Certification Report
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
BSI-DSZ-CC-0217-2003
for
IBM AIX 5L for POWER 5.2
Maintenance Package 5200-01,
Program Number 5765-E62
from
IBM Corporation
- Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Telefon +49 228 9582-0, Infoline +49 228 9582-111, Telefax +49 228 9582-455
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Telefon (0228) 9582-0 - Telefax (0228) 9582-455 - Infoline (0228) 9582-111
SOGIS-MRA
BSI-DSZ-CC-0217-2003
IBM AIX 5L for POWER 5.2
Maintenance Package 5200-01,
Program Number 5765-E62
from
IBM Corporation
Common Criteria Arrangement
The IT product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an accredited and licensed/
approved evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Part 1
Version 0.6, Part 2 Version 1.0 extended by CEM supplementation “ALC_FLR – Flaw remediation”,
Version 1.1, February 2002 for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation,
Version 2.1 (ISO/IEC 15408:1999).
Evaluation Results:
PP Conformance: Controlled Access Protection Profile, Issue 1.d, 8 October 1999
Functionality: Controlled Access Protection Profile conformant plus product
specific extensions
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance Package: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL4 augmented by
ALC_FLR.1 (Life cycle support - Basic flaw remediation)
This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated
configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification scheme
of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions of the evaluation
facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence adduced.
The notes mentioned on the reverse side are part of this certificate.
Bonn, 8th
September 2003
The President of the Federal Office
for Information Security
Dr. Helmbrecht L.S.
The rating of the strength of functions does not include the cryptoalgorithms suitable for encryption
and decryption (see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2)
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information
Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty
of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
BSI-DSZ-CC-0217-2003 Certification Report
V
Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the
task of issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a
distributor, hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product
according to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised
security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the
BSI or by BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This
report contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the
detailed Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security
functionality of the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and
weaknesses) and instructions for the user.
1
Act setting up the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Errichtungsgesetz, BSIG) of
17 December 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2834
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0217-2003
VI
Contents
Part A: Certification
Part B: Certification Results
Part C: Excerpts from the Criteria
BSI-DSZ-CC-0217-2003 Certification Report
A-1
A Certification
1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down
in the following:
· BSIG2
· BSI Certification Ordinance3
· BSI Schedule of Costs4
· Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal
Ministry of the Interior)
· DIN EN 45011 standard
· BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
· Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 2.15
· Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM)
- Part 1, Version 0.6
- Part 2, Version 1.0
· BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme
(AIS)
· CEM supplementation on “ALC_FLR – Flaw remediation”, Version 1.1,
February 2002
2
Act setting up the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Errichtungsgesetz, BSIG) of
17 December 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2834
3
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of a Certificate by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungsverordnung, BSIZertV) of 7 July 1992,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1230
4
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-
Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 29th October 1992, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1838
5
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 22nd September 2000 in the
Bundesanzeiger p. 19445
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0217-2003
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2 Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries
a mutual recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are
based on ITSEC or CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
2.1 ITSEC/CC - Certificates
The SOGIS-Agreement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on
ITSEC became effective on 3 March 1998. This agreement was signed by the
national bodies of Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, The Netherlands,
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. This
agreement on the mutual recognition of IT security certificates based on the CC
was extended to include certificates based on the CC for all evaluation levels
(EAL 1 – EAL 7).
2.2 CC - Certificates
An arrangement (Common Criteria Arrangement) on the mutual recognition of
certificates based on the CC evaluation assurance levels up to and including
EAL 4 was signed in May 2000. It includes also the recognition of Protection
Profiles based on the CC. The arrangement was signed by the national bodies
of Australia, Canada, Finland France, Germany, Greece, Italy, The Netherlands,
New Zealand, Norway, Spain, United Kingdom and the United States. Israel
joined the arrangement in November 2000, Sweden in February 2002, Austria
in November 2002.
BSI-DSZ-CC-0217-2003 Certification Report
A-3
3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform
procedure, a uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product IBM AIX 5L for POWER 5.2, Maintenance Package 5200-01,
Program Number 5765-E62 (also refered as IBM AIX 5L for POWER 5.2
herafter) has undergone the certification procedure at BSI. It is a re-certification
of BSI-DSZ-CC-0194-2002.
The evaluation of the product IBM AIX 5L for POWER 5.2 was conducted by
atsec information security GmbH. The atsec information security GmbH is an
evaluation facility (ITSEF)6
recognised by BSI.
The sponsor is
IBM Deutschland GmbH
Pascalstraße 100
70569 Stuttgart
The developer is
IBM Corporation
11400 Burnet Road
Austin, TX 78758, USA
The certification is concluded with
· the comparability check and
· the production of this Certification Report.
This work was completed by the BSI on 8th
September 2003.
The confirmed assurance package is only valid on the condition that
· all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as
given in the following report, are observed,
· the product is operated in the environment described, where specified in
the following report.
This Certification Report only applies to the version of the product indicated
here. The validity can be extended to new versions and releases of the product,
provided the sponsor applies for re-certification of the modified product, in
accordance with the procedural requirements, and the evaluation does not
reveal any security deficiencies.
For the meaning of the assurance levels and the confirmed strength of
functions, please refer to the excerpts from the criteria at the end of the
Certification Report.
6
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0217-2003
A-4
4 Publication
The following Certification Results contain pages B-1 to B-36.
The product IBM AIX 5L for POWER 5.2 has been included in the BSI list of the
certified products, which is published regularly (see also Internet: http://
www.bsi.bund.de). Further information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline
0228/9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the vendor7
of
the product. The Certification Report can also be downloaded from the above-
mentioned website.
7
IBM Corporation
11400 Burnet Road
Austin, TX 78758, USA
BSI-DSZ-CC-0217-2003 Certification Report
B-1
B Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
· the security target of the sponsor for the target of evaluation,
· the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
· complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0217-2003
B-2
Contents of the certification results
1 Executive Summary 4
2 Identification of the TOE 12
3 Security Policy 13
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope 14
5 Architectural Information 16
6 Documentation 18
7 IT Product Testing 20
8 Evaluated Configuration 24
9 Results of the Evaluation 26
10 Comments/Recommendations 28
11 Annexes 29
12 Security Target 30
13 Definitions 31
14 Bibliography 34
BSI-DSZ-CC-0217-2003 Certification Report
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0217-2003
B-4
1 Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is IBM AIX 5L for POWER 5.2,
Maintenance Package 5200-01, Program Number 5765-E62 also refered as
IBM AIX 5L for POWER 5.2 herafter). It is a UNIX-based Operating System
which has been developed to meet the requirements of the Controlled Access
Protection Profile (CAPP), Issue 1.d, 8 October 1999. By being compliant to the
CAPP the TOE fulfils the requirements of the C2 class of the U.S. Department
of Defense (DoD) Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria (TCSEC) (see
[9], chapter 1.2). This includes the fulfilment of the requirements for
Identification and Authentication, Audit, Object Reuse and Access Control
including the use of Access Control Lists.
