SECURITY TARGET
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PACE APPLICATION
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MORPHO
SECURITY TARGET LITE FOR
FOR IDEAL PASS V2 EAC WITH PACE APPLI-
CATION
Contract no.: N/A
Reference: 2014_0000001656
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Table of contents
1.1 SECURITY TARGET AND TOE REFERENCE ....................................................................................4
1.2 TOE OVERVIEW ....................................................................................................................4
1.2.1 TOE definition.............................................................................................................4
1.2.2 TOE usage and security features for operational use...................................................5
1.2.3 TOE life cycle..............................................................................................................8
2 CONFORMANCE CLAIMS.................................................................................. 11
2.1 CC CONFORMANCE CLAIM .....................................................................................................11
2.2 ST CLAIM ..........................................................................................................................11
2.3 PACKAGE CLAIM ..................................................................................................................11
2.4 CONFORMANCE RATIONALE ....................................................................................................11
3 SECURITY PROBLEM DEFINITION................................................................... 12
3.1 ASSETS..............................................................................................................................12
3.1.1 PP-0056 ....................................................................................................................12
3.2 USERS / SUBJECTS ...............................................................................................................15
3.2.1 PP-0056 ....................................................................................................................15
3.3 THREATS............................................................................................................................18
3.3.1 PP-0056 ....................................................................................................................18
3.4 ORGANISATIONAL SECURITY POLICIES .....................................................................................22
3.4.1 PP-0056 ....................................................................................................................22
3.5 ASSUMPTIONS.....................................................................................................................25
3.5.1 PP-0056 ....................................................................................................................25
4 SECURITY OBJECTIVES ................................................................................... 27
4.1 SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE TOE.......................................................................................27
4.1.1 PP-0056 ....................................................................................................................27
4.2 SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT .......................................................31
4.2.1 PP-0056 ....................................................................................................................31
4.3 SECURITY OBJECTIVES RATIONALE ..........................................................................................35
4.3.1 Threats.....................................................................................................................35
4.3.2 Organisational Security Policies .................................................................................37
4.3.3 Assumptions .............................................................................................................38
4.3.4 SPD and Security Objectives .....................................................................................39
5 EXTENDED REQUIREMENTS ............................................................................ 44
5.1 EXTENDED FAMILIES .............................................................................................................44
5.2 DEFINITION OF THE FAMILY FAU_SAS ....................................................................................44
5.3 DEFINITION OF THE FAMILY FCS_RND....................................................................................45
5.4 DEFINITION OF THE FAMILY FIA_API......................................................................................46
5.5 DEFINITION OF THE FAMILY FMT_LIM ....................................................................................47
5.6 DEFINITION OF THE FAMILY FPT_EMS....................................................................................49
6 SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS........................................................ 51
6.1 SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS....................................................................................51
6.1.1 PP-0056 ....................................................................................................................51
6.2 SECURITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS.....................................................................................76
7 TOE SUMMARY SPECIFICATION ...................................................................... 77
7.1 TOE SUMMARY SPECIFICATION ..............................................................................................77
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7.1.1 Chip security functionalities.......................................................................................77
7.1.2 Low level security functionalities ...............................................................................81
7.1.3 Operating system security functionalities...................................................................82
7.1.4 Application security functionalities.............................................................................85
8 SECURITY REQUIREMENTS – MUTUAL SUPPORT AND INTERNAL CONSISTENCY
88
9 SECURITY ATTRIBUTES, KEYS AND CERTIFICATES ......................................... 90
10 GLOSSARY AND ACRONYMS............................................................................ 94
11 BIBLIOGRAPHY............................................................................................. 117
Table of tables
Table 1 Threats and Security Objectives - Coverage.................................................39
Table 2 Security Objectives and Threats - Coverage.................................................40
Table 3 OSPs and Security Objectives - Coverage....................................................41
Table 4 Security Objectives and OSPs - Coverage....................................................42
Table 5 Assumptions and Security Objectives for the Operational Environment -
Coverage .......................................................................................................42
Table 6 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment and Assumptions -
Coverage .......................................................................................................43
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1.1 Security Target and TOE reference
ST reference :
Title :
Security target for for IDeal PASS V2 EAC with PACE
application
Version : 4.0.0
Security target identifier : 2014_0000001656
TOE reference :
Chip identifier : M7892 B11
Masked chip reference : IDealPass_v2N_M7892_1_0_0
Crypto library Toolbox v1.02.013
Chip Component Assur-
ance Level
EAL6+, augmented with ALC_FLR.1
TOE Identifier IDEALPASSV2SAC/EAC_NTePASSPORT/1.0.0
Administration guidance : 2013_1000001952 - Preparative Procedures
User guidance : 2013_1000001953 - Operational User Guidance
CC compliance :
Version : 3.1
Assurance level : EAL 5 augmented with ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5
Chip and cryptolibrary
certificate reference
: BSI-DSZ-CC-0782-2012
Protection Profile
BSI-CC-PP-0056-V2-2012 MA-02 [R7]
BSI-CC-PP-0068-V2-2011 [R16]
1.2 TOE Overview
The security target defines the security objectives and requirements for the con-
tact based / contactless smart card of machine readable travel documents based
on the requirements and recommendations of the International Civil Aviation Or-
ganization (ICAO). It addresses the advanced security methods Password Au-
thenticated Connection Establishment, Extended Access Control, and Chip Au-
thentication similar to the Active Authentication in ‗ICAO Doc 9303‘ [R6].
1.2.1 TOE definition
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) addressed by the current protection profile is an
electronic travel document representing a contactless / contact smart card pro-
grammed according to ICAO Technical Report ―Supplemental Access Control‖
[R7] (which means amongst others according to the Logical Data Structure (LDS)
defined in [R6])and additionally providing the Extended Access Control according
to the ‗ICAO Doc 9303‘ [R6] and BSI TR-03110 [R5], respectively. The communi-
cation between terminal and chip shall be protected by Password Authenticated
Connection Establishment (PACE) according to Electronic Passport using Stan-
dard Inspection Procedure with PACE (PACE PP), BSI-CC-PP-0068-V2 [R7].
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The TOE comprises of at least
the circuitry of the travel document‘s chip (the integrated circuit, IC),
the IC Dedicated Software with the parts IC Dedicated Test Software and
IC Dedicated Support Software,
the IC Embedded Software (operating system),
the ePassport application ,
the Active Authentication and
the associated guidance documentation.
1.2.2 TOE usage and security features for operational use
A State or Organisation issues travel documents to be used by the holder for in-
ternational travel. The traveller presents a travel document to the inspection sys-
tem to prove his or her identity. The travel document in context of this protection
profile contains (i) visual (eye readable) biographical data and portrait of the
holder, (ii) a separate data summary (MRZ data) for visual and machine reading
using OCR methods in the Machine readable zone (MRZ) and (iii) data elements
on the travel document‘s chip according to LDS in case of contactless machine
reading. The authentication of the traveller is based on (i) the possession of a
valid travel document personalised for a holder with the claimed identity as given
on the biographical data page and (ii) biometrics using the reference data stored
in the travel document. The issuing State or Organisation ensures the authentici-
ty of the data of genuine travel documents. The receiving State trusts a genuine
travel document of an issuing State or Organisation.
For this protection profile the travel document is viewed as unit of
i. The physical part of the travel document in form of paper and/or plastic
and chip. It presents visual readable data including (but not limited to) per-
sonal data of the travel document holder
a) the biographical data on the biographical data page of the travel document
surface,
b) the printed data in the Machine Readable Zone (MRZ) and
c) the printed portrait.
ii. The logical travel document as data of the travel document holder stored
according to the Logical Data Structure as defined in [R6] as specified by
ICAO on the contact based or contactless integrated circuit. It presents con-
tact based / contactless readable data including (but not limited to) personal
data of the travel document holder
a) the digital Machine Readable Zone Data (digital MRZ data, EF.DG1),
b) the digitized portraits (EF.DG2),
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c) the biometric reference data of finger(s) (EF.DG3) or iris image(s)
(EF.DG4) or both1
d) the other data according to LDS (EF.DG5 to EF.DG16) and
e) the Document Security Object (SOD).
The issuing State or Organisation implements security features of the travel doc-
ument to maintain the authenticity and integrity of the travel document and their
data. The physical part of the travel document and the travel document‘s chip
are identified by the Document Number.
The physical part of the travel document is protected by physical security meas-
ures (e.g. watermark, security printing), logical (e.g. authentication keys of the
travel document‘s chip) and organisational security measures (e.g. control of
materials, personalisation procedures) [R7]. These security measures can include
the binding of the travel document‘s chip to the travel document.
The logical travel document is protected in authenticity and integrity by a digital
signature created by the document signer acting for the issuing State or Organi-
sation and the security features of the travel document‘s chip.
The ICAO defines the baseline security methods Passive Authentication and the
optional advanced security methods Basic Access Control to the logical travel
document, Active Authentication of the travel document‘s chip, Extended Access
Control to and the Data Encryption of sensitive biometrics as optional security
measure in the ICAO Doc 9303 [R6], and Password Authenticated Connection
Establishment‘. The Passive Authentication Mechanism is performed completely
and independently of the TOE by the TOE environment.
This protection profile addresses the protection of the logical travel document (i)
in integrity by write-only-once access control and by physical means, and (ii) in
confidentiality by the Extended Access Control Mechanism. This protection profile
addresses the Chip Authentication Version 1 described in [R9] as an alternative
to the Active Authentication .
If BAC is supported by the TOE, the travel document has to be evaluated and
certified separately. This is due to the fact that [R8] does only consider extended
basic attack potential to the Basic Access Control Mechanism (i.e. AVA_VAN.3).
The confidentiality by Password Authenticated Connection Establishment (PACE)
is a mandatory security feature of the TOE. The travel document shall strictly
conform to the ‗Common Criteria Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel
Document using Standard Inspection Procedure with PACE (PACE PP)‘ [R7]. Note
that [R7] considers high attack potential.
For the PACE protocol according to [R4], the following steps shall be performed:
i. The travel document's chip encrypts a nonce with the shared password,
derived from the MRZ resp. CAN data and transmits the encrypted nonce
together with the domain parameters to the terminal.
ii. The terminal recovers the nonce using the shared password, by (physical-
ly) reading the MRZ resp. CAN data.
1
These biometric reference data are optional according to [6]. This PP assumes that the issuing State or Orga-
nisation uses this option and protects these data by means of extended access control.
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iii. The travel document's chip and terminal computer perform a Diffie-
Hellmann key agreement together with the ephemeral domain parameters
to create a shared secret. Both parties derive the session keys KMAC and
KENC from the shared secret.
iv. Each party generates an authentication token, sends it to the other party
and verifies the received token.
After successful key negotiation the terminal and the travel document's chip pro-
vide private communication (secure messaging) [R9].
The security target requires the TOE to implement the Extended Access Control
as defined in [R5]. The Extended Access Control consists of two parts (i) the Chip
Authentication Protocol Version 1 and (ii) the Terminal Authentication Protocol
Version 1 (v.1). The Chip Authentication Protocol v.1 (i) authenticates the travel
document‘s chip to the inspection system and (ii) establishes secure messaging
which is used by Terminal Authentication v.1 to protect the confidentiality and
integrity of the sensitive biometric reference data during their transmission from
the TOE to the inspection system. Therefore Terminal Authentication v.1 can only
be performed if Chip Authentication v.1 has been successfully executed. The
Terminal Authentication Protocol v.1 consists of (i) the authentication of the in-
spection system as entity authorized by the receiving State or Organisation
through the issuing State, and (ii) an access control by the TOE to allow reading
the sensitive biometric reference data only to successfully authenticated autho-
rized inspection systems. The issuing State or Organisation authorizes the receiv-
ing State by means of certification the authentication public keys of Document
Verifiers who create Inspection System Certificates.
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1.2.3 TOE life cycle
The product‘s life cycle is organised as follows:
Phase 1 -Step 1
IC Development
Phase 2 – Step 4
IC Packaging (Modules,
inlay, booklets,…)
IC Pre-personalization
(optional)
Phase 2 – Step 3
IC Manufacturing and test
IC Initialisation
IC Pre-personalization
(optional)
Phase 2 – Step 5 (if not
done on previous phase)
IC Pre-personalization
Phase 3 – Step 6
Personalisation
Phase 4 – Step 7
Operatinal Usage
TOE creation
ALC
AGD
ARES
Development
IC
Manufacturer
Travel
document
manufacturer
Personalisation
Agent
Final User
ARES
Delivery
Phase 5
Erase
Morpho
Phase 1 -Step 2
IC Embedded Software
Development
Figure 1 : TOE life cycle
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Phase
Number
Phase name Description / Authority
1 Development
(Step1) The TOE is developed in phase 1. The IC developer de-
velops the integrated circuit, the IC Dedicated Software and the
guidance documentation associated with these TOE components.
Actor : Morpho and Infineon
(Step2) The software developer uses the guidance documentation
for the integrated circuit and the guidance documentation for rele-
vant parts of the IC Dedicated Software and develops the IC Em-
bedded Software (operating system), the MRTD application and
the guidance documentation associated with these TOE compo-
nents.
The Morpho ePassport code is securely delivered directly from the
software developer (Morpho.) to the IC manufacturer (Infineon).
Actors : Morpho and Infineon
2 Manufacturing
(Step3) In a first step the TOE integrated circuit is produced con-
taining the MRTD’s chip Dedicated Software and the parts of the
MRTD’s chip Embedded Software in the non-volatile non-
programmable memories (FLASH). The IC manufacturer writes
the IC Identification Data onto the chip to control the IC as MRTD
material during the IC manufacturing and the delivery process to
the MRTD manufacturer.
The ePassport application code will be integrated in the FLASH
memory by the IC manufacturer.
Actors : Infineon
(Step 4) is performed by the Personalization Agent and includes
but is not limited to the creation of
(i) the digital MRZ data (EF.DG1),
(ii) the digitized portrait (EF.DG2),
(iii) the Document security object.
The signing of the Document security object by the Document
Signer [R9] finalizes the personalization of the genuine MRTD for
the MRTD holder. The personalized MRTD (together with appro-
priate guidance for TOE use if necessary) is handed over to the
MRTD holder for operational use.
This Security Target distinguishes between the Personalization
Agent as entity known to the TOE and the Document Signer as
entity in the TOE IT environment signing the Document security
object as described in [R9]. This approach allows but does not
enforce the separation of these roles.
Actor : Morpho
3
Personalization
agent
(Step6) The personalization of the MRTD includes
(i) the survey of the MRTD holder’s biographical data,
(ii) the enrolment of the MRTD holder biometric refer-
ence data (i.e. the digitized portraits and the optional
biometric reference data),
(iii) the printing of the visual readable data onto the physi-
cal MRTD,
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(iv) (iv) the writing of the TOE User Data and TSF Data
into the logical MRTD and
(v) configuration of the TSF if necessary.
Actor : issuing State or Organization
4 Operational Use
(Step 7) The TOE is used as MRTD’s chip by the traveller and the
inspection systems in the “Operational Use” phase. The user data
can be read according to the security policy of the Issuing State or
Organization and can be used according to the security policy of
the Issuing State but they can never be modified
Actor : Passport Holder
5 Erase
The erase function is included into the TOE. The access to
this function is granted only and only if Mutal Authentica-
tion with Key set n°1 is successful. After the erase all TOE
data (Sensitive and non sensitive) are Erased. Infineon
Bootloader will be re-activated. The erase function is not
accessible after Phase 3 (Operational Usage)
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2 Conformance Claims
2.1 CC Conformance Claim
This security target claims conformance to
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 1: In-
troduction and General Model; CCMB-2012-09-001, Version 3.1, Revision 4 [1]
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 2: Se-
curity Functional Components; CCMB-2012-09-002, Version 3.1, Revision 4
[R2]
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 3: Se-
curity Assurance Components; CCMB-2012-09-003, Version 3.1, Revision 4
[R3]
as follows
Part 2 extended,
Part 3 conformant.
The
Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Eval-
uation Methodology; CCMB-2012-09-004, Version 3.1, Revision 4 [R10] has to
be taken into account.
2.2 ST Claim
This ST claims strict conformance to
Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel Document with “ICAO Application”, Extended
Access Control with PACE (PACE PP), BSI-CC-PP-0056-V2 MA-02 [R7],
Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel Document using Standard Inspection Proce-
dure with PACE (PACE PP), BSI-CC-PP-0068-V2 [R16].
2.3 Package Claim
This ST is conforming to assurance package EAL5 augmented with ALC_DVS.2
and AVA_VAN.5 defined in CC part 3 [R3].
2.4 Conformance rationale
The current ST claims strict conformance to the following protection profile as
required: Machine Readable Travel Document using Standard Inspection Proce-
dure with PACE (PACE PP), BSI-CC-PP-0056-V2 MA-02 [R7].
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3 Security problem definition
3.1 Assets
3.1.1 PP-0056
The assets to be protected by the TOE include the User Data on the travel document's chip,
user data transferred between the TOE and the terminal, and travel document tracing data
from the claimed PACE PP [R7], chap 3.1.
3.1.1.1 Assets listed in PP PACE
Due to strict conformance to PACE PP, this PP also includes all assets listed in [R7], chap 3.1,
namely the primary assets user data stored on the TOE (object 1), user data transferred
between the TOE and the terminal connected (object 2), travel document tracing data (ob-
ject 3), and the secondary assets accessibility to the TOE functions and data only for autho-
rised subjects (object 4) Genuineness of the TOE (object 5), TOE intrinsic secret crypto-
graphic keys (object 6), TOE intrinsic non secret cryptographic material (object 7), and travel
document communication establishment authorisation data (object 8).
user data stored on the TOE
All data (being not authentication data) stored in the context of the ePassport
application of the travel document as defined in [R4] and being allowed to be
read out solely by an authenticated terminal acting as Basic Inspection System
with PACE (in the sense of [R4]). This asset covers 'User Data on the MRTD's
chip', 'Logical MRTD Data' and 'Sensitive User Data' in [R9].
The generic security properties to be maintained by the current security policy
are:
Confidentiality (Though not each data element stored on the TOE represents a secret,
the specification [R4] anyway requires securing their confidentiality: only terminals
authenticated according to [R4] can get access to the user data stored. They have
to be operated according to P.Terminal.)
Integrity
Authenticity
user data transferred between the TOE and the terminal connected
The terminal connected is an authority represented by Basic Inspection Sys-
tem with PACE.
All data (being not authentication data) being transferred in the context of the
ePassport application of the travel document as defined in [R4] between the
TOE and an authenticated terminal acting as Basic Inspection System with
PACE (in the sense of [R4]). User data can be received and sent (exchange
means receive and send).
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The generic security properties to be maintained by the current security policy
are:
Confidentiality (Though not each data element being transferred represents a secret,
the specification [R4] anyway requires securing their confidentiality: the secure
messaging in encrypt-then-authenticate mode is required for all messages accord-
ing to [R4])
Integrity
Authenticity
travel document tracing data
Technical information about the current and previous locations of the travel
document gathered unnoticeable by the travel document holder recognising
the TOE not knowing any PAC E password. TOE tracing data can be provided /
gathered.
The generic security property to be maintained by the current security policy
is:
Unavailability (it represents a prerequisite for anonymity of the travel document hold-
er)
Accessibility to the TOE functions and data only for authorised subjects
Property of the TOE to restrict access to TSF and TSF-data stored in the TOE
to authorised subjects only.
The property to be maintained by the current security policy is:
Availability
Genuineness of the TOE
Property of the TOE to be authentic in order to provide claimed security func-
tionality in a proper way. This asset also covers 'Authenticity of the MRTD's
chip' in [R9].
The property to be maintained by the current security policy is:
Availability
TOE internal secret cryptographic keys
Permanently or temporarily stored secret cryptographic material used by the
TOE in order to enforce its security functionality.
The properties to be maintained by the current security policy are:
Confidentiality
Integrity
TOE internal non-secret cryptographic material
Permanently or temporarily stored non-secret cryptographic (public) keys and
other non-secret material (Document Security Object SOD containing digital
signature) used by the TOE in order to enforce its security functionality.
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The properties to be maintained by the current security policy are:
Integrity
Authenticity
travel document communication establishment authorisation data
Restricted-revealable (The travel document holder may reveal, if necessary,
his or her verification values of CAN and MRZ to an authorised person or de-
vice who definitely act according to respective regulations and are trustwor-
thy) authorisation information for a human user being used for verification of
the authorisation attempts as authorised user (PACE password). These data
are stored in the TOE and are not to be send to it.
The properties to be maintained by the current security policy are:
Confidentiality
Integrity
Application note:
Since the travel document does not support any secret travel document holder
authentication data and the latter may reveal, if necessary, his or her verifica-
tion values of the PACE password to an authorised person or device, a suc-
cessful PACE authentication of a terminal does not unambiguously mean that
the travel document holder is using TOE.
The travel document communication establishment authorisation data are
represented by two different entities: (i) reference information being persis-
tently stored in the TOE and (ii) verification information being provided as in-
put for the TOE by a human user as an authorisation attempt. The TOE shall
secure the reference information as well as 'together with the terminal con-
nected (the input device of the terminal)' the verification information in the
'TOE - terminal' channel, if it has to be transferred to the TOE. Please note
that PACE passwords are not to be send to the TOE.
3.1.1.2 Additional Assets
Logical travel document sensitive User Data
Sensitive biometric reference data (EF.DG3, EF.DG4)
Application note:
Due to interoperability reasons the 'ICAO Doc 9303' [R6] requires that Basic
Inspection Systems may have access to logical travel document data DG1,
DG2, DG5 to DG16. The TOE is not in certified mode, if it is accessed using
BAC [R6]. Note that the BAC mechanism cannot resist attacks with high attack
potential (cf. [R8]). If supported, it is therefore recommended to used PACE
instead of BAC. If nevertheless BAC has to be used, it is recommended to per-
form Chip Authentication v.1 before getting access to data (except DG14), as
this mechanism is resistant to high potential attacks
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Authenticity of the travel document's chip
The authenticity of the travel document's chip personalised by the issuing
State or Organisation for the travel document holder is used by the traveller to
prove his possession of a genuine travel document.
3.2 Users / Subjects
3.2.1 PP-0056
This protection profile considers the following subjects additionally to those defined PACE PP
[R7]:
3.2.1.1 Subjects listed in PP PACE
This PP includes all subjects from the PACE Protection Profile [R7], chap 3.1, namely Manu-
facturer, Personalisation Agent, Basic Inspection System (with PACE), Document Signer (DS),
and Country Signing Certification Authority (CSCA), Travel Document Holder and Travel Doc-
ument Presenter (traveller).
Manufacturer
Generic term for the IC Manufacturer producing integrated circuit and the tra-
vel document Manufacturer completing the IC to the travel document. The
Manufacturer is the default user of the TOE during the manufacturing life cycle
phase. The TOE itself does not distinguish between the IC Manufacturer and
travel document Manufacturer using this role Manufacturer. This entity is
commensurate with 'Manufacturer' in [R9].
Personalisation Agent
An organisation acting on behalf of the travel document Issuer to personalise
the travel document for the travel document holder by some or all of the fol-
lowing activities: (i) establishing the identity of the travel document holder for
the biographic data in the travel document, (ii) enrolling the biometric refer-
ence data of the travel document holder, (iii) writing a subset of these data on
the physical travel document (optical personalisation) and storing them in the
travel document (electronic personalisation) for the travel document holder as
defined in [R6], (iv) writing the document details data, (v) writing the initial
TSF data, (vi) signing the Document Security Object defined in [R6] (in the
role of DS). Please note that the role 'Personalisation Agent' may be distri-
buted among several institutions according to the operational policy of the tra-
vel document Issuer. This entity is commensurate with 'Personalisation agent'
in [R9].
Basic Inspection System with BIS-PACE
A technical system being used by an inspecting authority (concretely, by a
control officer) and verifying the travel document presenter as the travel doc-
ument holder (for ePassport: by comparing the real biometric data (face) of
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the travel document presenter with the stored biometric data (DG2) of the
travel document holder). BIS-PACE implements the terminal's part of the PACE
protocol and authenticates itself to the travel document using a shared pass-
word (PACE password) and supports Passive Authentication.
