Microsoft SQL Server 2017
Database Engine
Common Criteria Evaluation
(EAL4+)
Security Target
SQL Server 2017 Team
Author: Wolfgang Peter
(Microsoft Corporation)
Version: 1.4
Date: 2019-11-15
Abstract
This document is the Security Target (ST) for the Common Criteria certification of the database
engine of SQL Server 2017.
Keywords
CC, ST, Common Criteria, SQL, Security Target, DBMS, Database Management System
© 2019 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved. This data sheet is informational purposes only.
Microsoft makes no warranties, express or implied, with respect to the information presented here.
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Table of Contents
Page
1 ST INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................................................... 6
1.1 ST and TOE Reference........................................................................................................... 6
1.2 TOE Overview ......................................................................................................................... 7
1.3 TOE Description ...................................................................................................................... 7
1.3.1 Product Type ....................................................................................................................... 7
1.3.2 Physical Scope and Boundary of the TOE .......................................................................... 8
1.3.3 Architecture of the TOE ..................................................................................................... 10
1.3.4 Logical Scope and Boundary of the TOE .......................................................................... 10
1.4 Conventions........................................................................................................................... 11
2 CONFORMANCE CLAIMS............................................................................................................. 13
2.1 CC Conformance Claim......................................................................................................... 13
2.2 PP Conformance Claim ......................................................................................................... 13
3 SECURITY PROBLEM DEFINITION.............................................................................................. 14
3.1 Assets.................................................................................................................................... 14
3.2 Assumptions .......................................................................................................................... 14
3.3 Threats................................................................................................................................... 15
3.4 Organizational Security Policies............................................................................................ 16
4 SECURITY OBJECTIVES .............................................................................................................. 17
4.1 Security Objectives for the TOE ............................................................................................ 17
4.2 Security Objectives for the operational Environment ............................................................ 18
4.3 Security Objectives Rationale................................................................................................ 19
4.3.1 Overview............................................................................................................................ 19
4.3.2 Rationale for TOE Security Objectives.............................................................................. 21
4.3.3 Rationale for Environmental Security Objectives .............................................................. 28
5 EXTENDED COMPONENTS DEFINITIONS.................................................................................. 40
5.1 Definition for FTA_TAH_(EXT).1........................................................................................... 40
5.2 Definition for FIA_USB_(EXT).2............................................................................................ 41
6 IT SECURITY REQUIREMENTS.................................................................................................... 42
6.1 TOE Security Functional Requirements ................................................................................ 42
6.1.1 Class FAU: Security Audit ................................................................................................. 43
6.1.2 Class FDP: User Data Protection...................................................................................... 45
6.1.3 Class FIA: Identification and authentication ...................................................................... 46
6.1.4 Class FMT: Security Management .................................................................................... 47
6.1.5 Class FPT: Protection of the TOE Security Functions ...................................................... 49
6.1.6 Class FTA: TOE Access.................................................................................................... 49
6.2 TOE Security Assurance Requirements................................................................................ 50
6.3 Security Requirements rationale ........................................................................................... 50
6.3.1 Security Functional Requirements rationale...................................................................... 50
6.3.2 Rationale for satisfying all Dependencies ......................................................................... 54
6.3.3 Rationale for extended requirements ................................................................................ 56
6.3.4 Rationale for Assurance Requirements............................................................................. 56
7 TOE SUMMARY SPECIFICATION................................................................................................. 57
7.1 Security Management (SF.SM) ............................................................................................. 57
7.2 Access Control (SF.AC) ........................................................................................................ 57
7.3 Identification and Authentication (SF.I&A)............................................................................. 59
7.4 Security Audit (SF.AU) .......................................................................................................... 60
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7.5 Session Handling (SF.SE)..................................................................................................... 61
8 APPENDIX ...................................................................................................................................... 62
8.1 Concept of Ownership Chains............................................................................................... 62
8.1.1 How Permissions Are Checked in a Chain........................................................................ 62
8.1.2 Example of Ownership Chaining ....................................................................................... 62
8.2 References ............................................................................................................................ 63
8.3 Glossary and Abbreviations................................................................................................... 65
8.3.1 Glossary............................................................................................................................. 65
8.3.2 Abbreviations..................................................................................................................... 65
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List of Tables
Page
Table 1 - Hardware and Software Requirements.................................................................................... 9
Table 2 – Assumptions.......................................................................................................................... 14
Table 3 – Threats to the TOE................................................................................................................ 16
Table 4 – Organizational Security Policies............................................................................................ 16
Table 5 – Security Objectives for the TOE............................................................................................ 17
Table 6 – Security Objectives for the TOE Environment....................................................................... 18
Table 7 – Summary of Security Objectives Rationale........................................................................... 20
Table 8 – Rationale for TOE Security Objectives.................................................................................. 21
Table 9 – Rationale for IT Environmental Objectives............................................................................ 28
Table 10 – TOE Security Functional Requirements.............................................................................. 42
Table 11 – Auditable Events ................................................................................................................. 43
Table 12 – Default Server Roles ........................................................................................................... 48
Table 13 – Default Database Roles ...................................................................................................... 49
Table 14 - Rationale for TOE Security Requirements........................................................................... 50
Table 15 - Rationale for satisfying all dependencies............................................................................. 54
Table 16 - Rationale for Explicit Requirements..................................................................................... 56
List of Figures
Page
Figure 1 - TOE Structure ......................................................................................................................... 8
Figure 2 - Concept of Ownership Chaining ........................................................................................... 63
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1 ST Introduction
This chapter presents Security Target (ST) and TOE identification information and a general overview
of the ST. A ST contains the information technology (IT) security requirements of an identified Target
of Evaluation (TOE) and specifies the functional and assurance security measures offered by that TOE
to meet stated requirements. A ST principally defines:
a) A security problem expressed as a set of assumptions about the security aspects of the
environment, a list of threats that the TOE is intended to counter, and any known rules
with which the TOE must comply (chapter 3, Security Problem Definition).
b) A set of security objectives and a set of security requirements to address the security
problem (chapters 4 and 6, Security Objectives and IT Security Requirements,
respectively).
c) The IT security functionality provided by the TOE that meets the set of requirements
(chapter 7, TOE Summary Specification).
1.1 ST and TOE Reference
This chapter provides information needed to identify and control this ST and its Target of Evaluation
(TOE).
ST Title: SQL Server 2017 Database Engine
Common Criteria Evaluation (EAL4+)
Security Target
ST Version: 1.4
Date: 2019-11-15
Author: Wolfgang Peter, Microsoft Corporation
Certification-ID: BSI-DSZ-CC-1050
TOE Identification: SQL Server 2017 Database Engine Enterprise Edition x64
(English)
(and its related guidance documentation ([AGD] and [AGD_ADD]))
TOE Version: 14.0.3223.3
TOE Platform: Windows Server 2012 R2 Update1 (English) Standard Edition and
Microsoft Windows Server 2016 (English) Standard Edition
CC Identification: Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 3.1, Revision 5 as of April 2017, English version ([CC]).
Evaluation Assurance Level: EAL4 augmented by ALC_FLR.2
PP Conformance: DBMS Working Group Technical Community Protection Profile for
Database Management Systems (DBMS PP) Base Package,
Version 2.12, March 23rd, 2017 ([PP]) and
DBMS Working Group Technical Community DBMS Protection
Profile Extended Package - Access History (DBMS PP_EP_AH),
Version 1.02, March 23rd, 2017 ([EP])
Keywords: CC, ST, Common Criteria, SQL, Security Target, DBMS,
Database Management System
1
(i.e. including KB2919355)
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1.2 TOE Overview
The TOE is the database engine of SQL Server 2017. SQL Server is a Database Management
System (DBMS).
The TOE has been developed as the core of the DBMS to store data in a secure way.
The security functionality of the TOE comprises:
 Security Management
 Access Control
 Identification and Authentication
 Security Audit
 Session Handling
A summary of the TOE security functionality can be found in chapter 1.3.4. A more detailed description
of the security functionality can be found in chapter 7, TOE Summary Specification.
Note that only the SQL Server 2017 database engine is addressed in this ST. Other related products
of the SQL Server 2017 platform, such as Analysis Services, provide services that are useful but are
not central to the enforcement of security policies. Hence, security evaluation is not directly applicable
to those other products.
1.3 TOE Description
This chapter provides context for the TOE evaluation by identifying the product type and describing the
evaluated configuration. The main purpose of this chapter is to bind the TOE in physical and logical
terms. The chapter starts with a description of the product type before it introduces the physical scope,
the architecture and last but not least the logical scope of the TOE.
1.3.1 Product Type
The product type of the TOE described in this ST is a database management system (DBMS) with the
capability to limit TOE access to authorized users, enforce Discretionary Access Controls on objects
under the control of the database management system based on user and/or role authorizations, and
to provide user accountability via audit of users’ actions.
A DBMS is a computerized repository that stores information and allows authorized users to retrieve
and update that information. A DBMS may be a single-user system, in which only one user may
access the DBMS at a given time, or a multi-user system, in which many users may access the DBMS
simultaneously.
The TOE which is described in this ST is the database engine and therefore part of SQL Server 2017.
It provides a relational database engine providing mechanisms for Access Control, Identification and
Authentication and Security Audit.
The SQL Server platform additionally includes the following tools which are not part of the TOE:
 SQL Server Replication: Data replication for distributed or mobile data processing applications
and integration with heterogeneous systems
 Machine Learning Services: Machine learning functionality
 Full-Text and Semantic Extractions for Search: Search engine for database contents
 Data Quality Services: Data quality database objects
 PolyBaseQuery Service for External Data: Provides access to non-relational external data
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 Analysis Services: Online analytical processing (OLAP) capabilities for the analysis of large
and complex datasets.
 Reporting Services: A comprehensive solution for creating, managing, and delivering both
traditional, paper-oriented reports and interactive, Web-based reports.
 Management tools: The SQL Server platform includes integrated management tools for
database management and tuning as well as tight integration with tools such as Microsoft
Operations Manager (MOM) and Microsoft Systems Management Server (SMS).
 Development tools: SQL Server offers integrated development tools for the database engine,
data extraction, transformation, and loading (ETL), data mining, OLAP, and reporting that are
tightly integrated with Microsoft Visual Studio to provide end-to-end application development
capabilities.
The TOE itself only comprises the database engine of the SQL Server 2017 platform which provides
the security functionality as required by this ST. Any additional tools of the SQL Server 2017 platform
interact with the TOE as a standard SQL client. The scope and boundary of the TOE will be described
in the next chapter.
1.3.2 Physical Scope and Boundary of the TOE
The TOE is the database engine of the SQL Server 2017 and its related guidance documentation.
This engine is available in two different configurations (x86, x64). Only the x64 version is subject to
this evaluation.
Further, SQL Server 2017 is available in different editions. Only the Enterprise Edition (EE) is subject
to this evaluation.
The following figure shows the TOE (including its internal structure) and its immediate environment.
Figure 1 - TOE Structure
As seen in Figure 1 the TOE internally comprises the following units:
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The Communication part is the interface for programs accessing the TOE. It is the interface between
the TOE and clients performing requests.
All responses to user application requests return to the client through this part of the TOE.
The Relational Engine is the core of the database engine and is responsible for all security relevant
decisions. The relational engine establishes a user context, syntactically checks every Transact SQL
(T-SQL) statement, compiles every statement, checks permissions to determine if the statement can
be executed by the user associated with the request, optimizes the query request, builds and caches a
query plan, and executes the statement. The Relational Engine allows compiling a subset of T-SQL
statements into native code to create natively compiled Stored Procedures. The Visual C compiler
used for this native compilation is not part of the TOE.
The Storage Engine is a resource provider. When the relational engine attempts to execute a T-SQL
statement that accesses an object for the first time, it calls upon the storage engine to retrieve the
object, put it into memory and return a pointer to the execution engine. To perform these tasks, the
storage engine manages the physical resources for the TOE by using the Windows OS.
The SQL-OS is a resource provider for all situations where the TOE uses functionality of the operating
system. SQL-OS provides an abstraction layer over common OS functions and was designed to
reduce the number of context switches within the TOE. SQL-OS especially contains functionality for
Task Management and for Memory Management.
For Task Management the TOE provides an OS-like environment for threads, including scheduling,
and synchronization - all running in user mode, all (except for I/O) without calling the Windows
Operating System.
The Memory Management is responsible for the TOE memory pool. The memory pool is used to
supply the TOE with its memory while it is executing. Almost all data structures that use memory in the
TOE are allocated in the memory pool. The memory pool also provides resources for transaction
logging and data buffers.
The immediate environment of the TOE comprises:
The Windows Server Operating System hosts the TOE. As the TOE is software only it lives as a
process in the Operating System (OS) and uses the resources of the OS. These resources comprise
general functionality (e.g. the memory management and scheduling features of the OS) as well as
specific functionality of the OS, which is important for the security functionality of the TOE (see chapter
7 for more details).
Other parts of the SQL Server 2017 Platform might be installed together with the TOE. The TOE is
the central part of a complete DBMS platform, which realizes all security functionality as described in
this ST. However other parts of the platform may be installed on the same machine if they are needed
to support the operation or administration of the TOE. However these other parts will interact with the
TOE in the same way, every other client would do.
Clients (comprising local clients and remote clients) are used to interact with the TOE during
administration and operation. Services of the Operating System are used to route the communication
of remote clients with the TOE.
