BSI-DSZ-CC-0623-V2-2018
for
ZEMO VML-GK2,
FW-Version 3.1.0, HW-Version 2.0.0
from
ZEMO GmbH
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0 CC-Zert-327 V5.21
BSI-DSZ-CC-0623-V2-2018 (*)
eHealth: Smart Card Readers
ZEMO VML-GK2
FW-Version 3.1.0, HW-Version 2.0.0
from ZEMO GmbH
PP Conformance: Common Criteria Protection Profile Mobile Card
Terminal for the German Healthcare System
(MobCT), Version 1.4, BSI-CC-PP-0052-2015, 19
January 2015
Functionality: PP conformant
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 3 augmented by ADV_FSP.4, ADV_IMP.1,
ADV_TDS.3, ALC_TAT.1, and AVA_VAN.5
The IT Product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation
facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1
extended by Scheme Interpretations for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT
Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1. CC and CEM are also published as ISO/IEC 15408
and ISO/IEC 18045.
(*) This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its
evaluated configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report and
Notification. For details on the validity see Certification Report part A chapter 4
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification
scheme of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions
of the evaluation facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the
evidence adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT Product by the Federal Office for
Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT Product by the Federal Office for Information
Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is
either expressed or implied.
Bonn, 28 June 2018
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Bernd Kowalski L.S.
Head of Division
SOGIS
Recognition Agreement
for components up to
EAL 4
Common Criteria
Recognition Arrangement
recognition for components
up to EAL 2
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0623-V2-2018
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0623-V2-2018 Certification Report
Contents
A. Certification.......................................................................................................................7
1. Preliminary Remarks.....................................................................................................7
2. Specifications of the Certification Procedure................................................................7
3. Recognition Agreements...............................................................................................8
4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification.................................................................9
5. Validity of the Certification Result..................................................................................9
6. Publication...................................................................................................................10
B. Certification Results........................................................................................................11
1. Executive Summary....................................................................................................12
2. Identification of the TOE..............................................................................................13
3. Security Policy.............................................................................................................14
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope......................................................................14
5. Architectural Information..............................................................................................15
6. Documentation............................................................................................................15
7. IT Product Testing........................................................................................................15
8. Evaluated Configuration..............................................................................................16
9. Results of the Evaluation.............................................................................................16
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE......................................................18
11. Security Target...........................................................................................................18
12. Definitions..................................................................................................................18
13. Bibliography...............................................................................................................20
C. Excerpts from the Criteria...............................................................................................23
D. Annexes..........................................................................................................................25
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0623-V2-2018 Certification Report
A. Certification
1. Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1 Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of
issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor,
hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according
to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by
BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report
contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed
Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of
the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and
instructions for the user.
2. Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the
following:
● Act on the Federal Office for Information Security1
● BSI Certification and Approval Ordinance2
● BSI Schedule of Costs3
● Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the
Interior)
● DIN EN ISO/IEC 17065 standard
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-
Produkte) [3]
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility, its
approval and licencing process (CC-Stellen) [3]
● Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.14
[1] also published as
ISO/IEC 15408.
1
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
2
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of Security Certificates and approval by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungs- und -Anerkennungsverordnung - BSIZertV) of 17 December
2014, Bundesgesetzblatt 2014, part I, no. 61, p. 2231
3
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
(BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0623-V2-2018
● Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 [2] also published
as ISO/IEC 18045.
● BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]
3. Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or
CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
3.1. European Recognition of CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in
April 2010. It defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition
level and, in addition, at higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain SOGIS
Technical Domains only.
The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels
EAL 1 to EAL 4. For "Smartcards and similar devices" a SOGIS Technical Domain is in
place. For "HW Devices with Security Boxes" a SOGIS Technical Domains is in place, too.
In addition, certificates issued for Protection Profiles based on Common Criteria are part of
the recognition agreement.
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes, details on
recognition, and the history of the agreement can be seen on the website at
https://www.sogisportal.eu.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the
terms of this agreement by the related bodies of the signatory nations. A disclaimer
beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of recognition.
This certificate is recognized according to the rules of SOGIS-MRA, i.e. up to and including
CC part 3 EAL 4 components. The evaluation contained the component AVA_VAN.5 that is
not mutually recognised in accordance with the provisions of the SOGIS MRA. For mutual
recognition the EAL 4 components of these assurance families are relevant.
