BSI-DSZ-CC-0688-2013
for
Dell EqualLogic PS Series Storage Array Firmware
Version 5.1.1-H2
from
Dell Inc.
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0 CC-Zert-327 V4.71
BSI-DSZ-CC-0688-2013
Storage Area Network
Dell EqualLogic PS Series Storage Array Firmware
Version 5.1.1-H2
from Dell Inc.
PP Conformance: None
Functionality: Product specific Security Target
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 2 augmented by ALC_FLR.1
Common Criteria
Recognition
Arrangement
The IT product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation facility using the
Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 for conformance to the Common
Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1.
This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated configuration
and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification scheme of the
German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions of the evaluation facility in the
evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any
other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by the
Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, is either expressed or implied.
Bonn, 28 March 2013
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Bernd Kowalski L.S.
Head of Department
for components up
to EAL 4
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0688-2013
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0688-2013 Certification Report
Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of
issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor,
hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according
to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by
BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report
contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed
Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of
the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and
instructions for the user.
1
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0688-2013
Contents
A Certification........................................................................................................................7
1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure.................................................................7
2 Recognition Agreements................................................................................................7
3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification..................................................................8
4 Validity of the Certification Result...................................................................................9
5 Publication......................................................................................................................9
B Certification Results.........................................................................................................11
1 Executive Summary.....................................................................................................12
2 Identification of the TOE...............................................................................................13
3 Security Policy..............................................................................................................13
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope.......................................................................13
5 Architectural Information...............................................................................................13
6 Documentation.............................................................................................................13
7 IT Product Testing.........................................................................................................14
8 Evaluated Configuration...............................................................................................14
9 Results of the Evaluation..............................................................................................14
10 Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE.......................................................17
11 Security Target............................................................................................................17
12 Definitions...................................................................................................................18
13 Bibliography................................................................................................................20
C Excerpts from the Criteria................................................................................................23
CC Part1:........................................................................................................................23
CC Part 3:.......................................................................................................................24
D Annexes...........................................................................................................................33
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0688-2013 Certification Report
A Certification
1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the
following:
● BSIG2
● BSI Certification Ordinance3
● BSI Schedule of Costs4
● Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the
Interior)
● DIN EN 45011 standard
● BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125) [3]
● Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.15
[1]
● Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 [2]
● BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]
2 Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or
CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
2.1 European Recognition of ITSEC/CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in
April 2010. It defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition
level and in addition at higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain technical
domains only.
The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels
EAL1 to EAL4 and ITSEC Evaluation Assurance Levels E1 to E3 (basic). For higher
recognition levels the technical domain Smart card and similar Devices has been defined.
It includes assurance levels beyond EAL4 resp. E3 (basic). In Addition, certificates issued
for Protection Profiles based on Common Criteria are part of the recognition agreement.
2
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
3
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of a Certificate by the Federal Office for Information Security
(BSI-Zertifizierungsverordnung, BSIZertV) of 07 July 1992, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1230
4
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
(BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519
5
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 12 February 2007 in the Bundesanzeiger dated
23 February 2007, p. 3730
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0688-2013
As of September 2011 the new agreement has been signed by the national bodies of
Austria, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and
the United Kingdom.Details on recognition and the history of the agreement can be found
at https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierung.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the
terms of this agreement by the nations listed above.
2.2 International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)
An arrangement (Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement) on the mutual recognition of
certificates based on the CC Evaluation Assurance Levels up to and including EAL 4 has
been signed in May 2000 (CCRA). It includes also the recognition of Protection Profiles
based on the CC.
As of September 2011 the arrangement has been signed by the national bodies of:
Australia, Austria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Hungary, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, The Netherlands, New
Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Republic of Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United
Kingdom, United States of America. The current list of signatory nations and approved
certification schemes can be seen on the website: http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates
that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the nations listed
above.
3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a
uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product Dell EqualLogic PS Series Storage Array Firmware, Version 5.1.1-H2 has
undergone the certification procedure at BSI.
