HPColor LaserJet Enterprise M856,
HPColor LaserJet Managed E85055,
HPColor LaserJet Managed E55040,
HPLaserJet Enterprise M610/M611/M612
Security Target
Version: 1.2
Status: Final
Last Update: 2021-04-15
Classification: Public
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Trademarks
The following terms are trademarks of Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P. in the United
States, other countries, or both.
• HP®
• LaserJet®
The following terms are trademarks of The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Incorporated
in the United States, other countries, or both:
• 2600.1™
• IEEE®
The following term is a trademark of Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) in the United States,
other countries, or both:
• Kerberos™
The following terms are trademarks of Microsoft Corporation in the United States, other countries, or
both:
• Microsoft®
• SharePoint®
• Windows®
• Authenticode®
The following term is a trademark of INSIDE Secure in the United States, other countries, or both:
• INSIDE Secure®
• QuickSec®
Other company, product, and service names may be trademarks or service marks of others.
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Legal Notices
This document is provided AS IS with no express or implied warranties. Use the information in this
document at your own risk.
This document may be reproduced or distributed in any form without prior permission provided the
copyright notice is retained on all copies. Modified versions of this document may be freely distributed
provided that they are clearly identified as such, and this copyright is included intact.
Revision History
Version Date Author(s) Changes Made
1.2 2021-04-15 Gerardo Colunga &
Anthony Peterson
Public version.
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Table of Contents
1 Introduction.........................................................................................................................................12
1.1 Security Target Identification .....................................................................................................12
1.2 TOE Identification ......................................................................................................................12
1.3 TOE Type....................................................................................................................................12
1.4 TOE Overview............................................................................................................................12
1.4.1 Required and Optional Hardware, Software, and Firmware...............................................13
1.4.2 Intended Method of Use......................................................................................................14
1.5 TOE Description.........................................................................................................................14
1.5.1 TOE Models and Firmware Versions .................................................................................14
1.5.2 TOE Architecture................................................................................................................17
1.5.3 TOE Security Functionality (TSF) Summary .....................................................................22
Auditing ..........................................................................................................................22
Cryptography ..................................................................................................................22
Identification and Authentication....................................................................................23
Data Protection and Access Control ...............................................................................25
Protection of the TSF......................................................................................................28
TOE Access Protection...................................................................................................28
Trusted Channel Communication and Certificate Management.....................................28
User and Access Management ........................................................................................29
1.5.4 TOE Boundaries..................................................................................................................29
Physical...........................................................................................................................29
Logical ............................................................................................................................30
Evaluated Configuration .................................................................................................30
1.5.5 Security Policy Model.........................................................................................................31
Subjects/Users.................................................................................................................31
Objects ............................................................................................................................32
SFR Package Functions ..................................................................................................35
SFR Package Attributes ..................................................................................................35
2 CC Conformance Claim......................................................................................................................36
2.1 Protection Profile Tailoring and Additions.................................................................................36
2.1.1 IEEE Std 2600.1-2009; "2600.1-PP, Protection Profile for Hardcopy Devices, Operational
Environment A" ([PP2600.1]) ............................................................................................................36
2.1.2 SFR Package for Hardcopy Device Document Storage and Retrieval (DSR) Functions
([PP2600.1-DSR])...............................................................................................................................41
2.1.3 SFR Package for Hardcopy Device Print Functions ([PP2600.1-PRT]).............................42
2.1.4 SFR Package for Hardcopy Device Shared-medium Interface Functions ([PP2600.1-SMI])
42
3 Security Problem Definition ...............................................................................................................44
3.1 Introduction.................................................................................................................................44
3.2 Threat Environment ....................................................................................................................44
3.2.1 Threats Countered by the TOE ...........................................................................................44
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3.3 Assumptions................................................................................................................................45
3.3.1 Environment of Use of the TOE .........................................................................................45
Physical...........................................................................................................................45
Personnel.........................................................................................................................45
Connectivity....................................................................................................................46
3.4 Organizational Security Policies.................................................................................................46
3.4.1 Included in the PP2600.1 Protection Profile.......................................................................46
3.4.2 In addition to the PP2600.1 Protection Profile....................................................................47
4 Security Objectives.............................................................................................................................48
4.1 Objectives for the TOE...............................................................................................................48
4.2 Objectives for the Operational Environment ..............................................................................48
4.3 Security Objectives Rationale.....................................................................................................50
4.3.1 Coverage .............................................................................................................................50
4.3.2 Sufficiency..........................................................................................................................52
5 Extended Components Definition.......................................................................................................59
5.1 Class FPT: Protection of the TSF ...............................................................................................59
5.1.1 Restricted Forwarding of Data to External Interfaces (FDI)...............................................59
FPT_FDI_EXP.1 - Restricted Forwarding of Data to External Interfaces .....................59
5.2 Class FCS: Cryptographic Support.............................................................................................60
5.2.1 Cryptographic Operation (Random Bit Generation) (FCS_RBG)......................................60
FCS_RBG_EXT.1 – Random Bit Generation ................................................................60
6 Security Requirements........................................................................................................................61
6.1 TOE Security Functional Requirements .....................................................................................61
6.1.1 Security audit (FAU)...........................................................................................................64
Audit data generation (FAU_GEN.1) .............................................................................64
User identity association (FAU_GEN.2) ........................................................................65
6.1.2 Cryptographic support (FCS)..............................................................................................65
Cryptographic key generation (FCS_CKM.1-ipsec).......................................................65
Cryptographic key generation (FCS_CKM.1-job)..........................................................66
Cryptographic key establishment (FCS_CKM.2)...........................................................66
Cryptographic operation for IPsec (FCS_COP.1-ipsec) .................................................66
Cryptographic operation for encrypted stored print jobs (FCS_COP.1-job) ..................67
Cryptographic operation for TSF self-testing (FCP_COP.1-tst).....................................68
Random Bit Generation (FCS_RBG_EXT.1).................................................................68
6.1.3 User data protection (FDP) .................................................................................................69
Common access control SFP (FDP_ACC.1-cac)............................................................69
TOE function access control SFP (FDP_ACC.1-tfac)....................................................70
Common access control functions (FDP_ACF.1-cac)....................................................70
TOE function access control functions (FDP_ACF.1-tfac) ............................................71
Subset residual information protection (FDP_RIP.1) .....................................................72
6.1.4 Identification and authentication (FIA)...............................................................................72
Local Device sign in authentication failure handling (FIA_AFL.1)...............................72
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Local user attribute definition (FIA_ATD.1)..................................................................72
Verification of secrets (FIA_SOS.1)...............................................................................73
Timing of Control Panel authentication (FIA_UAU.1) ..................................................73
IPsec authentication before any action (FIA_UAU.2)....................................................73
Control Panel protected authentication feedback (FIA_UAU.7)....................................73
Timing of Control Panel identification (FIA_UID.1).....................................................74
IPsec identification before any action (FIA_UID.2).......................................................74
User-subject binding (FIA_USB.1) ................................................................................74
6.1.5 Security management (FMT)..............................................................................................75
Management of security functions (FMT_MOF.1) ........................................................75
Management of security attributes (FMT_MSA.1) ........................................................76
Management of TSF data (FMT_MTD.1) ......................................................................80
Specification of management functions (FMT_SMF.1) .................................................80
Security roles (FMT_SMR.1) .........................................................................................81
6.1.6 Protection of the TSF (FPT)................................................................................................81
Restricted forwarding of data to external interfaces (FPT_FDI_EXP.1)........................81
Reliable time stamps (FPT_STM.1) ...............................................................................81
TSF testing (FPT_TST.1) ...............................................................................................81
6.1.7 TOE access (FTA) ..............................................................................................................82
TSF-initiated termination of Control Panel sign-in session (FTA_SSL.3).....................82
6.1.8 Trusted path/channels (FTP)...............................................................................................82
Inter-TSF trusted channel (FTP_ITC.1)..........................................................................82
6.2 Security Functional Requirements Rationale..............................................................................83
6.2.1 Coverage .............................................................................................................................83
6.2.2 Sufficiency..........................................................................................................................86
6.2.3 Security requirements dependency analysis........................................................................94
6.3 Security Assurance Requirements ..............................................................................................97
6.4 Security Assurance Requirements Rationale ..............................................................................98
7 TOE Summary Specification..............................................................................................................99
7.1 TOE Security Functionality ........................................................................................................99
7.1.1 Auditing ..............................................................................................................................99
7.1.2 Cryptography ....................................................................................................................104
7.1.3 Identification and Authentication (I&A)...........................................................................104
Control Panel I&A ........................................................................................................104
IPsec I&A......................................................................................................................107
7.1.4 Data Protection and Access Control .................................................................................108
Permission Sets .............................................................................................................108
Job PINs........................................................................................................................109
Job Encryption Passwords ............................................................................................109
Common Access Control ..............................................................................................110
TOE Function Access Control......................................................................................111
Residual Information Protection...................................................................................112
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7.1.5 Protection of the TSF........................................................................................................112
Restricted Forwarding of Data to External Interfaces...................................................112
TSF Self-Testing...........................................................................................................112
Reliable Timestamps.....................................................................................................113
7.1.6 TOE Access Protection.....................................................................................................113
Inactivity Timeout.........................................................................................................113
7.1.7 Trusted Channel Communication and Certificate Management.......................................113
7.1.8 CAVP Certificates.............................................................................................................116
7.1.9 User and Access Management ..........................................................................................118
8 Abbreviations, Terminology and References....................................................................................120
8.1 Abbreviations............................................................................................................................120
8.2 Terminology..............................................................................................................................121
8.3 References.................................................................................................................................122
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List of Tables
Table 1: TOE reference...............................................................................................................................15
Table 2: English-only guidance documentation..........................................................................................15
Table 3: IPsec user mappings to allowed network protocols......................................................................25
Table 4: Permission sets to user roles.........................................................................................................26
Table 5: TOE users .....................................................................................................................................32
Table 6: User data.......................................................................................................................................33
Table 7: TSF data........................................................................................................................................34
Table 8: TSF data listing.............................................................................................................................34
Table 9: SFR package functions .................................................................................................................35
Table 10: SFR package attributes ...............................................................................................................35
Table 11: SFR mappings between 2600.1 and the ST................................................................................37
Table 12: SFR mappings of non-PP2600.1 SFRs and the ST (in the ST, but not required by or
hierarchical to SFRs in PP2600.1)..............................................................................................................40
Table 13: SFR mappings between 2600.1-DSR and the ST.......................................................................42
Table 14: SFR mappings between 2600.1-PRT and the ST........................................................................42
Table 15: SFR mappings between 2600.1-SMI and the ST........................................................................42
Table 16: Threats countered by the TOE....................................................................................................44
Table 17: Physical assumptions..................................................................................................................45
Table 18: Personnel assumptions................................................................................................................45
Table 19: Connectivity assumptions...........................................................................................................46
Table 20: Organizational security policies in the PP2600.1 protection profile ..........................................46
Table 21: Organizational security policies in addition to the PP2600.1 protection profile ........................47
Table 22: Security objectives for the TOE..................................................................................................48
Table 23: Security objectives for the operational environment ..................................................................48
Table 24: Mapping of security objectives to threats and policies...............................................................50
Table 25: Mapping of security objectives for the Operational Environment to assumptions, threats and
policies........................................................................................................................................................51
Table 26: Sufficiency of objectives countering threats...............................................................................52
Table 27: Sufficiency of objectives holding assumptions...........................................................................54
Table 28: Sufficiency of objectives enforcing Organizational Security Policies........................................56
Table 29: Security functional requirements for the TOE............................................................................61
Table 30: Auditable events .........................................................................................................................64
Table 31: Asymmetric cryptographic key generation.................................................................................65
Table 32: Cryptographic key establishment................................................................................................66
Table 33: Cryptographic operations for IPsec ............................................................................................67
Table 34: Cryptographic operations for encrypted stored print jobs ..........................................................68
Table 35: Cryptographic operations for TSF self-testing ...........................................................................68
Table 36: Common Access Control SFP ....................................................................................................69
Table 37: Management of functions ...........................................................................................................75
Table 38: Management of security attributes..............................................................................................76
Table 39: Management of TSF data............................................................................................................80
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Table 40: Mapping of security functional requirements to security objectives..........................................83
Table 41: Security objectives for the TOE rationale...................................................................................86
Table 42: TOE SFR dependency analysis...................................................................................................94
Table 43: Security assurance requirements.................................................................................................97
Table 44: TOE audit records.....................................................................................................................100
Table 45: Trusted channel connections.....................................................................................................114
Table 46: CAVP certificates .....................................................................................................................116
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List of Figures
Figure 1: HCD Physical Diagram...............................................................................................................18
Figure 2: HCD Logical Scope Diagram......................................................................................................22
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1 Introduction
1.1 Security Target Identification
Title: HP Color LaserJet Enterprise M856,
HP Color LaserJet Managed E85055,
HP Color LaserJet Managed E55040,
HP LaserJet Enterprise M610/M611/M612
Security Target
Version: 1.2
Status: Final
Date: 2021-04-15
Sponsor: HP Inc.
Developer: HP Inc.
Certification Body: CSEC
Certification ID: CSEC2019024
Keywords: Common Criteria, HCD, Hardcopy Device, Color LaserJet, Color LaserJet
Enterprise, Color LaserJet Managed, M856, E85055, E55040, M610, M611,
M612
1.2 TOE Identification
The TOE is the HP FutureSmart 4.10 Firmware for the HP Color LaserJet Enterprise M856, HP Color
LaserJet Managed E85055, HP Color LaserJet Managed E55040, and HP LaserJet Enterprise
M610/M611/M612 printers. The complete list of TOE models and firmware versions are provided in
Table 1.
1.3 TOE Type
The TOE type is the internal firmware providing functionality of a network single-function printer (SFP).
1.4 TOE Overview
The TOE models are enterprise network SFPs designed to be shared by many client computers and users.
These products are designed to meet the requirements of the [PP2600.1] protection profile.
The TOE contains functions for the printing, storing, and retrieving of documents. These hardcopy
devices (HCDs), as they are called in [PP2600.1], are self-contained units that include processors,
memory, networking, one storage drive, and a print engine. The operating system, web servers, and
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Control Panel applications (i.e., applications that run internally on the HCD) reside within the firmware of
the HCD.
The TOE is the contents of the firmware with the exception of the operating system which are part of the
Operational Environment.
Each model provides the following security features:
• Auditing
• Cryptography
• Identification and authentication
• Data protection and access control
• Protection of the TSF (restricted forwarding, TSF self-testing, timestamps)
• TOE access protection (inactivity timeout)
• Trusted channel communication and certificate management
• User and access management
1.4.1 Required and Optional Hardware, Software, and Firmware
The following required components are part of the Operational Environment.
• The applicable SFP model from Table 1 for running the TOE firmware.
• Domain Name System (DNS) server
• One administrative client computer connected to the TOE in the role of an Administrative
Computer. It must contain:
o Web browser
• One or both of the following:
o Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) server
o Windows domain controller/Kerberos server
• Syslog server
• Windows Internet Name Service (WINS) server
• Network Time Protocol (NTP) server
The following optional components are part of the Operational Environment.
• Client computers connected to the TOE in a non-administrative computer role
• HP Print Drivers, including the HP Universal Print Driver, for client computers (for submitting
print job requests from client computers)
• SMTP gateway
• SMB server for administrative backup and restore of customer-specific configuration settings and
TSF data
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1.4.2 Intended Method of Use
[PP2600.1] is defined for a commercial information processing environment in which a high level of
document security, network security, and security assurance are required.
The TOE is intended to be used in non-hostile, networked environments where TOE users have direct
physical access to the HCDs for the printing, storing, and retrieving of documents. The physical
environment should be reasonably controlled and/or monitored where physical tampering of the HCDs
would be evident and noticed.
The TOE can be connected to multiple network computers via a wired local area network using HP's
embedded Jetdirect Inside printer server in the evaluated configuration. The evaluated configuration uses
secure network mechanisms for communication between the network computers and the TOE. The TOE
is managed by one designated administrative computer. The TOE is not intended be connected to the
Internet.
The evaluated configuration contains a built-in user identification and authentication database (a.k.a. sign-
in method) used for Local Device Sign In that is part of the TOE. It also supports a Windows domain
controller (via Kerberos) for a feature called Windows Sign In and a Lightweight Directory Access
Protocol (LDAP) authentication server for a feature called LDAP Sign In to identify and authenticate
users. The Windows domain controller and LDAP server are part of the Operational Environment.
The evaluated configuration supports the Embedded Web Server (EWS) interface and Representational
State Transfer (REST) Web Services interface for managing the TOE over HTTP.
The Universal Serial Bus (USB) ports are disabled in the evaluated configuration.
1.5 TOE Description
1.5.1 TOE Models and Firmware Versions
Table 1 shows the HCD models included in this evaluation.
Physically speaking, all models use the same ASIC and processor. All models contain one field-
replaceable nonvolatile storage drive. They all have a Control Panel for operating the HCD locally and
Ethernet network capability for connecting to a network. They all support submission of print jobs over
the network and remote administration over the network. The main physical differences between models
are floor models versus table top models, the number and size of paper feeders, print speed, and whether
or not they contain a stapler/stacker.
All TOE models use the same Jetdirect Inside firmware version.
• JSI24100002
The TOE includes the following System firmware versions.
1. 2410028_055028 (HP FutureSmart 4.10 Firmware)
2. 2410028_055002 (HP FutureSmart 4.10 Firmware)
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3. 2410028_055009 (HP FutureSmart 4.10 Firmware)
Table 1 includes a mapping of the System firmware versions to the TOE models.
Table 1: TOE reference
Product model name Product number System firmware version
HP Color LaserJet Enterprise M856dn T3U51A 2410028_055002
HP Color LaserJet Enterprise M856x T3U52A
HP Color LaserJet Managed E85055dn T3U66A
HP Color LaserJet Managed E55040dn 3GX99A 2410028_055028
HP LaserJet Enterprise M610n 7PS81A 2410028_055009
HP LaserJet Enterprise M610dn 7PS82A
HP LaserJet Enterprise M611n 7PS83A
HP LaserJet Enterprise M611dn 7PS84A
HP LaserJet Enterprise M611x 7PS85A
HP LaserJet Enterprise M612x 7PS87A
The following table lists the English-guidance documentation for the TOE:
Table 2: English-only guidance documentation
Models Title Reference
All Common Criteria Evaluated Configuration Guide for HP Single-function
Printers
HP Color LaserJet Enterprise M856,
HP Color LaserJet Managed E85055,
HP Color LaserJet Managed E55040dn,
HP LaserJet Enterprise M610/M611/M612
Edition 1, 4/2021
[CCECG]
M856dn,
M856x
HP Color LaserJet Enterprise M856
User Guide
Edition 1, 10/2019
[M856-UG]
M856dn, HP Color LaserJet Enterprise M856 [M856-IG]
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Models Title Reference
M856x
M856dn
M856x
Installation Guide
2019
E85055dn HP Color LaserJet Managed E85055
User Guide
Edition 1, 10/2019
[E85055-UG]
E85055dn HP Color LaserJet Managed E85055
E85055dn
Installation Guide
2019
[E85055-IG]
E55040dn HP Color LaserJet Managed E55040dn
User Guide
Edition 1, 10/2019
[E55040-UG]
E55040dn HP Color LaserJet Managed E55040dn
E55040dn
Installation Guide
2019
[E55040-IG]
M610n,
M610dn,
M611n,
M611dn,
M611x,
M612x
HP LaserJet Enterprise M610
HP LaserJet Enterprise M611
HP LaserJet Enterprise M612
User Guide
[M610_1_2-
UG]
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Models Title Reference
Edition 1, 05/2020
M610n,
M610dn,
M611n,
M611dn,
M611x,
M612x
HP LaserJet Enterprise M610
HP LaserJet Enterprise M611
HP LaserJet Enterprise M612
M610, M611, M612
Installation Guide
2020
[M610_1_2-IG]
The firmware, [CCECG], and other supporting files are packaged in a single ZIP file (i.e., a file in ZIP
archive file format). This ZIP file is available for download from the HP Inc. website. The firmware is
packaged in this ZIP file as a single firmware bundle. This firmware bundle contains the HP FutureSmart
firmware, which in turn contains the System firmware and Jetdirect Inside firmware.
The consumer receives the hardware independent of the ZIP file. The evaluated hardware models, which
are defined in Table 1, are either already on the consumer's premises or must be obtained from HP Inc.
1.5.2 TOE Architecture
As mentioned previously, the TOE is the firmware of an SFP designed to be shared by many network
client computers and human users.
The TOE can be connected to a wired local network through the embedded Jetdirect Inside printer
server's built-in Ethernet or to a USB device using its USB port (but the use of which must be disabled in
the evaluated configuration).
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Figure 1: HCD Physical Diagram
HCD
Administrative
Computer
HTTP
&
PJL
over
IPsec
PJL
over
IPsec
Commands
Commands &
Images
Remote Auth
LDAP
&
Kerberos
over
IPsec
SMTP
Gateways
SMTP
over
IPsec
Syslog
Server
Syslog
over
IPsec
Control
Panel
Print Engine
Network
Client
Computers
Embedded
Network
Interface
Operating System
USB
(types A & B)
Disabled in
the evaluated
configuration
System
Firmware
Jetdirect Inside
Firmware
Files
Storage Drive
NTP Server
NTP
over
IPsec
SMB Server
SMB
over
IPsec
DNS
Server
WINS
Server
DNS over
IPsec
WINS over
IPsec
Figure 1 shows a high-level physical diagram of an HCD with the unshaded areas representing the TOE
and the shaded areas indicating components that are part of the Operational Environment.
At the top of this figure is the Administrative Computer which connects to the TOE using Internet
Protocol Security (IPsec) with X.509v3 certificates for both mutual authentication and for protection of
data from disclosure and alteration. The Administrative Computer can administer the TOE using the
following interfaces over the IPsec connection:
• Embedded Web Server (EWS)
• Representational State Transfer (REST) Web Services
The EWS interface allows administrators to remotely manage the features of the TOE using a web
browser over HTTP.
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The REST Web Services interface allow administrators to externally manage the TOE over HTTP.
Printer Job Language (PJL) is used in a non-administrative capacity by the Administrative Computer. The
Administrative Computer uses PJL to send print jobs to the TOE as well as to receive job status. In
general, PJL supports password-protected administrative commands, but in the evaluated configuration
these commands are disabled. For the purposes of this Security Target, we define the PJL Interface as PJL
data sent to networking port 9100 on the TOE.
The TOE protects all non-broadcast/non-multicast network communications with IPsec, which is part of
the embedded Jetdirect Inside firmware. Though IPsec supports multiple authentication methods, in the
evaluated configuration, both ends of the IPsec connection are authenticated using X.509v3 certificates.
