BSI-DSZ-CC-0478-2008
for
Xerox WorkCentre 5030/5050 Multifunction
Systems
System Software Version 5.003.07.000
from
Xerox Corporation
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0 ZS-01-01-F-326 V4.25
BSI-DSZ-CC-0478-2008
Multifunction System
Xerox WorkCentre 5030/5050 Multifunction Systems
System Software Version 5.003.07.000
from Xerox Corporation
Functionality: product specific Security Target
Common Criteria Part 2 conformant
Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 2 augmented by
ALC_FLR.3
Common Criteria
Recognition
Arrangement
The IT product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an accredited and licensed / approved
evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Version 2.3 for conformance to
the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 2.3 (ISO/IEC 15408:2005).
This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated configuration
and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification scheme of the
German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions of the evaluation facility in the
evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any
other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by the
Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, is either expressed or implied.
Bonn, 19 August 2008
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Bernd Kowalski L.S.
Head of Department
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0478-2008
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0478-2008 Certification Report
Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of
issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor,
hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according
to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by
BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report
contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed
Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of
the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and
instructions for the user.
1
Act setting up the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Errichtungsgesetz, BSIG) of 17
December 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2834
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0478-2008
Contents
A Certification........................................................................................................................7
1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure.................................................................7
2 Recognition Agreements................................................................................................7
2.1 European Recognition of ITSEC/CC - Certificates..................................................8
2.2 International Recognition of CC - Certificates.........................................................8
3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification..................................................................8
4 Validity of the certification result.....................................................................................9
5 Publication......................................................................................................................9
B Certification Results.........................................................................................................10
1 Executive Summary.....................................................................................................11
2 Identification of the TOE...............................................................................................13
3 Security Policy..............................................................................................................14
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope.......................................................................14
5 Architectural Information..............................................................................................15
6 Documentation.............................................................................................................15
7 IT Product Testing........................................................................................................16
7.1 TOE Test Configuration.........................................................................................16
7.2 Developer Tests.....................................................................................................16
7.3 Independant Evaluator Tests.................................................................................16
7.4 Penetration Tests...................................................................................................17
8 Evaluated Configuration...............................................................................................17
9 Results of the Evaluation..............................................................................................18
9.1 CC specific results.................................................................................................18
9.2 Results of cryptographic assessment....................................................................18
10 Obligations and notes for the usage of the TOE........................................................18
11 Security Target...........................................................................................................19
12 Definitions...................................................................................................................19
12.1 Acronyms.............................................................................................................19
12.2 Glossary...............................................................................................................20
13 Bibliography................................................................................................................21
C Excerpts from the Criteria................................................................................................23
D Annexes...........................................................................................................................31
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0478-2008 Certification Report
A Certification
1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the
following:
● BSIG2
● BSI Certification Ordinance3
● BSI Schedule of Costs4
● Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the
Interior)
● DIN EN 45011 standard
● BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125) [3]
● Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 2.3 (ISO/IEC 15408:2005)5
● Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Version 2.3
● BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS)
● Advice from the Certification Body on methodology for assurance components above
EAL4 (AIS 34)
2 Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or
CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
2
Act setting up the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Errichtungsgesetz, BSIG) of 17
December 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2834
3
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of a Certificate by the Federal Office for Information Security
(BSI-Zertifizierungsverordnung, BSIZertV) of 07 July 1992, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1230
4
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
(BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519
5
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 10 May 2006 in the Bundesanzeiger dated 19
May 2006, p. 3730
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0478-2008
2.1 European Recognition of ITSEC/CC - Certificates
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (MRA) for certificates based on ITSEC
became effective on 3 March 1998.
This agreement was signed by the national bodies of Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United
Kingdom. This agreement on the mutual recognition of IT security certificates was
extended to include certificates based on the CC for all Evaluation Assurance Levels (EAL
1 – EAL 7). The German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) recognises
certificates issued by the national certification bodies of France and the United Kingdom
within the terms of this agreement.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the
terms of this agreement.
2.2 International Recognition of CC - Certificates
An arrangement (Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement) on the mutual recognition of
certificates based on the CC Evaluation Assurance Levels up to and including EAL 4 has
been signed in May 2000 (CCRA). It includes also the recognition of Protection Profiles
based on the CC.
As of February 2007 the arrangement has been signed by the national bodies of: Australia,
Austria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary,
India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway,
Republic of Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States of
America. The current list of signatory nations resp. approved certification schemes can be
seen on the web site: http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates
that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement.