The TOE relies on functionality of the Operating System and has the following hardware/software
requirements:
Table 1 - Hardware and Software Requirements
Aspect Requirement
CPU AMD Opteron, AMD Athlon 64, Intel Xeon with Intel EM64T support, Intel Pentium
IV with EM64T support at 1.4 GHz or faster
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Aspect Requirement
RAM 1 GB
Hard Disk Approx. 6 GB of free space
Other DVD drive, display at Super VGA or higher resolution, Microsoft mouse compatible
pointing device, keyboard
OS Windows Server 2012 R2 (English), Standard Edition
Windows Server 2016, Standard Edition
Software .NET Framework 3.5 SP1
The TOE is downloadable as a DVD image via the Microsoft volume licensing service center
(https://www.microsoft.com/licensing/servicecenter/default.aspx).
The following guidance documents and supportive information belong to the TOE:
 SQL Server Technical Documentation: This is the general guidance documentation for the
complete SQL Server 2017 platform ([AGD]).
 SQL Server Guidance Addendum: This document contains the aspects of the guidance that
are specific to the evaluated configuration of SQL Server 2017 ([AGD_ADD]).
The website https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/sql-server/data-security (click on “View our Common
Criteria certification”) contains additional information about the TOE and its evaluated configuration.
Also the guidance addendum that describes the specific aspects of the certified version can be
obtained via this website. The guidance addendum extends the general guidance of SQL Server 2017.
This website shall be visited before using the TOE.
1.3.3 Architecture of the TOE
The TOE which is described in this ST comprises one instance of the SQL Server 2017 database
engine but has the possibility to serve several clients simultaneously.
1.3.4 Logical Scope and Boundary of the TOE
SQL Server 2017 is able to run multiple instances of the database engine on one machine. After
installation one default instance exists. However the administrator is able to add more instances of
SQL Server 2017 to the same machine.
The TOE comprises one instance of SQL Server 2017. Within this ST it is referenced either as "the
TOE" or as "instance". The machine the instances are running on is referenced as "server" or "DBMS-
server".
If more than one instance of SQL Server 2017 is installed on one machine these just represent
multiple TOEs as there is no other interface between two instances of the TOE than the standard
client interface.
In this way two or more instances of the TOE may only communicate through the standard client
interface.
The TOE provides the following set of security functionality:
 The Access Control function of the TOE controls the access of users to user and metadata
stored in the TOE. It further controls that only authorized administrators are able to manage
the TOE.
 The Security Audit function of the TOE produces log files about all security relevant events.
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 The Security Management function allows authorized administrators to manage the behavior
of the security functionality of the TOE.
 The Identification and Authentication2
function of the TOE is able to identify and
authenticate users.
 The Session Handling mechanism which limits the possibilities of users to establish sessions
with the TOE and maintains a separate execution context for every operation. Also the
Memory Management functionality belongs to the area of Session Handling and ensures that
any previous information in memory is made unavailable before the memory is used either by
overwriting the memory explicitly with a certain pattern or by overwriting the memory
completely with new information.
The following functions are part of the environment:
 The Audit Review and Audit Storage functionality has to be provided by the environment
and provide the authorized administrators with the capability to review the security relevant
events of the TOE.
 The Access Control Mechanisms has to be provided by the environment for files stored in
the environment.
 The environment provides Identification and Authentication2 for users for the cases where
this is required by the TOE (The environment AND the TOE provide mechanisms for user
authentication. See chapter 7.3 for more details).
 The environment has to provide Time stamps to be used by the TOE.
 The environment provides a cryptographic mechanism for hashing of passwords.
 The environment provides residual information protection for memory which is allocated to
the TOE.
All these functions are provided by the underlying Operating System except Audit Review. An
additional tool (e.g. the SQL Server Profiler, which is part of the SQL Server Platform) has to be used
for Audit Review.
Access to the complete functionality of the TOE is possible via a set of SQL-commands.
This set of commands is available via:
 Shared Memory
 Named Pipes
 TCP/IP
1.4 Conventions
For this Security Target the following conventions are used:
The CC allows several operations to be performed on functional requirements: refinement, selection,
assignment, and iteration are defined in chapter C.4 of Part 1 of [CC]. Each of these operations is
used in this ST.
A refinement operation (denoted by bold crossed out text) is used to remove unnecessary details of
a requirement, though it does not change the meaning of the requirement.
2
Note that the TOE as well as the environment provides a mechanism for identification and authentication.
Chapter 7 will describe this in more detail.
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Moreover, a refinement operation (denoted by bold text) is used to add details to a requirement, and
thus further restricts a requirement.
The selection operation is used to select one or more options provided by the CC in stating a
requirement. Selections that have been made are denoted by italicized text.
The assignment operation is used to assign a specific value to an unspecified parameter, such as the
length of a password. Assignments that have been made are denoted by showing the value in square
brackets, [Assignment_value].
The iteration operation is used when a component is repeated with varying operations. Iteration is
denoted by showing the iteration number in parenthesis following the component identifier,
(iteration_number).
The CC paradigm also allows security target authors to create their own requirements. Such
requirements are termed ‘extended requirements’ and are permitted if the CC does not offer suitable
requirements to meet the authors’ needs. Extended requirements must be identified and are required
to use the CC class/family/component model in articulating the requirements. In this ST, extended
requirements will be indicated with the “EXT” following the component name.
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2 Conformance Claims
2.1 CC Conformance Claim
This Security Target claims to be
 CC Part 2 (Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017) extended due to the use of the components
FIA_USB_(EXT).2 and FTA_TAH_(EXT).1
 CC Part 3 (Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017) conformant as only assurance components
as defined in part III of [CC] have been used.
Further this Security Target claims to be conformant to the Security Assurance Requirements package
EAL 4 augmented by ALC_FLR.2.
2.2 PP Conformance Claim
This Security Target claims to be conformant to:
 DBMS Working Group Technical Community Protection Profile for Database Management
Systems (DBMS PP) Base Package, Version 2.12, March 23rd, 2017 ([PP]), and
 DBMS Working Group Technical Community DBMS Protection Profile Extended Package -
Access History (DBMS PP_EP_AH), Version 1.02, March 23rd, 2017 ([EP])
Though [PP] allows a demonstrable conformance this Security Target claims strict conformance to
[PP].
The product type of the TOE (see section 1.3.1) is consistent with the product type of the TOE
specified in [PP] (both are database management systems (DBMS)). As strict conformance to [PP] is
claimed no further conformance claim rationale is required.
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3 Security Problem Definition
This chapter describes
 the external entities interacting with the TOE,
 the assets that have to be protected by the TOE,
 assumptions about the environment of the TOE,
 threats against those assets, and
 organizational security policies that TOE shall comply with.
3.1 Assets
The following external entities interact with the TOE:
 Administrator:
The administrator is authorized to perform the administrative operations and able to use the
administrative functions.
 User:
A person who wants to use the TOE.
 Attacker:
An attacker is any individual who is attempting to subvert the operation of the TOE. The
intention may be to gain unauthorized access to the assets protected by the TOE.
The TOE maintains two types of data which represent the assets: User Data and TSF Data.
The primary assets are the User Data which comprises the following:
 The user data stored in or as database objects;
 The definitions of user databases and database objects, commonly known as DBMS
metadata; and
 User-developed queries or procedures that the DBMS maintains for users.
The secondary assets comprise the TSF data that the TOE maintains and uses for its own operation.
It specifically includes:
 Configuration parameters,
 User security attributes,
 Security Audit instructions and records.
3.2 Assumptions
The following table lists all the assumptions about the environment of the TOE. These assumptions
have been directly taken from [PP] without any modification.
Table 2 – Assumptions
Assumption Description
Physical aspects
A.PHYSICAL It is assumed that the IT environment provides the TOE
with appropriate physical security, commensurate with the
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Assumption Description
value of the IT assets protected by the TOE.
Personnel aspects
A.AUTHUSER Authorized users possess the necessary authorization to
access at least some of the information managed by the
TOE.
A.MANAGE The TOE security functionality is managed by one or more
competent administrators. The system administrative
personnel are not careless, willfully negligent, or hostile,
and will follow and abide by the instructions provided by the
guidance documentation.
A.TRAINEDUSER Users are sufficiently trained and trusted to accomplish
some task or group of tasks within a secure IT environment
by exercising complete control over their user data.
Procedural aspects
A.NO_GENERAL_PURPOSE There are no general-purpose computing capabilities (e.g.,
compilers or user applications) available on DBMS servers,
other than those services necessary for the operation,
administration and support of the DBMS.
A.PEER_FUNC_&_MGT All remote trusted IT systems trusted by the TSF to provide
TSF data or services to the TOE, or to support the TSF in
the enforcement of security policy decisions are assumed to
correctly implement the functionality used by the TSF
consistent with the assumptions defined for this functionality
and to be properly managed and operate under security
policy constraints compatible with those of the TOE.
A.SUPPORT Any information provided by a trusted entity in the IT
environment and used to support the provision of time and
date, information used in audit capture, user authentication,
and authorization that is used by the TOE is correct and up
to date.
Connectivity aspects
A.CONNECT All connections to and from remote trusted IT systems and
between separate parts of the TSF are physically or
logically protected within the TOE environment to ensure
the integrity and confidentiality of the data transmitted and
to ensure the authenticity of the communication end points.
3.3 Threats
The following table identifies the threats to the TOE. These threats have been directly taken from [PP]
without any modifications.
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Table 3 – Threats to the TOE
Threat Description
T.ACCESS_TSFDATA A threat agent may read or modify TSF data using functions
of the TOE without the proper authorization.
T.ACCESS_TSFFUNC A threat agent may use or manage TSF, bypassing the
protection mechanisms of the TSF.
T.IA_MASQUERADE A user or process acting on behalf of a user may
masquerade as another entity in order to gain unauthorized
access to user data, TSF data, or TOE resources.
T.IA_USER A threat agent may gain access to user data, TSF data, or
TOE resources with the exception of public objects without
being identified and authenticated.
T.RESIDUAL_DATA A user or process acting on behalf of a user may gain
unauthorized access to user or TSF data through
reallocation of TOE resources from one user or process to
another.
T.TSF_COMPROMISE A malicious user or process acting on behalf of a user may
cause configuration data to be inappropriately accessed
(viewed, modified or deleted), or may compromise
executable code within the TSF.
T.UNAUTHORIZED_ACCESS A threat agent may gain unauthorized access to user data
for which they are not authorized according to the TOE
security policy.
3.4 Organizational Security Policies
An organizational security policy is a set of rules, practices, and procedures imposed by an
organization to address its security needs. This chapter identifies the organizational security policies
applicable to the TOE. These organizational security policies have been taken from [PP] without any
changes.
Table 4 – Organizational Security Policies
Policy Description
P.ACCOUNTABILITY The authorized users of the TOE shall be held accountable for
their actions within the TOE.
P.ROLES Administrative authority to TSF functionality shall be given to
trusted personnel and be as restricted as possible supporting
only the administrative duties the person has. This role shall be
separate and distinct from other authorized users.
P.USER Authority shall only be given to users who are trusted to perform
the actions correctly.
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4 Security Objectives
The purpose of the security objectives is to detail the planned response to a security problem or threat.
This chapter describes the security objectives for the TOE and its operational environment.
4.1 Security Objectives for the TOE
This chapter identifies and describes the security objectives of the TOE. The objectives have been
directly taken from [PP] with the exception of O.ACCESS_HISTORY which has been taken from [EP].
Table 5 – Security Objectives for the TOE
Objective Description
O.ACCESS_HISTORY The TOE will store information related to previous
attempts to establish a session and make that
information available to the user.
O.ADMIN_ROLE The TOE will provide a mechanism (e.g. a "role") by
which the actions using administrative privileges may be
restricted.
O.AUDIT_GENERATION The TSF must be able to record defined security-
relevant events (which usually include security-critical
actions of users of the TOE). The information recorded
for security-relevant events must contain the time and
date the event happened and, if possible, the
identification of the user that caused the event, and must
be in sufficient detail to help the authorized user detect
attempted security violations or potential
misconfiguration of the TOE security features that would
leave the IT assets open to compromise.
O.DISCRETIONARY_ACCESS The TSF must control access of subjects and/or users to
named resources based on identity of the object,
subject, or user. The TSF must allow authorized users to
specify for each access mode which users/subjects are
allowed to access a specific named object in that access
mode.
O.I&A The TOE ensures that users are authenticated before
the TOE processes any actions that require
authentication.
O.MANAGE The TSF must provide all the functions and facilities
necessary to support the authorized users that are
responsible for the management of TOE security
mechanisms, must allow restricting such management
actions to dedicated users, and must ensure that only
such authorized users are able to access management
functionality.
O.MEDIATE The TOE must protect user data in accordance with its
security policy, and must mediate all requests to access
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Objective Description
such data.
O.RESIDUAL_INFORMATION The TOE will ensure that any information contained in a
protected resource within its Scope of Control is not
inappropriately disclosed when the resource is
reallocated.
O.TOE_ACCESS The TOE will provide mechanisms that control a user’s
logical access3 to user data and to the TSF.
4.2 Security Objectives for the operational Environment
The security objectives for the TOE Environment are defined in the following table. The objectives for
the environment have been directly taken from [PP] without any changes.
Table 6 – Security Objectives for the TOE Environment
Objective Description
OE.ADMIN Those responsible for the TOE are competent and
trustworthy individuals, capable of managing the TOE
and the security of the information it contains.
OE.INFO_PROTECT Those responsible for the TOE must establish and
implement procedures to ensure that information is
protected in an appropriate manner. In particular:
 All network and peripheral cabling must be
approved for the transmittal of the most
sensitive data transmitted over the link. Such
physical links are assumed to be adequately
protected against threats to the confidentiality
and integrity of the data transmitted using
appropriate physical and logical protection
techniques.
 DAC protections on security-relevant files
(such as audit trails and authorization
databases) shall always be set up correctly.
 Users are authorized to access parts of the
data managed by the TOE and are trained to
exercise control over their own data.