The TOE can be used on one or more servers running the evaluated version of
AIX which are connected to form a distributed system. The communication
aspects used for this connection are also part of the evaluation. The
communication links themselves are protected against interception and
manipulation by measures which are outside the scope of the evaluation.
This certification is a re-certification of BSI-DSZ-CC-0194-2002. The TOE is
allowed to be used in an LPAR environment (refer to [7], chapter 2.4.2.1 for
more details on LPAR).
The TOE and a various set of user guidance for the TOE is delivered on CD-
ROM (for details refer to chapters 2 and 6 of this report). The Licensed Product
Packages (LPPs) which are allowed to be used for the evaluated configuration
of the TOE are specified in [7], chapter 2.3.
The TOE is running on the following, LPAR enabled hardware platforms:
- IBM pSeries Symmetric Multiprocessor (SMP) Systems using
Power4 CPUs (p630, p650, p690)
The hardware and LPAR are not part of the TOE but support the TSF by
providing separation mechanisms. The BootPROM firmware is not part of the
TOE either.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) used in the Security Target
are Common Criteria Part 2 extended as shown in the following table:
Security
Functional
Requirement
Identifier
SFRs from CC Part 2, contained in CAPP
FAU_GEN.1 Audit Data Generation
FAU_GEN.2 User Identity Association
FAU_SAR.1 Audit Review
FAU_SAR.2 Restricted Audit Review
BSI-DSZ-CC-0217-2003 Certification Report
B-5
Security
Functional
Requirement
Identifier
FAU_SAR.3 Selectable Audit Review
FAU_SEL.1 Selective Audit
FAU_STG.1 Guarantees of Audit Data Availability
FAU_STG.3 Action in Case of Possible Audit Data Loss
FAU_STG.4 Prevention of Audit Data Loss
FDP_ACC.1 Discretionary Access Control Policy
FDP_ACF.1 Discretionary Access Control Functions
FDP_RIP.2 Object Residual Information Protection
FIA_ATD.1 User Attribute Definition
FIA_SOS.1 Strength of Authentication Data
FIA_UAU.7 Protected Authentication Feedback
FIA_USB.1 User-Subject Binding
FMT_MSA.1 Management of Object Security Attributes
FMT_MSA.3 Static Attribute Initialisation
FMT_MTD.1 Management of the Audit Trail
FMT_MTD.1 Management of Audited Events
FMT_MTD.1 Management of User Attributes
FMT_MTD.1 Management of Authentication Data
FMT_REV.1 Revocation of User Attributes
FMT_REV.1 Revocation of Object Attributes
FMT_SMR.1 Security Management Roles
FPT_AMT.1 Abstract Machine Testing
FPT_RVM.1 Reference Mediation
FPT_SEP.1 Domain Separation
FPT_STM.1 Reliable Time Stamps
SFRs from CC Part 2, contained in CAPP, substituted by
hierarchical higher ones in the ST
FIA_UAU.2 Authentication
FIA_UID.2 Identification
SFRs not in CC Part 2 (Part 2 extended), contained in CAPP
„Note1“
(as in [9],
chapter 5.2.4)
Subject Residual Information Protection
SFRs from CC Part 2, not contained in CAPP
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0217-2003
B-6
Security
Functional
Requirement
Identifier
FMT_SMF.18
Specification of Management Functions
The evaluation was completed on 15.08.2003. The atsec information security
GmbH is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)9
recognised by BSI.
The sponsor is IBM Deutschland GmbH, the developer is IBM Corporation,
USA.
1.1 Assurance package
The TOE security assurance requirements are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C of this report,
or [1], part 3 for details).
The TOE meets the assurance requirements of assurance level EAL4
(Evaluation Assurance Level 4). The assurance level 4 is augmented by:
ALC_FLR.1 – Basic flaw remediation. For the evaluation of the CC component
ALC_FLR.1 the mutually regognised CEM supplementation “ALC_FLR – Flaw
remediation”, Version 1.1, February 2002 ([5]) was used.
The evaluation assurance level named in the Protection Profile is EAL3 with no
augmentation. The Security Target of the TOE claims an evaluation assurance
level of EAL4 augmented by ALC_FLR.1. Since EAL4 is hierarchical to EAL3
conformance to the assurance requirements of the Protection Profile is given.
1.2 Functionality
The TOE IBM AIX 5L for POWER 5.2 provides the following Security Functions
(please refer to the Security Target [7] for a complete listing and precise
definition):
Identification and Authentication (IA)
The TOE requires users to authenticate themselves before they can work
with the TOE. The mechanism used for authentication is a
userid/password combination. The system administrator has a variety of
configuration parameter he can use to enforce users to select passwords
that are hard to guess. In addition the system administrator can define
the maximum and minimum life-time of passwords.
Users need to authenticate themselves when they log in but also when
they change their identity using the su command or when using network
8
Added because of AIS32, Final Interpretation 065
9
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
BSI-DSZ-CC-0217-2003 Certification Report
B-7
applications like rlogin, telnet, ftp. To avoid that normal users can login as
root when they for some reason get hold of the password for root, direct
login as root is prohibited. A system administrator has to log in under his
id using his password and then get root using the su command. Since the
use of the su command to get root can be restricted to defined users that
act as system administrators, any user without this permission can not
log in as root even when he knows the root password.
Auditing (AU)
The TOE includes the possibility to audit a large number of events. The
system administrator can configure which events are audited and is also
able to define such events on a per file system object basis, define audit
classes and assign them individually to users. This allows for a great
flexibility in the configuration of the events that are audited.
For the minimal set of events to be audited in the evaluated configration
refer to the Security Target [7], chapter 5.2.
The evaluated configuration supports bin mode auditing only.
Discretionary Access Control (DA)
The TOE supports discretionary access control for three different types of
objects:
- The discretionary access control for file system objects
The discretionary access control for file system objects in the TOE
supports the standard Unix permission bits extended by access
control lists that allow the system administrator and the owner of
the file system object to allow or restrict the access to the file
system object down to the granularity of a single user.
- The discretionary access control for IPC objects
The TOE supports discretionary access control based on Unix
permission bits for semaphore, shared memory segments and
message queues.
- The discretionary access control for TCP ports
The TOE includes a unique access control feature for TCP ports
allowing the system administrator to restrict the use of TCP ports
(binding to this port) to defined users. This feature also allows to
define TCP ports with numbers higher than 1024 to be privileged
ports (i. e. only a process with root authority can bind to this port).
This feature allows to eliminate some known vulnerabilities for
network programs using port numbers higher than 1024.
Object Reuse (OR)
The TOE ensures that objects are cleared before they are reassigned to
and reused by other subjects. This applies to memory and file system
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0217-2003
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objects as well as to a number of other objects that could transmit
information a user might not want to be transmitted to other users.
Security Management (SM)
The TOE supports only two roles: System administrator and normal
users. Additional privileges that exist within the TOE are not used in the
evaluated configuration.
System management within the TOE is restricted to the system
administrator. He may either use the commands provided for system
management or the “smitty” tool, which provides a non-graphical
interface. The tool will generate scripts using the system management
commands.