Document Signer
It is also called DS. An organisation enforcing the policy of the CSCA and sign-
ing the Document Security Object stored on the travel document for passive
authentication. A Document Signer is authorised by the national CSCA issuing
the Document Signer Certificate (CDS), see [R6]. This role is usually delegated
to a Personalisation Agent.
Country Signing Certification Authority
It is also called CSCA. An organisation enforcing the policy of the travel docu-
ment Issuer with respect to confirming correctness of user and TSF data
stored in the travel document. The CSCA represents the country specific root
of the PKI for the travel document and creates the Document Signer Certifi-
cates within this PKI. The CSCA also issues the self-signed CSCA Certificate
(CCSCA) having to be distributed by strictly secure diplomatic means, see.
[R6], 5.5.1.
travel document holder
A person for whom the travel document Issuer has personalised the travel
document (i.e. this person is uniquely associated with a concrete electronic
Passport). This entity is commensurate with 'MRTD Holder' in [R9]. Please
note that a travel document holder can also be an attacker (see below).
travel document presenter
It represents the traveler. A person presenting the travel document to a ter-
minal (in the sense of [R4]) and claiming the identity of the travel document
holder. This external entity is commensurate with 'Traveller' in [R9]. Please
note that a travel document presenter can also be an attacker (see below).
3.2.1.2 Additional Subjects
Country Verifying Certification Authority
The Country Verifying Certification Authority (CVCA) enforces the privacy poli-
cy of the issuing State or Organisation with respect to the protection of sensi-
tive biometric reference data stored in the travel document. The CVCA
represents the country specific root of the PKI of Inspection Systems and
creates the Document Verifier Certificates within this PKI. The updates of the
public key of the CVCA are distributed in the form of Country Verifying CA
Link-Certificates.
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Document Verifier
The Document Verifier (DV) enforces the privacy policy of the receiving State
with respect to the protection of sensitive biometric reference data to be han-
dled by the Extended Inspection Systems. The Document Verifier manages the
authorization of the Extended Inspection Systems for the sensitive data of the
travel document in the limits provided by the issuing States or Organisations
in the form of the Document Verifier Certificates. Terminal
Terminal
A terminal is any technical system communicating with the TOE either through
the contact interface or through the contactless interface.
Inspection system (IS)
It also called IS. A technical system used by the border control officer of the
receiving State (i) examining an travel document presented by the traveller
and verifying its authenticity and (ii) verifying the traveller as travel document
holder.
The Extended Inspection System (EIS) performs the Advanced Inspection Pro-
cedure and therefore (i) contains a terminal for the communication with the
travel document's chip, (ii) implements the terminals part of PACE and/or
BAC; (iii) gets the authorization to read the logical travel document either un-
der PACE or BAC by optical reading the travel document providing this infor-
mation. (iv) implements the Terminal Authentication and Chip Authentication
Protocols both Version 1 according to [R5] and (v) is authorized by the issuing
State or Organisation through the Document Verifier of the receiving State to
read the sensitive biometric reference data. Security attributes of the EIS are
defined by means of the Inspection System Certificates. BAC may only be
used if supported by the TOE. If both PACE and BAC are supported by the TOE
and the BIS, PACE must be used.
Application note:
For definition of Basic Inspection System (BIS) resp. Basic Inspection Sys-
tem with PACE (BIS-PACE) see PACE PP [R7].
Attacker
Additionally to the definition from PACE PP [R7], chap 3.1 the definition of an
attacker is refined as followed: A threat agent trying (i) to manipulate the log-
ical travel document without authorization, (ii) to read sensitive biometric ref-
erence data (i.e. EF.DG3, EF.DG4), (iii) to forge a genuine travel document, or
(iv) to trace a travel document.
Application note:
An impostor is attacking the inspection system as TOE IT environment inde-
pendent on using a genuine, counterfeit or forged travel document. Therefore
the impostor may use results of successful attacks against the TOE but the at-
tack itself is not relevant for the TOE.
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3.3 Threats
3.3.1 PP-0056
This section describes the threats to be averted by the TOE independently or in collaboration
environment and the assets stored in or protected by the TOE.
The TOE in collaboration with its IT environment shall avert the threats as specified below.
3.3.1.1 Threats listed in PP PACE
This PP includes all threats from the PACE PP [R7], chap 3.2, namely T.Skimming,
T.Eavesdropping, T.Tracing, T.Abuse-Func, T.Information_Leakage, T.Phys-Tamper,
T.Forgery and T.Malfunction.
T.Forgery from the PACE PP [R7] shall be extended by the Extended Inspection System addi-
tionally to the PACE authenticated BIS-PACE being outsmarted by the attacker.
T.Skimming
Skimming travel document / Capturing Card-Terminal Communication
Adverse action: An attacker imitates an inspection system in order to get
access to the user data stored on or transferred between the TOE and
the inspecting authority connected via the contactless/contact interface of
the TOE.
Threat agent: having high attack potential, cannot read and does not know the
correct value of the shared password (PACE password) in advance.
Asset: confidentiality of logical travel documentdata
Application note:
A product using BIS-BAC cannot avert this threat in the context of the security
policy defined in this PP.
MRZ is printed and CAN is printed or stuck on the travel document. Please
note that neither CAN nor MRZ effectively represent secrets, but are re-
stricted-revealable, cf. OE.Travel_Document_Holder.
T.Eavesdropping
Eavesdropping on the communication between the TOE and the PACE
terminal
Adverse action: An attacker is listening to the communication between the
travel document and the PACE authenticated BIS-PACE in order to gain the
user data transferred between the TOE and the terminal connected.
Threat agent: having high attack potential, cannot read and does not know the
correct value of the shared password (PACE password) in advance.
Asset: confidentiality of logical travel documentdata
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Application note:
A product using BIS-BAC cannot avert this threat in the context of the security
policy defined in this PP.
T.Tracing
Tracing travel document
Adverse action: An attacker tries to gather TOE tracing data (i.e. to trace the
movement of the travel document) unambiguously identifying it remotely by
establishing or listening to a communication via the contactless/contact inter-
face of the TOE.
Threat agent: having high attack potential, cannot read and does not know the
correct value of the shared password (PACE password) in advance.
Asset: privacy of the travel document holder
Application note:
This Threat completely covers and extends 'T.Chip-ID' from BAC PP [R9].
A product using BAC (whatever the type of the inspection system is: BIS-BAC)
cannot avert this threat in the context of the security policy defined in this PP.
T.Forgery
Forgery of Data
Adverse action: An attacker fraudulently alters the User Data or/and TSF-data
stored on the travel document or/and exchanged between the TOE and the
terminal connected in order to outsmart the PACE authenticated BIS-PACE by
means of changed travel document holder's related reference data (like bio-
graphic or biometric data). The attacker does it in such a way that the termin-
al connected perceives these modified data as authentic one.
Threat agent: having high attack potential
Asset: integrity of the travel document
Application note:
T.Forgery shall be extended by the Extended Inspection System additionally to
the PACE authenticated BIS-PACE being outsmarted by the attacker.
T.Abuse-Func
Abuse of Functionality
Adverse action: An attacker may use functions of the TOE which shall not be
used in TOE operational phase in order (i) to manipulate or to disclose the Us-
er Data stored in the TOE, (ii) to manipulate or to disclose the TSF-data stored
in the TOE or (iii) to manipulate (bypass, deactivate or modify) soft-coded se-
curity functionality of the TOE. This threat addresses the misuse of the func-
tions for the initialisation and personalisation in the operational phase after
delivery to the travel document holder.
Threat agent: having high attack potential, being in possession of one or more
legitimate travel documents
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Asset: integrity and authenticity of the travel document, availability of the
functionality of the travel document
Application note:
Details of the relevant attack scenarios depend, for instance, on the capabili-
ties of the test features provided by the IC Dedicated Test Software being not
specified here.
T.Information_Leakage
Information Leakage from travel document
Adverse action: An attacker may exploit information leaking from the TOE dur-
ing its usage in order to disclose confidential User Data or/and TSF-data stored
on the travel document or/and exchanged between the TOE and the terminal
connected. The information leakage may be inherent in the normal operation
or caused by the attacker.
Threat agent: having high attack potential.
Asset: confidentiality of User Data and TSF-data of the travel document
Application note:
Leakage may occur through emanations, variations in power consumption, I/O
characteristics, clock frequency, or by changes in processing time require-
ments. This leakage may be interpreted as a covert channel transmission, but
is more closely related to measurement of operating parameters which may be
derived either from measurements of the contactless interface (emanation) or
direct measurements (by contact to the chip still available even for a contact-
less chip) and can then be related to the specific operation being performed.
Examples are Differential Electromagnetic Analysis (DEMA) and Differential
Power Analysis (DPA). Moreover the attacker may try actively to enforce in-
formation leakage by fault injection (e.g. Differential Fault Analysis).
T.Phys-Tamper
Physical Tampering
Adverse action: An attacker may perform physical probing of the travel docu-
ment in order (i) to disclose the TSF-data, or (ii) to disclose/reconstruct the
TOE's Embedded Software. An attacker may physically modify the travel doc-
ument in order to alter (I) its security functionality (hardware and software
part, as well), (ii) the User Data or the TSF-data stored on the travel docu-
ment.
Threat agent: having high attack potential, being in possession of one or more
legitimate travel documents.
Asset: integrity and authenticity of the travel document, availability of the
functionality of the travel document, confidentiality of User Data and TSF-data
of the travel document
Application note:
Physical tampering may be focused directly on the disclosure or manipulation
of the user data (e.g. the biometric reference data for the inspection system)
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or the TSF data (e.g. authentication key of the travel document) or indirectly
by preparation of the TOE to following attack methods by modification of secu-
rity features (e.g. to enable information leakage through power analysis).
Physical tampering requires a direct interaction with the travel document's in-
ternals. Techniques commonly employed in IC failure analysis and IC reverse
engineering efforts may be used. Before that, hardware security mechanisms
and layout characteristics need to be identified. Determination of software de-
sign including treatment of the user data and the TSF data may also be a pre-
requisite. The modification may result in the deactivation of a security func-
tion. Changes of circuitry or data can be permanent or temporary.
T.Malfunction
Malfunction due to Environmental Stress
Adverse action: An attacker may cause a malfunction the travel document's
hardware and Embedded Software by applying environmental stress in order
to (i) deactivate or modify security features or functionality of the TOE'hard-
ware or to (ii) circumvent, deactivate or modify security functions of the TOE's
Embedded Software. This may be achieved e.g. by operating the travel docu-
ment outside the normal operating conditions, exploiting errors in the travel
document's Embedded Software or misusing administrative functions. To ex-
ploit these vulnerabilities an attacker needs information about the functional
operation.
Threat agent: having high attack potential, being in possession of one or more
legitimate travel documents, having information about the functional operation
Asset: integrity and authenticity of the travel document, availability of the
functionality of the travel document, confidentiality of User Data and TSF-data
of the travel document
Application note:
A malfunction of the TOE may also be caused using a direct interaction with
elements on the chip surface. This is considered as being a manipulation (refer
to the threat T.Phys-Tamper) assuming a detailed knowledge about TOE's in-
ternals.
3.3.1.2 Additional Threats
T.Read_Sensitive_Data
Read the sensitive biometric reference data
Adverse action: An attacker tries to gain the sensitive biometric reference data
through the communication interface of the travel document's chip. The attack
T.Read_Sensitive_Data is similar to the threat T.Skimming (cf. [R8]) in re-
spect of the attack path (communication interface) and the motivation (to get
data stored on the travel document's chip) but differs from those in the asset
under the attack (sensitive biometric reference data vs. digital MRZ, digitized
portrait and other data), the opportunity (i.e. knowing the PACE Password)
and therefore the possible attack methods. Note, that the sensitive biometric
reference data are stored only on the travel document's chip as private sensi-
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tive personal data whereas the MRZ data and the portrait are visually readable
on the physical part of the travel document as well.
Threat agent: having high attack potential, knowing the PACE Password, being
in possession of a legitimate travel document.
Asset: confidentiality of logical travel document sensitive user data(i.e. biome-
tric reference)
T.Counterfeit
Counterfeit of travel document chip data
Adverse action: An attacker with high attack potential produces an unautho-
rized copy or reproduction of a genuine travel document's chip to be used as
part of a counterfeit travel document. This violates the authenticity of the tra-
vel document's chip used for authentication of a traveller by possession of a
travel document. The attacker may generate a new data set or extract com-
pletely or partially the data from a genuine travel document's chip and copy
them to another appropriate chip to imitate this genuine travel document's
chip.
Threat agent: having high attack potential, being in possession of one or more
legitimate travel documents.
Asset: authenticity of user data stored on the TOE
Application note:
Since the Standard Inspection Procedure does not support any unique-secret-
based authentication of the travel document's chip (no Chip Authentication or
Active Authentication), a threat like T.Counterfeit (counterfeiting travel docu-
ment) cannot be averted by the current TOE. T.Counterfeit might be formu-
lated like: 'An attacker produces an unauthorised copy or reproduction of a
genuine travel document to be used as part of a counterfeit Passport: he or
she may generate a new data set or extract completely or partially the data
from a genuine travel document and copy them on another functionally appro-
priate chip to imitate this genuine travel document. This violates the authen-
ticity of the travel document being used for authentication of an travel docu-
ment presenter as the travel document holder'.
3.4 Organisational Security Policies
3.4.1 PP-0056
The TOE shall comply with the following Organisational Security Policies (OSP) as security
rules, procedures, practices, or guidelines imposed by an organisation upon its operations
(see CC part 1, sec. 3.2).
3.4.1.1 OSP listed in PP PACE
This PP includes all OSPs from the PACE PP [R7], chap 3.3, namely P.Pre-Operational,
P.Card_PKI, P.Trustworthy_PKI, P.Manufact and P.Terminal.
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P.Manufact
Manufacturing of the travel document's chip
The Initialization Data are written by the IC Manufacturer to identify the IC un-
iquely. The travel document Manufacturer writes the Pre-personalisation Data
which contains at least the Personalisation Agent Key.
P.Pre-Operational
Pre-operational handling of the travel document
1)The travel document Issuer issues the travel document and approves it us-
ing the terminals complying with all applicable laws and regulations.
2)The travel document Issuer guarantees correctness of the user data
(amongst other of those, concerning the travel document holder) and of the
TSF-data permanently stored in the TOE.
3)The travel document Issuer uses only such TOE's technical components (IC)
which enable traceability of the travel documents in their manufacturing and
issuing life cycle phases, i.e. before they are in the operational phase.
4.)If the travel document Issuer authorises a Personalisation Agent to perso-
nalise the travel document for travel document holders, the travel document
Issuer has to ensure that the Personalisation Agent acts in accordance with
the travel document Issuer's policy.
P.Card_PKI
PKI for Passive Authentication (issuing branch)
1)The travel document Issuer shall establish a public key infrastructure for the
passive authentication, i.e. for digital signature creation and verification for
the travel document. For this aim, he runs a Country Signing Certification Au-
thority (CSCA). The travel document Issuer shall publish the CSCA Certificate
(C.CSCA).
2)The CSCA shall securely generate, store and use the CSCA key pair. The
CSCA shall keep the CSCA Private Key secret and issue a self-signed CSCA
Certificate (C.CSCA) having to be made available to the travel document Issu-
er by strictly secure means, see [R6], 5.5.1. The CSCA shall create the Docu-
ment Signer Certificates for the Document Signer Public Keys (C.DS) and
make them available to the travel document Issuer, see [R6], 5.5.1.
3)A Document Signer shall (i) generate the Document Signer Key Pair, (ii)
hand over the Document Signer Public Key to the CSCA for certification, (iii)
keep the Document Signer Private Key secret and (iv) securely use the Docu-
ment Signer Private Key for signing the Document Security Objects of travel
documents.
Application note:
The given description states the responsibilities of involved parties and
represents the logical, but not the physical structure of the PKI. Physical dis-
tribution ways shall be implemented by the involved parties in such a way that
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all certificates belonging to the PKI are securely distributed / made available to
their final destination, e.g. by using directory services.
P.Trustworthy_PKI
Trustworthiness of PKI
The CSCA shall ensure that it issues its certificates exclusively to the rightful
organisations (DS) and DSs shall ensure that they sign exclusively correct
Document Security Objects to be stored on the travel document.
P.Terminal
Abilities and trustworthiness of terminals
The Basic Inspection Systems with PACE (BIS-PACE) shall operate their ter-
minals as follows:
1)The related terminals (basic inspection system, cf. above) shall be used by
terminal operators and by travel document holders as defined in [R6].
2)They shall implement the terminal parts of the PACE protocol [R4], of the
Passive Authentication [R6] and use them in this order (This order is commen-
surate with [R4]). The PACE terminal shall use randomly and (almost) un-
iformly selected nonces, if required by the protocols (for generating ephemeral
keys for Diffie-Hellmann).
3.)The related terminals need not to use any own credentials.
4.)They shall also store the Country Signing Public Key and the Document
Signer Public Key (in form of C.CSCA and C.DS) in order to enable and to per-
form Passive Authentication (determination of the authenticity of data groups
stored in the travel document, [R6]).
5) The related terminals and their environment shall ensure confidentiality and
integrity of respective data handled by them (e.g. confidentiality of PACE
passwords, integrity of PKI certificates, etc.), where it is necessary for a se-
cure operation of the TOE according to the current PP.
3.4.1.2 Additional OSPs
P.Sensitive_Data
Privacy of sensitive biometric reference data
The biometric reference data of finger(s) (EF.DG3) and iris image(s) (EF.DG4)
are sensitive private personal data of the travel document holder. The sensi-
tive biometric reference data can be used only by inspection systems which
are authorized for this access at the time the travel document is presented to
the inspection system (Extended Inspection Systems). The issuing State or
Organisation authorizes the Document Verifiers of the receiving States to
manage the authorization of inspection systems within the limits defined by
the Document Verifier Certificate. The travel document's chip shall protect the
confidentiality and integrity of the sensitive private personal data even during
transmission to the Extended Inspection System after Chip Authentication Ver-
sion 1.
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P.Personalisation
Personalisation of the travel document by issuing State or Organisa-
tion only
The issuing State or Organisation guarantees the correctness of the biographi-
cal data, the printed portrait and the digitized portrait, the biometric reference
data and other data of the logical travel document with respect to the travel
document holder. The personalisation of the travel document for the holder is
performed by an agent authorized by the issuing State or Organisation only.
3.5 Assumptions
3.5.1 PP-0056
The assumptions describe the security aspects of the environment in which the TOE will be
used or is intended to be used.
3.5.1.1 Assumptions listed in PP PACE
This PP includes the assumption from the PACE PP [R7], chap 3.4, namely A.Passive_Auth.
A.Passive_Auth
PKI for Passive Authentication The issuing and receiving States or Organi-
sations establish a public key infrastructure for passive authentication i.e. digi-
tal signature creation and verification for the logical travel document. The is-
suing State or Organisation runs a Certification Authority (CA) which securely
generates, stores and uses the Country Signing CA Key pair. The CA keeps the
Country Signing CA Private Key secret and is recommended to distribute the
Country Signing CA Public Key to ICAO, all receiving States maintaining its in-
tegrity. The Document Signer (i) generates the Document Signer Key Pair, (ii)
hands over the Document Signer Public Key to the CA for certification, (iii)
keeps the Document Signer Private Key secret and (iv) uses securely the Doc-
ument Signer Private Key for signing the Document Security Objects of the
travel documents. The CA creates the Document Signer Certificates for the
Document Signer Public Keys that are distributed to the receiving States and
Organisations. It is assumed that the Personalisation Agent ensures that the
Document Security Object contains only the hash values of genuine user data
according to [R6].
3.5.1.2 Additional Assumptions
A.Insp_Sys
Inspection Systems for global interoperability The Extended Inspection
System (EIS) for global interoperability (i) includes the Country Signing CA
Public Key and (ii) implements the terminal part of PACE [R4] and/or BAC
[R8]. BAC may only be used if supported by the TOE. If both PACE and BAC
are supported by the TOE and the IS, PACE must be used. The EIS reads the
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logical travel document under PACE or BAC and performs the Chip Authentica-
tion v.1 to verify the logical travel document and establishes secure messag-
ing. EIS supports the Terminal Authentication Protocol v.1 in order to ensure
access control and is authorized by the issuing State or Organisation through
the Document Verifier of the receiving State to read the sensitive biometric
reference data.
Justification: The assumption A.Insp_Sys does not confine the security ob-
jectives of the [R7] as it repeats the requirements of P.Terminal and adds only
assumptions for the Inspection Systems for handling the the EAC functionality
of the TOE.
A.Auth_PKI
PKI for Inspection Systems The issuing and receiving States or Organisa-
tions establish a public key infrastructure for card verifiable certificates of the
Extended Access Control. The Country Verifying Certification Authorities, the
Document Verifier and Extended Inspection Systems hold authentication key
pairs and certificates for their public keys encoding the access control rights.
The Country Verifying Certification Authorities of the issuing States or Organi-
sations are signing the certificates of the Document Verifier and the Document
Verifiers are signing the certificates of the Extended Inspection Systems of the
receiving States or Organisations. The issuing States or Organisations distri-
bute the public keys of their Country Verifying Certification Authority to their
travel document's chip.
Justification: This assumption only concerns the EAC part of the TOE. The is-
suing and use of card verifiable certificates of the Extended Access Control is
neither relevant for the PACE part of the TOE nor will the security objectives of
the [R7] be restricted by this assumption. For the EAC functionality of the TOE
the assumption is necessary because it covers the pre-requisite for performing
the Terminal Authentication Protocol Version 1.
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4 Security Objectives
4.1 Security Objectives for the TOE
4.1.1 PP-0056
This section describes the security objectives for the TOE addressing the aspects of identified
threats to be countered by the TOE and organisational security policies to be met by the
TOE.
4.1.1.1 Security Objectives listed in PP PACE
This PP includes all Security Objectives for the TOE from the PACE PP [R7], chap 4.1, namely
OT.Data_Integrity, OT.Data_Authenticity, OT.Data_Confidentiality, OT.Tracing,
OT.Prot_Abuse-Func, OT.Prof_Inf_Leak, OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper, OT.Identification,
OT.AC_Pers and OT.Prot_Malfunction.
OT.Data_Integrity
Integrity of Data
The TOE must ensure integrity of the User Data and the TSF-data (where ap-
propriate) stored on it by protecting these data against unauthorised modifica-
tion (physical manipulation and unauthorised modifying).The TOE must ensure
integrity of the User Data and the TSF-data during their exchange between the
TOE and the terminal connected (and represented by PACE authenticated BIS-
PACE) after the PACE Authentication.
OT.Data_Confidentiality
Confidentiality of Data
The TOE must ensure confidentiality of the User Data and the TSF-data (where
appropriate) by granting read access only to the PACE authenticated BIS-PACE
connected.The TOE must ensure confidentiality of the User Data and the TSF-
data during their exchange between the TOE and the terminal connected (and
represented by PACE authenticated BIS-PACE) after the PACE Authentication.
OT.Tracing
Tracing travel document
The TOE must prevent gathering TOE tracing data by means of unambiguous
identifying the travel document remotely through establishing or listening to a
communication via the contactless/contact interface of the TOE without know-
ledge of the correct values of shared passwords (PACE passwords) in advance.
Application note:
Application note 21: Since the Standard Inspection Procedure does not sup-
port any unique-secret-based authentication of the travel document's chip (no
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Chip Authentication), a security objective like OT.Chip_Auth_Proof (proof of
travel document authenticity) cannot be achieved by the current TOE.
OT.Prot_Abuse-Func
Protection against Abuse of Functionality
The TOE must prevent that functions of the TOE, which may not be used in
TOE operational phase, can be abused in order (i) to manipulate or to disclose
the User Data stored in the TOE, (ii) to manipulate or to disclose the TSF-data
stored in the TOE, (iii) to manipulate (bypass, deactivate or modify) soft-
coded security functionality of the TOE.
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak
Potection against Information Leakage
The TOE must provide protection against disclosure of confidential User Data
or/and TSF-data stored and/or processed by the travel document
by measurement and analysis of the shape and amplitude of signals or the time be-
tween events found by measuring signals on the electromagnetic field, power con-
sumption, clock, or I/O lines,
by forcing a malfunction of the TOE and/or
by a physical manipulation of the TOE.