3.2. International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)
The international arrangement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on the CC
(Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement, CCRA-2014) has been ratified on 08
September 2014. It covers CC certificates based on collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP)
(exact use), CC certificates based on assurance components up to and including EAL 2 or
the assurance family Flaw Remediation (ALC_FLR) and CC certificates for Protection
Profiles and for collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP).
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes can be seen on
the website: http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates
that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the related bodies
of the signatory nations. A disclaimer beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of
recognition.
4
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 12 February 2007 in the Bundesanzeiger dated
23 February 2007, p. 3730
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0623-V2-2018 Certification Report
This certificate is recognized according to the rules of CCRA-2014, i. e. up to and including
CC part 3 EAL 2 components.
4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a
uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product ZEMO VML-GK2, FW-Version 3.1.0, HW-Version 2.0.0 has undergone the
certification procedure at BSI.
The evaluation of the product ZEMO VML-GK2, FW-Version 3.1.0, HW-Version 2.0.0 was
conducted by datenschutz cert GmbH. The evaluation was completed on 15 June 2018.
datenschutz cert GmbH is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)5
recognised by the certification
body of BSI.
For this certification procedure the applicant is: ZEMO GmbH.
The product was developed by: ZEMO GmbH.
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this
Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
5. Validity of the Certification Result
This Certification Report applies only to the version of the product as indicated. The
confirmed assurance package is valid on the condition that
● all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the
following report, are observed,
● the product is operated in the environment described, as specified in the following report
and in the Security Target.
For the meaning of the assurance components and assurance levels please refer to CC
itself. Detailed references are listed in part C of this report.
The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target
at the date of certification. As attack methods evolve over time, the resistance of the
certified version of the product against new attack methods needs to be re-assessed.
Therefore, the sponsor should apply for the certified product being monitored within the
assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme (e.g. by a re-assessment or
re-certification). Specifically, if results of the certification are used in subsequent evaluation
and certification procedures, in a system integration process or if a user's risk
management needs regularly updated results, it is recommended to perform a re-
assessment on a regular e.g. annual basis.
In order to avoid an indefinite usage of the certificate when evolved attack methods would
require a re-assessment of the products resistance to state of the art attack methods, the
maximum validity of the certificate has been limited. The certificate issued on
28 June 2018 is valid until 27 June 2023. Validity can be re-newed by re-certification.
The owner of the certificate is obliged:
5
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0623-V2-2018
1. when advertising the certificate or the fact of the product's certification, to refer to
the Certification Report as well as to provide the Certification Report, the Security
Target and user guidance documentation mentioned herein to any customer of the
product for the application and usage of the certified product,
2. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately about vulnerabilities of the
product that have been identified by the developer or any third party after issuance
of the certificate,
3. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately in the case that security relevant
changes in the evaluated life cycle, e.g. related to development and production sites
or processes, occur, or the confidentiality of documentation and information related
to the Target of Evaluation (TOE) or resulting from the evaluation and certification
procedure where the certification of the product has assumed this confidentiality
being maintained, is not given any longer. In particular, prior to the dissemination of
confidential documentation and information related to the TOE or resulting from the
evaluation and certification procedure that do not belong to the deliverables
according to the Certification Report part B, or for those where no dissemination
rules have been agreed on, to third parties, the Certification Body at BSI has to be
informed.
In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to
the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e.
re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural
requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.
6. Publication
The product ZEMO VML-GK2, FW-Version 3.1.0, HW-Version 2.0.0 has been included in
the BSI list of certified products, which is published regularly (see also Internet:
https://www.bsi.bund.de and [5]). Further information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline
+49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer6
of the
product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet
address stated above.
6
ZEMO GmbH
Franz-Mader-Straße 9
94036 Passau
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0623-V2-2018 Certification Report
B. Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
● the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
● the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
● complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0623-V2-2018
1. Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the ZEMO VML-GK2, Version 2.0.0 (Hardware) / 3.1.0
(Firmware) by ZEMO GmbH. The TOE is a smart card terminal used for the German
healthcare system as a Mobile Card Terminal (MobCT). It is used by medical suppliers
during visits to read out insurance data from a German electronic Health Card (eHC) of a
health insured person.
