Security Target Lite
STARCOS 3.5 ID BAC C1
Version 2.6
R&D
Giesecke & Devrient GmbH
Prinzregentenstraße 159
Postfach 80 07 29
D-81607 München
Author Giesecke & Devrient GmbH
Status Final
Rating Public
Edition 26.07.2012
© Copyright 2012
Giesecke & Devrient GmbH
Prinzregentenstraße 159
Postfach 80 07 29
D-81607 München
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Contents
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Contents
Security Target Lite........................................................................................................ 1
STARCOS 3.5 ID BAC C1 ................................................................................................. 1
Version 2.6...................................................................................................................... 1
Contents ......................................................................................................................... 3
1 ST Introduction ..................................................................................................... 6
1.1 ST Reference......................................................................................................................................6
1.2 TOE Overview....................................................................................................................................6
1.2.1 Sections Overview.................................................................................................................7
1.2.2 TOE definition.......................................................................................................................7
1.2.3 TOE usage and security features for operational use .............................................................8
1.2.4 TOE life cycle.........................................................................................................................9
1.2.5 Non-TOE hardware/software/firmware required by the TOE ................................................11
2 Conformance Claims........................................................................................... 12
2.1 CC Conformance Claim...................................................................................................................12
2.2 PP Claim...........................................................................................................................................12
2.3 Package Claim.................................................................................................................................12
2.4 Conformance Rationale..................................................................................................................12
3 Security Problem Definition............................................................................... 13
3.1 Introduction ....................................................................................................................................13
3.1.1 Assets .................................................................................................................................13
3.1.2 Subjects ..............................................................................................................................13
3.2 Assumptions....................................................................................................................................15
3.3 Threats.............................................................................................................................................16
3.4 Organisational Security Policies.....................................................................................................18
4 Security Objectives.............................................................................................. 20
4.1 Security Objectives for the TOE .....................................................................................................20
4.2 Security Objectives for Operational Environment........................................................................22
4.3 Security Objective Rationale ..........................................................................................................24
5 Extended Components Definition ..................................................................... 27
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5.1 Definition of the Family FAU_SAS ................................................................................................ 27
5.2 Definition of the Family FCS_RND ................................................................................................ 27
5.3 Definition of the Family FMT_LIM ................................................................................................ 28
5.4 Definition of the Family FPT_EMSEC ............................................................................................ 30
6 Security Requirements ....................................................................................... 31
6.1 Security Functional Requirements for the TOE............................................................................ 32
6.1.1 Class FAU Security Audit..................................................................................................... 32
6.1.2 Class FCS Cryptographic Support ....................................................................................... 32
6.1.3 Class FIA Identification and Authentication......................................................................... 35
6.1.4 Class FDP User Data Protection........................................................................................... 39
6.1.5 Class FMT Security Management ........................................................................................ 41
6.1.6 Class FPT Protection of the Security Functions..................................................................... 44
6.2 Security Assurance Requirements for the TOE............................................................................. 47
6.3 Security Requirements Rationale.................................................................................................. 47
6.3.1 Security Functional Requirements Rationale........................................................................ 47
6.3.2 Dependency Rationale........................................................................................................ 50
6.3.3 Security Assurance Requirements Rationale ........................................................................ 53
6.3.4 Security Requirements – Mutual Support and Internal Consistency ..................................... 54
6.4 Statement of Compatibility........................................................................................................... 54
6.4.1 Classification of Platform TSFs ............................................................................................ 54
6.4.2 Matching statement ........................................................................................................... 55
6.4.3 Overall no contradictions found.......................................................................................... 60
7 TOE summary specification................................................................................ 61
7.1 TOE Security Functions................................................................................................................... 61
7.1.1 SF_AccessControl ............................................................................................................... 61
7.1.2 SF_Authentication .............................................................................................................. 62
7.1.3 SF_AssetProtection ............................................................................................................. 62
7.1.4 SF_TSFProtection ................................................................................................................ 62
7.1.5 SF_KeyManagement........................................................................................................... 63
7.2 Assurance Measures....................................................................................................................... 63
7.3 Fulfilment of the SFRs.................................................................................................................... 63
7.3.1 Justifications for the correspondence between functional requirements and TOE mechanisms65
7.4 Rationale for PP Claims.................................................................................................................. 65
8 Glossary and Acronyms ...................................................................................... 66
8.1 Glossary........................................................................................................................................... 66
8.2 Acronyms ........................................................................................................................................ 71
9 Bibliography ....................................................................................................... 72
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9.1 Common Criteria.............................................................................................................................72
9.2 ICAO.................................................................................................................................................72
9.3 Cryptography ..................................................................................................................................72
9.4 Protection Profiles ..........................................................................................................................73
9.5 Technical Guidelines and Directives ..............................................................................................73
9.6 Other................................................................................................................................................73
1 ST Introduction
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1 ST Introduction
1.1 ST Reference
Title: Security Target Lite STARCOS 3.5 ID BAC C1
Version 2.6 Status 26.07.2012
Origin: Giesecke & Devrient GmbH
CC Version: 3.1 (Revision 3)
Assurance Level: EAL4-augmented with assurance component ALC_DVS.2.
TOE: STARCOS 3.5 ID BAC C1
TOE documentation:
 Guidance Documentation STARCOS 3.5 ID – Main Document
 Guidance Documentation for the Initialisation Phase STARCOS 3.5 ID BAC C1
 Guidance Documentation for the Personalisation Phase STARCOS 3.5 ID BAC C1
 Guidance Documentation for the Usage Phase STARCOS 3.5 ID BAC C1
HW-Part of TOE: Infineon M7820 (Certificate: BSI-DSZ-CC-0813-2012) [25]. This TOE
was evaluated against Common Criteria Version 3.1.
1.2 TOE Overview
This security target defines the security objectives and requirements for the contactless
chip of machine readable travel documents (MRTD) based on the requirements and
recommendations of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). It addresses
the advanced security methods Basic Access Control in the ‘ICAO Doc 9303’ [5].
STARCOS 3.5 ID BAC C1 is the name of the related Target of Evaluation (TOE). The
related product is the STARCOS 3.5 ID BAC C1 card.
The TOE consists of software in combination with the underlying hardware ('Composite
Evaluation') including the STARCOS35PETABLES [29] and the GMA Verifier1
[28]
including its configuration file. The TOE software is the STARCOS 3.5 ID operating
system and the ePass application. The TOE hardware is the secure Infineon M7820
certified according to CC EAL5+ with the following configurations according to [25]:
 NVM: 36 kByte up to 128 kByte
 ROM: 280 kByte
 XRAM: 8 kByte
 SCP: Accessible
 Crypto2304T: Accessible
1
The GMA Verifier is not part of the TOE delivery. It is solely used by the MRTD Manufacturer for the correct installation of the TOE and
therefore of no use for the Personalisation Agent.
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 Interfaces: ISO/IEC 14443
The sales names of the TOE hardware platform [25] and the corresponding TOE names
of STARCOS 3.5 ID BAC C1 are listed below:
sales name of M7820 [25] TOE name of STARCOS 3.5 ID BAC C1
SLE78CLX360P STARCOS 3.5 ID BAC C1/360
SLE78CLX800P STARCOS 3.5 ID BAC C1/800
SLE78CLX1280P STARCOS 3.5 ID BAC C1/1280
The assurance level for the TOE is CC EAL4 augmented.
1.2.1 Sections Overview
Section 1 provides the introductory material for the Security Target.
Section 2 provides the conformance claims for the Security Target.
Section 3 provides a discussion of the security problems for the TOE. This section also
defines the set of threats that are to be addressed by either the technical
countermeasures implemented in the TOE hardware, the TOE software, or through the
environmental controls.
Section 4 defines the security objectives for both the TOE and the operational
environment and the security objective rational to explicitly demonstrate that the
information technology security objectives satisfy the policies and threats. Arguments
are provided for the coverage of each policy and threat.
Section 5 contains the extended component definitions.
Section 6 contains the security functional requirements and assurance requirements
derived from the Common Criteria [1], Part 2 [2] and Part 3 [3], which must be satisfied
and the security functional requirements rational. The section then explains how the set
of requirements are complete relative to the objectives, and that each security objective
is addressed by one or more component requirements. Arguments are provided for the
coverage of each objective.
Section 7 contains the TOE Summary Specification.
Section 8 provides information on used acronyms and glossary and the used references.
1.2.2 TOE definition
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the contactless integrated circuit chip of machine
readable travel documents (MRTD’s chip) programmed according to the Logical Data
Structure (LDS) and providing the Basic Access Control according to the ‘ICAO Doc
9303’ [5].
The TOE comprises of at least
 the circuitry of the MRTD’s chip (the integrated circuit, IC),
 the IC Dedicated Software with the parts IC Dedicated Test Software and IC
Dedicated Support Software,
 the IC Embedded Software (operating system),
 the MRTD application and
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 the associated guidance documentation.
1.2.3 TOE usage and security features for operational use
A State or Organization issues MRTDs to be used by the holder for international travel.
The traveler presents a MRTD to the inspection system to prove his or her identity. The
MRTD in context of this security target contains (i) visual (eye readable) biographical
data and portrait of the holder, (ii) a separate data summary (MRZ data) for visual and
machine reading using OCR methods in the Machine readable zone (MRZ) and (iii) data
elements on the MRTD’s chip according to LDS for contactless machine reading. The
authentication of the traveler is based on (i) the possession of a valid MRTD
personalized for a holder with the claimed identity as given on the biographical data
page and (ii) biometrics using the reference data stored in the MRTD. The issuing State
or Organization ensures the authenticity of the data of genuine MRTD’s. The receiving
State trusts a genuine MRTD of an issuing State or Organization.
For this security target the MRTD is viewed as unit of
(a) the physical MRTD as travel document in form of paper, plastic and chip. It
presents visual readable data including (but not limited to) personal data of the
MRTD holder
(1) the biographical data on the biographical data page of the passport book,
(2) the printed data in the Machine Readable Zone (MRZ) and
(3) the printed portrait.
(b) the logical MRTD as data of the MRTD holder stored according to the Logical
Data Structure [5] as specified by ICAO on the contactless integrated circuit. It
presents contactless readable data including (but not limited to) personal data of
the MRTD holder
(1) the digital Machine Readable Zone Data (digital MRZ data, EF.DG1),
(2) the digitized portraits (EF.DG2),
(3) the biometric reference data of finger(s) (EF.DG3) or iris image(s) (EF.DG4) or
both2
(4) the other data according to LDS (EF.DG5 to EF.DG16) and
(5) the Document security object.
The issuing State or Organization implements security features of the MRTD to maintain
the authenticity and integrity of the MRTD and their data. The MRTD as the passport
book and the MRTD’s chip is uniquely identified by the Document Number.
The physical MRTD is protected by physical security measures (e.g. watermark on paper,
security printing), logical (e.g. authentication keys of the MRTD’s chip) and
organizational security measures (e.g. control of materials, personalization procedures)
[5]. These security measures include the binding of the MRTD’s chip to the passport
book.
The logical MRTD is protected in authenticity and integrity by a digital signature created
by the document signer acting for the issuing State or Organization and the security
features of the MRTD’s chip.
2
These additional biometric reference data are optional.
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The ICAO defines the baseline security methods Passive Authentication and the optional
advanced security methods Basic Access Control to the logical MRTD, Active
Authentication of the MRTD’s chip, Extended Access Control to and the Data
Encryption of sensitive biometrics as optional security measure in the ICAO Doc 9303
[5]. The Passive Authentication Mechanism and the Data Encryption are performed
completely and independently of the TOE by the TOE environment.
This security target addresses the protection of the logical MRTD (i) in integrity by write-
only-once access control and by physical means, and (ii) in confidentiality by the Basic
Access Control Mechanism. This security target addresses the Active Authentication and
the Extended Access Control as optional security mechanisms.
The Basic Access Control is a security feature which is mandatory supported by the TOE.
The inspection system (i) reads optically the MRTD, (ii) authenticates itself as inspection
system by means of Document Basic Access Keys. After successful authentication of the
inspection system the MRTD’s chip provides read access to the logical MRTD by means
of private communication (secure messaging) with this inspection system [5], normative
appendix 5.
1.2.4 TOE life cycle
The TOE life cycle is described in terms of the four life cycle phases. (With respect to the
[18], the TOE life-cycle is additionally subdivided into 7 steps.)
Phase 1 “Development”
(Step1) The TOE is developed in phase 1. The IC developer develops the integrated
circuit, the IC Dedicated Software and the guidance documentation associated with
these TOE components.
(Step2) The software developer uses the guidance documentation for the integrated
circuit and the guidance documentation for relevant parts of the IC Dedicated Software
and develops the IC Embedded Software (operating system), the MRTD application and
the guidance documentation associated with these TOE components.
The manufacturing documentation of the IC including the IC Dedicated Software and
the Embedded Software in the non-volatile non-programmable memories (ROM) is
securely delivered to the IC manufacturer. The IC Embedded Software in the non-
volatile programmable memories, the MRTD application and the guidance
documentation is securely delivered to the MRTD manufacturer.
Phase 2 “Manufacturing”
(Step3) In a first step the TOE integrated circuit is produced containing the MRTD’s chip
Dedicated Software and the parts of the MRTD’s chip Embedded Software in the non-
volatile non-programmable memories (ROM). The IC manufacturer writes the IC
Identification Data onto the chip to control the IC as MRTD material during the IC
manufacturing and the delivery process to the MRTD manufacturer. The IC is securely
delivered from the IC manufacture to the MRTD manufacturer.
If necessary the IC manufacturer adds the parts of the IC Embedded Software in the
non-volatile programmable memories (for instance EEPROM).
(Step4) The MRTD manufacturer combines the IC with hardware for the contactless
interface in the passport book
(Step5) The MRTD manufacturer (i) creates the MRTD application and (ii) equips MRTD’s
chips with pre-personalization Data.
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Application Note 1: Creation of the application implies:
o For file based operating systems: the creation of MF and ICAO.DF
o For JavaCard operating systems: the Applet instantiation.
The pre-personalized MRTD together with the IC Identifier is securely delivered from the
MRTD manufacturer to the Personalization Agent. The MRTD manufacturer also
provides the relevant parts of the guidance documentation to the Personalization
Agent.
Phase 3 “Personalization of the MRTD”
(Step6) The personalization of the MRTD includes (i) the survey of the MRTD holder’s
biographical data, (ii) the enrolment of the MRTD holder biometric reference data (i.e.
the digitized portraits and the optional biometric reference data), (iii) the printing of the
visual readable data onto the physical MRTD, (iv) the writing of the TOE User Data and
TSF Data into the logical MRTD and (v) configuration of the TSF if necessary. The step
(iv) is performed by the Personalization Agent and includes but is not limited to the
creation of (i) the digital MRZ data (EF.DG1), (ii) the digitized portrait (EF.DG2), and (iii)
the Document security object.
The signing of the Document security object by the Document signer [5] finalizes the
personalization of the genuine MRTD for the MRTD holder. The personalized MRTD
(together with appropriate guidance for TOE use if necessary) is handed over to the
MRTD holder for operational use.
Application note 2: The TSF data (data created by and for the TOE, that might affect
the operation of the TOE; cf. [1] §92) comprise (but are not limited to) the
Personalization Agent Authentication Key(s) and the Chip Authentication Private Key.
Application note 3: This security target distinguishes between the Personalization
Agent as entity known to the TOE and the Document Signer as entity in the TOE IT
environment signing the Document security object as described in [5]. This approach
allows but does not enforce the separation of these roles. The selection of the
authentication keys should consider the organization, the productivity and the security
of the personalization process. Asymmetric authentication keys provide comfortable
security for distributed personalization but their use may be more time consuming than
authentication using symmetric cryptographic primitives. Authentication using
symmetric cryptographic primitives allows fast authentication protocols appropriate for
centralized personalization schemes but relies on stronger security protection in the
personalization environment.
Phase 4 “Operational Use”
(Step7) The TOE is used as MRTD chip by the traveler and the inspection systems in the
“Operational Use” phase. The user data can be read according to the security policy of
the issuing State or Organization and can be used according to the security policy of the
issuing State but they can never be modified.
Application note 4: The authorized Personalization Agents might be allowed to add
(not to modify) data in the other data groups of the MRTD application (e.g. person(s) to
notify EF.DG16) in the Phase 4 “Operational Use”. This will imply an update of the
Document Security Object including the re-signing by the Document Signer.
Application note 5: The intention of the PP is to consider at least the phases 1 and
parts of phase 2 (i.e. Step1 to Step3) as part of the evaluation and therefore to define
the TOE delivery according to CC after this phase. Since specific production steps of
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phase 2 are of minor security relevance (e.g. booklet manufacturing and antenna
integration) these are not part of the CC evaluation under ALC. Nevertheless the
decision about this has to be taken by the certification body resp. the national body of
the issuing State or Organization. In this case the national body of the issuing State or
Organization is responsible for these specific production steps.
Note that the personalization process and its environment may depend on specific
security needs of an issuing State or Organization. All production, generation and
installation procedures after TOE delivery up to the “Operational Use” (phase 4) have to
be considered in the product evaluation process under AGD assurance class. Therefore,
the Security Target has to outline the split up of P.Manufact, P.Personalization and the
related security objectives into aspects relevant before vs. after TOE delivery.
