
For RNG assessment the scheme interpretations AIS 20 was used (see [4]).
As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
● All components of the EAL 2 package including the class ASE as defined in the CC (see
also part C of this report)
● The components ALC_FLR.1 augmented for this TOE evaluation.
As the evaluation work performed for this certification procedure was carried out as a re-
evaluation based on the certificate BSI-DSZ-CC-0902-2017, re-use of specific evaluation
tasks was possible. The focus of this re-evaluation was on the reduced set of the provided
cryptographic functionality.
The evaluation has confirmed:
● PP Conformance: None
● for the Functionality: Product specific Security Target
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
● for the Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 2 augmented by ALC_FLR.1
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The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
9.2. Results of cryptographic assessment
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of this certification
procedure (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2). But Cryptographic Functionalities with
a security level of lower than 100 bits can no longer be regarded as secure without
considering the application context. Therefore, for these functionalities it shall be checked
whether the related crypto operations are appropriate for the intended system. Some
further hints and guidelines can be derived from the 'Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-02102'
(https://www.bsi.bund.de).
Any Cryptographic Functionality that is marked in column 'Security Level above 100 Bits'
of the following table with 'no' achieves a security level of lower than 100 Bits (in general
context).
No Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of Implementation Key Size in
Bits
Security
Level
above
100 Bits
1 Authentication RSA signature
generation
(RSASSAPKCS1-
v1_5 using SHA-1)
[RFC3447] (RSASSA-PKCS1-
v1_5), [RFC4253] (SSH-2),
[FIPS180-4] (SHA)
Modulus
length = 2048
no
2 Key Agreement DH with DH
group14-sha1
[RFC4253] (SSH-2), DH is
described in [RFC4253] refers to
[RFC3526] for the DH group,
[FIPS180-4] (SHA)
plength=2048 yes
3 Key derivation: PRF
based on SHA-1
[RFC4253], sec. 7.2 (SSH),
[FIPS180-4] (SHA)
|k| = variable yes
4 Confidentiality AES in CBC and
CTR mode
[FIPS197] (AES), [SP800-38A]
(CBC, CTR), [RFC4253] (SSH-2
using AES with CBC mode),
[RFC4344] (SSH-2 using AES with
CTR mode)
|k|=128, 192,
256
yes
5 TDES in CBC mode [SP800-67] (TDES/TDEA), [SP800-
38A] (CBC), [RFC4253] (SSH-2
using 3DES with CBC mode)
|k|=168 yes
6 Integrity HMAC-SHA-1,
HMAC-SHA-1-96
[FIPS180-4] (SHA), [FIPS198-1]
(HMAC), [RFC4251] / [RFC4253]
(SSH-2 general / detailed HMAC
support), [RFC4253] (SSH-2
detailed HMAC support)
|k|=160 yes
7 Key generation RSA key generation [FIPS186-2], Miller Rabin primality
tests.
n/a
8 Trusted
Channel
FTP_ITC.1-SSH:
SSH v2.0
[RFC4253] (SSH v2.0) yes / no
Table 3: TOE cryptographic functionality
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10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE
The documents as outlined in table 2 contain necessary information about the usage of the
TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered. In addition all aspects of
Assumptions, Threats and OSPs as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE
itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his
system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and
techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment of the
TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
If available, certified updates of the TOE should be used. If non-certified updates or
patches are available the user of the TOE should request the sponsor to provide a re-
certification. In the meantime a risk management process of the system using the TOE
should investigate and decide on the usage of not yet certified updates and patches or
take additional measures in order to maintain system security.
11. Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [6] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is
provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report.
12. Definitions
12.1. Acronyms
AIS Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for
Information Security, Bonn, Germany
BSIG BSI-Gesetz / Act on the Federal Office for Information Security
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
CLI Command Line Interface
DNS Domain Name Service
cPP Collaborative Protection Profile
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
FTP File Transfer Protocol
HTTPS Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure
iSCSI Internet Small Computer Systems Interface
IP Internet Protocol
IPsec Internet Protocol Security
IT Information Technology
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ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
MD5 Message Digest 5 Algorithm
NAS Network Attached Storage
NTP Network Time Protocol
PP Protection Profile
PSAPI PS Application Programming Interface
RTC Real Time Clock
SAN Storage Area Network
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
SNMP Simple Network Management Protocol
SSH Secure Shell
ST Security Target
TCP Transmission Control Protocol
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
12.2. Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.