Application note:
Application note 22: This objective pertains to measurements with subsequent
complex signal processing due to normal operation of the TOE or operations
enforced by an attacker.
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper
Protection against Physical Tampering
The TOE must provide protection of confidentiality and integrity of the User
Data, the TSF-data and the travel document's Embedded Software by means
of
measuring through galvanic contacts representing a direct physical probing on the
chip's surface except on pads being bonded (using standard tools for measuring
voltage and current) or
measuring not using galvanic contacts, but other types of physical interaction be-
tween electrical charges (using tools used in solid-state physics research and IC
failure analysis),
manipulation of the hardware and its security functionality, as well as
controlled manipulation of memory contents (User Data, TSF-data) with a prior
reverse-engineering to understand the design and its properties and functionality.
OT.Prot_Malfunction
Protection against Malfunctions
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The TOE must ensure its correct operation. The TOE must prevent its opera-
tion outside the normal operating conditions where reliability and secure oper-
ation have not been proven or tested. This is to prevent functional errors in
the TOE. The environmental conditions may include external energy (esp.
electromagnetic) fields, voltage (on any contacts), clock frequency or temper-
ature. The following TOE security objectives address the aspects of identified
threats to be countered involving TOE's environment.
OT.Identification
Identification of the TOE
The TOE must provide means to store Initialisation (amongst other, IC Identi-
fication data) and Pre-Personalisation Data in its non-volatile memory. The In-
itialisation Data must provide a unique identification of the IC during the man-
ufacturing and the card issuing life cycle phases of the travel document. The
storage of the Pre-Personalisation data includes writing of the Personalisation
Agent Key(s).
OT.Data_Authenticity
Authenticity of Data
The TOE must ensure authenticity of the User Data and the TSF-data (where
appropriate), stored on it by enabling verification of their authenticity at the
terminal-side (verification of SO.D). The TOE must ensure authenticity of the
User Data and the TSF-data during their exchange between the TOE and the
terminal connected (and represented by PACE authenticated BIS-PACE) after
the PACE Authentication. It shall happen by enabling such a verification at the
terminal-side (at receiving by the terminal) and by an active verification by
the TOE itself (at receiving by the TOE, secure messaging after the PACE au-
thentication, see also [R4]).
OT.AC_Pers
Access Control for Personalisation of logical MRTD
The TOE must ensure that the logical travel document data in EF.DG1 to
EF.DG16, the Document Security Object according to LDS [R6] and the TSF
data can be written by authorized Personalisation Agents only. The logical tra-
vel document data in EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 and the TSF data may be written on-
ly during and cannot be changed after personalisation of the document.
The authentication of the terminal as Personalisation Agent shall be performed
by TSF according to SFR FIA_UAU.4/PACE and FIA_UAU.5/PACE. If the Perso-
nalisation Terminal want to authenticate itself to the TOE by means of the
Terminal Authentication Protocol v.1 (after Chip Authentication v.1) with the
Personalisation Agent Keys the TOE will use TSF according to the FCS_RND.1
(for the generation of the challenge), FCS_CKM.1/CA (for the derivation of the
new session keys after Chip Authentication v.1), and FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC and
FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC (for the ENC_MAC_Mode secure messaging),
FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER (as part of the Terminal Authentication Protocol v.1) and
FIA_UAU.6/EAC (for the re-authentication). If the Personalisation Terminal
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wants to authenticate itself to the TOE by means of the Authentication Me-
chanism with Personalisation Agent Key the TOE will use TSF according to the
FCS_RND.1 (for the generation of the challenge) and FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC (to
verify the authentication attempt). The session keys are destroyed according
to FCS_CKM.4 after use.
Application note:
Application note 23: The OT.AC_Pers implies that the data of the LDS groups
written during personalisation for travel document holder (at least EF.DG1 and
EF.DG2) can not be changed using write access after personalisation.
4.1.1.2 Additional Security Objectives
OT.Sens_Data_Conf
Confidentiality of sensitive biometric reference data
The TOE must ensure the confidentiality of the sensitive biometric reference
data (EF.DG3 and EF.DG4) by granting read access only to authorized Ex-
tended Inspection Systems. The authorization of the inspection system is
drawn from the Inspection System Certificate used for the successful authenti-
cation and shall be a non-strict subset of the authorization defined in the Doc-
ument Verifier Certificate in the certificate chain to the Country Verifier Certifi-
cation Authority of the issuing State or Organisation. The TOE must ensure the
confidentiality of the logical travel document data during their transmission to
the Extended Inspection System. The confidentiality of the sensitive biometric
reference data shall be protected against attacks with high attack potential.
OT.Chip_Auth_Proof
Proof of the travel document's chip authenticity
The TOE must support the Inspection Systems to verify the identity and au-
thenticity of the travel document's chip as issued by the identified issuing
State or Organisation by means of the Chip Authentication Version 1 as de-
fined in [R5]. The authenticity proof provided by travel document's chip shall
be protected against attacks with high attack potential.
Application note:
The OT.Chip_Auth_Proof implies the travel document's chip to have (i) a
unique identity as given by the travel document's Document Number, (ii) a se-
cret to prove its identity by knowledge i.e. a private authentication key as TSF
data. The TOE shall protect this TSF data to prevent their misuse. The terminal
shall have the reference data to verify the authentication attempt of travel
document's chip i.e. a certificate for the Chip Authentication Public Key that
matches the Chip Authentication Private Key of the travel document's chip.
This certificate is provided by (i) the Chip Authentication Public Key (EF.DG14)
in the LDS defined in [R6] and (ii) the hash value of DG14 in the Document
Security Object signed by the Document Signer.
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4.2 Security objectives for the Operational Environment
4.2.1 PP-0056
4.2.1.1 OE listed in PP PACE
This PP includes all Security Objectives of the TOE environment from the PACE PP [R7],
chap. 4.2, namely OE.Legislative_Compliance, OE.Passive_Auth_Sign, OE.Personalisation,
OE.Terminal, and OE.Travel_Document_Holder.
OE.Legislative_Compliance
The travel document Issuer as the general responsible for the global se-
curity policy related will implement this security objectives:
The travel document Issuer must issue the travel document and approve it us-
ing the terminals complying with all applicable laws and regulations.
OE.Passive_Auth_Sign
Authentication of travel document by Signature.
The travel document Issuer and the related CSCA will implement this se-
curity objectives:
The travel document Issuer has to establish the necessary public key infra-
structure as follows: the CSCA acting on behalf and according to the policy of
the travel document Issuer must (i) generate a cryptographically secure CSCA
Key Pair, (ii) ensure the secrecy of the CSCA Private Key and sign Document
Signer Certificates in a secure operational environment, and (iii) publish the
Certificate of the CSCA Public Key (CCSCA). Hereby authenticity and integrity
of these certificates are being maintained.A Document Signer acting in accor-
dance with the CSCA policy must (i) generate a cryptographically secure Doc-
ument Signing Key Pair, (ii) ensure the secrecy of the Document Signer Pri-
vate Key, (iii) hand over the Document Signer Public Key to the CSCA for cer-
tification, (iv) sign Document Security Objects of genuine travel documents in
a secure operational environment only. The digital signature in the Document
Security Object relates to all hash values for each data group in use according
to [6]. The Personalisation Agent has to ensure that the Document Security
Object contains only the hash values of genuine user data according to [R6].
The CSCA must issue its certificates exclusively to the rightful organisations
(DS) and DSs must sign exclusively correct Document Security Objects to be
stored on travel document.
OE.Personalisation
Personalisation of travel document
The travel document Issuer and the related CSCA will implement this se-
curity objectives:
The travel document Issuer must ensure that the Personalisation Agents act-
ing on his behalf (i) establish the correct identity of the travel document hold-
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er and create the biographical data for the travel document, (ii) enrol the bio-
metric reference data of the travel document holder, (iii) write a subset of
these data on the physical Passport (optical personalisation) and store them in
the travel document (electronic personalisation) for the travel document hold-
er as defined in [R6] (see also [R6], sec. 10), (iv) write the document details
data, (v) write the initial TSF data, (vi) sign the Document Security Object de-
fined in [R6] (in the role of a DS).
OE.Terminal
Terminal operating
The terminal operators (terminal's receiving branch) must operate their ter-
minals as follows: 1)The related terminals (basic inspection systems, cf.
above) are used by terminal operators and by travel document holders as de-
fined in [R6]. 2)The related terminals implement the terminal parts of the
PACE protocol [R4], of the Passive Authentication [R4] (by verification of the
signature of the Document Security Object) and use them in this order (this
order is commensurate with [R4]). The PACE terminal uses randomly and (al-
most) uniformly selected nonces, if required by the protocols (for generating
ephemeral keys for Diffie-Hellmann). 3)The related terminals need not to use
any own credentials. 4)The related terminals securely store the Country Sign-
ing Public Key and the Document Signer Public Key (in form of C.CSCA and
C.DS) in order to enable and to perform Passive Authentication of the travel
document (determination of the authenticity of data groups stored in the tra-
vel document, [R6]). 5)The related terminals and their environment must en-
sure confidentiality and integrity of respective data handled by them (e.g. con-
fidentiality of the PACE passwords, integrity of PKI certificates, etc.), where it
is necessary for a secure operation of the TOE according to the current PP.
Application note:
Application note 24: OE.Terminal completely covers and extends
'OE.Exam_MRTD', 'OE.Passive_Auth_Verif' and 'OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD' from
BAC PP [R9].
OE.Travel_Document_Holder
Travel document holder Obligations
The travel document holder may reveal, if necessary, his or her verification
values of the PACE password to an authorized person or device who definitely
act according to respective regulations and are trustworthy.
4.2.1.2 Additional OEs
Issuing State or Organisation
The issuing State or Organisation will implement the following security objectives of the TOE
environment.
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OE.Auth_Key_Travel_Document
Travel document Authentication Key
The issuing State or Organisation has to establish the necessary public key in-
frastructure in order to (i) generate the travel document's Chip Authentication
Key Pair, (ii) sign and store the Chip Authentication Public Key in the Chip Au-
thentication Public Key data in EF.DG14 and (iii) support inspection systems of
receiving States or Organisations to verify the authenticity of the travel docu-
ment's chip used for genuine travel document by certification of the Chip Au-
thentication Public Key by means of the Document Security Object.
This objective is implemented by the issuing State or Organisation.
Justification: This security objective for the operational environment is
needed additionally to those from [R7] in order to counter the Threat
T.Counterfeit as it specifies the pre-requisite for the Chip Authentication Proto-
col Version 1 which is one of the additional features of the TOE described only
in this Protection Profile and not in [R7].
OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data
Authorization for Use of Sensitive Biometric Reference Data
The issuing State or Organisation has to establish the necessary public key in-
frastructure in order to limit the access to sensitive biometric reference data of
travel document holders to authorized receiving States or Organisations. The
Country Verifying Certification Authority of the issuing State or Organisation
generates card verifiable Document Verifier Certificates for the authorized
Document Verifier only.
This objective is implemented by the issuing State or Organisation.
Justification: This security objective for the operational environment is
needed additionally to those from [R7] in order to handle the Threat
T.Read_Sensitive_Data, the Organisational Security Policy P.Sensitive_Data
and the Assumption A.Auth_PKI as it specifies the pre-requisite for the Ter-
minal Authentication Protocol v.1 as it concerns the need of an PKI for this
protocol and the responsibilities of its root instance. The Terminal Authentica-
tion Protocol v.1 is one of the additional features of the TOE described only in
this Protection Profile and not in [R7].
Receiving State or Organisation
The receiving State or Organisation will implement the following security objectives of the
TOE environment.
OE.Exam_Travel_Document
Examination of the physical part of the travel document
The inspection system of the receiving State or Organisation must examine
the travel document presented by the traveller to verify its authenticity by
means of the physical security measures and to detect any manipulation of the
physical part of the travel document. The Basic Inspection System for global
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interoperability (i) includes the Country Signing CA Public Key and the Docu-
ment Signer Public Key of each issuing State or Organisation, and (ii) imple-
ments the terminal part of PACE [R4] and/or the Basic Access Control [R6].
Extended Inspection Systems perform additionally to these points the Chip Au-
thentication Protocol Version 1 to verify the Authenticity of the presented tra-
vel document's chip.
This objective is implemented by the receiving State or Organisation.
Justification: This security objective for the operational environment is
needed additionally to those from [R7] in order to handle the Threat
T.Counterfeit and the Assumption A.Insp_Sys by demanding the Inspection
System to perform the Chip Authentication protocol v.1.
OE.Exam_Travel_Document also repeats partly the requirements from
OE.Terminal in [R7] and therefore also counters T.Forgery and A.Passive_Auth
from [R7]. This is done because a new type of Inspection System is introduced
in this PP as the Extended Inspection System is needed to handle the addi-
tional features of a travel document with Extended Access Control.
OE.Prot_Logical_Travel_Document
Protection of data from the logical travel document
The inspection system of the receiving State or Organisation ensures the con-
fidentiality and integrity of the data read from the logical travel document. The
inspection system will prevent eavesdropping to their communication with the
TOE before secure messaging is successfully established based on the Chip
Authentication Protocol Version 1.
This objective is implemented by the receiving State or Organisation.
Justification: This security objective for the operational environment is
needed additionally to those from [R7] in order to handle the Assumption A.
Insp_Sys by requiring the Inspection System to perform secure messaging
based on the Chip Authentication Protocol v.1.
OE.Ext_Insp_Systems
Authorization of Extended Inspection Systems
The Document Verifier of receiving States or Organisations authorizes Ex-
tended Inspection Systems by creation of Inspection System Certificates for
access to sensitive biometric reference data of the logical travel document.
The Extended Inspection System authenticates themselves to the travel doc-
ument's chip for access to the sensitive biometric reference data with its pri-
vate Terminal Authentication Key and its Inspection System Certificate.
This objective is implemented by the receiving State or Organisation.
Justification: This security objective for the operational environment is
needed additionally to those from [R7] in order to handle the Threat
T.Read_Sensitive_Data, the Organisational Security Policy P.Sensitive_Data
and the Assumption A.Auth_PKI as it specifies the pre-requisite for the Ter-
minal Authentication Protocol v.1 as it concerns the responsibilities of the
Document Verifier instance and the Inspection Systems.
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4.3 Security Objectives Rationale
4.3.1 Threats
4.3.1.1 PP-0056
Threats listed in PP PACE
T.Skimming addresses accessing the User Data (stored on the TOE or trans-
ferred between the TOE and the terminal) using the TOE's contactless/contact
interface. This threat is countered by the security objectives
OT.Data_Integrity, OT.Data_Authenticity and OT.Data_Confidentiality through
the PACE authentication. The objective OE.Travel_Document_Holder ensures
that a PACE session can only be established either by the travel document
holder itself or by an authorised person or device, and, hence, cannot be cap-
tured by an attacker.
T.Eavesdropping addresses listening to the communication between the TOE
and a rightful terminal in order to gain the User Data transferred there. This
threat is countered by the security objective OT.Data_Confidentiality through a
trusted channel based on the PACE authentication.
T.Tracing addresses gathering TOE tracing data identifying it remotely by estab-
lishing or listening to a communication via the contactless/contact interface of
the TOE, whereby the attacker does not a priori know the correct values of the
PACE password. This threat is directly countered by security objectives
OT.Tracing (no gathering TOE tracing data) and OE.Travel_Document_Holder
(the attacker does not a priori know the correct values of the shared pass-
words).
T.Forgery 'Forgery of data' addresses the fraudulent, complete or partial altera-
tion of the User Data or/and TSF-data stored on the TOE or/and exchanged
between the TOE and the terminal. Additionally to the security objectives from
PACE PP [R7] which counter this threat, the examination of the presented
MRTD passport book according to OE.Exam_Travel_Document 'Examination of
the physical part of the travel document' shall ensure its authenticity by
means of the physical security measures and detect any manipulation of the
physical part of the travel document.
The threat T.Forgery also addresses the fraudulent, complete or partial altera-
tion of the User Data or/and TSF-data stored on the TOE or/and exchanged
between the TOE and the terminal. The security objective OT.AC_Pers requires
the TOE to limit the write access for the travel document to the trustworthy
Personalisation Agent (cf. OE.Personalisation). The TOE will protect the integri-
ty and authenticity of the stored and exchanged User Data or/and TSF-data as
aimed by the security objectives OT.Data_Integrity and OT.Data_Authenticity,
respectively. The objectives OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper and OT.Prot_Abuse-Func
contribute to protecting integrity of the User Data or/and TSF-data stored on
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the TOE. A terminal operator operating his terminals according to OE.Terminal
and performing the Passive Authentication using the Document Security Ob-
ject as aimed by OE.Passive_Auth_Sign will be able to effectively verify integr-
ity and authenticity of the data received from the TOE.
T.Abuse-Func addresses attacks of misusing TOE's functionality to manipulate
or to disclosure the stored User- or TSF-data as well as to disable or to bypass
the soft-coded security functionality. The security objective OT.Prot_Abuse-
Func ensures that the usage of functions having not to be used in the opera-
tional phase is effectively prevented.
T.Information_Leakage is typical for integrated circuits like smart cards under
direct attack with high attack potential. The protection of the TOE against this
threat is obviously addressed by the directly related security objective
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak.
T.Phys-Tamper is typical for integrated circuits like smart cards under direct
attack with high attack potential. The protection of the TOE against this threat
is obviously addressed by the directly related security objective OT.Prot_Phys-
Tamper.
T.Malfunction is typical for integrated circuits like smart cards under direct at-
tack with high attack potential. The protection of the TOE against this threat is
obviously addressed by the directly related security objective
OT.Prot_Malfunction.
Additional Threats
T.Read_Sensitive_Data The threat T.Read_Sensitive_Data 'Read the sensitive
biometric reference data' is countered by the TOE-objective
OT.Sens_Data_Conf 'Confidentiality of sensitive biometric reference data' re-
quiring that read access to EF.DG3 and EF.DG4 (containing the sensitive bio-
metric reference data) is only granted to authorized inspection systems. Fur-
thermore it is required that the transmission of these data ensures the data's
confidentiality. The authorization bases on Document Verifier certificates is-
sued by the issuing State or Organisation as required by
OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data 'Authorization for use of sensitive biometric reference
data'. The Document Verifier of the receiving State has to authorize Extended
Inspection Systems by creating appropriate Inspection System certificates for
access to the sensitive biometric reference data as demanded by
OE.Ext_Insp_Systems 'Authorization of Extended Inspection Systems'.
T.Counterfeit 'Counterfeit of travel document chip data' addresses the attack of
unauthorized copy or reproduction of the genuine travel document's chip. This
attack is thwarted by chip an identification and authenticity proof required by
OT.Chip_Auth_Proof 'Proof of travel document's chip authentication' using an
authentication key pair to be generated by the issuing State or Organisation.
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The Public Chip Authentication Key has to be written into EF.DG14 and signed
by means of Documents Security Objects as demanded by
OE.Auth_Key_Travel_Document 'Travel document Authentication Key'. Accord-
ing to OE.Exam_Travel_Document 'Examination of the physical part of the tra-
vel document' the General Inspection system has to perform the Chip Authen-
tication Protocol Version 1 to verify the authenticity of the travel document's
chip.
4.3.2 Organisational Security Policies
4.3.2.1 PP-0056
OSP listed in PP PACE
P.Manufact requires a unique identification of the IC by means of the Initializa-
tion Data and the writing of the Pre-personalisation Data as being fulfilled by
OT.Identification.
P.Pre-Operational is enforced by the following security objectives:
OT.Identification is affine to the OSP's property 'traceability before the opera-
tional phase; OT.AC_Pers and OE.Personalisation together enforce the OSP's
properties 'correctness of the User and the TSF-data stored' and 'authorisation
of Personalisation Agents'; OE.Legislative_Compliance is affine to the OSP's
property 'compliance with laws and regulations'.
P.Card_PKI is enforced by establishing the issuing PKI branch as aimed by the
objectives OE.Passive_Auth_Sign (for the Document Security Object).
P.Trustworthy_PKI is enforced by OE.Passive_Auth_Sign (for CSCA, issuing
PKI branch).
P.Terminal 'Abilities and trustworthiness of terminals' is countered by the secu-
rity objective OE.Exam_Travel_Document additionally to the security objec-
tives from PACE PP [R7]. OE.Exam_Travel_Document enforces the terminals
to perform the terminal part of the PACE protocol.
The OSP P.Terminal is obviously enforced by the objective OE.Terminal, whe-
reby the one-to-one mapping between the related properties is applicable.
Additional OSPs
P.Sensitive_Data 'Privacy of sensitive biometric reference data' is fulfilled and
the threat T.Read_Sensitive_Data 'Read the sensitive biometric reference data'
is countered by the TOE-objective OT.Sens_Data_Conf 'Confidentiality of sen-
sitive biometric reference data' requiring that read access to EF.DG3 and
EF.DG4 (containing the sensitive biometric reference data) is only granted to
authorized inspection systems. Furthermore it is required that the transmis-
sion of these data ensures the data's confidentiality. The authorization bases
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on Document Verifier certificates issued by the issuing State or Organisation
as required by OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data 'Authorization for use of sensitive bio-
metric reference data'. The Document Verifier of the receiving State has to au-
thorize Extended Inspection Systems by creating appropriate Inspection Sys-
tem certificates for access to the sensitive biometric reference data as de-
manded by OE.Ext_Insp_Systems 'Authorization of Extended Inspection Sys-
tems'.
P.Personalisation 'Personalisation of the travel document by issuing State or
Organisation only' addresses the (i) the enrolment of the logical travel docu-
ment by the Personalisation Agent as described in the security objective for
the TOE environment OE.Personalisation 'Personalisation of logical travel doc-
ument', and (ii) the access control for the user data and TSF data as described
by the security objective OT.AC_Pers 'Access Control for Personalisation of log-
ical travel document'. Note the manufacturer equips the TOE with the Persona-
lisation Agent Key(s) according to OT.Identification 'Identification and Authen-
tication of the TOE'. The security objective OT.AC_Pers limits the management
of TSF data and the management of TSF to the Personalisation Agent.
4.3.3 Assumptions
4.3.3.1 PP-0056
Assumptions listed in PP PACE
A.Passive_Auth The assumption A.Passive_Auth 'PKI for Passive Authentication'
is directly covered by the security objective for the TOE environment
OE.Passive_Auth_Sign 'Authentication of travel document by Signature' from
PACE PP [R7] covering the necessary procedures for the Country Signing CA
Key Pair and the Document Signer Key Pairs. The implementation of the signa-
ture verification procedures is covered by OE.Exam_Travel_Document
'Examination of the physical part of the travel document'.
Additional Assumptions
A.Insp_Sys The examination of the travel document addressed by the assump-
tion A.Insp_Sys 'Inspection Systems for global interoperability' is covered by
the security objectives for the TOE environment OE.Exam_Travel_Document
'Examination of the physical part of the travel document' which requires the
inspection system to examine physically the travel document, the Basic In-
spection System to implement the Basic Access Control, and the Extended In-
spection Systems to implement and to perform the Chip Authentication Proto-
col Version 1 to verify the Authenticity of the presented travel document's
chip. The security objectives for the TOE environment
OE.Prot_Logical_Travel_Document 'Protection of data from the logical travel
document' require the Inspection System to protect the logical travel docu-
ment data during the transmission and the internal handling.
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A.Auth_PKI 'PKI for Inspection Systems' is covered by the security objective for
the TOE environment OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data 'Authorization for use of sensi-
tive biometric reference data' requires the CVCA to limit the read access to
sensitive biometrics by issuing Document Verifier certificates for authorized re-
ceiving States or Organisations only. The Document Verifier of the receiving
State is required by OE.Ext_Insp_Systems 'Authorization of Extended Inspec-
tion Systems' to authorize Extended Inspection Systems by creating Inspec-
tion System Certificates. Therefore, the receiving issuing State or Organisation
has to establish the necessary public key infrastructure.