1.2.5 Non-TOE hardware/software/firmware required by the TOE
There is no explicit non-TOE hardware, software or firmware required by the TOE to
perform its claimed security features. The TOE is defined to comprise the chip and the
complete operating system and application. Note, the inlay holding the chip as well as
the antenna and the booklet (holding the printed MRZ) are needed to represent a
complete MRTD, nevertheless these parts are not inevitable for the secure operation of
the TOE.
2 Conformance Claims
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2 Conformance Claims
2.1 CC Conformance Claim
This security target claims conformance to
 Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 1:
Introduction and General Model; CCMB-2009-07-001, Version 3.1, Revision 3,
July 2009 [1]
 Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 2:
Security Functional Components; CCMB-2009-07-002, Version 3.1, Revision 3,
July 2009 [2]
 Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 3:
Security Assurance Requirements; CCMB-2009-07-003, Version 3.1, Revision 3,
July 2009 [3]
as follows
- Part 2 extended,
- Part 3 conformant.
The
 Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Evaluation Methodology; CCMB-2009-07-004, Version 3.1, Revision 3, July
2009, [4]
has to be taken into account.
2.2 PP Claim
This ST claims strict conformance to the Common Criteria Protection Profile – Machine
Readable Travel Document with ”ICAO Application”, Basic Access Control [19].
2.3 Package Claim
This ST is conformant to the assurance package EAL4 augmented with ALC_DVS.2
defined in the CC, part 3 [3].
2.4 Conformance Rationale
Since this ST is not claiming conformance to any other protection profile, no rationale is
necessary here.
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3 Security Problem Definition
3.1 Introduction
3.1.1 Assets
The assets to be protected by the TOE include the User Data on the MRTD’s chip.
Logical MRTD sensitive User Data
The logical MRTD data consists of the EF.COM, EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 (with different
security needs) and the Document Security Object EF.SOD according to LDS [5]. These
data are user data of the TOE. The EF.COM lists the existing elementary files (EF) with
the user data. The EF.DG1 to EF.DG13 and EF.DG16 contain personal data of the MRTD
holder. The Chip Authentication Public Key (EF.DG 14) is used by the inspection system
for the Chip Authentication. The EF.SOD is used by the inspection system for Passive
Authentication of the logical MRTD.
Due to interoperability reasons as the ‘ICAO Doc 9303’ [5] the TOE described in this
protection profile specifies only the BAC mechanisms with resistance against enhanced
basic attack potential granting access to
o Logical MRTD standard User Data (i.e. Personal Data) of the MRTD holder
(EF.DG1, EF.DG2, EF.DG5 to EF.DG13, EF.DG16),
o Chip Authentication Public Key in EF.DG14,
o Active Authentication Public Key in EF.DG15,
o Document Security Object (SOD) in EF.SOD,
o Common data in EF.COM.
The TOE prevents read access to sensitive User Data
o Sensitive biometric reference data (EF.DG3, EF.DG4)3
.
A sensitive asset is the following more general one.
Authenticity of the MRTD’s chip
The authenticity of the MRTD’s chip personalized by the issuing State or Organization
for the MRTD holder is used by the traveler to prove his possession of a genuine MRTD.
3.1.2 Subjects
This security target considers the following subjects:
Manufacturer
The generic term for the IC Manufacturer producing the integrated circuit and the
MRTD Manufacturer completing the IC to the MRTD’s chip. The Manufacturer is the
default user of the TOE during the Phase 2 Manufacturing. The TOE does not
distinguish between the users IC Manufacturer and MRTD Manufacturer using this role
Manufacturer.
3
Cf. [1] for details how to access these User data under EAC protection.
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Personalization Agent
The agent is acting on behalf of the issuing State or Organization to personalize the
MRTD for the holder by some or all of the following activities: (i) establishing the
identity of the holder for the biographic data in the MRTD, (ii) enrolling the biometric
reference data of the MRTD holder i.e. the portrait, the encoded finger image(s) and/or
the encoded iris image(s), (iii) writing these data on the physical and logical MRTD for
the holder as defined for global, international and national interoperability, (iv) writing
the initial TSF data and (v) signing the Document Security Object defined in [5].
Terminal
A terminal is any technical system communicating with the TOE through the contactless
interface.
Inspection system (IS)
A technical system used by the border control officer of the receiving State (i) examining
an MRTD presented by the traveler and verifying its authenticity and (ii) verifying the
traveler as MRTD holder. The Basic Inspection System (BIS) (i) contains a terminal for
the contactless communication with the MRTD’s chip, (ii) implements the terminals part
of the Basic Access Control Mechanism and (iii) gets the authorization to read the
logical MRTD under the Basic Access Control by optical reading the MRTD or other parts
of the passport book providing this information. Optionally, the BIS may support Active
Authentication. The General Inspection System (GIS) is a Basic Inspection System
which implements additionally the Chip Authentication Mechanism. The Extended
Inspection System (EIS) in addition to the General Inspection System (i) implements
the Terminal Authentication Protocol and (ii) is authorized by the issuing State or
Organization through the Document Verifier of the receiving State to read the sensitive
biometric reference data. The security attributes of the EIS are defined of the Inspection
System Certificates.
Application note 6: This security target does not distinguish between the BIS, GIS and
EIS because the Active Authentication and the Extended Access Control is outside the
scope.
MRTD Holder
The rightful holder of the MRTD for whom the issuing State or Organization
personalized the MRTD.
Traveler
Person presenting the MRTD to the inspection system and claiming the identity of the
MRTD holder.
Attacker
A threat agent trying (i) to manipulate the logical MRTD without authorization, (ii) to
read sensitive biometric reference data (i.e. EF.DG3, EF.DG4) or (iii) to forge a genuine
MRTD.
Application note 7: An impostor is attacking the inspection system as TOE IT
environment independent on using a genuine, counterfeit or forged MRTD. Therefore
the impostor may use results of successful attacks against the TOE but the attack itself is
not relevant for the TOE.
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3.2 Assumptions
The assumptions describe the security aspects of the environment in which the TOE will
be used or is intended to be used.
A.MRTD_Manufact MRTD manufacturing on steps 4 to 6
It is assumed that appropriate functionality testing of the MRTD is used. It is assumed
that security procedures are used during all manufacturing and test operations to
maintain confidentiality and integrity of the MRTD and of its manufacturing and test
data (to prevent any possible copy, modification, retention, theft or unauthorized use).
A.MRTD_Delivery MRTD delivery during steps 4 to 6
Procedures shall guarantee the control of the TOE delivery and storage process and
conformance to its objectives:
- Procedures shall ensure protection of TOE material/information under delivery and
storage.
- Procedures shall ensure that corrective actions are taken in case of improper
operation in the delivery process and storage.
- Procedures shall ensure that people dealing with the procedure for delivery have got
the required skill.
A.Pers_Agent Personalization of the MRTD’s chip
The Personalization Agent ensures the correctness of (i) the logical MRTD with respect
to the MRTD holder, (ii) the Document Basic Access Keys, (iii) the Chip Authentication
Public Key (EF.DG14) if stored on the MRTD’s chip, (iv) the Document Signer Public Key
Certificate (if stored on the MRTD’s chip), and (v) the Active Authentication Public Key
(if stored on the MRTD's chip). The Personalization Agent signs the Document Security
Object.
The Personalization Agent bears the Personalization Agent Authentication to
authenticate himself to the TOE by symmetric cryptographic mechanisms.
A.Insp_Sys Inspection Systems for global interoperability
The Inspection System is used by the border control officer of the receiving State (i)
examining an MRTD presented by the traveler and verifying its authenticity and (ii)
verifying the traveler as MRTD holder. The Basic Inspection System for global
interoperability (i) includes the Country Signing CA Public Key and the Document Signer
Public Key of each issuing State or Organization, and (ii) implements the terminal part of
the Basic Access Control [5]. The Basic Inspection System reads the logical MRTD under
Basic Access Control and performs the Passive Authentication to verify the logical
MRTD.
Application note 8: According to [5] the support of the Passive Authentication
mechanism is mandatory whereas the Basic Access Control is optional. This ST does not
address Primary Inspection Systems therefore the BAC is mandatory within this ST.
A.BAC-Keys Cryptographic quality of Basic Access Control Keys
The Document Basic Access Control Keys being generated and imported by the issuing
State or Organization have to provide sufficient cryptographic strength. As a
consequence of the ‘ICAO Doc 9303’ [5], the Document Basic Access Control Keys are
derived from a defined subset of the individual printed MRZ data. It has to be ensured
that these data provide sufficient entropy to withstand any attack based on the decision
that the inspection system has to derive Document Access Keys from the printed MRZ
data with enhanced basic attack potential.
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Application note 9: When assessing the MRZ data resp. the BAC keys entropy
potential dependencies between these data (especially single items of the MRZ) have to
be considered and taken into account. E.g. there might be a direct dependency
between the Document Number when chosen consecutively and the issuing date.
3.3 Threats
This section describes the threats to be averted by the TOE independently or in
collaboration with its IT environment. These threats result from the TOE method of use
in the operational environment and the assets stored in or protected by the TOE.
The TOE in collaboration with its IT environment shall avert the threats as specified
below.
T. Chip_ID Identification of MRTD’s chip
Adverse action: An attacker trying to trace the movement of the MRTD by identifying
remotely the MRTD’s chip by establishing or listening to
communications through the contactless communication interface.
Threat agent: having enhanced basic attack potential, not knowing the optically
readable MRZ data printed on the MRTD data page in advance
Asset: Anonymity of user
T. Skimming Skimming the logical MRTD
Adverse action: An attacker imitates an inspection system trying to establish a
communication to read the logical MRTD or parts of it via the
contactless communication channel of the TOE.
Threat agent: having enhanced basic attack potential, not knowing the optically
readable MRZ data printed on the MRTD data page in advance
Asset: confidentiality of logical MRTD data
T.Eavesdropping Eeavesdropping to the communication between TOE
and inspection system
Adverse action: An attacker is listening to an existing communication between the
MRTD’s chip and an inspection system to gain the logical MRTD or
parts of it. The inspection system uses the MRZ data printed on the
MRTD data page but the attacker does not know these data in
advance.
Threat agent: having enhanced basic attack potential, not knowing the optically
readable MRZ data printed on the MRTD data page in advance
Asset: confidentiality of logical MRTD data
T.Forgery Forgery of data on MRTD’s chip
Adverse action: An attacker alters fraudulently the complete stored logical MRTD or
any part of it including its security related data in order to deceive on
an inspection system by means of the changed MRTD holder’s
identity or biometric reference data. This threat comprises several
attack scenarios of MRTD forgery. The attacker may alter the
biographical data on the biographical data page of the passport
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book, in the printed MRZ and in the digital MRZ to claim another
identity of the traveler. The attacker may alter the printed portrait
and the digitized portrait to overcome the visual inspection of the
inspection officer and the automated biometric authentication
mechanism by face recognition. The attacker may alter the biometric
reference data to defeat automated biometric authentication
mechanism of the inspection system. The attacker may combine data
groups of different logical MRTDs to create a new forged MRTD, e.g.
the attacker writes the digitized portrait and optional biometric
reference finger data read from the logical MRTD of a traveler into
another MRTD’s chip leaving their digital MRZ unchanged to claim
the identity of the holder this MRTD. The attacker may also copy the
complete unchanged logical MRTD to another contactless chip.
Threat agent: having enhanced basic attack potential, being in possession of one
or more legitimate MRTDs
Asset: authenticity of logical MRTD data
The TOE shall avert the threats as specified below.
T.Abuse-Func Abuse of Functionality
Adverse action: An attacker may use functions of the TOE which shall not be used in
“Operational Use” phase in order (i) to manipulate User Data, (ii) to
manipulate (explore, bypass, deactivate or change) security features
or functions of the TOE or (iii) to disclose or to manipulate TSF Data.
This threat addresses the misuse of the functions for the initialization
and the personalization in the operational state after delivery to
MRTD holder.
Threat agent: having enhanced basic attack potential, being in possession of a
legitimate MRTD
Asset: confidentiality and authenticity of logical MRTD and TSF data,
correctness of TSF
T.Information_Leakage Information Leakage from MRTD’s chip
Adverse action: An attacker may exploit information which is leaked from the TOE
during its usage in order to disclose confidential TSF data. The
information leakage may be inherent in the normal operation or
caused by the attacker. Leakage may occur through emanations,
variations in power consumption, I/O characteristics, clock frequency,
or by changes in processing time requirements. This leakage may be
interpreted as a covert channel transmission but is more closely
related to measurement of operating parameters which may be
derived either from measurements of the contactless interface
(emanation) or direct measurements (by contact to the chip still
available even for a contactless chip) and can then be related to the
specific operation being performed. Examples are the Differential
Electromagnetic Analysis (DEMA) and the Differential Power Analysis
(DPA). Moreover the attacker may try actively to enforce information
leakage by fault injection (e.g. Differential Fault Analysis).
Threat agent: having enhanced basic attack potential, being in possession of a
legitimate MRTD
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Asset: confidentiality of logical MRTD and TSF data
T.Phys-Tamper Physical Tampering
Adverse action: An attacker may perform physical probing of the MRTD’s chip in
order (i) to disclose TSF Data, or (ii) to disclose/reconstruct the
MRTD’s chip Embedded Software. An attacker may physically modify
the MRTD’s chip in order to (i) modify security features or functions
of the MRTD’s chip, (ii) modify security functions of the MRTD’s chip
Embedded Software, (iii) modify User Data or (iv) to modify TSF data.
The physical tampering may be focused directly on the disclosure or
manipulation of TOE User Data (e.g. the biometric reference data for
the inspection system) or TSF Data (e.g. authentication key of the
MRTD’s chip) or indirectly by preparation of the TOE to following
attack methods by modification of security features (e.g. to enable
information leakage through power analysis). Physical tampering
requires direct interaction with the MRTD’s chip internals.
Techniques commonly employed in IC failure analysis and IC reverse
engineering efforts may be used. Before that, the hardware security
mechanisms and layout characteristics need to be identified.
Determination of software design including treatment of User Data
and TSF Data may also be a pre-requisite. The modification may
result in the deactivation of a security function. Changes of circuitry
or data can be permanent or temporary.
Threat agent: having enhanced basic attack potential, being in possession of a
legitimate MRTD
Asset: confidentiality and authenticity of logical MRTD and TSF data,
correctness of TSF
T.Malfunction Malfunction due to Environmental Stress
Adverse action: An attacker may cause a malfunction of TSF or of the MRTD’s chip
Embedded Software by applying environmental stress in order to (i)
deactivate or modify security features or functions of the TOE or (ii)
circumvent, deactivate or modify security functions of the MRTD’s
chip Embedded Software. This may be achieved e.g. by operating
the MRTD’s chip outside the normal operating conditions, exploiting
errors in the MRTD’s chip Embedded Software or misusing
administration function. To exploit these vulnerabilities an attacker
needs information about the functional operation.
Threat agent: having enhanced basic attack potential, being in possession of a
legitimate MRTD
Asset: confidentiality and authenticity of logical MRTD and TSF data,
correctness of TSF
3.4 Organisational Security Policies
The TOE shall comply with the following Organizational Security Policies (OSP) as
security rules, procedures, practices, or guidelines imposed by an organization upon its
operations (see CC part 1 [1], sec. 3.2).
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P.Manufact Manufacturing of the MRTD’s chip
The Initialization Data are written by the IC Manufacturer to identify the IC uniquely.
The MRTD Manufacturer writes the Pre-personalization Data which contains at least the
Personalization Agent Key.
P.Personalization Personalization of the MRTD by issuing State or
Organization only
The issuing State or Organization guarantees the correctness of the biographical data,
the printed portrait and the digitized portrait, the biometric reference data and other
data of the logical MRTD with respect to the MRTD holder. The personalization of the
MRTD for the holder is performed by an agent authorized by the issuing State or
Organization only.
P.Personal_Data Personal data protection policy
The biographical data and their summary printed in the MRZ and stored on the MRTD’s
chip (EF.DG1), the printed portrait and the digitized portrait (EF.DG2), the biometric
reference data of finger(s) (EF.DG3), the biometric reference data of iris image(s)
(EF.DG4)4
and data according to LDS (EF.DG5 to EF.DG13, EF.DG16) stored on the
MRTD’s chip are personal data of the MRTD holder. These data groups are intended to
be used only with agreement of the MRTD holder by inspection systems to which the
MRTD is presented. The MRTD’s chip shall provide the possibility for the Basic Access
Control to allow read access to these data only for terminals successfully authenticated
based on knowledge of the Document Basic Access Keys as defined in [5].
Application note 10: The organizational security policy P.Personal_Data is drawn from
the ICAO ‘ICAO Doc 9303’ [5]. Note that the Document Basic Access Key is defined by
the TOE environment and loaded to the TOE by the Personalization Agent.
4
Note, that EF.DG3 and EF.DG4 are only readable after successful EAC authentication not being covered by this Security Target.
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4 Security Objectives
This chapter describes the security objectives for the TOE and the security objectives for
the TOE environment. The security objectives for the TOE environment are separated
into security objectives for the development and production environment and security
objectives for the operational environment.
4.1 Security Objectives for the TOE
This section describes the security objectives for the TOE addressing the aspects of
identified threats to be countered by the TOE and organizational security policies to be
met by the TOE.
OT.AC_Pers Access Control for Personalization of logical MRTD
The TOE must ensure that the logical MRTD data in EF.DG1 to EF.DG16, the Document
security object according to LDS [5] and the TSF data can be written by authorized
Personalization Agents only. The logical MRTD data in EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 and the TSF
data may be written only during and cannot be changed after its personalization. The
Document security object can be updated by authorized Personalization Agents if data
in the data groups EF.DG3 to EF.DG16 are added.