3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a
uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product Xerox WorkCentre 5030/5050 Multifunction Systems, System Software
Version 5.003.07.000 has undergone the certification procedure at BSI.
The evaluation of the product Xerox WorkCentre 5030/5050 Multifunction Systems,
System Software Version 5.003.07.000 was conducted by CSC Deutschland Solutions
GmbH. The evaluation was completed on 30 July 2008. The CSC Deutschland Solutions
GmbH is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)6
recognised by the certification body of BSI.
For this certification procedure the sponsor and applicant is: Xerox Corporation
The product was developed by: Xerox Corporation
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this
Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
6
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0478-2008 Certification Report
4 Validity of the certification result
This Certification Report only applies to the version of the product as indicated. The
confirmed assurance package is only valid on the condition that
● all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the
following report, are observed,
● the product is operated in the environment described, where specified in the following
report and in the Security Target.
For the meaning of the assurance levels and the confirmed strength of functions, please
refer to the excerpts from the criteria at the end of the Certification Report.
The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security
Target at the date of certification. As attack methods may evolve over time, the resistance
of the certified version of the product against new attack methods can be re-assessed if
required and the sponsor applies for the certified product being monitored within the
assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme. It is recommended to
perform a re-assessment on a regular basis.
In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to
the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e.
re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural
requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.
5 Publication
The product Xerox WorkCentre 5030/5050 Multifunction Systems, System Software
Version 5.003.07.000 has been included in the BSI list of the certified products, which is
published regularly (see also Internet: http:// www.bsi.bund.de) and [5]. Further information
can be obtained from BSI-Infoline +49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer7
of the
product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet
address stated above.
7
Xerox Corporation
1350 Jefferson Road
Rochester, NY 14623
USA
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0478-2008
B Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
● the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
● the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
● complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0478-2008 Certification Report
1 Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) are the Xerox WorkCentre 5030/5050 Multifunction
Systems (Xerox WorkCentre model 5030 or 5050). The TOE is a Multifunction Device
(MFD) that consists of a printer, copier, scanner, FAX (when purchased by the consumer),
and email as well as all Administrator and User guidance. The difference between the two
models is their printing speed. The TOE consists of the whole MFD (complete Hardware
together with the Software which is installed on the Hardware).
The MFD provides copy and print services as well as the scan to email, network scan and
FAX options. The optional Xerox Embedded Fax accessory provides local analog FAX
capability over Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN) connections, if purchased by
the consumer.
The MFD stores temporary image data created during a print, network scan or scan-to-
email job on an internal Hard Disk Drive (HDD). This temporary image data consists of the
original data submitted and additional files created during a job.
The TOE has an Image Overwrite function that overwrites files created and stored on the
HDD during print, network scan or scan-to-email jobs. This overwrite process will be
activated at the completion of each print, network scan, or scan to email job (Immediate
Image Overwrite (IIO)), once the MFD is turned back on after a power failure or on
demand of the MFD system administrator (On Demand Image Overwrite (ODIO)). Copy
and FAX jobs are not written to the HDD and therefore need not to be overwritten.
The TOE does not allow information to flow between the PSTN port of the optional FAX
processing board (if installed) and the network controller (which covers the information
flow to and from the internal network). Data and/or commands cannot be sent to the
internal network via the PSTN. A direct connection from the internal network to external
entities by using the telephone line of the TOE is also denied.
The TOE requires a system administrator to authenticate before granting access to system
administration functions. The system administrator has to enter a PIN at either the web
user interface or the local user interface. The PIN will be obscured with asterisks as it is
being entered. Identification of the system administrator at the local user interface is
implicit – the administrator will identify themselves by pressing the “Access” hard button.
Identification of the system administrator at the web user interface is explicit -- the
administrator will identify themselves by entering the username “admin” in the
authentication dialog window. Only authenticated system administrators can enable or
disable the Image Overwrite function, enable or disable the On Demand Image Overwrite
function, change the system administrator PIN, and start or cancel an On Demand Image
Overwrite operation.
The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is not based on a certified
Protection Profile.
The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details).
The TOE meets the Assurance Requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 2
augmented by ALC_FLR.3.
The Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the
Security Target [6], chapter 5.2. They are all selected from Common Criteria Part 2. Thus
the TOE is CC Part 2 conformant.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0478-2008
There are no Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the IT-Environment of
the TOE.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functions:
TOE Security Function Addressed issue
Image Overwrite (TSF_IOW) The TOE implements an Image Overwrite
Security Function to overwrite temporary files
created during the printing, network scan, or
scan-to-email process.