The evaluation of the product Dell EqualLogic PS Series Storage Array Firmware, Version
5.1.1-H2 was conducted by atsec information security GmbH. The evaluation was
completed on 25 March 2013. The atsec information security GmbH is an evaluation
facility (ITSEF)6
recognised by the certification body of BSI.
For this certification procedure the sponsor and applicant is: Dell Inc.
The product was developed by: Dell Inc.
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this
Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
6
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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4 Validity of the Certification Result
This Certification Report only applies to the version of the product as indicated. The
confirmed assurance package is only valid on the condition that
● all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the
following report, are observed,
● the product is operated in the environment described, as specified in the following report
and in the Security Target.
For the meaning of the assurance levels please refer to the excerpts from the criteria at
the end of the Certification Report.
The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target
at the date of certification. As attack methods evolve over time, the resistance of the
certified version of the product against new attack methods needs to be re-assessed.
Therefore, the sponsor should apply for the certified product being monitored within the
assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme (e.g. by a re-certification).
Specifically, if results of the certification are used in subsequent evaluation and certification
procedures, in a system integration process or if a user's risk management needs regularly
updated results, it is recommended to perform a re-assessment on a regular e.g. annual
basis.
In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to
the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e.
re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural
requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.
5 Publication
The product Dell EqualLogic PS Series Storage Array Firmware, Version 5.1.1-H2 has
been included in the BSI list of certified products, which is published regularly (see also
Internet: https://www.bsi.bund.de and [5]). Further information can be obtained from
BSI-Infoline +49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer7
of the
product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet
address stated above.
7
Dell Inc.
One Dell Way
Round Rock, Texas 78682
United States
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0688-2013 Certification Report
B Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
● the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
● the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
● complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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1 Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the Dell EqualLogic PS Series Storage Array Firmware,
Version 5.1.1-H2.
The Dell EqualLogic PS Series Storage Array is a high performance, enterprise-level
Storage Area Network (SAN) device. Each device, called an array, contains multiple, hot
swappable drives for storing large quantities of data plus one to two controller cards.
Multiple arrays can be connected together to function as a single array. One or more
logical volumes can be created within a single array or that span across multiple arrays.
Client computers connect to the volumes using the Internet Small Computer System
Interface (iSCSI) protocol. A volume can be assigned to one or more iSCSI Clients
(through the use of volume access control lists) and used by these clients as filesystems.
Each array supports multiple iSCSI connections for communicating with iSCSI clients. The
arrays support administrative interfaces on the same network as the iSCSI clients. They
also support separate connections for administrative consoles (physically separated from
the iSCSI network). Multiple arrays can be logically linked together into a group. Grouping
allows volumes to be spread across multiple arrays and provides performance advantages
as well.
The TOE is the firmware that resides on the controller card(s) and the supporting guidance
documentation.
The Operational Environment for the TOE consists of the following hardware models:
PS4000 - E, X, XV; PS4100 - E, X, XV; PS6000 - E, X, XV, S; PS6010 - E, X, XV, S;
PS6100 - E, X, XV, S, ES, XS, XVS; PS6500 - E, X; PS6510 – E, X.
The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is not based on a certified
Protection Profile.
The TOE security assurance requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details).
The TOE meets the assurance requirements of the evaluation assurance level EAL 2
augmented by ALC_FLR.1.
The TOE security functional requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the
Security Target [6], chapter 6.1. They are selected from Common Criteria Part 2 and one of
them is newly defined. Thus the TOE is CC Part 2 extended.
The SFRs are implemented by the following TOE security functions:
TOE security functions Addressed issue
Auditing Audit data generation, user identity association, audit review
Identification and authentication I&A for iSCSI clients and administrators,
I&A of arrays when joining a group
User data protection Access control for iSCSI clients on the basis of access control lists
(ACLs), residual information protection
Security management Support of different administrator roles with different priviliges
Reliable time stamps Usage of internal time source to provide reliable time stamps
Trusted channel Establishment of trusted channel for administrative communication
Table 1: TOE security functions
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For more details please refer to the Security Target [6], chapter 7.
The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6], chapter 3.1.
Based on these assets the TOE security problem is defined in terms of assumptions,
threats and organisational security policies. This is outlined in the Security Target [6],
chapter 3.1 to 3.3.