Application note 12: The OT.AC_Pers implies that
(1) the data of the LDS groups written during personalization for MRTD holder (at least
EF.DG1 and EF.DG2) can not be changed by write access after personalization,
(2) the Personalization Agents may (i) add (fill) data into the LDS data groups not
written yet, and (ii) update and sign the Document Security Object accordingly. The
support for adding data in the “Operational Use” phase is optional.
OT.Data_Int Integrity of personal data
The TOE must ensure the integrity of the logical MRTD stored on the MRTD’s chip
against physical manipulation and unauthorized writing. The TOE must ensure that the
inspection system is able to detect any modification of the transmitted logical MRTD
data.
OT.Data_Conf Confidentiality of sensitive biometric reference data
The TOE must ensure the confidentiality of the logical MRTD data groups EF.DG1 to
EF.DG16. Read access to EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 is granted to terminals successfully
authenticated as Personalization Agent. Read access to EF.DG1, EF.DG2 and EF.DG5 to
EF.DG16 is granted to terminals successfully authenticated as Basic Inspection System.
The Basic Inspection System shall authenticate itself by means of the Basic Access
Control based on knowledge of the Document Basic Access Key. The TOE must ensure
the confidentiality of the logical MRTD data during their transmission to the Basic
Inspection System.
OT.Identification Identification and Authentication of the TOE
The TOE must provide means to store IC Identification and Pre-Personalization Data in
its non-volatile memory. The IC Identification Data must provide a unique identification
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of the IC during Phase 2 “Manufacturing” and Phase 3 “Personalization of the MRTD”.
The storage of the Pre-Personalization data includes writing of the Personalization
Agent Key(s). In Phase 4 “Operational Use” the TOE shall identify itself only to a
successful authenticated Basic Inspection System or Personalization Agent.
Application note 13: The TOE security objective OT.Identification addresses security
features of the TOE to support the life cycle security in the manufacturing and
personalization phases. The IC Identification Data are used for TOE identification in
Phase 2 “Manufacturing” and for traceability and/or to secure shipment of the TOE
from Phase 2 “Manufacturing” into the Phase 3 “Personalization of the MRTD”. The
OT.Identification addresses security features of the TOE to be used by the TOE
manufacturing. In the Phase 4 “Operational Use” the TOE is identified by the Document
Number as part of the printed and digital MRZ. The OT.Identification forbids the output
of any other IC (e.g. integrated circuit card serial number ICCSN) or MRTD identifier
through the contactless interface before successful authentication as Basic Inspection
System or as Personalization Agent.
The following TOE security objectives address the protection provided by the MRTD’s
chip independent of the TOE environment.
OT.Prot_Abuse-Func Protection against Abuse of Functionality
After delivery of the TOE to the MRTD Holder, the TOE must prevent the abuse of test
and support functions that may be maliciously used to (i) disclose critical User Data, (ii)
manipulate critical User Data of the IC Embedded Software, (iii) manipulate Soft-coded
IC Embedded Software or (iv) bypass, deactivate, change or explore security features or
functions of the TOE.
Details of the relevant attack scenarios depend, for instance, on the capabilities of the
Test Features provided by the IC Dedicated Test Software which are not specified here.
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak Protection against Information Leakage
The TOE must provide protection against disclosure of confidential TSF data stored
and/or processed in the MRTD’s chip
 by measurement and analysis of the shape and amplitude of signals or the time
between events found by measuring signals on the electromagnetic field, power
consumption, clock, or I/O lines and
 by forcing a malfunction of the TOE and/or
 by a physical manipulation of the TOE.
Application note 14: This objective pertains to measurements with subsequent
complex signal processing due to normal operation of the TOE or operations enforced
by an attacker. Details correspond to an analysis of attack scenarios which is not given
here.
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper Protection against Physical Tampering
The TOE must provide protection of the confidentiality and integrity of the User Data,
the TSF Data, and the MRTD’s chip Embedded Software. This includes protection
against attacks with enhanced basic attack potential by means of
 measuring through galvanic contacts which is direct physical probing on the
chips surface except on pads being bonded (using standard tools for measuring
voltage and current) or
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 measuring not using galvanic contacts but other types of physical interaction
between charges (using tools used in solid-state physics research and IC failure
analysis)
 manipulation of the hardware and its security features, as well as
 controlled manipulation of memory contents (User Data, TSF Data)
with a prior
 reverse-engineering to understand the design and its properties and functions.
OT.Prot_Malfunction Protection against Malfunctions
The TOE must ensure its correct operation. The TOE must prevent its operation outside
the normal operating conditions where reliability and secure operation has not been
proven or tested. This is to prevent errors. The environmental conditions may include
external energy (esp. electromagnetic) fields, voltage (on any contacts), clock frequency,
or temperature.
Application note 15: A malfunction of the TOE may also be caused using a direct
interaction with elements on the chip surface. This is considered as being a
manipulation (refer to the objective OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper) provided that detailed
knowledge about the TOE´s internals.
4.2 Security Objectives for Operational
Environment
Issuing State or Organization
The issuing State or Organization will implement the following security objectives of the
TOE environment.
OE.MRTD_Manufact Protection of the MRTD Manufacturing
Appropriate functionality testing of the TOE shall be used in step 4 to 6.
During all manufacturing and test operations, security procedures shall be used through
phases 4, 5 and 6 to maintain confidentiality and integrity of the TOE and its
manufacturing and test data.
OE.MRTD_Delivery Protection of the MRTD delivery
Procedures shall ensure protection of TOE material/information under delivery including
the following objectives:
- non-disclosure of any security relevant information,
- identification of the element under delivery,
- meet confidentiality rules (confidentiality level, transmittal form, reception
acknowledgment),
- physical protection to prevent external damage,
- secure storage and handling procedures (including rejected TOE’s),
- traceability of TOE during delivery including the following parameters:
 origin and shipment details,
 reception, reception acknowledgement,
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 location material/information.
Procedures shall ensure that corrective actions are taken in case of improper operation
in the delivery process (including if applicable any non-conformance to the
confidentiality convention) and highlight all non-conformance to this process.
Procedures shall ensure that people (shipping department, carrier, reception
department) dealing with the procedure for delivery have got the required skill, training
and knowledge to meet the procedure requirements and be able to act fully in
accordance with the above expectations.
OE.Personalization Personalization of logical MRTD
The issuing State or Organization must ensure that the Personalization Agents acting on
behalf of the issuing State or Organization (i) establish the correct identity of the holder
and create biographical data for the MRTD, (ii) enroll the biometric reference data of
the MRTD holder i.e. the portrait, the encoded finger image(s) and/or the encoded iris
image(s) and (iii) personalize the MRTD for the holder together with the defined physical
and logical security measures to protect the confidentiality and integrity of these data.
OE.Pass_Auth_Sign Authentication of logical MRTD by Signature
The issuing State or Organization must (i) generate a cryptographic secure Country
Signing CA Key Pair, (ii) ensure the secrecy of the Country Signing CA Private Key and
sign Document Signer Certificates in a secure operational environment, and (iii)
distribute the Certificate of the Country Signing CA Public Key to receiving States and
Organizations maintaining its authenticity and integrity. The issuing State or
Organization must (i) generate a cryptographic secure Document Signer Key Pair and
ensure the secrecy of the Document Signer Private Keys, (ii) sign Document Security
Objects of genuine MRTD in a secure operational environment only and (iii) distribute
the Certificate of the Document Signer Public Key to receiving States and Organizations.
The digital signature in the Document Security Object relates to all data in the data in
EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 if stored in the LDS according to [5].
OE.BAC-Keys Cryptographic quality of Basic Access Control Keys
The Document Basic Access Control Keys being generated and imported by the issuing
State or Organization have to provide sufficient cryptographic strength. As a
consequence of the ‘ICAO Doc 9303’ [5] the Document Basic Access Control Keys are
derived from a defined subset of the individual printed MRZ data. It has to be ensured
that these data provide sufficient entropy to withstand any attack based on the decision
that the inspection system has to derive Document Basic Access Keys from the printed
MRZ data with enhanced basic attack potential.
Receiving State or Organization
The receiving State or Organization will implement the following security objectives of
the TOE environment.
OE.Exam_MRTD Examination of the MRTD passport book
The inspection system of the receiving State or Organization must examine the MRTD
presented by the traveler to verify its authenticity by means of the physical security
measures and to detect any manipulation of the physical MRTD. The Basic Inspection
System for global interoperability (i) includes the Country Signing CA Public Key and the
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Document Signer Public Key of each issuing State or Organization, and (ii) implements
the terminal part of the Basic Access Control [5].
OE.Passive_Auth_Verif Verification by Passive Authentication
The border control officer of the receiving State uses the inspection system to verify the
traveller as MRTD holder. The inspection systems must have successfully verified the
signature of Document Security Objects and the integrity data elements of the logical
MRTD before they are used. The receiving States and Organizations must manage the
Country Signing Public Key and the Document Signer Public Key maintaining their
authenticity and availability in all inspection systems.
OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD Protection of data from the logical MRTD
The inspection system of the receiving State or Organization ensures the confidentiality
and integrity of the data read from the logical MRTD. The receiving State examining the
logical MRTD being under Basic Access Control will use inspection systems which
implement the terminal part of the Basic Access Control and use the secure messaging
with fresh generated keys for the protection of the transmitted data (i.e. Basic
Inspection Systems).
4.3 Security Objective Rationale
The following table provides an overview for security objectives coverage.
OT.AC_Pers
OT.Data_Int
OT.Data_Conf
OT.Identification
OT.Prot_Abuse-Func
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper
OT.Prot_Malfuntion
OE.MRTD_Manufact
OE.MRTD_Delivery
OE.Personalization
OE.Pass_Auth_Sign
OE.BAC-Keys
OE.Exam_MRTD
OE.Passive_Auth_Verif
OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD
T.Chip-ID x x
T.Skimming x x
T.Eavesdropping x
T.Forgery x x x x x x
T.Abuse-Func x x
T.Information_Leakage x
T.Phys-Tamper x
T.Malfunction x
P.Manufact x
P.Personalization x x x
P.Personal_Data x x
A.MRTD_Manufact x
A.MRTD_Delivery x
A.Pers_Agent x
A.Insp_Sys x x
A.BAC-Keys x
Table 1 Security Objective Rationale
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The OSP P.Manufact “Manufacturing of the MRTD’s chip” requires a unique
identification of the IC by means of the Initialization Data and the writing of the Pre-
personalization Data as being fulfilled by OT.Identification.
The OSP P.Personalization “Personalization of the MRTD by issuing State or
Organization only” addresses the (i) the enrolment of the logical MRTD by the
Personalization Agent as described in the security objective for the TOE environment
OE.Personalization “Personalization of logical MRTD”, and (ii) the access control for
the user data and TSF data as described by the security objective OT.AC_Pers “Access
Control for Personalization of logical MRTD”. Note the manufacturer equips the TOE
with the Personalization Agent Key(s) according to OT.Identification “Identification
and Authentication of the TOE”. The security objective OT.AC_Pers limits the
management of TSF data and the management of TSF to the Personalization Agent.
The OSP P.Personal_Data “Personal data protection policy” requires the TOE (i) to
support the protection of the confidentiality of the logical MRTD by means of the Basic
Access Control and (ii) enforce the access control for reading as decided by the issuing
State or Organization. This policy is implemented by the security objectives OT.Data_Int
“Integrity of personal data” describing the unconditional protection of the integrity of
the stored data and during transmission. The security objective OT.Data_Conf
“Confidentiality of personal data” describes the protection of the confidentiality.
The threat T. Chip_ID “Identification of MRTD’s chip” addresses the trace of the MRTD
movement by identifying remotely the MRTD’s chip through the contactless
communication interface. This threat is countered as described by the security objective
OT.Identification by Basic Access Control using sufficiently strong derived keys as
required by the security objective for the environment OE.BAC-Keys.
The threat T. Skimming “Skimming digital MRZ data or the digital portrait” and
T.Eavesdropping “Eavesdropping to the communication between TOE and inspection
system” address the reading of the logical MRTD trough the contactless interface or
listening the communication between the MRTD’s chip and a terminal. This threat is
countered by the security objective OT.Data_Conf “Confidentiality of personal data”
through Basic Access Control using sufficiently strong derived keys as required by the
security objective for the environment OE.BAC-Keys.
The threat T.Forgery “Forgery of data on MRTD’s chip” addresses the fraudulent
alteration of the complete stored logical MRTD or any part of it. The security objective
OT.AC_Pers “Access Control for Personalization of logical MRTD” requires the TOE to
limit the write access for the logical MRTD to the trustworthy Personalization Agent (cf.
OE.Personalization). The TOE will protect the integrity of the stored logical MRTD
according the security objective OT.Data_Int “Integrity of personal data” and
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper “Protection against Physical Tampering”. The examination of
the presented MRTD passport book according to OE.Exam_MRTD “Examination of the
MRTD passport book” shall ensure that passport book does not contain a sensitive
contactless chip which may present the complete unchanged logical MRTD. The TOE
environment will detect partly forged logical MRTD data by means of digital signature
which will be created according to OE.Pass_Auth_Sign “Authentication of logical
MRTD by Signature” and verified by the inspection system according to
OE.Passive_Auth_Verif “Verification by Passive Authentication”.
The threat T.Abuse-Func “Abuse of Functionality” addresses attacks using the MRTD’s
chip as production material for the MRTD and misuse of the functions for
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personalization in the operational state after delivery to MRTD holder to disclose or to
manipulate the logical MRTD. This threat is countered by OT.Prot_Abuse-Func
“Protection against Abuse of Functionality”. Additionally this objective is supported by
the security objective for the TOE environment: OE.Personalization “Personalization of
logical MRTD” ensuring that the TOE security functions for the initialization and the
personalization are disabled and the security functions for the operational state after
delivery to MRTD holder are enabled according to the intended use of the TOE.
The threats T.Information_Leakage“ Information Leakage from MRTD’s chip”,
T.Phys-Tamper “Physical Tampering” and T.Malfunction “Malfunction due to
Environmental Stress” are typical for integrated circuits like smart cards under direct
attack with high attack potential. The protection of the TOE against these threats is
addressed by the directly related security objectives OT.Prot_Inf_Leak “Protection
against Information Leakage”, OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper “Protection against Physical
Tampering” and OT.Prot_Malfunction “Protection against Malfunctions”.
The assumption A.MRTD_Manufact “MRTD manufacturing on step 4 to 6” is covered
by the security objective for the TOE environment OE.MRTD_Manufact “Protection of
the MRTD Manufacturing” that requires to use security procedures during all
manufacturing steps.
The assumption A.MRTD_Delivery “MRTD delivery during step 4 to 6” is covered by
the security objective for the TOE environment OE.MRTD_Delivery “Protection of the
MRTD delivery” that requires to use security procedures during delivery steps of the
MRTD.
The assumption A.Pers_Agent “Personalization of the MRTD’s chip” is covered by the
security objective for the TOE environment OE.Personalization “Personalization of
logical MRTD” including the enrolment, the protection with digital signature and the
storage of the MRTD holder personal data.
The examination of the MRTD passport book addressed by the assumption A.Insp_Sys
“Inspection Systems for global interoperability” is covered by the security objectives for
the TOE environment OE.Exam_MRTD “Examination of the MRTD passport book”. The
security objectives for the TOE environment OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD “Protection of
data from the logical MRTD” will require the Basic Inspection System to implement the
Basic Access Control and to protect the logical MRTD data during the transmission and
the internal handling.
The assumption A.BAC-Keys “Cryptographic quality of Basic Access Control Keys” is
directly covered by the security objective for the TOE environment OE.BAC-Keys
“Cryptographic quality of Basic Access Control Keys” ensuring the sufficient key quality
to be provided by the issuing State or Organization.
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5Extended Components
Definition
This security target uses components defined as extensions to CC part 2. Some of these
components are defined in [16] other components are defined in the protection profile
[19].
5.1 Definition of the Family FAU_SAS
To define the security functional requirements of the TOE a family (FAU_SAS) of the
class FAU (Security Audit) is defined here. This family describes the functional
requirements for the storage of audit data. It has a more general approach than
FAU_GEN, because it does not necessarily require the data to be generated by the TOE
itself and because it does not give specific details of the content of the audit records.
The family ‘Audit data storage (FAU_SAS)’ is specified as follows:
FAU_SAS Audit data storage
Family behaviour
This family defines functional requirements for the storage of audit data.
Component levelling
FAU_SAS.1 Requires the TOE to provide the possibility to store audit data.
Management: FAU_SAS.1
There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit: FAU_SAS.1
There are no actions defined to be auditable.
FAU_SAS.1 Audit storage
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: No dependencies
FAU_SAS.1.1 The TSF shall provide [assignment: authorised users] with the
capability to store [assignment: list of audit information] in the audit records.
5.2 Definition of the Family FCS_RND
To define the IT security functional requirements of the TOE a family (FCS_RND) of the
class FCS (cryptographic support) is defined here. This family describes the functional
requirements for random number generation used for cryptographic purposes. The
component FCS_RND.1 is not limited to generation of cryptographic keys unlike the
component FCS_CKM.1. The similar component FIA_SOS.2 is intended for non-
cryptographic use.