OE.NO_GENERAL_ PURPOSE There will be no general-purpose computing capabilities
(e.g., compilers or user applications) available on DBMS
servers, other than those services necessary for the
operation, administration and support of the DBMS.
OE.PHYSICAL Those responsible for the TOE must ensure that those
parts of the TOE critical to enforcement of the security
policy are protected from physical attack that might
3
Here, "logical access" is specified, since the control of "physical access" is outside the scope of this PP.
Security Target (EAL4+) - SQL Server 2017 Page 19/66
Objective Description
compromise IT security objectives. The protection must
be commensurate with the value of the IT assets
protected by the TOE.
OE.IT_I&A Any information provided by a trusted entity in the
environment and used to support user authentication
and authorization used by the TOE is correct and up to
date.
OE.IT_REMOTE If the TOE relies on remote trusted IT systems to support
the enforcement of its policy, those systems provide that
the functions and any data used by the TOE in making
policy decisions, required by the TOE are sufficiently
protected from any attack that may cause those
functions to provide false results.
OE.IT_TRUSTED_SYSTEM The remote trusted IT systems implement the protocols
and mechanisms required by the TSF to support the
enforcement of the security policy.
These remote trusted IT systems are managed
according to known, accepted, and trusted policies
based on the same rules and policies applicable to the
TOE, and are physically and logically protected
equivalent to the TOE.
4.3 Security Objectives Rationale
4.3.1 Overview
The following table maps the security objectives to assumptions / threats / OSPs:
Security Target (EAL4+) - SQL Server 2017 Page 20/66
Threats, Assumptions, OSP / Security
Objectives
O.ACCESS_HISTORY
O.ADMIN_ROLE
O.AUDIT_GENERATION
O.DISCRETIONARY_ACCESS
O.I&A
O.MANAGE
O.MEDIATE
O.RESIDUAL_INFORMATION
O.TOE_ACCESS
OE.ADMIN
OE.INFO_PROTECT
OE.IT_I&A
OE.IT_REMOTE
OE.IT_TRUSTED_SYSTEM
OE.NO_GENERAL_
PURPOSE
OE.PHYSICAL
T.ACCESS_TSFDATA X X X X X
T.ACCESS_TSFFUNC X X X X X
T.IA_MASQUERADE X X X X X
T.IA_USER X X X X
T.RESIDUAL_DATA X
T.TSF_COMPROMISE X X X X X X X X
T.UNAUTHORIZED_ACCESS X X X X
P.ACCOUNTABILITY X X X X X X
P.ROLES X X X
P.USER X X X X
A.PHYSICAL X X
A.AUTHUSER X X X
A.MANAGE X X
A.TRAINEDUSER X
A.NO_GENERAL_PURPOSE X
A.PEER_FUNC_&_MGT X X
A.SUPPORT X
A.CONNECT X X X X
Table 7 – Summary of Security Objectives Rationale
Details are given in the following table. These details are directly taken from [PP] and [EP].
Security Target (EAL4+) - SQL Server 2017 Page 21/66
4.3.2 Rationale for TOE Security Objectives
Table 8 – Rationale for TOE Security Objectives
Threat/Policy TOE Security Objectives Addressing the
Threat/Policy
Rationale
P.ACCOUNTABILITY
The
authorized
users
of
the
TOE
shall
be
held
accountable
for
their
actions
within
the
TOE.
O.ADMIN_ROLE
The TOE will provide a mechanism (e.g. a
"role") by which the actions using
administrative privileges may be restricted.
O.ADMIN_ROLE
supports this policy by ensuring that
the TOE has an objective to provide
authorized administrators with the
privileges needed for secure
administration.
O.AUDIT_GENERATION
The TOE will provide the capability to detect
and create records of security relevant
events associated with users.
O.AUDIT_GENERATION
supports this policy by ensuring that
audit records are generated. Having
these records available enables
accountability.
O.I&A
The TOE ensures that users are
authenticated before the TOE processes
any actions that require authentication.
O.I&A
supports this policy by requiring that
each entity interacting with the TOE
is properly identified and
authenticated before allowing any
action the TOE is defined to provide
to authenticated users only.
O.TOE_ACCESS
The TOE will provide mechanisms that
control a user's logical access to the TOE.
O.TOE_ACCESS
supports this policy by providing a
mechanism for controlling access to
authorized users.
P.USER
Authority
shall
only
be
given
to
users
who
are
trusted
to
perform
the
actions
correctly.
O.MANAGE
The TSF must provide all the functions and
facilities necessary to support the authorized
users that are responsible for the
management of TOE security mechanisms,
must allow restricting such management
actions to dedicated users, and must ensure
that only such authorized users are able to
access management functionality.
O.MANAGE
supports this policy by ensuring that
the functions and facilities supporting
the authorized administrator role are
in place.
Security Target (EAL4+) - SQL Server 2017 Page 22/66
Threat/Policy TOE Security Objectives Addressing the
Threat/Policy
Rationale
O.TOE_ACCESS
The TOE will provide mechanisms that control
a user's logical access to the TOE.
O.TOE_ACCESS
supports this policy by providing a
mechanism for controlling access to
authorized users.
OE.ADMIN
Those responsible for the TOE are competent
and trustworthy individuals, capable of
managing the TOE and the security of
information it contains.
OE.ADMIN
supports this policy by ensuring that
the authorized administrator role is
understood and used by competent
administrators.
P.ROLES
Administrative
authority
to
TSF
functionality
shall
be
given
to
trusted
personnel
and
be
as
restricted
as
possible
supporting
only
the
administrative
duties
the
person
has.
This
role
shall
be
separate
and
distinct
from
other
authorized
users.
O.ADMIN_ROLE
The TOE will provide a mechanism (e.g. a
"role") by which the actions using
administrative privileges may be restricted.
O.ADMIN_ROLE
The TOE has the objective of
providing an authorized administrator
role for secure administration. The
TOE may provide other roles as well,
but only the role of authorized
administrator is required.
O.TOE_ACCESS
The TOE will provide mechanisms that control
a user's logical access to the TOE.
O.TOE_ACCESS
supports this policy by ensuring that an
authorized administrator role can be
distinguished from other authorized
users.
T.ACCESS_TSFDATA
A
threat
agent
may
read
or
modify
TSF
data
using
functions
of
the
TOE
without
the
proper
authorization.
O.ACCESS_HISTORY
The TOE will store information related to
previous attempts to establish a session and
make that information available to the user.
O.ACCESS_HISTORY
diminishes this threat because it
ensures the TOE will store the
information that is needed to advise
the user of previous authentication
attempts and allows this information to
be retrieved.
O.I&A
The TOE ensures that users are
authenticated before the TOE processes any
actions that require authentication.
O.I&A
supports this policy by requiring that
each entity interacting with the TOE is
properly identified and authenticated
before allowing any action the TOE is
defined to provide to authenticated
users only.
Security Target (EAL4+) - SQL Server 2017 Page 23/66
Threat/Policy TOE Security Objectives Addressing the
Threat/Policy
Rationale
O.MANAGE
The TSF must provide all the functions and
facilities necessary to support the authorized
users that are responsible for the
management of TOE security mechanisms,
must allow restricting such management
actions to dedicated users, and must ensure
that only such authorized users are able to
access management functionality.
O.MANAGE
diminishes this threat since it ensures
that functions and facilities used to
modify TSF data are not available to
unauthorized users.
O.RESIDUAL_INFORMATION
The TOE will ensure that any information
contained in a protected resource within its
Scope of Control is not inappropriately
disclosed when the resource is reallocated.
O.RESIDUAL_INFORMATION
diminishes this threat since
information contained in protected
resources will not be easily available
to the threat agent through
reallocation attacks.
O.TOE_ACCESS
The TOE will provide mechanisms that control
a user's logical access to the TOE.
O.TOE_ACCESS
diminishes this threat since it makes it
more unlikely that a threat agent has
access to the TOE.
T.ACCESS_TSFFUNC
A
threat
agent
may
use
or
manage
functionality
of
the
TSF
bypassing
protection
mechanisms
of
the
TSF.
O.ADMIN_ROLE
The TOE will provide a mechanism (e.g. a
"role") by which the actions using
administrative privileges may be restricted.
O.ADMIN_ROLE
diminishes this threat by providing
isolation of privileged actions.
O.I&A
The TOE ensures that users are
authenticated before the TOE processes any
actions that require authentication.
O.I&A
diminishes this threat since the TOE
requires successful authentication to
the TOE prior to gaining access to any
controlled-access content. By
implementing strong authentication to
gain access to these services, an
attacker's opportunity to masquerade
as another entity in order to gain
unauthorized access to data or TOE
resources is reduced.
Security Target (EAL4+) - SQL Server 2017 Page 24/66
Threat/Policy TOE Security Objectives Addressing the
Threat/Policy
Rationale
O.MANAGE
The TSF must provide all the functions and
facilities necessary to support the authorized
users that are responsible for the
management of TOE security mechanisms,
must allow restricting such management
actions to dedicated users, and must ensure
that only such authorized users are able to
access management functionality.
O.MANAGE
diminishes this threat because an
access control policy is specified to
control access to TSF data. This
objective is used to dictate who is able
to view and modify TSF data, as well
as the behavior of TSF functions.
O.RESIDUAL_INFORMATION
The TOE will ensure that any information
contained in a protected resource within its
Scope of Control is not inappropriately
disclosed when the resource is reallocated.
O.RESIDUAL_INFORMATION
diminishes this threat by ensuring that
TSF data and user data is not
persistent when resources are
released by one user/process and
allocated to another user/process.
O.TOE_ACCESS
The TOE will provide mechanisms that control
a user's logical access to the TOE.
O.TOE_ACCESS
diminishes this threat since it makes it
more unlikely that a threat agent has
access to the TOE.
T.IA_MASQUERADE
A
user
or
process
may
masquerade
as
an
authorized
entity
in
order
to
gain
unauthorized
access
to
user
data,
TSF
data,
or
TOE
resources.
O.ACCESS_HISTORY
The TOE will store information related to
previous attempts to establish a session and
make that information available to the user.
O.ACCESS_HISTORY
diminishes this threat because it
ensures the TOE will be able to store
and retrieve the information that will
advise the user of the last successful
login attempt and performed actions
without their knowledge.
O.I&A
The TOE ensures that users are
authenticated before the TOE processes any
actions that require authentication.
O.I&A
diminishes this threat by requiring that
each entity interacting with the TOE is
properly identified and authenticated
before allowing any action the TOE
has defined to provide to authenticated
users only
Security Target (EAL4+) - SQL Server 2017 Page 25/66
Threat/Policy TOE Security Objectives Addressing the
Threat/Policy
Rationale
O.MEDIATE
The TOE must protect user data in
accordance with its security policy, and must
mediate all requests to access such data.
O.MEDIATE
diminishes this threat by ensuring that
all access to user data are subject to
mediation, unless said data has been
specifically identified as public data.
The TOE requires successful
authentication to the TOE prior to
gaining access to any controlled-
access content. By implementing
strong authentication to gain access to
these services, an attacker's
opportunity to masquerade as another
entity in order to gain unauthorized
access to data or TOE resources is
reduced.
O.TOE_ACCESS
The TOE will provide mechanisms that
control a user's logical access to the TOE.
O.TOE_ACCESS
diminishes this threat by controlling the
logical access to the TOE and its
resources. By constraining how and
when authorized users can access the
TOE, and by mandating the type and
strength of the authentication
mechanism this objective helps
mitigate the possibility of a user
attempting to login and masquerade as
an authorized user. In addition, this
objective provides the administrator
the means to control the number of
failed login attempts a user can
generate before an account is locked
out, further reducing the possibility of a
user gaining unauthorized access to
the TOE.
T.IA_USER
A
threat
agent
may
gain
access
to
user
data,
TSF
data
or
TOE
resources
with
the
exception
of
public
objects
without
being
identified
and
authenticated.
O.DISCRETIONARY_ACCESS
The TSF must control access of subjects
and/or users to named resources based on
identity of the object, subject, or user. The
TSF must allow authorized users to specify
for each access mode which users/subjects
are allowed to access a specific named
object in that access mode.
O.DISCRETIONARY_ACCESS
diminishes this threat by requiring
that data including user data stored
with the TOE, have discretionary
access control protection.
Security Target (EAL4+) - SQL Server 2017 Page 26/66
Threat/Policy TOE Security Objectives Addressing the
Threat/Policy
Rationale
O.I&A
The TOE ensures that users are
authenticated before the TOE processes any
actions that require authentication.
O.I&A
diminishes this threat by requiring that
each entity interacting with the TOE is
properly identified and authenticated
before allowing any action the TOE is
defined to provide to authenticated
users only.
O.MEDIATE
The TOE must protect user data in
accordance with its security policy, and must
mediate all requests to access such data.
O.MEDIATE
diminishes this threat by ensuring that
all access to user data are subject to
mediation, unless said data has been
specifically identified as public data.
The TOE requires successful
authentication to the TOE prior to
gaining access to any controlled-
access content. By implementing
strong authentication to gain access to
these services, an attacker's
opportunity to masquerade as another
entity in order to gain unauthorized
access to data or TOE resources is
reduced.
O.TOE_ACCESS
The TOE will provide mechanisms that
control a user's logical access to the TOE.
O.TOE_ACCESS
diminishes this threat by controlling
logical access to user data, TSF data
or TOE resources.
T.RESIDUAL_DATA
A
user
or
process
may
gain
unauthorized
access
to
user
or
TSF
data
through
reallocation
of
TOE
resources
from
one
user
or
process
to
another.
O.RESIDUAL_INFORMATION
The TOE will ensure that any information
contained in a protected resource within its
Scope of Control is not inappropriately
disclosed when the resource is reallocated.