Information Flow (TSF_FLOW) The TOE does not allow communication between
the optional FAX processing board and the
network controller and prevents therefore an
interconnection between the PSTN and the
internal network.
Authentication (TSF_AUT) The system administrator must authenticate by
entering a PIN prior to being granted access to
the system administration functions.
Security Management (TSF_FMT) The TOE provides some administrative functions
to the system administrator.
Table 1: TOE Security Functions
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6], chapter 6.1.
The claimed TOE’s Strength of Functions 'basic' (SOF-basic) for specific functions as
indicated in the Security Target [6], chapter 8.6 is confirmed.
The assets to be protected by the TOE are implicitly defined in the Security Target [6],
chapter 3. Based on these assets the TOE Security Environment is defined in terms of
Assumptions and Threats. This is outlined in the Security Target [6], chapter 3.
This certification covers the following configurations of the TOE: The Image Overwrite
Security Package is installed and Immediate Image Overwrite (IIO) and On Demand
Image Overwrite (ODIO) are enabled on the TOE. IIO and ODIO must not be disabled.
The Xerox Embedded Fax accessory is an optional part of the TOE which can be ordered
by the customer. It provides local analog FAX capability over PSTN connections, when
purchased and installed. Only in this case the TOE provides the Security Function
“Information Flow (TSF_FLOW)”. If the FAX option is not installed this Security Function is
not present and not needed as it is separated from and does not influence the other
Security Functionality.
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate
and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification
Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0478-2008 Certification Report
2 Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
Xerox WorkCentre 5030/5050 Multifunction Systems,
System Software Version 5.003.07.000
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
1 HW Xerox WorkCentre 5030 / 5050
2 SW System Software 5. 003.07.000 Installed on MFD
3 SW Network Controller Software 1.08.535.01 Installed on MFD
4 SW UI Software 005.03.007 Installed on MFD
5 SW SIP Software 50.06.00 Installed on MFD
6 SW IOT Software 23.54.00 Installed on MFD
7 SW DADH Software 12.15.00 Installed on MFD
8 SW Finisher Software 09.21.00 Installed on MFD
9 SW FAX Software 02.28.03 Installed on MFD
10 SW Printer and Fax Driver CD
11 SW All optional software kits the
customer purchased;
The evaluated configuration
includes at least the IIO
option kit.
part number
604E32560
CD
12 DOC WorkCentre 5030/5050
Quick Reference Guide
part number
604E39140
Paperform
13 DOC User guidance part number
538E11390
CD
14 DOC Administrator guidance part number
538E11400
CD
15 DOC Secure Installation and
Operation of Your
WorkCentre™ 5030/5050
Version 1.6
April 16, 2008
Download from Xerox-Webpage:
http://www.xerox.com/security
Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE
The TOE is assembled and packed according to the order form of the Customer. Xerox
Authorized Representatives deliver the device to the customer site. There Xerox
Authorized Representatives will install the product according to the installation instructions.
A customer system administrator can ensure that they have a TOE by printing a
configuration sheet and comparing the version numbers reported on the sheet to table 2
above or in the Security Target [6].
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0478-2008
3 Security Policy
The Security Policy is expressed by the set of Security Functional Requirements and
implemented by the TOE. It covers the following issues:
● The image information of the different types of jobs the MFD can handle is
considered as confidential user information. Therefore, the TOE must protect this
information according to the following rules:
Temporary document image data from a print, network scan or scan-to-email job
must be overwritten on the HDD immediately after that job is completed, once the
MFD is turned back on after a power failure or if the system administrator has
invoked the On Demand Image Overwrite function. Document image data of copy
and FAX jobs must not be written to the HDD.
● The Security Function “Information Flow (TSF_FLOW)” restricts the information flow
between the PSTN port of the optional FAX board (if installed) and the internal
network by implementing a store-and-forward principle. The TOE does not allow
information to flow between the PSTN port of the optional FAX processing board (if
installed) and the network controller (which covers the information flow to and from
the internal network). Data and/or commands cannot be sent to the internal network
via the PSTN. A direct connection from the internal network to external entities by
using the telephone line of the TOE is also denied.
If the FAX board is not installed, an information flow is not possible and needs not
to be restricted.