The evaluated configuration covered by this certification is defined by the configuration laid
out in the EqualLogic PS Series Storage Arrays Common Criteria Configuration Guide [11]
(for more details see chapter 8 of this report).
The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating
for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and
decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate
and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification
Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2 Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
Dell EqualLogic PS Series Storage Array Firmware, Version 5.1.1-H2
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
1 SW Dell EqualLogic PS Series Storage Array
Firmware
5.1.1-H2 Download
2 DOC EqualLogic PS Series Group Administration,
PS Series Firmware Version 5.1 [9]
110-6056-EN-R1 Download
3 DOC EqualLogic PS Series Firmware Command
Line Reference Version 5.1 [10]
110-6057-EN-R1 Download
4 DOC EqualLogic PS Series Storage Arrays Common
Criteria Configuration Guide [11]
110-6074-EN Rev. 2 Download
5 DOC EqualLogic Updating PS Series Storage Array
Firmware, Firmware Version 5.1 [12]
110-0025-EN Rev.18 Download
6 DOC EqualLogic PS Series Storage Arrays Release
Notes, PS Series Firmware Version 5.1 [13]
110-6055-EN Rev. 4 Download
7 DOC EqualLogic Master Glossary, PS Series
Firmware Version 5.1 [14]
110-6026-EN-R2 Download
Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE
The TOE is to be downloaded from the Dell/Equalogic website on
https://support.equallogic.com/support/. The download is secured by the HTTPS protocol.
In order to access this site a user-ID and a password are needed. The credentials can be
obtained from Dell customer support by customers that have an active service plan with
Dell.
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The TOE version can be queried in the running system in the "Controllers" tab on the
member display of the administrative GUI. It shows the following information:
Firmware: Storage Array Firmware V5.1.1 (R189834 H2)
The same information can be queried in the CLI environment via the show subcommand
(for example member show) which would report:
Version: V5.1.1 (R189834 H2)
3 Security Policy
The security policy is expressed by the set of security functional requirements and
implemented by the TOE. It covers the following issues:
The TOE uses the Challenge Handshake Authentication Protocol (CHAP) to authenticate
iSCSI users. All iSCSI communication is performed in the clear over the network (i.e., the
iSCSI communication, including authentication via CHAP, is not protected from disclosure
or modification). Therefore this network traffic is assumed to be protected by the TOE
environment.
The TOE controls access to the volumes through the use of access control lists (ACLs).
Each volume has its own ACL.
For network-based administrative connections, the TOE provides both a graphical user
interface (GUI) over TLS and a command line interface (CLI) via Secure Shell (SSH). Both
the GUI and CLI protect the communication from disclosure and modification.
The TOE supports local and remote authentication databases. A local authentication
database is stored on the local storage drives of the array by the TOE. RADIUS is a
remote authentication database server and is part of the operational environment of the
TOE.
Multiple arrays can be logically linked together (grouped) to act as a single array. This is
called a group. Grouping allows volumes to be spread across multiple arrays.
Within a group, one array acts as the initial contact point, called the group leader, for the
entire group. Each group member must successfully authenticate to the group leader using
the correct group name and group membership password in order to join the group. The
TOE performs the group member identification and authentication.
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of threats and
organisational security policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to
specific security objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-environment. The following topics are
of relevance: protection of network traffic (except administrative communication), physical
protection of underlying hardware, trained and trusted administrators as well as trained
users. Details can be found in the Security Target [6], chapter 3.2.
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5 Architectural Information
The operating software of the array consists of two major parts, a network stack and a
storage stack, which are executed in parallel. Memory protection is used for separation,
dedicated memory regions are used for the stacks to communicate. The network stack
implements high speed network protocols (e.g. iSCSI) as well as the lower layers of the
TCP/IP protocol. The storage stack implements the high speed storage algorithms, and in
addition provides the execution environment for low speed background operations that are
implemented as user mode processes. These user mode processes provide the
administration algorithms and system monitoring functions.
6 Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the product to
the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of
the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of
this report have to be followed.
7 IT Product Testing
7.1 Test Configuration
The developer tests were run on a model PS6100, configured according to the Common
Criteria Configuration Guide [11].