An identity certificate for the TOE must be created outside the TOE, signed by a Certificate Authority
(CA), and imported (added) into the TOE along with the Certificate Authority's CA certificate.
Because IPsec authenticates the computers (IPsec authenticates the computer itself; IPsec does not
authenticate the individual users of the computer), access to the Administrative Computer should be
restricted to TOE administrators only.
The TOE distinguishes between the Administrative Computer and Network Client Computers by using IP
addresses, IPsec, and the embedded Jetdirect Inside's internal firewall. In the evaluated configuration, the
number of Administrative Computers used to manage the TOE is limited to one and the Device
Administrator Password must be set.
Network Client Computers connect to the TOE using IPsec with X.509v3 certificates to protect the
communication and to mutually authenticate. Network Client Computers can send print jobs to the TOE
using the PJL Interface as well as receive job status.
The TOE protects stored print jobs with either a 4-digit Job PIN or by accepting (and storing) an
encrypted job from a client computer. Both protection mechanisms are optional by default and are
mutually exclusive of each other if used. In the evaluated configuration, every stored job must either be
assigned a 4-digit Job PIN or be an encrypted job.
The TOE supports name resolution using the DNS and WINS. The TOE uses IPsec with X.509v3
certificates to protect the communications and to mutually authenticate to the name resolution servers.
The TOE automatically synchronizes its system clock with an NTP server. The TOE uses IPsec with
X.509v3 certificates to protect the communications and to mutually authenticate to the NTP server.
The TOE also supports a remote file system (SMB server) for backing up and restoring TOE settings. The
TOE uses IPsec with X.509v3 certificates to protect the communications and to mutually authenticate to
the remote file system.
The TOE can send email alert messages to administrator-specified email addresses, or send automated
emails regarding product configuration and supplies to HP. The TOE supports protected communications
between itself and Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP) gateways. It uses IPsec with X.509v3
certificates to protect the communications and to mutually authenticate with the SMTP gateway. The
TOE can only protect unencrypted email up to the SMTP gateway. It is the responsibility of the
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Operational Environment to protect emails from the SMTP gateway to the email’s destination. Also, the
TOE can only send emails; it does not accept inbound emails.
Each HCD contains a user interface called the Control Panel. The Control Panel is the physical interface
that a user uses to communicate with the TOE when physically using the HCD. The LCD screen displays
information such as menus and status to the user. It also provides virtual buttons to the user such as an
alphanumeric keypad for entering usernames and passwords.
When a user signs in at the Control Panel, a Permission Set is associated with their session which
determines the functions the user is permitted to perform.
The TOE’s Control Panel supports local and remote sign-in methods for I&A of users.
• Local sign-in method:
o Local Device Sign In
• Remote sign-in methods:
o LDAP Sign In
o Windows Sign In
The Local Device Sign In method maintains the account information within the TOE. Only the Device
Administrator account, which is an administrative account, is supported through this method in the
evaluated configuration. The remote sign-in methods are called LDAP Sign In and Windows Sign In (i.e.,
Kerberos). The TOE uses IPsec with X.509v3 certificates to protect both the LDAP and Kerberos
communications.
The Print Engine in Figure 1 converts electronic documents into hardcopy form.
All SFP models contain a persistent storage drive (a.k.a. storage drive) that resides in the Operational
Environment. Depending on the SFP model, the storage drive will be either eMMC or a disk-based self-
encrypting drive (SED). For SFP models that contain eMMC, the HP TAA Version Secure Hard Disk
Drive accessory (HP part #: 5EL03A) is available for purchase to replace the eMMC. The HP TAA
Version Secure Hard Disk Drive accessory contains a disk-based SED that is FIPS 140-2 validated.
The storage drive contains a section called Job Storage which is a user-visible file system where stored
print jobs are stored/held. (Job types are discussed in section 1.5.5.2.1.)
If the SFP model contains eMMC, all jobs in Job Storage are automatically deleted when the HCD is
turned off. If the SFP model contains a disk-based SED, jobs in Job Storage can persist across power-
cycles or can be deleted depending on how the administrator configures the TOE and on the job type.
The TOE supports the auditing of document-processing functions and security-relevant events by
generating and forwarding audit records to a remote syslog server. The TOE uses IPsec with X.509v3
certificates to protect the communications between itself and the syslog server and for mutual
authentication of both endpoints.
The Jetdirect Inside Firmware and HCD System Firmware components comprise the firmware on the
system. They are shown as two separate components but they both share the same operating system (OS).
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The operating system is part of the Operational Environment. Both firmware components also contain an
Embedded Web Server (EWS).
The Jetdirect Inside firmware includes IPsec, a firewall, and the management functions for managing
these network-related features. The Jetdirect Inside firmware also provides the network stack and drivers
controlling the TOE's embedded Ethernet interface.
The HCD System Firmware controls the overall functions of the TOE from the Control Panel to the
storage drive to the print jobs.
Figure 2 shows the HCD boundary in grey and the firmware (TOE) boundary in blue (the TOE being
comprised of the HCD System firmware and the Jetdirect Inside firmware excluding the underlying
operating system). The Jetdirect Inside firmware provides the network connectivity and network device
drivers used by the HCD System firmware. The HCD System firmware and Jetdirect Inside firmware
share the same operating system (which is part of the Operational Environment). The HCD System
firmware also includes internal Control Panel applications that drive the functions of the TOE. Both
firmware components work together to provide the security functionality defined in this document for the
TOE.
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Figure 2: HCD Logical Scope Diagram
HCD
HCD System firmware & Jetdirect Inside firmware security functions TOE boundary
Control Panel
Identification &
Authentication
Network
Trusted Channel
Communication and
Certificate
Management
User and Access
Management
Data Protection
and
Access Control
Auditing
Protection of the TSF
(Restricted Forwarding of
Data to External
Interfaces,
TSF Self-Testing,
and Timestamps)
TOE Access
Protection
Human Users Administrative Computer Network Client Computers Trusted IT Products
Storage Drive Print Engine
Disabled in the
evaluated configuration
USB
Cryptography
1.5.3 TOE Security Functionality (TSF) Summary
Auditing
The TOE performs auditing of document-processing functions and security-relevant events. Both the
Jetdirect Inside and HCD System firmware generate audit records. The TOE connects and sends audit
records to a syslog server for long-term storage and audit review. (The syslog server is part of the
Operational Environment.)
Cryptography
The TOE uses IPsec to protect its communications channels. The HP FutureSmart QuickSec 5.1 (a.k.a.
QuickSec) cryptographic library within the TOE is used to supply the cryptographic algorithms for IPsec.
See section 1.5.3.7 for more information.
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The TOE supports key derivation and decryption for printing encrypted stored print jobs. Both the key
derivation function and decryption algorithm used by the TOE for this are included in the TOE. See
section 1.5.3.4.3 for more information.
The TOE contains a Data Integrity Test that provides administrators the ability to verify the integrity of
specific TSF Data TOE on-demand through the EWS. The Data Integrity Test uses the SHA-256
algorithm to verify the integrity of TSF Data. The HP FutureSmart Windows Mobile Enhanced
Cryptographic Provider (RSAENH) 6.00.1937 implementation, which is part of the operational
environment, supplies the SHA-256 algorithm. See section 1.5.3.5.3 for more information.
The TOE contains a Code Integrity Test that provides administrators the ability to verify the integrity of
TOE executable code files stored on the storage drive on-demand through the EWS. The Code Integrity
Test uses the SHA-256 algorithm to verify the integrity of TOE executable code files. The HP
FutureSmart Windows Mobile Enhanced Cryptographic Provider (RSAENH) 6.00.1937 implementation,
which is part of the operational environment, supplies the SHA-256 algorithm. See section 1.5.3.5.3 for
more information.
1.5.3.2.1 Cryptography Outside the Scope of the TOE
This section exists to inform the reader that the HCD contains other cryptography that is outside the scope
of the TOE, is not part of this evaluation, and is not used to fulfill any of the [PP2600.1] requirements.
The disk-based self-encrypting drive (SED) provides hardware-based cryptography and persistent storage
to securely manage sensitive document and system data. Data on this drive is encrypted and the
encryption key is locked to the HCD. The cryptographic functionality is transparent to the TOE and to the
user. Not all SFP models in this evaluation contain this storage drive. The SFP models that do not, instead
contain eMMC. For SFP models that contain eMMC, the HP TAA Version Secure Hard Disk Drive (HP
part #: 5EL03A) is available an accessory.
Certain areas of the eMMC are encrypted under the control of the TOE using the HCD's hardware.
Identification and Authentication
1.5.3.3.1 Control Panel I&A
From the Control Panel, the user can perform the following actions prior to authentication.
• Viewing of help information
• Viewing of device status information
• Viewing of network connectivity status information
• Viewing of system time
• Viewing of Web Services status information
• Viewing of Welcome screen
• Selection of Sign In
• Selection of sign-in method from Sign In screen
• Printing of help information
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• Printing of network connectivity status information
• Changing language for the session
• Resetting of session
The Control Panel user cannot perform any other TSF-mediated actions until after the user has been
successfully identified and authenticated.
Users select the sign-in method from a menu of sign-in methods. The menu options vary depending on
the number of remote sign-in methods configured for the TOE. The Control Panel supports the following
local and remote sign-in methods in the evaluated configuration.
The mechanism for the local sign-in method, which is part of the TOE firmware, is called:
• Local Device Sign In
Remote sign-in methods used by the TOE are:
• LDAP Sign In
• Windows Sign In (via Kerberos)
Although the Local Device Sign In method supports multiple accounts, only the built-in Device
Administrator account (U.ADMINISTRATOR) is to be used with this method in the evaluated
configuration. The administrator must not create any Local Device Sign In accounts.
For successful authentication using a remote sign-in method, Control Panel users must enter their
username and password as defined on the remote authentication server.
When users sign in through the Control Panel, the TOE displays dots for each character of access code or
password typed to prevent onlookers from viewing another user's authentication data. The TOE also
contains account lockout functionality for the built-in Device Administrator account to help prevent
password discovery through a brute-force attack.
1.5.3.3.2 IPsec I&A
Client computers can connect to the TOE to submit print jobs and to manage the TOE. The TOE uses
IPsec to identify and mutually authenticate client computers that attempt to connect to the TOE.
The client computers that connect to the TOE are considered IPsec users and are classified as either
Network Client Computers or the Administrative Computer. The TOE uses IP addresses to identify these
users and Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA) X.509v3 certificates to authenticate the users. The IP address of
a connecting client computer must be defined in the TOE's IPsec/Firewall in order for the computer to be
considered authorized to access the TOE. Any client computer not defined in the TOE's IPsec/Firewall is
considered unauthorized and is blocked by the firewall from accessing the TOE.
The TOE uses IPsec/Firewall address templates, service templates, and rules to map IP addresses to
network service protocols. An address template contains two or more IP addresses. A service template
contains one or more allowed network service protocols. A rule contains a mapping of an address
template to a service template. Through the rules, an administrator determines the User Role of the client
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computers (i.e., the administrator determines which client computer is the Administrative Computer and
which client computers are the Network Client Computers). In the evaluated configuration, the
IPsec/Firewall only allows the Administrative Computer to connect to all interfaces supported by the
TOE. The Network Client Computers are limited to just the PJL Interface (TCP port 9100). Table 3
shows the mapping of IPsec users to their allowed network protocols.
Table 3: IPsec user mappings to allowed network protocols
IPsec user Allowed network protocol access
Administrative Computer (U.ADMINISTRATOR) EWS (HTTP), REST Web Services (HTTP), and
PJL (TCP port 9100)
Network Client Computer (U.NORMAL) PJL (TCP port 9100)
Because IPsec mutual authentication is performed at the computer level, not the user level, the computer
allowed by the firewall to access the TOE via the EWS interface and REST Web Services interface must
itself be the Administrative Computer. This means that non-TOE administrative users should not be
allowed to logon to the Administrative Computer because every user of the Administrative Computer is
potentially a TOE administrator.
IPsec is configured to use X.509v3 certificates via the Internet Key Exchange (IKE) protocols. Both
IKEv1 and IKEv2 are supported in the evaluated configuration.
In addition, the TOE can contact many types of trusted IT products using IPsec and mutual authentication.
The TOE contacts these trusted IT products either to send data to them (e.g., send email alert to the SMTP
Gateway) or to request information from them (e.g., authenticate a user using LDAP). The TOE mutually
authenticates these servers via IPsec prior to sending data or requesting information from them.
Data Protection and Access Control
1.5.3.4.1 Permission Sets
The TOE controls user access to functions available at the Control Panel using permissions. Each Control
Panel application and protected feature has an associated permission. A permission is configured to either
grant or deny access. Permissions are defined in Permission Sets (a.k.a. User Roles) which are assigned to
users. To execute a Control Panel application or protected feature, the applicable permission must be
configured to grant access in the Permission Set applied to a user. The Permission Set applied to a user is
a combination of Permission Sets assigned to the user.
The TOE contains built-in Permission Sets. The built-in Permission Sets are:
• Device Guest
• Device Administrator
• Device User
Built-in Permission Sets cannot be deleted or renamed. Additionally, the permissions defined in the
Device Administrator Permission Set cannot be configured (i.e. the permissions are always set to grant
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access). The TOE provides the ability to add custom Permission Sets. Permission Sets are stored in the
TOE and are managed via the EWS.
The following table lists the access control level each Permission Set provides, and the User Role each
Permission Set is assigned to in the evaluated configuration.
Table 4: Permission sets to user roles
Permission set Access control level Assigned to user role
Device Guest None
(The Device Guest Permission
Set has all permissions
configured to deny access.)
All
Device Administrator Administrative
(The Device Administrator
Permission Set has all
permissions set to grant access.
With all permissions set to grant
access, the Device Administrator
Permission Set provides access
to all functions.)
U.ADMINISTRATOR
Device User Non-administrative
(The Device User Permission Set
has all permissions for
administrative functions
configured to deny access.)
U.NORMAL
Custom (if any are added by
U.ADMINISTRATOR)
Non-administrative
(The Custom Permission Set has
all permissions for
administrative functions
configured to deny access.)
U.NORMAL
1.5.3.4.2 Job PINs
Users control access to print jobs that they place in Job Storage by assigning Job PINs to these jobs
(required in the evaluated configuration). Job PINs must be 4 digits in length. Job PINs limit access to
these jobs while they reside on the TOE and allow users to control when the jobs are printed so that
physical access to the hard copies can be controlled.
1.5.3.4.3 Job Encryption Password
The TOE can store, and decrypt encrypted stored print jobs received from a client computer that has the
HP Universal Print Driver installed. A stored print job is first encrypted by the client computer using a
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user-specified Job Encryption Password. The job is then sent encrypted to the TOE and stored encrypted
by the TOE.
To print or delete an encrypted stored print job at the Control Panel, a non-administrative user must
provide the correct Job Encryption Password for the job. An administrative user can delete an encrypted
stored print job at the Control Panel without providing a Job Encryption Password but must provide the
correct Job Encryption Password to print the job.
1.5.3.4.4 Common Access Control
The TOE protects each job in Job Storage from non-administrative users through the use of a user
identifier and a Job PIN or through the use of just a Job Encryption Password. The user identifier for a
print job received from a client computer is either automatically assigned by that client computer or
assigned by the user sending the print job from the client computer. Every job in Job Storage is assigned
either a Job PIN or a Job Encryption Password by the user at job creation time.
The default rules for a non-administrative (U.NORMAL) user for accessing a job in Job Storage are:
• if the job is Job PIN protected:
o the job owner (i.e., the authenticated user who matches the job's user identifier) can
access the job without supplying the Job PIN
o any non-owner authenticated user who supplies the correct Job PIN can access the job
• if the job is Job Encryption Password protected, any authenticated user who supplies the correct
Job Encryption Password can access the job
A Control Panel administrator (U.ADMINISTRATOR) user has a permission in their Permission Set that
allows them to delete a job in Job Storage.
1.5.3.4.5 TOE Function Access Control
For Control Panel users, the TOE controls access to Control Panel applications (e.g., Print from Job
Storage) using Permission Sets and, optionally, sign-in methods (authentication databases). Permission
Sets act as User Roles to determine if the user can perform a function controlled by permissions.
Each Control Panel application requires the user to have one or more specific permissions in their session
Permission Set in order to access that application. In addition, the TOE's administrator can map a sign-in
method to each Control Panel application and require the user to be authenticated to that sign-in method
in order to access that application. The individual applications only check and enforce permissions. They
do not check the sign-in methods. Instead, the TOE enforces the sign-in method requirement at the time
that the user signs in to the TOE by removing permissions from the user's session Permission Set for each
application in which the user's sign-in method does not match the sign-in method required by the TOE.
By removing the permissions required by each non-matching application, the TOE limits the set of
applications that the user can access.
Administrators can change/modify the sign-in method mapped to each application. In addition, the TOE
contains a function that allows administrators to select if the sign-in method application mappings are
enforced or ignored by the TOE. This function is called "Allow users to choose alternate sign-in methods
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at the product control panel." When this function is disabled, the TOE enforces the "sign-in method to
application" mappings and prunes (reduces) the user's session Permission Set accordingly. When this
function is enabled, the sign-in method mappings are ignored by the TOE and the user's session
Permission Set remains unchanged.
For IPsec users, the TOE uses the IPsec/Firewall to control access to the supported network service
protocols. The IPsec/Firewall contains the IP addresses of authorized client computers grouped into
address templates and the network service protocols grouped into service templates. The administrator
maps an address template to a service template using an IPsec/Firewall rule. Service templates, therefore,
act as the User Roles. IP addresses of computers not contained in a rule are denied access to the TOE.
1.5.3.4.6 Residual Information Protection
The TOE protects deleted objects by making them unavailable to TOE users via the TOE's interfaces.
This prevents TOE users from attempting to recover deleted objects of other users via the TOE interfaces.
Protection of the TSF
1.5.3.5.1 Restricted Forwarding of Data to External Interfaces
The TOE allows an administrator to restrict the forwarding of data received from an External Interface to
the Shared-medium Interface. The TOE does not provide a pathway or support for commands necessary
to achieve network access.
1.5.3.5.2 TSF Self-Testing
The TOE contains a suite of self tests to test specific security functionality of the TOE. It contains an on-
demand Data Integrity Test to verify the integrity of specific TSF Data of the TOE, and an on-demand
Code Integrity Test to verify the integrity of TOE executable code files stored on the storage drive.
1.5.3.5.3 Reliable Timestamps
The TOE contains a system clock that is used to generate reliable timestamps. In the evaluated
configuration, the TOE must be configured to synchronize its system clock with a Network Time Protocol
(NTP) server.
TOE Access Protection
1.5.3.6.1 Inactivity Timeout
The Control Panel supports an Inactivity Timeout in case users forget to sign out of the Control Panel
after signing in.
Trusted Channel Communication and Certificate Management
The TOE supports IPsec to protect data being transferred over the Shared-medium Interface. IPsec along
with IKE use Diffie-Hellman (DH) key establishment (a.k.a. key exchange) to establish the key used for
the secure channel, IP addresses and RSA X.509v3 certificates to identify and authenticate the endpoint,
and the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) with cipher block chaining (CBC) to protect the data
transfers between the TOE and the endpoint using the key derived from the key establishment. DH uses
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the Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) for key generation. In addition, the Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA)
and Hashed Message Authentication Code (HMAC) based on SHA are used as part of the IPsec/IKE
protocol. A deterministic random bit generator (DRBG)—specifically the counter DRBG
CTR_DRBG(AES) that uses AES—is used to generate cryptographically random numbers for creating
encryption keys, key material, and secret keys.
The IPsec and IKE cryptographic algorithms are all supplied by the QuickSec cryptographic library.
In the evaluated configuration, the following IPsec cryptographic algorithms are supported:
• RSA 2048-bit, and 3072-bit signature generation and verification
• DSA 2048-bit, 3072-bit, 4096-bit, 6144-bit, and 8192-bit key pair generation
• DH (IKEv1, IKEv2) key establishment/exchange
• AES-128, AES-192, and AES-256 in CBC mode for data transfers
• AES-256 (with ECB mode) for the CTR_DRBG(AES)
• CTR_DRBG(AES)
• SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512 hashing
• HMAC-SHA1-96
• HMAC-SHA-256-128
• HMAC-SHA-384-192
• HMAC-SHA-512-256
In addition, the TOE provides certificate management functions used to manage X.509v3 certificates used
for IPsec authentication.
User and Access Management
The TOE provides management capabilities for managing its security functionality. The TOE supports the
following roles:
• Administrator (U.ADMINISTRATOR)
• Normal User (U.NORMAL)
Administrators have the authority to manage the security functionality of the TOE and to manage normal
users. Normal users can only manage user data that they have access to on the TOE.
1.5.4 TOE Boundaries
Physical
The physical boundary of the TOE is the programs and data stored in the firmware of the HCD (except
for the embedded operating system) and the English-language guidance documentation.
QuickSec version 5.1 ([QuickSec51]) library implements the TOE's IPsec including the IPsec/Firewall.
QuickSec includes a cryptographic library which implements the algorithms used for IPsec.
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It is typical for an HCD, and thus the TOE, to be shared by many users and for those users to have direct
physical access to the HCD. By design, users have easy access to some of the hardware features, such as
the Control Panel, the paper input trays, the paper output trays, and the power button. But other features
such as the processor, volatile memory, and storage drive are located inside the HCD in the formatter
cage. The formatter cage can be secured to the HCD chassis using a combination lock, thus, restricting
normal user access to the components inside the cage.
Because of the restricted access to the storage drive, the drive is considered a non-removable non-volatile
storage device from the perspective of [PP2600.1].
Due to the physical accessibility of the HCDs, they must be used in non-hostile environments. Physical
access should be controlled and/or monitored.
Logical
The security functionality provided by the TOE has been described above and includes:
• Auditing
• Cryptography
• Identification and authentication
• Data protection and access control
• Protection of the TSF (restricted forwarding, TSF self-testing, and timestamps)
• TOE access protection (inactivity timeout)
• Trusted channel communication and certificate management
• User and access management
Evaluated Configuration
The following items need to be adhered to in the evaluated configuration:
• Only one Administrative Computer is used to manage the TOE.
• Third-party solutions must not be installed on the TOE.
• Licenses must not be installed to enable features beyond what is supported in the evaluated
configuration.
• Remote Control-Panel use is disallowed per P.REMOTE_PANEL.DISALLOWED.
• OAUTH2 use is disallowed.
• SNMP over HTTP use is disallowed.
• The Service PIN, used by a customer support engineer to access functions available to HP support
personnel, must be disabled.
• All stored jobs must be assigned a Job PIN or Job Encryption Password.