O.RESIDUAL_INFORMATION
diminishes this threat because even
if the security mechanisms do not
allow a user to view TSF data, if TSF
data were to reside inappropriately in
a resource that was made available
to a user, that user would be able to
view the TSF data without
authorization.
Security Target (EAL4+) - SQL Server 2017 Page 27/66
Threat/Policy TOE Security Objectives Addressing the
Threat/Policy
Rationale
T.TSF_COMPROMISE
A
malicious
user
or
process
may
cause
configuration
data
to
be
inappropriately
accessed
(viewed,
modified
or
deleted),
or
may
compromise
executable
code
within
the
TSF.
O.ACCESS_HISTORY
The TOE will store information related to
previous attempts to establish a session and
make that information available to the user.
O.ACCESS_HISTORY
diminishes this threat because it
ensures the TOE will be able to store
and retrieve the information that will
advise the user of the last successful
login attempt and performed actions
without their knowledge.
O.AUDIT_GENERATION
The TOE will provide the capability to detect
and create records of security relevant events
associated with users.
O.AUDIT_GENERATION
diminishes this threat by providing the
authorized administrator with the
appropriate audit records supporting
the detection of compromise of the
TSF.
O.TOE_ACCESS
The TOE will provide mechanisms that control
a user's logical access to the TOE.
O.TOE_ACCESS
diminishes this threat since controlled
user's logical access to the TOE will
reduce the opportunities for an
attacker’s access to configuration data.
T.UNAUTHORIZED_ACCESS
A
user
may
gain
unauthorized
access
to
user
data
for
which
they
are
not
authorized
according
to
the
TOE
security
policy.
O.DISCRETIONARY_ACCESS
The TSF must control access of subjects
and/or users to named resources based on
identity of the object, subject or user. The
TSF must allow authorized users to specify
for each access mode which users/subjects
are allowed to access a specific named
object in that access mode.
O.DISCRETIONARY_ACCESS
diminishes this threat by requiring
that data including TSF data stored
with the TOE, have discretionary
access control protection.
O.MANAGE
The TSF must provide all the functions and
facilities necessary to support the authorized
users that are responsible for the
management of TOE security mechanisms,
must allow restricting such management
actions to dedicated users, and must ensure
that only such authorized users are able to
access management functionality.
O.MANAGE
diminishes this threat by ensuring that
the functions and facilities supporting
that authorized users can be held
accountable for their actions by
authorized administrators are in place.
Security Target (EAL4+) - SQL Server 2017 Page 28/66
Threat/Policy TOE Security Objectives Addressing the
Threat/Policy
Rationale
O.MEDIATE
The TOE must protect user data in
accordance with its security policy, and must
mediate all requests to access such data.
O.MEDIATE
diminishes this threat because it
ensures that all access to user data
are subject to mediation, unless said
data has been specifically identified as
public data. The TOE requires
successful authentication to the TOE
prior to gaining access to any
controlled-access content. By
implementing strong authentication to
gain access to these services, an
attacker's opportunity to conduct a
man-in-the-middle and/or password
guessing attack successfully is greatly
reduced. Lastly, the TSF will ensure
that all configured enforcement
functions (authentication, access
control rules, etc.) must be invoked
prior to allowing a user to gain access
to TOE or TOE mediated services. The
TOE restricts the ability to modify the
security attributes associated with
access control rules, access to
authenticated and unauthenticated
services, etc. to the administrator. This
feature ensures that no other user can
modify the information flow policy to
bypass the intended TOE security
policy.
4.3.3 Rationale for Environmental Security Objectives
The following table contains the rationale for the IT Environmental Objectives. This rationale has
directly been taken from [PP] without any changes.
Table 9 – Rationale for IT Environmental Objectives
Assumption Environmental Objective
Addressing the Assumption
Rationale
A.AUTHUSER
Authorized users possess the
necessary authorization to
access at least some of the
OE.INFO_PROTECT
Those responsible for the TOE
must establish and implement
procedures to ensure that
information is protected in an
OE.INFO_PROTECT
supports the assumption by
ensuring that users are
authorized to access parts of
the data managed by the TOE
Security Target (EAL4+) - SQL Server 2017 Page 29/66
Assumption Environmental Objective
Addressing the Assumption
Rationale
information managed by the
TOE. Authorized users are
expected to act in a cooperating
manner, in a benign
environment.
appropriate manner. In
particular:
 All network and peripheral
cabling must be approved
for the transmittal of the
most sensitive data
transmitted over the link.
Such physical links are
assumed to be adequately
protected against threats to
the confidentiality and
integrity of the data
transmitted using
appropriate physical and
logical protection
techniques.
 DAC protections on
security-relevant files (such
as audit trails and
authorization databases)
shall always be set up
correctly.
 Users are authorized to
access parts of the data
managed by the TOE and
are trained to exercise
control over their own data.
and is trained to exercise
control over their own data.
Having trained, authorized users,
who are provided with relevant
procedures for information
protection supports the
assumption of co-operation.
OE.IT_REMOTE
If the TOE relies on remote
trusted IT systems to support the
enforcement of its policy, those
systems provide that the
functions and any data used by
the TOE in making policy
decisions, required by the TOE
are sufficiently protected from any
attack that may cause those
functions to provide false results.
OE.IT_REMOTE
supports this assumption by
ensuring that remote systems that
form part of the IT environment
are protected. This gives
confidence that the environment
is benign.
OE.IT_TRUSTED_SYSTEM
The remote trusted IT systems
implement the protocols and
mechanisms required by the
TSF to support the enforcement
of the security policy.
These remote trusted IT systems
OE.IT_TRUSTED_SYSTEM
supports this assumption by
providing confidence that systems
in the TOE IT environment
contribute to a benign
environment.
Security Target (EAL4+) - SQL Server 2017 Page 30/66
Assumption Environmental Objective
Addressing the Assumption
Rationale
are managed according to known,
accepted, and trusted policies
based on the same rules and
policies applicable to the TOE,
and are physically and logically
protected equivalent to the TOE.
A.CONNECT
All connections to and from
remote trusted IT systems and
between separate parts of the
TSF are physically or logically
protected within the TOE
environment to ensure the
integrity and confidentiality of the
data transmitted and to ensure
the authenticity of the
communication end points.
OE.IT_REMOTE
If the TOE relies on remote
trusted IT systems to support the
enforcement of its policy, those
systems provide that the
functions and any data used by
the TOE in making policy
decisions, required by the TOE
are sufficiently protected from any
attack that may cause those
functions to provide false results.
OE.IT_REMOTE
supports the assumption by
levying a requirement in the
environment that connections
between trusted systems or
physically separated parts of the
TOE are sufficiently protected
from any attack that may cause
those functions to provide false
results.
OE.INFO_PROTECT
Those responsible for the TOE
must establish and implement
procedures to ensure that
information is protected in an
appropriate manner. In
particular:
 All network and peripheral
cabling must be approved
for the transmittal of the
most sensitive data
transmitted over the link.
Such physical links are
assumed to be adequately
protected against threats to
the confidentiality and
integrity of the data
transmitted using
appropriate physical and
logical protection
techniques.
 DAC protections on
security-relevant files (such
as audit trails and
authorization databases)
shall always be set up
correctly.
 Users are authorized to
access parts of the data
OE.INFO_PROTECT
supports the assumption by
requiring that All network and
peripheral cabling must be
approved for the transmittal of the
most sensitive data transmitted
over the link. Such physical links
are assumed to be adequately
protected against threats to the
confidentiality and integrity of the
data transmitted using
appropriate physical and logical
protection techniques
Security Target (EAL4+) - SQL Server 2017 Page 31/66
Assumption Environmental Objective
Addressing the Assumption
Rationale
managed by the TOE and
are trained to exercise
control over their own data.
OE.IT_TRUSTED_SYSTEM
The remote trusted IT systems
implement the protocols and
mechanisms required by the
TSF to support the enforcement
of the security policy.
These remote trusted IT systems
are managed according to known,
accepted and trusted policies
based on the same rules and
policies applicable to the TOE,
and are physically and logically
protected equivalent to the TOE.
OE.IT_TRUSTED_SYSTEM
supports the assumption by
ensuring that remote trusted IT
systems implement the
protocols and mechanisms
required by the TSF to support
the enforcement of the security
policy.
OE.PHYSICAL
Those responsible for the TOE
must ensure that those parts of
the TOE critical to enforcement of
the security policy are protected
from physical attack that might
compromise IT security
objectives. The protection must
be commensurate with the value
of the IT assets protected by the
TOE.
OE.PHYSICAL
supports the assumption by
ensuring that appropriate physical
security is provided within the
domain.
A.SUPPORT
Any information provided by a
trusted entity in the IT
environment and used to support
the provision of time and date,
information used in audit
capture, user authentication, and
authorization that is used by the
TOE is correct and up to date.
OE.IT_I&A
Any information provided by a
trusted entity in the environment
and used to support user
authentication and authorization
used by the TOE is correct and
up to date.
OE.IT_I&A
supports the assumption
implicitly.
A.MANAGE
The TOE security functionality is
managed by one or more
competent individuals. The
system administrative personnel
are not careless, willfully
OE.ADMIN
Those responsible for the TOE
are competent and trustworthy
individuals, capable of
managing the TOE and the
security of information it
OE.ADMIN
supports the assumption since
the authorized administrators are
assumed competent in order to
help ensure that all the tasks and
responsibilities are performed
Security Target (EAL4+) - SQL Server 2017 Page 32/66
Assumption Environmental Objective
Addressing the Assumption
Rationale
negligent, or hostile, and will
follow and abide by the
instructions provided by the
guidance documentation.
contains. effectively.
OE.INFO_PROTECT
Those responsible for the TOE
must establish and implement
procedures to ensure that
information is protected in an
appropriate manner. In
particular:
 All network and peripheral
cabling must be approved
for the transmittal of the
most sensitive data
transmitted over the link.
Such physical links are
assumed to be adequately
protected against threats to
the confidentiality and
integrity of the data
transmitted using
appropriate physical and
logical protection
techniques.
 DAC protections on
security-relevant files (such
as audit trails and
authorization databases)
shall always be set up
correctly.
 Users are authorized to
access parts of the data
managed by the TOE and
are trained to exercise
control over their own data.
OE.INFO_PROTECT
supports the assumption by
ensuring that the information
protection aspects of the TOE
and the system(s) and relevant
connectivity that form the
platform for the TOE is vital to
addressing the security
problem, described in this PP.
Managing these effectively using
defined procedures is reliant on
having competent administrators.
A.NO_GENERAL_PURPOSE
There are no general-purpose
computing or storage
repository capabilities (e.g.,
compilers or user applications)
available on DBMS servers,
other than those services
necessary for the operation,
administration, and support of
the DBMS.
OE.NO_GENERAL_PURPOSE
There will be no general-purpose
computing capabilities (e.g.,
compilers or user applications)
available on DMBS servers, other
than those services necessary for
the operation, administration, and
support of the DBMS.
OE.NO_GENERAL_PURPOSE
The DBMS server must not
include any general-purpose
computing or storage capabilities.
This will protect the TSF data
from malicious processes. The
environmental objective is tightly
related to the assumption, which
when fulfilled will address the
assumption.
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Assumption Environmental Objective
Addressing the Assumption
Rationale
A.PEER_FUNC_&_MGT
All remote trusted IT systems
trusted by the TSF to provide
TSF data or services to the TOE,
or to support the TSF in the
enforcement of security policy
decisions are assumed to
correctly implement the
functionality used by the TSF
consistent with the assumptions
defined for this functionality and
to be properly managed and
operate under security policy
constraints compatible with
those of the TOE.
OE.IT_REMOTE
If the TOE relies on remote
trusted IT systems to support the
enforcement of its policy, those
systems provide that the
functions and any data used by
the TOE in making policy
decisions, required by the TOE
are sufficiently protected from any
attack that may cause those
functions to provide false results.
OE.IT_REMOTE
The assumption that connections
between trusted systems or
physically separated parts of the
TOE is addressed by the
objective specifying that such
systems are sufficiently protected
from any attack that may cause
those functions to provide false
results.
OE.IT_TRUSTED_SYSTEM
The remote trusted IT systems
implement the protocols and
mechanisms required by the
TSF to support the enforcement
of the security policy.
These remote trusted IT
systems are managed
according to known, accepted,
and trusted policies based on
the same rules and policies
applicable to the TOE, and are
physically and logically
protected equivalent to the TOE.
OE.IT_TRUSTED_SYSTEM
The assumption on all remote
trusted IT systems to implement
correctly the functionality used
by the TSF consistent with the
assumptions defined for this
functionality is supported by
physical and logical protections
and the application of trusted
policies commensurate with
those applied to the TOE.
A.PHYSICAL
It is assumed that the IT
environment provides the TOE
with appropriate physical
security, commensurate with the
value of the IT assets protected
by the TOE.
OE.PHYSICAL
Those responsible for the TOE
must ensure that those parts of
the TOE critical to enforcement of
the security policy are protected
from physical attack that might
compromise IT security
objectives. The protection must
be commensurate with the value
of the IT assets protected by the
TOE.
OE.PHYSICAL
The TOE, the TSF data, and
protected user data is assumed to
be protected from physical attack
(e.g., theft, modification,
destruction, or eavesdropping).
Physical attack could include
unauthorized intruders into the
TOE environment, but it does not
include physical destructive
actions that might be taken by an
individual that is authorized to
access the TOE environment.
OE.INFO_PROTECT
Those responsible for the TOE
must establish and implement
procedures to ensure that
OE.INFO_PROTECT
supports the assumption by
ensuring that users are
authorized to access parts of the
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Assumption Environmental Objective
Addressing the Assumption
Rationale
information is protected in an
appropriate manner. In
particular:
 • All network and peripheral
cabling must be approved
for the transmittal of the
most sensitive data
transmitted over the link.