The Security Target [6] and its addendum [13] are the basis for this certification. It is based
on the certified Common Criteria Protection Profile Mobile Card Terminal for the German
Healthcare System (MobCT), Version 1.4, BSI-CC-PP-0052-2015, 19 January 2015 [8].
The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details).
The TOE meets the assurance requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 3
augmented by ADV_FSP.4, ADV_IMP.1, ADV_TDS.3, ALC_TAT.1, and AVA_VAN.5.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the
Security Target [6], chapter 6.1. They are selected from Common Criteria Part 2 and some
of them are newly defined. Thus the TOE is CC Part 2 extended.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functionality:
TOE Security Functionality Addressed issue
SF_1.SPE_MEM On reset to factory defaults the TOE will deallocate all information
in memory (except for the installed firmware) and erase encrypted
health insurance data in the persistent storage, as well as
temporary user data.
SF_2.FWDL The TOE can be securely updated with new firmware. The secure
update guarantees that only authentic firmware, electronically
signed by the manufacturer, will be accepted by the TOE and
installed into the TOE.
SF_3.SEC_PIN_ENTRY When a PIN has to be entered the TOE changes into a secure
PIN-entry mode. This mode can only be activated by the TOE and
is indicated to the user. For every entered PIN digit the TOE will
display an asterisk symbol. PINs and PIN digits will never be
displayed in clear text and no subject can read out the
administrator PIN.
SF_4.PIN_AUTH The TOE maintains the roles administrator, medical supplier and
associates users with roles.
SF_5.TOE_LOCK The TOE terminates an interactive session after 15 minutes of
administrator inactivity, after [1 – 60 minutes] of medical supplier
inactivity and after power loss.
SF_6.SELFTEST The TOE performs self-tests at initial start-up and following start-
ups. Self-tests check the TOE’s functionality by checking TOE
hardware and evaluating the integrity of the stored firmware and
the integrity of TSF data.
SF_7.STORAGE _ENCRYPTION The TOE encrypts health insurance data stored in the persistent
storage of the TOE with the cryptographic algorithm AES GCM and
cryptographic key size of 256 bit.
SF_8.Card_ Communication The TOE enables a communication between the smart cards that
are inserted in the TOE. When an authorised card is put into one
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0623-V2-2018 Certification Report
TOE Security Functionality Addressed issue
of the TOE's slots, the TOE will read out the card’s X.509
certificate and check it. The Card holder PINs entered via the PIN
pad is only sent to the card slot where the authorised card is
plugged in.
SF_9.DMS_ Communication The TOE enables the medical supplier to transfer data records
from the persistent storage to the DMS.
SF_10.Reliable_ Time_Stamps The TOE provides reliable time stamps with a clock precision of at
least ±100 ppm.
SF_11.Detection_ of_Physical_Attack The TOE provides the capability to determine during operation of
the TOE whether physical tampering of the TOE has occurred.
Table 1: TOE Security Functionalities
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6], chapter 7.1.
The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6], chapter 1.4.7.
Based on these assets the TOE Security Problem is defined in terms of Assumptions,
Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security Target [6],
chapter 3.
This certification covers the configurations of the TOE as outlined in chapter 8.
The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating
for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and
decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate
and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification
Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2. Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
ZEMO VML-GK2, FW-Version 3.1.0, HW-Version 2.0.0
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
1 HW Mobile smart card terminal VML-GK2 2.0.0 Sealed Box
2 SW Firmware 3.1.0 Installed on card terminal
3 SW Update file VML-GK2_V3.1.0_G5.GK2
Hash value (SHA-256): c2 16 85 af 4f ad ae
18 a0 14 1d fd 4b bb ac fe ac 8c 8b f0 7c 04
8e 76 01 d4 16 9c 40 7f aa 3a
3.1.0 E-Mail from ZEMO GmbH
4 SW Update file VML-GK2_V3.1.0_G5_Upd.GK2
Hash value (SHA-256): 61 c2 d7 67 f4 6e 3e
ca f2 f8 3b c7 43 61 21 ea a2 8d d0 5f 59 b3
35 00 95 2e f8 24 32 92 20 48
3.1.0 E-Mail from ZEMO GmbH
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0623-V2-2018
No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
5 DOC Guidance [10]
Hash value (SHA-256): 0a a0 79 91 71 6e 6e
47 ea fe e5 be f3 e2 e9 fb 72 de b7 83 59 67
4a 7c a8 9a 91 05 54 30 9f ef
1.1.4 Download from website
https://zemo.de/vmlgk-
downloads/
6 DOC Description of Delivery Procedure [11]
Hash value (SHA-256): de 05 9f f0 bc 72 c8
44 4d fd ea e8 3f c0 cf f1 a8 71 49 5f f9 b1 50
0e f3 8a 9c 52 2e 5c 96 66
1.3 Download from website
https://zemo.de/vmlgk-
downloads/
Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE
The delivery procedure is documented in [11] and is available at the ZEMO website
https://zemo.de/vmlgk-downloads/ together with the guidance documentation. The delivery
procedure contains the following key items:
● The box with the TOE is sealed with security seals and packed into a security bag.