TSF Protection (TP)
The TOE protects itself from tampering by untrusted subjects in a variety
of ways. The kernel operates in its own protected address space, which
can not be modified or read by untrusted processes. The kernel also
prohibits any direct access of untrusted processes to hardware. All non-
kernel processes have to use the system call interface to get access to
objects in the file system, inter-process communication objects or
network objects. The kernel controls access to those objects based on
the access control policy for those objects and the access rights defined
for the individual users. There is also a number of system calls where the
use is restricted to the system administrator. Other system calls have
specific parameters that are restricted to system administrators.
In addition the TOE uses trusted processes which run with system
administrator privileges to implement some of the TOE security functions.
Those trusted processes are separated by the kernel from untrusted
processes. Also the configuration files used by the TSF are protected by
the discretionary access control functions of the TOE from unauthorised
access by untrusted users.
1.3 Strength of Function
The TOE’s strength of functions is rated ‘medium’ (SOF-medium) for the
identification and authentication function IA.1 (refer to Security Target [7],
chapter 6.5).
1.4 Summary of threats and Organisational Security Policies (OSPs)
addressed by the evaluated IT product
Since the Security Target claims conformance to the CAPP, the OSPs defined
there (refer to [9], chapter 3.2) are applied for the TOE as well. Because all
security objectives of the CAPP are derived from OSPs, no specific threats
BSI-DSZ-CC-0217-2003 Certification Report
B-9
have been defined in the Protection Profile. In addition to CAPP the OSP
P.STATIC (usage of dynamic LPAR is not allowed) is defined in [7], chapter 3.3.
In addition to the PP, the Security Target adds the following threats
- T.UAUSER (impersonation of an attacker as authorised user),
- T.UAACCESS (access to information by an unauthorised user) and
- T.UAACTION (attacker performing unauthorised actions)
which are averted by the TOE (for detailed information on additional threats
please refer to Security Target [7], chapter 3.2.1).
Note that also threats to be averted by the TOEs environment have been
defined (refer to Security Target [7], chapter 3.2.2 and to chapter 4 of this
report).
1.5 Special configuration requirements
The configuration requirements for the TOE are defined in chapter 2.4 and
subsequent chapters of the Security Target [7] and are summarised here (for
the complete information please refer to the Security Target):
- The CC evaluated file set must be selected at install time.
- If a windowing environment is to be used, the CDE file set must be
selected at install time.
- The role based system administration features of AIX 5.2 are not
included.
- AIX 5.2 supports the use of IPv4 and IPv6, only IPv4 is included in the
evaluated configuration .
- Only 64 bit architectures are included.
- Web Based Systems Management (WebSM) is not included.
- Both network (NIM, Network Install Manager) and CD installations are
supported.
- The default configuration for identification and authentication is to be
used only. Support for other authentication options e.g. smartcard
authentication, is not included in the evaluated configuration.
- If the system console is used, it must be connected directly to the
workstation and the same physical protection as for the workstation is
needed.
- More than one server machine (running AIX 5.2 in the evaluated
configuration) can be used. If more than one so called TOE server is
used they are linked by LAN which may be joined by bridges/routers
or TOE server acting as routers/gateways. No other systems may be
connected to the network.
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0217-2003
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- Support of the following files systems: AIX journaling file system
(jfs2), network file system (nfs v3), file system for CD-ROM drives
(cdrfsisofs) and the process file system (procfs)
1.6 Assumptions about the operating environment
The following constraints concerning the allowed hardware and peripherals are
made in the Security Target (refer to [7], chapter 2.4.2):
Hardware Platform:
- IBM pSeries Symmetric Multiprocessor (SMP) Systems using Power4
CPUs (p630, p650, p690)
Note: The TOE is capable of running in an LPAR environment. If used in
such an environment, Dynamic Partitioning (Dynamic LPAR, DLPAR) is
not supported in the evaluated configuration, i.e. the dynamic (de-)
allocation of resources to a partition during operations is not allowed and
must be prevented by organisational means in the IT environment.
Peripherals:
- all terminals and printers supported by the TOE
- all storage devices and backup devices supported by the TOE (hard
disks, CD-ROM drives, streamer drives, floppy disk drives)
- all Ethernet and Token-Ring network adapters supported by the TOE
(supporting TCP/IP services over the TCP/IP protocol stack)
- all printer devices supported by the TOE
Since the Security Target claims conformance to the CAPP Protection Profile,
the assumptions defined there on physical, personnel and connectivity aspects
are also valid for the TOE (refer to [9], chapter 3.3). Additionally the Security
Target defines the assumptions A.UTRAIN and A.UTRUST (which are both
personnel assumption) and the assumption A.NET_COMP (concerned with
connectivity aspects). For a detailed description refer to the Security Target [7],
chapter 3.4.2 and 3.4.3.
1.7 Disclaimers
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the
certificate and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in
this Certification Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product
by the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation
that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT
BSI-DSZ-CC-0217-2003 Certification Report
B-11
product by BSI or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, is either expressed or implied.
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0217-2003
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2 Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation is called:
IBM AIX 5L for POWER 5.2
Maintenance Package 5200-01, Program Number 5765-E62
The TOE documentation is supplied on CD-ROM (see chapter 6 of this report
documents [10] to [31]). The documents [25] (Release Notes) and [26] (Security
Guide) are used as a starting point for an evaluation conformant usage of the
TOE.
The Licensed Product Packages (LPPs) / File Sets which are allowed to be
installed in the evaluated configuration of the TOE are defined in the Security
Target [7], chapter 2.3.
BSI-DSZ-CC-0217-2003 Certification Report
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3 Security Policy
The TOE is a UNIX based multi-user multi-tasking operating system, thus
providing service to several users at the same time. After successful login, the
users have access to a general computing environment, allowing the start-up of
user applications, issuing user commands at shell level, creating and accessing
files. The TOE provides adequate mechanisms to separate the users and
protect their data. Privileged commands are restricted to the system
administrator role (root).
The TOE provides facilities for on-line interaction with users. Networking is
covered only to the extent to which the TOE can be considered to be part of a
centrally-managed system that meets a common set of security requirements
(refer to the Security Target [7] for the constraints).
It is assumed that responsibility for the safeguarding of the data protected by
the TOE can be delegated to the TOE users. All data is under the control of the
TOE. The data is stored in named objects, and the TOE can associate with
each controlled object a description of the access rights to that object. All
individual users are assigned a unique user identifier. This user identifier
supports individual accountability. The TOE authenticates the claimed identity of
the user before allowing the user to perform any further actions.
The TOE enforces controls such that access to data objects can only take place
in accordance with the access restrictions placed on that object by its owner or
other suitably authorised user. Access rights (e.g. read, write, execute) can be
assigned to data objects with respect to subjects (users). Once a subject is
granted access to an object, the content of that object may be freely used to
influence other objects accessible to this subject.
A detailed description/definition of the Security Policy enforced by the TOE is
given in the Security Target [7] and with even more detail in the developer
document of the security policy model.