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The family ‘Generation of random numbers (FCS_RND)’ is specified as follows:
FCS_RND Generation of random numbers
Family behaviour
This family defines quality requirements for the generation of random numbers
intended to be used for cryptographic purposes.
Component levelling:
FCS_RND.1 Generation of random numbers requires that random numbers meet
a defined quality metric.
Management: FCS_RND.1
There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit: FCS_RND.1
There are no actions defined to be auditable.
FCS_RND.1 Quality metric for random numbers
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: No dependencies
FCS_RND.1.1 The TSF shall provide a mechanism to generate random numbers that
meet [assignment: a defined quality metric].
5.3 Definition of the Family FMT_LIM
The family FMT_LIM describes the functional requirements for the test features of the
TOE. The new functional requirements were defined in the class FMT because this class
addresses the management of functions of the TSF. The examples of the technical
mechanism used in the TOE show that no other class is appropriate to address the
specific issues of preventing abuse of functions by limiting the capabilities of the
functions and by limiting their availability.
The family ‘Limited capabilities and availability (FMT_LIM)’ is specified as follows:
FMT_LIM Limited capabilities and availability
Family behaviour
This family defines requirements that limit the capabilities and availability of functions in
a combined manner. Note, that FDP_ACF restricts access to functions whereas the
Limited capability of this family requires the functions themselves to be designed in a
specific manner.
Component levelling:
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FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities requires that the TSF is built to provide only the
capabilities (perform action, gather information) necessary for its genuine purpose.
FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability requires that the TSF restrict the use of functions
(refer to Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)). This can be achieved, for instance, by
removing or by disabling functions in a specific phase of the TOE’s life-cycle.
Management: FMT_LIM.1, FMT_LIM.2
There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit: FMT_LIM.1, FMT_LIM.2
There are no actions defined to be auditable.
To define the IT security functional requirements of the TOE a sensitive family (FMT_LIM)
of the Class FMT (Security Management) is defined here. This family describes the
functional requirements for the Test Features of the TOE. The new functional
requirements were defined in the class FMT because this class addresses the
management of functions of the TSF. The examples of the technical mechanism used in
the TOE show that no other class is appropriate to address the specific issues of
preventing the abuse of functions by limiting the capabilities of the functions and by
limiting their availability.
The TOE Functional Requirement “Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)” is specified as
follows.
FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability
FMT_LIM.1.1 The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their capabilities so
that in conjunction with ‘Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)’ the following policy is
enforced [assignment: limited capability and availability policy].
FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities
FMT_LIM.2.1 The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their availability so
that in conjunction with ‘Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)’ the following policy is
enforced [assignment: limited capability and availability policy].
Application Note 16: The functional requirements FMT_LIM.1 and FMT_LIM.2 assume
existence of two types of mechanisms (limited capabilities and limited availability) which
together shall provide protection in order to enforce the related policy. This also allows
that
(i) the TSF is provided without restrictions in the product in its user environment but
its capabilities are so limited that the policy is enforced
or conversely
(ii) the TSF is designed with test and support functionality that is removed from, or
disabled in, the product prior to the Operational Use Phase.
The combination of both the requirements shall enforce the related policy.
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5.4 Definition of the Family FPT_EMSEC
The family FPT_EMSEC (TOE Emanation) of the class FPT (Protection of the TSF) is
defined here to describe the IT security functional requirements of the TOE. The TOE
shall prevent attacks against the TOE and other secret data where the attack is based on
external observable physical phenomena of the TOE. Examples of such attacks are
evaluation of TOE’s electromagnetic radiation, simple power analysis (SPA), differential
power analysis (DPA), timing attacks, etc. This family describes the functional
requirements for the limitation of intelligible emanations being not directly addressed by
any other component of CC part 2 [2].
The family ‘TOE Emanation (FPT_EMSEC)’ is specified as follows:
FPT_EMSEC TOE emanation
Family behaviour
This family defines requirements to mitigate intelligible emanations.
Component levelling:
FPT_EMSEC.1 TOE emanation has two constituents:
FPT_EMSEC.1.1 Limit of Emissions requires to not emit intelligible emissions enabling
access to TSF data or user data.
FPT_EMSEC.1.2 Interface Emanation requires to not emit interface emanation
enabling access to TSF data or user data.
Management: FPT_EMSEC.1
There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit: FPT_EMSEC.1
There are no actions defined to be auditable.
FPT_EMSEC.1 TOE Emanation
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: No dependencies
FPT_EMSEC.1.1 The TOE shall not emit [assignment: types of emissions] in excess of
[assignment: specified limits] enabling access to [assignment: list of types of TSF data]
and [assignment: list of types of user data].
FPT_EMSEC.1.2 The TSF shall ensure [assignment: type of users] are unable to use the
following interface [assignment: type of connection] to gain access to [assignment: list
of types of TSF data] and [assignment: list of types of user data].
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6 Security Requirements
The CC allows several operations to be performed on security requirements (on the
component level); refinement, selection, assignment and iteration are defined in sec.
8.1 of Part 1 [1] of the CC. Each of these operations is used in this ST.
The refinement operation is used to add detail to a requirement, and, thus, further
restricts a requirement. Refinements of security requirements are denoted in such a way
that added words are in bold text.
The selection operation is used to select one or more options provided by the CC in
stating a requirement. Selections having been made by the PP author are denoted as
underlined text. Selections filled in by the ST author are denoted as double underlined
text and a foot note where the selection choices from the PP are listed.
The assignment operation is used to assign a specific value to an unspecified
parameter, such as the length of a password. Assignments having been made by the PP
author are denoted by showing as underlined text. Assignments filled in by the ST
author are denoted as double underlined text. In some cases the assignment made by
the PP authors defines a selection to be performed by the ST author. Thus this text is
underlined and italicised like this.
The iteration operation is used when a component is repeated with varying operations.
Iteration is denoted by showing a slash “/”, and the iteration indicator after the
component identifier.
The definition of the subjects “Manufacturer”, “Personalization Agent”, “Basic
Inspection System” and “Terminal” used in the following chapter is given in section 3.1.
Note, that all these subjects are acting for homonymous external entities. All used
objects are defined either in section 7 or in the following table. The operations “write”,
“read”, “modify”, and “disable read access” are used in accordance with the general
linguistic usage. The operations “transmit”, “receive”, and “authenticate” and “re-
authenticate” are originally taken from [2].
Definition of security attributes:
security attribute values meaning
none (any
Terminal)
default role (i.e. without
authorisation after start-up)
Basic Inspection
System
Terminal is authenticated as Basic
Inspection System after successful
Authentication in accordance with
the definition in rule 2 of
FIA_UAU.5.2.
terminal authentication
status
Personalization
Agent
Terminal is authenticated as
Personalization Agent after
successful Authentication in
accordance with the definition in
rule 1 of FIA_UAU.5.2.
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6.1 Security Functional Requirements for the TOE
This section on security functional requirements for the TOE is divided into sub-section
following the main security functionality.
6.1.1 Class FAU Security Audit
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Audit storage (FAU_SAS.1)” as specified below
(Common Criteria Part 2 extended).
FAU_SAS.1 Audit storage
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FAU_SAS.1.1 The TSF shall provide the Manufacturer5
with the capability to store
the IC Identification Data6
in the audit records.
Application note 17: The Manufacturer role is the default user identity assumed by the
TOE in the Phase 2 Manufacturing. The IC manufacturer and the MRTD manufacturer in
the Manufacturer role write the Initialization Data and/or Pre-personalization Data as
TSF Data of the TOE. The audit records are write-only-once data of the MRTD’s chip (see
FMT_MTD.1.1/INI_DIS).
6.1.2 Class FCS Cryptographic Support
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic key generation (FCS_CKM.1)” as
specified below (Common Criteria Part 2). The iterations are caused by different
cryptographic key generation algorithms to be implemented and key to be generated by
the TOE.
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation – Generation of Document Basic
Access Keys by the TOE
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution or
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_CKM.1.1 The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a
specified cryptographic key generation algorithm Document Basic Access Key Derivation
Algorithm7
and specified cryptographic key sizes 112 bits8
that meet the following: [5],
normative appendix 59
.
Application Note 18: The TOE is equipped with the Document Basic Access Key
generated and downloaded by the Personalization Agent. The Basic Access Control
Authentication Protocol described in [5], normative appendix 5, A5.2, produces agreed
parameters to generate the Triple-DES key and the Retail-MAC message authentication
keys for secure messaging by the algorithm in [5], Normative appendix A5.1. The
algorithm uses the random number RND.ICC generated by TSF as required by
FCS_RND.1.
5
[assignment: authorised users]
6
[assignment: list of audit information]
7
[assignment: cryptographic key generation algorithm]
8
[assignment: cryptographic key sizes]
9
[assignment: list of standards]
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The TOE shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic key destruction (FCS_CKM.4)” as
specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction - MRTD
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4.1 The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a
specified cryptographic key destruction method overwriting the key value with zero
values10
that meets the following: none11
.
Application Note 19: The TOE shall destroy the Triple-DES encryption key and the
Retail-MAC message authentication keys for secure messaging.
6.1.2.1 Cryptographic operation (FCS_COP.1)
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic operation (FCS_COP.1)” as
specified below (Common Criteria Part 2). The iterations are caused by different
cryptographic algorithms to be implemented by the TOE.
FCS_COP.1/SHA Cryptographic operation – Hash for key derivation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1.1/SHA The TSF shall perform hashing12
in accordance with a
specified cryptographic algorithm SHA-113,14
and cryptographic key sizes none15
that
meet the following: FIPS 180-216,17
.
Application Note 20: This SFR requires the TOE to implement the hash function SHA-1
for the cryptographic primitive to derive the Basic Access Control Authentication
Mechanism (see also FAU_UAU.4) according to [5].
FCS_COP.1/ENC Cryptographic operation – Symmetric Encryption / Decryption
Triple DES
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
10
[assignment: cryptographic key destruction method]
11
[assignment: list of standards]
12
[assignment: list of cryptographic operations]
13
[selection: SHA-1 or other approved algorithms]
14
[assignment: cryptographic algorithm]
15
[assignment: cryptographic key sizes]
16
[assignment: list of standards]
17
[selection: FIPS 180-2 or other approved standards]
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FCS_COP.1.1/ENC The TSF shall perform secure messaging (BAC) – encryption
and decryption18
in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm Triple-DES in
CBC mode19
and cryptographic key sizes 112 bits20
that meet the following: FIPS 46-3
[10] and [5]; normative appendix 5, A5.321
.
Application Note 21: This SFR requires the TOE to implement the cryptographic
primitive for secure messaging with encryption of the transmitted data. The keys are
agreed between the TOE and the terminal as part of the Basic Access Control
Authentication Mechanism according to the FCS_CKM.1 and FIA_UAU.4.
FCS_COP.1/AUTH Cryptographic operation – Authentication
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1.1/AUTH The TSF shall perform symmetric authentication – encryption
and decryption22
in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm AES23,24
and
cryptographic key sizes 128 bits25,26
that meet the following: FIPS197 [9]27,28
.
Application Note 22: This SFR requires the TOE to implement the cryptographic
primitive for authentication attempt of a terminal as Personalization Agent by means of
the symmetric authentication mechanism (cf. FIA_UAU.4).
FCS_COP.1/MAC Cryptographic operation – Retail MAC
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1.1/MAC The TSF shall perform secure messaging – message
authentication code29
in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm Retail-
MAC30
and cryptographic key sizes 112 bits31
that meet the following: ISO 9797 (MAC
algorithm 3, block cipher DES, Sequence Message Counter, padding mode 2)32
.
Application Note 26: This SFR requires the TOE to implement the cryptographic
primitive for secure messaging with encryption and message authentication code over
18
[assignment: list of cryptographic operations]
19
[assignment: cryptographic algorithm]
20
[assignment: cryptographic key sizes]
21
[assignment: list of standards]
22
[assignment: list of cryptographic operations]
23
[selection: Triple-DES, AES]
24
[assignment: cryptographic algorithm]
25
[selection: 112, 128, 168, 192, 256]
26
[assignment: cryptographic key sizes]
27
[selection: FIPS 46-3 [9], FIPS 197 [12]]
28
[assignment: list of standards]
29
[assignment: list of cryptographic operations]
30
[assignment: cryptographic algorithm]
31
[assignment: cryptographic key sizes]
32
[assignment: list of standards]
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the transmitted data. The key is agreed between the TSF by the Basic Access Control
Authentication Mechanism according to the FCS_CKM.1 and FIA_UAU.4.
6.1.2.2 Random Number Generation (FCS_RND.1)
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Quality metric for random numbers (FCS_RND.1)”
as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2 extended).
FCS_RND.1 Quality metric for random numbers
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FCS_RND.1.1 The TSF shall provide a mechanism to generate random numbers that
meet K4 (high) according to AIS20 [22]33
.
Application Note 24: This SFR requires the TOE to generate random numbers used for
the authentication protocols as required by FIA_UAU.4.
6.1.3 Class FIA Identification and Authentication
Application Note 25: The Table 2 provides an overview of the authentication
mechanisms used.
Name SFR for the TOE Algorithms and key sizes
according to [5], normative
appendix 5, and [21]
Basic Access Control
Authentication
Mechanism
FIA_UAU.4 and
FIA_UAU.6
Triple-DES, 112 bit keys (cf.
FCS_COP.1/ENC) and Retail-
MAC, 112 bit keys (cf.
FCS_COP.1/MAC)
Symmetric
Authentication
Mechanism for
Personalization Agents
FIA_UAU.4 AES with 128 bit keys (cf.
FCS_COP.1/AUTH)
Table 2 Overview on authentication SFRs
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Timing of identification (FIA_UID.1)” as specified
below (Common Criteria Part 2).
FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FIA_UID.1.1 The TSF shall allow
1. to read the Initialization Data in Phase 2 “Manufacturing”,
2. to read random identifier in Phase 3 “Personalization of the MRTD”,
3. to read the random identifier in Phase 4 “Operational Use”34
on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is identified.
33
[assignment: a defined quality metric]
34
[assignment: list of TSF-mediated actions]
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FIA_UID.1.2 The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before
allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
Application Note 26: The IC manufacturer and the MRTD manufacturer write the
Initialization Data and/or Pre-personalization Data in the audit records of the IC during
the Phase 2 “Manufacturing”. The audit records can be written only in the Phase 2
Manufacturing of the TOE. At this time the Manufacturer is the only user role available
for the TOE. The MRTD manufacturer may create the user role Personalization Agent for
transition from Phase 2 to Phase 3 “Personalization of the MRTD”. The users in role
Personalization Agent identify themselves by means of selecting the authentication key.
After personalization in the Phase 3 (i.e. writing the digital MRZ and the Document
Basic Access Keys) the user role Basic Inspection System is created by writing the
Document Basic Access Keys. The Basic Inspection System is identified as default user
after power up or reset of the TOE i.e. the TOE will use the Document Basic Access Key
to authenticate the user as Basic Inspection System.
Application Note 27: In the “Operational Use” phase the MRTD must not allow
anybody to read the ICCSN, the MRTD identifier or any other unique identification
before the user is authenticated as Basic Inspection System (cf. T.Chip_ID). Note that the
terminal and the MRTD’s chip use a (randomly chosen) identifier for the communication
channel to allow the terminal to communicate with more then one RFID. If this identifier
is randomly selected it will not violate the OT.Identification. If this identifier is fixed the
ST writer should consider the possibility to misuse this identifier to perform attacks
addressed by T.Chip_ID.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Timing of authentication (FIA_UAU.1)” as
specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
FIA_UAU.1.1 The TSF shall allow
1. to read the Initialization Data in Phase 2 “Manufacturing”,
2. to read the random identifier in Phase 3 “Personalization of the MRTD”,
3. to read the random identifier in Phase 4 “Operational Use”35
on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is authenticated.
FIA_UAU.1.2 The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated
before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
Application note 28: The Basic Inspection System and the Personalization Agent
authenticate themselves.
The TOE shall meet the requirements of “Single-use authentication mechanisms
(FIA_UAU.4)” as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
FIA_UAU.4 Single-use authentication mechanisms – Single-use authentication of
the Terminal by the TOE
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
35
[assignment: list of TSF-mediated actions]
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FIA_UAU.4.1 The TSF shall prevent reuse of authentication data related to
1. Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism,
2. Authentication Mechanism based on AES36,37
.
Application Note 29: The authentication mechanisms may use either a challenge
freshly and randomly generated by the TOE to prevent reuse of a response generated by
a terminal in a successful authentication attempt. However, the authentication of
Personalization Agent may rely on other mechanisms ensuring protection against replay
attacks, such as the use of an internal counter as a diversifier.
Application note 30: The Basic Access Control Mechanism is a mutual device
authentication mechanism defined in [5]. In the first step the terminal authenticates
itself to the MRTD’s chip and the MRTD’s chip authenticates to the terminal in the
second step. In this second step the MRTD’s chip provides the terminal with a
challenge-response-pair which allows a unique identification of the MRTD’s chip with
some probability depending on the entropy of the Document Basic Access Keys.
Therefore the TOE shall stop further communications if the terminal is not successfully
authenticated in the first step of the protocol to fulfil the security objective
OT.Identification and to prevent T.Chip_ID.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Multiple authentication mechanisms
(FIA_UAU.5)” as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
FIA_UAU.5 Multiple authentication mechanisms
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FIA_UAU.5.1 The TSF shall provide
1. Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism,
2. Symmetric Authentication Mechanism based on AES38,39
to support user authentication.