● The system administrator must authenticate by entering a PIN prior to being
granted access to the system administration functions. The following security
management functions are provided by the TOE:
● Enable or disable the Immediate Image Overwrite function (IIO) (only via
local user interface)
● Enable or disable the On Demand Image Overwrite function (ODIO) (only via
local user interface)
● Change of the System Administrator PIN (only via local user interface)
● Invocation of ODIO (via local user interface or web user interface)
● Cancellation (Abort) of ODIO (via local user interface or web user interface)
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and
Organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to
specific Security Objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. The following topics
are of relevance:
● Monitored network to which the TOE is connected to
● Secure installation and configuration of the TOE
● Monitored office environment in which the TOE is located
● Trained and trustworthy TOE administrators
Details can be found in the Security Target [6], chapter 4.2.
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5 Architectural Information
The following figure shows decomposition of the TOE into six subsystems.
Network Controller
Graphical User
Interface (also
known as Local
User Interface)
Fax Card
Image Output
Terminal (also
known as Marking
Engine)
Copy Controller
(also known as
Scanner Image
Processor)
Power Supply
Scanner /
Document Handler
PowerInterface
TOE internal wiring(proprietary)
RS-422
Firewire
TOE internal
wiring
(proprietary)
PCI
Bus
TOE Physical Boundary
Original
Documents
Optical
interface
Human Interface
Hardcopy
(Finisher)
Paper output interface
Buttons
and
Display
PSTN (RJ-11 Port)
Physical
external
interface
Ethernet Port, Serial Port,
USB Target Port, Inactive
USB Host Ports (2),
Firewire Port , Unused
Firewire Port, Monitor Port
Physical external
Interfaces
Power Cord PSW USB Target
Port, Serial Port,
Foreign Device
Interface, Scanner
Interface, Firewire
Ports
Physical external Interfaces
Power Button
Button
and
TOE
internal
wiring
(
proprietary)
Physical external
Interface
Figure 1: Architecture of the TOE
The TOE consists of the subsystems Scanner/Document Handler, Network Controller,
Power Supply, FAX Card, Copy Controller (also known as Scanner Image Processor),
Graphical User Interface (also known as Local User Interface) and the Image Output
Terminal (also known as Marking Engine). The TOE has several external and internal
interfaces as depicted in the figure.
6 Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the product to
the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of
the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of
this report have to be followed.
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7 IT Product Testing
7.1 TOE Test Configuration
The LAN interface of the network controller of the TOE is connected to a local LAN. All
other test systems are also connected to this LAN. The TOE is furthermore connected to
the PSTN to be able to send and receive facsimiles.
By using a serial Null-Modem connection, the evaluator was able to access the Linux-
based operating system of the network controller. The evaluator uses a terminal server for
this purpose because the TOE was not located in the office rooms of the evaluator. The
terminal server is a Windows 2003 server with a serial interface and Tutty1 v0.58.1 as
serial terminal software. The evaluator uses the remote desktop tool of Windows to access
the terminal server.
The File- and FTP-Server was set up to test the scan-to-network features and to have a
file transfer ability to and from the Linux-based operating system. This server runs under
Linux. File services are provided by Samba, the FTP-Server used was vsftpd.
The Email-Server was set up to test the scan-to-email features. This server runs under
Linux. Email services (only SMTP) are provided by postfix.
The evaluator PC runs under Windows XP. The TOE printer driver and the TOE as system
printer are installed.
7.2 Developer Tests
The developer tested all TOE Security Functions in combination with the different user
interfaces (local user interface or web user interface) and in combination with the different
types of jobs (print, copy, fax, …).
The depth of testing was on the level of the external interfaces as required for EAL 2.
The TOE passed all developer tests. This means the verification of the complete and
correct implementation of all TOE Security Functions and all TOE Security Functional
Requirements was successful.
7.3 Independant Evaluator Tests
Due to the fact that the TOE is a device with an overall SOF claim “basic”, the evaluator
does not select a very rigorous testing strategy. Therefore, the evaluator decides to test all
Security Functions and all Security Functional Requirements with little to medium rigor.
The approach to select and define the test subset is to take the developer tests into
account, modify some of the tests and define some additional tests in order to fulfill the test
strategy requirements. The evaluator does not repeat all tests of the developer tests but
only selected.
Due to the fact that the TOE itself must not be modified for the tests, only the tools
available at the Linux operating system of the TOE can be used. The external connections
to the TOE were realized by browsers (here: Internet Explorer 7 and Firefox 2.0.0.14). The
serial connection was established by Tutty (see above). Print jobs were started using the
Xerox PCL6 Printer Driver for Windows XP, available at the Xerox web site. For receiving
and sending facsimiles from and to the TOE, a conventional digital FAX machine was
used.