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0217-2003
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4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
4.1 Usage assumptions
Based on the Organisational Security Policies to which the TOE complies the
following usage assumptions arise:
- Only those users who have been authorised to access the information
within the system may access the system (P.AUTHORIZED_-
USERS).
- Implicit and explicit access rights to an object are granted by the
object owner (P.NEED_TO_KNOW).
- The users of the system shall be held accountable for their actions
within the system (P.ACCOUNTABLE).
- The TOE is only to be allowed with static LPAR. Dynamic LPAR must
not be used (P.STATIC).
Based on the personnel assumptions the following usage conditions consist:
- The TOE and the security of information have to be managed by one
or more competent individuals (A.MANAGE).
- The system administrative personnel are not careless, malicious and
abide the instruction provided by the TOE documentation
(A.NO_EVIL_ADMIN).
- TOE users are expected to act in a co-operating manner in a benign
environment (A.COOP).
- TOE users are trained well enough to be able to use the security
functionality appropriately (A.UTRAIN).
- TOE users are trusted to some task or group of tasks within a secure
IT environment by exercising complete control over their data
(A.UTRUST).
For a detailed description of the usage assumptions refer to the Security Target
[7], especially chapter 3.3 and 3.4.
4.2 Environmental assumptions
The following assumptions about physical and connectivity aspects defined by
the Security Target have to be met (refer to Security Target [7], chapter 3.4.1
and 3.4.3):
- It is assumed that the processing resources of the TOE are located
within controlled access facilities which will prevent unauthorised
physical access (A.LOCATE).
BSI-DSZ-CC-0217-2003 Certification Report
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- It is assumed that TOE hardware and software (critical to security
policy enforcement) is protected from unauthorised physical
modification (A.PROTECT).
- All network components (like bridges and routers) are assumed to
correctly pass data without modification (A.NET_COMP).
- Any other system with which the TOE communicates is assumed to
be under the same management control and operates under the
same security policy constraints. There are no security requirements
which address the need to trust external systems or the
communication links to such systems (A.PEER).
- It is assumed that all connections to peripheral devices and all
network connections reside within the controlled access facilities.
Internal communication paths to access points such as terminals or
other systems are assumed to be adequately protected
(A.CONNECT).
Please consider also the requirements for the evaluated configuration specified
in chapter 8 of this report.
4.3 Clarification of scope
The threats listed below have to be averted in order to support the TOE security
capabilities but are not addressed by the TOE itself. They have to be addressed
by the operating environment of the TOE (for detailed information about the
threats and how the environment may cover them refer to the Security
Target [7]).
- A unprivileged user or the privileged system administrator is losing
stored data due to hardware malfunction (TE.HWMF).
- Security enforcing or relevant files of the TOE are manipulated or
accidentally corrupted without the system administrator being able to
detect this (TE.COR_FILE).
- The hardware the TOE is running on, does not provide sufficient
capabilities to support the self-protection of the TSF from
unauthorised programs (TE.HW_SEP).
- When running in a logical partition, software running in a different
partition than the TOE is able to access resources that are assigned
to the TOE (TE.LPAR).
For a detailed description of the threats covered by the TOE environment
please refer to [7], chapter 3.2.2
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5 Architectural Information
General Overview:
The target of evaluation (TOE) is the operating system AIX Version 5.2b.
AIX is a general purpose, multi-user, multi-tasking operating system. It is
compliant with all major international standards for UNIX systems, such as the
POSIX standards, X/Open XPG 4, Spec 1170, and FIPS Pub 180. It provides a
platform for a variety of applications in the governmental and commercial
environment. AIX is available on a broad range of computer systems from IBM,
ranging from departmental servers to multi-processor enterprise servers.
The evaluated configuration of AIX 5.2b consists of a distributed, closed
network of high-end, mid-range and low-end IBM pSeries servers running the
evaluated version of AIX 5.2b. The servers may be either a p630, p650 or p690
system with hardware components as defined in the Security Target.
The network links and cabling are assumed to be physically protected against
eavesdropping and tampering. All hosts within the network must run the
evaluated version of the TOE software and must be configured in accordance
with the requirements as described in the AIX Security Guide for the operation
of the TOE as CAPP/EAL4+ system.
The TOE Security Functions (TSF) consists of those parts of AIX that run in
kernel mode plus some defined trusted processes. These together are the
functions that enforce the security policy as defined in the Security Target.
Tools and commands executed in user mode that are used by the system
administrator need also to be trusted to manage the system in a secure way.
But as with other operating system evaluations they are not considered to be
part of this TSF.
The hardware and the BootProm firmware are considered not to be part of the
TOE but part of the TOE environment.
The TOE includes installation from CDROM and from the network.
The TOE includes standard networking applications, such as ftp, rlogin, rsh and
NFS. Configuration of those network applications has to be performed in
accordance with the guidance provided in [25] and [26] for a CAPP/EAL4+
conformant configuration.
The TOE includes the X-Window graphical interface and X-Window
applications. System administration tools include the smitty non-graphical
system management tool.
The TOE environment also includes applications that are not evaluated, but are
used as unprivileged tools to access public system services, for example the
Netscape browser or the Adobe Acrobat Reader to access the supplied online
documentation (which is provided in HTML and PDF formats). No HTTP server
is included in the evaluated configuration.
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Major structural units of the TOE:
The TOE contains the following structural units:
- The kernel, which executes in system mode
- A set of trusted processes that execute in user mode but with root
privileges. They also provide some of the security functions of the TOE.
A set of configuration files that define the system configuration. Those files are
named the “TSF database” and need to be protected by the access control
mechanisms of the TOE such that they can only be modified by the system
administrator. The document [19] provides the detailed specification of those
files and also defines the access modes for each file.