Security seals and security bags are printed with individual IDs. Furthermore, each TOE
contains a transport PIN and a verification code.
● The TOE will be delivered overnight till 12 noon of the next day.
● ZEMO GmbH will send the recipient an e-mail with the date of delivery and the following
information about the TOE: serial number of the TOE, tracing information, IDs of security
seals, ID of security bag, transport PIN and verification code. The e-mail is signed with
an electronic signature and will be sent at 8 a.m. on the day of delivery.
● The recipient has to check the serial number of the TOE and the IDs of the security
seals and security bag. Then the recipient has to follow the authentication protocol by
entering the transport PIN and checking the verification code that is displayed on screen.
Only if all IDs and codes are correct and the TOE is delivered in time, the recipient is
allowed to use the TOE.
The TOE is labelled with its hardware version at the bottom of the case. Furthermore, the
hardware and the firmware version are displayed on the display of the TOE. Both the
delivery documentation as well as the guidance documentation are secured by an
electronic signature.
3. Security Policy
The Security Policy of the TOE is defined by the Security Functional Requirements and the
security functions that are implemented.
This includes the following items: The health insurance data is stored inside the TOE only
temporary and encrypted. To read out and to display the health insurance data a role
concept is implemented. Functions for the administrator require authentication and are
separated from functions for the medical supplier. For details see [6].
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and
Organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to
specific security objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. The following topics are
of relevance:
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0623-V2-2018 Certification Report
● OE.MEDIC: The medical supplier shall be non hostile, always act with care, and read
the existing guidance documentation of the TOE.
● OE.ADMIN: The administrator shall be non hostile, always act with care, read the
existing guidance documentation of the TOE and adhere to the rules of the TOEs
environment.
● OE.Developer: The developer is assumed to be non hostile, always act with care and
knows the existing guidance documentation of the TOE.
● OE.CARDS: The authorised cards and the eHC are smart cards that comply with the
specification of the gematik.
● OE.DMS: The TOE shall only be connected to a Data Management System for a
practice or hospital that is trusted by the medical supplier.
● OE.PHYSICAL: The secure TOE environment shall protect the TOE against physical
manipulation.
● OE.ENVIRONMENT: While the TOE is in use by either the medical supplier or the
administrator, they always keep the TOE under their control. This applies to its
authenticated as well as its unauthenticated state. While the TOE is not in use, it is kept
in a secure area.
Details can be found in the Security Target [6], chapter 4.2.
5. Architectural Information
The TOE „ZEMO VML-GK2“ is a mobile smart card terminal. The firmware is built modular
with the following subsystems:
● The subsystem Komm implements the activities at the USB- and RS232-interface.
● The subsystem Card is relevant for the interaction between the smart cards.
● The subsystem Bediener realizes the user interface.
● The subsystem Control controls the logic of the TOE.
At firmware update the whole firmware is updated.
6. Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in Table 2 is being provided with the product to
the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of
the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of
this report have to be followed.
7. IT Product Testing
The TOE was tested in the following configuration: firmware version 3.1.0 and hardware
version 2.0.0. This is conform to the ST [6].
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7.1. Developer Tests
The developer performed about 80 tests in the context of the evaluation both manually and
with tool support. The test documentation describes the tests that are systematically
defined based on the subsystems and TSFI of the TOE. Furthermore, the developer
performed gematik tests.
All results of the developer tests correspond with the expected results. Overall, the
developer tests show that the TOE behaves as specified in the ST [6], in the functional
specification, and in the TOE design.
7.2. Evaluator Tests
The independent testing was partially performed using the developer’s testing
environment, partially using the test environment of the ITSEF.