The evaluator tests were run on a model PS6000, configured according to the Common
Criteria Configuration Guide [11].
Both developer tests and evaluator test were run on the TOE, in the evaluated
configuration on a supported hardware platform.
7.2 Developer Tests
The developer used automatic and manual tests. Because the automatic test suites
contain thousands of tests, these are only executed on the base product version (i.e.
V5.0). For exact the evaluated TOE version, the developer filtered these and only choses a
subset of the tests that where security-relevant for the claimed TOE security functions. The
automatic test framework comes with the web interface that allows the tester to easily
select subsets of tests to be executed. The test framework also shows the running status
and results of each test.
Manual tests have been used to verify functions on the administrator GUI. All tests
(manual and automatic) are independent from each other as they define the necessary
test setup solely from this test case.
All security functions were tested by using only the external visible TOE interfaces. The
test focused on the identification and authentication functionality.
All results of the developer tests were as expected.
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7.3 Independent Evaluator Tests
The evaluator remotely witnessed a small subset of developer tests via a web meeting.
Furthermore the evaluator performed a small subset of 3 developer tests and 17 evaluator
tests within the premises of the ITSEF.
The evaluator performed tests in all areas of the TSF (audit, I&A, access control,
management), also exercising different variants of I&A with respect to local and RADIUS
authentication. A subset of these test activities were dedicated to verify that the various
settings (disabling of services) necessary for the evaluated configuration are actually
enforced by the TOE. All type of TSFIs were tested.
All independent tests results were as expected.
7.4 Evaluator Penetration Testing
The evaluator focused on the authentication functions accessible via the SSH, GUI
interfaces, and iSCSI.
The tests consisted of 8 manual test and one tool-driven test and considered the following
topics: RADIUS interaction, concurrent sessions, available network services, SNMP
restriction enforcement, client-side permission checks, system commands and password
guessing attacks.
The penetration tests showed that the TOE in its evaluated configuration is not vulnerable
to attacks with basic attack potential.
8 Evaluated Configuration
The evaluated configuration covered by this certification is defined by the configuration laid
out in the EqualLogic PS Series Storage Arrays Common Criteria Configuration Guide [11].
The following main configuration changes define the evaluated configuration:
● Strong passwords, conforming to a policy described in [11] must be used for the
accounts as well as the group and replication partners.
● iSCSI target authentication must be used.
● PS series API and SNMPv3 must be turned off.
● The volume creation process ensures that residual data is deleted.
● Administrative access is only allowed through encrypted channels (TLS/SSH).
● Non encrypted access (FTP, Telnet) must be turned off.
● Only a specific set of cryptographic algorithms and protocols must be enabled.
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9 Results of the Evaluation
9.1 CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [7] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used.
For RNG assessment the scheme interpretations AIS 20 was used (see [4]).
As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
● All components of the EAL 2 package including the class ASE as defined in the CC (see
also part C of this report)
● The component ALC_FLR.1 augmented for this TOE evaluation.
The evaluation has confirmed:
● PP Conformance: None
● for the Functionality: Product specific Security Target
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
● for the Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 2 augmented by ALC_FLR.1
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
9.2 Results of cryptographic assessment
The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating
for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and
decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).
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This holds for the cryptographic algorithms listed in the following table and used for the
establishment of a trusted channel.
Algorithm Key length Intended purpose Implementation standard
RSA 1024 Generation and verification of
digital signatures
PKCS#1 v1.5
DSA L=1024,
N=160
Generation and verification of
digital signatures
FIPS 186-3
DH 1024, 2048 Key agreement RFC4253, RFC4419
TDES in CBC mode 168 TLSv1 FIPS PUB 46-3,
SP800-38A
AES in CBC and
CTR mode
128, 192, 256 SSH, TLSv1 FIPS PUB 197,
SP800-38A
HMAC-SHA-1
HMAC-SHA-1-96
160
96
SSH, TLSv1 FIPS 180-4,
RFC2140
Table 3: Cryptographic algorithms implemented by the TOE
10 Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE
The documents as outlined in table 2 contain necessary information about the usage of the
TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered. In addition all aspects of
Assumptions, Threats and OSPs as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE
itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his
system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and
techniques to be covered, the customer should define the period of time until a
re-assessment for the TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the
certificate.