The following figure provides a general overview of the TOE with parts in the
grey shaded area indicating the parts that implement the TSF:
Untrusted
Processes
Trusted
Processes
TSF DB
System Call Interface
Device Drivers Kernel Extensions
Controllers / Adapters
Processor and hardware compliant to the Common Hardware
Reference Platform (CHRP)
User Mode Software
Kernel Mode Software
Hardware
Kernel Subsystems
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6 Documentation
The following documentation is provided with the product by the developer to
the customer on CD:
[10] "Technical Reference: Communications, Volume 1", Fourth edition,
October 2002
[11] "Technical Reference: Communications, Volume 2", Fourth Edition,
October 2002
[12] "Commands Reference, Volume 1", Fifth edition, March 2003
[13] "Commands Reference, Volume 2", Fifth edition, March 2003
[14] "Commands Reference, Volume 3", Fifth edition, March 2003
[15] "Commands Reference, Volume 4", Fifth edition, March 2003
[16] "Commands Reference, Volume 5", Fifth edition, March 2003
[17] "Commands Reference, Volume 6", Fifth edition, March 2003
[18] "Understanding the Diagnostic Subsystem for AIX", Sixth edition,
October 2002
[19] "Files Reference", Fourth edition, October 2002
[20] "General Programming Concepts: Writing and Debugging Programs",
Sixth edition, May 2003
[21] "Technical Reference: Kernel and Subsystems, Volume 1", Fourth
edition, October 2002
[22] "Technical Reference: Kernel and Subsystems, Volume 2", Fourth
edition, October 2002
[23] "System Management Guide: Operating System and Devices", Sixth
edition, May 2003
[24] "System Management Concepts: Operating Systems and Devices", Sixth
edition, October 2002
[25] "AIX 5L Version 5.2 Release Notes", Third edition, July 2003
[26] "AIX 5L Version 5.2 Security Guide", Second edition, July 2003
[27] "System Management Guide: Communications and Networks", Seventh
edition, May 2003
[28] "System User's Guide: Communication and Networks", Third edition,
October 2002
[29] "System User's Guide: Operating System and Devices", Third edition,
October 2002
[30] "Technical Reference: Base Operating System and Extensions, Volume
1", Fourth edition, October 2002
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[31] "Technical Reference: Base Operating System and Extensions, Volume
2", Fourth edition, October 2002
The administrator/user is recommended to use the documents:
- "AIX 5L Version 5.2 Release Notes", Third edition, July 2003, [25] and
- "AIX 5L Version 5.2 Security Guide", Second edition, July 2003, [26]
as a starting point for an evaluation conformant usage of the TOE. Please note
that the information contained in the Security Target also have to be taken into
account.
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7 IT Product Testing
Test Schedule
Developer testing on the final product release (GOLD Release) without the TOE
configuration as described in the Security Target was performed on June 14,
2003 at IBM in Austin, Texas on a p690. The developer tests on p630, p650
and p690 with a configuration as described in the Security Target were
performed from August 1 to August 5 2003 at IBM in Austin.
Evaluator testing on the final product release (GOLD Release) with the TOE
configuration as described in the Security Target was performed from May 14 to
May 23, 2003 at IBM in Austin, Texas on a p630, p650 and p690.
Test hardware configuration
The Security Target defines three different machine types for the TOE: p630,
p650 and p690.
Tests have been performed on all three machines types using the following
hardware configurations:
p630
- 2 POWER4 CPUs
- 8 GB Main Memory
- ISA Bus Diskette Drive
- 2 Wide/Ultra-3 SCSI I/O Controller
- Wide/Fast-20 SCSI I/O Controller
- 1 SCSI disk drives (hdisk0: 18 GB, all manufactured by IBM)
- SCSI DVD-RAM drive, manufactured by IBM
- 2 IBM 10/100 Mbits Ethernet PCI adapter
- HMC
- PS/2 Keyboard
- Three Button Mouse
p650
- 4 POWER4 CPUs
- 20 GB Main Memory
- ISA Bus Diskette Drive
- 2 Wide/Ultra-3 SCSI I/O Controller
- 3 Dual Channel Ultra3 SCSI Adapter
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- 4 LVD SCSI Disk Drive (9100 MB, 18200 MB and two 73400 MB),
manufactured by IBM
- 1 SCSI Multimedia CD-ROM Drive, manufactured by IBM
- 2 IBM 10/100 Mbits Ethernet PCI adapter
- 1 2-Port 10/100/1000 Base-TX PCI-X Adapter
- 2 2-Port Gigabit Ethernet PCI-X Adapter
- HMC
- Standard I/O Serial Port
p690
- 8 POWER4 CPUs
- 16 GB Main Memory
- ISA Bus Diskette Drive
- 2 Wide/Ultra-3 SCSI I/O Controller
- 2 LVD SCSI Disk Drive (36400 MB), manufactured by IBM
- 1 SCSI Multimedia CD-ROM Drive, manufactured by IBM
- IBM 10/100 Mbps Ethernet PCI Adapter
- HMC
- Standard I/O Serial Port
The detailed hardware configuration for each machine including the version
numbers, serial numbers and additional details have been extracted and stored
in a log file.
The tests have been performed with LPAR enabled.
Test coverage/depth
All tests were performed on external interfaces of the TSF. Internal interfaces
were partially tested directly and partially indirectly. For the sufficiency of the
indirect tests an argumentation was provided.
The correspondence between the tests and the functional specification was
found to be accurate and complete. According to the evaluation findings the
tests cases are completely to the TSF as described by the high-level design.
Summary of Developer Testing Effort
Test configuration:
All the tests have been performed on the configurations defined above.
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Testing approach:
IBM has a large number of different test suites and test cases for each
component. Several of the test suites are driven by similar frameworks. This
means, the test suite provides some user space application for building
(compiling, assembling) executables out of the test case files and executing the
test cases. In addition to the user space applications, a library for binary test
programs and several functions for shell code test programs are provided by the
testing framework. These functions are invoked by the test cases during their
run when the positive or negative result of a test unit is determined.
The test case files of the framework consist of one or more test units, which are
the individual tests. One test case is aimed to check one particular security
function (although it tests some others indirectly), the test units of one test case
in turn check different aspects of a security function. The framework can be
used in batch mode or manually. In manual mode, the test case files have to be
build and executed one by one by the tester. In batch mode, one user space
tool is configured to build and/or execute one or more test case automatically.
Testing results:
The developer performed the testing of the final product on all three platforms
(p630, p650 and p690). The developer has installed the TOE in accordance
with the guidance provided in [26] and [25] for the CAPP/EAL4 configuration.
The results of the tests are that all test cases show the expected behaviour in
the evaluated configuration.
Summary of Evaluator Testing Effort
Test configuration
The evaluator performed his test on p630, p650 and p690 systems located at
the IBM office in Austin. For rechecking testing results, and for penetration
testing, the evaluator additionally used a p630 located at IBM Munich.
Testing approach:
The evaluator testing effort consists of two parts. The first one is the complete
rerun of the developer test cases and the second is the execution of the tests
created by the evaluator.
The testing was carried out at the IBM lab in Austin and at the IBM facility in
Munich. The test environment in Austin consisted of a p630, a p650 and a p690
systems connected to each other via the IBM testing lab network. In contrast,
the IBM facility in Munich provided a standalone p630. LPAR was enabled on all
machines and the TOE was installed in an LPAR partition.
The evaluator performed all the developer tests and his own test cases on the
TOE he has installed in conformance with the Security Target and the
developer’s guidance documentation. The evaluator has verified that all test
cases produced the results that where expected.
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Evaluator penetration testing:
The evaluators have devised a set of penetration tests based on the
developer’s vulnerability analysis and based on the evaluator’s knowledge of
the TOE gained by the other evaluation activities. All penetration tests have
been designed to require only a low attack potential as defined in AVA_VLA.2.
The evaluators conducted those tests and did not find any test that resulted in a
successful penetration of the TOE with low attack potential.
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8 Evaluated Configuration
According to the Security Target the evaluated configuration of the TOE is
defined as follows (refer also to the Security Target [7]):
General Aspects:
- The CC evaluated file set must be selected at install time (refer to
chapter 2 of this report)
- If a windowing environment is to be used, the CDE file set must be
selected at install time.
- The role based system administration features of AIX 5.2 are not
included.