FIA_UAU.5.2 The TSF shall authenticate any user’s claimed identity according to
the following rules:
1. The TOE accepts the authentication attempt as Personalization Agent by one of
the following mechanism(s) Symmetric Authentication Mechanism with
Personalization Agent Key40
.
2. The TOE accepts the authentication attempt as Basic Inspection System only by
means of Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism with the Document
Basic Access Keys41
.
Application Note 31: In case the ‘Common Criteria Protection Profile Machine
Readable Travel Document with „ICAO Application", Extended Access Control’ [20]
should also be fulfilled the Personalization Agent should not be authenticated by using
36
[assignment: identified authentication mechanism(s)]
37
[selection: Triple-DES, AES or other approved algorithms]
38
[assignment: identified authentication mechanism(s)]
39
[selection: Triple-DES, AES]
40
[selection: the Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism with the Personalization Agent Keys, the Symmetric Authentication
Mechanism with the Personalization Agent Key, [assignment other]]
41
[assignment: rules describing how the multiple authentication mechanisms provide authentication]
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the BAC or other symmetric authentication mechanism based on the two-key Triple-
DES. The Personalization Agent is authenticated by using the AES-based Symmetric
Authentication Mechanism with the Personalization Agent Key, cf. [20] FIA_UAU.5.2.
Application note 32: The Basic Access Control Mechanism includes the secure
messaging for all commands exchanged after successful authentication of the
inspection system. The Personalization Agent may use Symmetric Authentication
Mechanism without secure messaging mechanism as well if the personalization
environment prevents eavesdropping to the communication between TOE and
personalization terminal. The Basic Inspection System may use the Basic Access Control
Authentication Mechanism with the Document Basic Access Keys.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Re-authenticating (FIA_UAU.6)” as specified
below (Common Criteria Part 2).
FIA_UAU.6 Re-authenticating – Re-authenticating of Terminal by the TOE
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FIA_UAU.6.1 The TSF shall re-authenticate the user under the conditions each
command sent to the TOE during a BAC mechanism based communication after
successful authentication of the terminal with Basic Access Control Authentication
Mechanism42
.
Application Note 33: The Basic Access Control Mechanism specified in [5] includes the
secure messaging for all commands exchanged after successful authentication of the
Inspection System. The TOE checks by secure messaging in MAC_ENC mode each
command based on Retail-MAC whether it was sent by the successfully authenticated
terminal (see FCS_COP.1/MAC for further details). The TOE does not execute any
command with incorrect message authentication code. Therefore the TOE re-
authenticates the user for each received command and accepts only those commands
received from the previously authenticated BAC user.
Application note 34: Note that in case the TOE should also fulfil [20] the BAC
communication might be followed by a Chip Authentication mechanism establishing a
new secure messaging that is distinct from the BAC based communication. In this case
the condition in FIA_UAU.6 above should not contradict to the option that commands
are sent to the TOE that are no longer meeting the BAC communication but are
protected by a more secure communication channel established after a more advanced
authentication process.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Authentication failure handling (FIA_AFL.1)” as
specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
FIA_AFL.1 Authentication failure handling
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication.
42
[assignment: list of conditions under which re-authentication is required]
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FIA_AFL.1.1 The TSF shall detect when an administrator configurable positive
integer within range of acceptable values 1 to 10 consecutive43
unsuccessful
authentication attempts occur related to the BAC mechanism44
.
FIA_AFL.1.2 When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts
has been met or surpassed45
, the TSF shall wait for an administrator configurable time
between the receiving the terminal challenge eIFD and sending the TSF response eICC
during the BAC authentication attempts46
.
Application note 35: These assignments are assigned to ensure especially the strength
of authentication function as terminal part of the Basic Access Control Authentication
Protocol to resist enhanced basic attack potential.
The terminal challenge eIFD and the TSF response eICC are described in [21], Appendix C.
The refinement by inclusion of the word “consecutive” allows the TSF to return to
normal operation of the BAC authentication protocol (without time out) after successful
run of the BAC authentication protocol. The unsuccessful authentication attempt shall
be stored non-volatile in the TOE thus the “consecutive unsuccessful authentication
attempts” are count independent on power-on sessions but reset to zero after
successful authentication only.
6.1.4 Class FDP User Data Protection
Subset access control (FDP_ACC.1)
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Subset access control (FDP_ACC.1)” as specified
below (Common Criteria Part 2).
FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control – Basic Access Control
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control
FDP_ACC.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the Basic Access Control SFP47
on terminals
gaining write, read and modification access to data in the EF.COM, EF.SOD, EF.DG1 to
EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD48
.
Security attribute based access control (FDP_ACF.1)
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Security attribute based access control
(FDP_ACF.1)” as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control – Basic Access Control
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialization
43
[selection: [assignment: positive integer number], an administrator configurable positive integer within [assignment: range of
acceptable values]]
44
[assignment: list of authentication events]
45
[assignment: met or surpassed]
46
[assignment: list of actions]
47
[assignment: access control SFP]
48
[assignment: list of subjects, objects, and operations among subjects and objects covered by the SFP]
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FDP_ACF.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the Basic Access Control SFP49
to objects based
on the following:
1. Subjects:
a. Personalization Agent,
b. Basic Inspection System,
c. Terminal,
2. Objects:
a. data EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD,
b. data in EF.COM,
c. data in EF.SOD
3. Security attributes:
a. authentication status of terminals50
FDP_ACF.1.2 The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation
among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed:
1. the successfully authenticated Personalization Agent is allowed to write and to
read the data of the EF.COM, EF.SOD, EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD,
2. the successfully authenticated Basic Inspection System is allowed to read the data
in EF.COM, EF.SOD, EF.DG1, EF.DG2 and EF.DG5 to EF.DG16 of the logical
MRTD51
FDP_ACF.1.3 The TSF shall explicitly authorize access of subjects to objects based
on the following additional rules: none52
.
FDP_ACF.1.4 The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on
the rule:
1. Any terminal is not allowed to modify any of the EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the
logical MRTD,
2. Any terminal is not allowed to read any of the EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical
MRTD.
3. The Basic Inspection System is not allowed to read the data in EF.DG3 and
EF.DG4.53
Application Note 36: The inspection system needs special authentication and
authorization for read access to DG3 and DG4 not defined in this protection profile (cf.
[20] for details).
Inter-TSF-Transfer
Application Note 37: FDP_UCT.1 and FDP_UIT.1 require the protection of the User
Data transmitted from the TOE to the terminal by secure messaging with encryption
49
[assignment: access control SFP]
50
[assignment: list of subjects and objects controlled under the indicated SFP, and. for each, the SFP-relevant security attributes, or
named groups of SFP-relevant security attributes]
51
[assignment: rules governing access among controlled subjects and controlled objects using controlled operations on controlled
objects]
52
[assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects]
53
[assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly deny access of subjects to objects]
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and message authentication codes after successful authentication of the terminal. The
authentication mechanisms as part of Basic Access Control Mechanism include the key
agreement for the encryption and the message authentication key to be used for secure
messaging.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Basic data exchange confidentiality (FDP_UCT.1)”
as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
FDP_UCT.1 Basic data exchange confidentiality - MRTD
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel, or
FTP_TRP.1 Trusted path]
[FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
FDP_UCT.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the Basic Access Control SFP54
to be able to
transmit and receive55
user data in a manner protected from unauthorized disclosure.
FDP_UIT.1 Data exchange integrity - MRTD
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
[FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel, or
FTP_TRP.1 Trusted path]
FDP_UIT.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the Basic Access Control SFP56
to be able to
transmit and receive57
user data in a manner protected from modification, deletion,
insertion and replay58
errors.
FDP_UIT.1.2 The TSF shall be able to determine on receipt of user data, whether
modification, deletion, insertion and replay59
has occurred.
6.1.5 Class FMT Security Management
Application note 38: The SFR FMT_SMF.1 and FMT_SMR.1 provide basic requirements
on the management of the TSF data.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Specification of Management Functions
(FMT_SMF.1)” as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FMT_SMF.1.1 The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management
functions:
54
[assignment: access control SFP(s) and/or information flow control SFP(s)]
55
[selection: transmit, receive]
56
[assignment: access control SFP(s) and/or information flow control SFP(s)]
57
[selection: transmit, receive]
58
[selection: modification, deletion, insertion, replay]
59
[selection: modification, deletion, insertion, replay]
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1. Initialization,
2. Pre-Personalization,
3. Personalization60
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Security roles (FMT_SMR.1)” as specified below
(Common Criteria Part 2).
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification.
FMT_SMR.1.1 The TSF shall maintain the roles
1. Manufacturer,
2. Personalization Agent,
3. Basic Inspection System.61
FMT_SMR.1.2 The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.
Application note 39: The SFR FMT_LIM.1 and FMT_LIM.2 address the management of
the TSF and TSF data to prevent misuse of test features of the TOE over the life cycle
phases.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)” as specified
below (Common Criteria Part 2 extended).
FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability
FMT_LIM.1.1 The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their capabilities so
that in conjunction with ‘Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)’ the following policy is
enforced:
Deploying test features after TOE delivery do not allow
1. User Data to be manipulated,
2. TSF data to be disclosed or manipulated,
3. software to be reconstructed and
4. substantial information about construction of TSF to be gathered which may
enable other attacks.62
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)” as specified
below (Common Criteria Part 2 extended).
FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability
Hierarchical to: No other components.
60
[assignment: list of management functions to be provided by the TSF]
61
[assignment: the authorised identified roles]
62
[assignment: limited capability and availability policy]
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Dependencies: FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities
FMT_LIM.2.1 The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their availability so
that in conjunction with ‘Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)’ the following policy is
enforced:
Deploying test features after TOE delivery do not allow
1. User Data to be manipulated,
2. TSF data to be disclosed or manipulated,
3. software to be reconstructed and
4. substantial information about construction of TSF to be gathered which may
enable other attacks.63
Application note 40: The formulation of “Deploying Test Features …” in FMT_LIM.2.1
might be a little bit misleading since the addressed features are no longer available (e.g.
by disabling or removing the respective functionality). Nevertheless the combination of
FMT_LIM.1 and FMT_LIM.2 is introduced provide an optional approach to enforce the
same policy. Note that the term “software” in item 3 of FMT_LIM.1.1 and FMT_LIM.2.1
refers to both IC Dedicated and IC Embedded Software.
Application note 41: The following SFR are iterations of the component Management
of TSF data (FMT_MTD.1). The TSF data include but are not limited to those identified
below.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Management of TSF data (FMT_MTD.1)” as
specified below (Common Criteria Part 2). The iterations address different management
functions and different TSF data.
FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA Management of TSF data – Writing Initialization Data and
Pre-personalization Data
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MTD.1.1/INI_ENA The TSF shall restrict the ability to write64
the Initialization
Data and Pre-personalization Data65
to the Manufacturer66
.
Application note 42: The Pre-personalization Data includes but is not limited to the
authentication reference data for the Personalization Agent which is the symmetric
cryptographic Personalization Agent Key.
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS Management of TSF data – Disabling of Read Access to
Initialization and Pre-personalization Data
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MTD.1.1/INI_DIS The TSF shall restrict the ability to disable read access for
users to67
the Initialization Data68
to the Personalization Agent69
.
63
[assignment: limited capability and availability policy]
64
[selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, clear, [assignment: other operations]]
65
[assignment: list of TSF data]
66
[assignment: the authorised identified roles]
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Application note 43: According to P.Manufact the IC Manufacturer and the MRTD
Manufacturer are the default users assumed by the TOE in the role Manufacturer during
the Phase 2 “Manufacturing” but the TOE is not requested to distinguish between
these users within the role Manufacturer. The TOE restricts the ability to write the
Initialization Data and the Pre-personalization Data by blocking the role Manufacturer at
the end of the Phase 2. The IC Manufacturer writes the Initialization Data which
includes but are not limited to the IC Identifier as required by FAU_SAS.1. The
Initialization Data provides a unique identification of the IC which is used to trace the IC
in the Phase 2 and 3 “Personalization” but is not needed and may be misused in the
Phase 4 “Operational Use”. Therefore the external read access shall be blocked. The
MRTD Manufacturer will write the Pre-personalization Data.
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE Management of TSF data – Key Write
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MTD.1.1/KEY_WRITE The TSF shall restrict the ability to write70
the
Document Basic Access Keys71
to the Personalization Agent72
.
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ Management of TSF data –Key Read
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MTD.1.1/KEY_READ The TSF shall restrict the ability to read73
the
Document Basic Access Keys and Personalization Agent Keys74
to none75
.
Application Note 44: The Personalization Agent generates, stores and ensures the
correctness of the Document Basic Access Keys.
6.1.6 Class FPT Protection of the Security Functions
The TOE shall prevent inherent and forced illicit information leakage for User Data and
TSF Data. The security functional requirement FPT_EMSEC.1 addresses the inherent
leakage. With respect to the forced leakage they have to be considered in combination
with the security functional requirements “Failure with preservation of secure state
(FPT_FLS.1)” and “TSF testing (FPT_TST.1)” on the one hand and “Resistance to physical
attack (FPT_PHP.3)” on the other. The SFRs “Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)”, “Limited
availability (FMT_LIM.2)” and “Resistance to physical attack (FPT_PHP.3)” together with
the SAR “Security architecture description” (ADV_ARC.1) prevent bypassing,
deactivation and manipulation of the security features or misuse of TOE functions.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “TOE Emanation (FPT_EMSEC.1)” as specified
below (Common Criteria Part 2 extended).
67
[selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, clear, [assignment: other operations]]
68
[assignment: list of TSF data]
69
[assignment: the authorised identified roles]
70
[selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, clear, [assignment: other operations]]
71
[assignment: list of TSF data]
72
[assignment: the authorised identified roles]
73
[selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, clear, [assignment: other operations]]
74
[assignment: list of TSF data]
75
[assignment: the authorised identified roles]
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FPT_EMSEC.1 TOE Emanation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FPT_EMSEC.1.1 The TOE shall not emit information about IC power consumption and
command execution time76
in excess of non useful information77
enabling access to
Personalization Agent Key(s)78
and logical MRTD data79
.
FPT_EMSEC.1.2 The TSF shall ensure any unauthorized users80
are unable to use the
following interface smart card circuit contacts81
to gain access to Personalization Agent
Key(s)82
and logical MRTD data83
.
Application note 51: The TOE shall prevent attacks against the listed secret data
where the attack is based on external observable physical phenomena of the TOE. Such
attacks may be observable at the interfaces of the TOE or may be originated from
internal operation of the TOE or may be caused by an attacker that varies the physical
environment under which the TOE operates. The set of measurable physical phenomena
is influenced by the technology employed to implement the smart card. The MRTD’s
chip has to provide a smart card contactless interface but may have also (not used by
the terminal but maybe by an attacker) sensitive contacts according to ISO/IEC 7816-2
as well. Examples of measurable phenomena include, but are not limited to variations in
the power consumption, the timing of signals and the electromagnetic radiation due to
internal operations or data transmissions.
The following security functional requirements address the protection against forced
illicit information leakage including physical manipulation.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Failure with preservation of secure state
(FPT_FLS.1)” as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
FPT_FLS.1 Failure with preservation of secure state
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FPT_FLS.1.1 The TSF shall preserve a secure state when the following types of
failures occur:
1. Exposure to out-of-range operating conditions where therefore a malfunction
could occur,
2. failure detected by TSF according to FPT_TST.184
The TOE shall meet the requirement “TSF testing (FPT_TST.1)” as specified below
(Common Criteria Part 2).
FPT_TST.1 TSF testing
76
[assignment: types of emissions]
77
[assignment: specified limits]
78
[assignment: type of users]
79
[assignment: list of types of user data]
80
[assignment: type of users]
81
[assignment: type of connection]
82
[assignment: type of users]
83
[assignment: list of types of user data]
84
[assignment: list of types of failures in the TSF]
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Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FPT_TST.1.1 The TSF shall run a suite of self tests during initial start-up,
periodically during normal operation, at the condition Reset of the TOE85,86
to
demonstrate the correct operation of the TSF87
.
FPT_TST.1.2 The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the
integrity of the TSF data88
.
FPT_TST.1.3 The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the
integrity of stored TSF executable code.
Application note 46: The MRTD’s chip uses state of the art smart card technology and
runs some self tests at the request of the authorized user and some self tests
automatically. E.g. a self test for the verification of the integrity of stored TSF executable
code required by FPT_TST.1.3 is executed during initial start-up by the “authorized
user” Manufacturer in the Phase 2 “Manufacturing”. Other self tests are executed
automatically to detect failure and to preserve of secure state according to FPT_FLS.1 in
the Phase 4 “Operational Use”, e.g. to check a calculation with a private key by the
reverse calculation with the corresponding public key as countermeasure against
Differential Failure Attacks.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Resistance to physical attack (FPT_PHP.3)” as
specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
FPT_PHP.3 Resistance to physical attack
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FPT_PHP.3.1 The TSF shall resist physical manipulation and physical probing89
to
the TSF90
by responding automatically such that the SFRs are always enforced.
Application note 47: The TOE will implement appropriate measures to continuously
counter physical manipulation and physical probing. Due to the nature of these attacks
(especially manipulation) the TOE can by no means detect attacks on all of its elements.
Therefore, permanent protection against these attacks is required ensuring that the TSP
could not be violated at any time. Hence, “automatic response” means here (i)
assuming that there might be an attack at any time and (ii) countermeasures are
provided at any time.