11 Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [6] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is
provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report.
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12 Definitions
12.1 Acronyms
ACL Access Control List
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
AIS Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme
API Application Programming Interface
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for
Information Security, Bonn, Germany
BSIG BSI-Gesetz / Act on the Federal Office for Information Security
CBC Cipher Block Chaining
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
CHAP Challenge Handshake Authentication Protocol
CLI Command Line Interface
CTR Counter
DH Diffie-Hellman
DSA Digital Signature Algorithm
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
FIPS Federal Information Processing Standard
FIPS PUB Federal Information Processing Standard Publications
FTP File Transfer Protocol
GUI Graphical User Interface
HTTPS Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure
iSCSI Internet Small Computer System Interface
IT Information Technology
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
PKCS public-key cryptography standard
PP Protection Profile
RADIUS Remote Authentication Dial-In User Service
RFC Request for Comments
RNG Random Number Generator
RSA Rivest, Shamir, Adleman
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SAN Storage Area Network
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
SNMP Simple Network Management Protocol
SSH Secure Shell
ST Security Target
TCP Transport Control Protocol
TDES Triple Data Encryption Standard
TLS Transport Layer Security
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
12.2 Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in part 2
and/or assurance requirements not contained in part 3 of the CC.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on
well-established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - An passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon
which subjects perform operations.
Protection Profile - An implementation-independent statement of security needs for a
TOE type.
Security Target - An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific
identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Subject - An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.
Target of Evaluation - A set of software, firmware and/or hardware possibly accompanied
by guidance.
TOE Security Functionality - combined functionality of all hardware, software, and
firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs
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13 Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Part 1: Introduction and general model, Revision 3, July 2009
Part 2: Security functional components, Revision 3, July 2009
Part 3: Security assurance components, Revision 3, July 2009
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Rev. 3, July 2009
[3] BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE8
.
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148), periodically updated list published also
in the BSI Website
[6] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-0688-2013, Version 2.5, 21 January 2013, Dell
EqualLogic PS Series Storage Array Firmware Version 5.1.1-H2 Security Target,
Dell Inc.
[7] Evaluation Technical Report, Version 3, 26 February 2013, atsec information
security GmbH (confidential document)
[8] Configuration list for the TOE, Version 1, 5.1.1-H2-cm-lists-v1.sh (confidential
document)
[9] EqualLogic PS Series Group Administration, PS Series Firmware Version 5.1,
110-6056-EN-R1, Dell Inc.
[10] EqualLogic PS Series Firmware Command Line Reference Version 5.1,
110-6057-EN-R1, Dell Inc.
[11] EqualLogic PS Series Storage Arrays Common Criteria Configuration Guide,
110-6074-EN Rev. 2, Dell Inc.
[12] EqualLogic Updating PS Series Storage Array Firmware, Firmware Version 5.1,
110-0025-EN Rev.18, Dell Inc.
[13] EqualLogic PS Series Storage Arrays Release Notes, PS Series Firmware
Version 5.1, 110-6055-EN Rev. 4, Dell Inc.
[14] EqualLogic Master Glossary, PS Series Firmware Version 5.1, 110-6026-EN-R2,
Dell Inc.
8
specifically
• AIS 20, Version 2, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für deterministische
Zufallszahlengeneratoren
• AIS 32, Version 7, CC-Interpretationen im deutschen Zertifizierungsschema
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0688-2013 Certification Report
C Excerpts from the Criteria
CC Part1:
Conformance Claim (chapter 10.4)
“The conformance claim indicates the source of the collection of requirements that is met
by a PP or ST that passes its evaluation. This conformance claim contains a CC
conformance claim that:
● describes the version of the CC to which the PP or ST claims conformance.
● describes the conformance to CC Part 2 (security functional requirements) as either:
– CC Part 2 conformant - A PP or ST is CC Part 2 conformant if all SFRs in that
PP or ST are based only upon functional components in CC Part 2, or
– CC Part 2 extended - A PP or ST is CC Part 2 extended if at least one SFR in
that PP or ST is not based upon functional components in CC Part 2.