4.3.4 SPD and Security Objectives
Threats Security Objectives Rationale
T.Skimming
OT.Data_Integrity, OT.Data_Authenticity,
OT.Data_Confidentiality,
OE.Travel_Document_Holder
Section
4.3.1
T.Eavesdropping OT.Data_Confidentiality
Section
4.3.1
T.Tracing OT.Tracing, OE.Travel_Document_Holder
Section
4.3.1
T.Forgery
OT.AC_Pers, OT.Data_Integrity,
OT.Data_Authenticity, OT.Prot_Abuse-
Func, OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper,
OE.Personalisation, OE.Passive_Auth_Sign,
OE.Terminal, OE.Exam_Travel_Document
Section
4.3.1
T.Abuse-Func OT.Prot_Abuse-Func
Section
4.3.1
T.Information_Leakage OT.Prot_Inf_Leak
Section
4.3.1
T.Phys-Tamper OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper
Section
4.3.1
T.Malfunction OT.Prot_Malfunction
Section
4.3.1
T.Read_Sensitive_Data
OT.Sens_Data_Conf,
OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data,
OE.Ext_Insp_Systems
Section
4.3.1
T.Counterfeit
OT.Chip_Auth_Proof,
OE.Auth_Key_Travel_Document,
OE.Exam_Travel_Document
Section
4.3.1
Table 1 Threats and Security Objectives - Coverage
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Security Objectives Threats
OT.Data_Integrity T.Skimming, T.Forgery
OT.Data_Confidentiality
T.Skimming,
T.Eavesdropping
OT.Tracing T.Tracing
OT.Prot_Abuse-Func T.Forgery, T.Abuse-Func
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak T.Information_Leakage
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper T.Forgery, T.Phys-Tamper
OT.Prot_Malfunction T.Malfunction
OT.Identification
OT.Data_Authenticity T.Skimming, T.Forgery
OT.AC_Pers T.Forgery
OT.Sens_Data_Conf T.Read_Sensitive_Data
OT.Chip_Auth_Proof T.Counterfeit
OE.Legislative_Compliance
OE.Passive_Auth_Sign T.Forgery
OE.Personalisation T.Forgery
OE.Terminal T.Forgery
OE.Travel_Document_Holder T.Skimming, T.Tracing
OE.Auth_Key_Travel_Document T.Counterfeit
OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data T.Read_Sensitive_Data
OE.Exam_Travel_Document T.Forgery, T.Counterfeit
OE.Prot_Logical_Travel_Document
OE.Ext_Insp_Systems T.Read_Sensitive_Data
Table 2 Security Objectives and Threats - Coverage
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Organisational Securi-
ty Policies
Security Objectives Rationale
P.Manufact OT.Identification
Section
4.3.2
P.Pre-Operational
OT.Identification, OT.AC_Pers,
OE.Personalisation,
OE.Legislative_Compliance
Section
4.3.2
P.Card_PKI OE.Passive_Auth_Sign
Section
4.3.2
P.Trustworthy_PKI OE.Passive_Auth_Sign
Section
4.3.2
P.Terminal OE.Terminal, OE.Exam_Travel_Document
Section
4.3.2
P.Sensitive_Data
OT.Sens_Data_Conf,
OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data,
OE.Ext_Insp_Systems
Section
4.3.2
P.Personalisation
OT.AC_Pers, OT.Identification,
OE.Personalisation
Section
4.3.2
Table 3 OSPs and Security Objectives - Coverage
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Security Objectives
Organisational Security
Policies
OT.Data_Integrity
OT.Data_Confidentiality
OT.Tracing
OT.Prot_Abuse-Func
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper
OT.Prot_Malfunction
OT.Identification
P.Manufact, P.Pre-
Operational,
P.Personalisation
OT.Data_Authenticity
OT.AC_Pers
P.Pre-Operational,
P.Personalisation
OT.Sens_Data_Conf P.Sensitive_Data
OT.Chip_Auth_Proof
OE.Legislative_Compliance P.Pre-Operational
OE.Passive_Auth_Sign
P.Card_PKI,
P.Trustworthy_PKI
OE.Personalisation
P.Pre-Operational,
P.Personalisation
OE.Terminal P.Terminal
OE.Travel_Document_Holder
OE.Auth_Key_Travel_Document
OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data P.Sensitive_Data
OE.Exam_Travel_Document P.Terminal
OE.Prot_Logical_Travel_Document
OE.Ext_Insp_Systems P.Sensitive_Data
Table 4 Security Objectives and OSPs - Coverage
Assumptions
Security objectives for the Operational Environ-
ment
Rationale
A.Passive_Auth
OE.Passive_Auth_Sign,
OE.Exam_Travel_Document
Section
4.3.3
A.Insp_Sys
OE.Exam_Travel_Document,
OE.Prot_Logical_Travel_Document
Section
4.3.3
A.Auth_PKI OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data, OE.Ext_Insp_Systems
Section
4.3.3
Table 5 Assumptions and Security Objectives for the Operational Environment -
Coverage
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Security objectives for the Operational
Environment
Assumptions
OE.Legislative_Compliance
OE.Passive_Auth_Sign A.Passive_Auth
OE.Personalisation
OE.Terminal
OE.Travel_Document_Holder
OE.Auth_Key_Travel_Document
OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data A.Auth_PKI
OE.Exam_Travel_Document
A.Passive_Auth,
A.Insp_Sys
OE.Prot_Logical_Travel_Document A.Insp_Sys
OE.Ext_Insp_Systems A.Auth_PKI
Table 6 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment and Assumptions -
Coverage
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5 Extended requirements
5.1 Extended families
5.2 Definition of the Family FAU_SAS
To define the security functional requirements of the TOE a sensitive family
(FAU_SAS) of the Class FAU (Security Audit) is defined here. This family describes
the functional requirements for the storage of audit data. It has a more general ap-
proach than FAU_GEN, because it does not necessarily require the data to be gener-
ated by the TOE itself and because it does not give specific details of the content of
the audit records.
The family ―Audit data storage (FAU_SAS)‖ is specified as follows.
FAU_SAS Audit data storage
Family behaviour
This family defines functional requirements for the storage of audit data.
Component levelling
FAU_SAS.1 Requires the TOE to provide the possibility to store audit data.
Management: FAU_SAS.1
There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit: FAU_SAS.1
There are no actions defined to be auditable.
FAU_SAS.1 Audit storage
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FAU_SAS.1.1 The TSF shall provide [assignment: authorized users] with the capability to
store [assignment: list of audit information] in the audit records.
FAU_SAS Audit data storage 1
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5.3 Definition of the Family FCS_RND
To define the IT security functional requirements of the TOE an additional family
(FCS_RND) of the Class FCS (cryptographic support) is defined here. This family de-
scribes the functional requirements for random number generation used for crypto-
graphic purposes. The component FCS_RND is not limited to generation of crypto-
graphic keys unlike the component FCS_CKM.1. The similar component FIA_SOS.2 is
intended for non-cryptographic use.
The family ―Generation of random numbers (FCS_RND)‖ is specified as follows.
FCS_RND Generation of random numbers
Family behaviour
This family defines quality requirements for the generation of random numbers
which are intended to be use for cryptographic purposes.
Component leveling:
FCS_RND.1 Generation of random numbers requires that random numbers meet
a defined quality metric.
Management: FCS_RND.1
There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit: FCS_RND.1
There are no actions defined to be auditable.
FCS_RND.1 Quality metric for random numbers
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FCS_RND.1.1 The TSF shall provide a mechanism to generate random numbers that meet
[assignment: a defined quality metric].
FCS_RND Generation of random numbers 1
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5.4 Definition of the Family FIA_API
To describe the IT security functional requirements of the TOE a sensitive family
(FIA_API) of the Class FIA (Identification and authentication) is defined here. This
family describes the functional requirements for the proof of the claimed identity for
the authentication verification by an external entity where the other families of the
class FIA address the verification of the identity of an external entity.
Application note 1: The other families of the Class FIA describe only the authenti-
cation verification of users‘ identity performed by the TOE and do not describe the
functionality of the user to prove their identity. The following paragraph defines the
family FIA_API in the style of the Common Criteria part 2 (cf. [R3], chapter ―Explic-
itly stated IT security requirements (APE_SRE)‖) from a TOE point of view.
FIA_API Authentication Proof of Identity
Family behaviour
This family defines functions provided by the TOE to prove their identity and to be
verified by an external entity in the TOE IT environment.
Component levelling
FIA_API.1 Authentication Proof of Identity.
Management: FIA_API.1
The following actions could be considered for the management functions in
FMT: Management of authentication information used to prove the claimed
identity.
Audit: FIA_API.1
There are no actions defined to be auditable.
FIA_API.1 Authentication Proof of Identity.
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FIA_API.1.1 The TSF shall provide a [assignment: authentication mechanism] to prove the
identity of the [assignment: authorized user or role].
FIA_API Authentication Proof of Identity 1
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5.5 Definition of the Family FMT_LIM
The family FMT_LIM describes the functional requirements for the Test Features of
the TOE. The new functional requirements were defined in the class FMT because
this class addresses the management of functions of the TSF. The examples of the
technical mechanism used in the TOE show that no other class is appropriate to ad-
dress the specific issues of preventing the abuse of functions by limiting the capabili-
ties of the functions and by limiting their availability.
The family ―Limited capabilities and availability (FMT_LIM)‖ is specified as follows.
FMT_LIM Limited capabilities and availability
Family behaviour
This family defines requirements that limit the capabilities and availability of func-
tions in a combined manner. Note that FDP_ACF restricts the access to functions
whereas the component Limited Capability of this family requires the functions
themselves to be designed in a specific manner.
Component levelling
FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities requires that the TSF is built to provide only the capabilities
(perform action, gather information) necessary for its genuine purpose.
FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability requires that the TSF restrict the use of functions (refer to
Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)). This can be achieved, for instance, by re-
moving or by disabling functions in a specific phase of the TOE’s life-cycle.
Management: FMT_LIM.1, FMT_LIM.2
There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit: FMT_LIM.1, FMT_LIM.2
There are no actions defined to be auditable.
To define the IT security functional requirements of the TOE a sensitive family
(FMT_LIM) of the Class FMT (Security Management) is defined here. This family de-
scribes the functional requirements for the Test Features of the TOE. The new func-
FMT_LIM Limited capabilities and availability
2
1
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tional requirements were defined in the class FMT because this class addresses the
management of functions of the TSF. The examples of the technical mechanism used
in the TOE show that no other class is appropriate to address the specific issues of
preventing the abuse of functions by limiting the capabilities of the functions and by
limiting their availability.
The TOE Functional Requirement ―Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)‖ is specified as
follows.
FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities.
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability.
FMT_LIM.1.1 The TSF shall be designed and implemented in a manner that limits its capa-
bilities so that in conjunction with “Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)” the follow-
ing policy is enforced [assignment: Limited capability and availability policy].
The TOE Functional Requirement ―Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)‖ is specified as
follows.
FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability.
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities.
FMT_LIM.2.1 The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits its availability so that in con-
junction with “Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)” the following policy is enforced
[assignment: Limited capability and availability policy].
Application note 2: The functional requirements FMT_LIM.1 and FMT_LIM.2 as-
sume that there are two types of mechanisms (limited capabilities and limited avail-
ability) which together shall provide protection in order to enforce the policy. This al-
so allows that
the TSF is provided without restrictions in the product in its user environment but its capa-
bilities are so limited that the policy is enforced
or conversely
the TSF is designed with test and support functionality that is removed from, or disabled in,
the product prior to the Operational Use Phase.
The combination of both requirements shall enforce the policy.
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5.6 Definition of the Family FPT_EMS
The sensitive family FPT_EMSEC (TOE Emanation) of the Class FPT (Protection of the
TSF) is defined here to describe the IT security functional requirement of the TOE.
The TOE shall prevent attacks against the TOE and other secret data where the at-
tack is based on external observable physical phenomena of the TOE. Examples of
such attacks are evaluation of TOE‘s electromagnetic radiation, simple power analy-
sis (SPA), differential power analysis (DPA), timing attacks, etc. This family de-
scribes the functional requirements for the limitation of intelligible emanations which
are not directly addressed by any other component of CC part 2 [R2].
The family ―TOE Emanation (FPT_EMS)‖ is specified as follows.
FPT_EMS TOE emanation
Family behaviour
This family defines requirements to mitigate intelligible emanations.
Component levelling
FPT_EMS.1 TOE emanation has two constituents:
FPT_EMS.1.1 Limit of Emissions requires to not emit intelligible emissions enabling access to
TSF data or user data.
FPT_EMS.1.2 Interface Emanation requires to not emit interface emanation enabling access
to TSF data or user data.
Management: FPT_EMS.1
There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit: FPT_EMSEC.1
There are no actions defined to be auditable.
FPT_EMS.1 TOE emanation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FPT_EMS TOE emanation 1
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FPT_EMS.1.1 The TOE shall not emit [assignment: types of emissions] in excess of [assign-
ment: specified limits] enabling access to [assignment: list of types of TSF
data] and [assignment: list of types of user data].
FPT_EMS.1.2 The TSF shall ensure [assignment: type of users] are unable to use the follow-
ing interface [assignment: type of connection] to gain access to [assignment:
list of types of TSF data] and [assignment: list of types of user data].
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6 Security Functional Requirements
6.1 Security Functional Requirements
6.1.1 PP-0056
The CC allows several operations to be performed on functional requirements; refinement,
selection, assignment, and iteration are defined in paragraph C.4 of Part 1 [R1]of the CC.
Each of these operations is used in this PP.
The refinement operation is used to add detail to a requirement, and thus further restricts a
requirement. Refinement of security requirements is denoted by the word 'refinement' in
bold text and the added/changed words are in bold text. In cases where words from a CC
requirement were deleted, a separate attachment indicates the words that were removed.
The selection operation is used to select one or more options provided by the CC in stating a
requirement. Selections that have been made by the PP authors are denoted as underlined
text and the original text of the component is given by a footnote. Selections to be filled in
by the ST author appear in square brackets with an indication that a selection is to be made,
[selection:], and are italicized.
The assignment operation is used to assign a specific value to an unspecified parameter,
such as the length of a password. Assignments that have been made by the PP authors are
denoted by showing as underlined text and the original text of the component is given by a
footnote. Assignments to be filled in by the ST author appear in square brackets with an
indication that an assignment is to be made [assignment:], and are italicized. In some cases
the assignment made by the PP authors defines a selection to be performed by the ST au-
thor. Thus this text is underlined and italicized like this.
The iteration operation is used when a component is repeated with varying operations. Itera-
tion is denoted by showing a slash '/', and the iteration indicator after the component iden-
tifier.
Note, that all the subjects used ('Manufacturer', 'Personalisation Agent', 'Extended Inspection
System', 'Country Verifying Certification Authority', 'Document Verifier' and 'Terminal') are
acting for homonymous external entities. All used objects are defined at the end of the doc-
ument or in the following table. The operations 'write', 'modify', 'read' and 'disable read
access' are used in accordance with the general linguistic usage. The operations 'store',
'create', 'transmit', 'receive', 'establish communication channel', 'authenticate' and 're-
authenticate' are originally taken from [2]. The operation 'load' is synonymous to 'import'
used in [2].
This section on security functional requirements for the TOE is divided into sub-section fol-
lowing the main security functionality. SFRs from the PACE PP are not repeated in this PP but
listed in Table 4. Only those SFRs from PACE PP extended in this PP are written down below.
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SFRs to be taken from PACE PP [R7]
FAU_SAS.1
FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1/PACE_ENC
FCS_COP.1/PACE_MAC
FCS_RND.1
FIA_AFL.1/PACE
FIA_UAU.6/PACE
FDP_RIP.1
FDP_UCT.1/TRM
FDP_UIT.1/TRM
FMT_SMF.1
FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS
FMT_MTD.1/PA
FPT_TST.1
FPT_FLS.1
FPT_PHP.3
FTP_ITC.1/PACE
6.1.1.1 SFRs listed in PP PACE
FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE Cryptographic key generation DH for PACE session key
FCS_CKM.1.1/DH_PACE The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with
dance with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm Diffie-Hellman Protocol
Protocol (PKCS3),ECDH (ISO 15946)
[R17] and specified cryptographic key sizes 1024, 1536 and 2048 bits and
192, 224 ,256, 320, 384, 512 and 521 bits that meet the following:
[R10],Annex A.1 and [R13]and [R14].
Application note:
The TOE generates a shared secret value K with the terminal during the PACE protocol,
see [R4]. This protocol may be based on the Diffie-Hellman-Protocol compliant to
PKCS#3 (i.e. modulo arithmetic based cryptographic algorithm, cf. [R13]) or on the
ECDH compliant to TR-03111 [R12] (i.e. the elliptic curve cryptographic algorithm
ECKA, cf. [R4]and [R12] for details). The shared secret value K is used for deriving the
AES or DES session keys for message encryption and message authentication (PACE-
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K.MAC, PACE-K.Enc) according to [R4]for the TSF required by FCS_COP.1/PACE_ENC
and FCS_COP.1/PACE_MAC.
FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE implicitly contains the requirements for the hashing functions used
for key derivation by demanding compliance to [R4].
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_CKM.4.1 The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a
specified cryptographic key destruction method Overwriting with random
data that meets the following: none.
Application note:
The TOE shall destroy the PACE session keys after detection of an error in a received com-
mand by verification of the MAC. The TOE shall clear the memory area of any session keys
before starting the communication with the terminal in a new after-reset-session as required
by FDP_RIP.1.
FCS_COP.1/PACE_ENC Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1.1/PACE_ENC The TSF shall perform secure messaging - encryp-
tion and decryption
in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm 3DES and AES in CBC mode and
cryptographic key sizes respectively 112 and 128, 192 and 256bits that meet the
following: compliant to [R4].
Application note:
This SFR requires the TOE to implement the cryptographic primitive AES or 3DES for secure
messaging with encryption of transmitted data and encrypting the nonce in the first step of
PACE. The related session keys are agreed between the TOE and the terminal as part of the
PACE protocol according to the FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE (PACE-KEnc).
FCS_COP.1/PACE_MAC Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1.1/PACE_MAC The TSF shall perform secure messaging - mes-
sage authentication code
in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm Retail-MAC and CMAC
and cryptographic key sizes respectively 112 and 128, 192 and 256bitsthat
meet the following: compliant to [R4].
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Application note:
This SFR requires the TOE to implement the cryptographic primitive for secure messaging
with message authentication code over transmitted data. The related session keys are
agreed between the TOE and the terminal as part of either the PACE protocol according to
the FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE (PACE-K.MAC). Note that in accordance with [R4] the (two-key)
Triple-DES could be used in Retail mode for secure messaging.
FIA_AFL.1/PACE Authentication failure handling
FIA_AFL.1.1/PACE The TSF shall detect when 3 unsuccessful authentication
attempts occur related to authentication attempts using the PACE pass-
word as shared password.
FIA_AFL.1.2/PACE When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication
attempts has been met, the TSF shall consecutively increase the reaction
time of the TOE before a new authentication attempt
Application note:
The open assignment operation shall be performed according to a concrete implementa-
tion of the TOE, whereby actions to be executed by the TOE may either be common
for all data concerned (PACE passwords, see [R4]) or for an arbitrary subset of them or
may also separately be defined for each datum in question. Since all non-blocking au-
thorisation data (PACE passwords) being used as a shared secret within the PACE pro-
tocol do not possess a sufficient entropy, the TOE shall not allow a quick monitoring of
its behaviour (e.g. due to a long reaction time) in order to make the first step of the
skimming attack requiring an attack potential beyond high, so that the threat T.Tracing
can be averted in the frame of the security policy of the current PP. One of some op-
portunities for performing this operation might be 'consecutively increase the reaction
time of the TOE to the next authentication attempt using PACE passwords'.
FIA_UAU.6/PACE Re-authenticating
FIA_UAU.6.1/PACE The TSF shall re-authenticate the user under the conditions
each command sent to the TOE after successful run of the PACE proto-
col shall be verified as being sent by the PACE terminal.
Application note:
The PACE protocol specified in [R4] starts secure messaging used for all commands ex-
changed after successful PACE authentication. The TOE checks each command by se-
cure messaging in encrypt-then-authenticate mode based on CMAC or Retail-MAC,
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whether it was sent by the successfully authenticated terminal (see
FCS_COP.1/PACE_MAC for further details). The TOE does not execute any command
with incorrect message authentication code. Therefore, the TOE re-authenticates the
terminal connected, if a secure messaging error occurred, and accepts only those
commands received from the initially authenticated terminal.
FDP_RIP.1 Subset residual information protection
FDP_RIP.1.1 The TSF shall ensure that any previous information content of a
resource is made unavailable upon the allocation of the resource to and
deallocation of the resource from the following objects: 1. Session Keys
(immediately after closing related communication session),
2. the ephemeral private key ephem - SK PICC- PACE (by having gen-
erated a DH shared secret K).
Application note:
The functional family FDP_RIP possesses such a general character, so that it is applicable
not only to user data (as assumed by the class FDP), but also to TSF-data; in this re-
spect it is similar to the functional family FPT_EMS. Applied to cryptographic keys,
FDP_RIP.1 requires a certain quality metric ('any previous information content of a re-
source is made unavailable') for key-s destruction in addition to FCS_CKM.4 that mere-
ly requires a fact of key destruction according to a method/standard.
The TOE shall meet the requirement -Basic data exchange confidentiality (FDP_UCT.1)- as
specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
FDP_UCT.1/TRM Basic data exchange confidentiality
FDP_UCT.1.1/TRM The TSF shall enforce the Access Control SFP to transmit
and receive user data in a manner protected from unauthorised disclosure.
FDP_UIT.1/TRM Data exchange integrity
FDP_UIT.1.1/TRM The TSF shall enforce the Access Control SFP to transmit
and receive user data in a manner protected from modification, deletion,
insertion and replay errors.
FDP_UIT.1.2/TRM The TSF shall be able to determine on receipt of user data,
whether modification, deletion, insertion and replay has occurred.
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FTP_ITC.1/PACE Inter-TSF trusted channel
FTP_ITC.1.1/PACE The TSF shall provide a communication channel between
itself and another trusted IT product that is logically distinct from other com-
munication channels and provides assured identification of its end points and
protection of the channel data from modification or disclosure.
FTP_ITC.1.2/PACE The TSF shall permit another trusted IT product to in-
itiate communication via the trusted channel.
FTP_ITC.1.3/PACE The TSF shall initiate communication via the trusted chan-
nel for any data exchange between the TOE and the Terminal. NOTE:
the TSF shall enforce instead of initiate
Application note:
The trusted IT product is the terminal. In FTP_ITC.1.3/PACE, the word 'initiate' is
changed to 'enforce', as the TOE is a passive device that can not initiate the communi-
cation. All the communication are initiated by the Terminal, and the TOE enforce the
trusted channel.
The trusted channel is established after successful performing the PACE protocol
(FIA_UAU.1/PACE). If the PACE was successfully performed, secure messaging is im-
mediately started using the derived session keys (PACE-K.MAC, PACE-K.Enc): this se-
cure messaging enforces preventing tracing while Passive Authentication and the re-
quired properties of operational trusted channel; the cryptographic primitives being
used for the secure messaging are as required by FCS_COP.1/PACE_ENC and
FCS_COP.1/PACE_MAC. The establishing phase of the PACE trusted channel does not
enable tracing due to the requirements FIA_AFL.1/PACE.
Please note that the control on the user data stored in the TOE is addressed by
FDP_ACF.1/TRM.
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_SMF.1.1 The TSF shall be capable of performing the following manage-
ment functions:
1. Initialization,
2. Pre-personalisation,
3. Personalisation
4. Configuration.
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FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1/INI_ENA The TSF shall restrict the ability to write the Initiali-
sation Data and the Pre-personalisation Data to the Manufacturer.
Application note:
The TOE may restrict the ability to write the Initialisation Data and the Pre-personalisation
Data by (i) allowing writing these data only once and (ii) blocking the role Manufactur-
er at the end of the manufacturing phase. The Manufacturer may write the Initialisa-
tion Data (as required by FAU_SAS.1) including, but being not limited to a unique iden-
tification of the IC being used to trace the IC in the life cycle phases 'manufacturing'
and 'issuing', but being not needed and may be misused in the 'operational use'.
Therefore, read and use access to the Initialisation Data shall be blocked in the
'operational use' by the Personalisation Agent, when he switches the TOE from the life
cycle phase 'issuing' to the life cycle phase 'operational use'.
