Certification Report
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
BSI-DSZ-CC-0368-2006
for
Philips P5CC036V1D Secure Smart Card
Controller with Cryptographic Library
as IC Dedicated Support Software
from
Philips Semiconductors GmbH
Business Line Identification
Certification Report V1.1 ZS-01-01-F-330 V3.23
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 228 9582-0, Fax +49 228 9582-455, Infoline +49 228 9582-111
BSI-DSZ-CC-0368-2006
Philips P5CC036V1D Secure Smart Card Controller
with Cryptographic Library
as IC Dedicated Support Software
from
Philips Semiconductors GmbH
Business Line Identification Common Criteria Arrangement
for components up to EAL4
The IT product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an accredited and licensed/
approved evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Part 1
Version 0.6, Part 2 Version 1.0 extended by advice of the Certification Body for components
beyond EAL4 and smart card specific guidance for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT
Security Evaluation, Version 2.1 (ISO/IEC 15408:1999) and including final interpretations for
compliance with Common Criteria Version 2.2 and Common Methodology Part 2, Version 2.2.
Evaluation Results:
PP Conformance: Protection Profile BSI-PP-0002-2001
Functionality: BSI-PP-0002-2001 conformant plus product specific extensions
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance Package: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant, EAL4 / augmented by
ADV_IMP.2 (Development - Implementation of the TSF),
ALC_DVS.2 (Life cycle support - Sufficiency of security measures),
ATE_DPT.2 (Testing - Low-level design),
AVA_MSU.3 (Vulnerability assessment - Analysis and testing for
insecure states),
AVA_VLA.4 (Vulnerability assessment - Highly resistant).
This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated
configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification
scheme of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions of the
evaluation facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence adduced.
The notes mentioned on the reverse side are part of this certificate.
Bonn, 13. March 2006
The Vice President of the Federal Office
for Information Security
Hange L.S.
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 228 9582-0 - Fax +49 228 9582-455 - Infoline +49 228 9582-111
The rating of the strength of functions does not include the cryptoalgorithms suitable for
encryption and decryption (see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2)
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information
Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no
warranty of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any other
organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
Certification Report V1.1 ZS-01-01-F-330 V3.23
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0368-2006
Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the
task of issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a
distributor, hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product
according to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised
security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the
BSI or by BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This
report contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the
detailed Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security
functionality of the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and
weaknesses) and instructions for the user.
1
Act setting up the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Errichtungsgesetz, BSIG) of 17 December
1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2834
V
BSI-DSZ-CC-0368-2006 Certification Report
Contents
Part A: Certification
Part B: Certification Results
Part C: Excerpts from the Criteria
Part D: Annexes
VI
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0368-2006
A Certification
1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down
in the following:
• BSIG2
• BSI Certification Ordinance3
• BSI Schedule of Costs4
• Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal
Ministry of the Interior)
• DIN EN 45011 standard
• BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
• Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 2.15
• Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM)
• Part 1, Version 0.6
• Part 2, Version 1.0
• BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS)
• Advice from the Certification Body on methodology for assurance
components above EAL4 (AIS 34)
The use of Common Criteria Version 2.1, Common Methodology, part 2,
Version 1.0 and final interpretations as part of AIS 32 results in compliance of
the certification results with Common Criteria Version 2.2 and Common
Methodology Part 2, Version 2.2 as endorsed by the Common Criteria
recognition arrangement committees.
2
Act setting up the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Errichtungsgesetz, BSIG) of
17 December 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2834
3
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of a Certificate by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungsverordnung, BSIZertV) of 7 July 1992,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1230
4
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik (BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519
5
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 22 September 2000 in the Bundes-
anzeiger p. 19445
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0368-2006 Certification Report
2 Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries
a mutual recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are
based on ITSEC or CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
2.1 ITSEC/CC - Certificates
The SOGIS-Agreement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on
ITSEC became effective on 3 March 1998. This agreement was signed by the
national bodies of Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, The Netherlands,
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. This
agreement on the mutual recognition of IT security certificates was extended to
include certificates based on the CC for all evaluation levels (EAL 1 – EAL 7).
2.2 CC - Certificates
An arrangement (Common Criteria Arrangement) on the mutual recognition of
certificates based on the CC evaluation assurance levels up to and including
EAL 4 was signed in May 2000. It includes also the recognition of Protection
Profiles based on the CC. The arrangement was signed by the national bodies
of Australia, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, The
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, United Kingdom and the United
States. Israel joined the arrangement in November 2000, Sweden in February
2002, Austria in November 2002, Hungary and Turkey in September 2003,
Japan in November 2003, the Czech Republic in September 2004, the Republic
of Singapore in March 2005, India in April 2005.
This evaluation contains the components ADV_IMP.2 (Implementation of the
TSF), ALC_DVS.2 (Life cycle support - Sufficiency of security measures),
ATE_DPT.2 (Testing - Low-level design), AVA_MSU.3 (Vulnerability
assessment - Analysis and testing for insecure states), AVA_VLA.4
(Vulnerability assessment - Highly resistant) that are not mutually recognised in
accordance with the provisions of the CCRA. For mutual recognition the EAL4-
components of these assurance families are relevant.
3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform
procedure, a uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product Philips P5CC036V1D Secure Smart Card Controller with
Cryptographic Library as IC Dedicated Support Software has undergone the
certification procedure at BSI. This is a re-certification based on BSI-DSZ-CC-
0296-2006. For this evaluation specific results from the evaluation process
based on BSI-DSZ-CC-0296-2006 were re-used.
The evaluation of the product Philips P5CC036V1D Secure Smart Card
Controller with Cryptographic Library as IC Dedicated Support Software was
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0368-2006
conducted by T-Systems GEI GmbH, Prüfstelle für IT-Sicherheit. The
T-Systems GEI GmbH, Prüfstelle für IT-Sicherheit is an evaluation facility
(ITSEF)6
recognised by BSI.
The sponsor, vendor, and distributor is:
Philips Semiconductors GmbH
Business Line Identification
P.O. Box 54 02 40
D-22502 Hamburg, Germany
The certification is concluded with
• the comparability check and
• the production of this Certification Report.
This work was completed by the BSI on 13. March 2006.
The confirmed assurance package is only valid on the condition that
• all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in
the following report, are observed,
• the product is operated in the environment described, where specified in the
following report.
This Certification Report only applies to the version of the product indicated
here. The validity can be extended to new versions and releases of the product,
provided the sponsor applies for re-certification of the modified product, in
accordance with the procedural requirements, and the evaluation does not
reveal any security deficiencies.
For the meaning of the assurance levels and the confirmed strength of
functions, please refer to the excerpts from the criteria at the end of the
Certification Report.
6
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0368-2006 Certification Report
4 Publication
The following Certification Results contain pages B-1 to B-26 and D1 to D-4.
The product Philips P5CC036V1D Secure Smart Card Controller with
Cryptographic Library as IC Dedicated Support Software has been included in
the BSI list of the certified products, which is published regularly (see also
Internet: http:// www.bsi.bund.de). Further information can be obtained from
BSI-Infoline +49 228 9582-111.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0368-2006
B Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
• the security target of the sponsor for the target of evaluation,
• the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
• complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
B-1
BSI-DSZ-CC-0368-2006 Certification Report
Contents of the certification results
1 Executive Summary 3
2 Identification of the TOE 11
3 Security Policy 13
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope 13
5 Architectural Information 14
6 Documentation 15
7 IT Product Testing 16
8 Evaluated Configuration 17
9 Results of the Evaluation 17
10 Comments/Recommendations 20
11 Annexes 21
12 Security Target 21
13 Definitions 21
14 Bibliography 23
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0368-2006
1 Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) and subject of the Security Target (ST) [6] and
[7] is the Philips P5CC036V1D Secure Smart Card Controller with
Cryptographic Library as IC Dedicated Support Software.
The evaluation of the TOE was conducted as a composition evaluation making
use of the platform evaluation results of the CC evaluation of the underlying
semiconductor.