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The TOE passed all evaluator tests. This means the verification of the complete and
correct implementation of all TOE Security Functions and all TOE Security Functional
Requirements was successful.
The depth of testing was on the level of the external interfaces as required for EAL 2.
7.4 Penetration Tests
According to the requirements of EAL 2 the developer did a research for common known
vulnerabilities for this product or product type. The developer did also a penetration test
using a penetration testing tool.
Additionally, the evaluator verified the results and conclusions of the developer and
performs also penetration tests using penetration testing tools.
The vulnerability tests of the evaluator are based on the intended operational environment.
Therefore the evaluator assumes that an attacker does not have direct physical access to
the TOE. So, only remote attacks were performed. This means only the network protocols
as logical interfaces of the TOE were tested. For this purpose, the evaluator activated all
network protocols the TOE supports.
The evaluator performed some network vulnerability scans using the vulnerability scanner
Nessus version 3.2.0. The scanner identified some potential vulnerabilities. After an
analysis of the given facts and the output of the scanner, all the remarks could be
identified as false positives. So, no vulnerability could be identified.
For verification of the developer SOF analysis the evaluator performed a brute force attack
the tool Brutus (www.hoobie.net/brutus) against the web user interface in order to break
PIN mechanism. It could be demonstrated that a brute force against this interface and
function will not succeed due to improper performance of the TOE.
8 Evaluated Configuration
This certification covers the following configurations of the TOE:
● The Image Overwrite Security Package is installed and Immediate Image Overwrite
(IIO) and On Demand Image Overwrite (ODIO) are enabled on the TOE. IIO and
ODIO must not be disabled.
● The Xerox Embedded Fax accessory is an optional part of the TOE which can be
ordered by the customer. It provides local analog FAX capability over PSTN
connections, when purchased and installed.
If the FAX option is installed and enabled, the TOE does not allow communication
between the optional FAX processing board and the network controller and
prevents therefore an interconnection between the PSTN and the internal network.
If the optional FAX board is not installed, an information flow from or to the FAX port
is not possible at all.
The Security Functionality provided by the TOE concerning the FAX option is
separated from and does not influence the other Security Functionality. If the FAX
option is not installed the associated Security Functionality (TSF_FLOW with
dedicated SFRs, see Security Target [6]) is not present and not needed.
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9 Results of the Evaluation
9.1 CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [7] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
● All components of the class ASE
● All components of the EAL2 package as defined in the CC (see also part C of this
report)
● The components ALC_FLR.3 augmented for this TOE evaluation.
The evaluation has confirmed:
● for the Functionality: product specific Security Target
Common Criteria Part 2 conformant
● for the Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 2 augmented by
ALC_FLR.3
● The following TOE Security Functions fulfil the claimed Strength of Function : basic
Authentication (TSF_AUT)
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
9.2 Results of cryptographic assessment
The TOE does not include cryptoalgorithms. Thus, no such mechanisms were part of the
assessment.
10 Obligations and notes for the usage of the TOE
The operational documents as outlined in table 2 contain necessary information about the
usage of the TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered. In addition, the
following aspects need to be fulfilled when using the TOE:
● There is no physical access to the TOE for an attacker.
● The minimum length of the PIN is 8 characters.
● The network the TOE is connected to is monitored regarding attacks against the
TOE or other network equipment.
● IIO is installed and enabled.
● The TOE has to be installed and configured according to the guidance document
“Secure Installation and Operation of Your WorkCentre™ 5030/5050” [11].
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11 Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [6] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is
provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report.
12 Definitions
12.1 Acronyms
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for
Information Security, Bonn, Germany
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
FAX Facsimile
HDD Hard Disk Drive
IIO Immediate Image Overwrite
IT Information Technology
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
LAN Local Area Network
MFD Multifunctional Device
ODIO On Demand Image Overwrite
PP Protection Profile
PSTN Public Switched Telephone Network
SF Security Function
SFP Security Function Policy
SOF Strength of Function
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSC TSF Scope of Control
TSF TOE Security Functions
TSP TOE Security Policy
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12.2 Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more assurance component(s) from CC Part 3 to
an EAL or assurance package.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in part 2
and/or assurance requirements not contained in part 3 of the CC.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on well-
established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - An entity within the TSC that contains or receives information and upon which
subjects perform operations.
Protection Profile - An implementation-independent set of security requirements for a
category of TOEs that meet specific consumer needs.
Security Function - A part or parts of the TOE that have to be relied upon for enforcing a
closely related subset of the rules from the TSP.