● describes the conformance to CC Part 3 (security assurance requirements) as either:
– CC Part 3 conformant - A PP or ST is CC Part 3 conformant if all SARs in that
PP or ST are based only upon assurance components in CC Part 3, or
– CC Part 3 extended - A PP or ST is CC Part 3 extended if at least one SAR in
that PP or ST is not based upon assurance components in CC Part 3.
Additionally, the conformance claim may include a statement made with respect to
packages, in which case it consists of one of the following:
● Package name Conformant - A PP or ST is conformant to a pre-defined package
(e.g. EAL) if:
– the SFRs of that PP or ST are identical to the SFRs in the package, or
– the SARs of that PP or ST are identical to the SARs in the package.
● Package name Augmented - A PP or ST is an augmentation of a predefined package
if:
– the SFRs of that PP or ST contain all SFRs in the package, but have at least
one additional SFR or one SFR that is hierarchically higher than an SFR in the
package.
– the SARs of that PP or ST contain all SARs in the package, but have at least
one additional SAR or one SAR that is hierarchically higher than an SAR in the
package.
Note that when a TOE is successfully evaluated to a given ST, any conformance claims of
the ST also hold for the TOE. A TOE can therefore also be e.g. CC Part 2 conformant.
Finally, the conformance claim may also include two statements with respect to Protection
Profiles:
● PP Conformant - A PP or TOE meets specific PP(s), which are listed as part of the
conformance result.
● Conformance Statement (Only for PPs) - This statement describes the manner in
which PPs or STs must conform to this PP: strict or demonstrable. For more
information on this Conformance Statement, see Annex D.”
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CC Part 3:
Class APE: Protection Profile evaluation (chapter 10)
“Evaluating a PP is required to demonstrate that the PP is sound and internally consistent,
and, if the PP is based on one or more other PPs or on packages, that the PP is a correct
instantiation of these PPs and packages. These properties are necessary for the PP to be
suitable for use as the basis for writing an ST or another PP.
Assurance Class Assurance Components
Class APE: Protection
Profile evaluation
APE_INT.1 PP introduction
APE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
APE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
APE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment
APE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
APE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
APE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
APE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
APE: Protection Profile evaluation class decomposition”
Class ASE: Security Target evaluation (chapter 11)
“Evaluating an ST is required to demonstrate that the ST is sound and internally
consistent, and, if the ST is based on one or more PPs or packages, that the ST is a
correct instantiation of these PPs and packages. These properties are necessary for the
ST to be suitable for use as the basis for a TOE evaluation.”
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Assurance Class Assurance Components
Class ASE: Security
Target evaluation
ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
ASE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
ASE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment
ASE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
ASE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
ASE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification
ASE_TSS.2 TOE summary specification with architectural design
summary
ASE: Security Target evaluation class decomposition
Security assurance components (chapter 7)
“The following Sections describe the constructs used in representing the assurance
classes, families, and components.“
“Each assurance class contains at least one assurance family.”
“Each assurance family contains one or more assurance components.”
The following table shows the assurance class decomposition.