Therefore, the Target of Evaluation (TOE) consists of a hardware part and a
software part. The hardware part consists of the Philips P5CC036V1D Secure
Smart Card Controller with IC Dedicated Software stored in the Test-ROM that
is not accessible in the System Mode or the User Mode after Phase 3. There is
dedicated documentation regarding the hardware. The additional IC Dedicated
Support Software “Secured Crypto Library on the P5CC036V1D” consists of a
software library and associated documentation. The Secured Crypto Library
provides cryptographic functions that can be operated on the hardware platform
as described in the Security Target lite [7].
Therefore, the TOE comprises the following components:
• Integrated Circuit (IC) "Philips P5CC036V1D with specific IC Dedicated
Software Secure Smart Card Controller" provided by Philips Semiconductors
GmbH (separately certified under the ID: BSI-DSZ-CC-0293-2005 [11])
• Secured Crypto Library on the P5CC036V1D.
The Hardware Security Target [10] contains an introduction about the SmartMX
hardware TOE that is considered in this composite evaluation. The
P5CC036V1D covers IC Dedicated Software stored in the ROM provided with
the SmartMX hardware platform.
The IC Dedicated Support Software “Secured Crypto Library on the
P5CC036V1D“ is a cryptographic library which provides a set of cryptographic
functions that can be used by a Smartcard Embedded Software. The
cryptographic library consists of several binary packages that must be linked to
the Smartcard Embedded Software. The Philips SmartMX smart card processor
P5CC036V1D provides the computing platform and the cryptographic support
by means of co-processors for the Secured Crypto Library on the
P5CC036V1D. The used parts of the Secured Crypto Library on the
P5CC036V1D are linked to the Smartcard Embedded Software during the
development process and implemented with the Smartcard Embedded Software
in the User ROM.
The TOE can be described by using the following three layers:
1. The Protection Profile “Smartcard IC Platform Protection Profile (SSVG-PP),
Version 1.0, July 2001; reference BSI-PP-0002-2001” [9] describes general
requirements for smart card controllers and their support software. It is a
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0368-2006 Certification Report
common basis for smart card platform evaluations and defines the minimum
requirements to the TOE hardware and the associated functionality.
2. The Hardware Security Target [10] defines the functionality of the platform
provided by the P5CC036V1D Smart Card Controller. It comprises the
specific hardware features of this platform.
3. The Secured Crypto Library on the P5CC036V1D provides additional
functionality to the developer of Smartcard Embedded Software. It is a
supplement of the basic cryptographic features provided by the hardware
platform. The Crypto Library on SmartMX implements cryptographic
algorithms with countermeasures against the attacks described in this
Security Target using the co-processors of the P5CC036V1D to provide a
software programming interface for the developer of the Smartcard
Embedded Software.
The hardware part of the TOE is not described here in detail. For more details
please read the Hardware Security Target [10].
The IT product Philips P5CC036V1D Secure Smart Card Controller with
Cryptographic Library as IC Dedicated Support Software was evaluated by
T-Systems GEI GmbH, Prüfstelle für IT-Sicherheit. The evaluation was
completed on 03. February 2006. The T-Systems GEI GmbH, Prüfstelle für IT-
Sicherheit is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)7
recognised by BSI.
The concept for composition as outlined in CC Supporting Document [4, AIS 36]
was used.
The sponsor, vendor, and distributor is
Philips Semiconductors GmbH
Business Line Identification
P.O. Box 54 02 40
D-22502 Hamburg, Germany
This certification is a re-certification of the composition TOE with crypto library
certified under the certification ID “BSI-DSZ-CC-0296” (see [27]). The only
change is an additional augmentation of the EAL level (ATE_DPT.1 augmented
to ATE_DPT.2). The TOE itself remains completely the same in both processes.
The additional augmentation has only an effect on the documention relevant for
the evaluation.
1.1 Assurance package
The TOE security assurance requirements are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in part 3 of the Common Criteria (see Annex C or [1], part
3 for details). The TOE meets the assurance requirements of assurance level
EAL4+ (Evaluation Assurance Level 4 augmented). The following table shows
the augmented assurance components.
7
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0368-2006
Requirement Identifier
EAL4 TOE evaluation: methodically designed, tested, and reviewed
+: ADV_IMP.2 Development – Implementation of the TSF
+: ALC_DVS.2 Life cycle support – Sufficiency of security measures
+: ATE_DPT.2 Testing - Low-level design
+: AVA_MSU.3 Vulnerability assessment - Analysis and testing for insecure
states
+: AVA_VLA.4 Vulnerability assessment - Highly resistant
Table 1: Augmented assurance components
1.2 Functionality
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) selected in the Security
Target are Common Criteria Part 2 conformant as shown in the following tables.
The following SFRs are taken from CC part 2:
Security Functional Requirement Addressed issue
FAU Security audit
FAU_SAS.1 Audit storage
FCS Cryptographic support
FCS_COP.1[DES] Cryptographic operation (DES)
FCS_COP.1[SW-DES] Cryptographic operation (TDES)
FCS_COP.1 [RSA] Cryptographic operation (RSA)
FCS_COP.1.1[SHA-1] Cryptographic operation (SHA-1)
FCS_CKM.1.1 Cryptographic key generation
FCS_RND.1 Quality metric for random numbers
(hardware (true) RNG)
FCS_RND.2 Random number generation (software
(pseudo) RNG)
FDP User data protection
FDP_ACC.1[MEM] Subset access control
FDP_ACC.1[SFR] Subset access control
FDP_ACF.1[MEM] Security Attribute based access control
FDP_ACF.1[SFR] Security Attribute based access control
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control
FDP_ITT.1 Basic internal transfer protection
FDP_ITT.1 [COPY] Basic internal TSF data transfer
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0368-2006 Certification Report
Security Functional Requirement Addressed issue
protection
FDP_RIP.1 Subset residual information protection
FMT Security Management
FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities
FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability
FMT_MSA.1[MEM] Management of security attributes
FMT_MSA.1[SFR] Management of security attributes
FMT_MSA.3[MEM] Static attribute initialisation
FMT_MSA.3[SFR] Static attribute initialisation
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FPT Protection of the TOE Security Functions
FPT_FLS.1 Failure with preservation of secure state
FPT_ITT.1 Basic internal TSF data transfer
protection
FPT_ITT.1 [COPY] Basic internal TSF data transfer
protection
FPT_PHP.3 Resistance to physical attack
FPT_SEP.1 TSF domain separation
FPT_TST.2 Subset TOE security testing
FRU Resource Utilistaion
FRU_FLT.2 Limited fault tolerance
Table 2: SFRs for the TOE taken from CC Part 2
Only the titles of the Security Functional Requirements are provided. For more
details please refer to the Security Target Lite [7], chapter 5, and the Security
Target Lite [10] of the hardware platform.
Chapter 5 of the ST Lite [7] also gives information if the SFRs are defined and
described in the protection profile, in the ST of the hardware, or in the ST of the
composition product.
The Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functions:
TOE Security Function Addressed issue
F.RNG Hardware Random Number Generator
F.HW_DES Hardware Triple-DES Co-processor
F.OPC Control of Operating Conditions
F.PHY Protection against Physical Manipulation
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0368-2006
TOE Security Function Addressed issue
F.LOG Logical Protection
F.COMP Protection of Mode Control
F.MEM_ACC Memory Access Control
F.SFR_ACC Special Function Register Access Control
Table 3: TOE Security Functions of the IC part of the TOE
Only the titles of the TOE Security Functions are provided. For more details
please read the Security Target Lite of the hardware platform [10], chapter 6.