Collaborative Protection Profile - A Protection Profile collaboratively developed by an
International Technical Community endorsed by the Management Committee.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in CC
part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in CC part 3.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on well-
established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - A passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon which
subjects perform operations.
Package - named set of either security functional or security assurance requirements
Protection Profile - A formal document defined in CC, expressing an implementation
independent set of security requirements for a category of IT Products that meet specific
consumer needs.
Security Target - An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific
identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
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Subject - An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.
Target of Evaluation - An IT Product and its associated administrator and user guidance
documentation that is the subject of an Evaluation.
TOE Security Functionality - Combined functionality of all hardware, software, and
firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs.
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13. Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Part 1: Introduction and general model, Revision 4, September 2012
Part 2: Security functional components, Revision 4, September 2012
Part 3: Security assurance components, Revision 4, September 2012
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Rev. 4, September 2012,
[3] BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-
Produkte) and Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility,
approval and licencing (CC-Stellen), https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierung
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE9
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148), periodically updated list published also
on the BSI Website, https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierungsreporte
[6] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-1008-2017, Version 3.22, 2017-04-06, Dell EqualLogic
PS4000 Series Storage Array Firmware Version 7.1.1 Security Target, Dell Inc.
[7] Evaluation Technical Report, Version 3, 2017-04-28, atsec information security
GmbH (confidential document)
[8] Configuration list for the TOE, Version 7.1.1, 2017-04-28, Configuration Collection
including the Configuration List (7.1.1-cm-lists+4000-2017-04-28.zip) (confidential
document)
[9] Updating Firmware for Dell EqualLogic PS Series Storage Arrays and FS Series
Appliances, 110-6196-EN-R2
[10] EqualLogic Master Glossary Version 7.0, 110-6177-EN-R1
[11] Dell EqualLogic PS Series Storage Arrays iSCSI Initiator and Operating System
Considerations, 110-6176-EN-R4
[12] Dell EqualLogic PS Series Storage Arrays Release Notes and Fix List PS Series
Firmware 7.1.1, 110-6171-EN-R14
[13] Dell EqualLogic Group Manager Administrator's Manual PS Series Firmware 7.0, FS
Series Firmware 3.0, 110-6152-EN-R1
[14] Dell EqualLogic Group Manager Online Help PS Series Firmware Version 7.0/FS
Series Firmware Version 3.0, Version 7.0/3.0
[15] Dell EqualLogic Group Manager CLI Reference Guide PS Series Firmware 7.0, FS
Series Firmware 3.0, 110-6157-EN-R1
[16] PS Series Storage Arrays Common Criteria Configuration Guide 7.1.1, 110-6188-
EN_R3
[17] Dell EqualLogic Events Guide PS Series Firmware 7.0, FS Series Firmware 3.0,
110-6158-EN-R1
9
specifically
• AIS 20, Version 3, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für deterministische
Zufallszahlengeneratoren
• AIS 32, Version 7, CC-Interpretationen im deutschen Zertifizierungsschema
• AIS 38, Version 2, Reuse of evaluation results
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C. Excerpts from the Criteria
CC Part 1:
Conformance Claim (chapter 10.4)
“The conformance claim indicates the source of the collection of requirements that is met
by a PP or ST that passes its evaluation. This conformance claim contains a CC
conformance claim that:
● describes the version of the CC to which the PP or ST claims conformance.
● describes the conformance to CC Part 2 (security functional requirements) as either:
– CC Part 2 conformant - A PP or ST is CC Part 2 conformant if all SFRs in that
PP or ST are based only upon functional components in CC Part 2, or
– CC Part 2 extended - A PP or ST is CC Part 2 extended if at least one SFR in
that PP or ST is not based upon functional components in CC Part 2.