Such physical links are
assumed to be adequately
protected against threats to
the confidentiality and
integrity of the data
transmitted using
appropriate physical and
logical protection
techniques.
 DAC protections on
security-relevant files (such
as audit trails and
authorization databases)
shall always be set up
correctly.
 Users are authorized to
access parts of the data
managed by the TOE and
are trained to exercise
control over their own data.
data managed by the TOE and is
trained to exercise control over
their own data.
A.TRAINEDUSER
Users are sufficiently trained and
trusted to accomplish some task
or group of tasks within a secure
IT environment by exercising
complete control over their user
data.
OE.INFO_PROTECT
Those responsible for the TOE
must establish and implement
procedures to ensure that
information is protected in an
appropriate manner. In
particular:
 All network and peripheral
cabling must be approved
for the transmittal of the
most sensitive data
transmitted over the link.
Such physical links are
assumed to be adequately
protected against threats to
the confidentiality and
integrity of the data
transmitted using
appropriate physical and
logical protection
OE.INFO_PROTECT
supports the assumption by
requiring that all network and
peripheral cabling must be
approved for the transmittal of the
most sensitive data transmitted
over the link. Such physical links
are assumed to be adequately
protected against threats to the
confidentiality and integrity of the
data transmitted using
appropriate physical and logical
protection techniques.
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Assumption Environmental Objective
Addressing the Assumption
Rationale
techniques.
 DAC protections on
security-relevant files (such
as audit trails and
authorization databases)
shall always be set up
correctly.
 Users are authorized to
access parts of the data
managed by the TOE and
are trained to exercise
control over their own data.
P.ACCOUNTABILITY
The authorized users of the TOE
shall be held accountable for
their actions within the TOE.
OE.ADMIN
Those responsible for the TOE
are competent and trustworthy
individuals, capable of managing
the TOE and the security of
information it contains.
OE.ADMIN
supports the policy that the
authorized administrators are
assumed competent in order to
help ensure that all the tasks and
responsibilities are performed
effectively.
OE.INFO_PROTECT
Those responsible for the TOE
must establish and implement
procedures to ensure that
information is protected in an
appropriate manner. In
particular:
 All network and peripheral
cabling must be approved
for the transmittal of the
most sensitive data
transmitted over the link.
Such physical links are
assumed to be adequately
protected against threats to
the confidentiality and
integrity of the data
transmitted using
appropriate physical and
logical protection
techniques.
 DAC protections on
security-relevant files (such
as audit trails and
authorization databases)
shall always be set up
OE.INFO_PROTECT
supports the policy by ensuring
that the authorized users are
trained and have procedures
available to support them and that
the DAC protections function and
are able to provide sufficient
information to inform those
pursuing accountability.
Security Target (EAL4+) - SQL Server 2017 Page 36/66
Assumption Environmental Objective
Addressing the Assumption
Rationale
correctly.
 Users are authorized to
access parts of the data
managed by the TOE and
are trained to exercise
control over their own data.
P.ROLES
The TOE shall provide an
authorized administrator role for
secure administration of the
TOE. This role shall be separate
and distinct from other
authorized users.
OE.ADMIN
Those responsible for the TOE
are competent and trustworthy
individuals, capable of managing
the TOE and the security of
information it contains.
OE.ADMIN
supports the policy by ensuring
that an authorized administrator
role for secure administration of
the TOE is established.
P.USER
Authority shall only be given to
users who are trusted to
perform the actions correctly.
OE.ADMIN
Those responsible for the TOE
are competent and trustworthy
individuals, capable of managing
the TOE and the security of
information it contains.
OE.ADMIN
supports the policy by ensuring
that the authorized
administrators, responsible for
giving appropriate authorities to
users, are trustworthy.
OE.INFO_PROTECT
Those responsible for the TOE
must establish and implement
procedures to ensure that
information is protected in an
appropriate manner. In
particular:
 All network and peripheral
cabling must be approved
for the transmittal of the
most sensitive data
transmitted over the link.
Such physical links are
assumed to be adequately
protected against threats to
the confidentiality and
integrity of the data
transmitted using
appropriate physical and
logical protection
techniques.
 DAC protections on
security-relevant files (such
as audit trails and
authorization databases)
shall always be set up
OE.INFO_PROTECT
supports the policy by ensuring
that users are authorized to
access parts of the data
managed by the TOE and are
trained to exercise control over
their own data and that DAC
protections on security-relevant
files (such as audit trails and
authorization databases) shall
always be set up correctly.
Security Target (EAL4+) - SQL Server 2017 Page 37/66
Assumption Environmental Objective
Addressing the Assumption
Rationale
correctly.Users are
authorized to access parts
of the data managed by the
TOE and are trained to
exercise control over their
own data.
T.IA_MASQUERADE
A user or process may
masquerade as an authorized
entity in order to gain
unauthorized access to user
data, TSF data, or TOE
resources.
OE.NO_GENERAL_PURPOSE
There will be no general-purpose
computing capabilities (e.g.,
compilers or user applications)
available on DMBS servers, other
than those services necessary for
the operation, administration, and
support of the DBMS.
OE.NO_GENERAL_PURPOSE
The DBMS server must not
include any general-purpose
computing or storage
capabilities.
This diminishes the threat of
masquerade since only users with
DBMS or related functions will be
defined in the TOE environment.
T.TSF_COMPROMISE
A malicious user or process may
cause configuration data to be
inappropriately accessed
(viewed, modified or deleted), or
may compromise executable
code within the TSF.
OE.INFO_PROTECT
Those responsible for the TOE
must establish and implement
procedures to ensure that
information is protected in an
appropriate manner. In
particular:
 All network and peripheral
cabling must be approved
for the transmittal of the
most sensitive data
transmitted over the link.
Such physical links are
assumed to be adequately
protected against threats to
the confidentiality and
integrity of the data
transmitted using
appropriate physical and
logical protection
techniques.
 DAC protections on
security-relevant files (such
as audit trails and
authorization databases)
shall always be set up
correctly.
 Users are authorized to
access parts of the data
managed by the TOE and
are trained to exercise
OE.INFO_PROTECT
supports the policy by ensuring
that users are authorized to
access parts of the data managed
by the TOE and are trained to
exercise control over their own
data and that DAC protections on
security-relevant files (such as
audit trails and authorization
databases) shall always be set up
correctly.
Security Target (EAL4+) - SQL Server 2017 Page 38/66
Assumption Environmental Objective
Addressing the Assumption
Rationale
control over their own data.
OE.IT_REMOTE
If the TOE relies on remote
trusted IT systems to support the
enforcement of its policy, those
systems provide that the
functions and any data used by
the TOE in making policy
decisions, required by the TOE
are sufficiently protected from any
attack that may cause those
functions to provide false results.
OE.IT_REMOTE
diminishes the threat by ensuring
that remote trusted IT systems
are sufficiently protected.
OE.IT_TRUSTED_SYSTEM
The remote trusted IT systems
implement the protocols and
mechanisms required by the
TSF to support the enforcement
of the security policy.
These remote trusted IT systems
are managed according to known,
accepted and trusted policies
based on the same rules and
policies applicable to the TOE,
and are physically and logically
protected equivalent to the TOE.
OE.IT_TRUSTED_SYSTEM
diminishes the threat by ensuring
that remote trusted IT systems
are managed according to known,
accepted and trusted policies
based on the same rules and
policies applicable to the TOE,
and are physically and logically
protected equivalent to the TOE.
OE.NO_GENERAL_PURPOSE
There will be no general-purpose
computing capabilities (e.g.,
compilers or user applications)
available on DMBS servers, other
than those services necessary for
the operation, administration, and
support of the DBMS
OE.NO_GENERAL_PURPOSE
diminishes this threat by reducing
the opportunities to subvert non
TOE related capabilities in the
TOE environment.
OE.PHYSICAL
Those responsible for the TOE
must ensure that those parts of
the TOE critical to enforcement of
the security policy are protected
from physical attack that might
compromise IT security
objectives. The protection must
OE.PHYSICAL
diminishes the threat of a TSF
compromise due to exploitation of
physical weaknesses or
vulnerabilities as a vector in an
attack.
Security Target (EAL4+) - SQL Server 2017 Page 39/66
Assumption Environmental Objective
Addressing the Assumption
Rationale
be commensurate with the value
of the IT assets protected by the
TOE.
T.UNAUTHORIZED_ACCESS
A user may gain unauthorized
access to user data for which
they are not authorized
according to the TOE security
policy.
OE.INFO_PROTECT
Those responsible for the TOE
must establish and implement
procedures to ensure that
information is protected in an
appropriate manner. In
particular:
 All network and peripheral
cabling must be approved
for the transmittal of the
most sensitive data
transmitted over the link.
Such physical links are
assumed to be adequately
protected against threats to
the confidentiality and
integrity of the data
transmitted using
appropriate physical and
logical protection
techniques.
 DAC protections on
security-relevant files (such
as audit trails and
authorization databases)
shall always be set up
correctly.
 Users are authorized to
access parts of the data
managed by the TOE and
are trained to exercise
control over their own data.
OE.INFO_PROTECT
diminishes the threat by
ensuring that the logical and
physical threats to network and
peripheral cabling are
appropriately protected.
DAC protections if implemented
correctly may support the
identification of unauthorized
accesses.
Security Target (EAL4+) - SQL Server 2017 Page 40/66
5 Extended Components Definitions
5.1 Definition for FTA_TAH_(EXT).1
This chapter defines the extended functional component FTA_TAH_(EXT).1 TOE access information.
The definition has been directly taken from [EP].
FTA_TAH_(EXT).1 TOE access information provides the requirement for a TOE to make available
information related to attempts to establish a session.
Component levelling
FTA_TAH_(EXT).1 is not hierarchical to any other components.
Management: FTA_TAH_(EXT).1
There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit: FTA_TAH_(EXT).1
There are no auditable events foreseen.
FTA_TAH_(EXT).1 TOE access information
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FTA_TAH_(EXT).1.1
Upon a session establishment attempt, the TSF shall store
a. the [date and time] of the session establishment attempt of the user.
b. the incremental count of successive unsuccessful session establishment attempt(s).
FTA_TAH_(EXT).1.2
Upon successful session establishment, the TSF shall allow the [date and time] of
a. the previous last successful session establishment, and
b. the last unsuccessful attempt to session establishment and the number of
unsuccessful attempts since the previous last successful session establishment
to be retrieved by the user.
Security Target (EAL4+) - SQL Server 2017 Page 41/66
5.2 Definition for FIA_USB_(EXT).2
This chapter defines the extended functional component FIA_USB_(EXT).2 Enhanced user-subject
binding. The definition has been directly taken from [PP].
FIA_USB_(EXT).2 is analogous to FIA_USB.1 except that it adds the possibility to specify rules
whereby subject security attributes are also derived from TSF data other than user security attributes.
Component leveling
FIA_USB_(EXT).2 is hierarchical to FIA_USB.1.
Management
See management description specified for FIA_USB.1 in [CC].
Audit
See audit requirement specified for FIA_USB.1 in [CC].
FIA_USB_(EXT).2 Enhanced user-subject binding
Hierarchical to: FIA_USB.1 User-subject binding
Dependencies: FIA_ATD.1 User attribute definition
FIA_USB_(EXT).2 .1
The TSF shall associate the following user security attributes with subjects acting on the
behalf of that user: [assignment: list of user security attributes].
FIA_USB_(EXT).2 .2
The TSF shall enforce the following rules on the initial association of user security attributes
with subjects acting on the behalf of users: [assignment: rules for the initial association of
attributes].
FIA_USB_(EXT).2 .3
The TSF shall enforce the following rules governing changes to the user security attributes
associated with subjects acting on the behalf of users: [assignment: rules for the changing of
attributes].
FIA_USB_(EXT).2 .4
The TSF shall enforce the following rules for the assignment of subject security
attributes not derived from user security attributes when a subject is created:
[assignment: rules for the initial association of the subject security attributes not
derived from user security attributes].
Security Target (EAL4+) - SQL Server 2017 Page 42/66
6 IT Security Requirements
This chapter defines the IT security requirements that shall be satisfied by the TOE or its environment:
Common Criteria divides TOE security requirements into two categories:
 Security functional requirements (SFRs) (such as, identification and authentication, security
management, and user data protection) that the TOE and the supporting evidence need to
satisfy to meet the security objectives of the TOE.
 Security assurance requirements (SARs) that provide grounds for confidence that the TOE
and its supporting IT environment meet its security objectives (e.g., configuration
management, testing, and vulnerability assessment).
These requirements are discussed separately within the following subchapters.
6.1 TOE Security Functional Requirements
The TOE satisfies the SFRs delineated in the following table. The rest of this chapter contains a
description of each component and any related dependencies.
Table 10 – TOE Security Functional Requirements
Class FAU: Security Audit
FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation
FAU_GEN.2 User identity association
FAU_SEL.1 Selective audit
Class FDP: User Data Protection
FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control
FDP_RIP.1 Subset residual information protection
Class FIA: Identification and Authentication
FIA_ATD.1 User attribute definition
FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication
FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
FIA_USB_(EXT).2 Enhanced user subject binding
Class FMT: Security Management
FMT_MOF.1 Management of security functions behaviour
FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialization
FMT_MTD.1 Management of TSF data
FMT_REV.1(1) Revocation (user attributes)
FMT_REV.1(2) Revocation (subject, object attributes)
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
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FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
Class FPT: Protection of the TSF
FPT_TRC.1 Internal TSF consistency
Class FTA: TOE Access
FTA_MCS.1 Basic limitation on multiple concurrent sessions
FTA_TAH_(EXT).1 TOE access information
FTA_TSE.1 TOE session establishment
6.1.1 Class FAU: Security Audit
Audit data generation (FAU_GEN.1)
FAU_GEN.1.1 The TSF shall be able to generate an audit record of the following auditable
events:
a) Start-up and shutdown of the audit functions;
b) All auditable events for the minimum level of audit listed in Table 11;
and
c) [Start-up and shutdown of the DBMS;
d) Use of special permissions (e.g., those often used by authorized
administrators to circumvent access control policies); and
e) no additional events].