TOE Security Function Addressed issue
F.RNG_Access Software generation of random numbers and test functionality
for hardware RNG
F.DES DES and TDES encryption and decryption in ECB, “outer”
CBC and CBC-MAC mode
F.RSA RSA and RSA-CRT algorithms (DFA-resistant and non-
resistant variants)
F.RSA_KeyGen Key generation for the RSA (both modes RSA and RSA-CRT)
F.SHA-1 Computation of secure hash algorithm SHA-1
F.LOG Extends the F.LOG of hardware part of the TOE and provides
in addition protection against side channel attacks and forced
leakage attacks for the additional functionality F.DES, F.RSA,
F.RSA_KeyGen, F-SHA.1
F.COPY Provides means to copy of data resistant to side channel
attacks
F.Object_Reuse Clears memory areas used by the crypto library after the
usage
Table 4: TOE Security Functions of the IC dedicated SW part of the TOE
Only the titles of the TOE Security Functions are provided. For more details
please read the Security Target Lite [7], chapter 6.
1.3 Strength of Function
The TOE‘s strength of functions is rated ‘high’ (SOF-high) for those functions,
identified in the Security Target lite [7], chapter 6.1.9, SOF Claim. The rating of
the strength of functions does not include the cryptoalgorithms suitable for
encryption and decryption (see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2).
1.4 Summary of threats and Organisational Security Policies
(OSPs) addressed by the evaluated IT product
The threats which were assumed for the evaluation and averted by the TOE are
specified in the BSI-PP-0002-2001 [9] and mentioned in the Security Target [6]:
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0368-2006 Certification Report
Name Definition
T.Leak-Inherent Inherent Information Leakage
T.Phys-Probing Physical Probing
T.Malfunction Malfunction due to Environmental Stress
T.Phys-Manipulation Physical Manipulation
T.Leak-Forced Forced Information Leakage
T.Abuse-Func Abuse of Functionality
T.RND Deficiency of Random Numbers
Table 5: Threats for the TOE
In comparison to the threats outlined in the Security Target of the hardware
[10], the scope of the threat T.RND is extended to include both the deficiency of
hardware random numbers and the deficiency of software random numbers.
The Organisational Security Policies for the TOE are defined as:
Name Definition
P.Process-TOE Protection during TOE Development and Production
P.Add-Components Additional Specific Security Components
P.Add-Func Additional Specific Security Functionality
Table 6: OSPs
Since the Security Target claims conformance to the Protection Profile [9], the
policy P.Process-TOE (Protection during TOE Development and Production) of
the Protection Profile is applied in the Security Target.
One additional Organisational Security Policy is defined in the hardware
Security Target. The Policy P.Add-Components (Additional Specific Security
Components) is defined for Triple-DES encryption and decryption, Area based
Memory Access Control, Special Function Register Access Control, and
memory separation for different software parts.
One additional Organisational Security Policy is provided by the Crypto Library
for use by the Smardcard Embedded Software. The Policy P.Add-Func
(Additional Specific Security Functionality) is defined for Triple-DES encryption
and decryption, RSA and RSA-CRT algorithm, RSA key generation, SHA-1
Hash Algorithm, access to the RNG (implementation of a software RNG and
tests for the hardware RNG), secure copy routine, protection of residual
information, and resistance against side channel attacks.
For more details please refer to the Security Target lite [7], chapters 3.3 and
3.4.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0368-2006
1.5 Special configuration requirements
The IC Dedicated Support Software as part of the TOE provides an interface
between the smart card hardware (P5CC036V1D) and a smart card operating
system or smart card application for the usage of the cryptographic functions
provided by the TOE. It uses the specific functionality of the hardware to provide
these cryptographic services.
The considered configuration of the Secured Crypto Library on the
P5CC036V1D assumes that the crypto library is executed in System Mode. In
addition the following Compiler Options are required:
• Memory Model: Large
• Code ROM size: huge
The Embedded Software developer has to be aware that no restrictions
regarding the access to the memory and to Special Function Registers are
available in the System Mode.
For performance reasons, specific checks on the input data have to be
performed by the Smartcard Embedded Software before the crypto library is
called. Details are described in the User Guidance [12] - [17].
These crypto functions are supplied as a library rather than as a monolithic
program and hence a user of the library may include those functions he requires
– it is not necessary to include all cryptographic functions of the library in every
Smartcard Embedded Software. Details are described in the User Guidance
[12].
In addition to the above, the further production and delivery processes, like the
integration into a smart card, personalization and the delivery of the smart card
to an end user, have to be organised in a way that excludes all possibilities of
physical manipulation of the TOE.
For other recommendations please read chapter 10 of this Report.
1.6 Assumptions about the operating environment
Since the Security Target claims conformance to the Protection Profile [9], the
assumptions defined in section 3.2 of the Protection Profile are valid for the
Security Target of this TOE.
With respect to the life cycle defined in the Security Target, Phase 1 and the
Phases from TOE Delivery up to the end of Phase 6 are covered by these
assumptions from the PP:
The developer of the smart card embedded software (Phase 1) must ensure:
• The appropriate “Usage of Hardware Platform (A.Plat-Appl)” while
developing this software in Phase 1. Therefore, it has to be ensured, that the
software fulfils the assumptions for a secure use of the TOE. In particular the
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0368-2006 Certification Report
assumptions imply that developers are trusted to develop software that fulfils
the assumptions.
• The appropriate “Treatment of User Data (A.Resp-Appl)” while developing
this software in Phase 1. The smart card operating system and the smart
card application software have to use security relevant user data of the TOE
(especially keys and plain text data) in a secure way. It is assumed that the
Security Policy as defined for the specific application context of the
environment does not contradict the Security Objectives of the TOE. Only
appropriate secret keys as input for the cryptographic function of the TOE
have to be used to ensure the strength of cryptographic operation.
Protection during Packaging, Finishing and Personalisation (A.Process-Card) is
assumed after TOE Delivery up to the end of Phase 6, as well as during the
delivery to Phase 7.
The following additional assumptions are assumed in the Security Target of the
HW chip:
• Key-dependent functions shall be implemented (if applicable) in the smart
card Embedded Software in a way that they are not susceptible to leakage
attacks (A.Key-Function)
• The Smart Card Embedded Software must provide a function to check
initialisation data. The data is defined by the customer and injected by the
TOE Manufacturer into the non-volatile memory to provide the possibility for
TOE identification and for traceability (A.Check-Init).
The following additional assumption is assumed in the Security Target of the
composition [7]:
Operational preconditions (A.Preconditions):
• In case that resistance of the SHA-1 implementation against side channel
attacks is required, the Smartcard Embedded Software developer shall
ensure that the necessary operational preconditions are met.
• For the RSA-CRT there exist two algorithms. Only one of them provides
built-in resistance against DFA attacks. When using the second algorithm, it
is assumed that the user of the Secured Crypto Library on the P5CC036V1D
first analyses and decides whether DFA attacks are applicable in the specific
field of application, and that he implements effective DFA countermeasures
on his own, if necessary.
1.7 Disclaimers
The Certification Results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the
Certificate and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in
this Certification Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product
by the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation
that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0368-2006
product by BSI or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2 Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
Philips P5CC036V1D Secure Smart Card Controller with Cryptographic Library
as IC Dedicated Support Software.