• Device USB and Host USB plug and play must be disabled.
• Control Panel Mandatory Sign-In must be enabled (this disables the Guest role).
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• When using Windows Sign In, the Windows domain must reject Microsoft NT LAN Manager
(NTLM) connections.
• User names for the LDAP and Windows Sign In users must only contain the characters defined in
P.USERNAME.CHARACTER_SET.
• Local Device Sign In accounts must not be created (i.e., only the built-in Device Administrator
account is allowed as a Local Device Sign In account).
• Device Administrator Password must be set as per P.ADMIN.PASSWORD.
• Remote Configuration Password must not be configured.
• PJL device access commands must be disabled.
• Firmware upgrades sent as print jobs through P9100 interface must be disabled.
• PJL drive access and PS drive access must be disabled.
• Wireless functionality must be disabled:
o Near Field Communication (NFC) must be disabled.
o Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) must be disabled.
o Wireless Direct Print must be disabled.
o Wireless station must be disabled.
• Jetdirect Inside management via telnet and FTP must be disabled.
• Jetdirect XML Services must be disabled.
• SNMP must be disabled.
• IPsec authentication using X.509v3 certificates must be enabled (IPsec authentication using
Kerberos or Pre-Shared Key is not supported).
• IPsec Authentication Headers (AH) must be disabled.
• Access must be blocked to the following Web Services (WS) using the Jetdirect Inside’s
IPsec/Firewall:
o Open Extensibility Platform device (OXPd) Web Services
o WS* Web Services
1.5.5 Security Policy Model
This section describes the security policy model for the TOE. Much of the terminology in this section
comes from [PP2600.1] and is duplicated here so that readers won't have to read [PP2600.1] to
understand the terminology used in the rest of this Security Target document.
Subjects/Users
Users are entities that are external to the TOE and which interact with the TOE. TOE users are defined in
Table 5.
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Table 5: TOE users
Designation Definition
U.USER Any authorized User. Authorized Users are U.ADMINISTRATOR and U.NORMAL.
Designation Definition
U.NORMAL A User who is authorized to perform User Document Data
processing functions of the TOE.
U.ADMINNISTRATOR A User who has been specifically granted the authority to
manage some portion or all of the TOE and whose actions
may affect the TOE security policy (TSP). A password
must be set for all U.ADMINISTRATOR accounts in the
evaluated configuration.
For the purpose of clarity in this Security Target, the following distinctions are made:
• Control Panel users - U.NORMAL and U.ADMINISTRATOR users who physically access the
TOE's Control Panel.
o Security attributes: User Role (defined by Permission Set) and User Identifier.
• IPsec users:
o Network Client Computers - Computers (U.NORMAL entities) that can successfully
authenticate to the TOE's PJL Interface (TCP port 9100) using IPsec and mutual
authentication. The TOE will accept print jobs from any user of a client computer where
the client computer has successfully authenticated with the TOE.
 Security attributes: User Role (defined by IPsec/Firewall service template) and
User Identifier (defined by IP address).
o Administrative Computer - Computer (U.ADMINISTRATOR entity) that can
successfully authenticate to the TOE's administrative interfaces (e.g., EWS (HTTP) and
REST Web Services (HTTP)) using IPsec and mutual authentication. An Administrative
Computer may also connect to the TOE as a Network Client Computer (i.e., the
Administrative Computer can send print jobs as a U.NORMAL user through the PJL
Interface on port 9100).
 Security attributes: User Role (defined by IPsec/Firewall service template) and
User Identifier (defined by IP address).
Objects
Objects are passive entities in the TOE that contain or receive information, and upon which Subjects
perform Operations. Objects are equivalent to TOE Assets. There are three types of Objects:
• User Data
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• TSF Data
• Functions
1.5.5.2.1 User Data
User Data are data created by and for Users and do not affect the operation of the TOE Security
Functionality (TSF). This type of data is comprised of two objects:
• User Document Data
• User Function Data
Table 6: User data
Designation Definition
D.DOC User Document Data consists of the information contained in a user's document. This
includes the original document itself in hardcopy or electronic form, image data, or
residually-stored data created by the HCD while processing an original document and
printed hardcopy output.
D.FUNC User Function Data are the information about a user's document or job to be processed
by the TOE.
User Data objects include:
• Print job types that use Job Storage:
o Personal jobs - Print jobs from a client computer that are stored in Job Storage. In the
evaluated configuration, such jobs must be PIN protected with a Job PIN. These jobs are
held until the user logs in to the Control Panel and releases the job. For PIN protected
stored jobs, the user must be the job owner or know the Job PIN (or have administrator
privileges) in order to delete the job. These jobs are automatically deleted after printing
or if the HCD is turned off or after an administrator specified time interval. If the HCD
contains the disk-based self-encrypting drive, the administrator can configure the TOE to
retain these jobs over a power cycle.
o Stored jobs - Print jobs such as a personnel form, time sheet, or calendar from a client
computer that are stored on the TOE and reprinted. In the evaluated configuration, such
jobs must be PIN protected with a Job PIN. The administrator can configure the TOE to
automatically delete these jobs after a specified time interval. For PIN protected stored
jobs, the user must be the job owner or know the Job PIN (or have administrator
privileges) in order to delete the job. If the HCD contains an eMMC, these jobs are
automatically deleted when the HCD is turned off.
o Encrypted stored print jobs - Print jobs like those described above but that require
higher than normal protection (for example, documents containing company or employee
confidential information). These jobs will be assigned a password by the submitter when
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submitted to the TOE. The user must know the password of the job in order to print or
delete it. The administrator may delete it without knowing the password. If the HCD
contains an eMMC, these jobs are automatically deleted when the HCD is turned off.
Ownership of a print job sent from a client computer is defined as the username associated with the job
when it is submitted to the TOE. The username is specified outside of the TOE, in the Operational
Environment, so it can neither be confirmed nor denied by the TOE.
1.5.5.2.2 TSF Data
TSF Data are data created by and for the TOE and that might affect the operation of the TOE. This type of
data is comprised of two components: TSF Protected Data and TSF Confidential Data.
Table 7: TSF data
Designation Definition
D.CONF TSF Confidential Data are assets for which either disclosure or alteration by a user who
is neither an administrator nor the owner of the data would have an effect on the
operational security of the TOE.
D.PROT TSF Protected Data are assets for which alteration by a user who is neither an
administrator nor the owner of the data would have an effect on the operational security
of the TOE, but for which disclosure is acceptable.
The following table lists the TSF Data and the data designations.
Table 8: TSF data listing
TSF data D.CONF D.PROT
Audit records X
Cryptographic keys and certificates X
Device and network configuration settings (including IPsec/Firewall rules
and templates)
X
Job PINs associated with PIN-protected stored print X
Content encryption keys associated with encrypted stored print jobs X
PJL protocol excluding the job data and Job PINs X
Permission sets X
System time X
User and administrator identification data X
User and administrator authentication data X
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SFR Package Functions
Functions perform processing, storage, and transmission of data. The following [PP2600.1]-defined
functions apply to this Security Target.
Table 9: SFR package functions
Designation Definition
F.DSR Document storage and retrieval: a function in which a document is stored during one
job and retrieved during one or more subsequent jobs.
F.PRT Printing: a function in which electronic document input is converted to physical
document output.
F.SMI Shared-medium interface: a function that transmits or receives User Data or TSF Data
over a communications medium which, in conventional practice, is or can be
simultaneously accessed by multiple users, such as wired network media and most
radio-frequency wireless media.
SFR Package Attributes
When a function is performing processing, storage, or transmission of data, the identity of the function is
associated with that particular data as a security attribute. The following [PP2600.1]-defined attributes
apply to this Security Target.
Table 10: SFR package attributes
Designation Definition
+DSR Indicates data that is associated with a document storage and retrieval job.
+PRT Indicates data that is associated with a print job.
+SMI Indicates data that is transmitted or received over a shared-medium interface.
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2 CC Conformance Claim
This Security Target is CC Part 2 extended and CC Part 3 conformant, with a claimed Evaluation
Assurance Level of EAL3, augmented by ALC_FLR.2.
This Security Target claims conformance to the following Protection Profiles and PP packages, if any:
• [PP2600.1]: IEEE Std 2600.1-2009; "2600.1-PP, Protection Profile for Hardcopy Devices,
Operational Environment A". Version 1.0 as of June 2009; demonstrable conformance.
• [PP2600.1-DSR]: SFR Package for Hardcopy Device Document Storage and Retrieval (DSR)
Functions. Version 1.0 as of June 2009; demonstrable conformance.
• [PP2600.1-PRT]: SFR Package for Hardcopy Device Print Functions. Version 1.0 as of June
2009; demonstrable conformance.
• [PP2600.1-SMI]: SFR Package for Hardcopy Device Shared-medium Interface Functions.
Version 1.0 as of June 2009; demonstrable conformance.
Common Criteria [CC] version 3.1 revision 5 is the basis for this conformance claim.
2.1 Protection Profile Tailoring and Additions
2.1.1 IEEE Std 2600.1-2009; "2600.1-PP, Protection Profile for
Hardcopy Devices, Operational Environment A" ([PP2600.1])
Although the HCDs in this Security Target contain a nonvolatile mass storage device (i.e., a storage
drive), this device is considered an internal, built-in component of the HCDs and, therefore, constitutes a
non-removable nonvolatile storage device from the perspective of [PP2600.1]. Because no removable
nonvolatile storage devices exist in the HCDs, this Security Target does not claim conformance to
"2600.1-NVS SFR Package for Hardcopy Device Nonvolatile Storage Functions, Operational
Environment A" contained in [PP2600.1].
The following tables provide the mappings of and rationale for how the SFRs in this Security Target map
to the SFRs in the protection profile [PP2600.1]. The term "n/a" means "not applicable". The term
"common" is used to refer to that portion of [PP2600.1] to which all TOEs must conform (i.e., the
portions not labeled as packages).
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Table 11: SFR mappings between 2600.1 and the ST
[PP2600.1] SFR Maps to ST
SFR(s)
Iteration Hierarchical
substitution
Rationale
FAU_GEN.1 FAU_GEN.1 The ST's FAU_GEN.1
combines the contents of
FAU_GEN.1 from the common
[PP2600.1] and FAU_GEN.1
from the [PP2600.1] SMI SFR
package.
FAU_GEN.2 FAU_GEN.2 n/a
FDP_ACC.1(a) FDP_ACC.1-cac The ST's FDP_ACC.1-cac
combines the contents of the
FDP_ACC.1(a) from the
common [PP2600.1] and the
FDP_ACC.1's from the
[PP2600.1] packages claimed
by the ST. The iteration name
was changed from "(a)" to "-
cac" (Common Access Control)
for better understandability
when reading the ST.
FDP_ACC.1(b) FDP_ACC.1-tfac The iteration name was changed
from "(b)" to "-tfac" (TOE
Function Access Control) for
better understandability when
reading the ST.
FDP_ACF.1(a) FDP_ACF.1-cac The ST's FDP_ACF.1-cac
combines the contents of the
FDP_ACF.1(a) from the
common [PP2600.1] and the
FDP_ACF.1's from the
[PP2600.1] packages claimed
by the ST. The iteration name
was changed from "(a)" to "-
cac" (Common Access Control)
for better understandability
when reading the ST.
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[PP2600.1] SFR Maps to ST
SFR(s)
Iteration Hierarchical
substitution
Rationale
FDP_ACF.1(b) FDP_ACF.1-tfac The iteration name was changed
from "(b)" to "-tfac" (TOE
Function Access Control) for
better understandability when
reading the ST.
FDP_RIP.1 FDP_RIP.1 n/a
FIA_ATD.1 FIA_ATD.1 n/a
FIA_UAU.1 FIA_UAU.1 The TOE's Control Panel
supports authentication
(FIA_UAU.1).
FIA_UAU.2 X The TOE supports IPsec
authentication (FIA_UAU.2)
which complies with the more
restrictive FIA_UAU.2.
FIA_UID.1 FIA_UID.1 The TOE's Control Panel
supports identification
(FIA_UID.1).
FIA_UID.2 X The TOE supports IPsec
identification (FIA_UID.2)
which complies with the more
restrictive FIA_UID.2.
FIA_USB.1 FIA_USB.1 n/a
FMT_MSA.1(a) FMT_MSA.1 FMT_MSA.1(a) was omitted
because management of all
security attributes can be
covered by FMT_MSA.1.
FMT_MSA.1(b) FMT_MSA.1 FMT_MSA.1(b) was omitted
because management of all
security attributes can be
covered by FMT_MSA.1.
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[PP2600.1] SFR Maps to ST
SFR(s)
Iteration Hierarchical
substitution
Rationale
FMT_MSA.3(a) None FMT_MSA.3(a) was omitted
because the security attributes
do not have default values in the
evaluated configuration.
FMT_MSA.3(b) None FMT_MSA.3(b) was omitted
because the security attributes
do not have default values in the
evaluated configuration.
FMT_MTD.1.1(a) FMT_MTD.1 Iteration was omitted because
only TSF Data that is not
associated with a Normal User
can be managed.
FMT_MTD.1.1(b) None Iteration was omitted because
only TSF Data that is not
associated with a Normal User
can be managed.
FMT_SMF.1 FMT_SMF.1 n/a
FMT_SMR.1 FMT_SMR.1 n/a
FPT_STM.1 FPT_STM.1 Because the TOE can be
configured to use NTP along
with its internal time source,
both A.SERVICES.RELIABLE
and OE.SERVICES.RELIABLE
apply.
FPT_TST.1 FPT_TST.1 n/a
FTA_SSL.3 FTA_SSL.3 n/a
These SFRs in the Security Target are not required by and do not map to the protection profile
[PP2600.1].
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Table 12: SFR mappings of non-PP2600.1 SFRs and the ST
(in the ST, but not required by or hierarchical to SFRs in PP2600.1)
[PP2600.1] SFR Maps to ST
SFR(s)
Iteration Hierarchical
substitution
Rationale
None FCS_CKM.1-ipsec X FCS_CKM.1-ipsec specifies the
type of cryptographic keys
generated for IPsec key
establishment.
None FCS_CKM.1-job X FCS_CKM.1-job specifies key
derivation function used by the
TOE to unlock an encrypted
stored print job.
None FCS_CKM.2 FCS_CKM.2 specifies
cryptographic key establishment
methods used by IKEv1 and
IKEv2 in IPsec
None FCS_COP.1-ipsec X FCS_COP.1-ipsec specifies
RSA signature generation and
verification along with AES and
HMAC cryptographic
algorithms used by the TOE in
IPsec.
None FCS_COP.1-job X FCS_COP.1-job specifies the
SHA and HMAC cryptographic
algorithms used by the TOE to
unlock encrypted stored print
jobs and the AES decryption
algorithm used by the TOE for
decrypting encrypted stored
print jobs.
None FCS_COP.1-tst X FCS_COP.1-tst specifies SHA
cryptographic algorithm used by
the TOE for TSF self-testing.
None FIA_AFL.1 The TOE locks the Device
Administrator account (a.k.a.
Local Administrator account)
after an administrator
configurable positive integer of
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[PP2600.1] SFR Maps to ST
SFR(s)
Iteration Hierarchical
substitution
Rationale
unsuccessful Control Panel
authentication attempts via the
Local Device Sign In method.
Recommended by [PP2600.1]
APPLICATION NOTE 38.
None FIA_SOS.1 FIA_SOS.1 specifies the Job
PIN strength of certain
authorization mechanisms used
by the TOE.
None FIA_UAU.7 The TOE masks Job PINs,
Access Codes, and passwords.
Recommended by [PP2600.1]
APPLICATION NOTE 38.
None FMT_MOF.1 X The TOE allows administrators
to manage the security functions
Control Panel authorization,
Windows Sign In, LDAP Sign
In, account lockout for Local
Administrator account,
Inactivity Timeout for Control
Panel user sign-in sessions,
enhanced security event
logging, and IPsec.
None FCS_RBG_EXT.1 FCS_RBG_EXT.1 specifies the
random bit generation used by
IPsec.
2.1.2 SFR Package for Hardcopy Device Document Storage and
Retrieval (DSR) Functions ([PP2600.1-DSR])
The following table shows how the SFRs in this SFR package map to the SFRs in the Security Target.
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Table 13: SFR mappings between 2600.1-DSR and the ST
[PP2600.1] SFR Maps to ST
SFR(s)
Iteration Hierarchical
substitution
Rationale
FDP_ACC.1 FDP_ACC.1-cac X See rationale for
FDP_ACC.1(a).
FDP_ACF.1 FDP_ACF.1-cac X See rationale for
FDP_ACF.1(a).
2.1.3 SFR Package for Hardcopy Device Print Functions ([PP2600.1-
PRT])
The following table shows how the SFRs in this SFR package map to the SFRs in the Security Target.
Table 14: SFR mappings between 2600.1-PRT and the ST
[PP2600.1] SFR Maps to ST
SFR(s)
Iteration Hierarchical
substitution
Rationale
FDP_ACC.1 FDP_ACC.1-cac X See rationale for
FDP_ACC.1(a).
FDP_ACF.1 FDP_ACF.1-cac X See rationale for
FDP_ACF.1(a).
2.1.4 SFR Package for Hardcopy Device Shared-medium Interface
Functions ([PP2600.1-SMI])
The following table shows how the SFRs in this SFR package map to the SFRs in the Security Target.
Table 15: SFR mappings between 2600.1-SMI and the ST
[PP2600.1] SFR Maps to ST
SFR(s)
Iteration Hierarchical
substitution
Rationale
FAU_GEN.1 FAU_GEN.1 The ST's FAU_GEN.1
combines the contents of
FAU_GEN.1 from the common
[PP2600.1] and FAU_GEN.1
from the [PP2600.1] SMI SFR
package.
FPT_FDI_EXP.1 FPT_FDI_EXP.1 n/a
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[PP2600.1] SFR Maps to ST
SFR(s)
Iteration Hierarchical
substitution
Rationale
FTP_ITC.1 FTP_ITC.1 n/a
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3 Security Problem Definition
3.1 Introduction
The statement of TOE security environment describes the security aspects of the environment in which
the TOE is intended to be used and the manner in which it is expected to be deployed.
To this end, the statement of TOE security environment identifies the list of assumptions made on the
Operational Environment (including physical and procedural measures) and the intended method of use of
the product, defines the threats that the product is designed to counter, and the organizational security
policies with which the product is designed to comply.
3.2 Threat Environment
This security problem definition addresses threats posed by four categories of threat agents:
a) Persons who are not permitted to use the TOE who may attempt to use the TOE.
b) Persons who are authorized to use the TOE who may attempt to use TOE functions for which
they are not authorized.
c) Persons who are authorized to use the TOE who may attempt to access data in ways for which
they not authorized.
d) Persons who unintentionally cause a software malfunction that may expose the TOE to
unanticipated threats.
The threats and policies defined in this Security Target address the threats posed by these threat agents.
The threat agents are assumed to originate from a well-managed user community in a non-hostile working
environment. Therefore, the product protects against threats of security vulnerabilities that might be
exploited in the intended environment for the TOE with low level of expertise and effort. The TOE
protects against straightforward or intentional breach of TOE security by attackers possessing a Basic
attack potential.
3.2.1 Threats Countered by the TOE
Table 16: Threats countered by the TOE
Threat Description
T.DOC.DIS User Document Data may be disclosed to unauthorized persons.
T.DOC.ALT User Document Data may be altered by unauthorized persons.
T.FUNC.ALT User Function Data may be altered by unauthorized persons.
T.PROT.ALT TSF Protected Data may be altered by unauthorized persons.
T.CONF.DIS TSF Confidential Data may be disclosed to unauthorized persons.
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Threat Description
T.CONF.ALT TSF Confidential Data may be altered by unauthorized persons.
3.3 Assumptions
3.3.1 Environment of Use of the TOE
Physical
Table 17: Physical assumptions
Assumption Description
A.ACCESS.MANAGED The TOE is located in a restricted or monitored environment that provides
protection from unmanaged access to the physical components and data
interfaces of the TOE.
A.ADMIN.PC.SECURE The administrative computer is in a physically secured and managed
environment and only the authorized administrator has access to it.
A.USER.PC.POLICY User computers are configured and used in conformance with the
organization's security policies.
Personnel
Table 18: Personnel assumptions
Assumption Description
A.USER.TRAINING TOE Users are aware of the security policies and procedures of their
organization, and are trained and competent to follow those policies and
procedures.
A.ADMIN.TRAINING Administrators are aware of the security policies and procedures of their
organization, are trained and competent to follow the manufacturer's guidance
and documentation, and correctly configure and operate the TOE in
accordance with those policies and procedures. The organization security
policies and procedures include security awareness training covering topics
such as how to identify and avoid clicking on malicious links.
A.ADMIN.TRUST Administrators do not use their privileged access rights for malicious
purposes.
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Connectivity
Table 19: Connectivity assumptions
Assumption Description
A.SERVICES.RELIABLE When the TOE uses any of the network services DNS, Kerberos, LDAP,
NTP, SMTP, syslog, SMB, and/or WINS, these services provide reliable
information and responses to the TOE.
A.EMAILS.PROTECTED For emails received by the SMTP gateway from the TOE, the transmission
of emails between the SMTP gateway and the email’s destination is
protected.
3.4 Organizational Security Policies
3.4.1 Included in the PP2600.1 Protection Profile
Table 20: Organizational security policies in the PP2600.1 protection profile
Organizational security policy Description
P.USER.AUTHORIZATION To preserve operational accountability and security, Users will be
authorized to use the TOE only as permitted by the TOE Owner.
P.SOFTWARE.VERIFICATION To detect corruption of the executable code in the TSF, procedures
will exist to self-verify executable code in the TSF.
P.AUDIT.LOGGING To preserve operational accountability and security, records that
provide an audit trail of TOE use and security-relevant events will
be created, maintained, and protected from unauthorized disclosure
or alteration, and will be reviewed by authorized personnel.
P.INTERFACE.MANAGEMENT To preserve operational accountability and security, records that
provide an audit trail of TOE use and security-relevant events will
be created, maintained, and protected from unauthorized disclosure
or alteration, and will be reviewed by authorized personnel.
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3.4.2 In addition to the PP2600.1 Protection Profile
Table 21: Organizational security policies in addition to the PP2600.1 protection profile
Organizational security policy Description
P.ADMIN.PASSWORD To restrict access to administrative tasks, the Device
Administrator Password will be set in the evaluated
configuration so that it is required to perform security-relevant
actions through the EWS (HTTP), REST Web Services
(HTTP), and at the Control Panel.