FMT_MTD.1/PA Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1/PA The TSF shall restrict the ability to write the Document Se-
curity Object (SO.D) to the Personalisation Agent.
Application note:
By writing SO.D into the TOE, the Personalisation Agent confirms (on behalf of DS) the
correctness and genuineness of all the personalisation data related. This consists of
user- and TSF- data.
FPT_FLS.1 Failure with preservation of secure state
FPT_FLS.1.1 The TSF shall preserve a secure state when the following types of
failures occur: 1. Exposure to operating conditions causing a TOE mal-
function,
2. Failure detected by TSF according to FPT_TST.1,
3. [assignment: list of types of failures in the TSF ].
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FPT_TST.1 TSF testing
FPT_TST.1.1 The TSF shall run a suite of self tests during initial start-up to
demonstrate the correct operation of TSF Data.
FPT_TST.1.2 The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify
the integrity of TSF data.
FPT_TST.1.3 The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify
the integrity of stored TSF executable code.
Application note:
If the travel document's chip uses state of the art smart card technology, it will run some
self tests at the request of an authorised user and some self tests automatically. E.g. a
self test for the verification of the integrity of stored TSF executable code required by
FPT_TST.1.3 may be executed during initial start-up by the 'authorised user' Manufac-
turer in the life cycle phase 'Manufacturing'. Other self tests may automatically run to
detect failures and to preserve the secure state according to FPT_FLS.1 in the phase
'operational use', e.g. to check a calculation with a private key by the reverse calcula-
tion with the corresponding public key as a countermeasure against Differential Failure
Analysis.
FPT_PHP.3 Resistance to physical attack
FPT_PHP.3.1 The TSF shall resist physical manipulation and physical prob-
ing to the TSF by responding automatically such that the SFRs are always en-
forced.
Application note:
The TOE will implement appropriate measures to continuously counter physical manipula-
tion and physical probing. Due to the nature of these attacks (especially manipulation)
the TOE can by no means detect attacks on all of its elements. Therefore, permanent
protection against these attacks is required ensuring that the TSP could not be violated
at any time. Hence, 'automatic response' means here (i) assuming that there might be
an attack at any time and (ii) countermeasures are provided at any time.
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FAU_SAS.1 Audit storage
FAU_SAS.1.1 The TSF shall provide the Manufacturer with the capability to
store initialisation and pre-personnalization data in the audit records.
Application note:
The Manufacturer role is the default user identity assumed by the TOE in the life cycle phase
'manufacturing'. The IC manufacturer and the travel document manufacturer in the Manufac-
turer role write the Initialisation and/or Pre-personalisation Data as TSF-data into the TOE.
The audit records are usually write-only-once data of the travel document (see
FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA, FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS). Please note that there could also be such audit
records which cannot be read out, but directly used by the TOE.
FCS_RND.1 Quality metric for random numbers
FCS_RND.1.1 The TSF shall provide a mechanism to generate random numbers
with a reprocessing algorithmic that meet AIS31 Class P2 quality metric.
Application note:
This SFR requires the TOE to generate random numbers (random nonce) used for the au-
thentication protocol (PACE) as required by FIA_UAU.4/PACE.
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1/INI_DIS The TSF shall restrict the ability to read out the In-
itialisation Data and the Pre-personalisation Data to the Personalisa-
tion Agent.
Application note:
The TOE may restrict the ability to write the Initialisation Data and the Pre-personalisation
Data by (i) allowing writing these data only once and (ii) blocking the role Manufactur-
er at the end of the manufacturing phase. The Manufacturer may write the Initialisa-
tion Data (as required by FAU_SAS.1) including, but being not limited to a unique iden-
tification of the IC being used to trace the IC in the life cycle phases 'manufacturing'
and 'issuing', but being not needed and may be misused in the 'operational use'.
Therefore, read and use access to the Initialisation Data shall be blocked in the
'operational use' by the Personalisation Agent, when he switches the TOE from the life
cycle phase 'issuing' to the life cycle phase 'operational use'.
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6.1.1.2 Additional SFRs
Class Cryptographic Support (FCS)
The TOE shall meet the requirement 'Cryptographic key generation (FCS_CKM.1)' as speci-
fied below (Common Criteria Part 2). The iterations are caused by different cryptographic
key generation algorithms to be implemented and key to be generated by the TOE.
Cryptographic operation (FCS_COP.1)
The TOE shall meet the requirement 'Cryptographic operation (FCS_COP.1)' as specified be-
low (Common Criteria Part 2). The iterations are caused by different cryptographic algo-
rithms to be implemented by the TOE.
FCS_COP.1/SYM Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1.1/SYM The TSF shall perform secure messaging encryption and
decryption in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm Triple-
DES and AES in CBC mode and cryptographic key sizes respectively 112
and 128, 192 and 256 bits that meet the following: [[R5]].
Application note:
This SFR requires the TOE to implement the cryptographic primitives (e.g. Triple-DES
and/or AES) for secure messaging with encryption of the transmitted data. The keys
are agreed between the TOE and the terminal as part of the Chip Authentication Proto-
col Version 1 according to the FCS_CKM.1/CA.
FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1.1/SIG_VER The TSF shall perform digital signature verification
in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm ECDSA and RSA.
For ECDSA the cryptographic key sizes are: 192, 224, 256, 320, 384 ,512 and 521
and 521 bits that meet the following: ISO15946-2 specified in
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[R17] in combination with SHA1, SHA224, SHA256, SHA384 and SHA512
digest algorithms
For RSA the cryptographic key sizes are: 1280, 1536, 1792, 2560 and 3072
bits . that meet the following:RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 and RSA PSS specified in
[R18] in combination with SHA1 and SHA256 digest algorithms for RSA
PKCS#1 v1.5 and SHA1 ,SHA256 and SHA512 for RSA PSS
Application note:
The ST writer shall perform the missing operation of the assignments for the signature algo-
rithms key lengths and standards implemented by the TOE for the Terminal Authentication
Protocol v.1 (cf. [R5]). The signature verification is used to verify the card verifiable certifi-
cates and the authentication attempt of the terminal creating a digital signature for the TOE
challenge.
FCS_COP.1/MAC Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1.1/MAC The TSF shall perform secure messaging message au-
thentication code in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm
3DES Retail MAC and AES CMAC and cryptographic key sizes respectively
112 and 128, 192 and 256bits that meet the following: [R6]
Application note:
This SFR requires the TOE to implement the cryptographic primitive for secure messaging
with encryption and message authentication code over the transmitted data. The key is
agreed between the TSF by Chip Authentication Protocol Version 1 according to the
FCS_CKM.1/CA. Furthermore the SFR is used for authentication attempts of a terminal as
Personalisation Agent by means of the authentication mechanism.
FCS_COP.1/SIG_GEN Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1.1/SIG_GEN The TSF shall perform :
digital signature generation in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm
gorithm ECDSA and RSA and cryptographic key sizes 192,224, 256 ,320, 384, 512
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384, 512 and 521 bits for ECDSA and 1536, 1792 ,2048, 2560, and 3072bits for
RSA that meet the following: ISO15946-2
[R17] for ECDSA and RSA-PKCS#1-v2.1[R18] for RSA, in combination
with SHA1, SHA224, SHA256, SHA384 and SHA512 digest algorithms
for ECDSA and SHA1, SHA224, SHA256, SHA384, and SHA512 digest
algorithms for ECDSA.
Application note:
This SFR has been added to this ST in order to support the signing of challenges generated
by the Inspection System as part of the optional Active Authentication protocol specified in
[ICAO-9303].
Miscellaneous
FCS_CKM.1/CA Cryptographic key generation
FCS_CKM.1.1/CA The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with
a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm based on the ECDH pro-
tocol and Diffie-Hellman Protocol, and specified cryptographic key sizes
192, 224, 256, 320, 384, 512 or 521 bits and 2048 bits that meet the
following: [DH-PKCS#3] and [TR-03111].
Application note:
FCS_CKM.1/CA implicitly contains the requirements for the hashing functions used for key
derivation by demanding compliance to [R5].
The TOE generates a shared secret value with the terminal during the Chip Authentication
Protocol Version 1, see [R5]. This protocol may be based on the Diffie-Hellman-
Protocol compliant to PKCS#3 (i.e. modulo arithmetic based cryptographic algorithm,
cf. [R12]) or on the ECDH compliant to TR-03111 (i.e. an elliptic curve cryptography
algorithm) (cf. [R13], for details). The shared secret value is used to derive the Chip
Authentication Session Keys used for encryption and MAC computation for secure mes-
saging (defined in Key Derivation Function [R5]).
The TOE shall implement the hash function SHA-1 for the cryptographic primitive to de-
rive the keys for secure messaging from any shared secrets of the Authentication Me-
chanisms. The Chip Authentication Protocol v.1 may use SHA-1 (cf. [R5] ). The TOE
may implement additional hash functions SHA-224 and SHA-256 for the Terminal Au-
thentication Protocol v.1 (cf. [R5] for details).
The TOE shall destroy any session keys in accordance with FCS_CKM.4 from [R7] after (i)
detection of an error in a received command by verification of the MAC and (ii) after
successful run of the Chip Authentication Protocol v.1. (iii) The TOE shall destroy the
PACE Session Keys after generation of a Chip Authentication Session Keys and chang-
ing the secure messaging to the Chip Authentication Session Keys. (iv) The TOE shall
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clear the memory area of any session keys before starting the communication with the
terminal in a new after-reset-session as required by FDP_RIP.1. Concerning the Chip
Authentication keys FCS_CKM.4 is also fulfilled by FCS_CKM.1/CA.
Class FIA Identification and Authentication
The Table 5 provides an overview on the authentication mechanisms used.
Name SFR for the TOE
Active Authentication Protocol FIA_API.1.1/AAP
Authentication Mechanism for Perso-
nalisation Agents
FIA_UAU.4/PACE
Chip Authentication Protocol v.1
FIA_API.1, FIA_UAU.5/PACE,
FIA_UAU.6/EAC
Terminal Authentication Protocol v.1 FIA_UAU.5/PACE
PACE protocol
FIA_UAU.1/PACE, FIA_UAU.5/PACE,
FIA_AFL.1/PACE
Passive Authentication FIA_UAU.5/PACE
Note the Chip Authentication Protocol Version 1 as defined in this protection profile includes:
the asymmetric key agreement to establish symmetric secure messaging keys between
the TOE and the terminal based on the Chip Authentication Public Key and the Termin-
al Public Key used later in the Terminal Authentication Protocol Version 1,
the check whether the TOE is able to generate the correct message authentication code
with the expected key for any message received by the terminal.
The Chip Authentication Protocol v.1 may be used independent of the Terminal Authentica-
tion Protocol v.1. But if the Terminal Authentication Protocol v.1 is used the terminal shall
use the same public key as presented during the Chip Authentication Protocol v.1.
The TOE shall meet the requirement 'Timing of identification (FIA_UID.1)' as specified below
(Common Criteria Part 2).
FIA_UID.1/PACE Timing of identification
FIA_UID.1.1/PACE The TSF shall allow 1. to establish the communication
channel,
2. carrying out the PACE Protocol according to [R4],
3. to read the Initialization Data if it is not disabled by TSF according
to FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS
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4. to carry out the Chip Authentication Protocol v.1 according to [R5]
5. to carry out the Terminal Authentication Protocol v.1 according to
[R5] on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is identified.
FIA_UID.1.2/PACE The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified
before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
Application note:
The SFR FIA_UID.1/PACE in the current PP covers the definition in PACE PP [R7] and ex-
tends it by EAC aspect 4. This extension does not conflict with the strict conformance
to PACE PP.
In the Phase 2 'Manufacturing of the TOE' the Manufacturer is the only user role known to
the TOE which writes the Initialization Data and/or Pre-personalisation Data in the au-
dit records of the IC. The travel document manufacturer may create the user role Per-
sonalisation Agent for transition from Phase 2 to Phase 3 'Personalisation of the travel
document'. The users in role Personalisation Agent identify themselves by means of se-
lecting the authentication key. After personalisation in the Phase 3 the PACE domain
parameters, the Chip Authentication data and Terminal Authentication Reference Data
are written into the TOE. The Inspection System is identified as default user after pow-
er up or reset of the TOE i.e. the TOE will run the PACE protocol, to gain access to the
Chip Authentication Reference Data and to run the Chip Authentication Protocol Ver-
sion 1. After successful authentication of the chip the terminal may identify itself as (i)
Extended Inspection System by selection of the templates for the Terminal Authentica-
tion Protocol Version 1 or (ii) if necessary and available by authentication as Personali-
sation Agent (using the Personalisation Agent Key).
User identified after a successfully performed PACE protocol is a terminal. Please note
that neither CAN nor MRZ effectively represent secrets, but are restricted revealable;
i.e. it is either the travel document holder itself or an authorised other person or device
(Basic Inspection System with PACE).
In the life-cycle phase 'Manufacturing' the Manufacturer is the only user role known to the
TOE. The Manufacturer writes the Initialisation Data and/or Pre-personalisation Data in
the audit records of the IC.Please note that a Personalisation Agent acts on behalf of
the travel document Issuer under his and CSCA and DS policies. Hence, they define au-
thentication procedure(s) for Personalisation Agents. The TOE must functionally sup-
port these authentication procedures being subject to evaluation within the assurance
components ALC_DEL.1 and AGD_PRE.1. The TOE assumes the user role
'Personalisation Agent', when a terminal proves the respective Terminal Authorisation
Level as defined by the related policy (policies).
FIA_UAU.1/PACE Timing of authentication
FIA_UAU.1.1/PACE The TSF shall allow 1. to establish the communication
channel,
2. carrying out the PACE Protocol according to [R4],
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3. to read the Initialization Data if it is not disabled by TSF according
to FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS,
4. to identify themselves by selection of the authentication key
5. to carry out the Chip Authentication Protocol Version 1 according to
[R5]
6. to carry out the Terminal Authentication Protocol Version 1 accord-
ing to [R5] 16 on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is au-
thenticated.
FIA_UAU.1.2/PACE The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authen-
ticated before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
Application note:
The SFR FIA_UAU.1/PACE. in the current PP covers the definition in PACE PP [R7] and ex-
tends it by EAC aspect 5. This extension does not conflict with the strict conformance
to PACE PP.
The user authenticated after a successfully performed PACE protocol is a terminal. Please
note that neither CAN nor MRZ effectively represent secrets, but are restricted reveala-
ble; i.e. it is either the travel document holder itself or an authorised other person or
device (BIS-PACE).If PACE was successfully performed, secure messaging is started us-
ing the derived session keys (PACE-K.MAC, PACE-K.Enc), cf. FTP_ITC.1/PACE.
FIA_UAU.4/PACE Single-use authentication mechanisms
FIA_UAU.4.1/PACE The TSF shall prevent reuse of authentication data related
to 1.PACE Protocol according to [R4],
2.Authentication Mechanism based on Triple- DES and AES
3.Terminal Authentication Protocol v.1 according to [R5].
Application note:
The SFR FIA_UAU.4.1 in the current PP covers the definition in PACE PP [R7] and extends
it by the EAC aspect 3. This extension does not conflict with the strict conformance to
PACE PP. The generation of random numbers (random nonce) used for the authentica-
tion protocol (PACE) and Terminal Authentication as required by FIA_UAU.4/PACE is
required by FCS_RND.1 from [R7].
The authentication mechanisms may use either a challenge freshly and randomly gener-
ated by the TOE to prevent reuse of a response generated by a terminal in a success-
ful authentication attempt. However, the authentication of Personalisation Agent may
rely on other mechanisms ensuring protection against replay attacks, such as the use
of an internal counter as a diversifier.
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FIA_UAU.5/PACE Multiple authentication mechanisms
FIA_UAU.5.1/PACE The TSF shall provide 1. PACE Protocol according to
[R4],
2. Passive Authentication according to [R6]
3. Secure messaging in MAC-ENC mode according to [R4],
4. Symmetric Authentication Mechanism based on Triple-DES and AES
5. Terminal Authentication Protocol v.1 according to [R5], to support
user authentication.
FIA_UAU.5.2/PACE The TSF shall authenticate any user's claimed identity ac-
cording to the following rules:
1. Having successfully run the PACE protocol the TOE accepts only re-
ceived commands with correct message authentication code sent by
means of secure messaging with the key agreed with the terminal by
means of the PACE protocol.
2. The TOE accepts the authentication attempt as Personalisation
Agent by [selection: the Authentication Mechanism with Personalisa-
tion Agent Key(s)].
3. After run of the Chip Authentication Protocol Version 1 the TOE ac-
cepts only received commands with correct message authentication
code sent by means of secure messaging with key agreed with the
terminal by means of the Chip Authentication Mechanism v1.
4. The TOE accepts the authentication attempt by means of the Ter-
minal Authentication Protocol v.1 only if the terminal uses the public
key presented during the Chip Authentication Protocol v.1 and the se-
cure messaging established by the Chip Authentication Mechanism v.1
19.
5. [assignment: rules describing how the multiple authentication me-
chanisms provide authentication].
Application note:
The SFR FIA_UAU.5.1/PACE in the current PP covers the definition in PACE PP [R7] and ex-
tends it by EAC aspects 4), 5), and 6). The SFR FIA_UAU.5.2/PACE in the current PP covers
the definition in PACE PP [R7] and extends it by EAC aspects 2), 3), 4) and 5). These exten-
sions do not conflict with the strict conformance to PACE PP.
FIA_UAU.6/EAC Re-authenticating
FIA_UAU.6.1/EAC The TSF shall re-authenticate the user under the conditions
each command sent to the TOE after successful run of the Chip Au-
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thentication Protocol Version 1 shall be verified as being sent by the
Inspection System.
Application note:
The Password Authenticated Connection Establishment and the Chip Authentication Protocol
specified in [R6] include secure messaging for all commands exchanged after successful au-
thentication of the Inspection System. The TOE checks by secure messaging in MAC_ENC
mode each command based on a corresponding MAC algorithm whether it was sent by the
successfully authenticated terminal (see FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC for further details). The TOE
does not execute any command with incorrect message authentication code. Therefore the
TOE re-authenticates the user for each received command and accepts only those com-
mands received from the previously authenticated user.
FIA_API.1/CAP Authentication Proof of Identity
FIA_API.1.1/CAP The TSF shall provide a Chip Authentication Protocol ac-
cording to [R5]to prove the identity of the TOE.
Application note:
This SFR requires the TOE to implement the Chip Authentication Mechanism v.1 specified in
[R5]. The TOE and the terminal generate a shared secret using the Diffie-Hellman Protocol
(DH or EC-DH) and two session keys for secure messaging in ENC_MAC mode according to
[R6]. The terminal verifies by means of secure messaging whether the travel document's
chip was able or not to run his protocol properly using its Chip Authentication Private Key
corresponding to the Chip Authentication Key (EF.DG14).
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FIA_API.1/AAP Authentication Proof of Identity
FIA_API.1.1/AAP The TSF shall provide a Active Authentication Protocol
according to [R6] to prove the identity of the TOE.
Application note:
This SFR requires the TOE to implement the Active Authentication Mechanism specified in
[R6]. The terminal generates a secret then verifies whether the MRTD’s chip was able or not
to sign it properly using its Active Authentication private key corresponding to the Active
Authentication public key (EF.DG14).
Class FDP User Data Protection
The TOE shall meet the requirement 'Subset access control (FDP_ACC.1)' as specified below
(Common Criteria Part 2).
FDP_ACC.1/TRM Subset access control
FDP_ACC.1.1/TRM The TSF shall enforce the Access Control SFP on termin-
als gaining access to the User Data and data stored in EF.SOD of the
logical travel document.
Application note:
The SFR FIA_ACC.1.1 in the current PP covers the definition in PACE PP [R7] and extends it
by data stored in EF.SOD of the logical travel document. This extension does not conflict
with the strict conformance to PACE PP.
FDP_ACF.1/TRM Security attribute based access control
FDP_ACF.1.1/TRM The TSF shall enforce the Access Control SFP to objects
based on the following: 1. Subjects:
1.a. Terminal,
1.b. BIS-PACE
1.c. Extended Inspection System
2. Objects:
2.a. data in EF.DG1, EF.DG2 and EF.DG5 to EF.DG16, EF.SOD and
EF.COM of the logical travel document,
2.b. data in EF.DG3 of the logical travel document,
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2.c. data in EF.DG4 of the logical travel document,
2.d. all TOE intrinsic secret cryptographic keys stored in the travel
document
3. Security attributes:
3.a. PACE Authentication
3.b. Terminal Authentication v.1
3.c. Authorisation of the Terminal.
FDP_ACF.1.2/TRM The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an
operation among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed: A BIS-
PACE is allowed to read data objects from FDP_ACF.1.1/TRM accord-
ing to [R4] after a successful PACE authentication as required by
FIA_UAU.1/PACE.
FDP_ACF.1.3/TRM The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to ob-
jects based on the following additional rules: none.
FDP_ACF.1.4/TRM The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects
based on the following additional rules: 1. Any terminal being not authen-
ticated as PACE authenticated BIS-PACE is not allowed to read, to
write, to modify, to use any User Data stored on the travel document.
2. Terminals not using secure messaging are not allowed to read, to
write, to modify, to use any data stored on the travel document.
3. Any terminal being not successfully authenticated as Extended In-
spection System with the Read access to DG 3 (Fingerprint) granted
by the relative certificate holder authorization encoding is not allowed
to read the data objects 2b) of FDP_ACF.1.1/TRM.
4. Any terminal being not successfully authenticated as Extended In-
spection System with the Read access to DG 4 (Iris) granted by the
relative certificate holder authorization encoding is not allowed to
read the data objects 2c) of FDP_ACF.1.1/TRM.
5. Nobody is allowed to read the data objects 2d) of
FDP_ACF.1.1/TRM.
6. Terminals authenticated as CVCA or as DV are not allowed to read
data in the EF.DG3 and EF.DG4.
Application note:
The SFR FDP_ACF.1.1/TRM in the current PP covers the definition in PACE PP [R7] and
extends it by additional subjects and objects. The SFRs FDP_ACF.1.2/TRM and
FDP_ACF.1.3/TRM in the current PP cover the definition in PACE PP [R7]. The SFR
FDP_ACF.1.4/TRM in the current PP covers the definition in PACE PP [R7] and extends
it by 3) to 6).These extensions do not conflict with the strict conformance to PACE PP.
The relative certificate holder authorization encoded in the CVC of the inspection system
is defined in [R5]. The TOE verifies the certificate chain established by the Country Ve-
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rifying Certification Authority, the Document Verifier Certificate and the Inspection Sys-
tem Certificate (cf. FMT_MTD.3). The Terminal Authorization is the intersection of the
Certificate Holder Authorization in the certificates of the Country Verifying Certification
Authority, the Document Verifier Certificate and the Inspection System Certificate in a
valid certificate chain.
Please note that the Document Security Object (SOD) stored in EF.SOD (see [R6]) does
not belong to the user data, but to the TSF data. The Document Security Object can be
read out by Inspection Systems using PACE, see [R4].
FDP_UCT.1/TRM and FDP_UIT.1/TRM require the protection of the User Data transmitted
from the TOE to the terminal by secure messaging with encryption and message au-
thentication codes after successful Chip Authentication Version 1 to the Inspection Sys-
tem. The Password Authenticated Connection Establishment, and the Chip Authentica-
tion Protocol v.1 establish different key sets to be used for secure messaging (each set
of keys for the encryption and the message authentication key).
Class FMT Security Management
The SFR FMT_SMR.1/PACE provides basic requirements to the management of the TSF data.
The TOE shall meet the requirement 'Security roles (FMT_SMR.1)' as specified below (Com-
mon Criteria Part 2).
FMT_SMR.1/PACE Security roles
FMT_SMR.1.1/PACE The TSF shall maintain the roles 1. Manufacturer,
2. Personalisation Agent,
3. Terminal,
4. PACE authenticated BIS-PACE,
5. Country Verifying Certification Authority,
6. Document Verifier,
7. Domestic Extended Inspection System
8. Foreign Extended Inspection System.
FMT_SMR.1.2/PACE The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.
Application note:
The SFR FMT_SMR.1/PACE provides basic requirements to the management of the TSF
data.
The SFR FMT_SMR.1.1/PACE in the current PP covers the definition in PACE PP [R7] and
extends it by 5) to 8). This extension does not conflict with the strict conformance to
PACE PP.