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
No Type Identifier Release Date Form of Delivery
1 Hard-
ware
Philips P5CC036V1D Secure
Smart Card Controller
V1D T503D.gds
2_20040915
wafer (dice include
reference T503D)
2 Soft-
ware
Test ROM Software (the IC
Dedicated Test Software)
1.4 August 16th,
2004
Test ROM on the
chip (tmfos.lst, V1.4)
3 Soft-
ware
Boot ROM Software
(boot.asm, part of the IC
Dedicated Support Software)
1.7 March 9th,
2004
Test ROM on the
chip (tmfos.lst, V1.4)
4 Docu-
ment
Data Sheet: SmartMX -
P5CC036, [18]
3.3 27.06.2005 electronic document
5 Docu-
ment
Instruction Set SmartMX-
Family, [19]
1.0 09.05.2003 electronic document
6 Docu-
ment
Guidance, Delivery and
Operation Manual:
P5CC036V1D, [20]
1.0 23.03.2005 electronic document
7 Soft-
ware
Secured Crypto Library on the
P5CC036V1D Pseudo
Random Number Generator
2.0 n/a (cf. MD5
checksum)
binary library file(s)
plus the required
header file(s), on CD
or electronically
8 Soft-
ware
Secured Crypto Library on the
P5CC036V1D Secured DES
Library
1.0 n/a (cf. MD5
checksum)
binary library file(s)
plus the required
header file(s), on CD
or electronically
9 Soft-
ware
Secured Crypto Library on the
P5CC036V1D Secured RSA
Library
2.0 n/a (cf. MD5
checksum)
binary library file(s)
plus the required
header file(s), on CD
or electronically
10 Soft-
ware
Secured Crypto Library on the
P5CC036V1D Secured RSA
Key Generation Library
2.0 n/a (cf. MD5
checksum)
binary library file(s)
plus the required
header file(s), on CD
or electronically
11 Soft-
ware
Secured Crypto Library on the
P5CC036V1D SHA-1 Library
2.0 n/a (cf. MD5
checksum)
binary library file(s)
plus the required
header file(s), on CD
or electronically
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0368-2006 Certification Report
No Type Identifier Release Date Form of Delivery
12 Docu-
ment
Secured Crypto Library on the
P5CC036V1D, User
Guidance [12]
2.0 23.11.2005 printed on paper, or
electronically with the
crypto library
13 Docu-
ment
User Guidance: Crypto
Library on SmartMX – Pseudo
Random Number Generator
and Chi-Squared Test Library
[13]
3.0 23.11.2005 printed on paper, or
electronically with the
crypto library
14 Docu-
ment
User Guidance: Crypto
Library on SmartMX –
Secured DES Library [14]
2.0 23.11.2005 printed on paper, or
electronically with the
crypto library
15 Docu-
ment
User Guidance: Crypto
Library on SmartMX – SHA-1
Library [15]
3.0 23.11.2005 printed on paper, or
electronically with the
crypto library
16 Docu-
ment
User Guidance: Crypto
Library on SmartMX –
Secured RSA Library [16]
3.0 23.11.2005 printed on paper, or
electronically with the
crypto library
17 Docu-
ment
User Guidance: Crypto
Library on SmartMX –
Secured RSA Key Generation
Library [17]
3.0 23.11.2005 printed on paper, or
electronically with the
crypto library
18 Docu-
ment
Software Delivery Description,
Secured DES Library, [21]
1.0 23.11.2005 electronically with the
crypto library
19 Docu-
ment
Software Delivery Description,
SHA-1 Library, [22]
1.0 23.11.2005 electronically with the
crypto library
20 Docu-
ment
Software Delivery Description,
Secured Random Number
Library, [23]
1.0 23.11.2005 electronically with the
crypto library
21 Docu-
ment
Software Delivery Description,
Secured RSA Library, [24]
1.0 23.11.2005 electronically with the
crypto library
22 Docu-
ment
Software Delivery Description,
Secured RSA Key Generation
Library, [25]
1.0 23.11.2005 electronically with the
crypto library
Table 7: Deliverables of the TOE
The hardware part of the TOE is identified as Philips P5CC036V1D with specific
IC Dedicated Software Secure Smart Card Controller and their specific GDS-
file. A so-called nameplate (on-chip identifier) is coded in a metal mask onto the
chip during production and can be checked by the customer. The nameplate
T503D is specific for the SSMC (Singapore) production site as outlined in the
guidance documentation of the chip. This nameplate identifies Version V1D of
the hardware. For identification of the P5CC036V1D, the Device Coding Bytes
stored in the EEPROM can be used. The value “0E” hex in Device Coding Byte
DC2 identifies the chip P5CC036V1D. For more details about the hardware
identification please read [11].
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0368-2006
To ensure that the customer receives this evaluated version, the delivery pro-
cedures described in [20] have to be followed.
3 Security Policy
The security policy of the TOE is to provide basic Security Functions to be used
by the smart card operating system and the smart card application thus provi-
ding an overall smart card system security. Therefore, the TOE will implement a
symmetric cryptographic block cipher algorithm to ensure the confidentiality of
plain text data by encryption and to support secure authentication protocols and
it will provide a random number generator. Additionally, a combination of
software and hardware parts of the TOE implement several cryptographic
functions to be used by the smart card embedded software.
The security policy of the TOE is also to provide protection against leakage of
information (e.g. to ensure the confidentiality of cryptographic keys during
cryptographic functions performed by the TOE), against physical probing,
against malfunctions, against physical manipulations, against access for code
and data memory and against abuse of functionality. Hence the TOE shall:
• maintain the integrity and the confidentiality of data stored in the memory of
the TOE and
• maintain the integrity, the correct operation and the confidentiality of security
functions (security mechanisms and associated functions) provided by the
TOE.
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The smart card operating system and the application software stored in the
User ROM and in the EEPROM are not part of the TOE. The code in the Test
ROM of the TOE (IC dedicated software) is used by the manufacturer of the
smart card to check the functionality of the chips before TOE Delivery. This was
considered as part of the evaluation under the CC assurance aspects ALC for
relevant procedures and under ATE for testing.
The TOE is delivered as a hardware unit at the end of the chip manufacturing
process (phase 3 of the life cycle defined) or at the end of the IC packaging into
modules (phase 4 of the life cycle defined). At these specific points in time the
ROM part of the operating system software is already stored in the ROM of the
chip and the test mode is completely disabled.
The smart card applications need the security functions of the smart card
operating system based on the security features of the TOE. With respect to
security a composition evaluation of the present TOE and the future operating
system and smart card application is important. Within the present composition,
the security functionality is only partly provided by the TOE and causes
dependencies between the TOE security functions and the functions provided
by the future operating system or the smart card application on top. These
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0368-2006 Certification Report
dependencies are expressed by environmental and secure usage assumptions
as outlined in the user documentation.
Within this evaluation of the TOE, several aspects were specifically considered
to support a composite evaluation of the TOE together with an embedded smart
card application software (i.e. smart card operating system and application).
This was necessary as Philips Semiconductors GmbH Business Line
Identification is the TOE developer and manufacturer and responsible for
specific aspects of handling the embedded smart card application software in its
development and production environment. For those aspects refer to chapter 9
of this report.
The evaluation results are applicable for chips from the IC fabrication SSMC in
Singapore indicated by the nameplate (on-chip identifier) T503D.
The Security Target of the composition [7] also specifies an assumption that
defines the operational preconditions that a Smartcard Embedded Software
developer and user of the Secured Crypto Library on the P5CC036V1D has to
fulfil (A.Preconditions, see also chapter 1.6 of this report).
5 Architectural Information
The TOE is called “Philips P5CC036V1D Secure Smart Card Controller with
Cryptographic Library as IC Dedicated Support Software.” It is a composite
TOE, consisting of the hardware “Philips SmartMX P5CC036V1D Secure Smart
Card Controller,” which is used as the evaluated platform, and the “Secured
Crypto Library on the P5CC036V1D,” which is built upon this platform.
The hardware covers the IC Dedicated Software stored in the ROM provided
with the SmartMX hardware platform.
The IC Dedicated Support Software “Secured Crypto Library on the
P5CC036V1D“ is a cryptographic library which provides a set of cryptographic
functions that can be used by the Smartcard Embedded Software. The
cryptographic library consists of several binary packages that must be linked to
the Smartcard Embedded Software. The Philips SmartMX smart card processor
P5CC036V1D provides the computing platform and the cryptographic support
by means of co-processors for the Secured Crypto Library on the
P5CC036V1D. The used parts of the Secured Crypto Library on the
P5CC036V1D are linked to the Smartcard Embedded Software during the
development process and implemented with the Smartcard Embedded Software
in the User ROM.
The additional IC Dedicated Support Software “Secured Crypto Library on the
P5CC036V1D“ is part of the present composite TOE. It provides cryptographic
support for the Philips P5CC036V1D smart card processor. The IC Dedicated
Support Software as part of the TOE provides an interface between the smart
card hardware and a future smart card operating system or smart card
application that use the cryptographic functions provided by the TOE. The IC
Dedicated Support Software uses the specific functionality of the hardware to
provide these cryptographic services.