- AIX 5.2 supports the use of IPv4 and IPv6, only IPv4 is included.
- Only 64 bit architectures are included.
- Web Based Systems Management (WebSM) is not included.
- Both network (NIM, Network Install Manager) and CD installations are
supported.
- The default configuration for identification and authentication is to be
used only. Support for other authentication options e.g. smartcard
authentication, is not included in the evaluation configuration.
- If the system console is used, it must be connected directly to the
workstation and the same physical protection as for the workstation is
needed.
- Dynamic Partitioning (Dynamic LPAR, DLPAR) is not supported in the
evaluated configuration, i.e. the dynamic (de-) allocation of resources
to a partition during operations is not allowed and must be prevented
by organisational means in the IT environment.
Networking Aspects:
- The TOE can be run on one or more server machines (called „TOE
server“ in [7]). If the product is configured with more than one TOE
server, they are linked by LANs, which may be joined by
bridges/routers or by TOE workstations which act as
routers/gateways.
- No other systems may be connected to the network.
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Technical Aspects:
- The TOE is running on the following hardware platforms:
- IBM pSeries Symmetric Multiprocessor (SMP) Systems using
Power4 CPUs (p630, p650, p690)
- The following file system types are supported:
- the AIX journaling file system, jfs2;
- the standard remote file system access protocol, nfs (V3);
- the High Sierra file system for CD-ROM drives, cdrfsisofs;
- the process file system, procfs (/proc);
- The following peripherals can be run with the TOE:
- all terminals and printers supported by the TOE
- all storage devices and backup devices supported by the TOE
(hard disks, CD-ROM drives,streamer drives, floppy disk drives)
- all Ethernet and Token-Ring network adapters supported by the
TOE
- all printer devices supported by the TOE
- Network connectors supported by the TOE (e.g. Ethernet, Token
Ring, etc.) supporting TCP/IP services over the TCP/IP protocol
stack.
For setting up / configuring the TOE all guidance documents especially the
documents [25] and [26] have to be followed (refer to chapter 6 of this report).
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9 Results of the Evaluation
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [8] was provided by the ITSEF
according to the Common Criteria [1], the Common Evaluation Methodology [2],
the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all interpretations and guidelines of the
Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE (this includes especially the
methodology for flaw remediation, [5]).
This certification is a re-certification of BSI-DSZ-CC-0194-2002. The TOE is
allowed to be used in an LPAR environment (refer to [7], chapter 2.4.2.1 for
more details on LPAR).
The verdicts for the CC, Part 3 assurance components (according to EAL4
augmented by ALC_FLR.1 plus Security Target evaluation) are summarised in
the following table:
Assurance Classes and Components Verdict
Security Target CC Class ASE PASS
TOE description ASE_DES.1 PASS
Security environment ASE_ENV.1 PASS
ST introduction ASE_INT.1 PASS
Security objectives ASE_OBJ.1 PASS
PP claims ASE_PPC.1 PASS
IT security requirements ASE_REQ.1 PASS
Explicitly stated IT security requirements ASE_SRE.1 PASS
TOE summary specification ASE_TSS.1 PASS
Configuration management CC Class ACM PASS
Partial CM automation ACM_AUT.1 PASS
Generation support and acceptance procedures ACM_CAP.4 PASS
Problem tracking CM coverage ACM_SCP.2 PASS
Delivery and Operation CC Class ADO PASS
Detection of modification ADO_DEL.2 PASS
Installation, generation, and start-up procedures ADO_IGS.1 PASS
Development CC class ADV PASS
Fully defined external interfaces ADV_FSP.2 PASS
Security enforcing high-level design ADV_HLD.2 PASS
Subset of the implementation of the TSF ADV_IMP.1 PASS
Descriptive low-level design ADV_LLD.1 PASS
Informal correspondence demonstration ADV_RCR.1 PASS
Informal TOE security policy model ADV_SPM.1 PASS
Guidance documents CC Class AGD PASS
Administrator guidance AGD_ADM.1 PASS
User guidance AGD_USR.1 PASS
Life cycle support CC Class ALC PASS
Identification of security measures ALC_DVS.1 PASS
Basic flaw remediation ALC_FLR.1 PASS
Developer defined life-cycle model ALC_LCD.1 PASS
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Assurance Classes and Components Verdict
Well-defined development tools ALC_TAT.1 PASS
Tests CC Class ATE PASS
Analysis of coverage ATE_COV.2 PASS
Testing: high-level design ATE_DPT.1 PASS
Functional testing ATE_FUN.1 PASS
Independent testing - sample ATE_IND.2 PASS
Vulnerability assessment CC Class AVA PASS
Validation of analysis AVA_MSU.2 PASS
Strength of TOE security function evaluation AVA_SOF.1 PASS
Independent vulnerability analysis AVA_VLA.2 PASS
The evaluation has shown that the TOE fulfils the claimed strength of function
(SOF-medium) for the identification and authentication function IA.1 (based on
passwords).
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the product IBM AIX 5L for
POWER 5.2, Maintenance Package 5200-01, Program Number 5765-E62 in the
configuration as defined in the Security Target and summarised in this report
(refer to the Security Target [7] and the chapters 2, 4 and 8 of this report). The
validity can be extended to new versions and releases of the product, provided
the sponsor applies for re-certification of the modified product, and if the
evaluation of the modified product does not reveal any security deficiencies.
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10 Comments/Recommendations
The User Guidance documentation (especially [25] and [26]) contains
necessary information about the secure usage of the TOE. Additionally, for
secure usage of the TOE the fulfilment of the assumptions about the
environment in the Security Target [7] and the Security Target as a whole has to
be taken into account. Therefore a user/administrator has to follow the guidance
in these documents.
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11 Annexes
None.
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12 Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [7] of the Target of Evaluation
(TOE) is provided within a separate document.
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13 Definitions
13.1 Acronyms
AU Security Function Auditing
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI) /
Federal Office for Information Security
CAPP Controlled Access Protection Profile
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CDE Common Desktop Environment
DA Security Function Discretionary Access Control
DoD U.S. Department of Defense
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
FTP File Transfer Protocol
LAN Local Area Network
LPAR Logical partitioning
LPP Licensed Product Package
IP Internet Protocol
IA Security Function Identification and Authentication
IT Information Technology
JFS Journalled File System
NFS Network File System
NIM Network Install Manager
OR Security Function Object Reuse
OSP Organisational Security Policy
PP Protection Profile
PROM Programmable read only memory
RPC Remote Procedure Call
RSH Remote Shell
SF Security Function
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
SOF Strength of Function
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SM Security Function Security Management
SMIT System Management Interface Tool
ST Security Target
TCP Transmission Control Protocol
TCSEC Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria
TOE Target of Evaluation
TP TSF Protection
TSC TSF Scope of Control
TSF TOE Security Functions
TSP TOE Security Policy
VMM Virtual Memory Manager
13.2 Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more assurance component(s) from CC
Part 3 to an EAL or assurance package.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not
contained in part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in part 3 of the
CC.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics
based on well-established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - An entity within the TSC that contains or receives information and
upon which subjects perform operations.