Application note 48: The SFRs “Non-bypassability of the TSF FPT_RVM.1” and “TSF
domain separation FPT_SEP.1” are no longer part of [2]. These requirements are now an
implicit part of the assurance requirement ADV_ARC.1.
85
[selection: during initial start-up, periodically during normal operation, at the request of the authorised user, at the conditions
[assignment: conditions under which self test should occur]]
86
[assignment: conditions under which self test should occur]
87
[selection: [assignment: parts of TSF], the TSF]
88
[selection: [assignment: parts of TSF], TSF data]
89
[assignment: physical tampering scenarios]
90
[assignment: list of TSF devices/elements]
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6.2 Security Assurance Requirements for the TOE
The for the evaluation of the TOE and its development and operating environment are
those taken from the
Evaluation Assurance Level 4 (EAL4)
and augmented by the following components:
ALC_DVS.2.
6.3 Security Requirements Rationale
6.3.1 Security Functional Requirements Rationale
The following table provides an overview for security functional requirements coverage.
OT.AC_Pers
OT.Data_Int
OT.Data_Conf
OT.Identification
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper
OT.Prot_Malfunction
OT.Prot_Abuse-Func
FAU_SAS.1 x
FCS_CKM.1 x x x
FCS_CKM.4 x x
FCS_COP.1/SHA x x x
FCS_COP.1/ENC x x x
FCS_COP.1/AUTH x x
FCS_COP.1/MAC x x x
FCS_RND.1 x x x
FIA_UID.1 x x
FIA_AFL.1 x x
FIA_UAU.1 x x
FIA_UAU.4 x x x
FIA_UAU.5 x x x
FIA_UAU.6 x x x
FDP_ACC.1 x x x
FDP_ACF.1 x x x
FDP_UCT.1 x x x
FDP_UIT.1 x x x
FMT_SMF.1 x x x
FMT_SMR.1 x x x
FMT_LIM.1 x
FMT_LIM.2 x
FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA x
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS x
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE x x x
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OT.AC_Pers
OT.Data_Int
OT.Data_Conf
OT.Identification
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper
OT.Prot_Malfunction
OT.Prot_Abuse-Func
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ x x x
FPT_EMSEC.1 x x
FPT_TST.1 x x
FPT_FLS.1 x x x
FPT_PHP.3 x x x
Table 3 Coverage of Security Objectives for the TOE by SFR
The security objective OT.AC_Pers “Access Control for Personalization of logical
MRTD” addresses the access control of the writing the logical MRTD. The write access
to the logical MRTD data are defined by the SFR FDP_ACC.1 and FDP_ACF.1 as follows:
only the successfully authenticated Personalization Agent is allowed to write the data of
the groups EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD only once.
The authentication of the terminal as Personalization Agent shall be performed by TSF
according to SRF FIA_UAU.4 and FIA_UAU.5. The Personalization Agent can be
authenticated (for reasons of interoperability with [20]) by using the symmetric
authentication mechanism (FCS_COP.1/AUTH).
The SFR FMT_SMR.1 lists the roles (including Personalization Agent) and the SFR
FMT_SMF.1 lists the TSF management functions (including Personalization) setting the
Document Basic Access Keys according to the SFR FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE as
authentication reference data. The SFR FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ prevents read access to
the secret key of the Personalization Agent Keys and ensure together with the SFR
FCS_CKM.4, FPT_EMSEC.1, FPT_FLS.1 and FPT_PHP.3 the confidentially of these keys.
The security objective OT.Data_Int “Integrity of personal data” requires the TOE to
protect the integrity of the logical MRTD stored on the MRTD’s chip against physical
manipulation and unauthorized writing. The write access to the logical MRTD data is
defined by the SFR FDP_ACC.1 and FDP_ACF.1 in the same way: only the
Personalization Agent is allowed to write the data in EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical
MRTD (FDP_ACF.1.2, rule 1) and terminals are not allowed to modify any of the data in
EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD (cf. FDP_ACF.1.4). The SFR FMT_SMR.1 lists the
roles (including Personalization Agent) and the SFR FMT_SMF.1 lists the TSF
management functions (including Personalization). The authentication of the terminal as
Personalization Agent shall be performed by TSF according to SRF FIA_UAU.4 and
FIA_UAU.5 using FCS_COP.1/AUTH.
The security objective OT.Data_Int “Integrity of personal data” requires the TOE to
ensure that the inspection system is able to detect any modification of the transmitted
logical MRTD data by means of the BAC mechanism. The SFR FIA_UAU.6, FDP_UCT.1
and FDP_UIT.1 requires the protection of the transmitted data by means of secure
messaging implemented by the cryptographic functions according to FCS_CKM.1,
FCS_COP.1/SHA, FCS_RND.1 (for key generation), and FCS_COP.1/ENC and
FCS_COP.1/MAC for the ENC_MAC_Mode. The SFR FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE requires
the Personalization Agent to establish the Document Basic Access Keys in a way that
they cannot be read by anyone in accordance to FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ.
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The security objective OT.Data_Conf “Confidentiality of personal data” requires the
TOE to ensure the confidentiality of the logical MRTD data groups EF.DG1 to EF.DG16.
The SFR FIA_UID.1 and FIA_UAU.1 allow only those actions before identification
respective authentication which do not violate OT.Data_Conf. In case of failed
authentication attempts FIA_AFL.1 enforces additional waiting time prolonging the
necessary amount of time for facilitating a brute force attack. The read access to the
logical MRTD data is defined by the FDP_ACC.1 and FDP_ACF.1.2: the successful
authenticated Personalization Agent is allowed to read the data of the logical MRTD
(EF.DG1 to EF.DG16). The successful authenticated Basic Inspection System is allowed to
read the data of the logical MRTD (EF.DG1, EF.DG2 and EF.DG5 to EF.DG16). The SFR
FMT_SMR.1 lists the roles (including Personalization Agent and Basic Inspection System)
and the SFR FMT_SMF.1 lists the TSF management functions (including Personalization
for the key management for the Document Basic Access Keys).
The SFR FIA_UAU.4 prevents reuse of authentication data to strengthen the
authentication of the user. The SFR FIA_UAU.5 enforces the TOE to accept the
authentication attempt as Basic Inspection System only by means of the Basic Access
Control Authentication Mechanism with the Document Basic Access Keys. Moreover,
the SFR FIA_UAU.6 requests secure messaging after successful authentication of the
terminal with Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism which includes the
protection of the transmitted data in ENC_MAC_Mode by means of the cryptographic
functions according to FCS_COP.1/ENC and FCS_COP.1/MAC (cf. the SFR FDP_UCT.1
and FDP_UIT.1 for key generation), and FCS_COP.1/ENC and FCS_COP.1/MAC for the
ENC_MAC_Mode. The SFR FCS_CKM.1, FCS_CKM.4, FCS_COP.1/SHA and FCS_RND.1
establish the key management for the secure messaging keys. The SFR
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE addresses the key management and FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ
prevents reading of the Document Basic Access Keys.
Note, neither the security objective OT.Data_Conf nor the SFR FIA_UAU.5 requires the
Personalization Agent to use the Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism or
secure messaging.
The security objective OT.Identification “Identification and Authentication of the TOE”
address the storage of the IC Identification Data uniquely identifying the MRTD’s chip in
its non-volatile memory. This will be ensured by TSF according to SFR FAU_SAS.1.
Furthermore, the TOE shall identify itself only to a successful authenticated Basic
Inspection System in Phase 4 “Operational Use”. The SFR FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA allows
only the Manufacturer to write Initialization Data and Pre-personalization Data
(including the Personalization Agent key). The SFR FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS allows the
Personalization Agent to disable Initialization Data if their usage in the phase 4
“Operational Use” violates the security objective OT.Identification. The SFR FIA_UID.1
and FIA_UAU.1 do not allow reading of any data uniquely identifying the MRTD’s chip
before successful authentication of the Basic Inspection Terminal and will stop
communication after unsuccessful authentication attempt (cf. Application note 30). In
case of failed authentication attempts FIA_AFL.1 enforces additional waiting time
prolonging the necessary amount of time for facilitating a brute force attack.
The security objective OT.Prot_Abuse-Func “Protection against Abuse of
Functionality” is ensured by the SFR FMT_LIM.1 and FMT_LIM.2 which prevent misuse
of test functionality of the TOE or other features which may not be used after TOE
Delivery.
The security objective OT.Prot_Inf_Leak “Protection against Information Leakage”
requires the TOE to protect confidential TSF data stored and/or processed in the MRTD’s
chip against disclosure
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 by measurement and analysis of the shape and amplitude of signals or the time
between events found by measuring signals on the electromagnetic field,
power consumption, clock, or I/O lines which is addressed by the SFR
FPT_EMSEC.1,
 by forcing a malfunction of the TOE which is addressed by the SFR FPT_FLS.1
and FPT_TST.1, and/or
 by a physical manipulation of the TOE which is addressed by the SFR FPT_PHP.3.
The security objective OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper “Protection against Physical Tampering”
is covered by the SFR FPT_PHP.3.
The security objective OT.Prot_Malfunction “Protection against Malfunctions” is
covered by (i) the SFR FPT_TST.1 which requires self tests to demonstrate the correct
operation and tests of authorized users to verify the integrity of TSF data and TSF code,
and (ii) the SFR FPT_FLS.1 which requires a secure state in case of detected failure or
operating conditions possibly causing a malfunction.
6.3.2 Dependency Rationale
The dependency analysis for the security functional requirements shows that the basis
for mutual support and internal consistency between all defined functional
requirements is satisfied. All dependencies between the chosen functional components
are analysed, and non-dissolved dependencies are appropriately explained.
The Table 4 shows the dependencies between the SFR of the TOE.
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SFR Dependencies Support of the
Dependencies
FAU_SAS.1 No dependencies n.a.
FCS_CKM.1 FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic
key distribution or
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic
operation],
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic
key destruction
Fulfilled by FCS_COP.1/ENC,
and FCS_COP.1/MAC,
Fulfilled by FCS_CKM.4
FCS_CKM.4 [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user
data without security
attributes,
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user
data with security
attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic
key generation]
Fulfilled by FCS_CKM.1
FCS_COP.1/SHA [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user
data without security
attributes,
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user
data with security
attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic
key generation],
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic
key destruction
justification 1 for non-
satisfied dependencies
Fulfilled by FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1/ENC [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user
data without security
attributes,
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user
data with security
attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic
key generation],
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic
key destruction
Fulfilled by FCS_CKM.1
Fulfilled by FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1/AUTH [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user
data without security
attributes,
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user
data with security
attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic
key generation],
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic
key destruction
justification 2 for non-
satisfied dependencies
justification 2 for non-
satisfied dependencies
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FCS_COP.1/MAC [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user
data without security
attributes,
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user
data with security
attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic
key generation],
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic
key destruction
Fulfilled by FCS_CKM.1
Fulfilled by FCS_CKM.4
FCS_RND.1 No dependencies n.a.
FIA_AFL.1 FIA_UAU.1 Timing of
authentication
Fulfilled by FIA_UAU.1
FIA_UID.1 No dependencies n.a.
FIA_UAU.1 FIA_UID.1 Timing of
identification
Fulfilled by FIA_UID.1
FIA_UAU.4 No dependencies n.a.
FIA_UAU.5 No dependencies n.a.
FIA_UAU.6 No dependencies n.a.
FDP_ACC.1 FDP_ACF.1 Security
attribute based access
control
Fulfilled by FDP_ACF.1
FDP_ACF.1 FDP_ACC.1 Subset access
control,
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute
initialization
Fulfilled by FDP_ACC.1,
justification 3 for non-
satisfied dependencies
FDP_UCT.1 [FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted
channel, or
FTP_TRP.1 Trusted path],
[FDP_ACC.1 Subset access
control, or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset
information flow control]
justification 4 for non-
satisfied dependencies
Fulfilled by FDP_ACC.1
FDP_UIT.1 [FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted
channel, or
FTP_TRP.1 Trusted path],
[FDP_ACC.1 Subset access
control, or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset
information flow control]
justification 4 for non-
satisfied dependencies
Fulfilled by FDP_ACC.1
FMT_SMF.1 No dependencies n.a.
FMT_SMR.1 FIA_UID.1 Timing of
identification
Fulfilled by FIA_UID.1
FMT_LIM.1 FMT_LIM.2 Fulfilled by FMT_LIM.2
FMT_LIM.2 FMT_LIM.1 Fulfilled by FMT_LIM.1
FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA FMT_SMF.1 Specification of
management functions,
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
Fulfilled by FMT_SMF.1
Fulfilled by FMT_SMR.1
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FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS FMT_SMF.1 Specification of
management functions,
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
Fulfilled by FMT_SMF.1
Fulfilled by FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE FMT_SMF.1 Specification of
management functions,
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
Fulfilled by FMT_SMF.1
Fulfilled by FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ FMT_SMF.1 Specification of
management functions,
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
Fulfilled by FMT_SMF.1
Fulfilled by FMT_SMR.1
FPT_EMSEC.1 No dependencies n.a.
FPT_FLS.1 No dependencies n.a.
FPT_PHP.3 No dependencies n.a.
FPT_TST.1 No dependencies n.a.
Table 4 Dependencies between the SFR for the TOE
Justification for non-satisfied dependencies between the SFR for TOE:
No. 1: The hash algorithm required by the SFR FCS_COP.1.1/SHA does not need any key
material. Therefore neither a key generation (FCS_CKM.1) nor an import (FDP_ITC.1/2)
is necessary.
No. 2: The SFR FCS_COP.1/AUTH uses the symmetric Personalization Key permanently
stored during the Pre-Personalization process (cf. FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA) by the
manufacturer. Thus there is neither the necessity to generate nor to import a key during
the addressed TOE lifecycle by the means of FCS_CKM.1 or FDP_ITC. Since the key is
permanently stored within the TOE there is no need for FCS_CKM.4.
No. 3: The access control TSF according to FDP_ACF.1 uses security attributes which are
defined during the personalization and are fixed over the whole life time of the TOE. No
management of these security attribute (i.e. SFR FMT_MSA.1 and FMT_MSA.3) is
necessary here.
No. 4: The SFR FDP_UCT.1 and FDP_UIT.1 require the use secure messaging between
the MRTD and the BIS. There is no need for SFR FTP_ITC.1, e.g. to require this
communication channel to be logically distinct from other communication channels
since there is only one channel. Since the TOE does not provide a direct human
interface a trusted path as required by FTP_TRP.1 is not applicable here.
6.3.3 Security Assurance Requirements Rationale
The EAL4 was chosen to permit a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive
security engineering based on good commercial development practices which, though
rigorous, do not require substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other resources.
EAL4 is the highest level at which it is likely to be economically feasible to retrofit to an
existing product line. EAL4 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or
users require a moderate to high level of independently assured security in conventional
commodity TOEs and are prepared to incur sensitive security specific engineering costs.
The selection of the component ALC_DVS.2 provides a higher assurance of the security
of the MRTD’s development and manufacturing especially for the secure handling of
MRTD’s material.
The component ALC_DVS.2 augmented to EAL4 has no dependencies to other security
requirements
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Dependencies ALC_DVS.2:
no dependencies.
6.3.4 Security Requirements – Mutual Support and Internal Consistency
The following part of the security requirements rationale shows that the set of security
requirements for the TOE consisting of the security functional requirements (SFRs) and
the security assurance requirements (SARs) together form a mutually supportive and
internally consistent whole.
The analysis of the TOE security requirements with regard to their mutual support and
internal consistency demonstrates:
The dependency analysis in section 6.3.2 Dependency Rationale for the security
functional requirements shows that the basis for mutual support and internal
consistency between all defined functional requirements is satisfied. All dependencies
between the chosen functional components are analyzed, and non-satisfied
dependencies are appropriately explained.
The assurance class EAL4 is an established set of mutually supportive and internally
consistent assurance requirements. The dependency analysis for the sensitive assurance
components in section 6.3.3 Security Assurance Requirements Rationale shows that the
assurance requirements are mutually supportive and internally consistent as all
(sensitive) dependencies are satisfied and no inconsistency appears.
Inconsistency between functional and assurance requirements could only arise if there
are functional-assurance dependencies which are not met, a possibility which has been
shown not to arise in sections 6.3.2 Dependency Rationale and 6.3.3 Security Assurance
Requirements Rationale. Furthermore, as also discussed in section 6.3.3 Security
Assurance Requirements Rationale, the chosen assurance components are adequate for
the functionality of the TOE. So the assurance requirements and security functional
requirements support each other and there are no inconsistencies between the goals of
these two groups of security requirements.
6.4 Statement of Compatibility
This is a statement of compatibility between this Composite Security Target (Composite-
ST) and the Platform Security Target (Platform-ST) of the Infineon microcontroller
derivates SLE78CLX360P, SLE78CLX800P, SLE78CLX1280P [25]. This statement is
compliant to the requirements of [4a].
6.4.1 Classification of Platform TSFs
A classification of TSFs of the Platform-ST has been made. Each TSF has been classified
as ‘relevant’ or ‘not relevant’ for the Composite-ST.
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TOE Security Functionality
Relevant
Not
relevant
SF_DPM: Device Phase Management x
SF_PS: Protection against Snooping x
SF_PMA: Protection against Modifying Attacks x
SF_PLA: Protection against Logical Attacks x
SF_CS: Cryptographic Support x
Table 5 Classification of Platform-TSFs
All listed TSFs of the Platform-ST are relevant for the Composite-ST.