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6 Documentation
The following documentation is provided with the product by the developer to
the customer (see also table 7 of this report):
• Data Sheet: SmartMX - P5CC036, 3.3, 27.06.2005 [18]
• Instruction Set SmartMX-Family, 1.0, 09.05.2003 [19]
• Guidance, Delivery and Operation Manual: P5CC036V1D, 1.0, 23.03.2005
[20]
• Secured Crypto Library on the P5CC036V1D, User Guidance 2.0,
23.11.2005 [12]
• User Guidance: Crypto Library on SmartMX – Pseudo Random Number
Generator and Chi-Squared Test Library, 3.0, 23.11.2005 [13]
• User Guidance: Crypto Library on SmartMX – Secured DES Library, 2.0,
23.11.2005 [14]
• User Guidance: Crypto Library on SmartMX – SHA-1 Library, 3.0,
23.11.2005 [15]
• User Guidance: Crypto Library on SmartMX – Secured RSA Library, 3.0,
23.11.2005 [16]
• User Guidance: Crypto Library on SmartMX – Secured RSA Key Generation
Library, 3.0, 23.11.2005 [17]
• Software Delivery Description, Secured DES Library, 1.0, 23.11.2005 [21]
• Software Delivery Description, SHA-1 Library, 1.0, 23.11.2005 [22]
• Software Delivery Description, Secured Random Number Library, 1.0,
23.11.2005 [23]
• Software Delivery Description, Secured RSA Library, 1.0, 23.11.2005 [24]
• Software Delivery Description, Secured RSA Key Generation Library, 1.0,
23.11.2005 [25]
Note that the customer who buys the TOE is normally the developer of the
operating system and/or application software which will use the TOE as the
hardware computing platform with a crypto library that provides cryptographic
support. The documents will be used by the customer to implement the software
(operating system / application software) and to integrate the required parts of
the Secured Crypto Library.
The ETR-lite of this evaluation will be available for a future composite
evaluation on the base of this TOE. It is intended to provide the results of this
evaluation in a way that meets the requirements for a composite evaluation as
defined in AIS 36 [4].
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0368-2006 Certification Report
7 IT Product Testing
For Information on testing of the IC part of the TOE, please read the
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0293-2005 [11].
Developer Tests:
Tests on functionality and memory leakage have been performed by the
developer to the farthest possible extend using specialised automatic test
software.
The TOE consists of a Secured Crypto Library on the P5CC036V1D as IC
dedicated Software. Therefore the test environment is based on a smart card
reader connected to a PC.
The performed Test Sequences describe real test scenarios. In a test sequence
all necessary commands are collected to build up the special environment of
the test case, the preparation for the particular function call is done and the
particular function is called in conjunction with the expected return code.
The testing concentrates on the interfaces, the subsystems, and the modules of
the TOE security functions as identified and described in the functional
specification, the high level design and the low level design. The functions are
called with different parameters and different sets of option bits. In addition,
many standard tests from NIST are used showing the correctness of the
implemented algorithms.
Manual checks which cannot be performed in an automated manner are
described with sufficient detail to cover all aspects of the security functions, this
includes tests with an emulation of the hardware to cover the low level
interfaces of the Secured Crypto Library.
Independent evaluator tests:
The evaluators repeated a carefully chosen subset of the automatic developer
tests using the same test environment and test tools as the developer. The
evaluators have also done additional testing for all security functions.
The developer provided many tests for each TSF. These tests have been
verified and extended by the evaluators in an appropriate manner. The tests
produced the expected results. This verified the correct implementation of the
TSFs in the TOE. The independent testing performed by the evaluators
additionally confirmed that all the TOE’s security functions behave as specified
in the Security Target [6] and as detailed in the developer’s functional
specification.
To verify and reject possible vulnerabilities, the evaluators performed
penetration tests. Therefore, they took all security functions into consideration.
Intensive penetration testing was performed to consider the physical tampering
of the TOE using highly sophisticated equipment and expertise know how. In
addition non-invasive attacks like side channel analysis and fault analysis were
performed during the vulnerability tests. During the evaluator’s penetration
testing the TOE operated as specified. The TOE withstood the penetration
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efforts of attackers with high attack potential in the intended environment for the
TOE.
8 Evaluated Configuration
The TOE is a composite TOE, consisting of the hardware “Philips SmartMX
P5CC036V1D Secure Smart Card Controller”, which is used as the evaluated
platform and the “Secured Crypto Library on the P5CC036V1D”, which is built
upon this platform.
The considered configuration of the Secured Crypto Library on the
P5CC036V1D assumes that the crypto library is executed in System Mode.
9 Results of the Evaluation
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [8] was provided by the ITSEF
according to the Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of
the Scheme [3] and all interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as
relevant for the TOE.
The evaluation methodology CEM [2] was used for those components identical
with EAL4. For components beyond EAL4 the methodology was defined in co-
ordination with the Certification Body [4, AIS 34]).
As the evaluation of the TOE was conducted as a composition evaluation, the
ETR [8] includes also the evaluation results of the composite evaluation
activities in accordance with CC Supporting Document, ETR-lite for
Composition: Annex A Composite smart card evaluation [4, AIS 36].
The ETR [8] builds up on the ETR-lite for Composition documents of the
evaluations of the underlying hardware "Philips SmartMX P5CC036V1D Secure
Smart Card Controller " (see [11]).
For smart card IC specific methodology the CC supporting documents or Joint
Interpretation Library documents
• The Application of CC to Integrated Circuits
• Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards
• Integrated Circuit Hardware Evaluation Methodology and
(see [4]: AIS 25 and AIS 26), AIS 31 (Functionality classes and evaluation
methodology for physical random number generators) and AIS 20 (Functionality
classes and evaluation methodology for deterministic random number
generators) were used.
The assurance refinements outlined in the Security Target were followed in the
course of the evaluation of the TOE.
The verdicts for the CC, Part 3 assurance components (according to EAL4
augmented and the class ASE for the Security Target evaluation) are
summarised in the following table.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0368-2006 Certification Report
Assurance classes and components Verdict
Security Target evaluation CC Class ASE PASS
TOE description ASE_DES.1 PASS
Security environment ASE_ENV.1 PASS
ST introduction ASE_INT.1 PASS
Security objectives ASE_OBJ.1 PASS
PP claims ASE_PPC.1 PASS
IT security requirements ASE_REQ.1 PASS
Explicitly stated IT security requirements ASE_SRE.1 PASS
TOE summary specification ASE_TSS.1 PASS
Configuration management CC Class ACM PASS
Partial CM automation ACM_AUT.1 PASS
Generation support and acceptance procedures ACM_CAP.4 PASS
Problem tracking CM coverage ACM_SCP.2 PASS
Delivery and operation CC Class ADO PASS
Detection of modification ADO_DEL.2 PASS
Installation, generation, and start-up procedures ADO_IGS.1 PASS
Development CC Class ADV PASS
Fully defined external interfaces ADV_FSP.2 PASS
Security enforcing high-level design ADV_HLD.2 PASS
Implementation of the TSF ADV_IMP.2 PASS
Descriptive low-level design ADV_LLD.1 PASS
Informal correspondence demonstration ADV_RCR.1 PASS
Informal TOE security policy model ADV_SPM.1 PASS
Guidance documents CC Class AGD PASS
Administrator guidance AGD_ADM.1 PASS
User guidance AGD_USR.1 PASS
Life cycle support CC Class ALC PASS
Sufficiency of security measures ALC_DVS.2 PASS
Developer defined life-cycle model ALC_LCD.1 PASS
Well-defined development tools ALC_TAT.1 PASS
Tests CC Class ATE PASS
Analysis of coverage ATE_COV.2 PASS
Testing: low-level design ATE_DPT.2 PASS
Functional testing ATE_FUN.1 PASS
Independent testing – sample ATE_IND.2 PASS
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Assurance classes and components Verdict
Vulnerability assessment CC Class AVA PASS
Analysis and testing for insecure states AVA_MSU.3 PASS
Strength of TOE security function evaluation AVA_SOF.1 PASS
Highly resistant AVA_VLA.4 PASS
Table 8: Verdicts for the assurance components
This certification is a re-certification of the composition TOE with crypto library
certified under the certification ID “BSI-DSZ-CC-0296” (see [27]). The only
change is an additional augmentation of the EAL level (ATE_DPT.1 augmented
to ATE_DPT.2). The TOE itself remains completely the same in both processes.