FAU_GEN.1.2 The TSF shall record within each audit record at least the following
information:
a) Date and time of the event, type of event, subject identity (if applicable),
and the outcome (success or failure) of the event; and
b) For each audit event type, based on the auditable event definitions of
the functional components included in the PP/ST, [information specified in
column three of Table 11, below].
Table 11 – Auditable Events
Security Functional
Requirement
Auditable Event(s) Additional Audit Record
Contents
FAU_GEN.1 None None
FAU_GEN.2 None None
FAU_SEL.1 All modifications to the audit
configuration that occur while the
audit collection functions are
operating.
The identity of the authorized
administrator that made the
change to the audit configuration
FDP_ACC.1 None None
FDP_ACF.1 Successful requests to perform
an operation on an object
covered by the SFP.
The identity of the subject
performing the operation
FDP_RIP.1 None None
FIA_ATD.1 None None
Security Target (EAL4+) - SQL Server 2017 Page 44/66
Security Functional
Requirement
Auditable Event(s) Additional Audit Record
Contents
FIA_UAU.1 Unsuccessful use of the
authentication mechanism
None
FIA_UID.1 Unsuccessful use of the user
identification mechanism,
including the user identity
provided
None
FIA_USB_(EXT).2 Unsuccessful binding of user
security attributes to a subject
(e.g. creation of a subject)
None
FMT_MOF.1 None None
FMT_MSA.1 None None
FMT_MSA.3 None None
FMT_MTD.1 None None
FMT_REV.1(1) Unsuccessful revocation of
security attributes.
Identity of individual attempting to
revoke security attributes
FMT_REV.1(2) Unsuccessful revocation of
security attributes.
Identity of individual attempting to
revoke security attributes
FMT_SMF.1 Use of the management
functions.
Identity of the administrator
performing these functions
FMT_SMR.1 Modifications to the group of
users that are part of a role.
Identity of authorized administrator
modifying the role definition
FTA_MCS.1 Rejection of a new session based
on the limitation of multiple
concurrent sessions
None
FTA_TAH_(EXT).1 None None
FTA_TSE.1 Denial of a session establishment
due to the session establishment
mechanism
Identity of the individual attempting
to establish a session
User identity association (FAU_GEN.2)
FAU_GEN.2.1 For audit events resulting from actions of identified users and any
identified groups, the TSF shall be able to associate each auditable event
with the identity of the user that caused the event.
Selective audit (FAU_SEL.1)
FAU_SEL.1.1 The TSF shall be able to select the set of events to be audited from the set of
all auditable events based on the following attributes:
a) object identity;
b) user identity;
c) no other identities;
Security Target (EAL4+) - SQL Server 2017 Page 45/66
d) event type;
e) [success of auditable security events;
f) failure of auditable security events; and
g) [no additional criteria].]
Application Note:
([PP, 7.1.1.3])
The intent of this requirement is to capture enough audit data to allow the
administrators to perform their task, not necessarily to capture only the
needed audit data. In other words, the DBMS does not necessarily need to
include or exclude auditable events based on all attributes at any given time.
6.1.2 Class FDP: User Data Protection
Subset access control (FDP_ACC.1)
FDP_ACC.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the [Discretionary Access Control policy] to objects
on [all subjects, all DBMS-controlled objects, and all operations among
them].
Security attribute based access control (FDP_ACF.1)
FDP_ACF.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the [Discretionary Access Control policy] to objects
based on the following:
 [authorized users: user identity and/or group membership associated
with the user4,
 DBMS-controlled objects: object identity, access control rules for the
object, ownership of object and parent object].
FDP_ACF.1.2 The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation
among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed:[
 The Discretionary Access Control policy mechanism shall, either by
explicit authorized user action or by default, provide that database
management system controlled objects are protected from unauthorized
access according to the following ordered rules:
a) If the requested mode of access is denied to that authorized user deny
access
b) If the requested mode of access is denied to any group of which the
authorized user is a member, deny access
c) If the requested mode of access is permitted to that authorized user,
permit access.
d) If the requested mode of access is permitted to any group of which the
authorized user is a member, grant access
e) Else deny access].
FDP_ACF.1.3 The TSF shall explicitly authorize access of subjects to objects based on
the following additional rules: [
 Authorized administrators, the owner of an object and owners of parent
4
The Discretionary Access Control policy is not enforced on system internal tasks that are not associated with an
identified user.
Security Target (EAL4+) - SQL Server 2017 Page 46/66
objects have access
 in case of Ownership-Chaining access is always granted].
FDP_ACF.1.4 The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the
following rules: [no additional explicit denial rules].
Subset residual information protection (FDP_RIP.1)
FDP_RIP.1.1 The TSF shall ensure that any previous information content of a resource is
made unavailable upon the allocation of the resource to the following objects
[objects that are related to or may be exposed through user sessions].
6.1.3 Class FIA: Identification and authentication
User attribute definition (FIA_ATD.1)
FIA_ATD.1.1 The TSF shall maintain the following list of security attributes belonging to
individual users:
 [Database user identifier and any associated group memberships;
 Security-relevant database roles; and
 [login-type (SQL-Server login or Windows Account Name)]].
Timing of authentication (FIA_UAU.1)
FIA_UAU.1.1 The TSF shall allow [no TSF mediated actions] on behalf of the user to be
performed before the user is authenticated.
FIA_UAU.1.2 The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before
allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
Application Note: The TSF shall provide
 SQL Server Authentication and
 Access to Windows Authentication
to support user authentication.
The TSF shall authenticate any user’s claimed identity according to the
following rules:
 If the login is associated with a Windows user or a Windows group
Windows Authentication is used,
 If the login is a SQL Server login the SQL Server authentication is used.
Timing of identification (FIA_UID.1)
FIA_UID.1.1 The TSF shall allow [no TSF-mediated actions] on behalf of the user to be
performed before the user is identified.
FIA_UID.1.2 The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before
allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
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Enhanced user-subject binding (FIA_USB_(EXT).2)
FIA_USB_(EXT).2.1
The TSF shall associate the following user security attributes with subjects
acting on the behalf of that user: [the list of the security attributes as
defined in FIA_ATD.1.1].
FIA_USB_(EXT).2.2
The TSF shall enforce the following rules on the initial association of user
security attributes with subjects acting on the behalf of users: [none].
FIA_USB_(EXT).2.3
The TSF shall enforce the following rules governing changes to the user
security attributes associated with subjects acting on the behalf of users:
[none].
FIA_USB_(EXT).2.4
The TSF shall enforce the following rules for the assignment of subject
security attributes not derived from user security attributes when a subject
is created: [none].
6.1.4 Class FMT: Security Management
Management of security functions behaviour (FMT_MOF.1)
FMT_MOF.1.1 The TSF shall restrict the ability to disable and enable the functions [relating
to the specification of events to be audited] to [authorized administrators].
Management of security attributes (FMT_MSA.1)
FMT_MSA.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the [Discretionary Access Control policy] to restrict
the ability to manage [all] the security attributes to [authorized
administrators].
Application Note: This restriction includes the management of the security attributes defined
in FIA_ATD.1.
Static attribute initialization (FMT_MSA.3)
FMT_MSA.3.1 The TSF shall enforce the [Discretionary Access Control policy] to provide
restrictive default values for security attributes that are used to enforce the
SFP.
FMT_MSA.3.2 The TSF shall allow the [no user] to specify alternative initial values to
override the default values when an object or information is created.
Management of TSF data (FMT_MTD.1)
FMT_MTD.1.1 The TSF shall restrict the ability to include or exclude the [auditable events]
to [authorized administrators].
Revocation (FMT_REV.1(1))
FMT_REV.1.1(1) The TSF shall restrict the ability to revoke [the list of the security attributes
as defined in FIA_ATD.1.1] associated with the users under the control of
the TSF to [the authorized administrator].
FMT_REV.1.2(1) The TSF shall enforce the rules [Changes to logins are applied at the latest
as soon as a new session for the login is established].
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Revocation (FMT_REV.1(2))
FMT_REV.1.1(2) The TSF shall restrict the ability to revoke [the list of security attributes as
defined in FDP_ACF.1.1] associated with the objects under the control of
the TSF to [the authorized administrator] and database users with
sufficient privileges as allowed by the Discretionary Access Control
policy.
FMT_REV.1.2(2) The TSF shall enforce the rules [The changes have to be applied
immediately].
Specification of Management Functions (FMT_SMF.1)
FMT_SMF.1.1 The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management
functions: [
 Add and delete logins
 Add and delete users
 Change role membership for DB scoped roles and Server scoped roles
 Create and destroy database scoped groups
 Create, Start and Stop Audit
 Include and Exclude Auditable events
 Define the mode of authentication
 Manage Attributes for Session Establishment
 Define the action to take in case the audit file is full]
Security roles (FMT_SMR.1)
FMT_SMR.1.1 The TSF shall maintain the roles [authorized administrator and [roles as
defined in the following tables; roles to be defined by authorized
administrators]].
FMT_SMR.1.2 The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.
Table 12 – Default Server Roles
Role Description
sysadmin Members of the sysadmin fixed server role can perform any activity in the
server. By default, all members of the Windows BUILTIN\Administrators
group, the local administrator’s group, are members of the sysadmin fixed
server role.
serveradmin Members of the serveradmin fixed server role can change server-wide
configuration options and shut down the server.
securityadmin Members of the securityadmin fixed server role manage logins and their
properties. They can GRANT, DENY, and REVOKE server-level permissions.
They can also GRANT, DENY, and REVOKE database-level permissions.
Additionally, they can reset passwords for SQL Server logins.
processadmin Members of the processadmin fixed server role can end processes that are
running in an instance of SQL Server.
setupadmin Members of the setupadmin fixed server role can add and remove linked
servers.
bulkadmin Members of the bulkadmin fixed server role can run the BULK INSERT
Security Target (EAL4+) - SQL Server 2017 Page 49/66
statement.
diskadmin The diskadmin fixed server role is used for managing disk files.
dbcreator Members of the dbcreator fixed server role can create, restore and drop any
database, and can alter their own databases.
Table 13 – Default Database Roles
Role Granted Permission(s)
db_owner Members of the db_owner fixed database role can perform all configuration
and maintenance activities on the database, and can also drop the
database.
db_securityadmin Members of the db_securityadmin fixed database role can modify role
membership and manage permissions. Adding principals to this role could
enable unintended privilege escalation.
db_accessadmin Members of the db_accessadmin fixed database role can add or remove
access to the database for Windows logins, Windows groups, and SQL
Server logins.
db_backupoperator Members of the db_backupoperator fixed database role can back up the
database.
db_ddladmin Members of the db_ddladmin fixed database role can run any Data
Definition Language (DDL) command in a database.
db_datawriter Members of the db_datawriter fixed database role can add, delete, or
change data in all user tables.
db_datareader Members of the db_datareader fixed database role can read all data from all
user tables.
db_denydatawriter Members of the db_denydatawriter fixed database role cannot add, modify,
or delete any data in the user tables within a database.
db_denydatareader Members of the db_denydatareader fixed database role cannot read any
data in the user tables within a database.
6.1.5 Class FPT: Protection of the TOE Security Functions
Internal TSF consistency (FPT_TRC.1)
FPT_TRC.1.1 The TSF shall ensure that TSF data is consistent when replicated between
parts of the TOE.
FPT_TRC.1.2 When parts of the TOE containing replicated TSF data are disconnected, the
TSF shall ensure the consistency of the replicated TSF data upon
reconnection before processing any requests for [no function, since the TOE
does not contain physically separated parts].
6.1.6 Class FTA: TOE Access
Basic limitation on multiple concurrent sessions (FTA_MCS.1)
FTA_MCS.1.1 The TSF shall restrict the maximum number of concurrent sessions that
belong to the same user.
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FTA_MCS.1.2 The TSF shall enforce, by default, a limit of [5] sessions per user.
TOE access information (FTA_TAH_(EXT).1)
FTA_TAH_(EXT).1.1 Upon a session establishment, the TSF shall store
a. the [date and time] of the session establishment attempt of the user.
b. the incremental count of successive unsuccessful session establishment
attempt(s).
FTA_TAH_(EXT).1.2 Upon successful session establishment, the TSF shall allow the [date and time] of
a. the previous last successful session establishment, and
b. the last unsuccessful attempt to session establishment and the number of
unsuccessful attempts since the previous last successful session
establishment
to be retrieved by the user.
TOE session establishment (FTA_TSE.1)
FTA_TSE.1.1 The TSF shall be able to deny session establishment based on [attributes
that can be set explicitly by authorized administrator(s), including user
identity, and time of day, day of the week]
6.2 TOE Security Assurance Requirements
The assurance requirements for the TOE comprise all assurance requirements for EAL 4 as defined in
[CC] augmented by ALC_FLR.2.
6.3 Security Requirements rationale
6.3.1 Security Functional Requirements rationale
The following table contains the rationale for the TOE Security Requirements. This rationale has been
directly taken from [PP] with the exception of O.ACCESS_HISTORY which has been taken from [EP].
Table 14 - Rationale for TOE Security Requirements
Objective Requirements Addressing
the Objective
Rationale
O.ACCESS_HISTORY
The TOE will store
information related to
previous attempts to
establish a session and
make that information
available to the user.