6.4.2 Matching statement
The TOE relies on fulfillment of the following implicit assumptions on the IC:
 Certified Infineon microcontroller derivates SLE78CLX360P, SLE78CLX800P,
SLE78CLX1280P; the optional RSA2048/4096 v1.02.008, EC v1.02.008 and
SHA-2 v1.01 libraries are not used by the composite TOE.
 True Random Number Generator (TRNG) with P2 classification according to
AIS31 [23].
 Cryptographic support based symmetric algorithm and 112 bits (2-key Triple-
DES) and 128 bits (AES) symmetric cryptographic key length.
The rationale of the Platform-ST has been used to identify the relevant SFRs, TOE
objectives, threats and OSPs. All SFRs, objectives for the TOEs, but also all objectives for
the TOE-environment, all threats and OSPs of the Platform-ST have been used for the
following analysis.
6.4.2.1 TOE Security Environment
6.4.2.1.1 Threats and OSPs
(see chapters 3.3 Threats and 3.4 Organisational Security Policies)
The OSPs of the Composite-ST are not applicable to the IC and are therefore not
mapped to the OSPs of the Platform-ST.
The augmented organizational security policy P.Add-Functions of the Platform-ST deals
with additional specific security functionality of the cryptographic libraries and could
therefore be mapped to OT.Prot_Inf_Leak and OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper of the Composite-
ST.
The following threats of this Composite-ST are directly related to IC functionality:
 T.Phys-Tamper
 T.Malfunction
 T.Abuse-Func
 T.Information_Leakage
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 T.Forgery
These threats will be mapped to the following Platform-ST threats:
 T.Leak-Inherent
 T.Phys_Probing
 T.Malfunction
 T.Phys_Manipulation
 T.Leak-Forced
 T.Abuse-Func
 T.RND
 T.Mem-Access
The following table shows the mapping of the threats.
Platform-ST
T.Leak-Inherent
T.Phys_Probing
T.Phys_Manipulation
T.Malfunction
T.Leak-Forced
T.Abuse-Func
T.RND
T.Mem-Access
T.Phys_Tamper x x x x x x
T.Malfunction x
T.Abuse-Func x x
T.Information_Leakage x x x x x x
Composite-ST
T.Forgery x x
Table 6 Mapping of threats
T.Phys-Tamper matches to T.Leak-Inherent, T.Phys_Probing, T.Phys-Manipulation,
T.Malfunction, T.Leak-Forced and T.RND as physical TOE interfaces like emanations,
probing, environmental stress and tampering are used to exploit vulnerabilities.
T.Abuse-Func matches to T.Mem-Access as security violations either accidentally or
deliberately could access restricted data (which may include code) or privilege levels.
T.Information_Leakage matches to T.Leak-Inherent, T.Phys_Probing, T.Phys-
Manipulation, T.Malfunction, T.Leak-Forced and T.Abuse-Func as physical TOE
interfaces like emanations, probing, environmental stress and tampering could be used
to exploit exploit information leaking from the TOE during its usage in order to disclose
confidential User Data or/and TSF-data.
T.Forgery matches to T.Phys_Manipulation and T.Malfunction because if an attacker
fraudulently alters the User Data or/and TSF-data stored on the MRTD or/and exchanged
between the TOE and the inspection system then the listed threats of the Platform-ST
could be relevant.
6.4.2.1.2 Assumptions
The assumptions from this ST (see chapter 3.2 Assumptions) make no assumptions on
the platform.
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The assumptions from the Platform-ST [25] are as follows:
Assumption Classification of
assumptions
Mapping to Security Objectives of this
Composite-ST
A.Process-Sec-IC not relevant n/a
A.Plat-Appl not relevant n/a
A.Resp-Appl relevant OT.Data_Int, OT.Prot_Abuse-Func,
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper
A.Key-Function relevant OT.Prot_Inf_Leak
Table 7 Mapping of assumptions
There is no conflict between security environments of this Composite-ST and the
Platform-ST [25].
6.4.2.2 Security objectives
This Composite-ST has security objectives which are related to the Platform-ST. These
are:
 OT.Identification
 OT.Prot_Abuse-Func
 OT.Prot_Inf_Leak
 OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper
 OT.Prot_Malfunction
The following platform objectives could be mapped to composite objectives:
 O.Phys-Probing
 O.Malfunction
 O.Phys-Manipulation
 O.Abuse-Func
 O.Leak-Forced
 O.Leak-Inherent
 O.Identification
These Platform-ST objectives can be mapped to the Composite-ST objectives as shown
in the following table.
Platform-ST
O.Phys-Probing
O.Malfunction
O.Phys-
Manipulation
O.Abuse-Func
O.Leak-Forced
O.Leak-Inherent
O.Identification
OT.Prot_Abuse-Func x
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak x x
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper x x x
OT.Identification x
Composite-ST
OT.Prot_Malfunction x
Table 8 Mapping of objectives
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The following Platform-ST objectives are not relevant for or cannot be mapped to
objectives of the Composite-ST:
 O.Add-Functions cannot be mapped
 O.MEM_ACCESS is not relevant because the Composite-TOE does not use area
based memory access control.
All Security Objectives for the Environment (see chapter 4.2 and [19]) are not linked to
the platform and are therefore not applicable to this mapping. These objectives are:
 OE.MRTD_Manufact
 OE.MRTD_Delivery
 OE.Personalization
 OE.Pass_Auth_Sign
 OE.BAC-Keys
 OE.Exam_MRTD
 OE.Passive_Auth_Verif
 OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD
There is no conflict between security objectives of this Composite-ST and the Platform-
ST [25].
6.4.2.3 Security requirements
6.4.2.3.1 Security Functional Requirements
This Composite-ST has the following platform-related SFRs:
 FCS_CKM.1
 FCS_COP.1.1/ENC
 FCS_COP.1.1/AUTH
 FCS_COP.1.1/MAC
 FCS_RND.1
 FPT_PHP.3
 FPT_EMSEC.1
 FPT_FLS.1
 FPT_TST.1
 FMT_LIM.1
 FMT_LIM.2
 FAU_SAS.1
The following Platform-SFRs could be mapped to Composite-SFRs:
 FCS_RNG.1
 FCS_COP.1/DES
 FCS_COP.1/AES
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 FRU_FLT.2
 FPT_PHP.3
 FPT_FLS.1
 FPT_TST.2
 FMT_LIM.1
 FMT_LIM.2
 FAU_SAS.1
They will be mapped as seen in the following table.
Platform-ST
FCS_RNG.1
FCS_COP.1/DES
FCS_COP.1/AES
FRU_FLT.2
FPT_FLS.1
FPT_PHP.3
FMT_LIM.1
FMT_LIM.2
FAU_SAS.1
FPT_TST.2
FCS_COP.1.1/ENC x
FCS_COP.1.1/AUTH x
FCS_COP.1.1/MAC x
FCS_RND.1 x
FPT_PHP.3 x x x
FPT_EMSEC.1 x
FPT_FLS.1 x
FPT_TST.1 x
FMT_LIM.1 x
FMT_LIM.2 x
Composite-ST
FAU_SAS.1 x
Table 9 Mapping of SFRs
FCS_COP.1.1/ENC and FCS_COP.1.1/MAC of the Composite-ST match FCS_COP.1/DES
of the Platform-ST when the DES coprocessor is used by the TOE.
FCS_COP.1.1/AUTH of the Composite-ST matches FCS_COP.1/AES of the Platform-ST
when the AES coprocessor is used by the TOE.
FPT_PHP.3 of the Composite-ST matches the robustness requirements of FRU_FLT.2,
FPT_FLS.1 and FPT_PHP.3 of the Platform-ST.
FMT_LIM.1 and FMT_LIM.2 of the Composite-ST match to the equivalent SFR of the
Platform-ST.
FAU_SAS.1 of the Composite-ST matches to the equivalent SFR of the Platform-ST.
The following Platform-SFRs are not mapped to Composite-SFRs:
 FCS_CKM.1/RSA, because the RSA key generation is not used by the TOE.
 FCS_COP.1/RSA, because the RSA encryption and decryption is not required for
BAC functionality.
 FCS_CKM.1/EC, because ECDSA key generation is not required for BAC
functionality.
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 FCS_COP.1/EC, because ECDSA signature generation and verification is not
required for BAC functionality.
 FCS_COP.1/ECDH, because the TOE implements the ECDH key agreement
according to [21], Annex A.1, that is covered by FCS_CKM.1 of the
Composite-ST.
 FDP_ACC.1, because the composite TOE is always in system mode and therefore
no MMU is necessary and because the composite TOE does not use the platform
TOE special function registers.
 FDP_ACF.1, because the composite TOE does not use the platform TOE special
function registers and the MMU.
 FMT_MSA.1, because the composite TOE is always in system mode and
therefore no MMU and special function registers is necessary.
 FMT_MSA.3, because the composite TOE is always in system mode and
therefore no MMU is necessary.
 FMT_SMF.1, because the TOE does not change the CPU mode.
 FDP_ITT.1, because it deals with the internal data processing policy of the
platform TOE that does not by itself impact the composite TOE.
 FPT_ITT.1, because it deals with the basic internal data protection of the
platform TOE that does not by itself impact the composite TOE.
 FDP_IFC.1, because it deals with the data processing policy of the platform TOE
that does not by itself impact the composite TOE.
 FDP_SDI.1 and FDP_SDI.2 are not applicable to the composite TOE. Protection
against malfunctions is covered by the SFRs FPT_TST.1 and FPT_FLS.1 of the
composite TOE.
6.4.2.3.2 Assurance requirements
The Composite-ST requires EAL 4 according to Common Criteria V3.1R3 augmented by
ALC_DVS.2.
The Platform-ST requires EAL 5 according to Common Criteria V3.1 R3 augmented by:
ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5.
As EAL 5 covers all assurance requirements of EAL 4 all non augmented parts of the
Composite-ST will match to the Platform-ST assurance requirements.
6.4.3 Overall no contradictions found
Overall there is no conflict between security requirements of this Composite-ST and the
Platform-ST.
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7 TOE summary specification
This chapter gives the overview description of the different TOE Security Functions
composing the TSF.
7.1 TOE Security Functions
7.1.1 SF_AccessControl
The TOE provides access control mechanisms that allow to maintain different users and
to associate users with roles (Manufacturer, Personalization Agent, Basic Inspection
System).
The TOE restricts the ability to write the Initialization Data and Pre-personalization Data
to the Manufacturer. Manufacturer is the only role with the capability to store the IC
Identification Data in the audit records. Users of role Manufacturer are assumed default
users by the TOE during the Phase 2.
The TOE enforces access control on terminals by requiring authentication prior to
gaining write, read and modification access to data in the EF.COM, EF.SOD, EF.DG1 to
EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD.
Personalization Agent is the only role with the ability:
 to disable read access for users to the Initialization Data,
 to write the Document Basic Access Keys,
 to write and to read the data of the EF.COM, EF.SOD, EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of
the logical MRTD after successful authentication.
The Basic inspection System
 is allowed to read the data in EF.COM, EF.SOD, EF.DG1, EF.DG2 and EF.DG5 to
EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD after successful authentication,
 is not allowed to read data in EF.DG3 and EF.DG4 of the logical MRTD.
No terminal is allowed
 to modify any of the EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD,
 to read any of the EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD.
The access control mechanisms ensure that nobody is allowed to read the Document
Basic Access Keys and the Personalization Agent Keys.
Test features of the TOE are not available for the user in Phase 4. Deploying test
features after TOE delivery does not allow User Data to be disclosed or manipulated, TSF
data to be disclosed or manipulated, software to be reconstructed and substantial
information about construction of TSF to be gathered which may enable other attacks.
All security attributes under access control are modified in a secure way so that no
unauthorised modifications are possible.
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7.1.2 SF_Authentication
After activation or reset of the TOE no user is authenticated.
TSF-mediated actions on behalf of a user require the user’s prior successful
identification and authentication.
The TOE supports user authentication by the following means:
 Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism,
 Symmetric Authentication Mechanism based on AES.
The Basic Inspection System authenticates to the TOE by means of Basic Access Control
Authentication Mechanism with the Document Basic Access Keys.
The Personalization Agent authenticates himself to the TOE by use of the
Personalization Agent Keys with the Symmetric Authentication Mechanism.
The TOE prevents reuse of authentication data related to the Basic Access Control
Authentication Mechanism and the Symmetric Authentication Mechanism.
After successful authentication of the terminal with Basic Access Control Authentication
Mechanism the TOE re-authenticates the user for each received command and accepts
only those commands received from the previously authenticated BAC user.
Protection of user data transmitted from the TOE to the terminal is achieved by means
of secure messaging with encryption and message authentication codes once successful
authentication of terminal with the Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism has
been completed. After authentication, user data in transit is protected from
unauthorized disclosure, modification, deletion, insertion and replay errors.
7.1.3 SF_AssetProtection
The TOE supports the calculation of block check values for data integrity checking.
These block check values are stored with persistently stored assets of the TOE as well as
temporarily stored hash values for data to be signed.
The TOE hides information about IC power consumption and command execution time
ensuring that neither the Personalization Agent Keys nor the logical MRTD data nor any
other confidential information can be derived from this information.
The TOE ensures any unauthorized users are unable to use the smart card circuit
contacts to gain access to Personalization Agent Keys and logical MRTD data.
7.1.4 SF_TSFProtection
The TOE detects physical tampering of the TSF with sensors for operating voltage, clock
frequency, temperature and electromagnetic radiation.
The TOE is resistant to physical tampering on the TSF. If the TOE detects with the above
mentioned sensors, that it is not supplied within the specified limits, a security reset is
initiated and the TOE is not operable until the supply is back in the specified limits. The
design of the hardware protects it against analyzing and physical tampering.
The TOE demonstrates the correct operation of the TSF by among others verifying the
integrity of the TSF and TSF data and verifying the absence of fault injections. In the
case of inconsistencies in the calculation of the signature and fault injections during the
operation of the TSF the TOE preserves a secure state.
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The TOE runs a suite of self tests during initial start-up, periodically during normal
operation, at the reset, verifying correct operation of the TSF.
7.1.5 SF_KeyManagement
The TOE generates 2-key Triple DES keys in accordance with the Document Basic Access
Key Derivation Algorithm that uses SHA-1 hash function as specified in [5].
The TOE supports overwriting the cryptographic keys with zero values as follows:
 the BAC Session Keys after detection of an error in a received command by
verification of the MAC, and after successful run of the Chip Authentication
Protocol,
 any session keys before starting the communication with the terminal in a new
power-on-session.
7.2 Assurance Measures
This chapter describes the Assurance Measures fulfilling the requirements listed in
chapter 6.3.
The following table lists the Assurance measures and references the corresponding
documents describing the measures.
Assurance Measures Description
AM_ADV The representing of the TSF is described in the documentation for
functional specification, in the documentation for TOE design, in
the security architecture description and in the documentation for
implementation representation.
AM_AGD The guidance documentation is described in the operational user
guidance documentation and in the documentation for preparative
procedures.
AM_ALC The life cycle support of the TOE during its development and
maintenance is described in the life cycle documentation including
configuration management, delivery procedures, development
security as well as development tools.
AM_ATE The testing of the TOE is described in the test documentation.
AM_AVA The vulnerability assessment for the TOE is described in the
vulnerability analysis documentation.
Table 10 References of Assurance measures
7.3 Fulfilment of the SFRs
The following table shows the mapping of the SFRs to security functions of the TOE.
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TOE SFR / Security
Function
SF_AccessControl
SF_Authentication
SF_AssetProtection
SF_TSFProtection
SF_KeyManagement
FAU_SAS.1 x
FCS_CKM.1 x
FCS_CKM.4 x
FCS_COP.1/SHA x x
FCS_COP.1/ENC x x
FCS_COP.1/AUTH x x
FCS_COP.1/MAC x x
FCS_RND.1 x x
FIA_UID.1 x
FIA_UAU.1 x
FIA_UAU.4 x
FIA_UAU.5 x
FIA_UAU.6 x
FDP_ACC.1 x
FDP_ACF.1 x
FDP_UCT.1 x
FDP_UIT.1 x
FMT_SMF.1 x
FMT_SMR.1 x
FMT_LIM.1 x x
FMT_LIM.2 x x
FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA x
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS x
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE x
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ x
FPT_EMSEC.1 x
FPT_TST.1 x
FPT_FLS.1 x
FPT_PHP.3 x
Table 11 Mapping of SFRs to mechanisms of TOE
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7.3.1 Justifications for the correspondence between functional
requirements and TOE mechanisms
Each TOE security functional requirement is implemented by at least one TOE
mechanism. In section 7.1 the implementing of the TOE security functional requirement
is described in form of the TOE mechanism.
7.4 Rationale for PP Claims
This security target is conformant to the claimed PP [19].
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8 Glossary and Acronyms
8.1 Glossary
Term Definition
Active
Authentication
Security mechanism defined in [5] option by which means the
MRTD’s chip proves and the inspection system verifies the identity
and authenticity of the MRTD’s chip as part of a genuine MRTD
issued by a known State of Organization.
Application Note Optional informative part of the PP containing sensitive supporting
information that is considered relevant or useful for the
construction, evaluation, or use of the TOE.
Audit records Write-only-once non-volatile memory area of the MRTD’s chip to
store the Initialization Data and Pre-personalization Data.