The additional augmentation has only an effect on the documention relevant for
the evaluation.
The evaluation has shown that:
• the TOE is conform to the Smartcard IC Platform Protection Profile,
BSI-PP-0002-2001 [9],
• Security Functional Requirements specified for the TOE are Common
Criteria Part 2 extended,
• the assurance of the TOE is Common Criteria Part 3 conformant, EAL4
augmented by ADV_IMP.2, ALC_DVS.2, ATE_DPT.2, AVA_MSU.3, and
AVA_VLA.4,
• the TOE fulfils the claimed strength of function SOF-high for the functions as
outlined in chapter 1.3.
This applies to F.LOG, F.RSA, F.RNG, and F.RNG_Access.
Therefore the scheme interpretations AIS 20, AIS 26, and AIS 31 (see [4])
were used.
The rating of the strength of functions does not include the cryptoalgorithms
suitable for encryption and decryption (see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2).
This holds for the TOE security functions F.RSA, F.RSA_KeyGen, F.HW_DES,
and F.DES.
For specific evaluation results regarding the development and production
environment see annex A in part D of this report.
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the Philips P5CC036V1D
Secure Smart Card Controller with Cryptographic Library as IC Dedicated
Support Software as outlined in this report and that is produced and initialised in
an environment that was subject to an audit in the cause of the evaluation.
The validity can be extended to new versions and releases of the product,
provided the sponsor applies for re-certification or assurance continuity of the
modified product, in accordance with the procedural requirements, and the
evaluation of the modified product does not reveal any security deficiencies.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0368-2006 Certification Report
10 Comments/Recommendations
The operational documentation (refer to chapter 6 of this report) contains
necessary information about the secure usage of the TOE. Additionally, for
secure usage of the TOE the fulfilment of the assumptions about the
environment in the Security Target [6] and the Security Target as a whole has to
be taken into account. Therefore a user/administrator has to follow the guidance
in these documents.
For evaluations of products or systems including the TOE as a part or using the
TOE as a platform (for example smart card operating systems or complete
smart cards), specific information resulting from this evaluation is of importance
and shall be given to the succeeding evaluation. Therefore, the document ETR-
lite [26] was generated according to AIS 36 [4]. That document lists the results
of additional evaluator actions performed to support a composite evaluation of
the TOE together with a specific smart card embedded software.
Based on the life cycle model only the delivery of the TOE at the end of phase 4
is relevant. Nevertheless the interaction between phase 1 and phase 2 are also
important and they are taken into account. During the evaluation dedicated
tasks were performed to examine the interface between the Smartcard
Embedded Software developer and the developer of the smartcard IC. These
composition related actions cover the following tasks:
• The integration of the Smartcard Embedded Software in the IC manufacturer
configuration management system.
This comprises the handling of the ROM-code, the related acceptance and
verification procedures with the customer and the assignment to a unique
commercial type identifier as well as the handling of different ROM-code
masks for the same smartcard IC.
This comprises also the handling of Fabkey and pre-personalisation data
with respect to the physical, technical and organisational measures to
protect these data as well as the procedures to ensure the correct
configuration of the TOE. In addition, the production test related to customer
specific items including the integrity check of the customer ROM-code and
the personalisation process are checked.
• The configuration of the TOE (mask coded bits assembled with the ROM
code and different configuration pattern for the EEPROM loaded at the end
of the wafer tests) according to the configuration issues described in the
Security Target (refer to [10]).
• Consistency check and verification for the ROM code delivery and the data
of the pre-personalisation procedures between Philips and the customer.
In addition, the separation based on the unique commercial type identifier
according to test and delivery was also subject of the evaluation.
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11 Annexes
Annex A: Evaluation results regarding the development and production
environment. (see part D of this report)
12 Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [7] of the target of evaluation
(TOE) is provided within a separate document. It is a sanitised version of the
complete security target [6] used for the evaluation performed.
13 Definitions
13.1 Acronyms
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal
Office for Information Security
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (see [1])
DES Data Encryption Standard; symmetric block cipher algorithm
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
EEPROM Electrically Erasable Programmable Read Only Memory
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
GDS Graphic Design System; Image file format used for integrated
circuit masks
IC Integrated Circuit
IT Information Technology
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
NIST National Institute of Standards & Technology
PP Protection Profile
RNG Random Number Generator
ROM Read Only Memory
RSA Rivest, Shamir, Adelmann – a public key encryption algorithm
SF Security Function
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SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
SOF Strength of Function
SSMC Systems on Silicon Manufacturing Co. Pte. Ltd., Singapore
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
Triple-DES Symmetric block cipher algorithm based on the DES
TSC TSF Scope of Control
TSF TOE Security Functions
TSP TOE Security Policy
TSS TOE Summary Specification
13.2 Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more assurance component(s) from CC
Part 3 to an EAL or assurance package.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not
contained in part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in part 3 of the
CC.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics
based on well-established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - An entity within the TSC that contains or receives information and
upon which subjects perform operations.
Protection Profile - An implementation-independent set of security require-
ments for a category of TOEs that meet specific consumer needs.
Security Function - A part or parts of the TOE that have to be relied upon for
enforcing a closely related subset of the rules from the TSP.
Security Target - A set of security requirements and specifications to be used
as the basis for evaluation of an identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined
semantics.
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Strength of Function - A qualification of a TOE security function expressing
the minimum efforts assumed necessary to defeat its expected security
behaviour by directly attacking its underlying security mechanisms.
SOF-basic - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that
the function provides adequate protection against casual breach of TOE
security by attackers possessing a low attack potential.
SOF-medium - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows
that the function provides adequate protection against straightforward or
intentional breach of TOE security by attackers possessing a moderate attack
potential.
SOF-high - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that
the function provides adequate protection against deliberately planned or
organised breach of TOE security by attackers possessing a high attack
potential.
Subject - An entity within the TSC that causes operations to be performed.
Target of Evaluation - An IT product or system and its associated
administrator and user guidance documentation that is the subject of an
evaluation.
TOE Security Functions - A set consisting of all hardware, software, and
firmware of the TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the
TSP.
TOE Security Policy - A set of rules that regulate how assets are managed,
protected and distributed within a TOE.
TSF Scope of Control - The set of interactions that can occur with or within a
TOE and are subject to the rules of the TSP.
14 Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 2.1, August 1999
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
(CEM), Part 1, Version 0.6; Part 2: Evaluation Methodology, Version 1.0,
August 1999
[3] BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for
the TOE.