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party without prior written approval. EDD DNP 029 F1 EN A
The SFR FMT_LIM.1 and FMT_LIM.2 address the management of the TSF and TSF data to
prevent misuse of test features of the TOE over the life-cycle phases.
FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities
FMT_LIM.1.1 The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their capabilities
so that in conjunction with 'Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)' the following poli-
cy is enforced Deploying Test Features after TOE Delivery does not al-
low,
1. User Data to be manipulated and disclosed,
2. TSF data to be disclosed or manipulated,
3. software to be reconstructed,
4. substantial information about construction of TSF to be gathered
which may enable other attacks and
5. sensitive User Data (EF.DG3 and EF.DG4) to be disclosed
FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability
FMT_LIM.2.1 The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their availability
so that in conjunction with 'Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)' the following pol-
icy is enforced Deploying Test Features after TOE Delivery does not al-
low:
1. User Data to be manipulated and disclosed,
2. TSF data to be disclosed or manipulated
3. software to be reconstructed,
4. substantial information about construction of TSF to be gathered
which may enable other attacks and
5. sensitive User Data (EF.DG3 and EF.DG4) to be disclosed,
Application note:
The formulation of 'Deploying Test Features' in FMT_LIM.2.1 might be a little bit mislead-
ing since the addressed features are no longer available (e.g. by disabling or removing
the respective functionality). Nevertheless the combination of FMT_LIM.1 and
FMT_LIM.2 is introduced to provide an optional approach to enforce the same policy.
Note that the term 'software' in item 4 of FMT_LIM.1.1 and FMT_LIM.2.1 refers to both
IC Dedicated and IC Embedded Software.
The following SFR are iterations of the component Management of TSF data
(FMT_MTD.1). The TSF data include but are not limited to those identified below.
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FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_INI Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1/CVCA_INI The TSF shall restrict the ability to write the 1. ini-
tial Country Verifying Certification Authority Public Key,
2. initial Country Verifying Certification Authority Certificate,
3. initial Current Date,
4. [assignment: list of TSF data ] to Personalization Agent.
Application note:
The ST writer shall perform the missing operation in the component
FMT_MTD.1.1/CVCA_INI. The initial Country Verifying Certification Authority Public Key may
be written by the Manufacturer in the production or pre-personalisation phase or by the Per-
sonalisation Agent (cf. [R5]). The initial Country Verifying Certification Authority Public Keys
(and their updates later on) are used to verify the Country Verifying Certification Authority
Link-Certificates. The initial Country Verifying Certification Authority Certificate and the initial
Current Date is needed for verification of the certificates and the calculation of the Terminal
Authorization.
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_UPD Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1/CVCA_UPD The TSF shall restrict the ability to update the 1.
Country Verifying Certification Authority Public Key,
2. Country Verifying Certification Authority Certificate to Country Veri-
fying Certification Authority.
Application note:
The Country Verifying Certification Authority updates its asymmetric key pair and distributes
the public key be means of the Country Verifying CA Link-Certificates (cf. [R5]). The TOE
updates its internal trust-point if a valid Country Verifying CA Link-Certificates (cf.
FMT_MTD.3) is provided by the terminal (cf. [R5]).
FMT_MTD.1/DATE Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1/DATE The TSF shall restrict the ability to modify the Current
date to 1. Country Verifying Certification Authority,
2. Document Verifier,
3. Domestic Extended Inspection System.
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Application note:
The authorized roles are identified in their certificate (cf. [R5]) and authorized by validation
of the certificate chain (cf. FMT_MTD.3). The authorized role of the terminal is part of the
Certificate Holder Authorization in the card verifiable certificate provided by the terminal for
the identification and the Terminal Authentication v.1 (cf. to [R5]).
FMT_MTD.1/CAPK Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1/CAPK The TSF shall restrict the ability to load the Chip Au-
thentication Private Key to Personalization Agent.
Application note:
The component FMT_MTD.1/CAPK is refined by (i) selecting other operations and (ii) defin-
ing a selection for the operations 'create' and 'load' to be performed by the ST writer. The
verb 'load' means here that the Chip Authentication Private Key is generated securely outside
the TOE and written into the TOE memory. The verb 'create' means here that the Chip Au-
thentication Private Key is generated by the TOE itself. In the latter case the ST writer shall
include an appropriate instantiation of the component FCS_CKM.1/CA as SFR for this key
generation. The ST writer shall perform the assignment for the authorized identified roles in
the SFR component FMT_MTD.1/CAPK.
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1/KEY_READ The TSF shall restrict the ability to read the 1.
PACE passwords,
2. Chip Authentication Private Key,
3. Personalisation Agent Keys
4. Active Authentication Private Key to none.
Application note:
The SFR FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ in the current PP covers the definition in PACE PP [R7] and
extends it by additional TSF data. This extension does not conflict with the strict confor-
mance to PACE PP.
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FMT_MTD.3 Secure TSF data
FMT_MTD.3.1 The TSF shall ensure that only secure values are accepted for
TSF data of the Terminal Authentication Protocol v.1 and the Access
Control.
Refinement:
The certificate chain is valid if and only if
1. the digital signature of the Inspection System Certificate can be verified as
correct with the public key of the Document Verifier Certificate and the expira-
tion date of the Inspection System Certificate is not before the Current Date of
the TOE,
2. the digital signature of the Document Verifier Certificate can be verified as
correct with the public key in the Certificate of the Country Verifying Certifica-
tion
Authority and the expiration date of the Certificate of the Country Verifying
Certification Authority is not before the Current Date of the TOE and the
expiration date of the Document Verifier Certificate is not before the Current
Date of the TOE,
3. the digital signature of the Certificate of the Country Verifying Certification
Authority can be verified as correct with the public key of the Country Verify-
ing Certification Authority known to the TOE.
The Inspection System Public Key contained in the Inspection System Certifi-
cate in a valid certificate chain is a secure value for the authentication refer-
ence data of the Extended Inspection System.
The intersection of the Certificate Holder Authorizations contained in the certif-
icates of a valid certificate chain is a secure value for Terminal Authorization of
a successful authenticated Extended Inspection System.
Application note:
The Terminal Authentication Version 1 is used for Extended Inspection System as required
by FIA_UAU.4/PACE and FIA_UAU.5/PACE. The Terminal Authorization is used as TSF data
for access control required by FDP_ACF.1/TRM.
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FMT_MTD.1/AAPK Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1/AAPK The TSF shall restrict the ability to create and load the
Active Authentication Private Key to Personalization Agent.
Application note:
The component FMT_MTD.1/CAPK is refined by (i) selecting other operations and (ii) defin-
ing a selection for the operations 'create' and 'load' to be performed by the ST writer. The
verb 'load' means here that the Chip Authentication Private Key is generated securely outside
the TOE and written into the TOE memory. The verb 'create' means here that the Chip Au-
thentication Private Key is generated by the TOE itself. In the latter case the ST writer shall
include an appropriate instantiation of the component FCS_CKM.1/CA as SFR for this key
generation. The ST writer shall perform the assignment for the authorized identified roles in
the SFR component FMT_MTD.1/CAPK.
Class FPT Protection of the Security Functions
The TOE shall prevent inherent and forced illicit information leakage for User Data and TSF
Data. The security functional requirement FPT_EMS.1 addresses the inherent leakage. The
SFRs 'Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)', 'Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)' together with the
SAR 'Security architecture description' (ADV_ARC.1) prevent bypassing, deactivation and
manipulation of the security features or misuse of TOE functions. The TOE shall meet the
requirement 'TOE Emanation (FPT_EMS.1)' as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2 ex-
tended):
FPT_EMS.1 TOE Emanation
FPT_EMS.1.1 The TOE shall not emit side channel in excess of limits of the
state of the art enabling access to 1. Chip Authentication Session Keys
2. PACE session Keys (PACE-K MAC, PACE-KEnc),
3. the ephemeral private key ephem SK PICC-PACE,
4. Active Authentication Private Key,
5. Personalisation Agent Key(s),
6. Chip Authentication Private Key and none
FPT_EMS.1.2 The TSF shall ensure any users are unable to use the following
interface smart card circuit contacts to gain access to 1. Chip Authentica-
tion Session Keys
2. PACE Session Keys (PACE-K.MAC, PACE-K.Enc),
3. the ephemeral private key ephem SK PICC-PACE,
4. [assignment: list of types of TSF data ],
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5. Personalisation Agent Key(s) and
6. Chip Authentication Private Key and none.
Application note:
The SFR FPT_EMS.1.1 in the current PP covers the definition in PACE PP [R7] and extends
it by EAC aspects 1., 5. and 6. The SFR FPT_EMS.1.2 in the current PP covers the defi-
nition in PACE PP [R7] and extends it by EAC aspects 4) and 5). These extensions do
not conflict with the strict conformance to PACE PP.
The ST writer shall perform the operation in FPT_EMS.1.1 and FPT_EMS.1.2. The TOE
shall prevent attacks against the listed secret data where the attack is based on exter-
nal observable physical phenomena of the TOE. Such attacks may be observable at the
interfaces of the TOE or may be originated from internal operation of the TOE or may
be caused by an attacker that varies the physical environment under which the TOE
operates. The set of measurable physical phenomena is influenced by the technology
employed to implement the smart card. The travel document's chip can provide a
smart card contactless interface and contact based interface according to ISO/IEC
7816-2 [R14] as well (in case the package only provides a contactless interface the at-
tacker might gain access to the contacts anyway). Examples of measurable phenome-
na include, but are not limited to variations in the power consumption, the timing of
signals and the electromagnetic radiation due to internal operations or data transmis-
sions.
6.2 Security Assurance Requirements
The security assurance requirement level is EAL5 augmented with AVA_VAN.5 and
ALC_DVS.2.
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7 TOE Summary Specification
7.1 TOE Summary Specification
7.1.1 Chip security functionalities
TSF_DPM
The life cycle of the TOE is split-up in several phases. Chip development and
production (phase 2, 3, 4) and final use (phase 4-7) is a rough split-up from
TOE point of view. These phases are implemented in the TOE as test mode
(phase 3) and user mode (phase 4-7). In addition a chip identification mode
exists which is active in all phases. The chip identification data
(O.Identification) is stored in a in the not changeable configuration page area
and non-volatile memory. In the same area further TOE configuration data is
stored. In addition, user initialization data can be stored in the non-volatile
memory during the production phase as well. During this first data program-
ming, the TOE is still in the secure environment and in Test Mode. The covered
security functional requirement is FAU_SAS.1 "Audit storage". During start-up
of the TOE the decision for one of the various operation modes is taken de-
pendent on phase identifiers. The decision of accessing a certain mode is de-
fined as phase entry protection. The phases follow also a defined and pro-
tected sequence. The sequence of the phases is protected by means of au-
thentication. The covered security functional requirements are FMT_LIM.1 and
FMT_LIM.2. During the production phase (phase 3 and 4) or after the delivery
to the customer (phase 5 or phase 6), the TOE provides the possibility to
download, after a successful authentication process, a user specific encryption
key and user code and data into the empty (erased) Infineon® SOLID FLASH
memory area as specified by the associated control information of the Flash
Loader software. This process is only possible after a successful authentication
process. The integrity of the loaded data is checked with a signature process.
The data to be loaded may be transferred optionally in encrypted form. After
finishing the load operation, the Flash Loader can be permanently deactivated,
so that no further load operation with the Flash Loader is possible. These pro-
cedures are defined as phase operation limitation. The covered security func-
tional requirement is FPT_LIM.2 "Limited availability". During operation within
a phase the accesses to memories are granted by the MMU controlled access
rights and related privilege level. The covered security functional requirements
are FDP_ACC.1, FDP_ACF.1 and FMT_MSA.1. In addition, during each start-up
of the TOE the address ranges and access rights are initialized by the STS with
predefined values. The covered security functional requirement is FMT_MSA.3.
The TOE clearly defines access rights and privilege levels in conjunction with
the appropriate key management in dependency of the firmware or software
to be executed. By this clearly defined management functions are imple-
mented, enforced by the MMU, and the covered security functional require-
ment is FMT_SMF.1. During the testing phase in production within the secure
environment the entire Infineon® SOLID FLASH is deleted. The covered secu-
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rity functional requirement is FPT_PHP.3. Each operation phase is protected by
means of authentication and encryption. The covered security functional re-
quirements are FDP_ITT.1 and FPT_ITT.1.
TSF_PS
All contents of all memories of the TOE are encrypted on chip to protect
against data analysis on stored data as well as on internally transmitted data.
There is no plain data on the chip. In addition the data transferred over the
busses, the SFRs and the peripheral devices (CRC, RNG and Timer) are en-
crypted as well. The memory content and bus encryption is done by the MED
using a complex key management and by the memories Infineon® SOLID
FLASH, RAM, CACHE and the bus are entirely encrypted. Note that the FLASH
contains the firmware only and no user data. Therefore, no data in plain are
handled anywhere on the TOE and thus also the two CPUs compute entirely
masked. The symmetric cryptographic co-processor is entirely masked as well.
The encryption covers the data processing policy and FDP_IFC.1 ¯Subset in-
formation flow control¯. The covered security functional requirements are
FPT_PHP.3, FDP_IFC.1, FPT_ITT.1 and FDP_ITT.1. The user can define his own
key for an Infineon® SOLID FLASH area to protect his data. This user indivi-
dually chosen key is then delivered by the operating system and included in
the dynamic Infineon® SOLID FLASH encryption. The user specified Infineon®
SOLID FLASH area is then encrypted with his key and another component. The
encryption of the memories is performed by the memory encryption and de-
cryption unit MED providing protection against cryptographic analysis attacks.
The keys which have to be stored on the chip are protected against read out.
The covered security functional requirements are FPT_PHP.3, FDP_IFC.1,
FPT_ITT.1, and FDP_ITT.1. The CPU has no standard command set and dis-
closes therefore no possibility for deeper analysis. The covered security func-
tional requirement is FPT_PHP.3. The entire design is kept in a non standard
way to aggravate attacks using standard analysis methods to an almost not
practical condition. A proprietary CPU with a non public bus protocol is imple-
mented, which makes analysis very complicated and time consuming. Impor-
tant parts of the chip are especially designed to counter leakage or side chan-
nel attacks like DPA/SPA or EMA/DEMA. Therefore, even the physical data
gaining is difficult to perform, since timing and current consumption is almost
independent of the processed data, protected by a bunch of other protecting
means. In the design a number of components are automatically synthesized
and mixed up to disguise their physical boarders and to make an analysis
more difficult. A further protective design method implements special routing
measures against probing. The covered security functional requirements are
FPT_PHP.3, FPT_ITT.1 and FDP_ITT.1. In addition to their protection during
processing of code and data their storage in the Infineon® SOLID FLASH is
protected against side channel attacks too: Even if users operate with direct
and static addressing for storing their secrets, the addresses are always trans-
lated and modified. In addition the correct privilege level is controlled by the
MMU. The covered security functional requirements are FPT_PHP.3, FPT_ITT.1
and FDP_ITT.1. In contrast to the linear virtual address range, the physical In-
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fineon® SOLID FLASH pages are transparently and dynamically scrambled.
These measures cause that the physical location of data is different from chip
to chip. Even user software would always call the equal physical addresses. An
observation of the clock is used to prevent the TOE from single stepping. This
is tested by the user mode security life control UMSLC. The covered security
functional requirements are FPT_PHP.3 and FPT_FLS.1. An induced error which
can not be corrected will be recognized by the Integrity Guard and leads to an
alarm. In case of security critical detections a security alarm and reset is gen-
erated. The covered security functional requirement is FPT_FLS.1.
TSF_PMA
First of all we can say that all security mechanisms effective against snooping
SF_PS apply also here since a reasonable modification of data is almost im-
possible on dynamically encrypted, masked, scrambled, transparently relo-
cated, randomized and topologically protected hardware. Due to this the cov-
ered security functional requirements are FPT_PHP.3, FDP_IFC.1, FPT_ITT.1,
FDP_ITT.1 and FPT_FLS.1. The TOE is equipped with an error detection code
(EDC) which covers the memory system of RAM, FLASH and Infineon® SOLID
FLASH and includes also the MED, MMU and the bus system. Thus introduced
failures are detected and in certain errors are also automatically corrected
(FDP_SDI.2). In order to prevent accidental bit faults during production in the
FLASH, over the data stored in FLASH an EDC value is calculated (FDP_SDI.1).
The covered security functional requirements are FRU_FLT.2, FPT_PHP.3,
FDP_SDI.1 and FDP_SDI.2. If a user tears the card resulting in a power off
situation during an Infineon® SOLID FLASH programming operation or if other
perturbation is applied, no data or content loss occurs and the TOE restarts
power on. The Infineon® SOLID FLASH tearing save write functionality covers
FPT_FLS.1 "Failure with preservation of secure state" since if the programming
was not successful, the old data are still present and valid, which ensures a
secure state although a programming failure occurred. This action includes al-
so FDP_SDI.1 "Stored data integrity monitoring" as the new data to be pro-
grammed are checked for integrity and correct programming before the page
with the old data becomes the new physical page for the next new data. The
covered security functional requirement is also FPT_PHP.3 "Resistance to
physical attack", since these measures make it difficult to manipulate the write
process of the Infineon® SOLID FLASH. The covered security functional re-
quirements are FPT_FLS.1, FPT_PHP.3 and FDP_SDI.1. The TOE is protected
against fault and modifying attacks. The core provides the functionality of
double-computing and result comparison of all tasks to detect incorrect calcu-
lations. The detection of an incorrect calculation is stored and the TOE enters a
defined secure state which causes the chip internal reset process. The imple-
mentation of two CPUs computing on the same data is by this one of the most
important security features of this platform. As the results of both CPUs are
compared at the end, a fault induction of modifying attacks would have to be
done on both CPUs at the correct place with the correct timing despite all oth-
er countermeasures like dynamic masking, encryption and others. As the
comparison and the register files are also protected by various measures suc-
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cessful manipulative attacks are seen as being not practical. During start up,
the STS performs various configurations and subsystem tests. After the STS
has finished, the operating system or application can call the User Mode Secu-
rity Life Control (UMSLC) test. The UMSLC checks the alarm lines and number
of functions and sensors for correct operation. This test can be released ac-
tively by the user software during normal chip operation at any time. In the
case that a physical manipulation or a physical probing attack is detected, the
processing of the TOE is immediately stopped and the TOE enters a secure
state called security reset. The covered security functional requirements are
FPT_FLS.1, FPT_PHP.3 and FPT_TST.2. As physical effects or manipulative at-
tacks may also address the program flow of the user software, a watchdog ti-
mer and a check point register are implemented. These features allow the user
to check the correct processing time and the integrity of the program flow of
the user software. Another measure against modifying and perturbation re-
spectively differential fault attacks (DFA) is the implementation of backward
calculation in the SCP. By this induced errors are discovered. The covered se-
curity functional requirements are FPT_FLS.1, FDP_IFC.1, FPT_ITT.1,
FDP_ITT.1 and FPT_PHP.3. The RMS provides the user also the testing of all
security features enabled to generate an alarm. This security testing is called
user mode security life control (UMSLC). As attempts to modify the security
features will be detected from the test, the covered security functional re-
quirement is FPT_TST.2. All communication via the busses is in addition pro-
tected by a monitored hardware handshake. If the handshake was not suc-
cessful an alarm is generated. The covered security functional requirements
are FPT_FLS.1 and FPT_PHP.3. The virtual memory system and privilege level
model are enforced by the MMU. This controls the access rights throughout the
TOE. There is a clear differentiation within the privilege levels defined. The
covered security functional requirements are FDP_ACC.1, FDP_ACF.1,
FMT_MSA.1, FMT_MSA.3 and FMT_SMF1.
TSF_PLA
The memory access control of the TOE uses a memory management unit
(MMU) to control the access to the available physical memory by using virtual
memory addresses and to segregate the code and data to a privilege level
model. The MMU controls the address permissions of the privileged levels and
gives the software the possibility to define different access rights. The address
permissions of the privilege levels are controlled by the MMU. In case of an
access violation the MMU will trigger a reset and then a trap service routine
can react on the access violation. The policy of setting up the MMU and speci-
fying the memory ranges, to a certain extend, for the privilege levels with the
exception of the IFX level - is defined from the user software (OS). As the TOE
provides support for separation of memory areas the covered security func-
tional requirements are FDP_ACC.1 "Subset access control", FDP_ACF.1 "Secu-
rity attribute based access control", FMT_MSA.3 "Static attribute initialization",
FMT_MSA.1 "Management of security attributes" and FMT_SMF.1 "Specifica-
tion of Management functions". The TOE provides the possibility to protect the
property rights of user code and data by the encryption of the Infineon® SOL-
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ID FLASH memory areas with a specific key defined by the user. Due to this
key management FDP_ACF.1 is fulfilled. In addition, all memories present on
the TOE are individually encrypted using individual keys assigned by complex
key management. All data are protected by means of encryption or masking
also during transportation via the busses. Induced errors are recognized by
the Integrity Guard concept and lead to an alarm. In case of security critical
errors a security alarm is generated and the TOE ends up in a secure state.
The covered security functional requirements are FPT_PHP.3, FDP_ITT.1,
FDP_IFC.1 and FPT_FLS.1. Beside the access protection and key management,
also the use of illegal operation code is detected and will release a security re-
set.
TSF_CS
The TOE is equipped with several hardware accelerators and software modules
to support the standard symmetric and asymmetric cryptographic operations.
This security function is introduced to include the cryptographic operation in
the scope of the evaluation as the cryptographic function respectively mathe-
matic algorithm itself is not used from the TOE security policy. On the other
hand these functions are of special interest for the use of the hardware as
platform for the software. The components are a co-processor supporting the
DES and AES algorithms and a combination of a co-processor and software
modules to support RSA cryptography, RSA key generation, ECDSA signature
generation and verification, ECDH key agreement and EC public key calcula-
tion and public key testing.
7.1.2 Low level security functionalities
TSF_EXECUTION_ENVIRONMENT
This security functionality provides a secure execution environment based on
the secure operation of CPU that controls the execution flow, detects and
reacts to potential security violations. After start-up, this function calls
TSF_BOOT_AT_POWER_UP and waits for a terminal command. This command
is either processed or redirected to another item.
In particular, TSF_EXECUTION_ENVIRONMENT manages:
Application selection
Applications management (firewall)
A security group by application (Key status, SECURE MESSAGING status)
Before sending a command to an application, this function tests its (syntaxic)
validity. This function initializes a transaction with a previously selected appli-
cation.
Then, the managed security attributes are:
when a transaction begins, the allocation of security attribute context and the initiali-
zation of all the security group status to (FALSE, FALSE, FALSE)
when a transaction ends, the release of the security attribute context (memory era-
sure with TSF_MEMORY_MANAGEMENT)
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the Key status is set to TRUE if mutual authentication has succedeed during phases 4
to 6
the Secure Messaging status is set to TRUE if the current command uses the Secure
Messaging, is authenticated and checked for integrity
the Secure Messaging status is set to FALSE after each processed command All the
hardware security functionalities are used to produce the secure execution envi-
ronment.
7.1.3 Operating system security functionalities
TSF_BOOT_AT_POWER_UP
This security functionality manages the initialization of the TOE that happens
after each reset warm or cold. This security feature performs the following op-
erations:
Test of the following items:
FLASH memory segment
RAM memory
Random Number Generator
Crypto-processor
ATR issuing
Initialization of all modules and applications initialization.
The following hardware TSF are called:
SF_PMA Protection against Modification Attacks
SF_PLA Protection against Logical Attacks
SF_DPM Device Phase Management
TSF_MEMORY_MANAGEMENT
This security functionality manages the persistent and volatile memories of the
product according to the capacities of the underlying security IC, so as to con-
trol access to sensitive content protected by the TOE.
TSF_MEMORY_MANAGEMENT manages the access to objects (files, directories,
data and secrets) stored in FLASH. Access for read or write to RAM and FLASH
is impossible from the outside, refer to TSF_IO_MANAGEMENT for more infor-
mation.
An access is granted only if:
The file type is managed by the TOE
The file header is positively checked for integrity
The record that must be accessed is positively checked for integrity
The access conditions are fulfilled TSF_MEMORY_MANAGEMENT manages the erasure
of the FLASH and RAM memory. FLASH and RAM erasure are performed by writing
random values on it.