P.USERNAME.CHARACTER_SET To prevent ambiguous user names in the TOE's audit trail, the
user names of the LDAP and Windows Sign In users must only
contain ASCII printable characters except for the double quote
(22 hex) and single quote (27 hex) characters (i.e., allowed
ASCII characters in hexadecimal: 20, 21, 23 - 26, 28 - 7E).
P.REMOTE_PANEL.DISALLOWED To preserve operational accountability and security,
administrators must not use the Remote Control-Panel feature.
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4 Security Objectives
4.1 Objectives for the TOE
Table 22: Security objectives for the TOE
Security objective Description
O.AUDIT.LOGGED The TOE shall create and maintain a log of TOE use and security-
relevant events, and prevent its unauthorized disclosure or alteration.
O.CONF.NO_ALT The TOE shall protect TSF Confidential Data from unauthorized
alteration.
O.CONF.NO_DIS The TOE shall protect TSF Confidential Data from unauthorized
disclosure.
O.DOC.NO_ALT The TOE shall protect User Document Data from unauthorized
alteration.
O.DOC.NO_DIS The TOE shall protect User Document Data from unauthorized
disclosure.
O.FUNC.NO_ALT The TOE shall protect User Function Data from unauthorized alteration.
O.INTERFACE.MANAGED The TOE shall manage the operation of external interfaces in
accordance with security policies.
O.PROT.NO_ALT The TOE shall protect TSF Protected Data from unauthorized
alteration.
O.SOFTWARE.VERIFIED The TOE shall provide procedures to self-verify executable code in the
TSF.
O.USER.AUTHORIZED The TOE shall require identification and authentication of Users, and
shall ensure that Users are authorized in accordance with security
policies before allowing them to use the TOE.
4.2 Objectives for the Operational Environment
Table 23: Security objectives for the operational environment
Security objective Description
OE.ADMIN.PC.SECURE The TOE Owner shall locate the Administrative Computer in
a physically secured and managed environment and allow
only authorized personnel access to it.
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Security objective Description
OE.ADMIN.TRAINED The TOE Owner shall ensure that TOE Administrators are
aware of the security policies and procedures of their
organization; have the training, competence, and time to
follow the manufacturer's guidance and documentation; and
correctly configure and operate the TOE in accordance with
those policies and procedures. The organization security
policies and procedures include security awareness training
covering topics such as how to identify and avoid clicking on
malicious links.
OE.ADMIN.TRUSTED The TOE Owner shall establish trust that TOE Administrators
will not use their privileged access rights for malicious
purposes.
OE.AUDIT.REVIEWED The TOE Owner shall ensure that audit logs are reviewed at
appropriate intervals for security violations or unusual
patterns of activity.
OE.AUDIT_ACCESS.AUTHORIZED If audit records generated by the TOE are exported from the
TOE to another trusted IT product, the TOE Owner shall
ensure that those records can be accessed in order to detect
potential security violations, and only by authorized persons.
OE.AUDIT_STORAGE.PROTECTED If audit records are exported from the TOE to another trusted
IT product, the TOE Owner shall ensure that those records are
protected from unauthorized access, deletion and
modifications.
OE.INTERFACE.MANAGED The IT environment shall provide protection from unmanaged
access to TOE external interfaces.
OE.PHYSICAL.MANAGED The TOE shall be placed in a secure or monitored area that
provides protection from unmanaged physical access to the
TOE.
OE.SERVICES.RELIABLE When the TOE uses any of the network services DNS,
Kerberos, LDAP, NTP, SMTP, syslog, SMB, and/or WINS,
these services shall provide reliable information and responses
to the TOE.
OE.EMAILS.PROTECTED The IT environment shall protect the transmission of emails
from the SMTP gateway to the email’s destination.
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Security objective Description
OE.USER.AUTHORIZED The TOE Owner shall grant permission to Users to be
authorized to use the TOE according to the security policies
and procedures of their organization.
OE.USER.PC.POLICY The TOE Owner shall create a set of security policies to
which user computers will conform.
OE.USER.TRAINED The TOE Owner shall ensure that Users are aware of the
security policies and procedures of their organization, and
have the training and competence to follow those policies and
procedures.
OE.USERNAME.CHARACTER_SET The user names of all LDAP and Windows Sign In method
users shall only contain ASCII printable characters except for
the double quote (22 hex) and single quote (27 hex) characters
(i.e., allowed ASCII characters in hexadecimal: 20, 21, 23 -
26, 28 - 7E).
4.3 Security Objectives Rationale
4.3.1 Coverage
The following table provides a mapping of TOE objectives to threats and policies, showing that each
objective counters or enforces at least one threat or policy, respectively.
Table 24: Mapping of security objectives to threats and policies
Objective Threats/OSPs
O.AUDIT.LOGGED P.AUDIT.LOGGING
O.CONF.NO_ALT T.CONF.ALT
O.CONF.NO_DIS T.CONF.DIS
O.DOC.NO_ALT T.DOC.ALT
O.DOC.NO_DIS T.DOC.DIS
O.FUNC.NO_ALT T.FUNC.ALT
O.INTERFACE.MANAGED P.INTERFACE.MANAGEMENT
O.PROT.NO_ALT T.PROT.ALT
O.SOFTWARE.VERIFIED P.SOFTWARE.VERIFICATION
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Objective Threats/OSPs
O.USER.AUTHORIZED T.DOC.DIS
T.DOC.ALT
T.FUNC.ALT
T.PROT.ALT
T.CONF.DIS
T.CONF.ALT
P.USER.AUTHORIZATION
The following table provides a mapping of the objectives for the Operational Environment to
assumptions, threats and policies, showing that each objective holds, counters or enforces at least one
assumption, threat or policy, respectively.
Table 25: Mapping of security objectives for the Operational
Environment to assumptions, threats and policies
Objective Assumptions/Threats/OSPs
OE.ADMIN.PC.SECURE A.ADMIN.PC.SECURE
OE.ADMIN.TRAINED A.ADMIN.TRAINING
P.ADMIN.PASSWORD
P.REMOTE_PANEL.DISALLOWED
OE.ADMIN.TRUSTED A.ADMIN.TRUST
OE.AUDIT.REVIEWED P.AUDIT.LOGGING
OE.AUDIT_ACCESS.AUTHORIZED P.AUDIT.LOGGING
OE.AUDIT_STORAGE.PROTECTED P.AUDIT.LOGGING
OE.INTERFACE.MANAGED P.INTERFACE.MANAGEMENT
OE.PHYSICAL.MANAGED A.ACCESS.MANAGED
OE.SERVICES.RELIABLE A.SERVICES.RELIABLE
OE.EMAILS.PROTECTED A.EMAILS.PROTECTED
OE.USER.AUTHORIZED T.DOC.DIS
T.DOC.ALT
T.FUNC.ALT
T.PROT.ALT
T.CONF.DIS
T.CONF.ALT
P.USER.AUTHORIZATION
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Objective Assumptions/Threats/OSPs
OE.USER.PC.POLICY A.USER.PC.POLICY
OE.USER.TRAINED A.USER.TRAINING
OE.USERNAME.CHARACTER_SET P.USERNAME.CHARACTER_SET
4.3.2 Sufficiency
The following rationale provides justification that the security objectives are suitable to counter each
individual threat and that each security objective tracing back to a threat, when achieved, actually
contributes to the removal, diminishing or mitigation of that threat:
Table 26: Sufficiency of objectives countering threats
Threat Rationale for security objectives
T.DOC.DIS The threat:
• User Document Data may be disclosed to unauthorized persons.
is countered by:
• O.DOC.NO_DIS which protects D.DOC from unauthorized disclosure.
• O.USER.AUTHORIZED which establishes user identification and
authentication as the basis for authorization.
• OE.USER.AUTHORIZED which establishes responsibility of the TOE Owner
to appropriately grant authorization.
T.DOC.ALT The threat:
• User Document Data may be altered by unauthorized persons.
is countered by:
• O.DOC.NO_ALT which protects D.DOC from unauthorized alteration.
• O.USER.AUTHORIZED which establishes user identification and
authentication as the basis for authorization.
• OE.USER.AUTHORIZED which establishes responsibility of the TOE Owner
to appropriately grant authorization.
T.FUNC.ALT The threat:
• User Function Data may be altered by unauthorized persons.
is countered by:
• O.FUNC.NO_ALT which protects D.FUNC from unauthorized alteration.
• O.USER.AUTHORIZED which establishes user identification and
authentication as the basis for authorization.
• OE.USER.AUTHORIZED which establishes responsibility of the TOE Owner
to appropriately grant authorization.
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Threat Rationale for security objectives
T.PROT.ALT The threat:
• TSF Protected Data may be altered by unauthorized persons.
is countered by:
• O.PROT.NO_ALT which protects D.PROT from unauthorized alteration.
• O.USER.AUTHORIZED which establishes user identification and
authentication as the basis for authorization.
• OE.USER.AUTHORIZED which establishes responsibility of the TOE Owner
to appropriately grant authorization.
T.CONF.DIS The threat:
• TSF Confidential Data may be disclosed to unauthorized persons.
is countered by:
• O.CONF.NO_DIS which protects D.CONF from unauthorized disclosure.
• O.USER.AUTHORIZED which establishes user identification and
authentication as the basis for authorization.
• OE.USER.AUTHORIZED which establishes responsibility of the TOE Owner
to appropriately grant authorization.
T.CONF.ALT The threat:
• TSF Confidential Data may be altered by unauthorized persons.
is countered by:
• O.CONF.NO_ALT which protects D.CONF from unauthorized alteration.
• O.USER.AUTHORIZED which establishes user identification and
authentication as the basis for authorization.
• OE.USER.AUTHORIZED which establishes responsibility of the TOE Owner
to appropriately grant authorization.
The following rationale provides justification that the security objectives for the environment are suitable
to cover each individual assumption, that each security objective for the environment that traces back to
an assumption about the environment of use of the TOE, when achieved, actually contributes to the
environment achieving consistency with the assumption, and that if all security objectives for the
environment that trace back to an assumption are achieved, the intended usage is supported:
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Table 27: Sufficiency of objectives holding assumptions
Assumption Rationale for security objectives
A.ACCESS.MANAGED The assumption:
• The TOE is located in a restricted or monitored
environment that provides protection from unmanaged
access to the physical components and data interfaces
of the TOE.
is upheld by:
• OE.PHYSICAL.MANAGED which establishes a
protected physical environment for the TOE.
A.ADMIN.PC.SECURE The assumption:
• The administrative computer is in a physically secured
and managed environment and only the authorized
administrator has access to it.
is upheld by:
• OE.ADMIN.PC.SECURE which establishes the
responsibility of the TOE owner to locate the
administrative computer in a physically secured and
managed environment and allow only authorized
personnel access.
A.USER.PC.POLICY The assumption:
• User computers are configured and used in
conformance with the organization's security policies.
is upheld by:
• OE.USER.PC.POLICY which establishes the
responsibility of the TOE owner to create a set of
security policies to which user computers will
conform.
A.USER.TRAINING The assumption:
• TOE Users are aware of the security policies and
procedures of their organization, and are trained and
competent to follow those policies and procedures.
is upheld by:
• OE.USER.TRAINED which establishes responsibility
of the TOE Owner to provide appropriate User
training.
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Assumption Rationale for security objectives
A.ADMIN.TRAINING The assumption:
• Administrators are aware of the security policies and
procedures of their organization, are trained and
competent to follow the manufacturer's guidance and
documentation, and correctly configure and operate the
TOE in accordance with those policies and procedures.
The organization security policies and procedures
include security awareness training covering topics
such as how to identify and avoid clicking on
malicious links.
is upheld by:
• OE.ADMIN.TRAINED which establishes
responsibility of the TOE Owner to provide
appropriate Administrator training.
A.ADMIN.TRUST The assumption:
• Administrators do not use their privileged access rights
for malicious purposes.
is upheld by:
• OE.ADMIN.TRUSTED which establishes
responsibility of the TOE Owner to have a trusted
relationship with Administrators.
A.SERVICES.RELIABLE The assumption:
• When the TOE uses any of the network services DNS,
Kerberos, LDAP, NTP SMTP, syslog, SMB, and/or
WINS, these services provide reliable information and
responses to the TOE.
is upheld by:
• OE.SERVICES.RELIABLE which, when the TOE
uses the network services DNS, Kerberos, LDAP,
NTP, SMTP, syslog, SMB, and/or WINS, establishes
that these services provide reliable information and
responses to the TOE.
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Assumption Rationale for security objectives
A.EMAILS.PROTECTED The assumption:
• For emails received by the SMTP gateway from the
TOE, the transmission of emails between the SMTP
gateway and the email’s destination is protected.
is upheld by:
• OE.EMAILS.PROTECTED which protects the
transmission of emails from the SMTP gateway to the
email’s destination
The following rationale provides justification that the security objectives are suitable to cover each
individual organizational security policy, that each security objective that traces back to an OSP, when
achieved, actually contributes to the implementation of the OSP, and that if all security objectives that
trace back to an OSP are achieved, the OSP is implemented:
Table 28: Sufficiency of objectives enforcing Organizational Security Policies
OSP Rationale for security objectives
P.USER.AUTHORIZATION The OSP:
• To preserve operational accountability and security,
Users will be authorized to use the TOE only as
permitted by the TOE Owner.
is enforced by:
• O.USER.AUTHORIZED which establishes user
identification and authentication as the basis for
authorization to use the TOE.
• OE.USER.AUTHORIZED which establishes
responsibility of the TOE Owner to appropriately grant
authorization.
P.SOFTWARE.VERIFICATION The OSP:
• To detect corruption of the executable code in the TSF,
procedures will exist to self-verify executable code in
the TSF.
is enforced by:
• O.SOFTWARE.VERIFIED which provides procedures
to self-verify executable code in the TSF.
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OSP Rationale for security objectives
P.AUDIT.LOGGING The OSP:
• To preserve operational accountability and security,
records that provide an audit trail of TOE use and
security-relevant events will be created, maintained,
and protected from unauthorized disclosure or
alteration, and will be reviewed by authorized
personnel.
is enforced by:
• O.AUDIT.LOGGED which creates and maintains a
log of TOE use and security-relevant events, and
prevents unauthorized disclosure or alteration.
• OE.AUDIT_STORAGE.PROTECTED which protects
exported audit records from unauthorized access,
deletion and modifications.
• OE.AUDIT_ACCESS.AUTHORIZED which
establishes responsibility of the TOE Owner to provide
appropriate access to exported audit records.
• OE.AUDIT.REVIEWED which establishes
responsibility of the TOE Owner to ensure that audit
logs are appropriately reviewed.
P.INTERFACE.MANAGEMENT The OSP:
• To prevent unauthorized use of the external interfaces
of the TOE, operation of those interfaces will be
controlled by the TOE and its IT environment.
is enforced by:
• O.INTERFACE.MANAGED which manages the
operation of external interfaces in accordance with
security policies.
• OE.INTERFACE.MANAGED which establishes a
protected environment for TOE external interfaces.
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OSP Rationale for security objectives
P.ADMIN.PASSWORD The OSP:
• To restrict access to administrative tasks, the Device
Administrator Password will be set in the evaluated
configuration so that it is required to perform security-
relevant actions through EWS (HTTP), REST Web
Services (HTTP), and at the Control Panel.
is enforced by:
• OE.ADMIN.TRAINED which establishes
responsibility of the TOE Owner to provide
appropriate Administrator training.
P.USERNAME.CHARACTER_SET The OSP:
• To prevent ambiguous user names in the TOE's audit
trail, the user names of the LDAP and Windows Sign
In method users must only contain ASCII printable
characters except for the double quote (22 hex) and
single quote (27 hex) characters (i.e., allowed ASCII
characters in hexadecimal: 20, 21, 23 - 26, 28 - 7E).
is enforced by:
• OE.USERNAME.CHARACTER_SET which
establishes that the user names of all LDAP and
Windows Sign In methods users shall only contain
ASCII printable characters except for the double quote
(22 hex) and single quote (27 hex) characters (i.e.,
allowed ASCII characters in hexadecimal: 20, 21, 23 -
26, 28 - 7E).
P.REMOTE_PANEL.DISALLOWED The OSP:
• To preserve operational accountability and security,
administrators must not use the Remote Control-Panel
feature.
is enforced by:
• OE.ADMIN_TRAINED which establishes
responsibility of the TOE Owner to provide
appropriate Administrator training.
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5 Extended Components Definition
This section contains the extended component definition(s) used by this ST.
5.1 Class FPT: Protection of the TSF
5.1.1 Restricted Forwarding of Data to External Interfaces (FDI)
Family behaviour
This family defines requirements for the TSF to restrict direct forwarding of information from one
external interface to another external interface.
Many products receive information on specific external interfaces and are intended to transform and
process this information before it is transmitted on another external interface. However, some products
may provide the capability for attackers to misuse external interfaces to violate the security of the TOE or
devices that are connected to the TOE's external interfaces. Therefore, direct forwarding of unprocessed
data between different external interfaces is forbidden unless explicitly allowed by an authorized
administrative role. The family FPT_FDI_EXP has been defined to specify this kind of functionality.
Component levelling
FPT_FDI_EXP.1 Restricted forwarding of data to external interfaces provides for the functionality to
require TSF controlled processing of data received over defined external interfaces before these data are
sent out on another external interface. Direct forwarding of data from one external interface to another
one requires explicit allowance by an authorized administrative role.
Management: FPT_FDI_EXP.1
There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit: FPT_FDI_EXP.1
There are no audit events foreseen.
FPT_FDI_EXP.1 - Restricted Forwarding of Data to External Interfaces
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FPT_FDI_EXP.1.1 The TSF shall provide the capability to restrict data received on [assignment: list
of external interfaces] from being forwarded without further processing by the
TSF to [assignment: list of external interfaces ].
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5.2 Class FCS: Cryptographic Support
5.2.1 Cryptographic Operation (Random Bit Generation) (FCS_RBG)
Family behaviour
This family defines requirements for random bit generation to ensure that it is performed in
accordance with selected standards and seeded by an entropy source.
Component levelling
FCS_RBG_EXT.1 Random Bit Generation requires random bit generation to be performed in
accordance with selected standards and seeded by an entropy source.
Management: FCS_RBG_EXT.1
There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit: FCS_RBG_EXT.1
There are no audit events foreseen.
FCS_RBG_EXT.1 – Random Bit Generation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FCS_RBG_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall perform all deterministic random bit generation services in
accordance with NIST SP 800-90A using [selection: Hash_DRBG(any),
HMAC_DRBG(any), CTR_DRBG(AES) ].
FCS_RBG_EXT.1.2 The deterministic RBG shall be seeded by an entropy source that accumulates
entropy from software-based noise sources with a minimum of [selection: 128
bits, 256 bits] of entropy at least equal to the greatest security strength, according
to NIST SP 800-57, of the keys and hashes that it will generate.
Rationale Random bits/number will be used by the SFRs for key generation and
destruction, and the Common Criteria does not provide a suitable SFR for the
random bit generation. This extended component ensures the strength of
encryption keys, and it is therefore placed in the FCS class with a single
component.
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6 Security Requirements
6.1 TOE Security Functional Requirements
The following table shows the security functional requirements for the TOE, and the operations
performed on the components according to CC part 2: iteration (Iter.), refinement (Ref.), assignment
(Ass.) and selection (Sel.).
Table 29: Security functional requirements for the TOE
Security
functional
group
Security functional
requirement
Base security
functional
component
Source Operations
Iter. Ref. Ass. Sel.
FAU - Security
audit
FAU_GEN.1 Audit data
generation
PP2600.1 No No Yes Yes
FAU_GEN.2 User
identity association
PP2600.1 No No No No
FCS -
Cryptographic
support
FCS_CKM.1-ipsec
Cryptographic key
generation
FCS_CKM.1 CC Part 2 Yes Yes Yes No
FCS_CKM.1-job
Cryptographic key
generation
FCS_CKM.1 CC Part 2 Yes No Yes No
FCS_CKM.2
Cryptographic key
establishment
CC part 2 No Yes Yes No
FCS_COP.1-ipsec
Cryptographic operation
for IPsec
FCS_COP.1 CC part 2 Yes No Yes No
FCS_COP.1-job
Cryptographic operation
for encrypted stored
print jobs
FCS_COP.1 CC part 2 Yes No Yes No
FCS_COP.1-tst
Cryptographic operation
for TSF self-testing
FCS_COP.1 CC part 2 Yes No Yes No
FCS_RBG_EXT.1
Random Bit Generation
ECD No No No Yes
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Security
functional
group
Security functional
requirement
Base security
functional
component
Source Operations
Iter. Ref. Ass. Sel.
FDP - User data
protection
FDP_ACC.1-cac
Common access control
SFP
FDP_ACC.1 PP2600.1 Yes No Yes No
FDP_ACC.1-tfac TOE
function access control
SFP
FDP_ACC.1 PP2600.1 Yes No Yes No
FDP_ACF.1-cac
Common access control
functions
FDP_ACF.1 PP2600.1 Yes No Yes No
FDP_ACF.1-tfac TOE
function access control
functions
FDP_ACF.1 PP2600.1 Yes No Yes No
FDP_RIP.1 Subset
residual information
protection
PP2600.1 No No Yes Yes
FIA -
Identification
and
authentication
FIA_AFL.1
Authentication failure
handling
CC Part 2 No No Yes Yes
FIA_ATD.1 Local user
attribute definition
PP2600.1 No No Yes No
FIA_SOS.1 Verification
of secrets
CC Part 2 No No Yes No
FIA_UAU.1 Timing of
Control Panel
authentication
PP2600.1 No Yes Yes No
FIA_UAU.2 IPsec
authentication before
any action
CC Part 2 No Yes No No
FIA_UAU.7 Control
Panel protected
authentication feedback
CC Part 2 No Yes Yes No
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Security
functional
group
Security functional
requirement
Base security
functional
component
Source Operations
Iter. Ref. Ass. Sel.
FIA_UID.1 Timing of
Control Panel
identification
PP2600.1 No Yes Yes No
FIA_UID.2 IPsec
identification before
any action
CC Part 2 No Yes No No
FIA_USB.1 User-
subject binding
PP2600.1 No Yes Yes No
FMT - Security
management
FMT_MOF.1
Management of
authentication security
functions behavior
FMT_MOF.1 CC Part 2 Yes No Yes Yes
FMT_MSA.1
Management of
security attributes
FMT_MSA.1 PP2600.1 Yes No Yes Yes
FMT_MTD.1
Management of TSF
data
FMT_MTD.1 PP2600.1 Yes No Yes Yes
FMT_SMF.1
Specification of
management functions
PP2600.1 No No Yes No
FMT_SMR.1 Security
roles
PP2600.1 No No Yes No
FPT - Protection
of the TSF
FPT_FDI_EXP.1
Restricted forwarding
of data to external
interfaces
PP2600.1-SMI No No Yes No
FPT_STM.1 Reliable
time stamps
PP2600.1 No No No No
FPT_TST.1 TSF testing PP2600.1 No No Yes Yes
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Security
functional
group
Security functional
requirement
Base security
functional
component
Source Operations
Iter. Ref. Ass. Sel.