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148, BSI 7149), periodically
updated list published also on the BSI Web-site
[6] Philips Semiconductors Evaluation Documentation: Secured Crypto
Library on the P5CC036V1D - Security Target, Revision 2.2.0,
27.01.2006 (confidential document)
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0368-2006 Certification Report
[7] Philips Semiconductors Evaluation Documentation: Secured Crypto
Library on the P5CC036V1D- Security Target Lite, Version 2.2.0,
30.01.2006
[8] Evaluation Technical Report; BSI-DSZ-CC-0368; Version 1.2; Feb 9th,
2006 (confidential document)
[9] Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI): Smartcard IC
Platform Protection Profile (SSVG-PP), Version 1.0, July 2001; registered
and certified by (BSI) under the reference BSI-PP-0002-2001
[10] Philips Semiconductors Documentation: Hardware Security Target Lite -
Evaluation of the Philips P5CC036V1D, Secure Smart Card Controller,
Version 1.0, 13.05.2005
[11] Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0293-2005 for Philips P5CC036V1D
and P5CC009V1D with specific IC Dedicated Software Secure Smart
Card Controller from Philips Semiconductors GmbH, Business Line
Identification, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI),
19.08.2005
[12] Philips Semiconductors User Guidance: Secured Crypto Library on the
P5CC036V1D, User Guidance, Revision 2.0, November 23rd, 2005
[13] Philips Semiconductors User Guidance: Crypto Library on SmartMX –
Pseudo Random Number Generator & Chi-Squared Test Library, User
Guidance, Revision 3.0, November 23rd, 2005
[14] Philips Semiconductors User Guidance: Crypto Library on SmartMX –
Secured DES Library, User Guidance, Revision 2.0, November 23rd,
2005
[15] Philips Semiconductors User Guidance: Crypto Library on SmartMX –
SHA-1 Library, User Guidance, Revision 3.0, November 23rd, 2005
[16] Philips Semiconductors User Guidance: Crypto Library on SmartMX –
Secured RSA Library, User Guidance, Revision 3.0, November 23rd,
2005
[17] Philips Semiconductors User Guidance: Crypto Library on SmartMX –
Secured RSA Key Generation Library, User Guidance, Revision 3.0,
November 23rd, 2005
[18] Philips Semiconductors Data Sheet: SmartMX - P5CC036 Secure Smart
Card Controller, Revision 3.3, 27.06.2005, Document-ID 081733
[19] Philips Semiconductors Documentation: Instruction Set SmartMX-Family,
Secure Smart Card Controller, Objective Specification, Revision 1.0, May
9th, 2003, Document Number: 084110
[20] Philips Semiconductors Guidance, Delivery and Operation Manual:
P5CC036V1D - Evaluation of Philips P5CC036V1D - Secure Smart Card
Controller, Revision 1.0, 23.03.2005
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[21] Software Delivery Description, Secured DES Library, Delivery Module
Contents, Revision 1.0, 23 November 2005, Doc.No 117110
[22] Software Delivery Description, SHA-1 Library, Delivery Module Contents,
Revision 1.0, 23 November 2005, Doc.No 117510
[23] Software Delivery Description, Secured Random Number Library,
Delivery Module Contents, Revision 1.0, 23 November 2005, Doc.No
117410
[24] Software Delivery Description, Secured RSA Library, Delivery Module
Contents, Revision 1.0, 23 November 2005, Doc.No 117210
[25] Software Delivery Description, Secured RSA Key Generation Library,
Delivery Module Contents, Revision 1.0, 23 November 2005, Doc.No
117310
[26] ETR-lite for composition according to AIS36 as summary of the
Evaluation Technical Report; BSI-DSZ-CC-0368; Version 1.2; Feb 8th,
2006 (confidential document)
[27] Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0296-2006 for Philips P5CC036V1D
Secure Smart Card Controller with Cryptographic Libraryas IC Dedicated
Support Software from Philips Semiconductors GmbH, Business Line
Identification, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI)
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C Excerpts from the Criteria
CC Part 1:
Caveats on evaluation results (chapter 5.4) / Final Interpretation 008
The conformance result indicates the source of the collection of requirements
that is met by a TOE or PP that passes its evaluation. This conformance result
is presented with respect to Part 2 (functional requirements), Part 3 (assurance
requirements) and, if applicable, to a pre-defined set of requirements (e.g., EAL,
Protection Profile).
The conformance result consists of one of the following:
Part 2 conformant - A PP or TOE is Part 2 conformant if the functional
requirements are based only upon functional components in Part 2
Part 2 extended - A PP or TOE is Part 2 extended if the functional
requirements include functional components not in Part 2
plus one of the following:
Part 3 conformant - A PP or TOE is Part 3 conformant if the assurance
requirements are based only upon assurance components in Part 3
Part 3 extended - A PP or TOE is Part 3 extended if the assurance
requirements include assurance requirements not in Part 3.
Additionally, the conformance result may include a statement made with respect
to sets of defined requirements, in which case it consists of one of the following:
Package name Conformant - A PP or TOE is conformant to a pre-defined
named functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the requirements
(functions or assurance) include all components in the packages listed as part
of the conformance result.
Package name Augmented - A PP or TOE is an augmentation of a pre-defined
named functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the requirements
(functions or assurance) are a proper superset of all components in the
packages listed as part of the conformance result.
Finally, the conformance result may also include a statement made with respect
to Protection Profiles, in which case it includes the following:
PP Conformant - A TOE meets specific PP(s), which are listed as part of the
conformance result.
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CC Part 3:
Assurance categorisation (chapter 2.5)
"The assurance classes, families, and the abbreviation for each family are
shown in Table 2.1."
Assurance Class Assurance Family Abbreviated Name
Class ACM: Configuration
management
CM automation ACM_AUT
CM capabilities ACM_CAP
CM scope ACM_SCP
Class ADO: Delivery and
operation
Delivery ADO_DEL
Installation, generation and start-up ADO_IGS
Class ADV: Development Functional specification ADV_FSP
High-level design ADV_HLD
Implementation representation ADV_IMP
TSF internals ADV_INT
Low-level design ADV_LLD
Representation correspondence ADV_RCR
Security policy modeling ADV_SPM
Class AGD: Guidance
documents
Administrator guidance AGD_ADM
User guidance AGD_USR
Class ALC: Life cycle support Development security ALC_DVS
Flaw remediation ALC_FLR
Life cycle definition ALC_LCD
Tools and techniques ALC_TAT
Class ATE: Tests Coverage ATE_COV
Depth ATE_DPT
Functional tests ATE_FUN
Independent testing ATE_IND
Class AVA: Vulnerability
assessment
Covert channel analysis AVA_CCA
Misuse AVA_MSU
Strength of TOE security functions AVA_SOF
Vulnerability analysis AVA_VLA
Table 2: Assurance family breakdown and map
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Evaluation assurance levels (chapter 6)
"The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that
balances the level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of
acquiring that degree of assurance. The CC approach identifies the separate
concepts of assurance in a TOE at the end of the evaluation, and of
maintenance of that assurance during the operational use of the TOE.
It is important to note that not all families and components from Part 3 are
included in the EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful
and desirable assurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and
components will be considered for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and
STs for which they provide utility."
Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview (chapter 6.1)
Table 6.1 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a
hierarchically ordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families.
Each number in the resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component
where applicable.
As outlined in the next section, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation
assurance levels are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE's assurance.
They are hierarchically ordered inasmuch as each EAL represents more
assurance than all lower EALs. The increase in assurance from EAL to EAL is
accomplished by substitution of a hierarchically higher assurance component
from the same assurance family (i.e. increasing rigour, scope, and/or depth)
and from the addition of assurance components from other assurance families
(i.e. adding new requirements).
These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as
described in chapter 2 of this Part 3. More precisely, each EAL includes no
more than one component of each assurance family and all assurance
dependencies of every component are addressed.
While the EALs are defined in the CC, it is possible to represent other
combinations of assurance. Specifically, the notion of “augmentation“ allows the
addition of assurance components (from assurance families not already
included in the EAL) or the substitution of assurance components (with another
hierarchically higher assurance component in the same assurance family) to an
EAL. Of the assurance constructs defined in the CC, only EALs may be
augmented. The notion of an “EAL minus a constituent assurance component“
is not recognised by the CC as a valid claim. Augmentation carries with it the
obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility and added value of the
added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also be extended with
explicitly stated assurance requirements.