Security Target - A set of security requirements and specifications to be used as the
basis for evaluation of an identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Strength of Function - A qualification of a TOE security function expressing the minimum
efforts assumed necessary to defeat its expected security behaviour by directly attacking
its underlying security mechanisms.
SOF-basic - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that the function
provides adequate protection against casual breach of TOE security by attackers
possessing a low attack potential.
SOF-medium - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that the
function provides adequate protection against straightforward or intentional breach of TOE
security by attackers possessing a moderate attack potential.
SOF-high - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that the function
provides adequate protection against deliberately planned or organised breach of TOE
security by attackers possessing a high attack potential.
Subject - An entity within the TSC that causes operations to be performed.
Target of Evaluation - An IT product or system and its associated administrator and user
guidance documentation that is the subject of an evaluation.
TOE Security Functions - A set consisting of all hardware, software, and firmware of the
TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the TSP.
TOE Security Policy - A set of rules that regulate how assets are managed, protected
and distributed within a TOE.
TSF Scope of Control - The set of interactions that can occur with or within a TOE and
are subject to the rules of the TSP.
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13 Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 2.3,
August 2005
[2] Common Methology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
Evaluation Methology, Version 2.3, August 2005
[3] BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148, BSI 7149), periodically updated list
published also on the BSI Website
[6] Security Target BSI-DSZ-0478-2008, Version 1.0, Revision 1.18, 15 April 2008,
„Xerox WorkCentre 5030/5050 Multifunction Systems Security Target“,
Xerox Corporation
[7] Evaluation Technical Report BSI-DSZ-0478-2008, Version 1.0, 30 July 2008,
CSC Deutschland Solutions GmbH (confidential document)
[8] WorkCentre 5030/5050 Quick Reference Guide, Part Number 604E39140,
Xerox Corporation
[9] User guidance, Part Number 538E11390, Xerox Corporation
[10] Administrator guidance, Part Number 538E11400, Xerox Corporation
[11] Secure Installation and Operation of Your WorkCentre™ 5030/5050, Version 1.6,
16 April 2008, Xerox Corporation
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0478-2008 Certification Report
C Excerpts from the Criteria
CC Part1:
Conformance results (chapter 7.4)
„The conformance result indicates the source of the collection of requirements that is met
by a TOE or PP that passes its evaluation. This conformance result is presented with
respect to CC Part 2 (functional requirements), CC Part 3 (assurance requirements) and, if
applicable, to a pre-defined set of requirements (e.g., EAL, Protection Profile).
The conformance result consists of one of the following:
– CC Part 2 conformant - A PP or TOE is CC Part 2 conformant if the functional
requirements are based only upon functional components in CC Part 2.
– CC Part 2 extended - A PP or TOE is CC Part 2 extended if the functional
requirements include functional components not in CC Part 2.
plus one of the following:
– CC Part 3 conformant - A PP or TOE is CC Part 3 conformant if the assurance
requirements are based only upon assurance components in CC Part 3.
– CC Part 3 extended - A PP or TOE is CC Part 3 extended if the assurance
requirements include assurance requirements not in CC Part 3.
Additionally, the conformance result may include a statement made with respect to sets of
defined requirements, in which case it consists of one of the following:
– Package name Conformant - A PP or TOE is conformant to a pre-defined named
functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the requirements (functions or
assurance) include all components in the packages listed as part of the conformance
result.
– Package name Augmented - A PP or TOE is an augmentation of a pre-defined
named functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the requirements (functions
or assurance) are a proper superset of all components in the packages listed as part of
the conformance result.
Finally, the conformance result may also include a statement made with respect to
Protection Profiles, in which case it includes the following:
– PP Conformant - A TOE meets specific PP(s), which are listed as part of the
conformance result.“
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CC Part 3:
Protection Profile criteria overview (chapter 8.2)
“The goal of a PP evaluation is to demonstrate that the PP is complete, consistent,
technically sound, and hence suitable for use as a statement of requirements for one or
more evaluatable TOEs. Such a PP may be eligible for inclusion within a PP registry.
Assurance Class Assurance Family
TOE description (APE_DES)
Security environment (APE_ENV)
Class APE: Protection Profile evaluation PP introduction (APE_INT)
Security objectives (APE_OBJ)
IT security requirements (APE_REQ)
Explicitly stated IT security requirements
(APE_SRE)
Table 3 - Protection Profile families - CC extended requirements”
Security Target criteria overview (Chapter 8.3)
“The goal of an ST evaluation is to demonstrate that the ST is complete, consistent,
technically sound, and hence suitable for use as the basis for the corresponding TOE
evaluation.