Assurance Class Assurance Components
ADV: Development ADV_ARC.1 Security architecture description
ADV_FSP.1 Basic functional specification
ADV_FSP.2 Security-enforcing functional specification
ADV_FSP.3 Functional specification with complete summary
ADV_FSP.4 Complete functional specification
ADV_FSP.5 Complete semi-formal functional specification with
additional error information
ADV_FSP.6 Complete semi-formal functional specification with
additional formal specification
ADV_IMP.1 Implementation representation of the TSF
ADV_IMP.2 Implementation of the TSF
ADV_INT.1 Well-structured subset of TSF internals
ADV_INT.2 Well-structured internals
ADV_INT.3 Minimally complex internals
ADV_SPM.1 Formal TOE security policy model
ADV_TDS.1 Basic design
ADV_TDS.2 Architectural design
ADV_TDS.3 Basic modular design
ADV_TDS.4 Semiformal modular design
ADV_TDS.5 Complete semiformal modular design
ADV_TDS.6 Complete semiformal modular design with formal
high-level design presentation
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Assurance Class Assurance Components
AGD:
Guidance documents
AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
ALC: Life cycle support
ALC_CMC.1 Labelling of the TOE
ALC_CMC.2 Use of a CM system
ALC_CMC.3 Authorisation controls
ALC_CMC.4 Production support, acceptance procedures and
automation
ALC_CMC.5 Advanced support
ALC_CMS.1 TOE CM coverage
ALC_CMS.2 Parts of the TOE CM coverage
ALC_CMS.3 Implementation representation CM coverage
ALC_CMS.4 Problem tracking CM coverage
ALC_CMS.5 Development tools CM coverage
ALC_DEL.1 Delivery procedures
ALC_DVS.1 Identification of security measures
ALC_DVS.2 Sufficiency of security measures
ALC_FLR.1 Basic flaw remediation
ALC_FLR.2 Flaw reporting procedures
ALC_FLR.3 Systematic flaw remediation
ALC_LCD.1 Developer defined life-cycle model
ALC_LCD.2 Measurable life-cycle model
ALC_TAT.1 Well-defined development tools
ALC_TAT.2 Compliance with implementation standards
ALC_TAT.3 Compliance with implementation standards - all parts
ATE: Tests
ATE_COV.1 Evidence of coverage
ATE_COV.2 Analysis of coverage
ATE_COV.3 Rigorous analysis of coverage
ATE_DPT.1 Testing: basic design
ATE_DPT.2 Testing: security enforcing modules
ATE_DPT.3 Testing: modular design
ATE_DPT.4 Testing: implementation representation
ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing
ATE_FUN.2 Ordered functional testing
ATE_IND.1 Independent testing – conformance
ATE_IND.2 Independent testing – sample
ATE_IND.3 Independent testing – complete
AVA: Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_VAN.1 Vulnerability survey
AVA_VAN.2 Vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.3 Focused vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.4 Methodical vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.5 Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis
Assurance class decomposition
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Evaluation assurance levels (chapter 8)
“The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that balances the
level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of acquiring that degree of
assurance. The CC approach identifies the separate concepts of assurance in a TOE at
the end of the evaluation, and of maintenance of that assurance during the operational use
of the TOE.
It is important to note that not all families and components from CC Part 3 are included in
the EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful and desirable
assurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and components will be considered
for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and STs for which they provide utility.”
Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview (chapter 8.1)
“Table 1 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a hierarchically
ordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families. Each number in the
resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component where applicable.
As outlined in the next Section, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation assurance levels
are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE's assurance. They are hierarchically ordered
inasmuch as each EAL represents more assurance than all lower EALs. The increase in
assurance from EAL to EAL is accomplished by substitution of a hierarchically higher
assurance component from the same assurance family (i.e. increasing rigour, scope,
and/or depth) and from the addition of assurance components from other assurance
families (i.e. adding new requirements).
These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as described
in Chapter 7 of this CC Part 3. More precisely, each EAL includes no more than one
component of each assurance family and all assurance dependencies of every component
are addressed.
While the EALs are defined in the CC, it is possible to represent other combinations of
assurance. Specifically, the notion of “augmentation” allows the addition of assurance
components (from assurance families not already included in the EAL) or the substitution
of assurance components (with another hierarchically higher assurance component in the
same assurance family) to an EAL. Of the assurance constructs defined in the CC, only
EALs may be augmented. The notion of an “EAL minus a constituent assurance
component” is not recognised by the standard as a valid claim. Augmentation carries with
it the obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility and added value of the
added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also be augmented with extended
assurance requirements.