Independent tests were performed by the evaluator. The security functions were tested by
triggering the external interfaces of the TOE. In addition, internal states of the TOE were
tested, too. The following security functions were tested: SF_2.FWDL,
SF_3.SEC_PIN_ENTRY, SF_4.PIN_AUTH, SF_5.TOE_LOCK,
SF_11.Detection_of_Physical_Attack. In total, 44 independent tests were performed. All
interfaces were tested by the evaluator. As a result the tests showed that the TOE is
operating correctly as specified in the ST [6], the functional specification, and the TOE
design.
Based on the vulnerability analysis the evaluator performed the following penetration tests:
manipulation of the seals, misuse of the display and keypad, attacks at the USB and smart
card interfaces. As a result the tests showed that there are no vulnerabilities that could be
exploited in the intended environment.
The overall test result is that no deviations were found between the expected and the
actual test results.
8. Evaluated Configuration
This certification covers the following configurations of the TOE:
● Hardware Version: 2.0.0
● Firmware Version: 3.1.0
9. Results of the Evaluation
9.1. CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [7] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used.
As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
● All components of the EAL 3 package including the class ASE as defined in the CC (see
also part C of this report)
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0623-V2-2018 Certification Report
● The components ADV_FSP.4, ADV_IMP.1, ADV_TDS.3, ALC_TAT.1, and AVA_VAN.5
augmented for this TOE evaluation.
The evaluation has confirmed:
● PP Conformance: Common Criteria Protection Profile Mobile Card Terminal for the
German Healthcare System (MobCT), Version 1.4, BSI-CC-PP-
0052-2015, 19 January 2015 [8]
● for the Functionality: PP conformant
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
● for the Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 3 augmented by ADV_FSP.4, ADV_IMP.1, ADV_TDS.3,
ALC_TAT.1, and AVA_VAN.5
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
9.2. Results of cryptographic assessment
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of this certification
procedure (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2). But cryptographic functionalities with a
security level of lower than 100 bits can no longer be regarded as secure without
considering the application context. Therefore, for these functionalities it shall be checked
whether the related crypto operations are appropriate for the intended system. Some
further hints and guidelines can be derived from the 'Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-02102'
(https://www.bsi.bund.de).
The following table gives an overview of the cryptographic functionalities inside the TOE to
enforce the security policy and outlines its rating from cryptographic point of view. Any
Cryptographic Functionality that is marked in column 'Security Level above 100 Bits' of the
following table with 'no' achieves a security level of lower than 100 Bits (in general context)
only.
Purpose Cryptographic Mechanism Standard of
Implementation
Key Size
in Bits
Security Level
above 100 Bits
Authentication
and Integrity
RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 signature
verification using SHA-256 hash
function
PKCS#1 (RSA),
FIPS 180-4 (SHA)
2048 Yes
Table 3: TOE cryptographic functionality
The following table gives an overview of the cryptographic functionalities inside the TOE to
enforce the security policy and outlines the standard of application where its specific
appropriateness is stated.
Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of Implementation Key Size
in Bits
Standard of Application
Confidentiality
and Integrity
AES in GCM-
mode
FIPS-197 (AES),
NIST SP 800-38D (AES-GCM)
256 gemSpec_Krypt [12]
Table 4: TOE cryptographic functionality
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The strength of the these cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of this
certification procedure (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE
The documents as outlined in Table 2 contain necessary information about the usage of
the TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered. In addition all aspects of
Assumptions, Threats and OSPs as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE
itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his
system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and
techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment of the
TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
The limited validity for the usage of cryptographic algorithms as outlined in chapter 9 has
to be considered by the user and his system risk management process, too.
If available, certified updates of the TOE should be used. If non-certified updates or
patches are available the user of the TOE should request the sponsor to provide a re-
certification. In the meantime a risk management process of the system using the TOE
should investigate and decide on the usage of not yet certified updates and patches or
take additional measures in order to maintain system security.
11. Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [6] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is
provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report.
12. Definitions
12.1. Acronyms
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
AIS Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for
Information Security, Bonn, Germany
BSIG BSI-Gesetz / Act on the Federal Office for Information Security
C2C Card-to-Card-Authentication
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
cPP Collaborative Protection Profile
CT Card Terminal
DMS Data Management System
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
eHC Electronic Health Card
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eHCT Electronic Health Card Terminal
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
gematik Gesellschaft für Telematikanwendungen der Gesundheitskarte mbH
HPC Health Professional Card
IT Information Technology
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
MobCT Mobile Health Card Terminal
PP Protection Profile
ppm Parts per Million
RTC Real Time Clock
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
SMC Secure Module Card
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
12.2. Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.