FTA - TOE
access
FTA_SSL.3 Control
Panel TSF-initiated
termination
PP2600.1 No Yes Yes No
FTP - Trusted
path/channels
FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF
trusted channel
PP2600.1-SMI No Yes Yes Yes
6.1.1 Security audit (FAU)
Audit data generation (FAU_GEN.1)
FAU_GEN.1.1 The TSF shall be able to generate an audit record of the following auditable events:
a) Start-up and shutdown of the audit functions; and
b) All auditable events for the not specified level of audit; and
c) All Auditable Events as each is defined for its Audit Level (if one is
specified) for the Relevant SFR in Table 30; none.
FAU_GEN.1.2 The TSF shall record within each audit record at least the following information:
a) Date and time of the event, type of event, subject identity (if applicable),
and the outcome (success or failure) of the event; and
b) For each audit event type, based on the auditable event definitions of the
functional components included in the PP/ST, for each Relevant SFR
listed in Table 30 (1) information as defined by its Audit Level (if one is
specified), and (2) all Additional Information (if any is required); none.
Table 30: Auditable events
Auditable event Relevant SFR(s) Audit Level Additional information [PP2600.1]
Job completion FDP_ACF.1 Not specified Type of job Yes:
Common
Both successful and
unsuccessful use of the
authentication
mechanism
FIA_UAU.1,
FIA_UAU.2
Basic None required Yes:
Common
Both successful and
unsuccessful use of the
identification mechanism
FIA_UID.1,
FIA_UID.2
Basic Attempted user identity,
if available
Yes:
Common
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Auditable event Relevant SFR(s) Audit Level Additional information [PP2600.1]
Use of the management
functions
FMT_SMF.1 Minimum None required Yes:
Common
Modifications to the
group of users that are
part of a role
FMT_SMR.1 Minimum None required Yes:
Common
Changes to the time FPT_STM.1 Minimum None required Yes:
Common
Failure of the trusted
channel functions
FTP_ITC.1 Minimum None required Yes: SMI
Termination of an
interactive session by the
session termination
mechanism
FTA_SSL.3 Minimum None required No
User identity association (FAU_GEN.2)
FAU_GEN.2.1 For audit events resulting from actions of identified users, the TSF shall be able
to associate each auditable event with the identity of the user that caused the
event.
6.1.2 Cryptographic support (FCS)
Cryptographic key generation (FCS_CKM.1-ipsec)
FCS_CKM.1.1 The TSF shall generate asymmetric cryptographic keys in accordance with a
specified cryptographic key generation algorithm defined in Table 31 and
specified cryptographic key sizes defined in Table 31 that meet the following:
the standards defined in Table 31.
Table 31: Asymmetric cryptographic key generation
Protocol Key generation algorithm Key sizes Standards
IPsec DSA 2048-bit,
3072-bit,
4096-bit,
6144-bit,
8192-bit
[FIPS186-4] Finite Field
Cryptography (FFC) “Digital
Signature Standard (DSS)”
Application Note: Random bit generation for FCS_CKM.1-ipsec is implemented by FCS_RBG_EXT.1.
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Application Note: The asymmetric keys generated by the DSA algorithm are used by the key
establishment algorithms specified in FCS_CKM.2.
Cryptographic key generation (FCS_CKM.1-job)
FCS_CKM.1.1 The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specific
cryptographic key generation algorithm Password-Based Key Derivation
Function 2 (PBKDF2) with HMAC-SHA-256 and specified cryptographic key
sizes 256 bit that meet the following: [PKCS5v2.1]
Application Note: PBKDF2 is used to derive a key from a Job Encryption Password to unlock an
encrypted stored print job.
Cryptographic key establishment (FCS_CKM.2)
FCS_CKM.2.1 The TSF shall perform cryptographic key establishment distribute cryptographic
keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key establishment distribution
method defined in Table 32 that meets the following: the standards defined in
Table 32.
Table 32: Cryptographic key establishment
Protocol Key establishment method Standards
IPsec IKEv1 (DH) [RFC4109] Algorithms for Internet Key Exchange version
1 (IKEv1)
[RFC4894] Use of Hash Algorithms in Internet Key
Exchange (IKE) and IPsec
IKEv2 (DH) [RFC4306] Diffie-Hellman key agreement method defined
for the IKEv2 protocol;
[RFC4718] IKEv2 Clarifications and Implementation
Guidelines
[RFC4894] Use of Hash Algorithms in Internet Key
Exchange (IKE) and IPsec
Cryptographic operation for IPsec (FCS_COP.1-ipsec)
FCS_COP.1.1 The TSF shall perform the operations defined in Table 33 in accordance with a
specified cryptographic algorithm defined in Table 33 and cryptographic key
sizes defined in Table 33 that meet the following: the standards defined in
Table 33.
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Table 33: Cryptographic operations for IPsec
Protocol Operations Algorithm
Key sizes
(in bits)
Standards
IPsec Signature
generation and
verification
RSA 2048,
3072
[PKCS1v1.5] Public-Key
Cryptography Standard (PKCS) #1
v1.5: RSA Encryption Standard
Symmetric
encryption and
decryption
AES CBC: 128,
192, 256;
ECB: 256
[FIPS197] Advanced Encryption
Standard;
[SP800-38A] Recommendation for
Block Cipher Modes of Operation:
Methods and Techniques
Secure hash SHA-1,
SHA-256,
SHA-384,
SHA-512
[FIPS180-4] Secure Hash Standard
(SHS);
[RFC4894] Use of Hash Algorithms
in Internet Key Exchange (IKE) and
IPsec
Data
authentication
HMAC-SHA1-96 160 [RFC2104] HMAC: Keyed-Hashing
for Message Authentication;
[RFC2404] The Use of HMAC-SHA-
1-96 within ESP and AH
HMAC-SHA-256-
128
256 [RFC2104] HMAC: Keyed-Hashing
for Message Authentication;
[RFC4868] Using HMAC-SHA-256-,
HMAC-SHA-384, and HMAC-SHA-
512 with IPsec
HMAC-SHA-384-
192
384
HMAC-SHA-512-
256
512
Cryptographic operation for encrypted stored print jobs (FCS_COP.1-job)
FCS_COP.1.1 The TSF shall perform the operations defined in Table 34 in accordance with a
specified cryptographic algorithm defined in Table 34 and cryptographic key
sizes defined in Table 34 that meet the following: the standards defined in
Table 34.
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Table 34: Cryptographic operations for encrypted stored print jobs
Protocol Operations Algorithm
Key sizes
(in bits)
Standards
Print job Symmetric
decryption
AES (CBC mode) 256 [FIPS197] Advanced Encryption
Standard;
[SP800-38A] Recommendation for
Block Cipher Modes of Operation
Secure hash SHA-256 [FIPS180-4] Secure Hash Standard
(SHS)
HMAC
calculation
HMAC-SHA-256 256 [RFC2104] HMAC: Keyed-Hashing
for Message Authentication
Cryptographic operation for TSF self-testing (FCP_COP.1-tst)
FCS_COP.1.1 The HP FutureSmart Windows Mobile Enhanced Cryptographic Provider
(RSAENH) in the operational environment TSF shall perform the operations
defined in Table 35 in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm
defined in Table 35 and cryptographic key sizes defined in Table 35 that meet
the following: the standards defined in Table 35.
Table 35: Cryptographic operations for TSF self-testing
Protocol Operations Algorithm
Key sizes
(in bits)
Standards
TSF self-
testing
Secure hash SHA-256 [FIPS180-4] Secure Hash Standard
(SHS)
Random Bit Generation (FCS_RBG_EXT.1)
FCS_RBG_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall perform all deterministic random bit generation services in
accordance with NIST SP 800-90A using CTR_DRBG(AES).
FCS_RBG_EXT.1.2 The deterministic RBG shall be seeded by an entropy source that accumulates
entropy from software-based noise sources with a minimum of 256 bits of
entropy at least equal to the greatest security strength, according to NIST SP 800-
57, of the keys and hashes that it will generate.
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6.1.3 User data protection (FDP)
Common access control SFP (FDP_ACC.1-cac)
FDP_ACC.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the Common Access Control SFP in Table 36 on the list
of users as subjects, objects, and operations among subjects and objects
covered by the Common Access Control SFP in Table 36.
Table 36: Common Access Control SFP
Object Operations(s) Subject Access control rules
[PP2600.1]
section
D.FUNC Modify,
Delete
U.NORMAL For stored print jobs in Job Storage
with the Job PIN attribute set: From
the Control Panel, subjects must be
the job owner or know the Job PIN
or have the appropriate Job Storage
permission in their Permission Set to
delete the job; otherwise, delete
access is denied. D.FUNC for Stored
Jobs cannot be modified by any user,
including U.ADMINISTRATOR.
For encrypted stored print jobs in Job
Storage: From the Control Panel,
subjects must know the job's Job
Encryption Password or have the
appropriate Job Storage permission
in their Permission Set to delete
D.FUNC; otherwise, delete access is
denied.
Common
D.DOC Delete U.NORMAL For stored print jobs in Job Storage
with the Job PIN attribute set: From
the Control Panel, subjects must be
the job owner or know the Job PIN
or have the appropriate Job Storage
permission in their Permission Set to
delete the job; otherwise, delete
access is denied.
For encrypted stored print jobs in Job
Storage: From the Control Panel,
Common
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Object Operations(s) Subject Access control rules
[PP2600.1]
section
subjects must know the job's Job
Encryption Password or have the
appropriate Job Storage permission
in their Permission Set to delete
D.DOC; otherwise, delete access is
denied.
D.DOC+DSR
D.DOC+PRT
Read U.NORMAL For stored print jobs in Job Storage
with the Job PIN attribute set:
Subjects must be the job owner or
know the Job PIN to read the object;
otherwise, read access is denied.
For encrypted stored print jobs in Job
Storage: Subjects must know the
job's Job Encryption Password to
read the object, otherwise, read
access is denied.
DSR,
PRT
TOE function access control SFP (FDP_ACC.1-tfac)
FDP_ACC.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the TOE Function Access Control SFP on users as
subjects, TOE functions as objects, and the right to use the functions as
operations.
Common access control functions (FDP_ACF.1-cac)
FDP_ACF.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the Common Access Control SFP in Table 36 to objects
based on the following: the list of users as subjects and objects controlled
under the Common Access Control SFP in Table 36, and for each, the
indicated security attributes in Table 36.
FDP_ACF.1.2 The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among
controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed: rules specified in the
Common Access Control SFP in Table 36 governing access among
controlled users as subjects and controlled objects using controlled
operations on controlled objects.
FDP_ACF.1.3 The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on the
following additional rules:
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• U.ADMINISTRATOR can delete any D.DOC without providing a
Job PIN or Job Encryption Password.
FDP_ACF.1.4 The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the following
additional rules: none.
TOE function access control functions (FDP_ACF.1-tfac)
FDP_ACF.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the TOE Function Access Control SFP to objects based
on the following: users and the following TOE functions and security
attributes:
• Users: Control Panel users;
Functions: F.PRT, F.DSR, F.SMI;
Security attributes:
o User Role as defined by the user's Permission Set
o Association of a sign-in method to a Control Panel
application
• Users: Network Client Computers, Administrative Computer;
Functions: F.DSR, F.PRT, F.SMI;
Security attributes:
o User Role as defined by the user's IPsec/Firewall service
templates.
Application Note: The " Allow users to choose alternate sign-in methods at the
product control panel" function affects the sign in processing behavior of Control
Panel users, but is considered a function instead of a security attribute and, thus,
not listed under "security attributes" above.
FDP_ACF.1.2 The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among
controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed:
• The user is explicitly authorized by U.ADMINISTRATOR to use a
function
• A Network Client Computer that is authorized to use the TOE is
automatically authorized to use the functions F.DSR, F.PRT, F.SMI.
FDP_ACF.1.3 The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on the
following additional rules: the user acts in the role U.ADMINISTRATOR,
none.
FDP_ACF.1.4 The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the following
additional rules: none.
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Subset residual information protection (FDP_RIP.1)
FDP_RIP.1.1 The TSF shall ensure that any previous information content of a resource is made
unavailable upon the deallocation of the resource from the following objects:
D.DOC, none.
6.1.4 Identification and authentication (FIA)
Local Device sign in authentication failure handling (FIA_AFL.1)
FIA_AFL.1.1 The TSF shall detect when an administrator configurable positive integer
within 3 to 10 unsuccessful authentication attempts occur related to the last
successful authentication for the indicated user identity for the following
interfaces
• Control Panel
o Local Device Sign In
FIA_AFL.1.2 When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has been met,
the TSF shall lock the account.
Application Note: Multiple unsuccessful authentication attempts using the same authentication data are
counted as just one unsuccessful authentication attempt by the sign-in method.
Local user attribute definition (FIA_ATD.1)
FIA_ATD.1.1 The TSF shall maintain the following list of security attributes belonging to
individual users:
• Control Panel users:
o Local Device Sign In (Local Administrator account only)
 User Identifier: Display name
 User Role: Permission set
o Windows Sign In
 User Role: Permission set
o LDAP Sign In
 User Role: Permission set
• IPsec users:
o User Identifier: IP address
o User Role: IPsec/Firewall service template
Application Note: The LDAP and Windows Sign In method security attributes belonging to individual
users are not in FIA_ATD.1 because these attributes are "maintained" independently by the LDAP server
and Windows domain controller, respectively, which are part of the Operational Environment.
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Verification of secrets (FIA_SOS.1)
FIA_SOS.1.1 The TSF shall provide a mechanism to verify that secrets meet the requirement:
Job PINs shall be 4 digits.
Timing of Control Panel authentication (FIA_UAU.1)
FIA_UAU.1.1 The TSF shall allow
• Viewing of help information
• Viewing of device status information
• Viewing of network connectivity status information
• Viewing of system time
• Viewing of Web Services status information
• Viewing of Welcome screen
• Selection of Sign In
• Selection of sign-in method from Sign In screen
• Printing of help information
• Printing of network connectivity status information
• Changing language for the session
• Resetting of session
on behalf of the Control Panel user to be performed before the user is
authenticated.
FIA_UAU.1.2 The TSF shall require each Control Panel user to be successfully authenticated
before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
IPsec authentication before any action (FIA_UAU.2)
FIA_UAU.2.1 The TSF shall require each Network Client Computer, Administrative Computer,
and trusted IT product connection user to be successfully authenticated before
allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that connection user.
Control Panel protected authentication feedback (FIA_UAU.7)
FIA_UAU.7.1 The TSF shall provide only dots (“”) to users while the Control Panel
authentication is in progress.
Application Note: Job PINs and Job Encryption Passwords are not used for authentication, but the
digits are masked within dots (“”) when entered.
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Timing of Control Panel identification (FIA_UID.1)
FIA_UID.1.1 The TSF shall allow
• Viewing of help information
• Viewing of device status information
• Viewing of network connectivity status information
• Viewing of system time
• Viewing of Web Services status information
• Viewing of Welcome screen
• Selection of Sign In
• Selection of sign-in method from Sign In screen
• Printing of help information
• Printing of network connectivity status information
• Changing language for the session
• Resetting of session
on behalf of the Control Panel user to be performed before the user is identified.
FIA_UID.1.2 The TSF shall require each Control Panel user to be successfully identified
before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
IPsec identification before any action (FIA_UID.2)
FIA_UID.2.1 The TSF shall require each Network Client Computer, Administrative Computer,
and trusted IT product connection user to be successfully identified before
allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that connection user.
User-subject binding (FIA_USB.1)
FIA_USB.1.1 The TSF shall associate the following user security attributes with subjects acting
on the behalf of that user:
1. User Identifier
• Control Panel users:
o Local Device Sign In: Display name
o Windows Sign In: Windows username
o LDAP Sign In: LDAP username
• IPsec users:
o IP address
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2. User Role
• Control Panel users:
o Local Device Sign In: Permission set
o Windows Sign In: Permission set
o LDAP Sign In: Permission set
• IPsec users:
o IPsec/Firewall service template
FIA_USB.1.2 The TSF shall enforce the following rules on the initial association of user
security attributes with subjects acting on behalf of users:
• If "Allow users to choose alternate sign-in methods at the product
control panel" is disabled, the Control Panel user's session
Permission Set will be reduced to exclude the permissions of
applications whose sign-in method does not match the sign-in
method used by the user to sign in.
FIA_USB.1.3 The TSF shall enforce the following rules governing changes to the user security
attributes associated with the subjects acting on the behalf of users:
• None
6.1.5 Security management (FMT)
Management of security functions (FMT_MOF.1)
FMT_MOF.1.1 The TSF shall restrict the ability to perform the actions defined in Table 37 on
the functions defined in Table 37 to U.ADMINISTRATOR.
Table 37: Management of functions
Function(s) Action(s) Application note
Control Panel user
authorization
determine the behavior of,
modify the behavior of
The “Allow users to choose alternate sign-in
methods at the product control panel” function
affects how the TOE authorizes control panel
users. When this function is disabled, the sign-in
method to application mappings are enforced
during control panel user authorization.
Windows Sign In disable,
enable,
determine the behavior of,
modify the behavior of
In the evaluated configuration, at least one
external authentication mechanism must be
enabled.
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Function(s) Action(s) Application note
LDAP Sign In disable,
enable,
determine the behavior of,
modify the behavior of
In the evaluated configuration, at least one
external authentication mechanism must be
enabled.
Account lockout for
Local Administrator
account
disable,
enable,
determine the behavior of,
modify the behavior of
In the evaluated configuration, account lockout for
the Local Administrator account must be enabled.
Inactivity Timeout
for Control Panel
user sign-in sessions
determine the behavior of,
modify the behavior of
In the evaluated configuration, the Control Panel
Inactivity Timeout must be set to value in the
range of 10-60 seconds.
Enhanced security
event logging
disable,
enable
In the evaluated configuration, enhanced security
event logging must be enabled.
IPsec disable,
enable,
determine the behavior of,
modify the behavior of
In the evaluated configuration, IPsec must be
enabled.
Management of security attributes (FMT_MSA.1)
FMT_MSA.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the Common Access Control SFP in Table 38 and TOE
Function Access Control SFP to restrict the ability to perform the operations
defined in Table 38 on the security attributes defined in Table 38 to
U.ADMINISTRATOR.
Table 38: Management of security attributes
Security attributes(s) Operation(s) Application note
User Identifier
Custom IPsec/Firewall address
template
query,
create,
modify,
delete
The TOE provides the capability
to create custom IPsec/Firewall
address templates. A custom
IPsec/Firewall address template
defines two or more IP
addresses for which the address
template is to apply.
Role
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Security attributes(s) Operation(s) Application note
Built-in Device Administrator
permission set
query The TOE contains a built-in
Device Administrator
permission set that cannot be
renamed or deleted.
In the evaluated configuration,
U.ADMINISRATOR users must
be granted the Device
Administrator permission set.
Built-in Device User permission
set
query The TOE contains a built-in
Device User permission set that
cannot be renamed or deleted.
In the evaluated configuration,
U.NORMAL users must be
granted either the built-in
Device User permission set or a
custom permission set (if any
exist).
Custom permission set query,
create,
modify,
delete
The TOE provides the capability
to create custom permission sets.
A custom permission set can be
renamed or deleted.
In the evaluated configuration,
U.NORMAL users must be
granted either the built-in
Device User permission set or a
custom permission set (if any
exist).
Permissions associated with built-
in Device Administrator
permission set
query The built-in Device
Administrator permission set has
all permissions enabled. The
permissions associated with the
Device Administrator
permission set cannot be
disabled.
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Security attributes(s) Operation(s) Application note
Permissions associated with built-
in Device User permission set
query,
enable,
disable
The permissions associated with
the built-in Device User
permission set can be enabled or
disabled.
In the evaluated configuration,
the built-in Device User
permission set must have all
administrative permissions
disabled.
Permissions associated with a
custom permission set
query,
enable,
disable
The permissions associated with
a custom permission set can be
enabled or disabled.
In the evaluated configuration,
any custom permission sets
created must have all
administrative permissions
disabled.
Built-in IPsec/Firewall All
Services template
query The TOE contains a built-in
IPsec/Firewall All Services
template. The built-in
IPsec/Firewall All Services
template cannot be renamed or
deleted.
In the evaluated configuration,
built-in IPsec/Firewall All
Services template must be
granted to the Administrative
Computer
(U.ADMINISTRATOR).
Custom IPsec/Firewall service
template
query,
create,
delete,
modify
The TOE provides the capability
to create custom IPsec/Firewall
service templates.
In the evaluated configuration,
two custom IPsec/Firewall
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Security attributes(s) Operation(s) Application note
service templates must be
created:
One custom IPsec/Firewall
service template for Network
Client Computers
(U.NORMAL).
One custom IPsec/Firewall
service template for trusted IT
products.
Network services associated with
built-in IPsec/Firewall All
Services template
query The built-in IPsec/Firewall All
Services template has all
network services enabled.
Network services associated
with the built-in IPsec/Firewall
All Services template cannot be
disabled.
Network services associated with
a custom IPsec/Firewall services
template
query,
enable,
disable
Network services associated
with a custom IPsec/Firewall
services template can be enabled
or disabled.
In the evaluated configuration;
The custom IPsec/Firewall
service template for Network
Client Computers
(U.NORMAL) must only have
the P9100 services enabled.
The custom IPsec/Firewall
service template for trusted IT
products must only have those
network services (e.g. SMTP)
required for the TOE to establish
an IPsec connection with the
trusted IT products to either
send data to them or request data
from them. The custom
IPsec/Firewall service template
must not contain any network
services that allow trusted IT
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Security attributes(s) Operation(s) Application note
products to initiate a connection
to the TOE.
Management of TSF data (FMT_MTD.1)
FMT_MTD.1.1 The TSF shall restrict the ability to perform the operations defined in Table 39
on the TSF Data defined in Table 39 to U.ADMINISTRATOR.
Table 39: Management of TSF data
TSF Data Operation(s) Application note
Device Administrator
Password
query,
set,
modify,
clear
In the evaluated configuration, the Device Administrator
Password must be set.
The query operation reads the status (set or not set) of the
Device Administrator Password and not the value of the
Device Administrator Password.
CA certificates query,
install,
delete,
export
<none>
Identity certificates query,
install,
delete,
export
In the evaluated configuration, an identity certificate with
private key that is generated outside the TOE must be
imported into the TOE’s certificate store.