Protection Profile - An implementation-independent set of security require-
ments for a category of TOEs that meet specific consumer needs.
Security Function - A part or parts of the TOE that have to be relied upon for
enforcing a closely related subset of the rules from the TSP.
Security Target - A set of security requirements and specifications to be used
as the basis for evaluation of an identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined
semantics.
Strength of Function - A qualification of a TOE security function expressing
the minimum efforts assumed necessary to defeat its expected security
behaviour by directly attacking its underlying security mechanisms.
SOF-basic - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that
the function provides adequate protection against casual breach of TOE
security by attackers possessing a low attack potential.
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SOF-medium - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows
that the function provides adequate protection against straightforward or
intentional breach of TOE security by attackers possessing a moderate attack
potential.
SOF-high - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that
the function provides adequate protection against deliberately planned or
organised breach of TOE security by attackers possessing a high attack
potential.
Subject - An entity within the TSC that causes operations to be performed.
Target of Evaluation - An IT product or system and its associated
administrator and user guidance documentation that is the subject of an
evaluation.
TOE Security Functions - A set consisting of all hardware, software, and
firmware of the TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the
TSP.
TOE Security Policy - A set of rules that regulate how assets are managed,
protected and distributed within a TOE.
TSF Scope of Control - The set of interactions that can occur with or within a
TOE and are subject to the rules of the TSP.
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14 Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 2.1, August 1999
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
(CEM), Part 1, Version 0.6; Part 2: Evaluation Methodology, Version 1.0,
August 1999
[3] BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
[4] Applicaton Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for
the TOE:
[5] Applicaton Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme AIS33,
Version 2 – “Methodologie zur Fehlerbehebung – Flaw
Remediation”, 26.07.2002
[6] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148, BSI 7149), periodically
updated list published also on the BSI Web-site
[7] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-0217, Version 1.1, 2003-03-28, AIX5.2
Security Target, IBM Corporation
[8] Evaluation Technical Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0217, Version 1.1, atsec
security information GmbH, 2003-08-15 (confidential document)
[9] Controlled Access Protection Profile, Issue 1.d, 8 October 1999, National
Security Agency
User Guidance Documentation:
[10] "Technical Reference: Communications, Volume 1", Fourth edition,
October 2002
[11] "Technical Reference: Communications, Volume 2", Fourth Edition,
October 2002
[12] "Commands Reference, Volume 1", Fifth edition, March 2003
[13] "Commands Reference, Volume 2", Fifth edition, March 2003
[14] "Commands Reference, Volume 3", Fifth edition, March 2003
[15] "Commands Reference, Volume 4", Fifth edition, March 2003
[16] "Commands Reference, Volume 5", Fifth edition, March 2003
[17] "Commands Reference, Volume 6", Fifth edition, March 2003
[18] "Understanding the Diagnostic Subsystem for AIX", Sixth edition,
October 2002
[19] "Files Reference", Fourth edition, October 2002
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[20] "General Programming Concepts: Writing and Debugging Programs",
Sixth edition, May 2003
[21] "Technical Reference: Kernel and Subsystems, Volume 1", Fourth
edition, October 2002
[22] "Technical Reference: Kernel and Subsystems, Volume 2", Fourth
edition, October 2002
[23] "System Management Guide: Operating System and Devices", Sixth
edition, May 2003
[24] "System Management Concepts: Operating Systems and Devices", Sixth
edition, October 2002
[25] "AIX 5L Version 5.2 Release Notes", Third edition, July 2003
[26] "AIX 5L Version 5.2 Security Guide", Second edition, July 2003
[27] "System Management Guide: Communications and Networks", Seventh
edition, May 2003
[28] "System User's Guide: Communication and Networks", Third edition,
October 2002
[29] "System User's Guide: Operating System and Devices", Third edition,
October 2002
[30] "Technical Reference: Base Operating System and Extensions, Volume
1", Fourth edition, October 2002
[31] "Technical Reference: Base Operating System and Extensions, Volume
2", Fourth edition, October 2002
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C Excerpts from the Criteria
CC Part 1:
Caveats on evaluation results (chapter 5.4) / Final Interpretation 008
The conformance result indicates the source of the collection of requirements that is
met by a TOE or PP that passes its evaluation. This conformance result is presented
with respect to Part 2 (functional requirements), Part 3 (assurance requirements) and, if
applicable, to a pre-defined set of requirements (e.g., EAL, Protection Profile).
The conformance result consists of one of the following:
Part 2 conformant - A PP or TOE is Part 2 conformant if the functional requirements
are based only upon functional components in Part 2
Part 2 extended - A PP or TOE is Part 2 extended if the functional requirements
include functional components not in Part 2
plus one of the following:
Part 3 conformant - A PP or TOE is Part 3 conformant if the assurance requirements
are based only upon assurance components in Part 3
Part 3 extended - A PP or TOE is Part 3 extended if the assurance requirements
include assurance requirements not in Part 3.
Additionally, the conformance result may include a statement made with respect to sets
of defined requirements, in which case it consists of one of the following:
Package name Conformant - A PP or TOE is conformant to a pre-defined named
functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the requirements (functions or
assurance) include all components in the packages listed as part of the conformance
result.
Package name Augmented - A PP or TOE is an augmentation of a pre-defined
named functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the requirements (functions
or assurance) are a proper superset of all components in the packages listed as part of
the conformance result.
Finally, the conformance result may also include a statement made with respect to
Protection Profiles, in which case it includes the following:
PP Conformant - A TOE meets specific PP(s), which are listed as part of the
conformance result.
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CC Part 3:
Assurance categorisation (chapter 2.5)
„The assurance classes, families, and the abbreviation for each family are shown in
Table 2.1.
Assurance Class Assurance Family Abbreviated Name
Class ACM:
Configuration
management
CM automation ACM_AUT
CM capabilities ACM_CAP
CM scope ACM_SCP
Class ADO: Delivery
and operation
Delivery ADO_DEL
Installation, generation and start-up ADO_IGS
Class ADV:
Development
Functional specification ADV_FSP
High-level design ADV_HLD
Implementation representation ADV_IMP
TSF internals ADV_INT
Low-level design ADV_LLD
Representation correspondence ADV_RCR
Security policy modeling ADV_SPM
Class AGD: Guidance
documents
Administrator guidance AGD_ADM
User guidance AGD_USR
Class ALC: Life cycle
support
Development security ALC_DVS
Flaw remediation ALC_FLR
Life cycle definition ALC_LCD
Tools and techniques ALC_TAT
Class ATE: Tests Coverage ATE_COV
Depth ATE_DPT
Functional tests ATE_FUN
Independent testing ATE_IND
Class AVA:
Vulnerability
assessment
Covert channel analysis AVA_CCA
Misuse AVA_MSU
Strength of TOE security functions AVA_SOF
Vulnerability analysis AVA_VLA
Table 2.1 -Assurance family breakdown and mapping“
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Evaluation assurance levels (chapter 6)
„The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that balances
the level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of acquiring that degree of
assurance. The CC approach identifies the separate concepts of assurance in a TOE
at the end of the evaluation, and of maintenance of that assurance during the
operational use of the TOE.