● describes the conformance to CC Part 3 (security assurance requirements) as either:
– CC Part 3 conformant - A PP or ST is CC Part 3 conformant if all SARs in that
PP or ST are based only upon assurance components in CC Part 3, or
– CC Part 3 extended - A PP or ST is CC Part 3 extended if at least one SAR in
that PP or ST is not based upon assurance components in CC Part 3.
Additionally, the conformance claim may include a statement made with respect to
packages, in which case it consists of one of the following:
● Package name Conformant - A PP or ST is conformant to a pre-defined package
(e.g. EAL) if:
– the SFRs of that PP or ST are identical to the SFRs in the package, or
– the SARs of that PP or ST are identical to the SARs in the package.
● Package name Augmented - A PP or ST is an augmentation of a predefined package
if:
– the SFRs of that PP or ST contain all SFRs in the package, but have at least
one additional SFR or one SFR that is hierarchically higher than an SFR in the
package.
– the SARs of that PP or ST contain all SARs in the package, but have at least
one additional SAR or one SAR that is hierarchically higher than an SAR in the
package.
Note that when a TOE is successfully evaluated to a given ST, any conformance claims of
the ST also hold for the TOE. A TOE can therefore also be e.g. CC Part 2 conformant.
Finally, the conformance claim may also include two statements with respect to Protection
Profiles:
● PP Conformant - A PP or TOE meets specific PP(s), which are listed as part of the
conformance result.
● Conformance Statement (Only for PPs) - This statement describes the manner in
which PPs or STs must conform to this PP: strict or demonstrable. For more
information on this Conformance Statement, see Annex D.”
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CC Part 3:
Class APE: Protection Profile evaluation (chapter 10)
“Evaluating a PP is required to demonstrate that the PP is sound and internally consistent,
and, if the PP is based on one or more other PPs or on packages, that the PP is a correct
instantiation of these PPs and packages. These properties are necessary for the PP to be
suitable for use as the basis for writing an ST or another PP.
Assurance Class Assurance Components
Class APE: Protection
Profile evaluation
APE_INT.1 PP introduction
APE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
APE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
APE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment
APE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
APE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
APE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
APE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
APE: Protection Profile evaluation class decomposition”
Class ASE: Security Target evaluation (chapter 11)
“Evaluating an ST is required to demonstrate that the ST is sound and internally
consistent, and, if the ST is based on one or more PPs or packages, that the ST is a
correct instantiation of these PPs and packages. These properties are necessary for the
ST to be suitable for use as the basis for a TOE evaluation.”
Assurance Class Assurance Components
Class ASE: Security
Target evaluation
ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
ASE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
ASE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment
ASE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
ASE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
ASE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification
ASE_TSS.2 TOE summary specification with architectural design
summary
ASE: Security Target evaluation class decomposition
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Security assurance components (chapter 7)
“The following Sections describe the constructs used in representing the assurance
classes, families, and components.“
“Each assurance class contains at least one assurance family.”
“Each assurance family contains one or more assurance components.”
The following table shows the assurance class decomposition.