FTA_TAH_(EXT).1 The TOE must be able to store and
retrieve information about previous
unauthorized login attempts and the
number of times the login was
attempted every time the user logs into
their account. The TOE must also
store the last successful authorized
login. This information will include the
date, time, method, and location of the
attempts. When appropriately
displayed, this will allow the user to
Security Target (EAL4+) - SQL Server 2017 Page 51/66
Objective Requirements Addressing
the Objective
Rationale
detect if another user is attempting to
access their account. These records
should not be deleted until after the
user has been notified of their access
history. (FTA_TAH_(EXT).1)
O.ADMIN_ROLE
The TOE will provide a
mechanism (e.g. a
"role") by which the
actions using
administrative privileges
may be restricted.
FMT_SMR.1 The TOE will establish, at least, an
authorized administrator role. The ST
writer may choose to specify more
roles. The authorized administrator
will be given privileges to perform
certain tasks that other users will not
be able to perform. These privileges
include, but are not limited to, access
to audit information and security
functions. (FMT_SMR.1)
O.AUDIT_GENERATI
ON
The TOE will provide the
capability to detect and
create records of
security relevant events
associated with users.
FAU_GEN.1
FAU_GEN.2
FAU_SEL.1
FAU_GEN.1 defines the set of events
that the TOE must be capable of
recording. This requirement ensures
that the administrator has the ability
to audit any security relevant events
that takes place in the TOE. This
requirement also defines the
information that must be contained in
the audit record for each auditable
event. This requirement also places
a requirement on the level of detail
that is recorded on any additional
security functional requirements a ST
author adds to this PP.5
FAU_GEN.2 ensures that the audit
records associate a user and any
associated group identity with the
auditable event. In the case of
authorized users, the association is
accomplished with the user ID. In the
case of authorized groups, the
association is accomplished with the
group ID.
FAU_SEL.1 allows the administrator to
configure which auditable events will
be recorded in the audit trail. This
provides the administrator with the
flexibility in recording only those events
that are deemed necessary by site
policy, thus reducing the amount of
resources consumed by the audit
5
No additional security functional requirements were added by the ST author.
Security Target (EAL4+) - SQL Server 2017 Page 52/66
Objective Requirements Addressing
the Objective
Rationale
mechanism.
O.DISCRETIONARY_
ACCESS
The TSF must control
access of subjects
and/or users to named
resources based on
identity of the object,
subject or user. The
TSF must allow
authorized users to
specify for each access
mode which
users/subjects are
allowed to access a
specific named object in
that access mode.
FDP_ACC.1
FDP_ACF.1
The TSF must control access to
resources based on the identity of
users that are allowed to specify
which resources they want to access
for storing their data.
The access control policy must have a
defined scope of control [FDP_ACC.1].
The rules for the access control policy
are defined [FDP_ACF.1].
O.I&A
The TOE ensures that
users are authenticated
before the TOE
processes any actions
that require
authentication.
FIA_ATD.1
FIA_UAU.1
FIA_UID.1
FIA_USB_(EXT).2
The TSF must ensure that only
authorized users gain access to the
TOE and its resources. Users
authorized to access the TOE must
use an identification and
authentication process [FIA_UID.1,
FIA_UAU.1].
To ensure that the security attributes
used to determine access are defined
and available to the support
authentication decisions. [FIA_ATD.1].
Proper authorization for subjects acting
on behalf of users is also ensured
[FIA_USB_(EXT).2 ]. The appropriate
strength of the authentication
mechanism is ensured.
O.MANAGE
The TSF must provide
all the functions and
facilities necessary to
support the authorized
users that are
responsible for the
management of TOE
security mechanisms,
must allow restricting
such management
FMT_MOF.1
FMT_MSA.1
FMT_MSA.3
FMT_MTD.1
FMT_REV.1(1)
FMT_REV.1(2)
FMT_SMF.1
FMT_MOF.1 requires that the ability
to use particular TOE capabilities be
restricted to the administrator.
FMT_MSA.1 requires that the ability
to perform operations on security
attributes be restricted to particular
roles.
FMT_MSA.3 requires that default
values used for security attributes are
restrictive.
Security Target (EAL4+) - SQL Server 2017 Page 53/66
Objective Requirements Addressing
the Objective
Rationale
actions to dedicated
users, and must ensure
that only such
authorized users are
able to access
management
functionality.
FMT_SMR.1 FMT_MTD.1 requires that the ability
to manipulate TOE content is
restricted to administrators.
FMT_REV.1 restricts the ability to
revoke attributes to the administrator.
FMT_SMF.1 identifies the
management functions that are
available to the authorized
administrator.
FMT_SMR.1 defines the specific
security roles to be supported.
O.MEDIATE
The TOE must protect
user data in accordance
with its security policy,
and must mediate all
requests to access such
data.
FDP_ACC.1
FDP_ACF.1
FPT_TRC.1
The FDP requirements were chosen
to define the policies, the subjects,
objects, and operations for how and
when mediation takes place in the
TOE.
FDP_ACC.1 defines the Access
Control policy that will be enforced on
a list of subjects acting on the behalf
of users attempting to gain access to
a list of named objects. All the
operations between subject and
object covered are defined by the
TOE'spolicy.
FDP_ACF.1 defines the security
attribute used to provide access
control to objects based on the TOE's
access control policy.
FPT_TRC.1 ensures replicated TSF
data that specifies attributes for access
control must be consistent across
distributed components of the TOE.
The requirement is to maintain
consistency of replicated TSF data.
O.RESIDUAL_INFOR
MATION
The TOE will ensure
that any information
contained in a protected
resource within its
Scope of Control is not
inappropriately
disclosed when the
resource is reallocated.
FDP_RIP.1 FDP_RIP.1 is used to ensure the
contents of resources are not available
to subjects other than those explicitly
granted access to the data.
Security Target (EAL4+) - SQL Server 2017 Page 54/66
Objective Requirements Addressing
the Objective
Rationale
O.TOE_ACCESS
The TOE will provide
mechanisms that control
a user's logical access
to the TOE.
FDP_ACC.1
FDP_ACF.1
FIA_ATD.1
FTA_MCS.1
FTA_TSE.1
FDP_ACC.1 requires that each
identified access control SFP be in
place for a subset of the possible
operations on a subset of the objects
in the TOE.
FDP_ACF.1 allows the TSF to
enforce access based upon security
attributes and named groups of
attributes. Furthermore, the TSF may
have the ability to explicitly authorize
or deny access to an object based
upon security attributes.
FIA_ATD.1 defines the security
attributes for individual users
including the user's identifier and any
associated group memberships.
Security relevant roles and other
identity security attributes.
FTA_MCS.1 ensures that users may
only have a maximum of a specified
number of active sessions open at
any given time.
FTA_TSE.1 allows the TOE to restrict
access to the TOE based on certain
criteria.
6.3.2 Rationale for satisfying all Dependencies
The following table contains the rationale for satisfying all dependencies of the Security Requirements.
This rationale has been taken from [PP] with the addition of the entry of FTA_TAH_(EXT)1 from [EP].
Table 15 - Rationale for satisfying all dependencies
Requirement Dependency Satisfied
FAU_GEN.1 FPT_STM.1
This requirement is satisfied by the
assumption on the IT environment,
given in A.SUPPORT.
FAU_GEN.2
FAU_GEN.1
FIA_UID.1
satisfied by FAU_GEN.1
satisfied by FIA_UID.1
FAU_SEL.1
FAU_GEN.1
FMT_MTD.1
satisfied by FAU_GEN.1
satisfied by FMT_MTD.1
FDP_ACC.1 FDP_ACF.1 satisfied by FDP_ACF.1
FDP_ACF.1
FDP_ACC.1 satisfied by FDP_ACC.1
Security Target (EAL4+) - SQL Server 2017 Page 55/66
Requirement Dependency Satisfied
FMT_MSA.3 satisfied by FMT_MSA.3.
FDP_RIP.1 None N/A
FIA_ATD.1 None N/A
FIA_UAU.1 FIA_UID.1 satisfied by FIA_UID.1
FIA_UID.1 None N/A
FIA_USB_(EXT).2 FIA_ATD.1 satisfied by FIA_ATD.1
FMT_MOF.1
FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.1
satisfied by FMT_SMF.1
satisfied by FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MSA.1
[FDP_ACC.1 or
FDP_IFC.1]
FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.1
satisfied by FDP_ACC.1.
satisfied by FMT_SMF.1
satisfied by FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MSA.3
FMT_MSA.1
FMT_SMR.1
satisfied by FMT_MSA.1
satisfied by FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MTD.1
FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.1
satisfied by FMT_SMF.1
satisfied by FMT_SMR.1
FMT_REV.1(1) FMT_SMR.1 satisfied by FMT_SMR.1
FMT_REV.1(2) FMT_SMR.1 satisfied by FMT_SMR.1
FMT_SMF.1 None N/A
FMT_SMR.1 FIA_UID.1 satisfied by FIA_UID.1
FPT_TRC.1 FPT_ITT.1
FPT_ITT.1 is not applicable
For a distributed TOE the
dependency is satisfied through the
assumption on the environment,
A.CONNECT , that assures the
confidentiality and integrity of the
transmitted data6
FTA_MCS.1 FIA_UID.1
satisfied by FIA_UID.1
6
The TOE does not contain physically separated parts.
Security Target (EAL4+) - SQL Server 2017 Page 56/66
Requirement Dependency Satisfied
FTA_TAH_(EXT).1 None
N/A
FTA_TSE.1 None N/A
6.3.3 Rationale for extended requirements
Table 16 presents the rationale for the inclusion of the extended functional requirements as already
given in [PP] and [EP] respectively.
Table 16 - Rationale for Explicit Requirements
Explicit Requirement Identifier Rationale
FTA_TAH_(EXT).1 TOE Access History
This PP does not require the TOE to
contain a client. Therefore, the PP
cannot require the client to display a
message. This requirement has been
modified to require the TOE to store
and retrieve the access history instead
of displaying it.
FIA_USB_(EXT).2
Enhanced user-
subject binding
A DBMS may derive subject security
attributes from other TSF data that are
not directly user security attributes. An
example is the point-of-entry the user
has used to establish the connection.
An access control policy may also use
this subject security attribute within its
access control policy, allowing access
to critical objects only when the user
has connected through specific ports-
of-entry.
6.3.4 Rationale for Assurance Requirements
To be resistant against attacks that are performed by attackers with an attack potential of enhanced
basic and to gain a higher level of assurance in the correct implementation, EAL4 has been chosen.
The additional use of ALC_FLR.2 is necessary in order to stay compliant to [PP].
Security Target (EAL4+) - SQL Server 2017 Page 57/66
7 TOE Summary Specification
This chapter presents an overview of the security functionality implemented by the TOE. Please note
that the TOE does not contain physically separated parts, hence, the SFR FPT_TRC.1 is trivially met
as intended by the application note in [PP, 7.1.5.1].
7.1 Security Management (SF.SM)
This security functionality of the TOE allows modifying the TSF data of the TOE and therewith
managing the behavior of the TSF.
This comprises the following management functions (FMT_SMF.1):
 Add and delete logins on an instance level,
 Add and delete users on a database level,
 Change role membership for DB scoped roles and Server scoped roles,
 Create and destroy database roles,
 Create, Start and Stop Security Audit,
 Include and exclude Auditable events,
 Define the mode of authentication for every login,
 Manage attributes for Session Establishment,
 Define the action to take in case the audit file is full.
All these management functions are available via T-SQL statements directly or realized by Stored
Procedures within the TOE which can be called using T-SQL.
The TOE maintains a set of roles on the server level and on the database level as listed in Table 12
and Table 13. The TOE maintains a security ID for each login on a server level and each database
user. This security ID is used to associate each user with his assigned roles (FIA_ATD.1,
FIA_USB_(EXT).2, FMT_SMR.1).
Changes to logins that are preformed via the management functions are applied at the latest as soon
as a new session for the login is established (FMT_REV.1(1)).
7.2 Access Control (SF.AC)
The TOE provides a Discretionary Access Control (DAC) mechanism to control the access of users to
objects based on the identity of the user requesting access, the membership of this user to roles, the
requested operation and the ID of the requested object.
The TOE maintains two kinds of user representations:
1. On an instance level an end user is represented by a login. On this level the TOE controls the
access of logins to objects pertaining to the instance (e.g. to view a database).
2. On a database level an end user is represented by a database user. On this level the TOE
controls the access of database users to objects of the database (e.g. to read or create a
table).
Further the TOE is able to manage a user account completely within a database. In this case the user
account in the database is associated with a login that is also contained in this database. The
authentication then happens against this database.
Security Target (EAL4+) - SQL Server 2017 Page 58/66
Members of the database roles “db_owner” or “db_accessadmin” are able to add users to a database.
The TOE maintains an internal security identifier (SID) for every user and role. Each database user
can be associated with at most one instance “login”.
Every object controlled by the TOE has an ID, an owner and a name.
Objects in the TOE form a hierarchy and belong to one of three different levels: server, database and
schema.
The TOE maintains an Access Control List (ACL) for each object within its scope. These ACLs are
stored in a system table which exists in every database for database related ACLs and in a system
table in the ‘master’ database for instance level ACLs.
Each entry of an ACL contains a user SID and defines whether a permission is an “Allow” or a “Deny”
permission for that SID.
When a new object is created, the creating user is assigned as the owner of the object and has
complete control over the object. The initial ACL for a newly created object is always empty by default
and cannot be overridden by any role (FMT_MSA.3).
After creation, grant, deny or revoke permissions on objects can be assigned to users. Changes to the
security relevant attributes of objects are immediately applied (FMT_REV.1(2)).