It is important to note that not all families and components from Part 3 are included in
the EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful and desirable
assurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and components will be
considered for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and STs for which they provide
utility.
Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview (chapter 6.1)
Table 6.1 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a hierarchically
ordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families. Each number in the
resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component where applicable.
As outlined in the next section, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation assurance
levels are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE's assurance. They are hierarchically
ordered inasmuch as each EAL represents more assurance than all lower EALs. The
increase in assurance from EAL to EAL is accomplished by substitution of a
hierarchically higher assurance component from the same assurance family (i.e.
increasing rigour, scope, and/or depth) and from the addition of assurance components
from other assurance families (i.e. adding new requirements).
These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as
described in chapter 2 of this Part 3. More precisely, each EAL includes no more than
one component of each assurance family and all assurance dependencies of every
component are addressed.
While the EALs are defined in the CC, it is possible to represent other combinations of
assurance. Specifically, the notion of “augmentation“ allows the addition of assurance
components (from assurance families not already included in the EAL) or the
substitution of assurance components (with another hierarchically higher assurance
component in the same assurance family) to an EAL. Of the assurance constructs
defined in the CC, only EALs may be augmented. The notion of an “EAL minus a
constituent assurance component“ is not recognised by the CC as a valid claim.
Augmentation carries with it the obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility
and added value of the added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also be
extended with explicitly stated assurance requirements.
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Assurance
Class
Assurance
Family
Assurance Components by
Evaluation Assurance Level
EAL1 EAL2 EAL3 EAL4 EAL5 EAL6 EAL7
Configuration
management
ACM_AUT 1 1 2 2
ACM_CAP 1 2 3 4 4 5 5
ACM_SCP 1 2 3 3 3
Delivery and
operation
ADO_DEL 1 1 2 2 2 3
ADO_IGS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Development ADV_FSP 1 1 1 2 3 3 4
ADV_HLD 1 2 2 3 4 5
ADV_IMP 1 2 3 3
ADV_INT 1 2 3
ADV_LLD 1 1 2 2
ADV_RCR 1 1 1 1 2 2 3
ADV_SPM 1 3 3 3
Guidance
documents
AGD_ADM 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
AGD_USR 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Life cycle
support
ALC_DVS 1 1 1 2 2
ALC_FLR
ALC_LCD 1 2 2 3
ALC_TAT 1 2 3 3
Tests ATE_COV 1 2 2 2 3 3
ATE_DPT 1 1 2 2 3
ATE_FUN 1 1 1 1 2 2
ATE_IND 1 2 2 2 2 2 3
Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_CCA 1 2 2
AVA_MSU 1 2 2 3 3
AVA_SOF 1 1 1 1 1 1
AVA_VLA 1 1 2 3 4 4
Table 6.1 - Evaluation assurance level summary“
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Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL1) - functionally tested (chapter 6.2.1)
„Objectives
EAL1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but the
threats to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where independent
assurance is required to support the contention that due care has been exercised with
respect to the protection of personal or similar information.
EAL1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer, including
independent testing against a specification, and an examination of the guidance
documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL1 evaluation could be successfully
conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE, and for minimal outlay.
An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a manner
consistent with its documentation, and that it provides useful protection against
identified threats.“
Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL2) - structurally tested (chapter 6.2.2)
„Objectives
EAL2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of design
information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the part of the
developer than is consistent with good commercial practice. As such it should not
require a substantially increased investment of cost or time.
EAL2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require
a low to moderate level of independently assured security in the absence of ready
availability of the complete development record. Such a situation may arise when
securing legacy systems, or where access to the developer may be limited.“
Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL3) - methodically tested and checked
(chapter 6.2.3)
„Objectives
EAL3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from positive
security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of existing sound
development practices.
EAL3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
moderate level of independently assured security, and require a thorough investigation
of the TOE and its development without substantial re-engineering.“
Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL4) - methodically designed, tested, and
reviewed (chapter 6.2.4)
„Objectives
EAL4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security
engineering based on good commercial development practices which, though rigorous,
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do not require substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other resources. EAL4 is the
highest level at which it is likely to be economically feasible to retrofit to an existing
product line.
EAL4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require
a moderate to high level of independently assured security in conventional commodity
TOEs and are prepared to incur additional security-specific engineering costs.“
Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL5) - semiformally designed and tested
(chapter 6.2.5)
„Objectives
EAL5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security engineering
based upon rigorous commercial development practices supported by moderate
application of specialist security engineering techniques. Such a TOE will probably be
designed and developed with the intent of achieving EAL5 assurance. It is likely that
the additional costs attributable to the EAL5 requirements, relative to rigorous
development without the application of specialised techniques, will not be large.
EAL5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require
a high level of independently assured security in a planned development and require a
rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable costs attributable to
specialist security engineering techniques.“
Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL6) - semiformally verified design and
tested (chapter 6.2.6)
„Objectives
EAL6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security
engineering techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to produce a
premium TOE for protecting high value assets against significant risks.
EAL6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in
high risk situations where the value of the protected assets justifies the additional
costs.“
Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL7) - formally verified design and tested
(chapter 6.2.7)
„Objectives
EAL7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in extremely
high risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies the higher costs.
Practical application of EAL7 is currently limited to TOEs with tightly focused security
functionality that is amenable to extensive formal analysis.“
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Strength of TOE security functions (AVA_SOF) (chapter 14.3)
AVA_SOF Strength of TOE security functions
„Objectives
Even if a TOE security function cannot be bypassed, deactivated, or corrupted, it may
still be possible to defeat it because there is a vulnerability in the concept of its
underlying security mechanisms. For those functions a qualification of their security
behaviour can be made using the results of a quantitative or statistical analysis of the
security behaviour of these mechanisms and the effort required to overcome them. The
qualification is made in the form of a strength of TOE security function claim.“
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VLA) (chapter 14.4)
AVA_VLA Vulnerability analysis
„Objectives
Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether vulnerabilities identified,
during the evaluation of the construction and anticipated operation of the TOE or by
other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses), could allow users to violate the TSP.
Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that a user will be able to discover flaws
that will allow unauthorised access to resources (e.g. data), allow the ability to interfere
with or alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorised capabilities of other users.“
„Application notes
A vulnerability analysis is performed by the developer in order to ascertain the
presence of security vulnerabilities, and should consider at least the contents of all the
TOE deliverables including the ST for the targeted evaluation assurance level. The
developer is required to document the disposition of identified vulnerabilities to allow
the evaluator to make use of that information if it is found useful as a support for the
evaluator's independent vulnerability analysis.“
„Independent vulnerability analysis goes beyond the vulnerabilities identified by the
developer. The main intent of the evaluator analysis is to determine that the TOE is
resistant to penetration attacks performed by an attacker possessing a low (for
AVA_VLA.2), moderate (for AVA_VLA.3) or high (for AVA_VLA.4) attack potential.“