Assurance Class Assurance Family
TOE description (ASE_DES)
Security environment (ASE_ENV)
ST introduction (ASE_INT)
Class ASE: Security Target evaluation Security objectives (ASE_OBJ)
PP claims (ASE_PPC)
IT security requirements (ASE_REQ)
Explicitly stated IT security requirements (ASE_SRE)
TOE summary specification (ASE_TSS)
Table 5 - Security Target families - CC extended requirements”
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Assurance categorisation (chapter 7.5)
“The assurance classes, families, and the abbreviation for each family are shown in
Table 1.
Assurance Class Assurance Family
CM automation (ACM_AUT)
ACM: Configuration management CM capabilities (ACM_CAP)
CM scope (ACM_SCP)
ADO: Delivery and operation Delivery (ADO_DEL)
Installation, generation and start-up (ADO_IGS)
Functional specification (ADV_FSP)
High-level design (ADV_HLD)
Implementation representation (ADV_IMP)
ADV: Development TSF internals (ADV_INT)
Low-level design (ADV_LLD)
Representation correspondence (ADV_RCR)
Security policy modeling (ADV_SPM)
AGD: Guidance documents Administrator guidance (AGD_ADM)
User guidance (AGD_USR)
Development security (ALC_DVS)
ALC: Life cycle support Flaw remediation (ALC_FLR)
Life cycle definition (ALC_LCD)
Tools and techniques (ALC_TAT)
Coverage (ATE_COV)
ATE: Tests Depth (ATE_DPT)
Functional tests (ATE_FUN)
Independent testing (ATE_IND)
Covert channel analysis (AVA_CCA)
AVA: Vulnerability assessment Misuse (AVA_MSU)
Strength of TOE security functions (AVA_SOF)
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VLA)
Table 1: Assurance family breakdown and mapping”
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Evaluation assurance levels (chapter 11)
“The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that balances the
level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of acquiring that degree of
assurance. The CC approach identifies the separate concepts of assurance in a TOE at
the end of the evaluation, and of maintenance of that assurance during the operational use
of the TOE.
It is important to note that not all families and components from CC Part 3 are included in
the EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful and desirable
assurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and components will be considered
for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and STs for which they provide utility.”
Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview (chapter 11.1)
“Table 6 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a hierarchically
ordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families. Each number in the
resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component where applicable.
As outlined in the next section, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation assurance levels
are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE's assurance. They are hierarchically ordered
inasmuch as each EAL represents more assurance than all lower EALs. The increase in
assurance from EAL to EAL is accomplished by substitution of a hierarchically higher
assurance component from the same assurance family (i.e. increasing rigour, scope, and/
or depth) and from the addition of assurance components from other assurance families
(i.e. adding new requirements).
These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as described
in chapter 7 of this Part 3. More precisely, each EAL includes no more than one
component of each assurance family and all assurance dependencies of every component
are addressed.
While the EALs are defined in the CC, it is possible to represent other combinations of
assurance. Specifically, the notion of “augmentation” allows the addition of assurance
components (from assurance families not already included in the EAL) or the substitution
of assurance components (with another hierarchically higher assurance component in the
same assurance family) to an EAL. Of the assurance constructs defined in the CC, only
EALs may be augmented. The notion of an “EAL minus a constituent assurance
component” is not recognised by the standard as a valid claim. Augmentation carries with
it the obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility and added value of the
added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also be extended with explicitly
stated assurance requirements.
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Assurance Class Assurance
Family
Assurance Components by
Evaluation Assurance Level
EAL1 EAL2 EAL3 EAL4 EAL5 EAL6 EAL7
Configuration
management
ACM_AUT 1 1 2 2
ACM_CAP 1 2 3 4 4 5 5
ACM_SCP 1 2 3 3 3
Delivery and
operation
ADO_DEL 1 1 2 2 2 3
ADO_IGS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Development ADV_FSP 1 1 1 2 3 3 4
ADV_HLD 1 2 2 3 4 5
ADV_IMP 1 2 3 3
ADV_INT 1 2 3
ADV_LLD 1 1 2 2
ADV_RCR 1 1 1 1 2 2 3
ADV_SPM 1 3 3 3
Guidance
documents
AGD_ADM 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
AGD_USR 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Life cycle
support
ALC_DVS 1 1 1 2 2
ALC_FLR
ALC_LCD 1 2 2 3
ALC_TAT 1 2 3 3
Tests ATE_COV 1 2 2 2 3 3
ATE_DPT 1 1 2 2 3
ATE_FUN 1 1 1 1 2 2
ATE_IND 1 2 2 2 2 2 3
Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_CCA 1 2 2
AVA_MSU 1 2 2 3 3
AVA_SOF 1 1 1 1 1 1
AVA_VLA 1 1 2 3 4 4
Table 6: Evaluation assurance level summary”
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Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL1) - functionally tested (chapter 11.3)
“Objectives
EAL1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but the threats
to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where independent assurance is
required to support the contention that due care has been exercised with respect to the
protection of personal or similar information.