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Assurance Class Assurance
Family
Assurance Components by
Evaluation Assurance Level
EAL1 EAL2 EAL3 EAL4 EAL5 EAL6 EAL7
Configuration
management
ACM_AUT 1 1 2 2
ACM_CAP 1 2 3 4 4 5 5
ACM_SCP 1 2 3 3 3
Delivery and
operation
ADO_DEL 1 1 2 2 2 3
ADO_IGS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Development ADV_FSP 1 1 1 2 3 3 4
ADV_HLD 1 2 2 3 4 5
ADV_IMP 1 2 3 3
ADV_INT 1 2 3
ADV_LLD 1 1 2 2
ADV_RCR 1 1 1 1 2 2 3
ADV_SPM 1 3 3 3
Guidance
documents
AGD_ADM 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
AGD_USR 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Life cycle
support
ALC_DVS 1 1 1 2 2
ALC_FLR
ALC_LCD 1 2 2 3
ALC_TAT 1 2 3 3
Tests ATE_COV 1 2 2 2 3 3
ATE_DPT 1 1 2 2 3
ATE_FUN 1 1 1 1 2 2
ATE_IND 1 2 2 2 2 2 3
Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_CCA 1 2 2
AVA_MSU 1 2 2 3 3
AVA_SOF 1 1 1 1 1 1
AVA_VLA 1 1 2 3 4 4
Table 3: Evaluation assurance level summary
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Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL1) - functionally tested (chapter 6.2.1)
"Objectives
EAL1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but
the threats to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where
independent assurance is required to support the contention that due care has
been exercised with respect to the protection of personal or similar information.
EAL1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer,
including independent testing against a specification, and an examination of the
guidance documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL1 evaluation could
be successfully conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE,
and for minimal outlay.
An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a
manner consistent with its documentation, and that it provides useful protection
against identified threats.“
Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL2) - structurally tested (chapter 6.2.2)
"Objectives
EAL2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of
design information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the
part of the developer than is consistent with good commercial practice. As such
it should not require a substantially increased investment of cost or time.
EAL2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users
require a low to moderate level of independently assured security in the
absence of ready availability of the complete development record. Such a
situation may arise when securing legacy systems, or where access to the
developer may be limited.“
Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL3) - methodically tested and checked
(chapter 6.2.3)
"Objectives
EAL3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from
positive security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of
existing sound development practices.
EAL3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
moderate level of independently assured security, and require a thorough
investigation of the TOE and its development without substantial re-
engineering.“
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Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL4) - methodically designed, tested, and
reviewed (chapter 6.2.4)
"Objectives
EAL4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security
engineering based on good commercial development practices which, though
rigorous, do not require substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other
resources. EAL4 is the highest level at which it is likely to be economically
feasible to retrofit to an existing product line.
EAL4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users
require a moderate to high level of independently assured security in
conventional commodity TOEs and are prepared to incur additional security-
specific engineering costs.“
Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL5) - semiformally designed and tested
(chapter 6.2.5)
"Objectives
EAL5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security
engineering based upon rigorous commercial development practices supported
by moderate application of specialist security engineering techniques. Such a
TOE will probably be designed and developed with the intent of achieving EAL5
assurance. It is likely that the additional costs attributable to the EAL5
requirements, relative to rigorous development without the application of
specialised techniques, will not be large.
EAL5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users
require a high level of independently assured security in a planned development
and require a rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable
costs attributable to specialist security engineering techniques.“
Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL6) - semiformally verified design and
tested (chapter 6.2.6)
"Objectives
EAL6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security
engineering techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to
produce a premium TOE for protecting high value assets against significant
risks.
EAL6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for
application in high risk situations where the value of the protected assets
justifies the additional costs.“
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Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL7) - formally verified design and tested
(chapter 6.2.7)
"Objectives
EAL7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in
extremely high risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies
the higher costs. Practical application of EAL7 is currently limited to TOEs with
tightly focused security functionality that is amenable to extensive formal
analysis.“
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Strength of TOE security functions (AVA_SOF) (chapter 14.3)
AVA_SOF Strength of TOE security functions
"Objectives
Even if a TOE security function cannot be bypassed, deactivated, or corrupted,
it may still be possible to defeat it because there is a vulnerability in the concept
of its underlying security mechanisms. For those functions a qualification of their
security behaviour can be made using the results of a quantitative or statistical
analysis of the security behaviour of these mechanisms and the effort required
to overcome them. The qualification is made in the form of a strength of TOE
security function claim.“
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VLA) (chapter 14.4)
AVA_VLA Vulnerability analysis
"Objectives
Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether vulnerabilities
identified, during the evaluation of the construction and anticipated operation of
the TOE or by other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses), could allow users to
violate the TSP.
Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that a user will be able to discover
flaws that will allow unauthorised access to resources (e.g. data), allow the
ability to interfere with or alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorised
capabilities of other users.“
"Application notes
A vulnerability analysis is performed by the developer in order to ascertain the
presence of security vulnerabilities, and should consider at least the contents of
all the TOE deliverables including the ST for the targeted evaluation assurance
level. The developer is required to document the disposition of identified
vulnerabilities to allow the evaluator to make use of that information if it is found
useful as a support for the evaluator's independent vulnerability analysis.“
"Independent vulnerability analysis goes beyond the vulnerabilities identified by
the developer. The main intent of the evaluator analysis is to determine that the
TOE is resistant to penetration attacks performed by an attacker possessing a
low (for AVA_VLA.2), moderate (for AVA_VLA.3) or high (for AVA_VLA.4)
attack potential.“
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D Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Evaluation results regarding development
and production environment D-3
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Annex A of Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0368-2006
Evaluation results regarding
development and production
environment
The IT product Philips P5CC036V1D Secure Smart Card Controller with Cryptographic
Library as IC Dedicated Support Software (Target of Evaluation, TOE) has been
evaluated at an accredited and licensed / approved evaluation facility using the
Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Part 1 Version 0.6, Part 2
Version 1.0, extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL4
and smart card specific guidance, for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT
Security Evaluation, Version 2.1 (ISO/IEC15408: 1999) and including final
interpretations for compliance with Common Criteria Version 2.2 and Common
Methodology Part 2, Version 2.2.
As a result of the TOE certification, dated 13. March 2006, the following results
regarding the development and production environment apply. The Common Criteria
assurance requirements
• ACM – Configuration management (i.e. ACM_AUT.1, ACM_CAP.4, ACM_SCP.2),
• ADO – Delivery and operation (i.e. ADO_DEL.2, ADO_IGS.1) and
• ALC – Life cycle support (i.e. ALC_DVS.2, ALC_LCD.1, ALC_TAT.1),
are fulfilled for the development and production sites of the TOE listed below ((a) – (g)):
Philips Semiconductors GmbH, Business Line Identification
(BL ID), Georg-Heyken-Strasse 1, 21147 Hamburg, Germany, (development
center)
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
(f)
(g)
Philips Semiconductors GmbH, Assembly and Test Organisation Hamburg
Stresemannallee 101, 22529 Hamburg, Germany
Philips Semiconductors (Thailand), 303 Chaengwattana Rd., Laksi Bangkok
10210, Thailand (assembly)
Philips Semiconductors GmbH, Business Line Identification, Document Control
Office, Mikron-Weg 1, 8101 Gratkorn, Austria
Systems on Silicon Manufacturing Co. Pte. Ltd. 8 (SSMC), 70 Pasir Ris Drive 1,
Singapore 519527, Singapore (semiconductor factory)
Photronics Singapore Pte. Ltd., 6 Loyang Way 2, Loyang Industrial Park,
Singapore 507099, Singapore (mask shop)
Photronics Semiconductors Mask Corp. (PSMC), 1F, No.2, Li-Hsin Rd., Science-
Based Industrial Park, Hsin-Chu City Taiwan R.O.C. (mask shop)
The TOE is manufactured in the IC fabrication SSMC in Singapore indicated by the
nameplate (on-chip identifier) T503D.
For the sites listed above, the requirements have been specifically applied in
accordance with the Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-0296, Revision 2.0.0, 23.11.2005,
Secured Crypto Library on the P5CC036V1D [6]. The evaluators verified, that the
threats are countered and the security objectives for the life cycle phases 2, 3 and 4 up
to delivery at the end of phase 3 or 4 as stated in the TOE Security Target are fulfilled
by the procedures of these sites.
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