Authenticity Ability to confirm the MRTD and its data elements on the MRTD’s
chip were created by the issuing State or Organization
Basic Control Access
(BAC)
Security mechanism defined in [5] by which means the MRTD’s chip
proves and the inspection system protects their communication by
means of secure messaging with Document Basic Access Keys (see
there).
Basic Inspection
System (BIS)
An inspection system which implements the terminals part of the
Basic Access Control Mechanism and authenticates itself to the
MRTD’s chip using the Document Basic Access Keys derived from
the printed MRZ data for reading the logical MRTD.
Biographical data
(biodata)
The personalized details of the MRTD holder of the document
appearing as text in the visual and machine readable zones on the
biographical data page of a passport book or on a travel card or
visa. [5]
Biometric reference
data
Data stored for biometric authentication of the MRTD holder in the
MRTD’s chip as (i) digital portrait and (ii) optional biometric
reference data.
Counterfeit An unauthorised copy or reproduction of a genuine security
document made by whatever means. [5]
Country Signing CA
Certificate (CCSCA)
Certificate of the Country Signing Certification Authority Public Key
(KPuCSCA) issued by Country Signing Certification Authority and stored
in the inspection system.
Document Basic
Access Keys
Pair of symmetric (two-key) Triple-DES keys used for secure
messaging with encryption (key KENC) and message authentication
(key KMAC) of data transmitted between the MRTD’s chip and the
inspection system [5]. It is drawn from the printed MRZ of the
passport book to authenticate an entity able to read the printed
MRZ of the passport book.
Document Security
Object (SOD)
A RFC3369 CMS Signed Data Structure, signed by the Document
Signer (DS). Carries the hash values of the LDS Data Groups. It is
stored in the MRTD’s chip. It may carry the Document Signer
Certificate (CDS). [5]
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Term Definition
Eavesdropper A threat agent with Enhanced-Basic attack potential reading the
communication between the MRTD’s chip and the inspection system
to gain the data on the MRTD’s chip.
Enrolment The process of collecting biometric samples from a person and the
subsequent preparation and storage of biometric reference
templates representing that person's identity. [5]
Extended Access
Control
Security mechanism identified in [5] by which means the MRTD’s
chip (i) verifies the authentication of the inspection systems
authorized to read the optional biometric reference data, (ii) controls
the access to the optional biometric reference data and (iii) protects
the confidentiality and integrity of the optional biometric reference
data during their transmission to the inspection system by secure
messaging. The Personalization Agent may use the same mechanism
to authenticate itself with Personalization Agent Private Key and to
get write and read access to the logical MRTD and TSF data.
Extended Inspection
System (EIS)
A role of a terminal as part of an inspection system which is in
addition to Basic Inspection System authorized by the issuing State
or Organization to read the optional biometric reference data and
supports the terminals part of the Extended Access Control
Authentication Mechanism.
Forgery Fraudulent alteration of any part of the genuine document, e.g.
changes to the biographical data or portrait. [5]
Global
Interoperability
The capability of inspection systems (either manual or automated) in
different States throughout the world to exchange data, to process
data received from systems in other States, and to utilise that data in
inspection operations in their respective States. Global
interoperability is a major objective of the standardised specifications
for placement of both eye-readable and machine readable data in all
MRTDs. [5]
IC Dedicated
Support Software
That part of the IC Dedicated Software (refer to above) which
provides functions after TOE Delivery. The usage of parts of the IC
Dedicated Software might be restricted to certain phases.
IC Dedicated Test
Software
That part of the IC Dedicated Software (refer to above) which is
used to test the TOE before TOE Delivery but which does not
provide any functionality thereafter.
IC Identification Data The IC manufacturer writes a unique IC identifier to the chip to
control the IC as MRTD material during the IC manufacturing and
the delivery process to the MRTD manufacturer.
Impostor A person who applies for and obtains a document by assuming a
false name and identity, or a person who alters his or her physical
appearance to represent himself or herself as another person for the
purpose of using that person’s document. [5]
Improperly
documented person
A person who travels, or attempts to travel with: (a) an expired
travel document or an invalid visa; (b) a counterfeit, forged or
altered travel document or visa; (c) someone else’s travel document
or visa; or (d) no travel document or visa, if required. [5]
Initialization Process of writing Initialization Data (see below) to the TOE (cf. sec.
1.2, TOE life cycle, Phase 2, Step 3).
Initialization Data Any data defined by the TOE Manufacturer and injected into the
non-volatile memory by the Integrated Circuits manufacturer (Phase
2). These data are for instance used for traceability and for IC
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Term Definition
identification as MRTD’s material (IC identification data).
Inspection The act of a State examining an MRTD presented to it by a traveler
(the MRTD holder) and verifying its authenticity. [5]
Inspection system
(IS)
A technical system used by the border control officer of the
receiving State (i) examining an MRTD presented by the traveler and
verifying its authenticity and (ii) verifying the traveler as MRTD
holder.
Integrated circuit (IC) Electronic component(s) designed to perform processing and/or
memory functions. The MRTD’s chip is an integrated circuit.
Integrity Ability to confirm the MRTD and its data elements on the MRTD’s
chip have not been altered from that created by the issuing State or
Organization
Issuing Organization Organization authorized to issue an official travel document (e.g.
the United Nations Organization, issuer of the Laissez-passer). [5]
Issuing State
The country issuing the MRTD. [5]
Logical Data
Structure (LDS)
The collection of groupings of Data Elements stored in the optional
capacity expansion technology [5]. The capacity expansion
technology used is the MRTD’s chip.
Logical MRTD Data of the MRTD holder stored according to the Logical Data
Structure [5] as specified by ICAO on the contactless integrated
circuit. It presents contactless readable data including (but not
limited to)
(1) personal data of the MRTD holder
(2) the digital Machine Readable Zone Data (digital MRZ data,
EF.DG1),
(3) the digitized portraits (EF.DG2),
(4) the biometric reference data of finger(s) (EF.DG3) or iris
image(s) (EF.DG4) or both and
(5) the other data according to LDS (EF.DG5 to EF.DG16)
(6) EF.COM and EF.SOD
Logical Travel
Document
Data stored according to the Logical Data Structure as specified by
ICAO in the contactless integrated circuit including (but not limited
to)
(1) data contained in the machine-readable zone (mandatory),
(2) digitized photographic image (mandatory) and
(3) fingerprint image(s) and/or iris image(s) (optional).
Machine readable
travel document
(MRTD)
Official document issued by a State or Organisation which is used by
the holder for international travel (e.g. passport, visa, official
document of identity) and which contains mandatory visual (eye
readable) data and a separate mandatory data summary, intended
for global use, reflecting essential data elements capable of being
machine read. [5]
Machine readable
visa (MRV)
A visa or, where appropriate, an entry clearance (hereinafter
collectively referred to as visas) conforming to the specifications
contained herein, formulated to improve facilitation and enhance
security for the visa holder. Contains mandatory visual (eye readable)
data and a separate mandatory data summary capable of being
machine read. The MRV is normally a label which is attached to a
visa page in a passport. [5]
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Term Definition
Machine readable
zone (MRZ)
Fixed dimensional area located on the front of the MRTD or MRP
Data Page or, in the case of the TD1, the back of the MRTD,
containing mandatory and optional data for machine reading using
OCR methods. [5]
Machine-verifiable
biometrics feature
A unique physical personal identification feature (e.g. an iris pattern,
fingerprint or facial characteristics) stored on a travel document in a
form that can be read and verified by machine. [5]
MRTD application Non-executable data defining the functionality of the operating
system on the IC as the MRTD’s chip. It includes
- the file structure implementing the LDS [5],
- the definition of the User Data, but does not include the User
Data itself (i.e. content of EF.DG1 to EF.DG14 EF.DG16, EF.COM
and EF.SOD) and
- the TSF Data including the definition the authentication data but
except the authentication data itself.
MRTD Basic Access
Control
Mutual authentication protocol followed by secure messaging
between the inspection system and the MRTD’s chip based on MRZ
information as key seed and access condition to data stored on
MRTD’s chip according to LDS.
MRTD holder The rightful holder of the MRTD for whom the issuing State or
Organization personalized the MRTD.
MRTD’s Chip A contactless integrated circuit chip complying with ISO/IEC 14443
and programmed according to the Logical Data Structure as
specified by ICAO, [6], p. 14.
MRTD’s Chip
Embedded Software
Software embedded in a MRTD’s chip and not being developed by
the IC Designer. The MRTD’s chip Embedded Software is designed in
Phase 1 and embedded into the MRTD’s chip in Phase 2 of the TOE
life-cycle.
Optional biometric
reference data
Data stored for biometric authentication of the MRTD holder in the
MRTD’s chip as (i) encoded finger image(s) (EF.DG3) or (ii) encoded
iris image(s) (EF.DG4) or (iii) both. Note, that the European
commission decided to use only fingerprint and not to use iris
images as optional biometric reference data.
Passive
authentication
(i) verification of the digital signature of the Document Security
Object and
(ii) comparing the hash values of the read LDS data fields with the
hash values contained in the Document Security Object.
Personalization The process by which the portrait, signature and biographical data
are applied to the document. This may also include the optional
biometric data collected during the “Enrolment” (cf. sec. 1.2, TOE
life cycle, Phase 3, Step 6).
Personalization
Agent
The agent acting on the behalf of the issuing State or Organization
to personalize the MRTD for the holder by (i) establishing the
identity the holder for the biographic data in the MRTD, (ii) enrolling
the biometric reference data of the MRTD holder i.e. the portrait,
the encoded finger image(s) or (ii) the encoded iris image(s) and (iii)
writing these data on the physical and logical MRTD for the holder.
Personalization
Agent
Authentication
Information
TSF data used for authentication proof and verification of the
Personalization Agent.
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Term Definition
Personalization
Agent Key
Symmetric cryptographic authentication key used (i) by the
Personalization Agent to prove his identity and to get access to the
logical MRTD and (ii) by the MRTD’s chip to verify the authentication
attempt of a terminal as Personalization Agent according to the SFR
FIA_UAU.4, FIA_UAU.5 and FIA_UAU.6.
Physical travel
document
Travel document in form of paper, plastic and chip using secure
printing to present data including (but not limited to)
(1) biographical data,
(2) data of the machine-readable zone,
(3) photographic image and
(4) other data.
Pre-Personalization Process of writing Pre-Personalization Data (see below) to the TOE
including the creation of the MRTD Application (cf. sec. 1.2, TOE life
cycle, Phase 2, Step 5)
Pre-Personalization
Data
Any data that is injected into the non-volatile memory of the TOE by
the MRTD Manufacturer (Phase 2) for traceability of non-
personalized MRTD’s and/or to secure shipment within or between
life cycle phases 2 and 3. It contains (but is not limited to) the Active
Authentication Key Pair and the Personalization Agent Key Pair.
Pre-personalized
MRTD’s chip
MRTD’s chip equipped with a unique identifier and a unique
asymmetric Active Authentication Key Pair of the chip.
Primary Inspection
System (PIS)
An inspection system that contains a terminal for the contactless
communication with the MRTD’s chip and does not implement the
terminals part of the Basic Access Control Mechanism.
random identifier Random identifier used to establish a communication to the TOE in
Phase 3 and 4 preventing the unique identification of the MRTD and
thus participates in the prevention of traceability.
Receiving State The Country to which the Traveler is applying for entry. [5]
reference data Data enrolled for a known identity and used by the verifier to check
the verification data provided by an entity to prove this identity in an
authentication attempt.
secondary image A repeat image of the holder’s portrait reproduced elsewhere in the
document by whatever means. [5]
Secure messaging in
encrypted mode
Secure messaging using encryption and message authentication
code according to ISO/IEC 7816-4
Skimming Imitation of the inspection system to read the logical MRTD or parts
of it via the contactless communication channel of the TOE without
knowledge of the printed MRZ data.
Travel document A passport or other official document of identity issued by a State or
Organisation which may be used by the rightful holder for
international travel. [5]
Traveler Person presenting the MRTD to the inspection system and claiming
the identity of the MRTD holder.
TSF data Data created by and for the TOE that might affect the operation of
the TOE (CC part 1 [1]).
Unpersonalized
MRTD
The MRTD that contains the MRTD Chip holding only Initialization
Data and Pre-personalization Data as delivered to the
Personalization Agent from the Manufacturer.
User Data Data created by and for the user that does not affect the operation
of the TSF (CC part 1 [1]).
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Term Definition
Verification The process of comparing a submitted biometric sample against the
biometric reference template of a single enrollee whose identity is
being claimed, to determine whether it matches the enrollee’s
template. [5]
Verification data Data provided by an entity in an authentication attempt to prove
their identity to the verifier. The verifier checks whether the
verification data match the reference data known for the claimed
identity.
8.2 Acronyms
Acronym Term
BIS Basic Inspection System
CC Common Criteria
EF Elementary File
GIS General Inspection System
ICCSN Integrated Circuit Card Serial Number
MF Master File
n.a. Not applicable
OSP Organisational security policy
PT Personalization Terminal
SAR Security assurance requirements
SFR Security functional requirement
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE security functionality
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9 Bibliography
9.1 Common Criteria
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 1:
Introduction and General Model; CCMB-2009-07-001, Version 3.1, Revision 3,
July 2009
[2] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 2:
Security Functional Components; CCMB-2009-07-002, Version 3.1, Revision 3,
July 2009
[3] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 3:
Security Assurance Requirements; CCMB-2009-07-003, Version 3.1, Revision 3,
July 2009
[4] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Evaluation Methodology; CCMB-2009-07-004, Version 3.1, Revision 3, July
2009
[4a] Supporting Document, Mandatory Technical Document, Composite product
evaluation for Smart Cards and similar devices, September 2007, Version 1.0,
CCDB-007-09-001
9.2 ICAO
[5] ICAO Doc 9303, Specifications for electronically enabled passports with
biometric identification capabilities. In Machine Readable Travel Documents –
Part 1: Machine Readable Passport, Volume 2, ICAO, 6th edition, 2006
[6] INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION FACILITATION (FAL) DIVISION,
twelfth session (Cairo, Egypt, 22 March – 1 April 2004)
9.3 Cryptography
[7] ISO/IEC 9796-2: Information Technology – Security Techniques – Digital
Signature Schemes giving message recovery – Part 2: Integer factorisation based
mechanisms, 2002
[8] ISO/IEC 14888-3: Information technology – Security techniques – Digital
signatures with appendix – Part 3: Certificate-based mechanisms, 1999
[9] Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 197, ADVANCED
ENCRYPTION STANDARD (AES), U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE/National
Institute of Standards and Technology, November 26, 2001
[10] Federal Information Processing Standards Publication FIPS PUB 46-3, DATA
ENCRYPTION STANDARD (DES), Reaffirmed 1999 October 25, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE/National Institute of Standards and Technology
[11] Federal Information Processing Standards Publication FIPS PUB 186-2 DIGITAL
SIGNATURE STANDARD (DSS) (+ Change Notice), U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
COMMERCE/National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2002 August 1
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[12] Federal Information Processing Standards Publication FIPS PUB 180-2 Secure
Hash Standard (and Change Notice to include SHA-224), U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
COMMERCE/National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2002
[13] NIST Special Publication 800-20, Modes of Operation Validation System for the
Triple Data Encryption Algorithm, US Department of Commerce, October 1999
[14] ANSI X9.62-1999, AMERICAN NATIONAL STANDARD, Public Key Cryptography
For The Financial Services Industry: The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
(ECDSA)©, September 20, 1998
[15] Certicom Research: SEC 1: Elliptic Curve Cryptography, September 20, 2000,
Version 1.0
9.4 Protection Profiles
[16] Common Criteria Protection Profile PP conformant to Smartcard IC Platform,
BSI-PP-0002-2001, version 1.0, July 2001
[17] Smartcard Integrated Circuit Platform Augmentations, Version 1.00, March 8th,
2002
[18] Common Criteria Protection Profile Security IC Platform, BSI-PP-0035-2007,
version 1.0, June 2007
[19] Common Criteria Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel Document with
„ICAO Application", Basic Access Control, BSI-CC-PP-0055-2009, version 1.10,
25th March 2009
[20] Common Criteria Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel Document with
„ICAO Application", Extended Access Control, BSI-CC-PP-0056-2009, version
1.10, 25th March 2009
9.5 Technical Guidelines and Directives
[21] Technical Guideline TR-03110 Advanced Security Mechanisms for Machine
Readable Travel Documents – Extended Access Control (EAC), TR-03110, version
1.11, 21.02.2008, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI)
[22] Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS), AIS 20;
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Version 1.0, 02.12.1999
[23] Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS), AIS 31;
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Version 1, 25.09.2001
[24] Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS), AIS 32;
Übernahme international abgestimmter CC-Interpretationen ins deutsche
Zertifizierungsschema, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik,Version 1, 2.7.2001
9.6 Other
[25] Security Target, Infineon, M7820 A11, Version 1.5, 07.05.2012
[26] ISO 14443, Identification cards – Contactless integrated circuit(s) cards –
Proximity cards, 2000
[27] ISO 7816, Identification cards – Integrated circuit(s) cards with contacts, Part 4:
Organization, security and commands for interchange, FDIS 2004
9 Bibliography
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[28] Generic MRTD Application Verifier Tool for STARCOS 3.5 ID, Version 4.0,
28.03.2012, Giesecke & Devrient
[29] STARCOS 3.5 ID TABLES, Giesecke & Devrient
-End of Document-