EAL1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer, including
independent testing against a specification, and an examination of the guidance
documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL1 evaluation could be successfully
conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE, and for minimal outlay.
An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a manner
consistent with its documentation, and that it provides useful protection against identified
threats.”
Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL2) - structurally tested (chapter 11.4)
“Objectives
EAL2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of design
information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the part of the
developer than is consistent with good commercial practice. As such it should not require a
substantially increased investment of cost or time.
EAL2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
low to moderate level of independently assured security in the absence of ready
availability of the complete development record. Such a situation may arise when securing
legacy systems, or where access to the developer may be limited.”
Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL3) - methodically tested and checked
(chapter 11.5)
“Objectives
EAL3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from positive
security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of existing sound
development practices.
EAL3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a moderate
level of independently assured security, and require a thorough investigation of the TOE
and its development without substantial re-engineering.”
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Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL4) - methodically designed, tested, and reviewed
(chapter 11.6)
“Objectives
EAL4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security engineering
based on good commercial development practices which, though rigorous, do not require
substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other resources. EAL4 is the highest level at
which it is likely to be economically feasible to retrofit to an existing product line.
EAL4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
moderate to high level of independently assured security in conventional commodity TOEs
and are prepared to incur additional security-specific engineering costs.”
Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL5) - semiformally designed and tested
(chapter 11.7)
“Objectives
EAL5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security engineering based
upon rigorous commercial development practices supported by moderate application of
specialist security engineering techniques. Such a TOE will probably be designed and
developed with the intent of achieving EAL5 assurance. It is likely that the additional costs
attributable to the EAL5 requirements, relative to rigorous development without the
application of specialised techniques, will not be large.
EAL5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
high level of independently assured security in a planned development and require a
rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable costs attributable to
specialist security engineering techniques.”
Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL6) - semiformally verified design and tested
(chapter 11.8)
“Objectives
EAL6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security engineering
techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to produce a premium TOE for
protecting high value assets against significant risks.
EAL6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in high
risk situations where the value of the protected assets justifies the additional costs.”
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Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL7) - formally verified design and tested
(chapter 11.9)
“Objectives
EAL7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in extremely high
risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies the higher costs. Practical
application of EAL7 is currently limited to TOEs with tightly focused security functionality
that is amenable to extensive formal analysis.“
Strength of TOE security functions (AVA_SOF) (chapter 19.3)
“Objectives
Even if a TOE security function cannot be bypassed, deactivated, or corrupted, it may still
be possible to defeat it because there is a vulnerability in the concept of its underlying
security mechanisms. For those functions a qualification of their security behaviour can be
made using the results of a quantitative or statistical analysis of the security behaviour of
these mechanisms and the effort required to overcome them. The qualification is made in
the form of a strength of TOE security function claim.”
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VLA) (chapter 19.4)
"Objectives
Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether vulnerabilities identified,
during the evaluation of the construction and anticipated operation of the TOE or by other
methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses), could allow users to violate the TSP.
Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that a user will be able to discover flaws that
will allow unauthorised access to resources (e.g. data), allow the ability to interfere with or
alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorised capabilities of other users.”
"Application notes
A vulnerability analysis is performed by the developer in order to ascertain the presence of
security vulnerabilities, and should consider at least the contents of all the TOE
deliverables including the ST for the targeted evaluation assurance level. The developer is
required to document the disposition of identified vulnerabilities to allow the evaluator to
make use of that information if it is found useful as a support for the evaluator's
independent vulnerability analysis.”
“Independent vulnerability analysis goes beyond the vulnerabilities identified by the
developer. The main intent of the evaluator analysis is to determine that the TOE is
resistant to penetration attacks performed by an attacker possessing a low (for
AVA_VLA.2 Independent vulnerability analysis), moderate (for AVA_VLA.3 Moderately
resistant) or high (for AVA_VLA.4 Highly resistant) attack potential.”
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D Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Security Target provided within a separate document.
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