Moreover, this security functionality uses TSF_CRYPTO_OPERATION to perform
cryptographic operations in order to verify the integrity. CRC (Cyclic Redun-
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dancy Check) is the algorithm used to perform integrity tests. This operation
concerns file header, file record, OTP zone. All integrity tests link with the In-
put/Output Buffer is managed by TSF_IO_MANAGEMENT. In phases 4 to 6 of
the life cycle, only administration application can perform this access for creat-
ing files. Once these files are created, administration applications have all
rights on these lasts. The access conditions to files are applied for the phase 7.
In phase 7, subjects that can perform access are applications (pre-selected or
selected) or the manager. Two access conditions are defined: Check if the
concerned file is in the application arborescence. This condition is only used if
the application is pre-selected or selected. Application arborescence is com-
posed of all the files under its ADF, of all the elementary files under its DDF
and of all the elementary files under its MF (GROUPE ALL). This control en-
sures the data isolation and applies the inheritance rule for data sharing,
Check that the file access attributes are consistent with the operation that
must be performed. There exists two attributes for each file, one controls the
READ accesses, the other the WRITE accesses. For each attribute, it is pre-
cised: The person who can perform the action. The operation can be possible
only for a library or an application, for all the applications of an applicative
base, or for all the modules of a group, General conditions to the access.
These conditions correspond to the security attributes of an application. This
test is then performed only in the case where an application is pre-selected or
selected. These conditions are NONE, NEVER and secure messaging (data va-
lidity through secure messaging).
The following hardware TSF can be used:
SF_PS Protection against Snooping
SF_PMA Protection against Modification Attacks
SF_DPM Device Phase Management
TSF_LIFE_CYCLE_MANAGEMENT
This security functionality manages the life cycle of the product and provides a
secure transition mechanism between states. The various phases to be recog-
nized are pre-personalization, personalization, usage and end of life. The
management of the life cycle is performed by writing information in the One-
Time Programmable (OTP) memory. The life cycle of the product is composed
of 7 phases, more information is available in the dedicated paragraph 3.2 At
the end of the fabrication phase, after a test phase, chip test mode is inhibited
in a non-reversible way: the data (system or user) are completely under the
control of the card operating system. This is true for read, write or modify op-
erations. Tests done during fabrication phase can not be used anymore.
The following hardware security functionality is used: SF_DPM Device Phase
Management, for the management of the OTP memory (user write once)
TSF_CPLC
This security functionality manages the CPLC area. The CPLC area contains
Manufacturing data, pre-personalization data and Personalization data. Manu-
facturing data are written by the Manufacturer during the Manufacturing phase
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and contain identification data such as founder ID, chip ID and operating sys-
tem ID. Pre-Personalization data are written by the Manufacturer and also
contains identification data such as the module ID. The CPLC area is a write-
only-once area and write access is subject to Manufacturer or Personalization
Agent authentication. Read access to the CPLC area is allowed during Persona-
lization phase. During Operational Use phase, the CPLC area read access is on-
ly possible after PACE authentication.
TSF_MONITORING
This Security Functionality monitors all the events generated by the security
IC physical detectors:
Bad CPU usage
integrity loss in FLASH, OTP or RAM,
code signature alarm,
fault injection attempt,
watchdog timeout,
access attempt to unavailable or reserved memory areas,
MPU errors,
clock and voltage supply operating changes by the environment,
TOE physical integrity abuse.
Executable code integrity is controlled during its execution through the addi-
tion of code redundancies and specific tests. Code consistency is then ensured.
The following hardware TSF are used:
SF_PS Protection against Snooping
SF_PMA Protection against Modification Attacks
TSF_IO_MANAGEMENT
This security functionality manages Input/Output interfaces by way of contact
and contactless. Two protocols are used to communicate:
T=0 protocol, asynchronous, character-oriented half-duplex transmission protocol
T=CL, specific to the contactless, asynchronous, block-oriented half-duplex transmis-
sion protocol
A buffer is used for inputs and outputs. It is a reserved memory zone for the
communication. Other memories can not be accessed. During a cryp- tograph-
ic operation, the access to this buffer is blocked, once the operation is fi-
nished, the integrity of the buffer is verified by a CRC.
The following hardware TSF is used:
SF_PMA Protection against Modification Attacks
TSF_ALEA
This security functionality provides random numbers. The random number
generation is in conformance to the quality requirements of the french national
schemes:
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A random number generator compliant with the French Scheme ANSSI requirements
for RNG
A random generator of n bytes.
The chip security functionality is compliant with the AIS31 standard. Conform-
ing to the French Scheme ANSSI requirement for RNG, post-treatment is ef-
fectued on the RNG chip output, directly by the chip. The RNG chip output
provided by the chip s submitted to a posttreatment in order to provide a ran-
dom number of n bytes.
7.1.4 Application security functionalities
TSF_KEY_MANAGEMENT
This security functionality provides secure generation, destruction, replace-
ment and storage of cryptographic keys (KEY, …) according to the specification
of the product. Each secret is identified by a unique identifier and only mani-
pulated with the help of this identifier by the cryptographic module.
Each secret is associated to a ratification counter. The management of these
lasts is made by read/write control of the management of the maximum num-
ber of attempts. The ratification counter:
for a key is initialized to 32 and decremented after each presentation of a wrong
MAC,
Keys management consists of the following functions, prior to Issuer authenti-
cation, using a random generation of size 8 bytes:
Loading in the TOE: Keys are protected in integrity and confidentiality during their
loading (first loading or update). The cryptographic module ensures their secure
storage in the initialization, personalization and user life cycles phases. Loaded
keys use is made by the cryptographic module, using the unique key identifier.
Internal transfer in the TOE: The cryptographic module handles the secure transfer of
each key to the cryptographic processor, during its use for a cryptographic iden-
tifier.
The following hardware security functionality is used:
SF_PS Protection against Snooping
SF_PMA Protection against Modification Attacks
TSF_PACE_AUTH
This security functionality manages the authentication of the Inspection sys-
tem to the TOE, based on the Document Basic Access Keys. TSF_PACE_AUTH
performs the Password Authenticated Connection Establishment mechanism,
as described in [R5], in order to authenticate the Inspection System.
TSF_PACE_AUTH calls TSF_CRYPTO_OPERATION in order to perform the re-
lated cryptographic operations.
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TSF_CRYPTO_OPERATION
This security functionality performs high level cryptographic operations:
Encryption/decryption;
Integrity verification;
Secret decryption;
Authentication cryptogram creation/verification;
Key derivation;
Hash value calculation.
Encryption/decryption TSF_CRYPTO_OPERATION performs TDES in CBC mode
in conformance with FIPS 46-3 [R14] in order to achieve encryption and de-
cryption in secure messaging.
Integrity verification TSF_CRYPTO_OPERATION performs Retail MAC in con-
formance with ISO 9797 (MAC algorithm 3, block cipher DES, Sequence Mes-
sage Counter, padding mode 2), in order to achieve message authentication
code in secure messaging.
Secret decryption TSF_CRYPTO_OPERATION performs decryption of ciphered
secret imported in the card in conformance with [R22]. This functionality is
available in personalization phase only.
Authentication cryptogram creation/verification TSF_CRYPTO_OPERATION per-
forms the following authentication cryptogram calculation/verification:
Mutual Authentication compliant with [R22] for authentication based on TDES, this
mechanism is available in personalization phase only.
Basic Access Control authentication (see key derivation)
CBC DES with Retail MAC for secure messaging (see Integrity verification). Authenti-
cation cryptogram calculations are performed using a random number in order to
avoid replay of the authentication.
Key derivation TSF_CRYPTO_OPERATION performs the Document Basic Access
Key Derivation Algorithm to derive Triple-DES and Retail-MAC Session Keys of
size 112 bits for secure messaging, from agreed parameters produced during
the Basic Access Control Authentication Protocol, as described in [R9] norma-
tive appendix 5. Hash value calculation
TSF_CRYPTO_OPERATION performs SHA-1, SHA-224 and SHA-256 in confor-
mance with [R16], in order to calculate a hash value.
TSF_TERM_AUTH
This security function manages the authentication of the Terminal to the TOE,
based on the authentication secrets related to the Terminal. TSF_TERM_AUTH
performs the Terminal Authentication to authenticate the terminal.
TSF_TERM_AUTH calls TSF_CRYPTO_OPERATION in order to perform the re-
lated cryptographic operations.
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TSF_SYM_AUTH
This security function manages the authentication of a user to the TOE, based
on the TDES or AES keys related to this user, during the personalization
phase. TSF_SYM_AUTH performs an authentication mechanism based on TDES
or AES. TSF_SYM_AUTH calls TSF_CRYPTO_OPERATION in order to perform
the related cryptographic operations.
TSF_CHIP_AUTH
This security function manages the capability of the TOE to authenticate itself
to the terminal using the Chip Authentication Protocol as defined in [[R5]].
TSF_CHIP_AUTH calls TSF_CRYPTO_OPERATION in order to perform the re-
lated cryptographic operations
TSF_ACTIVE_AUTH
This security function manages the capability of the TOE to authenticate itself
to the terminal using the Active Authentication Protocol as defined in [R5].
TSF_ACTIVE_AUTH calls TSF_CRYPTO_OPERATION in order to perform the re-
lated cryptographic operations
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8 Security Requirements – Mutual Support and
Internal Consistency
The following part of the security requirements rationale shows that the set of
security requirements for the TOE consisting of the security functional require-
ments (SFRs) and the security assurance requirements (SARs) together form a
mutually supportive and internally consistent whole.
The analysis of the TOE´s security requirements with regard to their mutual sup-
port and internal consistency demonstrates:
The dependency analysis shows that the basis for mutual support and internal
consistency between all defined functional requirements is satisfied. All depen-
dencies between the chosen functional components are analysed, and non-
satisfied dependencies are appropriately explained.
All subjects and objects addressed by more than one SFR are also treated in a
consistent way: the SFRs impacting them do not require any contradictory prop-
erty and behaviour of these ‗shared‘ items.
The assurance class EAL4 is an established set of mutually supportive and inter-
nally consistent assurance requirements. The dependency analysis for the sensi-
tive assurance components shows that the assurance requirements are mutually
supportive and internally consistent as all (sensitive) dependencies are satisfied
and no inconsistency appears.
Inconsistency between functional and assurance requirements could only arise if
there are functional-assurance dependencies which are not met, a possibility
which has been shown not to arise. Furthermore, the chosen assurance compo-
nents are adequate for the functionality of the TOE. So the assurance require-
ments and security functional requirements support each other and there are no
inconsistencies between the goals of these two groups of security requirements.
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9 Security Attributes, Keys and Certificates
Security attributes
Security attributes Values Meaning
Terminal authentication
status
none (any Terminal) default role (i.e. without au-
thorisation after start-up)
CVCA
roles defined in the certificate
used for authentication (cf.
[R5]); Terminal is authenti-
cated as Country Verifying
Certification Authority after
successful CA v.1 and TA v.1
DV (domestic)
roles defined in the certificate
used for authentication (cf.
[R5]); Terminal is authenti-
cated as domestic Document
Verifier after successful CA v.1
and TA v.1
DV (foreign)
roles defined in the certificate
used for authentication (cf.
[R5]); Terminal is authenti-
cated as foreign Document
Verifier after successful CA v.1
1 and TA v.1
IS
roles defined in the certificate
used for authentication (cf.
[R5]); Terminal is authenticated
as Extended Inspection System
after successful CA v.1 and TA
v.1
Terminal Authorization none
DG4 (Iris) Read access to DG4: (cf. [R5])
DG3 (Fingerprint) Read access to DG3: (cf. [R5])
DG3 (Fingerprint) /
DG4 (Iris)
Read access to DG3 and DG4:
(cf. [R5])
Keys and Certificates
The following table provides an overview of the keys and certificates used. Fur-
ther keys and certificates are listed in [R7].
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Name Data
TOE intrinsic secret crypto-
graphic keys
Permanently or temporarily stored secret crypto-
graphic material used by the TOE in order to en-
force its security functionality.
Country Verifying Certifica-
tion Authority Private Key
(SK.CVCA)
The Country Verifying Certification Authority
(CVCA) holds a private key (SK.CVCA) used for
signing the Document Verifier Certificates.
Country Verifying
The TOE stores the Country Verifying Certifica-
tion Authority
Certification Authority Pub-
lic Key (PK.CVCA)
Public Key (PK.CVCA) as part of the TSF data to
verify the Document Verifier Certificates. The
PK.CVCA has the security attribute Current Date
as the most recent valid effective date of the
Country Verifying Certification Authority Certifi-
cate or of a domestic Document Verifier Certifi-
cate.
Country Verifying Certifica-
tion Authority Certificate
(C.CVCA)
The Country Verifying Certification Authority Cer-
tificate may be a self-signed certificate or a link
certificate (cf. [R5] and Glossary). It contains (i)
the Country Verifying Certification Authority Pub-
lic Key (PK.CVCA) as authentication reference
data, (ii) the coded access control rights of the
Country Verifying Certification Authority, (iii) the
Certificate Effective Date and the Certificate Ex-
piration Date as security attributes.
Document Verifier Certifi-
cate (C.DV)
The Document Verifier Certificate C.DV is issued
by the Country Verifying Certification Authority.
It contains (i) the Document Verifier Public Key
(PK.DV) as authentication reference data (ii)
identification as domestic or foreign Document
Verifier, the coded access control rights of the
Document Verifier, the Certificate Effective Date
and the Certificate Expiration Date as security
attributes.
Inspection System Certifi-
cate (C.IS)
The Inspection System Certificate (C.IS) is is-
sued by the Document Verifier. It contains (i) as
authentication reference data the Inspection Sys-
tem Public Key (PK.IS), (ii) the coded access
control rights of the Extended Inspection Sys-
tem, the Certificate Effective Date and the Certif-
icate Expiration Date as security attributes.
Chip Authentication Public
Key Pair
The Chip Authentication Public Key Pair (SK.ICC,
PK.ICC) are used for Key Agreement Protocol:
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Diffie-Hellman (DH) according to RFC 2631 or
Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman according to ISO
11770-3 [R11].
Chip Authentication Public
Key (PK.ICC)
The Chip Authentication Public Key (PK.ICC) is
stored in the EF.DG14 Chip Authentication Public
Key of the TOE‘s logical travel document and
used by the inspection system for Chip Authenti-
cation Version 1 of the travel document‘s chip. It
is part of the user data provided by the TOE for
the IT environment.
Chip Authentication Private
Key (SK.ICC)
The Chip Authentication Private Key (SK.ICC) is
used by the TOE to authenticate itself as authen-
tic travel document‘s chip. It is part of the TSF
data.
Country Signing Certifica-
tion Authority Key Pair
Country Signing Certification Authority of the is-
suing State or Organisation signs the Document
Signer Public Key Certificate with the Country
Signing Certification Authority Private Key and
the signature will be verified by receiving State
or Organisation (e.g. an Extended Inspection
System) with the Country Signing Certification
Authority Public Key.
Document Signer Key Pairs
Document Signer of the issuing State or Organi-
sation signs the Document Security Object of the
logical travel document with the Document Sign-
er Private Key and the signature will be verified
by an Extended Inspection System of the receiv-
ing State or Organisation with the Document
Signer Public Key.
Chip Authentication Session
Keys
Secure messaging encryption key and MAC com-
putation key agreed between the TOE and an
Inspection System in result of the Chip Authenti-
cation Protocol Version 1.
PACE Session Keys
Secure messaging encryption key and MAC com-
putation key agreed between the TOE and an
Inspection System in result of PACE.
Application note: The Country Verifying Certification Authority identifies a Doc-
ument Verifier as ―domestic‖ in the Document Verifier Certificate if it belongs to
the same State as the Country Verifying Certification Authority. The Country Ve-
rifying Certification Authority identifies a Document Verifier as ―foreign‖ in the
Document Verifier Certificate if it does not belong to the same State as the Coun-
try Verifying Certification Authority. From travel document‘s point of view the
domestic Document Verifier belongs to the issuing State or Organisation.
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10 Glossary and Acronyms
Term Definition
Accurate Terminal Certificate
A Terminal Certificate is accurate, if the is-
suing Document Verifier is trusted by the tra-
vel document‘s chip to produce Terminal Cer-
tificates with the correct certificate effective
date, see [R5].
Advanced Inspection Proce-
dure (with PACE)
A specific order of authentication steps be-
tween a travel document and a terminal as
required by [R4], namely (i) PACE, (ii) Chip
Authentication v.1, (iii) Passive Authentication
with SO.D and (iv) Terminal Authentication
v.1. AIP can generally be used by EIS-AIP-
PACE.
Agreement
This term is used in the current PP in order to
reflect an appropriate relationship between the
parties involved, but not as a legal notion.
Active Authentication
Security mechanism defined in [R6] option by
which means the travel document‘s chip
proves and the inspection system verifies the
identity and authenticity of the travel docu-
ment‘s chip as part of a genuine travel docu-
ment issued by a known State of Organisation.
Application note
Optional informative part of the PP containing
sensitive supporting information that is consi-
dered relevant or useful for the construction,
evaluation, or use of the TOE.
Audit records
Write-only-once non-volatile memory area of
the travel document's chip to store the Initiali-
zation Data and Pre-personalisation Data.
Authenticity
Ability to confirm the travel document and its
data elements on the travel document‘s chip
were created by the issuing State or Organisa-
tion
Basic Access Control (BAC)
Security mechanism defined in [R6] by which
means the travel document‘s chip proves and
the inspection system protects their communi-
cation by means of secure messaging with
Document Basic Access Keys (see there).
Basic Inspection System with
PACE protocol (BIS-PACE)
A technical system being used by an inspect-
ing authority and operated by a governmental
organisation (i.e. an Official Domestic or For-
eign Document Verifier) and verifying the tra-
vel document presenter as the travel docu-
ment holder (for ePassport: by comparing the
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real biometric data (face) of the travel docu-
ment presenter with the stored biometric data
(DG2) of the travel document holder).
The Basic Inspection System with PACE is a
PACE Terminal additionally support-
ing/applying the Passive Authentication proto-
col and is authorised by the travel document
Issuer through the Document Verifier of re-
ceiving state to read a subset of data stored
on the travel document.
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Basic Inspection System (BIS)
An inspection system which implements the
terminals part of the Basic Access Control Me-
chanism and authenticates itself to the travel
document‘s chip using the Document Basic
Access Keys derived from the printed MRZ da-
ta for reading the logical travel document.
Biographic data (biodata).
The personalised details of the travel docu-
ment holder of the document appearing as
text in the visual and machine readable zones
on the biographical data page of a travel doc-
ument. [R6]
Biometric reference data
Data stored for biometric authentication of the
travel document holder in the travel docu-
ment‘s chip as (i) digital portrait and (ii) op-
tional biometric reference data.
Card Access Number (CAN)
Password derived from a short number printed
on the front side of the data-page.
Certificate chain
A sequence defining a hierarchy certificates.
The Inspection System Certificate is the lowest
level, Document Verifier Certificate in be-
tween, and Country Verifying Certification Au-
thority Certificates are on the highest level. A
certificate of a lower level is signed with the
private key corresponding to the public key in
the certificate of the next higher level.
Counterfeit
An unauthorized copy or reproduction of a ge-
nuine security document made by whatever
means. [R6]
Country Signing CA Certificate
(C.CSCA)
Certificate of the Country Signing Certification
Authority Public Key (K.PuCSCA) issued by
Country Signing Certification Authority stored
in the inspection system.
Country Signing Certification
Authority (CSCA)
An organisation enforcing the policy of the tra-
vel document Issuer with respect to confirm-
ing correctness of user and TSF data stored in
the travel document. The CSCA represents the
country specific root of the PKI for the travel
documents and creates the Document Signer
Certificates within this PKI.
The CSCA also issues the self-signed CSCA
Certificate (CCSCA) having to be distributed
by strictly secure diplomatic means, see. [R6],
5.5.1.
The Country Signing Certification Authority
issuing certificates for Document Signers (cf.
[R6]) and the domestic CVCA may be inte-
grated into a single entity, e.g. a Country Cer-
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tification Authority. However, even in this
case, separate key pairs must be used for dif-
ferent roles, see [R5].
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Country Verifying Certification
Authority (CVCA)
An organisation enforcing the privacy policy of
the travel document Issuer with respect to
protection of user data stored in the travel
document (at a trial of a terminal to get an
access to these data). The CVCA represents
the country specific root of the PKI for the
terminals using it and creates the Document
Verifier Certificates within this PKI. Updates of
the public key of the CVCA are distributed in
form of CVCA Link-Certificates, see [R5].
Since the Standard Inspection Procedure does
not imply any certificate-based terminal au-
thentication, the current TOE cannot recognise
a CVCS as a subject; hence, it merely
represents an organizational entity within this
PP.
The Country Signing Certification Authority
(CSCA) issuing certificates for Document Sign-
ers (cf. [R6]) and the domestic CVCA may be
integrated into a single entity, e.g. a Country
Certification Authority. However, even in this
case, separate key pairs must be used for dif-
ferent roles, see [R5].
Current date
The maximum of the effective dates of valid
CVCA, DV and domestic Inspection System
certificates known to the TOE. It is used the
validate card verifiable certificates.
CV Certificate Card Verifiable Certificate according to [R5].
CVCA link Certificate
Certificate of the new public key of the Coun-
try Verifying Certification Authority signed with
the old public key of the Country Verifying
Certification Authority where the certificate
effective date for the new key is before the
certificate expiration date of the certificate for
the old key.
Document Basic Access Key
Derivation Algorithm
The [R6] describes the Document Basic Access
Key Derivation Algorithm on how terminals
may derive the Document Basic Access Keys
from the second line of the printed MRZ data.
PACE passwords
Passwords used as input for PACE. This may
either be the CAN or the SHA-1-value of the
concatenation of Serial Number, Date of Birth
and Date of Expiry as read from the MRZ, see
[R4],
Document Details Data
Data printed on and electronically stored in
the travel document representing the docu-
ment details like document type, issuing state,
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document number, date of issue, date of ex-
piry, issuing authority. The document details
data are less-sensitive data.
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Document Security Object
(SO.D)
A RFC3369 CMS Signed Data Structure, signed
by the Document Signer (DS). Carries the
hash values of the LDS Data Groups. It is
stored in the travel document‘s chip. It may
carry the Document Signer Certificate (C.DS).
[R6]
Document Signer (DS)
An organisation enforcing the policy of the
CSCA and signing the Document Security Ob-
ject stored on the travel document for passive
authentication.
A Document Signer is authorised by the na-
tional CSCA issuing the Document Signer Cer-
tificate (CDS), see [R5]and [R6].
This role is usually delegated to a Personalisa-
tion Agent.
Document Verifier (DV)
An organisation enforcing the policies of the
CVCA and of a Service Provider (here: of a
governmental organisation / inspection au-
thority) and managing terminals belonging
together (e.g. terminals operated by a State‘s
border police), by – inter alia – issuing Ter-
minal Certificates. A Document Verifier is
therefore a Certification Authority, authorised
by at least the national CVCA to issue certifi-
cates for national terminals, see [R5].
Since the Standard Inspection Procedure does
not imply any certificate-based terminal au-
thentication, the current TOE cannot recognise
a DV as a subject; hence, it merely represents
an organisational entity within this PP.
There can be Domestic and Foreign DV: A do-
mestic DV is acting under the policy of the
domestic CVCA being run by the travel docu-
ment Issuer; a foreign DV is acting under a
policy of the respective foreign CVCA (in this
case there shall be an appropriate agreement
between the travel document Issuer und a
foreign CVCA ensuring enforcing the travel
document Issuer‘s privacy policy).
Eavesdropper
A threat agent with high attack potential read-
ing the communication between the travel
document‘s chip and the inspection system to
gain the data on the travel document‘s chip.
Enrolment
The process of collecting biometric samples
from a person and the subsequent preparation
and storage of biometric reference templates
representing that person's identity. [R6]
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Travel document (electronic)
The contact based or contactless smart card
integrated into the plastic or paper, optical
readable cover and providing the following ap-
plication: ePassport.
ePassport application
A part of the TOE containing the non-
executable, related user data (incl. biometric)
as well as the data needed for authentication
(incl. MRZ); this application is intended to be
used by authorities, amongst other as a ma-
chine readable travel document (MRTD). See
[R5].