The query operation does not allow reading of the private
key associated with an identity certificate.
If the private key associated with an identity certificate is
marked as non-exportable, the export operation will export
an identity certificate without its associated private key.
Network identity
certificate
query,
modify
The query operation does not allow reading of the private
key associated with the network identity certificate.
Specification of management functions (FMT_SMF.1)
FMT_SMF.1.1 The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions:
• Management of Control Panel user authorization (FMT_MOF.1)
• Management of Windows Sign In (FMT_MOF.1)
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• Management of LDAP Sign In (FMT_MOF.1)
• Management of account lockout policy for Local Administrator
account (FMT_MOF.1)
• Management of Inactivity Timeout for Control Panel sign-in sessions
(FMT_MOF.1)
• Management of enhanced security event logging (FMT_MOF.1)
• Management of IPsec (FMT_MOF.1)
• Management of IPsec/Firewall address templates (FMT_MSA.1)
• Management of permission sets (FMT_MSA.1)
• Management of permissions associated with permission sets
(FMT_MSA.1)
• Management of IPsec/Firewall service templates (FMT_MSA.1)
• Management of Device Administrator Password (FMT_MTD.1)
• Management of CA certificates (FMT_MTD.1)
• Management of identity certificates (FMT_MTD.1)
• Management of network identity certificate (FMT_MTD.1)
Security roles (FMT_SMR.1)
FMT_SMR.1.1 The TSF shall maintain the roles U.ADMINISTRATOR, U.NORMAL.
FMT_SMR.1.2 The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.
6.1.6 Protection of the TSF (FPT)
Restricted forwarding of data to external interfaces (FPT_FDI_EXP.1)
FPT_FDI_EXP.1.1 The TSF shall provide the capability to restrict data received on any external
Interface from being forwarded without further processing by the TSF to any
Shared-medium Interface.
Reliable time stamps (FPT_STM.1)
FPT_STM.1.1 The TSF shall be able to provide reliable time stamps.
TSF testing (FPT_TST.1)
FPT_TST.1.1 The TSF shall run a suite of self tests at the request of the authorised user to
demonstrate the correct operation of
• System Clock - Timestamp verification
• LDAP Sign In - LDAP Settings verification
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• Windows Sign In (via Kerberos) - Windows Settings verification
FPT_TST.1.2 The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the integrity
of
• Device Administrator Password
• Windows Sign In settings
• LDAP Sign In settings
• Permission sets
• Permissions associated with permission sets
• Network user to permission set relationships
• Network group to permission set relationships
• “Allow users to choose alternate sign-in methods at the product
control panel” function enable/disable setting
FPT_TST.1.3 The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the integrity
of stored TSF executable code.
6.1.7 TOE access (FTA)
TSF-initiated termination of Control Panel sign-in session (FTA_SSL.3)
FTA_SSL.3.1 The TSF shall terminate an interactive Control Panel sign-in session after a an
administrator-configurable amount of user inactivity.
6.1.8 Trusted path/channels (FTP)
Inter-TSF trusted channel (FTP_ITC.1)
FTP_ITC.1.1 The TSF shall provide a communication channel between itself and another
trusted IT product that is logically distinct from other communication channels
and provides assured identification of its end points and protection of the channel
communicated data from modification or disclosure.
FTP_ITC.1.2 The TSF shall permit the TSF, another trusted IT product to initiate
communication via the trusted channel.
FTP_ITC.1.3 The TSF shall initiate communication via the trusted channel for communication
of D.DOC, D.FUNC, D.PROT, and D.CONF over any Shared-medium
Interface.
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6.2 Security Functional Requirements Rationale
6.2.1 Coverage
The following table provides a mapping of SFR to the security objectives, showing that each security
functional requirement addresses at least one security objective.
Table 40: Mapping of security functional requirements to security objectives
Security functional requirements Objectives
FAU_GEN.1 O.AUDIT.LOGGED
FAU_GEN.2 O.AUDIT.LOGGED
FCS_CKM.1-ipsec O.CONF.NO_ALT,
O.CONF.NO_DIS,
O.DOC.NO_ALT,
O.DOC.NO_DIS,
O.FUNC.NO_ALT,
O.PROT.NO_ALT
FCS_CKM.1-job O.DOC.NO_ALT,
O.DOC.NO_DIS,
O.FUNC.NO_ALT
FCS_CKM.2 O.CONF.NO_ALT,
O.CONF.NO_DIS,
O.DOC.NO_ALT,
O.DOC.NO_DIS,
O.FUNC.NO_ALT,
O.PROT.NO_ALT
FCS_COP.1-ipsec O.CONF.NO_ALT,
O.CONF.NO_DIS,
O.DOC.NO_ALT,
O.DOC.NO_DIS,
O.FUNC.NO_ALT,
O.PROT.NO_ALT
FCS_COP.1-job O.DOC.NO_ALT,
O.DOC.NO_DIS,
O.FUNC.NO_ALT
FCS_COP.1-tst O.SOFTWARE.VERIFIED
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Security functional requirements Objectives
FCS_RBG_EXT.1 O.CONF.NO_ALT,
O.CONF.NO_DIS,
O.DOC.NO_ALT,
O.DOC.NO_DIS,
O.FUNC.NO_ALT,
O.PROT.NO_ALT
FDP_ACC.1-cac O.DOC.NO_ALT,
O.DOC.NO_DIS,
O.FUNC.NO_ALT
FDP_ACC.1-tfac O.USER.AUTHORIZED
FDP_ACF.1-cac O.DOC.NO_ALT,
O.DOC.NO_DIS,
O.FUNC.NO_ALT
FDP_ACF.1-tfac O.USER.AUTHORIZED
FDP_RIP.1 O.DOC.NO_DIS
FIA_AFL.1 O.USER.AUTHORIZED
FIA_ATD.1 O.USER.AUTHORIZED
FIA_SOS.1 O.USER.AUTHORIZED
FIA_UAU.1 O.INTERFACE.MANAGED,
O.USER.AUTHORIZED
FIA_UAU.2 O.INTERFACE.MANAGED,
O.USER.AUTHORIZED
FIA_UAU.7 O.CONF.NO_DIS
FIA_UID.1 O.AUDIT.LOGGED,
O.CONF.NO_ALT,
O.CONF.NO_DIS,
O.DOC.NO_ALT,
O.DOC.NO_DIS,
O.FUNC.NO_ALT,
O.INTERFACE.MANAGED,
O.PROT.NO_ALT,
O.USER.AUTHORIZED
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Security functional requirements Objectives
FIA_UID.2 O.AUDIT.LOGGED,
O.CONF.NO_ALT,
O.CONF.NO_DIS,
O.DOC.NO_ALT,
O.DOC.NO_DIS,
O.FUNC.NO_ALT,
O.INTERFACE.MANAGED,
O.PROT.NO_ALT,
O.USER.AUTHORIZED
FIA_USB.1 O.USER.AUTHORIZED
FMT_MOF.1 O.PROT.NO_ALT
FMT_MSA.1 O.DOC.NO_ALT,
O.DOC.NO_DIS,
O.FUNC.NO_ALT,
O.USER.AUTHORIZED
FMT_MTD.1 O.CONF.NO_ALT,
O.CONF.NO_DIS,
O.PROT.NO_ALT
FMT_SMF.1 O.CONF.NO_ALT,
O.CONF.NO_DIS,
O.DOC.NO_ALT,
O.DOC.NO_DIS,
O.FUNC.NO_ALT,
O.PROT.NO_ALT
FMT_SMR.1 O.CONF.NO_ALT,
O.CONF.NO_DIS,
O.DOC.NO_ALT,
O.DOC.NO_DIS,
O.FUNC.NO_ALT,
O.PROT.NO_ALT,
O.USER.AUTHORIZED
FPT_FDI_EXP.1 O.INTERFACE.MANAGED
FPT_STM.1 O.AUDIT.LOGGED
FPT_TST.1 O.SOFTWARE.VERIFIED
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Security functional requirements Objectives
FTA_SSL.3 O.INTERFACE.MANAGED,
O.USER.AUTHORIZED
FTP_ITC.1 O.CONF.NO_ALT,
O.CONF.NO_DIS,
O.DOC.NO_ALT,
O.DOC.NO_DIS,
O.FUNC.NO_ALT,
O.PROT.NO_ALT
6.2.2 Sufficiency
The following rationale provides justification for each security objective for the TOE, showing that the
security functional requirements are suitable to meet and achieve the security objectives:
Table 41: Security objectives for the TOE rationale
Security objectives Rationale
O.AUDIT.LOGGED The objective:
• The TOE shall create and maintain a log of TOE use and
security-relevant events, and prevent its unauthorized disclosure
or alteration.
is met by:
• FAU_GEN.1 which enforces audit policies by requiring logging
of relevant events.
• FAU_GEN.2 which enforces audit policies by requiring logging
of information associated with audited events.
• FIA_UID.1 and FIA_UID.2 which support audit policies by
associating user identity with events
• FPT_STM.1 which supports audit policies by requiring time
stamps associated with events.
O.CONF.NO_ALT The objective:
• The TOE shall protect TSF Confidential Data from
unauthorized alteration.
is met by:
• FCS_CKM.1-ipsec which specifies the type of cryptographic
keys generated for IPsec key establishment.
• FCS_CKM.2 which specifies the cryptographic key
establishment methods used by IKEv1 and IKEv2 in IPsec to
create a channel that detects unauthorized modification.
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Security objectives Rationale
• FCS_COP.1-ipsec which specifies the SHA and HMAC
cryptographic algorithms used by IPsec to detect unauthorized
modification.
• FCS_RBG_EXT.1 which specifies the random bit generation
used by IPsec.
• FIA_UID.1 and FIA_UID.2 which support access control and
security roles by requiring user identification.
• FMT_MTD.1 which enforce protection by restricting access.
• FMT_SMF.1 which supports control of security attributes by
requiring functions to control attributes.
• FMT_SMR.1 which supports control of security attributes by
requiring security roles.
• FTP_ITC.1 which enforces protection by requiring the use of
trusted channels for communication of data over Shared-
medium Interfaces.
O.CONF.NO_DIS The objective:
• The TOE shall protect TSF Confidential Data from
unauthorized disclosure.
is met by:
• FCS_CKM.1-ipsec which specifies the type of cryptographic
keys generated for IPsec key establishment.
• FCS_CKM.2 which specifies the cryptographic key
establishment methods used by IKEv1 and IKEv2 in IPsec to
create a channel protected from unauthorized disclosure.
• FCS_COP.1-ipsec which specifies the RSA signature
generation and verification along with the AES and HMAC
cryptographic algorithms used by IPsec to help prevent
unauthorized disclosure.
• FCS_RBG_EXT.1 which specifies the random bit generation
used by IPsec.
• FIA_UAU.7 which masks the display of certain passwords and
PINs during authentication.
• FIA_UID.1 and FIA_UID.2 which support access control and
security roles by requiring user identification.
• FMT_MTD.1 which enforce protection by restricting access.
• FMT_SMF.1 which supports control of security attributes by
requiring functions to control attributes.
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Security objectives Rationale
• FMT_SMR.1 which supports control of security attributes by
requiring security roles.
• FTP_ITC.1 which enforces protection by requiring the use of
trusted channels for communication of data over Shared-
medium Interfaces.
O.DOC.NO_ALT The objective:
• The TOE shall protect User Document Data from unauthorized
alteration.
is met by:
• FCS_CKM.1-ipsec which specifies the type of cryptographic
keys generated for IPsec key establishment.
• FCS_CKM.1-job which specifies the PBKDF2 with HMAC-
SHA256 used by the TOE to process encrypted stored print
jobs.
• FCS_CKM.2 which specifies the cryptographic key
establishment methods used by IKEv1 and IKEv2 in IPsec to
create a channel that detects unauthorized modification.
• FCS_COP.1-ipsec which specifies the SHA and HMAC
cryptographic algorithms used by IPsec to detect unauthorized
modification.
• FCS_COP.1-job which specifies the SHA and HMAC
cryptographic algorithms used by the TOE to unlock encrypted
stored print jobs and the AES decryption algorithm used by the
TOE to decrypt encrypted stored print jobs.
• FCS_RBG_EXT.1 which specifies the random bit generation
used by IPsec.
• FDP_ACC.1-cac which enforces protection by establishing an
access control policy.
• FDP_ACF.1-cac which supports access control policy by
providing access control function.
• FIA_UID.1 and FIA_UID.2 which support access control and
security roles by requiring user identification.
• FMT_MSA.1 which supports access control function by
enforcing control of security attributes.
• FMT_SMF.1 which supports control of security attributes by
requiring functions to control attributes.
• FMT_SMR.1 which supports control of security attributes by
requiring security roles.
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Security objectives Rationale
• FTP_ITC.1 which enforces protection by requiring the use of
trusted channels for communication of data over Shared-
medium Interfaces.
O.DOC.NO_DIS The objective:
• The TOE shall protect User Document Data from unauthorized
disclosure.
is met by:
• FCS_CKM.1-ipsec which specifies the type of cryptographic
keys generated for IPsec key establishment.
• FCS_CKM.1-job which specifies the PBKDF2 with HMAC-
SHA256 used by the TOE to process encrypted stored print
jobs.
• FCS_CKM.2 which specifies the cryptographic key
establishment methods used by IKEv1 and IKEv2 in IPsec to
create a channel protected from unauthorized disclosure.
• FCS_COP.1-ipsec which specifies the RSA signature
generation and verification along with the AES and HMAC
cryptographic algorithms used by IPsec to help prevent
unauthorized disclosure.
• FCS_COP.1-job which specifies the SHA and HMAC
cryptographic algorithms used by the TOE to unlock encrypted
stored print jobs and the AES decryption algorithm used by the
TOE to decrypt encrypted stored print jobs.
• FCS_RBG_EXT.1 which specifies the random bit generation
used by IPsec.
• FDP_ACC.1-cac which enforces protection by establishing an
access control policy.
• FDP_ACF.1-cac which supports access control policy by
providing access control function.
• FDP_RIP.1 which enforces protection by making residual data
unavailable.
• FIA_UID.1 and FIA_UID.2 which support access control and
security roles by requiring user identification.
• FMT_MSA.1 which supports access control function by
enforcing control of security attributes.
• FMT_SMF.1 which supports control of security attributes by
requiring functions to control attributes.
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Security objectives Rationale
• FMT_SMR.1 which supports control of security attributes by
requiring security roles.
• FTP_ITC.1 which enforces protection by requiring the use of
trusted channels for communication of data over Shared-
medium Interfaces.
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Security objectives Rationale
O.FUNC.NO_ALT The objective:
• The TOE shall protect User Function Data from unauthorized
alteration.
is met by:
• FCS_CKM.1-ipsec which specifies the type of cryptographic
keys generated for IPsec key establishment.
• FCS_CKM.1-job which specifies the PBKDF2 with HMAC-
SHA256 used by the TOE to process encrypted stored print
jobs.
• FCS_CKM.2 which specifies the cryptographic key
establishment methods used by IKEv1 and IKEv2 in IPsec to
create a channel that detects unauthorized modification.
• FCS_COP.1-ipsec which specifies the SHA and HMAC
cryptographic algorithms used by IPsec to detect unauthorized
modification.
• FCS_COP.1-job which specifies the SHA and HMAC
cryptographic algorithms used by the TOE to unlock encrypted
stored print jobs and the AES decryption algorithm used by the
TOE to decrypt encrypted stored print jobs.
• FCS_RBG_EXT.1 which specifies the random bit generation
used by IPsec.
• FDP_ACC.1-cac which enforces protection by establishing an
access control policy.
• FDP_ACF.1-cac which supports access control policy by
providing access control function.
• FIA_UID.1 and FIA_UID.2 which support access control and
security roles by requiring user identification.
• FMT_MSA.1 which supports access control function by
enforcing control of security attributes.
• FMT_SMF.1 which supports control of security attributes by
requiring functions to control attributes.
• FMT_SMR.1 which supports control of security attributes by
requiring security roles.
• FTP_ITC.1 which enforces protection by requiring the use of
trusted channels for communication of data over Shared-
medium Interfaces.
O.INTERFACE.MANAGED The objective:
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Security objectives Rationale
• The TOE shall manage the operation of external interfaces in
accordance with security policies.
is met by:
• FIA_UAU.1 and FIA_UAU.2 which enforce management of
external interfaces by requiring user authentication.
• FIA_UID.1 and FIA_UID.2 which enforce management of
external interfaces by requiring user identification.
• FPT_FDI_EXP.1 which enforces management of external
interfaces by requiring (as needed) administrator control of data
transmission from external Interfaces to Shared-medium
Interfaces.
• FTA_SSL.3 which enforces management of external interfaces
by terminating inactive sessions.
O.PROT.NO_ALT The objective:
• The TOE shall protect TSF Protected Data from unauthorized
alteration.
is met by:
• FCS_CKM.1-ipsec which specifies the type of cryptographic
keys generated for IPsec key establishment.
• FCS_CKM.2 which specifies the cryptographic key
establishment methods used by IKEv1 and IKEv2 in IPsec to
create a channel that detects unauthorized modification.
• FCS_COP.1-ipsec which specifies the SHA and HMAC
cryptographic algorithms used by IPsec to detect unauthorized
modification.
• FCS_RBG_EXT.1 which specifies the random bit generation
used by IPsec.
• FIA_UID.1 and FIA_UID.2 which support access control and
security roles by requiring user identification.
• FMT_MOF.1 which specifies the roles that can manage the
security functions.
• FMT_MTD.1 which enforce protection by restricting access.
• FMT_SMF.1 which supports control of security attributes by
requiring functions to control attributes.
• FMT_SMR.1 which supports control of security attributes by
requiring security roles.
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Security objectives Rationale
• FTP_ITC.1 which enforces protection by requiring the use of
trusted channels for communication of data over Shared-
medium Interfaces.
O.SOFTWARE.VERIFIED The objective:
• The TOE shall provide procedures to self-verify executable
code in the TSF.
is met by:
• FPT_TST.1 which enforces verification of software by
requiring the TOE include self-tests.
• FCS_COP.1-tst which specifies the SHA cryptographic
algorithm used by the TOE for TSF self-testing.
O.USER.AUTHORIZED The objective:
• The TOE shall require identification and authentication of
Users, and shall ensure that Users are authorized in accordance
with security policies before allowing them to use the TOE.
is met by:
• FDP_ACC.1-tfac which enforces authorization by establishing
an access control policy.
• FDP_ACF.1-tfac which supports access control policy by
providing access control function.
• FIA_AFL.1 which locks Device Administrator account (a.k.a.
Local Administrator account) after an administrator
configurable positive integer of unsuccessful Control Panel
authentication attempts via Local Device Sign In method.
• FIA_ATD.1 which supports authorization by associating
security attributes with users.
• FIA_SOS.1 which specifies the password/PIN strength of
certain authentication mechanisms.
• FIA_UAU.1 and FIA_UAU.2 which enforce authorization by
requiring user authentication.
• FIA_UID.1 and FIA_UID.2 which enforce authorization by
requiring user identification.
• FIA_USB.1 which enforces authorization by distinguishing
subject security attributes associated with User Roles.
• FMT_MSA.1 which support access control function by
enforcing control of security attributes.
• FMT_SMR.1 which supports authorization by requiring
security roles.
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Security objectives Rationale
• FTA_SSL.3 which enforces authorization by terminating
inactive sessions.
6.2.3 Security requirements dependency analysis
The following table demonstrates the dependencies of SFRs modeled in CC Part 2 and how the SFRs for
the TOE resolve those dependencies:
Table 42: TOE SFR dependency analysis
Security functional requirement Dependencies Resolution
FAU_GEN.1 FPT_STM.1 FPT_STM.1
FAU_GEN.2 FAU_GEN.1 FAU_GEN.1
FIA_UID.1 FIA_UID.1
FCS_CKM.1-ipsec [FCS_CKM.2 or
FCS_COP.1]
FCS_CKM.2
FCS_COP.1-ipsec
FCS_CKM.4 This dependency is unresolved. The
generated keys are not formally destroyed.
The object reuse mechanisms of the
operating system prevent their use except
in the intended context.
FCS_CKM.1-job [FCS_CKM.2 or
FCS_COP.1]
FCS_COP.1-job
FCS_CKM.4 This dependency is unresolved. The
derived keys are not formally destroyed.
The object reuse mechanisms of the
operating system prevent their use except
in the intended context.
FCS_CKM.2 [FDP_ITC.1 or
FDP_ITC.2 or
FCS_CKM.1]
FCS_CKM.1-ipsec
FCS_CKM.4 This dependency is unresolved. The
derived keys are not formally destroyed.
The object reuse mechanisms of the
operating system prevent their use except
in the intended context.
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Security functional requirement Dependencies Resolution
FCS_COP.1-ipsec [FDP_ITC.1 or
FDP_ITC.2 or
FCS_CKM.1]
This dependency is unresolved. The RSA
keys used by the TOE for IPsec
authentication are generated outside the
TOE in the operational environment and
imported into the TOE. The IPsec session
keys are generated by FCS_CKM.2.
FCS_CKM.4 This dependency is unresolved. The keys
used for encryption, decryption, and data
authentication are not formally destroyed.
The object reuse mechanisms in the
operating system prevent their use except
in the intended context.
FCS_COP.1-job [FDP_ITC.1 or
FDP_ITC.2 or
FCS_CKM.1]
FCS_CKM.1-job
FCS_CKM.4 This dependency is unresolved. The
derived keys are not formally destroyed.
The object reuse mechanisms of the
operating system prevent their use except
in the intended context.
FCS_COP.1-tst [FDP_ITC.1 or
FDP_ITC.2 or
FCS_CKM.1]
This dependency is unresolved. There are
no keys generated for or used by this hash
algorithm.
FCS_CKM.4 This dependency is unresolved. There are
no keys used by this hash algorithm to
destroy.
FCS_RBG_EXT.1 No dependencies
FDP_ACC.1-cac FDP_ACF.1 FDP_ACF.1-cac
FDP_ACC.1-tfac FDP_ACF.1 FDP_ACF.1-tfac
FDP_ACF.1-cac FDP_ACC.1 FDP_ACC.1-cac
FMT_MSA.3 This dependency is unresolved. The Job
PIN, Job Encryption Password, and
Permission Sets do not have default values
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Security functional requirement Dependencies Resolution
and do not allow for the specification of
alternative initial values.
FDP_ACF.1-tfac FDP_ACC.1 FDP_ACC.1-tfac
FMT_MSA.3 This dependency is unresolved. The IP
service templates, associations of sign-in
method to a Control Panel application, and
Permission Sets do not have default values
and do not allow for the specification of
alternative initial values.
FDP_RIP.1 No dependencies.