When a user attempts to perform an action to an object under the control of the TOE, the TOE decides
whether the action is to be permitted based on the following rules:
1. If the requested mode of access is denied to that authorized user, the TOE will deny access
2. If the requested mode of access is denied to any role of which the authorized user is a
member, the TOE will deny access
3. If the requested mode of access is permitted to that authorized user, the TOE will permit
access
4. If the requested mode of access is permitted to any role of which the authorized user is a
member, the TOE will permit access
5. Else: The TOE will deny access
The TOE permission check for an action on an object includes the permissions of its parent objects.
The permissions for the object itself and all its parent objects are accumulated together before the
aforementioned rules are evaluated. Note: Some actions require more than one permission.
This means that if a user or a role has been granted a permission to an object this permission is also
valid for all child objects. E.g. if a user has been granted a permission to a schema, he automatically
has the same permission on all tables within that schema, if the permission has not explicitly been
denied. Similarly, if a user has been denied a permission on a schema, he will be denied the same
permission to all tables within that schema, regardless of explicit grant permissions.
The rules as described before are always applied when a user requests access to a certain object
using a certain operation. There are only two situations where these access control rules are
overridden:
1. The system administrator, the owner of an object and owners of parent objects always have
access, so for these users the TOE will always allow access to the object
2. In the case of “Ownership Chaining” which is described in chapter 8.1 in more detail the
access is allowed
(FDP_ACC.1 and FDP_ACF.1)
As the access to management functions of the TOE is controlled by the same functionality as the
access to user data this security functionality additionally ensures that the management functions are
Security Target (EAL4+) - SQL Server 2017 Page 59/66
only available for authorized administrators (FMT_MOF.1, FMT_MSA.1, FMT_MTD.1,
FMT_REV.1(1)).
7.3 Identification and Authentication (SF.I&A)
This security functionality requires each user to be successfully authenticated before allowing any
other actions on behalf of that user. This is done on an instance level and means that the user has to
be associated with a login of the TOE.
The TOE knows two types of logins: Windows accounts and SQL Server logins. The administrator has
to specify the type of login for every login he is creating.
The possibility for the TOE to perform its own authentication is necessary because not all users
connecting to the TOE are connecting from a Windows environment.
Microsoft Windows account names
These logins are associated with a user account of the Windows Operating System in the
environment.
For these logins the TOE requires that the Windows environment passes on the Windows
SID(s) of that user to authenticate the user before any other action on behalf of that user is
allowed.7
For these logins the Windows security identifier (SID) from the Windows account or group is
used for identification of that login within the TOE. Any permission is associated with that SID
(FIA_UAU.1, FIA_UID.1, FIA_ATD.1, FIA_USB_(EXT).2).
SQL Server login names
SQL Server logins are not associated with a user of Windows but are maintained by the TOE
itself. Logins exist on a server level (and users in databases can be associated with a login)
and on a database level itself (for contained databases). For every SQL Server login the TOE
maintains a login name and a password. The password is not stored in plain text, but hashed
using the SHA2-512 hash function provided by the Operating System in the environment.
Each SQL Server login name is stored in a system table. SQL Server generates a SID that is
used as a security identifier and stores it in this table.
This SID is internally used as a security identifier for the login.
If a user is connecting to the TOE using a SQL Server login he has to provide the username
and password. The TOE hashes the password using the hash function provided by the
Operating System in the environment, and compares the hash to the value stored for that
user. If the values are identical the TOE has successfully authenticated the user (FIA_UAU.1,
FIA_UID.1, FIA_ATD.1, FIA_USB_(EXT).2).
If the binding of a user security attribute to a subject fails at login (e.g., role membership), the login will
also fail, and the failure of the login will be audited (FIA_USB_(EXT).2, FAU_GEN.1).
7
Windows authentication of users may be based on a username and password or alternative mechanisms. After
successful authentication of a user Windows associates a list of SID(s) with every user which represent the user
and every group the user is a member of.
Security Target (EAL4+) - SQL Server 2017 Page 60/66
7.4 Security Audit (SF.AU)
The TOE produces audit logs for all security relevant actions. These audit logs are stored into files in
the environment of the TOE.
The Security Audit of the TOE especially comprises the following events:
 Startup and Shutdown of the TOE,
 Start and Shutdown of Security Audit Function,
 Every login attempt including the processes for authentication and session establishment,
 Every successful request to perform on operation on an object covered by the access control
function,
 Modifications to the role membership of users,
 The use of SF.SM,
 Every rejected attempt to establish a session.
The TOE maintains a set of events which can be additionally audited and provides the administrator
with the capability to start a Security Audit process to capture these events.
For each event in the Security Audit logs the following information is stored:
1. Date and Time of the event,
2. Identity of the user causing the event (if available),
3. Type of the event,
4. ID of the object,
5. Outcome (success or failure) of the event.
Furthermore each audit file contains an introduction with the list of events which are audited in the file
(FAU_GEN.1 and FAU_GEN.2).
The administrator has the possibility to specify, what should happen in case an audit file is full. The
following two scenarios are supported in the evaluated version:
1. Rollover
The administrator specifies a maximum size per audit file and a maximum number of files for
the Security Audit. If one audit file is full, the TOE starts the next file until the maximum
number of files has been reached. When the maximum number of files has been reached and
the last audit file is full, the TOE will start overwriting the oldest audit file.
2. Shutdown
The administrator specifies one audit file with a maximum size and the option to shut down the
TOE on any audit error. When the maximum size of the audit file has been reached the TOE
will stop operation.
The TOE provides the possibility to create a filter for the audit function. Using this filter mechanism the
administrator is able to exclude auditable events from being audited based on the following attributes:
 User identity,
 Event Type,
 Object identity,
 Success or failure of auditable security events.
However, to modify the behavior of the Security Audit function by including additional or excluding
events from being audited the administrator has to stop the Security Audit process, modify the Security
Audit function and start the Security Audit process again. The event types to be audited are defined by
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Audit Action Groups which allow including or excluding classes of audit events on a server-level,
database-level and audit-level (FAU_SEL.1).
7.5 Session Handling (SF.SE)
After a user attempting to establish a session has been successfully authenticated by SF.I&A this
security functionality decides whether this user is actually allowed to establish a session to the TOE.
The TOE uses two sets of additional criteria to decide whether a user is allowed to establish a session.
First the TOE enforces a limit of the number of concurrent sessions a user is allowed to have at one
time. This limit is set to 5 by default but can be modified by authorized administrators as described in
SF.SM. If a user reached the limit of concurrent sessions the TOE will deny establishing another
session for that user (FTA_MCS.1).
As a second criterion the admin is able to specify a set of rules to explicitly deny session
establishment based on:
 User’s identity,
 Time of the day, and
 Day of the week.
The TOE only establishes a session for a user if no explicit deny rule for that user has been specified
(FTA_TSE.1).
For every attempt to establish a session (whether successful or not) the TOE stores the date and time
of the event and the number of unsuccessful attempts since the last successful attempt. This
information is available at the client interface at any time. It is not erased but only overwritten with
updated values between sessions, i.e. the time of the last successful logon, the time of the last
unsuccessful logon and the number of unsuccessful logon attempts between the last successful logon
and the current successful logon are available until the user logs out (FTA_TAH._(EXT).1).
After the TOE established a session to a user the user context is held in a context with limited
permission. SF.SE maintains a separate context for the execution of each operation by a user. As
soon as a user performs an operation on an object the TOE starts at least one thread to perform this
operation.
When the TOE reuses memory which could contain previous information content and which is related
to the context of a user’s session (i.e. to which a user could gain access), this previous information will
not be available for any user. To ensure this, the TOE either directly overwrites any memory that will
be used for users sessions completely with new information or with a certain pattern. Before the
previous information has been overwritten the resource is not available for any usage. For memory
which is allocated using the Operating System the TOE uses a function of the OS, which ensures that
only empty memory is provided to the TOE. Whenever data is written to or loaded from disc this is
done page wise where a page has the size of 8 KB (FDP_RIP.1).
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8 Appendix
8.1 Concept of Ownership Chains
Database Objects within the TOE are not always only passive objects. Some objects refer to other
objects. This is especially true for Stored Procedures and Views. When multiple database objects
access each other sequentially, the sequence is known as a chain. Although such chains do not
independently exist, when the TOE traverses the links in a chain, the TOE evaluates access
permissions on the constituent objects differently than it would if it were accessing the objects
separately. These differences have important implications for managing security.
Ownership chaining enables managing access to multiple objects, such as multiple tables, by setting
permissions on one object, such as a view. Ownership chaining also offers a slight performance
advantage in scenarios that allow for skipping permission checks.
8.1.1 How Permissions Are Checked in a Chain
When an object is accessed through a chain, the TOE first compares the owner of the object to the
owner of the calling object. This is the previous link in the chain. If both objects have the same owner,
permissions on the referenced object are not evaluated. In the context of the Discretionary Access
Control Mechanism this is not a circumvention of access control as the owner of an object always has
complete control over his objects. So if one user is the owner of both objects, the calling object and the
called object, the owner also would have direct access to both objects.
8.1.2 Example of Ownership Chaining
In the following illustration, the July2003 view is owned by Mary. She has granted to Alex permissions
on the view. He has no other permissions on database objects in this instance. What happens when
Alex selects the view?
Alex executes SELECT * on the July2003 view. The TOE checks permissions on the view and
confirms that Alex has permission to select on it.
The July 2003 view requires information from the SalesXZ view. The TOE checks the ownership of the
SalesXZ view. Because this view has the same owner (Mary) as the view that calls it, permissions on
SalesXZ are not checked. The required information is returned.
The SalesXZ view requires information from the InvoicesXZ view. The TOE checks the ownership of
the InvoicesXZ view. Because this view has the same owner as the previous object, permissions on
InvoicesXZ are not checked. The required information is returned. To this point, all items in the
sequence have had one owner (Mary). This is known as an unbroken ownership chain.
The InvoicesXZ view requires information from the AcctAgeXZ view. The TOE checks the ownership
of the AcctAgeXZ view. Because the owner of this view is different from the owner of the previous
object (Sam, not Mary), full information about permissions on this view is retrieved. If the AcctAgeXZ
view has permissions that allow access by Alex, information will be returned.
The AcctAgeXZ view requires information from the ExpenseXZ table. The TOE checks the ownership
of the ExpenseXZ table. Because the owner of this table is different from the owner of the previous
object (Joe, not Sam), full information about permissions on this table is retrieved. If the ExpenseXZ
table has permissions that allow access by Alex, information is returned.
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Figure 2 - Concept of Ownership Chaining
When the July2003 view tries to retrieve information from the ProjectionsXZ table, the TOE first
checks to see whether cross-database chaining is enabled between Database 1 and Database 2. If
cross-database chaining is enabled, the TOE will check the ownership of the ProjectionsXZ table.
Because this table has the same owner as the calling view (Mary), permissions on this table are not
checked. The requested information is returned.
8.2 References
The following documentation was used to prepare this ST:
[AGD] SQL Server 2017 Technical Documentation
[AGD_ADD] SQL Server 2017 Database Engine Common Criteria Evaluation – Guidance
Addendum (delivered via https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/sql-server/data-security
(click on “View our Common Criteria certification”))
[CC] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation
Part 1: Introduction and general model, dated April 2017, version 3.1 R5
Part 2: Security functional requirements, dated April 2017, version 3.1, R5
Part 3: Security assurance requirements, dated April 2017, version 3.1, R5
[PP] DBMS Working Group Technical Community Protection Profile for Database
Management Systems (DBMS PP) Base Package, Version 2.12, March 23rd, 2017
([PP])
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[EP] DBMS Working Group Technical Community DBMS Protection Profile Extended
Package - Access History (DBMS PP_EP_AH), Version 1.02, March 23rd, 2017
([EP])
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8.3 Glossary and Abbreviations
8.3.1 Glossary
The following terms are used in this Security Target:
Term Definition
Attacker The term attacker refers to any individual (or technical entity) that is attempting to
subvert the security functionality of the TOE. In this Security Target it is assumed
that the attacker has an attack potential of “enhanced basic”.
Authorized
Administrators
This term refers to a group of users which comprise the “sysadmin” (sa) and any
user who is allowed to perform a management operation because the permission
has been granted to him within the DAC either by assigning him to a role with
administrator permissions or by granting him the possibility to perform an
administrative operation explicitly.
DAC Discretionary Access Control is a mechanism to limit the access of users to
objects based on the ID of the user, the ID of the object and a set of access
control rules.
DBMS A DBMS is a computerized repository that stores information and allows
authorized users to retrieve and update that information.
Named Pipe Method for inter process communication.
Object An object within the TOE contains data and can be accessed by subjects.
However in the TOE an object is not necessarily only a passive entity as some
objects refer to other objects.
OC Ownership Chaining.
SQL The Structured Query Language is a language which can be used to create,
modify and retrieve data from a DBMS.
SQL Server SQL Server is a product of Microsoft to which the TOE belongs.
TDS Tabular Data Stream is a data format which is used for communication with the
TOE.
T-SQL Extension of the SQL language in order to support control flow, variables, user
authentication and various other functions.
User The term user refers to technical entities (e.g. applications, other instances of the
TOE) or human users (using a SQL-client) that are using the services of the TOE.
8.3.2 Abbreviations
The following abbreviations are used in this Security Target:
Abbreviation Definition
ACL Access Control List
CC Common Criteria
DAC Discretionary Access Control
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Abbreviation Definition
DBMS Database Management System
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ETL Extract, Transform, Load
IT Information Technology
MOM Microsoft Operations Manager
MS Microsoft
NIAP National Information Assurance Partnership
NSA National Security Agency
OLAP Online analytical processing
OS Operating System
OSP Organizational Security Policy
PP Protection Profile
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SF Security Functionality
SFR Security Functional Requirement
SID Security ID
SMS System Management Server
SQL Structured Query Language
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSC TSF Scope of Control
TSF TOE Security Functionality
T-SQL Transact SQL