Extended Access Control
Security mechanism identified in [R6] by which
means the travel document‘s chip (i) verifies
the authentication of the inspection systems
authorized to read the optional biometric ref-
erence data, (ii) controls the access to the op-
tional biometric reference data and (iii) pro-
tects the confidentiality and integrity of the
optional biometric reference data during their
transmission to the inspection system by se-
cure messaging.
Extended Inspection System
(EIS)
A role of a terminal as part of an inspection
system which is in addition to Basic Inspection
System authorized by the issuing State or Or-
ganisation to read the optional biometric ref-
erence data and supports the terminals part of
the Extended Access Control Authentication
Mechanism.
Forgery
Fraudulent alteration of any part of the ge-
nuine document, e.g. changes to the bio-
graphical data or the portrait. [R6]
Global Interoperability
The capability of inspection systems (either
manual or automated) in different States
throughout the world to exchange data, to
process data received from systems in other
States, and to utilize that data in inspection
operations in their respective States. Global
interoperability is a major objective of the
standardized specifications for placement of
both eye-readable and machine readable data
in all travel documents. [R6]
IC Dedicated Software
Software developed and injected into the chip
hardware by the IC manufacturer. Such soft-
ware might support special functionality of the
IC hardware and be used, amongst other, for
implementing delivery procedures between
different players. The usage of parts of the IC
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Dedicated Software might be restricted to cer-
tain life phases.
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IC Dedicated Support Soft-
ware
That part of the IC Dedicated Software (refer
to above) which provides functions after TOE
Delivery. The usage of parts of the IC Dedicat-
ed Software might be restricted to certain
phases.
IC Dedicated Test Software
That part of the IC Dedicated Software (refer
to above) which is used to test the TOE before
TOE Delivery but which does not provide any
functionality thereafter.
IC Embedded Software
Software embedded in an IC and not being
designed by the IC developer. The IC Embed-
ded Software is designed in the design life
phase and embedded into the IC in the manu-
facturing life phase of the TOE.
IC Identification Data
The IC manufacturer writes a unique IC iden-
tifier to the chip to control the IC as travel
document material during the IC manufactur-
ing and the delivery process to the travel doc-
ument manufacturer.
Impostor
A person who applies for and obtains a docu-
ment by assuming a false name and identity,
or a person who alters his or her physical ap-
pearance to represent himself or herself as
another person for the purpose of using that
person‘s document. [R6]
Improperly documented per-
son
A person who travels, or attempts to travel
with: (a) an expired travel document or an
invalid visa; (b) a counterfeit, forged or al-
tered travel document or visa; (c) someone
else‘s travel document or visa; or (d) no travel
document or visa, if required. [R6]
Initialisation
Process of writing Initialisation Data (see be-
low) to the TOE (cf. sec. 1.2, TOE life-cycle,
Phase 2, Step 3).
Initialisation Data
Any data defined by the TOE Manufacturer and
injected into the non-volatile memory by the
Integrated Circuits manufacturer (Phase 2).
These data are for instance used for traceabili-
ty and for IC identification as travel docu-
ment‘s material (IC identification data).
Inspection
The act of a State examining an travel docu-
ment presented to it by a traveller (the travel
document holder) and verifying its authentici-
ty. [R6]
Inspection system (IS)
A technical system used by the border control
officer of the receiving State (i) examining an
travel document presented by the traveller
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and verifying its authenticity and (ii) verifying
the traveller as travel document holder.
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Integrated circuit (IC)
Electronic component(s) designed to perform
processing and/or memory functions. The tra-
vel document‘s chip is an integrated circuit.
Integrity
Ability to confirm the travel document and its
data elements on the travel document‘s chip
have not been altered from that created by
the issuing State or Organisation
Issuing Organisation
Organisation authorized to issue an official
travel document (e.g. the United Nations Or-
ganization, issuer of the Laissez-passer). [R6]
Issuing State The Country issuing the travel document. [R6]
Logical Data Structure (LDS)
The collection of groupings of Data Elements
stored in the optional capacity expansion
technology [R6]. The capacity expansion tech-
nology used is the travel document‘s chip.
Logical travel document
Data of the travel document holder stored ac-
cording to the Logical Data Structure [R6] as
specified by ICAO on the contact
based/contactless integrated circuit. It
presents contact based/contactless readable
data including (but not limited to)
1. personal data of the travel document holder
2. the digital Machine Readable Zone Data
(digital MRZ data, EF.DG1),
3. the digitized portraits (EF.DG2),
4. the biometric reference data of finger(s)
(EF.DG3) or iris image(s) (EF.DG4) or both
and
5. the other data according to LDS (EF.DG5 to
EF.DG16).
6. EF.COM and EF.SOD
Machine readable travel do-
cument (MRTD)
Official document issued by a State or Organi-
sation which is used by the holder for interna-
tional travel (e.g. passport, visa, official doc-
ument of identity) and which contains manda-
tory visual (eye readable) data and a separate
mandatory data summary, intended for global
use, reflecting essential data elements capable
of being machine read. [R6]
Machine readable zone (MRZ)
Fixed dimensional area located on the front of
the travel document or MRP Data Page or, in
the case of the TD1, the back of the travel
document, containing mandatory and optional
data for machine reading using OCR methods.
[R6]
The MRZ-Password is a restricted-revealable
secret that is derived from the machine reada-
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ble zone and may be used for PACE.
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Machine-verifiable biometrics
feature
A unique physical personal identification fea-
ture (e.g. an iris pattern, fingerprint or facial
characteristics) stored on a travel document in
a form that can be read and verified by ma-
chine. [R6]
Manufacturer
Generic term for the IC Manufacturer produc-
ing integrated circuit and the travel document
Manufacturer completing the IC to the travel
document. The Manufacturer is the default
user of the TOE during the manufacturing life
phase. The TOE itself does not distinguish be-
tween the IC Manufacturer and travel docu-
ment Manufacturer using this role Manufactur-
er.
Metadata of a CV Certificate
Data within the certificate body (excepting
Public Key) as described in [R5].
The metadata of a CV certificate comprise the
following elements:
- Certificate Profile Identifier,
- Certificate Authority Reference,
- Certificate Holder Reference,
- Certificate Holder Authorisation Template,
- Certificate Effective Date,
- Certificate Expiration Date.
ePassport application
Non-executable data defining the functionality
of the operating system on the IC as the travel
document‘s chip. It includes
• the file structure implementing the LDS
[R6],
• the definition of the User Data, but does not
include the User Data itself (i.e. content of
EF.DG1 to EF.DG13, EF.DG16, EF.COM and
EF.SOD) and
• the TSF Data including the definition the au-
thentication data but except the authentication
data itself.
Optional biometric reference
data
Data stored for biometric authentication of the
travel document holder in the travel docu-
ment‘s chip as (i) encoded finger image(s)
(EF.DG3) or (ii) encoded iris image(s)
(EF.DG4) or (iii) both. Note, that the European
commission decided to use only fingerprint
and not to use iris images as optional biome-
tric reference data.
Passive authentication (i) verification of the digital signature of the
Document Security Object
and (ii) comparing the hash values of the read
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LDS data fields with the hash values contained
in the Document Security Object.
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Password Authenticated Con-
nection Establishment (PACE)
A communication establishment protocol de-
fined in [R4],. The PACE Protocol is a password
authenticated Diffie-Hellman key agreement
protocol providing implicit password-based
authentication of the communication partners
(e.g. smart card and the terminal connected):
i.e. PACE provides a verification, whether the
communication partners share the same value
of a password π). Based on this authentica-
tion, PACE also provides a secure communica-
tion, whereby confidentiality and authenticity
of data transferred within this communication
channel are maintained.
PACE Password A password needed for PACE authentication,
e.g. CAN or MRZ.
Personalisation
The process by which the Personalisation Data
are stored in and unambiguously, inseparably
associated with the travel document. This may
also include the optional biometric data col-
lected during the ―Enrolment‖ (cf. sec. 1.2,
TOE life-cycle, Phase 3, Step 6).
Personalisation Agent
An organisation acting on behalf of the travel
document Issuer to personalise the travel
document for the travel document holder by
some or all of the following activities:
(i) establishing the identity of the travel
document holder for the biographic data
in the travel document,
(ii) enrolling the biometric reference data of
the travel document holder,
(iii) writing a subset of these data on the
physical travel document (optical perso-
nalisation) and storing them in the tra-
vel document (electronic personalisa-
tion) for the travel document holder as
defined in [R5],
(iv) writing the document details data,
(v) writing the initial TSF data,
(vi) signing the Document Security Object
defined in [R6] (in the role of DS).
Please note that the role ‗Personalisation
Agent‘ may be distributed among several insti-
tutions according to the operational policy of
the travel document Issuer.
Generating signature key pair(s) is not in the
scope of the tasks of this role.
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Personalisation Data
A set of data incl.
(i)individual-related data (biographic and bio-
metric data) of the travel document holder,
(ii)dedicated document details data and
(iii)dedicated initial TSF data (incl. the Docu-
ment Security Object).
Personalisation data are gathered and then
written into the non-volatile memory of the
TOE by the Personalisation Agent in the life-
cycle phase card issuing.
Personalisation Agent Authen-
tication Information
TSF data used for authentication proof and
verification of the Personalisation Agent.
Personalisation Agent Key
Cryptographic authentication key used (i) by
the Personalisation Agent to prove his identity
and to get access to the logical travel docu-
ment and (ii) by the travel document‘s chip to
verify the authentication attempt of a terminal
as Personalisation Agent according to the SFR
FIA_UAU.4/PACE, FIA_UAU.5/PACE and
FIA_UAU.6/EAC.
Physical part of the travel
document
Travel document in form of paper, plastic and
chip using secure printing to present data in-
cluding (but not limited to)
1. biographical data,
2. data of the machine-readable zone,
3. photographic image and
4. other data.
Pre-Personalisation
Process of writing Pre-Personalisation Data
(see below) to the TOE including the creation
of the travel document Application (cf. sec.
1.2, TOE life-cycle, Phase 2, Step 5)
Pre-personalisation Data
Any data that is injected into the non-volatile
memory of the TOE by the travel document
Manufacturer (Phase 2) for traceability of non-
personalised travel document‘s and/or to se-
cure shipment within or between life cycle
phases 2 and 3. It contains (but is not limited
to) the Personalisation Agent Key Pair.
Pre-personalised travel docu-
ment’s chip
travel document‘s chip equipped with a unique
identifier.
Receiving State
The Country to which the traveller is applying
for entry. [R6]
Reference data
Data enrolled for a known identity and used by
the verifier to check the verification data pro-
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vided by an entity to prove this identity in an
authentication attempt.
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RF-terminal
A device being able to establish communica-
tion with an RF-chip according to ISO/IEC
14443 [R15].
Secondary image
A repeat image of the holder‘s portrait repro-
duced elsewhere in the document by whatever
means. [R6]
Secure messaging in en-
crypted/combined mode
Secure messaging using encryption and mes-
sage authentication code according to ISO/IEC
7816-4 [R14]
Service Provider
An official organisation (inspection authority)
providing inspection service which can be used
by the travel document holder. Service Provid-
er uses terminals (BIS-PACE) managed by a
DV.
Skimming
Imitation of the inspection system to read the
logical travel document or parts of it via the
contactless communication channel of the TOE
without knowledge of the printed MRZ data.
Standard Inspection Proce-
dure
A specific order of authentication steps be-
tween an travel document and a terminal as
required by [R4], namely (i) PACE or BAC and
(ii) Passive Authentication with SO.D. SIP can
generally be used by BIS-PACE and BIS-BAC.
Terminal
A terminal is any technical system communi-
cating with the TOE either through the contact
based or contactless interface. A technical sys-
tem verifying correspondence between the
password stored in the travel document and
the related value presented to the terminal by
the travel document presenter.
In this PP the role ‗Terminal‘ corresponds to
any terminal being authenticated by the TOE.
Terminal may implement the terminal‘s part of
the PACE protocol and thus authenticate itself
to the travel document using a shared pass-
word (CAN or MRZ).
Terminal Authorization
Intersection of the Certificate Holder Authori-
zations defined by the Inspection System Cer-
tificate, the Document Verifier Certificate and
Country Verifying Certification Authority which
shall be all valid for the Current Date.
Terminal Authorisation Level
Intersection of the Certificate Holder Authori-
sations defined by the Terminal Certificate, the
Document Verifier Certificate and Country Ve-
rifying Certification Authority which shall be all
valid for the Current Date.
TOE tracing data Technical information about the current and
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previous locations of the travel document ga-
thered by inconspicuous (for the travel docu-
ment holder) recognising the travel document.
Travel document
Official document issued by a state or organi-
sation which is used by the holder for interna-
tional travel (e.g. passport, visa, official doc-
ument of identity) and which contains manda-
tory visual (eye readable) data and a separate
mandatory data summary, intended for global
use, reflecting essential data elements capable
of being machine read; see [R6] (there ―Ma-
chine readable travel document‖).
Travel Document Holder
The rightful holder of the travel document for
whom the issuing State or Organisation perso-
nalised the travel document.
Travel document’s Chip
A contact based/contactless integrated circuit
chip complying with ISO/IEC 14443 [R15] and
programmed according to the Logical Data
Structure as specified by ICAO, [R6], sec III.
Travel document’s Chip Em-
bedded Software
Software embedded in a travel document‘s
chip and not being developed by the IC De-
signer. The travel document‘s chip Embedded
Software is designed in Phase 1 and embed-
ded into the travel document‘s chip in Phase 2
of the TOE life-cycle.
Traveller
Person presenting the travel document to the
inspection system and claiming the identity of
the travel document holder.
TSF data
Data created by and for the TOE that might
affect the operation of the TOE (CC part 1
[1]).
Unpersonalised travel docu-
ment
The travel document that contains the travel
document chip holding only Initialization Data
and Pre-personalisation Data as delivered to
the Personalisation Agent from the Manufac-
turer.
User data
All data (being not authentication data)
(i) stored in the context of the ePassport ap-
plication of the travel document as defined in
[R5] and
(ii) being allowed to be read out solely by an
authenticated terminal acting as Basic Inspec-
tion System with PACE .
CC give the following generic definitions for
user data:
Data created by and for the user that does not
affect the operation of the TSF (CC part 1 [1]).
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Information stored in TOE resources that can
be operated upon by users in accordance with
the SFRs and upon which the TSF places no
special meaning (CC part 2 [R2]).
Verification
The process of comparing a submitted biome-
tric sample against the biometric reference
template of a single enrollee whose identity is
being claimed, to determine whether it
matches the enrollee‘s template. [R6]
Verification data
Data provided by an entity in an authentica-
tion attempt to prove their identity to the ve-
rifier. The verifier checks whether the verifica-
tion data match the reference data known for
the claimed identity.
Acronyms
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Acronym Term
BIS Basic Inspection System
BIS-PACE Basic Inspection System with PACE
CA Chip Authentication
CAN Card Access Number
CC Common Criteria
EAC Extended Access Control
EF Elementary File
ICCSN Integrated Circuit Card Serial Number.
MF Master File
MRZ Machine readable zone
n.a. Not applicable
OSP Organisational security policy
PACE
Password Authenticated Connection
Establishment
PCD Proximity Coupling Device
PICC Proximity Integrated Circuit Chip
PP Protection Profile
PT Personalisation Terminal
RF Radio Frequency
SAR Security assurance requirements
SFR Security functional requirement
SIP
TA
Standard Inspection Procedure
Terminal Authentication
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functions
TSP TOE Security Policy (defined by the
current document)
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11 Bibliography
[R1]: Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 1:
Introduction and General Model; CCMB-2012-09-001, Version 3.1, Revision 4,
September 2012
[R2]: Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 2:
Security Functional Components; CCMB-2012-09-002, Version 3.1, Revision 4,
September 2012
[R3]: Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 3:
Security Assurance Components; CCMB-2012-09-003, Version 3.1, Revision 4,
September 2012
[R4]: ICAO MACHINE READABLE TRAVEL DOCUMENTS, TECHNICAL REPORT,
Supplemental Access Control for Machine Readable Travel Documents, Version
1.00, November 2010
[R5]: Technical Guideline TR-03110-1, Advanced Security Mechanisms for Machine
Readable Travel Documents –Part 1 – eMRTDs with BAC/PACEv2 and EACv1,
Version 2.10, 20.03.2012
[R6]: International Civil Aviation Organization, ICAO Doc 9303, Machine Readable
Travel Documents – Machine Readable Passports, 2006 (this includes the latest
Supplemental for ICAO Doc 9303 which also should be considered)
[R7]: Common Criteria Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel Document with
―ICAO Application‖, Extended Access Control with PACE (PACE PP),
BSI-CC-PP-0056-V2-2012 MA-02, Version 1.3.2, December 2012
[R8]: Common Criteria Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel Document with
―ICAO Application", Basic Access Control, BSI-PP-0055, Version 1.10, 25th March
2009
[R9]: Security IC Platform Protection Profile; registered and certified by BSI
(Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik) under the reference BSI-
PP-0035-2007, Version 1.0, June 2007
[R10]: Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Evaluation Methodology; CCMB-2012-09-004, Version 3.1, Revision 4,
September 2012
[R11]: ISO/IEC 11770-3: Information technology — Security techniques — Key
management-- Part 3: Mechanisms using asymmetric techniques, 2008
[R12]: PKCS #3: Diffie-Hellman Key-Agreement Standard, An RSA Laboratories
Technical Note, Version 1.4, Revised, November 1, 1993
[R13]: Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI), Technical Guideline
TR-03111 Elliptic Curve Cryptography, TR-03111, 17.04.2009
[R14]: ISO/IEC 7816: Identification cards — Integrated circuit cards, Version Second
Edition, 2008
[R15]: ISO/IEC 14443 Identification cards -- Contactless integrated circuit cards --
Proximity cards, 2008-11
[R16]: Common Criteria Protection Profile Machine Readable unsing
Standard Inspection Procedure with PACE (PACE PP),
BSI-CC-PP-0068-V2-2011,Version 1.0, November 2011
[R17]: ISO/IEC 15946-2: Information technology — Security techniques —Cryptographic
techniques based on elliptic curves: Part2-Digital signatures
[R18]: PKCS #1: RSA Cryptographic Standard, RSA Laboratories Version 2.1, June 14,
2002
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[R19] FIPS PUB 46-3 FEDERAL INFORMATION PROCESSING STANDARDS PUBLICATION
Reaffirmed 1999 October 25
[R20] Composite product evaluation for Smart Cards and similar devices September
2007 Version 1.0 Revision 1
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Index
A
A.Auth_PKI ......................................................... 32
A.Insp_Sys ........................................................... 32
A.Passive_Auth.................................................... 32
Accessibility to the TOE functions and data only
for authorised subjects...................................... 19
Attacker................................................................ 24
Authenticity of the travel document's chip........... 21
B
Basic Inspection System with BIS-PACE............ 22
C
Country Signing Certification Authority.............. 22
Country Verifying Certification Authority........... 23
D
Document Signer.................................................. 22
Document Verifier ............................................... 23
F
FAU_SAS.1 ......................................................... 66
FCS_CKM.1/CA.................................................. 69
FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE ..................................... 60
FCS_CKM.4 ........................................................ 61
FCS_COP.1/MAC................................................ 69
FCS_COP.1/PACE_ENC..................................... 61
FCS_COP.1/PACE_MAC ................................... 61
FCS_COP.1/SIG_GEN........................................ 69
FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER ........................................ 68
FCS_COP.1/SYM................................................ 68
FCS_RND.1......................................................... 67
FDP_ACC.1/TRM ............................................... 76
FDP_ACF.1/TRM................................................ 76
FDP_RIP.1........................................................... 63
FDP_UCT.1/TRM................................................ 63
FDP_UIT.1/TRM................................................. 63
FIA_AFL.1/PACE ............................................... 62
FIA_API.1/AAP................................................... 75
FIA_API.1/CAP................................................... 75
FIA_UAU.1/PACE .............................................. 73
FIA_UAU.4/PACE .............................................. 73
FIA_UAU.5/PACE .............................................. 74
FIA_UAU.6/EAC ................................................ 75
FIA_UAU.6/PACE .............................................. 62
FIA_UID.1/PACE................................................ 72
FMT_LIM.1......................................................... 79
FMT_LIM.2......................................................... 79
FMT_MTD.1/AAPK............................................ 82
FMT_MTD.1/CAPK............................................ 81
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_INI.................................... 80
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_UPD ................................. 80
FMT_MTD.1/DATE............................................ 80
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS ........................................ 67
FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA....................................... 64
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ ................................. 81
FMT_MTD.1/PA................................................. 65
FMT_MTD.3 ....................................................... 82
FMT_SMF.1 ........................................................ 64
FMT_SMR.1/PACE............................................. 78
FPT_EMS.1 ......................................................... 83
FPT_FLS.1........................................................... 65
FPT_PHP.3.......................................................... 66
FPT_TST.1 .......................................................... 65
FTP_ITC.1/PACE................................................ 63
G
Genuineness of the TOE ...................................... 19
I
Inspection system (IS).......................................... 23
L
Logical travel document sensitive User Data....... 20
M
Manufacturer........................................................ 21
O
OE.Auth_Key_Travel_Document........................ 40
OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data...................................... 40
OE.Exam_Travel_Document............................... 41
OE.Ext_Insp_Systems ......................................... 41
OE.Legislative_Compliance ................................ 38
OE.Passive_Auth_Sign........................................ 38
OE.Personalisation............................................... 39
OE.Prot_Logical_Travel_Document ................... 41
OE.Terminal ........................................................ 39
OE.Travel_Document_Holder ............................. 39
OT.AC_Pers......................................................... 36
OT.Chip_Auth_Proof........................................... 37
OT.Data_Authenticity.......................................... 36
OT.Data_Confidentiality...................................... 34
OT.Data_Integrity................................................ 34
OT.Identification.................................................. 36
OT.Prot_Abuse-Func........................................... 35
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak................................................ 35
OT.Prot_Malfunction........................................... 36
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper......................................... 35
OT.Sens_Data_Conf............................................ 37
OT.Tracing........................................................... 34
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P
P.Card_PKI.......................................................... 30
P.Manufact........................................................... 29
P.Personalisation.................................................. 31
P.Pre-Operational................................................. 29
P.Sensitive_Data .................................................. 31
P.Terminal............................................................ 30
P.Trustworthy_PKI .............................................. 30
Personalisation Agent .......................................... 21
T
T.Abuse-Func....................................................... 26
T.Counterfeit........................................................ 28
T.Eavesdropping .................................................. 25
T.Forgery ............................................................. 25
T.Information_Leakage........................................ 26
T.Malfunction ...................................................... 27
T.Phys-Tamper..................................................... 27
T.Read_Sensitive_Data........................................ 28
T.Skimming ......................................................... 24
T.Tracing.............................................................. 25
Terminal............................................................... 23
TOE internal non-secret cryptographic material .. 20
TOE internal secret cryptographic keys ............... 19
travel document communication establishment
authorisation data............................................. 20
travel document holder ........................................ 22
travel document presenter .................................... 22
travel document tracing data................................ 19
TSF_ACTIVE_AUTH....................................... 113
TSF_ALEA........................................................ 111
TSF_BOOT_AT_POWER_UP ......................... 108
TSF_CHIP_AUTH ............................................ 113
TSF_CPLC......................................................... 110
TSF_CRYPTO_OPERATION .......................... 112
TSF_CS.............................................................. 107
TSF_DPM.......................................................... 103
TSF_EXECUTION_ENVIRONMENT............. 107
TSF_IO_MANAGEMENT................................ 111
TSF_KEY_MANAGEMENT............................ 111
TSF_LIFE_CYCLE_MANAGEMENT ............ 110
TSF_MEMORY_MANAGEMENT.................. 108
TSF_MONITORING......................................... 110
TSF_PLA........................................................... 106
TSF_PMA.......................................................... 105
TSF_PS.............................................................. 104
TSF_SYM_AUTH............................................. 113
TSF_TERM_AUTH .......................................... 113
U
user data stored on the TOE................................. 18
user data transferred between the TOE and the
terminal connected........................................... 18