Collaborative Protection Profile - A Protection Profile collaboratively developed by an
International Technical Community endorsed by the Management Committee.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in CC
part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in CC part 3.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on well-
established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - A passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon which
subjects perform operations.
Package - named set of either security functional or security assurance requirements
Protection Profile - A formal document defined in CC, expressing an implementation
independent set of security requirements for a category of IT Products that meet specific
consumer needs.
Security Target - An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific
identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Subject - An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.
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Target of Evaluation - An IT Product and its associated administrator and user guidance
documentation that is the subject of an Evaluation.
TOE Security Functionality - Combined functionality of all hardware, software, and
firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs.
13. Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Part 1: Introduction and general model, Revision 4, September 2012
Part 2: Security functional components, Revision 4, September 2012
Part 3: Security assurance components, Revision 4, September 2012
http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Rev. 4, September 2012,
http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[3] BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-
Produkte) and Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility,
approval and licencing (CC-Stellen), https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierung
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE7
https://www.bsi.bund.de/AIS
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148), periodically updated list published also
on the BSI Website, https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierungsreporte
[6] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-0623-V2-2018, Version 2.15, 04.06.2018, Security
Target for a Common Criteria EAL3+ Evaluation of the Product ZEMO VML-GK2,
ZEMO GmbH
[7] Evaluation Technical Report, Version 1.0 10.06.2018, Evaluation Technical Report –
Summary, datenschutz cert GmbH, (confidential document)
[8] Common Criteria Protection Profile Mobile Card Terminal for the German Healthcare
System (MobCT), Version 1.4, BSI-CC-PP-0052-2015, 19 January 2015
[9] Configuration list for the TOE, 18.04.2018, Konfigurationsliste (confidential
document)
[10] Guidance documentation for the TOE, Version 1.1.4, 18.04.2018,
Bedienungsanleitung ZEMO-VML-GK2 V3.1.0
[11] Delivery procedure "Beschreibung sicherer Lieferweg für das Produkt ZEMO VML-
GK2 der ZEMO GmbH", Version 1.3, 04.06.2018
[12] Gematik crypto specification "Verwendung kryptographischer Algorithmen in der
Telematikinfrastruktur", gemSpec_Krypt, Version 2.3.0, 17.06.2014, gematik
[13] Addendum to the Security Target for a Common Criteria EAL3+ Evaluation
of the Product ZEMO VML-GK2 from ZEMO GmbH”, Version 2.00,
02.04.2015
7
specifically
• AIS 32, Version 7, CC-Interpretationen im deutschen Zertifizierungsschema
• AIS 34, Version 3, Evaluation Methodology for CC Assurance Classes for EAL 5+ (CCv2.3 &
CCv3.1) and EAL 6 (CCv3.1)
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Referenzierte Standards:
[FIPS 180-4] FIPS PUB 180-4 Secure Hash Signature Standard (SHS), NIST, 2012-03
[FIPS 197] Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 197: ADVANCED
ENCRYPTION STANDARD (AES), NIST, November 2001
[PKCS#1] PKCS #1 v2.2: RSA Cryptography Standard, October 2012
[NIST SP 800-38D] Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation:
Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) and GMAC, November 2007
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C. Excerpts from the Criteria
For the meaning of the assurance components and levels the following references to the
Common Criteria can be followed:
• On conformance claim definitions and descriptions refer to CC part 1 chapter 10.4
• On the concept of assurance classes, families and components refer to CC Part 3
chapter 7.1
• On the concept and definition of pre-defined assurance packages (EAL) refer to CC
Part 3 chapters 7.2 and 8
• On the assurance class ASE for Security Target evaluation refer to CC Part 3
chapter 11
• On the detailled definitions of the assurance components for the TOE evaluation
refer to CC Part 3 chapters 12 to 16
• The table in CC part 3 , Annex E summarizes the relationship between the
evaluation assurance levels (EAL) and the assurance classes, families and
components.
The CC are published at http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/cc/
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D. Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Security Target provided within a separate document.
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Note: End of report
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