FIA_AFL.1 FIA_UAU.1 FIA_UAU.1
FIA_ATD.1 No dependencies.
FIA_SOS.1 No dependencies.
FIA_UAU.1 FIA_UID.1 FIA_UID.1
FIA_UAU.2 FIA_UID.1 FIA_UID.2
FIA_UAU.7 FIA_UAU.1 FIA_UAU.1
FIA_UID.1 No dependencies.
FIA_UID.2 No dependencies.
FIA_USB.1 FIA_ATD.1 FIA_ATD.1
FMT_MOF.1 FMT_SMR.1 FMT_SMR.1
FMT_SMF.1 FMT_SMF.1
FMT_MSA.1 [FDP_ACC.1 or
FDP_IFC.1]
FDP_ACC.1-cac
FDP_ACC.1-tfac
FMT_SMR.1 FMT_SMR.1
FMT_SMF.1 FMT_SMF.1
FMT_MTD.1 FMT_SMR.1 FMT_SMR.1
FMT_SMF.1 FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMF.1 No dependencies.
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Security functional requirement Dependencies Resolution
FMT_SMR.1 FIA_UID.1 FIA_UID.1
FPT_FDI_EXP.1 FMT_SMR.1 FMT_SMR.1
FMT_SMF.1 FMT_SMF.1
FPT_STM.1 No dependencies.
FPT_TST.1 No dependencies.
FTA_SSL.3 No dependencies.
FTP_ITC.1 No dependencies.
6.3 Security Assurance Requirements
The security assurance requirements for the TOE are the Evaluation Assurance Level 3 components as
specified in [CC] part 3, augmented by ALC_FLR.2.
The following table shows the Security assurance requirements, and the operations performed on the
components according to CC part 3: iteration (Iter.), refinement (Ref.), assignment (Ass.) and selection
(Sel.).
Table 43: Security assurance requirements
Security
assurance class
Security assurance requirement Source
Operations
Iter. Ref. Ass. Sel.
ADV
Development
ADV_ARC.1 Security architecture description CC Part 3 No No No No
ADV_FSP.3 Functional specification with
complete summary
CC Part 3 No No No No
ADV_TDS.2 Architectural design CC Part 3 No No No No
AGD Guidance
documents
AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance CC Part 3 No No No No
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures CC Part 3 No No No No
ALC Life-cycle
support
ALC_CMC.3 Authorisation controls CC Part 3 No No No No
ALC_CMS.3 Implementation representation
CM coverage
CC Part 3 No No No No
ALC_DEL.1 Delivery procedures CC Part 3 No No No No
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Security
assurance class
Security assurance requirement Source
Operations
Iter. Ref. Ass. Sel.
ALC_DVS.1 Identification of security
measures
CC Part 3 No No No No
ALC_FLR.2 Flaw reporting procedures CC Part 3 No No No No
ALC_LCD.1 Developer defined life-cycle
model
CC Part 3 No No No No
ASE Security
Target
evaluation
ASE_INT.1 ST introduction CC Part 3 No No No No
ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims CC Part 3 No No No No
ASE_SPD.1 Security problem definition CC Part 3 No No No No
ASE_OBJ.2 Security objectives CC Part 3 No No No No
ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition CC Part 3 No No No No
ASE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements CC Part 3 No No No No
ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification CC Part 3 No No No No
ATE Tests ATE_COV.2 Analysis of coverage CC Part 3 No No No No
ATE_DPT.1 Testing: basic design CC Part 3 No No No No
ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing CC Part 3 No No No No
ATE_IND.2 Independent testing - sample CC Part 3 No No No No
AVA
Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_VAN.2 Vulnerability analysis CC Part 3 No No No No
6.4 Security Assurance Requirements Rationale
The evaluation assurance level has been chosen to match a Basic attack potential commensurate with the
threat environment that is experienced by typical consumers of the TOE and commensurate with
[PP2600.1]. In addition, the evaluation assurance level has been augmented with ALC_FLR.2
commensurate with the augmented flaw remediation capabilities offered by the developer beyond those
required by the evaluation assurance level and commensurate with [PP2600.1].
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7 TOE Summary Specification
7.1 TOE Security Functionality
The following section explains how the security functions are implemented by the TOE. The different
TOE security functions cover the various SFR classes.
The primary security features of the TOE are:
• Auditing
• Cryptography
• Identification and authentication
• Data protection and access control
• Protection of the TSF
• TOE access protection
• Trusted channel communication and certificate management
• User and access management
7.1.1 Auditing
The TOE performs auditing of security-relevant functions. The TOE connects and sends audit records to a
syslog server (part of the Operational Environment) for long-term storage and audit review. The records
sent to the syslog server by the TOE are only those generated by the TOE while the syslog server has an
established connection with the TOE. If the connection between the TOE and syslog server breaks and is
later reestablished, only records generated by the TOE after the connection is reestablished are sent to the
syslog server. Both the Jetdirect Inside and HCD System firmware generate audit records.
To generate the proper set of audit events, the TOE's enhanced security event logging must be enabled.
The complete audit record format and audit record details are provided in the [CCECG] in chapter 7
Enhanced security event logging messages in section Syslog messages. The [CCECG] groups the events
into event categories in the section Syslog messages.
The following table provides a mapping of the [CCECG] event categories to the events defined in
FAU_GEN.1. (The ST author's intent is to not consume 30 pages of the ST by repeating the audit events
listed in the [CCECG], but to refer the ST reader to the appropriate category of events in the [CCECG]
that map to the events defined in FAU_GEN.1.).
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Table 44: TOE audit records
Auditable event CCECG “Syslog messages” category and records
Start-up and shutdown of the
audit functions
Enhanced security event logging:
• Auditing was started during boot up
• Auditing was stopped using EWS
• Auditing was restarted using EWS
Job completion Job completion:
• Save to Device Memory job completion
• Retrieve from Device Memory job completion (Print from
job storage)
• Job Notification completion
• Print job completion
Both successful and
unsuccessful use of the
authentication mechanism
Control panel sign in (Local Device):
• Sign in using the Local Device sign-in method successful for
the specified user
• Sign in using the Local Device sign-in method failed
Control panel sign in (Windows):
• Sign in using the Windows sign-in method successful for the
specified user
• Sign in using the Windows sign-in method failed for the
specified user
Control panel sign in (LDAP):
• Sign in using the LDAP sign-in method successful for the
specified user
• Sign in using the LDAP sign-in method failed for the
specified user
Both successful and
unsuccessful use of the
identification mechanism
Same categories and records as the "Both successful and
unsuccessful use of the authentication mechanism" auditable events
Use of the management
functions
Device administrator password:
• Device Administrator Password modified
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Auditable event CCECG “Syslog messages” category and records
Windows Sign In:
• Windows Sign In enabled
• Windows Sign In disabled
• Windows Sign In configuration modified
LDAP Sign In:
• LDAP Sign In enabled
• LDAP Sign In disabled
• LDAP Sign In configuration modified
Allow users to choose alternate sign-in methods at the product
control panel:
• Sign In and Permission Policy settings modified
Account lockout policy for device administrator account:
• Account Lockout Policy enabled
• Account Lockout Policy disabled
• Account Lockout Policy setting modified
Control panel inactivity timeout:
• Control Panel Inactivity Timeout Changed
Custom permission sets:
• Permission Set added
• Permission Set modified
• Permission Set copied
• Permission Set deleted
Permissions associated with permission sets:
• Permission Set modified
CA certificates:
• Device CA certificate installed
• Device CA certificate deleted
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Auditable event CCECG “Syslog messages” category and records
Identity certificates:
• Device Identity certificate and private key installed
• Device Identity certificate for network identity selected
• Device Identity certificate deleted
IPsec/Firewall address templates:
• IPsec/Firewall address policy added
• IPsec/Firewall address policy modified
• IPsec/Firewall address policy deleted
IPsec/Firewall service templates:
• IPsec/Firewall service policy added
• IPsec/Firewall service policy modified
• IPsec/Firewall service policy deleted
Modifications to the group of
users that are part of a role
Network user to permission set relationships:
• User to Permission Set Relationship added
• User to Permission Set Relationship deleted
Network group to permission set relationships:
• Group to Permission Set Relationship added
• Group to Permission Set Relationship deleted
IPsec/Firewall rules:
• IPsec/Firewall rule added
• IPsec/Firewall rule deleted
• IPsec/Firewall rule enabled
• IPsec/Firewall rule disabled
• IPsec/Firewall rule position changed
Changes to the time System time:
• System time changed
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Auditable event CCECG “Syslog messages” category and records
Failure of the trusted channel
functions
IKEv1 phase 1 negotiations:
• IKEv1 phase 1 negotiation failed initiated by the client
computer
• IKEv1 phase 1 negotiation failed initiated by the local device
(TOE)
IKEv1 phase 2 negotiations:
• IKEv1 phase 2 negotiation failed initiated by the client
computer
• IKEv1 phase 2 negotiation failed initiated by the local device
(TOE)
IKEv2 phase 1 negotiations:
• IKEv2 phase 1 negotiation failed initiated by the client
computer
• IKEv2 phase 1 negotiation failed initiated by the local device
(TOE)
IKEv2 phase 2 negotiations:
• IKEv2 phase 2 negotiation failed initiated by the client
computer
• IKEv2 phase 2 negotiation failed initiated by the local device
(TOE)
IPsec ESP:
• IPsec using ESP failed
Termination of an interactive
session by the session
termination mechanism
Control panel user sign out:
• Control Panel session terminated
Each audit record includes the date and time of the event, type of event, subject identity (if applicable),
and the outcome (success or failure) of the event.
The subject identity used in the audit record is formed in the following manner. For Local Device Sign In,
the subject's identity contains the user's Display Name prefixed with "LOCAL\". For LDAP Sign In, the
subject's identity contains the user's LDAP user name prefixed with either the LDAP server's host name
or IP address then a "\". For Windows Sign In, the subject's identity contains the user's Windows domain
name and Windows user name separated by a "\". For IPsec, the subject's identity is the user's IP address.
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The time source used for the audit record timestamps is discussed in section 7.1.5.3.
This section maps to the following SFRs:
• FAU_GEN.1
• FAU_GEN.2
7.1.2 Cryptography
The TOE uses IPsec to protect its communications channels. The QuickSec cryptographic library is used
to supply the cryptographic algorithms for IPsec. See section 7.1.7 for more information.
The TOE supports the decrypting of an encrypted stored print job. To decrypt an encrypted stored print
job, the TOE derives a key from a Job Encryption Password and unlocks the decryption key using the
derived key. The TOE then decrypts the encrypted stored print job using the decryption key. The key
derivation code and the decryption code used by the TOE is included in the TOE. See section 7.1.4.3 for
more information.
The TOE’s on-demand Data Integrity Test uses the SHA-256 algorithm to verify the integrity of specific
TSF Data. The HP FutureSmart Windows Mobile Enhanced Cryptographic Provider (RSAENH)
6.00.1937 implementation, which is part of the operational environment, supplies the SHA-256 algorithm.
See section 7.1.5.2 for more information.
The TOE’s on-demand Code Integrity Test uses the SHA-256 algorithm to verify the integrity of TOE
executable code files stored on the storage drive. The HP FutureSmart Windows Mobile Enhanced
Cryptographic Provider (RSAENH) 6.00.1937 implementation, which is part of the operational
environment, supplies the SHA-256 algorithm. See section 7.1.5.2 for more information.
7.1.3 Identification and Authentication (I&A)
The TOE supports multiple Control Panel sign-in methods, both local and remote methods. It also
supports IPsec identification and mutual authentication.
The following interfaces support I&A:
• Control Panel
• IPsec
Control Panel I&A
The Control Panel interface supports both local and remote sign-in methods. The following sign-in
methods are allowed with the evaluated configuration:
• Local sign-in method:
o Local Device Sign In (Local Administrator account only)
• Remote sign-in methods:
o LDAP Sign In
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o Windows Sign In (via Kerberos)
(The servers for the remote sign-in methods are part of the Operational Environment.)
The Control Panel also allows both non-administrative users (U.NORMAL) and administrative users
(U.ADMINISTRATOR) to sign in. Prior to sign in, the Control Panel allows users to perform the
following functions:
• Viewing of help information
• Viewing of device status information
• Viewing of network connectivity status information
• Viewing of system time
• Viewing of Web Services status information
• Viewing of Welcome screen
• Selection of Sign In
• Selection of sign-in method from Sign In screen
• Printing of help information
• Printing of network connectivity status information
• Changing language for the session
• Resetting of session
The TOE contains a local user database that defines a single administrative (U.ADMINISTRATOR)
device user account called the Local Administrator account to support the Local Device Sign In
mechanism. The Local Administrator contains the following attributes:
• Display Name
• Administrator Access Code
• Permission Set
The Display Name and Permission Set attributes for the Local Administrator account are hardcoded.
There values are:
• Display Name = admin
• Permission Set = Device Administrator permission set
Only the Administrator Access Code (a.k.a. Device Administrator Password) is manageable. It can be
managed via the EWS. The Device Administrator Password can be set to value between 1 and 16
characters in length. Additionally, the Device Administrator Password can contain upper- and lower-case
letters, numbers, and the following special characters:
• "!", "@", "#", "$", "%", "^", "&", "*", "(", ")", """, "'", "`", "+", ",", "-", ".", "/", "\", ":", ";", "<",
"=", ">", "?", "[", "]", "_", "|", "~", "{", "}"
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In the evaluated configuration, the Device Administrator Password must be at a minimum 8 characters in
length and must contain three of the following: uppercase letters, lowercase letters, numbers, and special
characters.
The Device Administrator Password can also be used to sign into the EWS from a remote computer in
addition to signing in at the Control Panel.
The Permission Set defines/determines a user's access to many of the TOE's functions. Permission Sets
are discussed in more detail in section 7.1.4.1.
Like Local Device Sign In, the remote sign-in methods are used by the Control Panel. The TOE receives
authentication credentials from the Control Panel users and passes the credentials to the remote sign-in
method. The remote sign-in method returns an authentication decision to the TOE. This decision is then
enforced by the TOE by granting or denying access to the Control Panel user.
In the case of LDAP, the user name and password entered at the Control Panel are used to bind to the
LDAP server. The user must have a valid and active LDAP account in order to successfully bind using
this method.
In the case of Kerberos, the user name and password entered at the Control Panel are used to authenticate
with the Windows domain controller. The user must have a valid and active Windows domain account in
order to successfully bind using this method.
When a user successfully signs in to the Control Panel, the Permission Set associated with that user is
bound to that user instance and defines the user's User Role.
When users authenticate through the Control Panel, the TOE displays a dot character of a PIN, Access
Code, or password typed to prevent onlookers from viewing another user's authentication data. (Job PINs
are not authentication data, but the Job PIN is masked.)
The TOE contains account lockout functionality to help protect against brute-force attacks. The account
lockout functionality applies to the Device Administrator account (a.k.a. Local Administrator account)
only.
The lockout mechanism uses the following control values.
• Account lockout maximum attempts
• Account lockout interval
• Account reset lockout counter interval
The account lockout maximum attempts value allows an administrator to control the number of failed
authentication attempts on the account before it is locked. The administrator can choose a value between
3 and 10 inclusively. Consecutive failed authentication attempts using the same authentication credential
count as a single failed authentication attempt. The counted failed attempts must happen within the value
set for the account reset lockout counter interval value; otherwise, the maximum attempts counter is reset
when the account reset lockout counter interval value elapses.
This section maps to the following SFRs:
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• FIA_AFL.1
• FIA_ATD.1
• FIA_UAU.1
• FIA_UAU.7
• FIA_UID.1
• FIA_USB.1
• FMT_SMR.1
IPsec I&A
The TOE uses IPsec to identify and mutually authenticate the following user types:
• Administrative Computer (U.ADMINISTRATOR)
• Network Client Computers (U.NORMAL)
IPsec uses IP addresses and RSA X.509v3 certificates via the IKE protocols (IKEv1 and IKEv2) to
identify and authenticate, respectively, a client computer. The TOE contains one X.509v3 identity
certificate designated as the network identity certificate and one or more X.509v3 CA certificates to use
for the IPsec mutual authentication. The TOE does not maintain individual X.509v3 certificates of its
client computers.
The User Identity of a client computer is its IP address. The TOE's internal firewall maintains lists
(IPsec/Firewall address templates) of IP addresses of client computers that can connect to the TOE as a
Network Client Computer and as the Administrative Computer. If a client computer has an unrecognized
IP address that is not defined in the IPsec/Firewall as either the Administrative Computer or a Network
Client Computer, then the client computer is not allowed to connect to the TOE. Similarly, if the client
computer presents an invalid or unknown (unrecognized CA) X.509v3 certificate, the IPsec mutual
authentication mechanism will fail. The TOE uses RSA signature generation and signature verification
methods as part of this validity checking process.
The TOE also uses IP addresses and X.509v3 certificates via the IKE protocols to connect to and identify
other trusted IT products. See section 7.1.7 for more details.
The TOE supports the following versions of the IKE protocol:
• IKEv1 ([RFC4109])
• IKEv2 ([RFC4306] and [RFC4718])
Mutual identification and authentication must be completed before any tasks can be performed by a
Network Client Computer or an Administrative Computer.
The service templates define the User Role of a client computer. The following service templates are used
to define the TOE's User Roles for IPsec users:
• Administrative Computer (U.ADMINISTRATOR)
• Network Client Computers (U.NORMAL)
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The Administrative Computer and Network Client Computers service templates are created by the
administrator as part of the TOE's configuration guidance.
Both the Administrative Computer and the Network Client Computers can access the PJL Interface on
port 9100, but only the Administrative Computer can access the EWS (HTTP) and REST Web Services
(HTTP) interfaces.
IP address management is discussed in section 7.1.4.5. Certificate management is discussed in section
7.1.7.
This section maps to the following SFRs:
• FIA_ATD.1
• FIA_UAU.2
• FIA_UID.2
• FIA_USB.1
• FMT_SMR.1
7.1.4 Data Protection and Access Control
Permission Sets
For Control Panel users, the TOE uses a user's User Role (as determined by each user's Permission Set) to
determine a user's access to many TOE functions. Only U.ADMINISTRATOR can query, create, modify,
and delete Permission Sets. In addition, only U.ADMINISTRATOR can query, create, modify, and delete
the Permission Set associations to users. The TOE contains the following built-in Permission Sets:
• Device Guest
• Device Administrator (U.ADMINISTRATOR)
• Device User (U.NORMAL)
Built-in Permission Sets cannot be renamed or deleted. The permissions associated with the Device
Administrator Permission Set can be queried, but cannot be configured to deny access (i.e., the
permissions are always set to grant access). The permissions associated with the Device Guest and Device
User Permission Sets can be queried and can be configured to grant or deny access.
The Device Administrator Permission Set has all permissions set to grant access. In the evaluated
configuration, the Device Guest Permission Set has permissions configured to deny access, and the
Device User permission set has all administrative permissions configured to deny access.
The Device Administrator Permission Set is automatically granted to the Local Administrator account
(U.ADMINISTROR) and can be granted to other administrator accounts (U.ADMINISTRATOR) defined
in a remote authentication server (e.g. LDAP server) used by a remote sign-in method (e.g. LDAP Sign
In).
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The Device Guest Permission Set is associated with a Control Panel session when no user is signed in. In
the evaluated configuration, the Device Guest Permission Set has all permissions configured to deny
access. With all permissions in the Device Guest Permission Set configured to deny access, the TOE
requires all users to sign in at the Control Panel in order to perform any document-processing or
administrative functions at the Control Panel.
Permissions in a Permission Set include permissions as high-level as executing the Print from Job Storage
application. They also include more granular permissions that control administrative functions like the
ability to delete protected jobs in Job Storage without entering a Job Encryption Password or Job PIN.
Each permission in a Permission Set has two possible values: deny access and grant access.
This section maps to the following SFRs:
• FMT_MSA.1
• FMT_SMF.1
Job PINs
Users can control access to each stored print job that they place under the TOE's control by assigning a
Job PIN to each job. A Job PIN limits access to a stored print job while the job resides under the TOE's
control and allows a user to control when the job is printed so that physical access to the hard copies can
be controlled by the user. A Job PIN must be 4 digits (0000-9999) in length. Only one Job PIN is
permitted per job.
A Job PIN can only be assigned to a job at the time of creation. They cannot be assigned after the job
already resides under the TOE's control. A user assigns a Job PIN to a print job at the client computer.
The Job PIN is embedded in the print job by the client computer prior to sending the print job to the TOE.
Once the TOE receives a print job containing a Job PIN, the TOE enforces the Job PIN embedded in that
job.
Once a Job PIN is set on a job and the job resides under the TOE's control, the Job PIN cannot be
modified or deleted (i.e., the TOE does not provide the ability to manage Job PINs).
A job with a Job Encryption Password cannot be assigned a Job PIN.
This section maps to the following SFRs:
• FIA_SOS.1
Job Encryption Passwords
The TOE can store, and decrypt encrypted stored print jobs received from a client computer. A stored
print job is first encrypted with AES-256 in CBC mode using an encryption/decryption key and protected
with a key derived from the user-specified Job Encryption Password. The stored print job is then sent
encrypted to the TOE and stored encrypted by the TOE.
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To decrypt an encrypted stored print job at the Control Panel, a user must enter the correct Job Encryption
Password that was used to derive the key to protect the job. The key derivation function and decryption
algorithm are included in the TOE. Only one Job Encryption Password is permitted per print job.
A Job Encryption Password can only be assigned to a print job at creation time. A user assigns a Job
Encryption Password to a print job at the client computer. Once a Job Encryption Password is set on a
print job, it cannot be changed or removed. In addition, a print job with a Job Encryption Password cannot
be assigned a Job PIN.
This section maps to the following SFRs:
• FCS_CKM.1-job
• FCS_COP.1-job
Common Access Control
The TOE protects each print job in Job Storage from non-administrative users through the use of a user
identifier and a Job PIN or through the use of a Job Encryption Password. The user identifier for a stored
print job received from a client computer is either assigned by that client computer or assigned by the user
sending the print job from the client computer. Every print job in Job Storage is assigned either a Job PIN
or a Job Encryption Password by the user at job creation time. If the TOE receives a print job from a
client computer without either a Job PIN or a Job Encryption Password, the TOE cancels the job.
The User Role, as defined by the user's Permission Set, defines each user's access. The default rules for a
U.NORMAL User Role for accessing a print job in Job Storage are:
• if the job is Job PIN protected:
o the job owner (i.e., the authenticated user who matches the job's user identifier) can
access (read/delete D.DOC) the job without supplying the Job PIN
o any non-owner authenticated user who supplies the correct Job PIN can access
(read/delete D.DOC) the job
• if the job is Job Encryption Password protected:
o any authenticated user who supplies the correct Job Encryption Password can access
(read/delete D.DOC) the job
By default, a Control Panel administrator (U.ADMINISTRATOR) has a permission in their Permission
Set that allows them to delete print jobs (D.DOC) in Job Storage without provided a Job Encryption
Password or Job PIN.