Assurance Class Assurance Components
ADV: Development ADV_ARC.1 Security architecture description
ADV_FSP.1 Basic functional specification
ADV_FSP.2 Security-enforcing functional specification
ADV_FSP.3 Functional specification with complete summary
ADV_FSP.4 Complete functional specification
ADV_FSP.5 Complete semi-formal functional specification with
additional error information
ADV_FSP.6 Complete semi-formal functional specification with
additional formal specification
ADV_IMP.1 Implementation representation of the TSF
ADV_IMP.2 Implementation of the TSF
ADV_INT.1 Well-structured subset of TSF internals
ADV_INT.2 Well-structured internals
ADV_INT.3 Minimally complex internals
ADV_SPM.1 Formal TOE security policy model
ADV_TDS.1 Basic design
ADV_TDS.2 Architectural design
ADV_TDS.3 Basic modular design
ADV_TDS.4 Semiformal modular design
ADV_TDS.5 Complete semiformal modular design
ADV_TDS.6 Complete semiformal modular design with formal high-
level design presentation
AGD:
Guidance documents
AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
ALC: Life cycle support
ALC_CMC.1 Labelling of the TOE
ALC_CMC.2 Use of a CM system
ALC_CMC.3 Authorisation controls
ALC_CMC.4 Production support, acceptance procedures and
automation
ALC_CMC.5 Advanced support
ALC_CMS.1 TOE CM coverage
ALC_CMS.2 Parts of the TOE CM coverage
ALC_CMS.3 Implementation representation CM coverage
ALC_CMS.4 Problem tracking CM coverage
ALC_CMS.5 Development tools CM coverage
ALC_DEL.1 Delivery procedures
ALC_DVS.1 Identification of security measures
ALC_DVS.2 Sufficiency of security measures
ALC_FLR.1 Basic flaw remediation
ALC_FLR.2 Flaw reporting procedures
ALC_FLR.3 Systematic flaw remediation
ALC_LCD.1 Developer defined life-cycle model
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Assurance Class Assurance Components
ALC_LCD.2 Measurable life-cycle model
ALC_TAT.1 Well-defined development tools
ALC_TAT.2 Compliance with implementation standards
ALC_TAT.3 Compliance with implementation standards - all parts
ATE: Tests
ATE_COV.1 Evidence of coverage
ATE_COV.2 Analysis of coverage
ATE_COV.3 Rigorous analysis of coverage
ATE_DPT.1 Testing: basic design
ATE_DPT.2 Testing: security enforcing modules
ATE_DPT.3 Testing: modular design
ATE_DPT.4 Testing: implementation representation
ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing
ATE_FUN.2 Ordered functional testing
ATE_IND.1 Independent testing – conformance
ATE_IND.2 Independent testing – sample
ATE_IND.3 Independent testing – complete
AVA: Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_VAN.1 Vulnerability survey
AVA_VAN.2 Vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.3 Focused vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.4 Methodical vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.5 Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis
Assurance class decomposition
Evaluation assurance levels (chapter 8)
“The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that balances the
level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of acquiring that degree of
assurance. The CC approach identifies the separate concepts of assurance in a TOE at
the end of the evaluation, and of maintenance of that assurance during the operational use
of the TOE.
It is important to note that not all families and components from CC Part 3 are included in
the EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful and desirable
assurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and components will be considered
for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and STs for which they provide utility.”
Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview (chapter 8.1)
“Table 1 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a hierarchically
ordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families. Each number in the
resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component where applicable.
As outlined in the next Section, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation assurance levels
are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE's assurance. They are hierarchically ordered
inasmuch as each EAL represents more assurance than all lower EALs. The increase in
assurance from EAL to EAL is accomplished by substitution of a hierarchically higher
assurance component from the same assurance family (i.e. increasing rigour, scope,
and/or depth) and from the addition of assurance components from other assurance
families (i.e. adding new requirements).
These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as described
in Chapter 7 of this CC Part 3. More precisely, each EAL includes no more than one
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component of each assurance family and all assurance dependencies of every component
are addressed.
While the EALs are defined in the CC, it is possible to represent other combinations of
assurance. Specifically, the notion of “augmentation” allows the addition of assurance
components (from assurance families not already included in the EAL) or the substitution
of assurance components (with another hierarchically higher assurance component in the
same assurance family) to an EAL. Of the assurance constructs defined in the CC, only
EALs may be augmented. The notion of an “EAL minus a constituent assurance
component” is not recognised by the standard as a valid claim. Augmentation carries with
it the obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility and added value of the
added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also be augmented with extended
assurance requirements.
Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL 1) - functionally tested (chapter 8.3)
“Objectives
EAL 1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but the threats
to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where independent assurance is
required to support the contention that due care has been exercised with respect to the
protection of personal or similar information.
EAL 1 requires only a limited security target. It is sufficient to simply state the SFRs that
the TOE must meet, rather than deriving them from threats, OSPs and assumptions
through security objectives.
EAL 1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer, including
independent testing against a specification, and an examination of the guidance
documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL 1 evaluation could be successfully
conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE, and for minimal outlay.
An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a manner
consistent with its documentation.”
Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL 2) - structurally tested (chapter 8.4)
“Objectives
EAL 2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of design
information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the part of the
developer than is consistent with good commercial practise. As such it should not require a
substantially increased investment of cost or time.
EAL 2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
low to moderate level of independently assured security in the absence of ready
availability of the complete development record. Such a situation may arise when securing
legacy systems, or where access to the developer may be limited.”
Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL 3) - methodically tested and checked (chapter 8.5)
“Objectives
EAL 3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from positive
security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of existing sound
development practises.
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EAL 3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a moderate
level of independently assured security, and require a thorough investigation of the TOE
and its development without substantial re-engineering.”
Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL 4) - methodically designed, tested, and reviewed
(chapter 8.6)
“Objectives
EAL 4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security engineering
based on good commercial development practises which, though rigorous, do not require
substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other resources. EAL 4 is the highest level at
which it is likely to be economically feasible to retrofit to an existing product line.
EAL 4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
moderate to high level of independently assured security in conventional commodity TOEs
and are prepared to incur additional security-specific engineering costs.”
Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL 5) - semiformally designed and tested (chapter
8.7)
“Objectives
EAL 5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security engineering based
upon rigorous commercial development practises supported by moderate application of
specialist security engineering techniques. Such a TOE will probably be designed and
developed with the intent of achieving EAL 5 assurance. It is likely that the additional costs
attributable to the EAL 5 requirements, relative to rigorous development without the
application of specialised techniques, will not be large.
EAL 5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
high level of independently assured security in a planned development and require a
rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable costs attributable to
specialist security engineering techniques.”
Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL 6) - semiformally verified design and tested
(chapter 8.8)
“Objectives
EAL 6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security engineering
techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to produce a premium TOE for
protecting high value assets against significant risks.
EAL 6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in high
risk situations where the value of the protected assets justifies the additional costs.”
Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL 7) - formally verified design and tested
(chapter 8.9)
“Objectives
EAL 7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in extremely high
risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies the higher costs. Practical
application of EAL 7 is currently limited to TOEs with tightly focused security functionality
that is amenable to extensive formal analysis.”
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Assurance
Class
Assurance
Family
Assurance Components by
Evaluation Assurance Level
EAL 1 EAL 2 EAL 3 EAL 4 EAL 5 EAL 6 EAL 7
Development ADV_ARC 1 1 1 1 1 1
ADV_FSP 1 2 3 4 5 5 6
ADV_IMP 1 1 2 2
ADV_INT 2 3 3
ADV_SPM 1 1
ADV_TDS 1 2 3 4 5 6
Guidance
Documents
AGD_OPE 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
AGD_PRE 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Life cycle
Support
ALC_CMC 1 2 3 4 4 5 5
ALC_CMS 1 2 3 4 5 5 5
ALC_DEL 1 1 1 1 1 1
ALC_DVS 1 1 1 2 2
ALC_FLR
ALC_LCD 1 1 1 1 2
ALC_TAT 1 2 3 3
Security Target
Evaluation
ASE_CCL 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_ECD 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_INT 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_OBJ 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
ASE_REQ 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
ASE_SPD 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_TSS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Tests ATE_COV 1 2 2 2 3 3
ATE_DPT 1 1 3 3 4
ATE_FUN 1 1 1 1 2 2
ATE_IND 1 2 2 2 2 2 3
Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_VAN 1 2 2 3 4 5 5
Table 1: Evaluation assurance level summary”
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Class AVA: Vulnerability assessment (chapter 16)
“The AVA: Vulnerability assessment class addresses the possibility of exploitable
vulnerabilities introduced in the development or the operation of the TOE.”
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VAN) (chapter 16.1)
“Objectives
Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether potential vulnerabilities
identified, during the evaluation of the development and anticipated operation of the TOE
or by other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses or quantitative or statistical analysis of the
security behaviour of the underlying security mechanisms), could allow attackers to violate
the SFRs.
Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that an attacker will be able to discover flaws
that will allow unauthorised access to data and functionality, allow the ability to interfere
with or alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorised capabilities of other users.”
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D. Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Security Target provided within a separate document.
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