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Assurance
Class
Assurance
Family
Assurance Components by
Evaluation Assurance Level
EAL1 EAL2 EAL3 EAL4 EAL5 EAL6 EAL7
Development ADV_ARC 1 1 1 1 1 1
ADV_FSP 1 2 3 4 5 5 6
ADV_IMP 1 1 2 2
ADV_INT 2 3 3
ADV_SPM 1 1
ADV_TDS 1 2 3 4 5 6
Guidance
Documents
AGD_OPE 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
AGD_PRE 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Life cycle
Support
ALC_CMC 1 2 3 4 4 5 5
ALC_CMS 1 2 3 4 5 5 5
ALC_DEL 1 1 1 1 1 1
ALC_DVS 1 1 1 2 2
ALC_FLR
ALC_LCD 1 1 1 1 2
ALC_TAT 1 2 3 3
Security Target
Evaluation
ASE_CCL 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_ECD 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_INT 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_OBJ 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
ASR_REQ 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
ASE_SPD 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_TSS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Tests ATE_COV 1 2 2 2 3 3
ATE_DPT 1 1 3 3 4
ATE_FUN 1 1 1 1 2 2
ATE_IND 1 2 2 2 2 2 3
Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_VAN 1 2 2 3 4 5 5
Table 1: Evaluation assurance level summary”
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Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL1) - functionally tested (chapter 8.3)
“Objectives
EAL1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but the threats
to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where independent assurance is
required to support the contention that due care has been exercised with respect to the
protection of personal or similar information.
EAL1 requires only a limited security target. It is sufficient to simply state the SFRs that the
TOE must meet, rather than deriving them from threats, OSPs and assumptions through
security objectives.
EAL1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer, including
independent testing against a specification, and an examination of the guidance
documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL1 evaluation could be successfully
conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE, and for minimal outlay.
An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a manner
consistent with its documentation.”
Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL2) - structurally tested (chapter 8.4)
“Objectives
EAL2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of design
information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the part of the
developer than is consistent with good commercial practise. As such it should not require a
substantially increased investment of cost or time.
EAL2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
low to moderate level of independently assured security in the absence of ready
availability of the complete development record. Such a situation may arise when securing
legacy systems, or where access to the developer may be limited.”
Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL3) - methodically tested and checked (chapter 8.5)
“Objectives
EAL3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from positive
security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of existing sound
development practises.
EAL3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a moderate
level of independently assured security, and require a thorough investigation of the TOE
and its development without substantial re-engineering.”
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Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL4) - methodically designed, tested, and reviewed
(chapter 8.6)
“Objectives
EAL4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security engineering
based on good commercial development practises which, though rigorous, do not require
substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other resources. EAL4 is the highest level at
which it is likely to be economically feasible to retrofit to an existing product line.
EAL4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
moderate to high level of independently assured security in conventional commodity TOEs
and are prepared to incur additional security-specific engineering costs.”
Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL5) - semiformally designed and tested (chapter 8.7)
“Objectives
EAL5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security engineering based
upon rigorous commercial development practises supported by moderate application of
specialist security engineering techniques. Such a TOE will probably be designed and
developed with the intent of achieving EAL5 assurance. It is likely that the additional costs
attributable to the EAL5 requirements, relative to rigorous development without the
application of specialised techniques, will not be large.
EAL5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
high level of independently assured security in a planned development and require a
rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable costs attributable to
specialist security engineering techniques.”
Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL6) - semiformally verified design and tested
(chapter 8.8)
“Objectives
EAL6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security engineering
techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to produce a premium TOE for
protecting high value assets against significant risks.
EAL6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in high
risk situations where the value of the protected assets justifies the additional costs.”
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Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL7) - formally verified design and tested
(chapter 8.9)
“Objectives
EAL7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in extremely high
risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies the higher costs. Practical
application of EAL7 is currently limited to TOEs with tightly focused security functionality
that is amenable to extensive formal analysis.”
Class AVA: Vulnerability assessment (chapter 16)
“The AVA: Vulnerability assessment class addresses the possibility of exploitable
vulnerabilities introduced in the development or the operation of the TOE.”
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VAN) (chapter 16.1)
"Objectives
Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether potential vulnerabilities
identified, during the evaluation of the development and anticipated operation of the TOE
or by other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses or quantitative or statistical analysis of the
security behaviour of the underlying security mechanisms), could allow attackers to violate
the SFRs.
Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that an attacker will be able to discover flaws
that will allow unauthorised access to data and functionality, allow the ability to interfere
with or alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorised capabilities of other users.”
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0688-2013 Certification Report
D Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Security Target provided within a separate document.
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