This section maps to the following SFRs:
• FDP_ACC.1-cac
• FDP_ACF.1-cac
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TOE Function Access Control
The TOE controls access to TOE functions available at the Control Panel using permissions defined in
Permission Sets. During the Control Panel sign-in process, the TOE authorizes the user after they are
successfully identified and authenticated. As part of the user authorization process, the TOE associates
Permission Sets to the user and then applies a Permission Set (which is the combination of the Permission
Sets associated to the user). The applied Permission Set (a.k.a. session Permission Set) becomes the user's
User Role. Access to each TOE function is configurable via a permission in Permission Sets by an
administrator. A user can perform any function permitted in the session Permission Set. Control Panel
applications (e.g., Print from Job Storage) use the user's session Permission Set to determine which of the
application's functions should be allowed or disallowed for the user. A Control Panel user can perform the
[PP2600.1] functions of F.PRT, F.DSR and F.SMI as determined by the user's session Permission Set.
Each Control Panel application requires the user to have one or more specific permissions in their session
Permission Set in order to access that application. In addition, the TOE's administrator can map sign-in
methods to each Control Panel application and require the user to be authenticated to that sign-in method
in order to access that application. The individual applications only check and enforce permissions. They
do not check the sign-in methods. Instead, the TOE enforces the sign-in method requirement at the time
that the user signs into the TOE by removing permissions from the user's session Permission Set for each
application in which the user's sign-in method does not match the sign-in method required by the TOE.
By removing the permissions required by each non-matching application, the TOE limits the set of
applications that the user can access.
Administrators can change/modify the sign-in method mapped to each application. In addition, the TOE
provides a feature called “Allow users to choose alternate sign-in methods at the product’s control panel”
which allows administrators to select if the sign-in method application mappings are enforced or ignored
by the TOE. This feature can be enabled or disabled by an administrator through the EWS (HTTP).
When this feature is disabled, the TOE enforces the sign-in method to application mappings and prunes
(reduces) the user's session Permission Set accordingly. When this feature is enabled, the sign-in method
mappings are ignored by the TOE and the user's session Permission Set remains unchanged.
For IPsec users, the TOE uses the IPsec/Firewall to control access to the supported network service
protocols. The IPsec/Firewall contains the IP addresses of authorized client computers grouped into
address templates and the network service protocols grouped into service templates. The administrator
maps an address template to a service template using an IPsec/Firewall rule. Service templates, therefore,
act as the User Roles for IPsec users. IP addresses of computers not contained in a rule are denied access
to the TOE. The [PP2600.1] functions available to an authorized client computer are F.DSR, F.PRT, and
F.SMI.
This section maps to the following SFRs:
• FDP_ACC.1-tfac
• FDP_ACF.1-tfac
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Residual Information Protection
When the TOE deletes an object defined in section 6.1.3.5, the contents of the object are no longer
available to TOE users.
This section maps to the following SFR:
• FDP_RIP.1
7.1.5 Protection of the TSF
Restricted Forwarding of Data to External Interfaces
The TOE does not allow forwarding of data to an External Interface. The TOE contains only one External
Interface in the evaluated configuration and that interface is the Shared-medium Interface. The terms
External Interface and Shared-medium Interface are defined in [PP2600.1] and duplicated in section 8.2
of this Security Target.
This section maps to the following SFR:
• FPT_FDI_EXP.1
TSF Self-Testing
TSF Functional tests
The EWS interface allows an administrator (U.ADMINISTRATOR) to execute a set of correct operations
tests. These correct operation tests are listed in FPT_TST.1. In some cases, the tests have pre-requisites
that must be met prior to execution in order to receive valid results. For example, the LDAP Settings
verification test requires LDAP Sign In to be configured and enabled prior to executing the test. The tests
that may be available during self-test include:
• System Clock - Timestamp verification
• LDAP Settings verification
• Windows Setting verification
TSF Data Integrity Test
The Data Integrity Test provides the administrator (U.ADMINISTRATOR) the ability to verify the
integrity of certain TSF data on-demand. The administrator first sets a reference point and then the
administrator can periodically perform the test to verify the integrity of the current TSF data against the
reference point. The EWS interface allows the administrator to set the reference point and execute the
Data Integrity Test.
The Data Integrity Test uses the SHA-256 algorithm for both setting the reference point and verifying the
integrity of current TSF Data against the reference point.
TSF Code Integrity Test
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The Code Integrity Test provides the administrator (U.ADMINISTRATOR) the ability to verify the
integrity of TOE executable code files stored on the storage drive on-demand. The administrator first sets
a reference point and then the administrator can periodically perform the test to verify the integrity of the
TOE executable code files against the reference point. The EWS interface allows the administrator to set
the reference point and to execute the Code Integrity Test.
The Code Integrity Test uses the SHA-256 algorithm for both setting the reference point and verifying the
integrity of current TOE executable code files against the reference point.
This section maps to the following SFR:
• FCS_COP.1-tst
• FPT_TST.1
Reliable Timestamps
The TOE contains a system clock that is used to generate reliable timestamps. In the evaluated
configuration, the administrator must configure the TOE to synchronize its system clock with a Network
Time Protocol (NTP) server.
This section maps to the following SFR:
• FPT_STM.1
7.1.6 TOE Access Protection
The following session termination mechanisms are supported by the TOE:
• Inactivity timeout
Inactivity Timeout
The TOE supports an inactivity timeout for Control Panel sign-in sessions. If a signed-in user is inactive
for longer than the specified period of inactivity, the user is automatically signed out of the Control Panel
by the TOE. The inactivity period is managed by the administrator through EWS (HTTP) or the Control
Panel. Only one inactivity period setting exists per TOE.
This section maps to the following SFR:
• FTA_SSL.3
7.1.7 Trusted Channel Communication and Certificate Management
Shared-medium communications (i.e., Ethernet) between the TOE and other trusted IT products use a
trusted channel mechanism to protect the communications from disclosure and modification. The TOE
also ensures the cryptographic operations are validated during policy processing such as validating digital
signatures or encrypting and decrypting data. The following table provides a list of the mechanism(s) used
to protect these channels and the channels protected by the mechanism(s).
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Table 45: Trusted channel connections
Secure protocol Network channel Initiated by
IPsec Email connections (SMTP gateway) TOE
EWS (HTTP) connections (including web
browser & certificate upload)
Administrative Computer
REST Web Services (HTTP) connections Administrative Computer
Windows domain controller (Kerberos)
connections
TOE
LDAP server connections TOE
NTP connections TOE
PJL connections Administrative Computer &
Network Client Computer
Syslog server connections TOE
SMB server connections TOE
DNS server connections TOE
WINS server connections TOE
The TOE uses IPsec as means to provide trusted channel communications. IPsec uses X.509v3
certificates, the Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP), Internet Security Association and Key
Management Protocol (ISAKMP), IKEv1, and IKEv2 protocols, and the cryptographic algorithms listed
below to protect communications.
The cryptographic functions used by IPsec are implemented in the QuickSec cryptographic library
version 5.1 ([QuickSec51]) which is produced by INSIDE Secure. The TOE prepares the data and
invokes the appropriate cryptographic functions, but the code in the QuickSec cryptographic library
performs the processing and calculations required. INSIDE Secure performs regular and rigorous
developer testing of the implementation of the cryptographic algorithms in the QuickSec cryptographic
library.
In the evaluated configuration, the supported IPsec cryptographic algorithms are:
• RSA 2048-bit, and 3072-bit signature generation and verification
• DSA 2048-bit, 3072-bit, 4096-bit, 6144-bit, and 8192-bit key pair generation
• DH (IKEv1, IKEv2) key establishment/exchange
• AES-128, AES-192, and AES-256 in CBC mode for data transfers
• AES-256 (with ECB mode) for the CTR_DRBG(AES)
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• CTR_DRBG(AES)
• SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512 hashing
• HMAC-SHA1-96
• HMAC-SHA-256-128
• HMAC-SHA-384-192
• HMAC-SHA-512-256
IPsec is conformant to the MUST/MUST NOT requirements of the following Internet Engineering Task
Force (IETF) Request for Comments (RFCs):
• [RFC4301] and [RFC4894] for IPsec
• [RFC4303] for ESP
• [RFC4306] for ISAKMP
• [RFC4109] and [RFC4894] for IKEv1
• [RFC4306], [RFC4718], and [RFC4894] for IKEv2.
The TOE maintains the following X.509v3 certificates for IPsec in the certificate store:
• One network identity certificate
• One or more Certificate Authority (CA) certificates
The EWS (HTTP) interface allows administrators to manage these X.509v3 certificates used by IPsec.
When the TOE is first powered on, it generates a self-signed identity certificate to use for network
identity. In the evaluated configuration, the use of a self-signed identity certificate generated by the TOE
for network identity is not permitted. The administrator must import a CA-signed identity certificate with
private key and designate it for network identity usage. The TOE requires a network identity certificate to
always exist; therefore, it allows the administrator to replace the network identity certificate used by
IPsec.
The TOE uses a copy of the self-signed identity certificate it generates when first powered on as a CA
certificate (self-signed) and comes with other CA certificates pre-installed. The administrator must obtain
a CA certificate from the Operational Environment and install this certificate when setting up the
evaluated configuration. The TOE allows the administrator to install and delete CA certificates used by
IPsec.
This section maps to the following SFRs:
• FCS_CKM.1-ipsec
• FCS_CKM.2
• FCS_COP.1-ipsec
• FCS_RBG_EXT.1
• FMT_MTD.1
• FMT_SMF.1
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• FTP_ITC.1
7.1.8 CAVP Certificates
Table 46 contains a complete list of cryptographic operations and their CAVP certificates claimed by this
ST.
Table 46: CAVP certificates
Usage Implementati
on
SFR Standard and operation CAVP certificate
IPsec with
IKEv1 and
IKEv2
HP
FutureSmart
QuickSec 5.1
FCS_CKM.1-ipsec [FIPS PUB 186-4]
KAS FFC
DSA
L=2048, N=224
L=2048, N=256
L=3072, N=256
Prerequisite: SHS #4474,
DRBG #2220
DSA #1432
FCS_CKM.2 [NIST SP 800-56A]
KAS FFC
DH (dhEphem)
KARoles: Initiator,
Responder
FB: SHA: SHA2-256
FC: SHA: SHA2-256
Prerequisite: SHS #4474,
DSA #1432, DRBG #2220
CVL #1999
FCS_COP.1-ipsec [FIPS PUB 197 (AES) and
NIST SP 800-38A (CBC,
ECB)]
AES-CBC
Modes: Decrypt, encrypt
Key lens: 128, 256 (bits)
AES-ECB
Modes: Encrypt
AES #5567
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Usage Implementati
on
SFR Standard and operation CAVP certificate
Key lens: 256 (bits)
[FIPS PUB 186-4]
RSA 186-4
Signature generation
PKCS1.5
Mod 2048 SHA:
SHA2-256,
SHA2-384,
SHA2-512
Mod 3072 SHA
SHA2-256,
SHA2-384,
SHA2-512
Signature verification
PKCS1.5
Mod 2048 SHA
SHA-1,
SHA2-256,
SHA2-384,
SHA2-512
Mod 3072 SHA
SHA-1,
SHA2-256,
SHA2-384,
SHA2-512
Prerequisite: SHS #4474,
DRBG #2220
RSA #2996
[FIPS 180-3 and 180-4]
SHA-1,
SHA2-256,
SHA2-384,
SHS #4474
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Usage Implementati
on
SFR Standard and operation CAVP certificate
SHA2-512
[FIPS 198-1]
HMAC-SHA-1,
HMAC-SHA2-256,
HMAC-SHA2-384,
HMAC-SHA2-512
Prerequisite: AES #5567
HMAC #3711
FCS_RBG_EXT.1 [NIST SP 800-90A Rev 1]
CTR_DRBG(AES)
Counter
Modes: AES-256
(Uses AES-ECB-256)
Prerequisite: AES #5567
DRBG #2220
TSF self-
testing
HP
FutureSmart
Windows
Mobile
Enhanced
Cryptographic
Provider
(RSAENH)
6.00.1937
FCS_COP.1-tst [FIPS 180-3 and 180-4]
SHA-256
SHS #4474
7.1.9 User and Access Management
The TOE supports the following roles:
• Administrators (U.ADMINISTRATOR)
• Users (U.NORMAL)
Administrators maintain and configure the TOE and Operational Environment. Users perform the
standard print and document storage and retrieval functions on the system.
In addition, the TOE performs many security management functions.
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Only administrators can configure the list of Network Client Computers and the Administrative Computer
that are allowed to connect to the TOE and the list of other trusted IT products to which the TOE will
connect. Administrators do this by creating, modifying, and deleting IPsec/Firewall address templates,
service templates, and rules via the TOE. Similarly, only administrators can create, modify, and delete
address templates, service templates, and rules via the TOE for trusted IT products.
For each Control Panel application, an administrator can modify the association of a sign-in method to an
application. (For example, the administrator can associate LDAP Sign In method to the Print from Job
Storage application). In addition, administrators control whether or not a Control Panel user must use the
administrator-selected sign-in method associated with the applications in order to access that application.
This latter feature is controlled through the "Allow users to choose alternate sign-in methods at the
product’s control panel" feature.
It's worth noting that although the following security attributes are enforced by the TOE, the TOE does
not provide functionality to manage these attributes (i.e., the TOE cannot add, change, delete, or query
these attributes on an existing job) and the TOE does not provide default values for these attributes;
therefore, there are no management SFRs are specified in this ST for these security attributes:
• Job Encryption Password - The job is protected using a key derived from the Job Encryption
Password by the Operational Environment. The TOE does not provide a mechanism to change or
delete the password on the job.
• Job PIN - A print job's Job PIN is set by the Operational Environment (i.e., Network Client
Computer). The TOE does not provide a mechanism to change or delete a Job PIN from a print
job.
This section maps to the following SFRs:
• FMT_MOF.1
• FMT_MSA.1
• FMT_MTD.1
• FMT_SMF.1
• FMT_SMR.1
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8 Abbreviations, Terminology and References
8.1 Abbreviations
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
AH Authentication Header (IPsec)
ASCII American Standard Code for Information Interchange
BIOS Basic Input/ Output System
CA Certificate Authority
CBC Cipher Block Chaining
DNS Domain Name System
eMMC embedded MMC
ESP Encapsulating Security Payload (IPsec)
EWS Embedded Web Server
HCD Hardcopy Device
HMAC Hashed Message Authentication Code
HTML Hypertext Markup Language
HTTP Hypertext Transfer Protocol
IEEE Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc.
IKE Internet Key Exchange (IPsec)
IP Internet Protocol
IPsec Internet Protocol Security
ISAKMP Internet Security Association Key Management Protocol (IPsec)
LCD Liquid Crystal Display
LDAP Lightweight Directory Access Protocol
MAC Message Authentication Code
MD5 Message Digest 5
MMC MultiMediaCard
NFC Near Field Communication
NTLM Microsoft NT LAN Manager
NTP Network Time Protocol
OXP Open Extensibility Platform
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OXPd OXP device layer
PIN Personal Identification Number
PJL Printer Job Language
PRF Pseudo-random Function
PSTN Public Switched Telephone Network
REST Representational State Transfer
SFR Security Functional Requirement
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
SMB Server Message Block
SMTP Simple Mail Transfer Protocol
SNMP Simple Network Management Protocol
SOAP Simple Object Access Protocol
SSH Secure Shell
TOE Target of Evaluation
USB Universal Serial Bus
WINS Windows Internet Name Service
D3ft0n3s
XML
Extensible Markup Language
8.2 Terminology
This section contains definitions of technical terms that are used with a meaning specific to this
document. Terms defined in the [CC] are not reiterated here, unless stated otherwise.
Administrative User This term refers to a user with administrative control of the TOE.
Authentication Data This includes the Access Code and/or password for each user of the
product.
Control Panel Application An application that resides in the firmware and is selectable by the
user via the Control Panel.
Device Administrator Password The password used to restrict access to administrative tasks via EWS
and the Control Panel. This password is also required to associate a
user with the Administrator role. In product documentation, it may
also be referred to as the Local Device Administrator Password, Local
Device Administrator Access Code, the Device Password, or the
Administrator Password.
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External Interface A non-hardcopy interface where either the input is being received
from outside the TOE or the output is delivered to a destination
outside the TOE.
Hardcopy Device (HCD) This term generically refers to the product models in this Security
Target.
Near Field Communication (NFC) Proximity (within a few inches) radio communication between two or
more devices.
Shared-medium Interface Mechanism for transmitting or receiving data that uses wired or
wireless network or non-network electronic methods over a
communications medium which, in conventional practice, is or can be
simultaneously accessed by multiple users.
User Security Attributes Defined by functional requirement FIA_ATD.1, every user is
associated with one or more security attributes which allow the TOE
to enforce its security functions on this user.
Wireless Direct Print Feature that enables Wi-Fi capable devices (for example: smart
phones, tablets, or computers) to establish a direct peer-to-peer
wireless connection with the printer to submit print jobs.
8.3 References
CC Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation
Version 3.1R4
Date September 2012
Location http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/files/ccfiles/CCPART1V3.1R4.pdf
Location http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/files/ccfiles/CCPART2V3.1R4.pdf
Location http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/files/ccfiles/CCPART3V3.1R4.pdf
FIPS197 Advanced Encryption Standard
Date 2001-11-26
Location http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips197/fips-197.pdf
FIPS186-4 Digital Signature Standard (DSS)
Date 2013-07-19
Location https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.186-4.pdf
FIPS180-4 Secure Hash Standard (SHS)
Date 2015-08-04
Location https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/fips/180/4/final
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PKCS1v1.5 Public-Key Cryptography Standard (PKCS) #1: RSA Encryption Standard
Author(s) RSA Laboratories
Version 1.5
Date November 1993
PKCS5v2.1 PKCS5v2.1: Password-Based Cryptography Standard
Author(s) RSA Laboratories
Version 2.1
Date October 2012
PP2600.1 IEEE Std 2600.1-2009; "2600.1-PP, Protection Profile for Hardcopy Devices,
Operational Environment A"
Version 1.0
Date June 2009
Location https://www.niap-ccevs.org/pp/pp_hcd_br_v1.0.pdf
PP2600.1-DSR SFR Package for Hardcopy Device Document Storage and Retrieval (DSR)
Functions
Version 1.0
Date June 2009
Location https://www.niap-ccevs.org/pp/pp_hcd_br_v1.0.pdf
PP2600.1-PRT SFR Package for Hardcopy Device Print (PRT) Functions
Version 1.0
Date June 2009
Location https://www.niap-ccevs.org/pp/pp_hcd_br_v1.0.pdf
PP2600.1-SMI SFR Package for Hardcopy Device Shared-medium Interface (SMI) Functions
Version 1.0
Date June 2009
Location https://www.niap-ccevs.org/pp/pp_hcd_br_v1.0.pdf
QuickSec51 QuickSec 5.1 Toolkit Reference Manual
Author(s) INSIDE Secure
Version 1..0
Date December 2009
RFC1321 The MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm
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Author(s) R. Rivest
Date 1992-04-01
Location http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1321.txt
RFC2104 HMAC: Keyed-Hashing for Message Authentication
Author(s) H. Krawczyk, M. Bellare, R. Canetti
Date 1997-02-01
Location http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2104.txt
RFC2404 The Use of HMAC-SHA-1-96 within ESP and AH
Author(s) C. Madson, R. Glenn
Date 1998-11-01
Location http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2404.txt
RFC2409 The Internet Key Exchange (IKE)
Author(s) D. Harkins, D. Carrel
Date 1998-11-01
Location http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2409.txt
RFC4109 Algorithms for Internet Key Exchange version 1 (IKEv1)
Author(s) P. Hoffman
Date 2005-05-01
Location http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4109.txt
RFC4301 Security Architecture for the Internet Protocol
Author(s) S. Kent, K. Seo
Date 2005-12-01
Location http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4301.txt
RFC4303 IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)
Author(s) S. Kent
Date 2005-12-01
Location http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4303.txt
RFC4306 Internet Key Exchange (IKEv2) Protocol
Author(s) C. Kaufman
Date 2005-12-01
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Location http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4306.txt
RFC4718 IKEv2 Clarifications and Implementation Guidelines
Author(s) P. Eronen, P. Hoffman
Date 2006-10-01
Location http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4718.txt
RFC4868 Using HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-384, and HMAC-SHA-512 with IPsec
Author(s) S. Kelly, S. Frankel
Date 2007-05-01
Location http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4868.txt
RFC4894 Use of Hash Algorithms in Internet Key Exchange (IKE) and IPsec
Author(s) P. Hoffman
Date 2007-05-01
Location http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4894.txt
SP800-38A Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Methods and
Techniques
Author(s) Morris Dworkin
Version NIST Special Publication 800-38A 2001 Edition
Date December 2001
Location http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-38a/sp800-38a.pdf
CCECG Common Criteria Evaluated Configuration Guide for HP Single-function
Printers
HP Color LaserJet Enterprise M856,
HP Color LaserJet Managed E85055,
HP Color LaserJet Managed E55040dn,
HP LaserJet Enterprise M610/M611/M612
Author(s) HP Inc.
Edition 1
Date 4/2021
M856-UG HP Color LaserJet Enterprise M856
User Guide
Author(s) HP Inc.
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Edition 1
Date 10/2019
M856-IG HP Color LaserJet Enterprise M856
M856dn
M856x
Installation Guide
Author(s) HP Inc.
Date 2019
E85055-UG HP Color LaserJet Managed E85055
User Guide
Author(s) HP Inc.
Edition 1
Date 10/2019
E85055-IG HP Color LaserJet Managed E85055
E85055dn
Installation Guide
Author(s) HP Inc.
Date 2019
E55040-UG HP Color LaserJet Managed E55040dn
User Guide
Author(s) HP Inc.
Edition 1
Date 10/2019
E55040-IG HP Color LaserJet Managed E55040dn
E55040dn
Installation Guide
Author(s) HP Inc.
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Date 2019
M610_1_2-UG HP LaserJet Enterprise M610
HP LaserJet Enterprise M611
HP LaserJet Enterprise M612
User Guide
Author(s) HP Inc.
Edition 1
Date 05/2020
M610_1_2-IG HP LaserJet Enterprise M610
HP LaserJet Enterprise M611
HP LaserJet Enterprise M612
M610, M611, M612
Installation Guide
Author(s) HP Inc.
Date 2020